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

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THE HISTORY
OF BRITISH INDIA,

BY

MILL & WILSON.

IN TEN VOLUMES.

VOL. III.

THE HISTORY OF

BRITISH INDIA.

BY JAMES MILL, ESQ.

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FIFTH EDITION WITH NOTES AND CONTINUATION,

BY HORACE HAYMAN WILSON, M.A., F.R.S.

MEMBER OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY, OF THE ASIATIC SOCIETIES OF PARIS, BOSTON AND CALCUTTA, AND OF THE ORIENTAL SOCIETY OF GERMANY; OF THE IMPERIAL INSTITUTE OF FRANCE, AND THE IMPERIAL ACADEMIES OF VIENNA AND ST. PETERSBURGH; OF THE ROYAL ACADEMIES OF BERLIN AND MUNICH, ETC., ETC.; AND BODEN PROFESSOR OF SANSCRIT IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD.

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OF

BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK IV.

FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT, ON LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY, OF ONE EXCLUSIVE COMPANY, IN THE YEAR 1708, TILL THE CHANGE IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMPANY, BY THE ACT OF 13TH GEO. III. IN 1773.

CHAPTER I.

The Constitution of the East India Company, its practical Arrangements for the Conduct of Business, and Transactions till the Conclusion of the War with France by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle.

1708.

WHEN the competitors for Indian commerce were united into one corporate body, and the privilege of exclusive trade was founded on legislative authority, the business of the East India Company became regular and uniform. Their capital, composed of the shares of the subscribers, was a fixed and definite sum. Of the modes of dealing, adapted to the nature of the business, little information remained to be acquired. Their proceedings were reduced to an established routine, or a series of operations periodically recurring. A general description, therefore, of the plan upon which the Company conducted themselves, and a statement of its principal results, appear to comprehend every thing which falls within the design of a history of that commercial body, during a period of several years.

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When a number of individuals unite themselves in any common interest, reason suggests, that they themselves should manage as much as it is convenient for them to manage; and that they should make choice of persons to execute for them such parts of the business as cannot be conveniently transacted by themselves.

It was upon this principle, that the adventurers in the trade to India originally framed the constitution of their Company. They met in assemblies, which were called Courts of Proprietors, and transacted certain parts of the common business; and they chose a certain number of persons belonging to their own body, and who were called Committees,[1] to manage, for them, other parts of the business, which they could not so well perform themselves. The whole of the managing business, therefore, or the whole of the government, was in the hands of,—

1st. The Proprietors, assembled in general court;

2ndly. The Committees, called afterwards the Directors, assembled in their special courts.

At the time of the award of the Earl of Godolphin, power was distributed between these assemblies according to the following plan:

To have a vote in the Court of Proprietors, that is, any share in its power, it was necessary to be the owner of £500 of the Company's stock: and no additional share, contrary to a more early regulation, gave any advantage, or more to any proprietor than a single vote.

The directors were twenty-four in number; no person was competent to be chosen as a Director who possessed less than £2,000 of the Company's stock; and, of these Directors, one was Chairman, and another Deputy-Chairman, presiding in the Courts.

The Directors were chosen annually by the Proprietors in their General Court; and no Director could serve for more than a year, except by re-election.

Four Courts of Proprietors, or General Courts, were held regularly in each year, in the months of December, March, June, and September, respectively; the Directors might summon Courts at other times, as often as they saw cause, and were bound to summon Courts within ten days, upon

[1] *Committees;* i.e., persons to whom something is committed, or intrusted.

a requisition signed by any nine of the Proprietors, qualified to vote.

The Courts of Directors, of whom thirteen were requisite to constitute a Court, were held by appointment of the Directors themselves, as often, and at such times and places, as they might deem expedient for the despatch of affairs.[1]

1708.

According to this constitution, the supreme power was vested in the Court of Proprietors. In the first place they held the legislative power entire: all laws and regulations, all determinations of dividend, all grants of money, were made by the Court of Proprietors. To act under their ordinances, and manage the business of routine, was the department reserved for the Court of Directors. In the second place, the supreme power was secured to the Court of Proprietors, by the important power of displacing, annually, the persons whom they chose to act in their behalf.

In this constitution, if the Court of Proprietors be regarded as representing the general body of the people, the Court of Directors as representing an aristocratical senate, and the Chairman as representing the sovereign, we have an image of the British constitution; a system in which the forms of the different species of government, the monarchical, aristocratical, and democratical, are mixed and combined.

In the constitution, however, of the East India Company, the power allotted to the democratical part was so great, that a small portion may seem to have been reserved to the other two. Not only were the sovereignty, and the aristocracy, both elective, but they were elected from year to year: that is, were in a state of complete dependence upon the democratical part. This was not all: no decrees, but those of the democracy, were binding, at least in the last resort; the aristocracy, therefore, and monarchy, were subordinate, and subject. Under the common impression of democratic ambition, irregularity, and violence, it might be concluded, that the democratic assembly would grasp at the whole of the power; would constrain and disturb the proceedings of the Chairman and Directors; would

[1] Letters Patent, 10 Will. III., Collection of Charters, etc.

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deliberate with violence and animosity; and exhibit all confusion, precipitation, and imprudence, which are so commonly ascribed to the exercise of popular power.

The actual result is extremely different from what the common modes of reasoning incite common minds to infer. Notwithstanding the power which, by the theory of the constitution, was thus reserved to the popular parts of the system, all power has centred in the Court of Directors; and the government of the Company has been an oligarchy, in fact. So far from meddling too much, the Court of Proprietors have not attended to the common affairs even sufficiently for the business of inspection; and the known principles of human nature abundantly secured that unfortunate result. To watch, to scrutinize, to inquire, is labour; and labour is pain. To confide, to take for granted that all is well, is easy, is exempt from trouble, and, to the great mass of mankind, comparatively delightful. On all ordinary occasions, on all occasions which present not a powerful motive to action, the great mass of mankind are sure to be led by the soft and agreeable feeling. And if they who act have only sufficient prudence to avoid those occurrences which are calculated to rouse the people on account of whom they act, the people will allow them abundant scope to manage the common concerns in a way conformable to their own liking and advantage. It is thus that all constitutions, however democratically formed, have a tendency to become oligarchical in practice. By the numerous body who constitute the democracy, the objects of ambition are beheld at so great a distance, and the competition for them is shared with so great a number, that in general they make but a feeble impression upon their minds; the small number, on the other hand, intrusted with the management, feel so immediately the advantages, and their affections are so powerfully engaged by the presence, of their object that they easily concentrate their views, and point their energies with perfect constancy in the selfish direction. The apathy and inattention of the people, on the one hand, and the interested activity of the rulers on the other, are two powers, the action of which may always be counted upon; nor has the art of government as yet exemplified, however the science may or may not have discovered, any

certain means by which the unhappy effects of that action may be prevented.[1]

For conducting the affairs of the Company, the Directors divided themselves into parties called Committees; and the business into as many separate shares.[2]

The first was the Committee of Correspondence, of which the business was more confidential, as well as extensive, than that of any of the rest. Its duties were, to study the advices from India, and to prepare answers for the inspection of the Court of Directors: to report upon the number of ships expedient for the trade of the season, and the stations proper for each: to report upon the number of servants, civil and military, in the different stations abroad; on the demand for alterations, and the applications made for leave of absence, or leave to return: all complaints of grievances, and all pecuniary demands on the Company, were decided upon, in the first instance, by this Committee, which nominated to all places, in the treasury, and in the secretary's, examiner's, and auditor's offices. It performed, in fact, the prime and governing business of the Company: the rest was secondary and subordinate.

The next Committee was that of Law-suits; of which the business was to deliberate and direct in all cases of litigation; and to examine the bills of law charges. It is not a little remarkable that there should be work of this description sufficient to engross the time of a committee.

The third was the Committee of Treasury. Its business was to provide, agreeably to the orders of the Court, for the payment of dividends and interest on bonds; to negotiate the Company's loans; to purchase gold and silver for exportation: to affix the Company's seal to bonds and

[1] Not in the East India Company alone; in the Bank of England, also, the constitution of which is similar, oligarchy has always prevailed. Nor will the circumstances be found to differ in any joint-stock association in the history of British Commerce. So little does experience countenance the dangerous maxim, of the people's being always eager to grasp at too much power, that the great difficulty, in regard to good government, is, to get them really to exercise that degree of power, their own exercise of which good government absolutely requires.

[2] The following account is derived from an official report on the business of the Committees, called for by the Board of Control, and transmitted officially by the Court of Directors, of which the substance is given in Mr. Bruce's Historical View of Plans for the Government of British India, p. 600.

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other deeds; to examine monthly, or oftener, the balance of cash: and to decide, in the first instance, on applications respecting the loss of bonds, on pecuniary questions in general, and the delivery of unregistered diamonds and bullion.

The Committee of Warehouses was the fourth. The business of importation was the principal part of its charge. It framed the orders for the species of goods of which the investment or importation was intended to consist: it had the superintendence of the servants employed in the inspection of the purchases; determined upon the modes of shipping and conveyance; superintended the landing and warehousing of the goods; arranged the order of sales; and deliberated generally upon the means of promoting and improving the trade.

The fifth was the Committee of Accounts; of whose duties the principal were, to examine bills of exchange, and money certificates; to compare advices with bills; to examine the estimates, and accounts of cash and stock; and to superintend the office of the accountant, and the office of transfer, in which are effected the transfers of the Company's stock and annuities, and in which the foreign letters of attorney for that purpose are examined.

A committee, called the Committee of Buying, was the sixth. Its business was, to superintend the purchase and preparation of the standard articles of export, of which lead and woollens constituted the chief; to contract with the dyers and other tradesmen; to audit their accounts, and keep charge of the goods till deposited in the ships for exportation.

The Committee of the House was the seventh, and its business was mostly of an inferior and ministerial nature. The alterations and repairs of the buildings, regulations for the attendance of the several officers and clerks, the appointment of the inferior servants of the House, and the control of the secretary's accounts for domestic disbursements, were included in its province.

The eighth Committee, that of Shipping, had the charge of purchasing stores, and all other articles of export, except the grand articles appropriated to the Committee of Buying; the business of hiring ships, and of ascertaining the qualifications of their commanders and officers: of dis-

tributing the outward cargoes; of fixing seamen's wages; of issuing orders for building, repairing, and fitting out the ships, packets, &c., of which the Company were proprietors; and of regulating and determining the tonnage allowed for private trade, to the commanders and officers of the Company's ships.

The ninth was the Committee of Private Trade; and its occupation was to adjust the accounts of freight, and other charges, payable on the goods exported for private account, in the chartered ships of the Company; to regulate the indulgences to private trade homeward: and by examining the commanders of ships, and other inquiries, to ascertain how far the regulations of the Company had been violated or obeyed.

The tenth Committee was of a characteristic description. It was the committee for preventing the growth of private trade. Its business was to take cognisance of all instances in which the license granted by the Company for private trade was exceeded; to decide upon the controversies to which the encroachments of the private traders gave birth; and to make application of the penalties which were provided for transgression. So closely, however, did the provinces of this and the preceding committee border upon one another; and so little, in truth, were their boundaries defined, that the business of the one was not unfrequently transferred to the other.

Other transactions respecting the employment of troops, and the government of territory, required additions to the system of committees, when the Company afterwards became conquerors and rulers. But of these it will be time to speak when the events arrive which produced them.

The chairmen, as the name imports, preside in the Courts, whether of directors or proprietors; they are the organs of official communication between the Company and other parties, and are by office members of all the committees.

The articles in which the export branch of the Indian trade has all along consisted are bullion, lead, quicksilver, woollen cloths, and hardware, of which the proportions have varied at various times.

The official value of all the exports to India, for the year

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1708, the year in which the union of the two Companies was completed, exceeded not £60,915. The following year it rose to £168,357. But from this it descended gradually till, in the year 1715, it amounted to no more than £36,997. It made a start, however, in the following year; and the medium exportation for the first twenty years, subsequent to 1708, was £92,281 per annum.[1] The average annual exportation of bullion during the same years was £442,350.

The articles of which the import trade of the East India Company chiefly consisted, were calicoes and the other woven manufactures of India: raw silk, diamonds, tea, porcelain, pepper, drugs, and saltpetre. The official value of their imports in 1708 was £493,257; and their annual average importation for this and the nineteen following years was £758,042. At that period, the official value assigned to goods at the Custom House differed not greatly from the real value: and the statements which have been made by the East India Company of the actual value of their exports and imports for some of those years, though not according with the Custom House accounts from year to year, probably from their being made up to different periods in the year, yet on a sum of several years pretty nearly coincide.[2] The business of sale is transacted by the East India Company in the way of auction. On stated days, the goods, according to the discretion of the Directors, are put up to sale at the India House, and transferred to the highest bidder.

At first the Company built and owned the ships employed in their trade. But in the progress and subdivision of commerce, ship-owning became a distinct branch of business; and the Company preferred the hiring of ships, called chartering. It was in hired or chartered ships, accordingly, that from this time the trade of the Company was chiefly conveyed; and a few swift-sailing vessels, called packets, more for the purpose of intelligence than of freight, formed with some occasional exceptions, the only article of ship-

[1] Custom House Accounts. See Sir Charles Whitworth's Tables, p. 9.

[2] Try, for example, the sum of the exports for twenty years, from 1710, in Sir Charles Whitworth's Tables, and that in the Company's accounts; the table, for instance, No. 7, in the Appendix to Mr. Macpherson's History of European Commerce with India. See, too, the averages in Bruce's Historical View of Plans for British India, p. 295.

ping which they properly called their own. This regulation set free a considerable portion of the funds or resources of the Company, for direct traffic, or the simple transactions of buying and selling.[1]

That part of the business of the Company which was situated in India, was distinguished by several features which the peculiar circumstances of the country forced it to assume. The sale, indeed, of the commodities imported from Europe, they transacted in the simplest and easiest of all possible ways; namely, by auction, the way in which they disposed of Indian goods in England. At the beginning of this trade, the English, as well as other European adventurers, used to carry their commodities to the interior towns and markets, transporting them in the hackeries of the country, and established factories or warehouses, where the goods were exposed to sale. During the confusion, however, which prevailed, while the empire of the Moguls was in the progress of dissolution, the security which had formerly existed, imperfect as it was, became greatly impaired; and, shortly after the union of the two Companies, a rule was adopted, not to permit any of the persons in the Company's service, or under their jurisdiction, to remove far into the inland country, without leave obtained from the Governor and Council of the place to which they belonged. According to this plan, the care of distributing the goods into the country, and of introducing them to the consumers, was left to the native and other independent tribes.

For the purchase, collection, and custody of the goods, which constituted the freight to England, a complicated system of operations was required. As the state of the country was too low in respect of civilisation and of wealth, to possess manufacturers and merchants, on a large scale, capable of executing extensive orders, and delivering the goods contracted for on pre-appointed days, the Company were under the necessity of employing their own agents to collect throughout the country, in such quantities as presented themselves, the different articles of which the cargoes to Europe were composed. Places of reception were required, in which the goods might be collected, and ready upon the arrival of the ships, that the expense of demur-

[1] Ninth bye-law of the Company, in Russel's Collection of Statutes.

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rage might be reduced to its lowest terms. Warehouses were built; and these, with the counting-houses, and other apartments for the agents and business of the place, constituted what were called the factories of the Company. Under the disorderly and inefficient system of government which prevailed in India, deposits of property were always exposed, either to the rapacity of the government, or, under the weakness of the government, to the hands of depredators. It was always, therefore, an object of importance to build the factories strong, and to keep the inmates armed, and disciplined for self-defence, as perfectly as circumstances would admit. At an early period, the Company even fortified those stations of their trade, and maintained professional troops, as often as the negligence permitted, or the assent could be obtained, of the kings and governors of the countries in which they were placed.

Of the commodities collected for the European market, that part, the acquisition of which was attended with the greatest variety of operations, was the produce of the loom. The weavers, like the other laborious classes of India, are in the lowest stage of poverty, being always reduced to the bare means of the most scanty subsistence. They must at all times, therefore, be furnished with the materials of their work, or the means of purchasing them; and with subsistence while the piece is under their hands. To transact in this manner with each particular weaver, to watch him that he may not sell the fabric which his employer has enabled him to produce, and to provide a large supply, is a work of infinite detail, and gives employment to a multitude of agents. The European functionary, who, in each district, is the head of as much business as it is supposed that he can superintend, has first his banyan, or native secretary, through whom the whole of the business is conducted; the banyan hires a species of broker, called a gomashtah, at so much a month: the gomashtah repairs to the aurung, or manufacturing town, which is assigned as his station, and there fixes upon a habitation, which he calls his cutchery: he is provided with a sufficient number of peons, a sort of armed servants, and hircarahs, messengers or letter carriers, by his employer; these he immediately despatches about the place, to summon to him the dallâls, pycârs and weavers: the dallâls and pycârs are two sets of

brokers; of whom the pycârs are the lowest, transacting the business of detail with the weavers; the dallâls again transact business with the pycârs: the gomashtah transacts with the dallâls, the banyan with the gomashtah, and the Company's European servant with the banyan. The Company's servant is thus five removes from the workman; and it may easily be supposed that much collusion and trick, that much of fraud towards the Company, and much of oppression towards the weaver, is the consequence of the obscurity which so much complication implies.[1] Besides his banyan; there is attached to the European agent a mohurrer, or clerk, and a cash-keeper, with a sufficient allowance of peons and hircarahs. Along with the gomashtah is despatched in the first instance as much money as suffices for the first advance to the weaver, that is, as suffices to purchase the materials, and to afford him subsistence during part at least of the time in which he is engaged with the work. The cloth, when made, is collected in a warehouse, adapted for the purpose, and called a kottah. Each piece is marked with the weaver's name; and when the whole is finished, or when it is convenient for the gomashtah, he *holds a kottah*, as the business is called, when each piece is examined, the price fixed, and the money due upon it paid to the weaver. This last is the stage at which chiefly the injustice to the workman is said to take place; as he is then obliged to content himself with fifteen or twenty, and often thirty or forty per cent. less than his work would fetch in the market. This is a species of traffic which could not exist but where the rulers of the country were favourable to the dealer; as everything, however, which increased the productive powers of the labourers added directly in India to the income of the rulers, their protection was but seldom denied.

The business of India was at this time under the government of three Presidencies, one at Bombay, another at

[1] The obstinate adherence of the natives to their established customs, renders it not easy to quit the track which on any occasion they have formed; and, under the ignorance of their manners and character, which distinguishes the greater proportion of the Company's servants, it would be mischievous to attempt it. Where the agent, however, is intelligent, and acquainted with the language and manners of the people, he does simplify and improve the business to a certain degree; and were it performed by men who had an interest to establish themselves in the country, and who would make it a business, it would gradually acquire that rational form which the interest of a rational people would recommend.

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Madras, and a third at Calcutta, of which the last had been created so lately as the year 1707, the business at Calcutta having, till that time, been conducted under the government of the Presidency of Madras. These Presidencies had as yet no dependence upon one another; each was absolute within its own limits, and responsible only to the Company in England. A Presidency was composed of a President or Governor, and a Council; both appointed by commission of the Company. The council was not any fixed number, but determined by the views of the Directors; being sometimes nine, and sometimes twelve, according to the presumed importance or extent of the business to be performed. The Members of the Council were the superior servants in the civil or non-military class, promoted according to the rule of seniority, unless where directions from home prescribed aberration. All power was lodged in the President and Council jointly; nor could anything be transacted, except by a majority of votes. When any man became a ruler, he was not however debarred from subordinate functions; and the members of council, by natural consequence, distributed all the most lucrative offices among themselves.[1] Of the offices which any man held, that which was the chief source of his gain failed not to be the chief object of his attention; and the business of the Council, the duties of governing, did not, in general, engross the greatest part of the study and care of a Member of Council. It seldom, if ever, happened, that less or more of the Members of Council were not appointed as chiefs of the more important factories under the Presidency, and by their absence, were not disqualified for assisting in the deliberations of the governing body. The irresistible motive thus afforded to the persons intrusted with the government, to neglect the business

[1] There were no lucrative offices, for many years, under the Company's administration. For some time, the salaries of the chiefs of Bombay and Fort St. George, did not exceed 300*l.* per annum, and those of the merchants and factors were but 30*l.* and 20*l.* per annum. Even as late as the acquisition of all real power in Bengal, the salary of a counsellor was 250*l.* per annum; of a factor, 140*l.*; of a writer, as then lately increased, 130*l.* The advantages made by the Company's servants, arose from their engaging in the internal trade, and also in the trade by sea to all eastern ports north of the equator, except Tonquin and Formosa (see the text, p. 37). In either of those branches of trade, much depended upon convenience of situation; and, so far, the Company's servants were dependant upon the principal, with whom it rested where to employ them. The official emoluments attached to any situation, were, in all cases, of small amount.—W.

of government, occupied a high rank among the causes to which the defects at that time in the management of the Company's affairs in India may, doubtless, be ascribed. Notwithstanding the equality assigned to the votes of all the Members of the Council, the influence of the President was commonly sufficient to make the decisions agreeable to his inclination. The appointment of the Members to the gainful offices after which they aspired, was in a considerable degree subject to his determination; while he had it in his power to make the situation even of a member of the Council so uneasy to him, that his continuance in the service ceased to be an object of desire. Under the notion of supporting authority, the Company always lent an unwilling ear to complaints brought by a subordinate against his superior; and in the case of councilmen disposed to complain, it seldom happened, that of the transactions in which they themselves had been concerned, a portion was not unfit to be revealed.

The powers exercised by the Governor or President and Council, were, in the first place, those of masters in regard to servants over all the persons who were in the employment of the company; and as the Company were the sole master, without fellow or competitor, and those under them had adopted their service as the business of their lives, the power of the master, in reality, and in the majority of cases, extended to almost everything valuable to man. With regard to such of their countrymen, as were not in their service, the Company were armed with powers to seize them, to keep them in confinement, and send them to England; an extent of authority which amounted to confiscation of goods, to imprisonment, and what to a European constitution is the natural effect of any long confinement under an Indian climate, actual death.[1] At an early period of the Company's history, it had been deemed necessary to intrust them with the powers of martial law, for the government of the troops which they maintained in defence of their factories and presidencies; and by a charter of Charles II., granted them in 1661, the Presidents and Councils in their factories were empowered

[1] Close imprisonment, debarring a prisoner from air, light, and exercise altogether, has probably never been inflicted in India by an English government, and its effects, even if it had been, would not be necessarily more injurious to life than similar treatment elsewhere.—W.

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to exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction according to the laws of England. Under this sanction they had exercised judicial powers, during all the changes which their affairs had undergone; but at last it appeared desirable that so important an article of their authority should rest on a better foundation. In the year 1726 a charter was granted, by which the Company were permitted to establish a Mayor's Court at each of their three presidencies, Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta;[1] consisting of a mayor and nine aldermen, empowered to decide in civil cases of all descriptions.[2] From this jurisdiction, the President and Council were erected into a Court of Appeal. They were also vested with the power of holding Courts of Quarter Sessions for the exercise of penal judicature, in all cases, excepting those of high treason. And a Court of Requests, or Court of Conscience, was instituted, for the decision, by summary procedure, of pecuniary questions of inconsiderable amount.

This reform in the judicature of India was not attended with all the beneficial effects which were probably expected from it. Negligence was left to corrupt the business of detail. The charter is said to have been procured by the influence of an individual, for the extension of his own authority; and when his ends were gained, his solicitude expired. The persons appointed to fill the judicial offices were the servants of the Company, bred to commerce, and nursed in its details; while a manuscript book of instructions comprised the whole of the assistance which the wisdom of the King and the Company provided to guide uninstructed men in the administration of justice.

Nor was the obscurity of the English law, and the inexperience of the judges, the only source of the many evils which the new arrangements continued, or produced. Jealousy arose between the Councils, and the Mayor's Courts. The Councils complained that the Courts encroached upon their authority; and the Courts complained

[1] Madras had been previously formed into a municipality, in December 1687, under the authority of the King in Council, consisting of a mayor, twelve aldermen, and sixty burgesses.—W.

[2] The charter of 1726, comprehended the three Presidencies, but this was superseded by a new charter in 1753, which is the final authority for the constitution of the different European courts then authorised. (See Seventh Report of Secret Committee, 1773).—W.

that they were oppressed by the Councils. The most violent dissensions often prevailed; and many of the members of the Mayor's Courts quitted the service, and went home with their animosities and complaints.

Besides the above-mentioned tribunals established by the Company for the administration of the British laws to the British people in India, they erected, in the capacity of Zemindar of the district around Calcutta, the usual Zemindary Courts, for the administration of the Indian laws to the Indian people: the Phoujdary Court for the trial of crimes; and the Cutcherry for civil causes; besides the Collector's Court for matters of revenue. The judges, in these tribunals, were servants of the Company, appointed by the Governor and Council, and holding offices during pleasure; the rule of judgment was the supposed usage of the country, and the discretion of the court; and the mode of procedure was summary. Punishments extended to fine; imprisonment; labour upon the roads in chains for a limited time, or for life; and flagellation, either to a limited degree, or death. The ideas of honour, prevalent among the natives, induced the Mogul government to forbid the European mode of capital punishment, by hanging, in the case of a Mussulman. In compensation, however, it had no objection to his being whipped to death; and the flagellants in India are said to be so dexterous, as to kill a man with a few strokes of the chawbuck.[1]

The executive and judicial functions were combined in the Councils, at the Indian presidencies; the powers even of justices of the peace being granted to the members of Council, and to them alone. If complaints were not wanting of the oppression by these authorities upon their fellow-servants, it is abundantly evident, that the Company were judge in their own cause in all cases in which the dispute existed between them and any other party.

The President was Commander-in-Chief of the military force maintained within his presidency. It consisted, partly of the recruits sent out in the ships of the Company; partly of deserters from the other European nations

[1] Seventh Report from the Committee of Secrecy on the State of the East India Company, in 1773.—M. These latter particulars are not found in the Report referred to.—W.

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settled in India, French, Dutch, and Portuguese; and partly, at least at Bombay and Surat, of Topasses, or persons whom we may denominate Indo-Portuguese, either the mixed produce of Portuguese and Indian parents, or converts to the Portuguese from the Indian faith. These were troops disciplined and uniformed; besides whom, the natives were already, to a small extent, employed by the Company in military service, and called Sepoys, from the Indian term Sipahi, equivalent to soldier. They were made to use the musket, but remained chiefly armed in the fashion of the country, with sword and target; they wore the Indian dress, the turban, *cabay* or vest, and long drawers; and were provided with native officers according to the custom of the country; but ultimately all under English command. It had not as yet been attempted to train them to the European discipline, in which it was possible to render them so expert and steady; but considerable service was derived from them; and under the conduct of European leaders they were found capable of facing danger with great constancy and firmness. What at this time was the average number at each presidency, is not particularly stated. It is mentioned, that at the time when the presidency was established at Calcutta in 1707, an effort was made to augment the garrison to 300 men.

The President was the organ of correspondence, by letter, or otherwise, with the country powers. It rested with him to communicate to the Council the account of what he thus transacted, at any time, and in any form, which he deemed expedient; and from this no slight accession to his power was derived.

The several denominations of the Company's servants in India were, writers, factors, junior merchants, and senior merchants: the business of the writers, as the term, in some degree, imports, was that of clerking, with the inferior details of commerce; and when dominion succeeded, of government. In the capacity of writers they remained during five years. The first promotion was to the rank of factor; the next to that of junior merchant; in each of which the period of service was three years. After this extent of service, they became senior merchants. And out of the class of senior merchants were taken by

seniority the members of the Council, and when no particular appointment interfered, even the presidents themselves.[1]

1708.

Shortly after the first great era, in the history of the British commerce with India, the nation was delivered from the destructive burden of the long war with France which preceded the treaty of Utrecht: and though the accession of a new family to the throne, and the resentments which one party of statesmen had to gratify against another, kept the minds of men for a time in a feverish anxiety, not the most favourable to the persevering studies and pursuits on which the triumphs of industry depend, the commerce and the wealth of the nation made rapid advances. The town of Liverpool, which was not formed into a separate parish till 1699, so rapidly increased, that in 1715 a new parish, with a church, was erected; and it doubled its size between 1690 and 1726. The town of Manchester increased in a similar proportion; and was computed in 1727 to contain no less than 50,000 inhabitants: the manufactures of Birmingham, which thirty years before was little more than a village, are stated as giving maintenance at that time to upwards of 30,000 individuals.[2] In 1719, a patent was granted to Sir Thomas Lombe, for his machine for throwing silk, one of the first of those noble efforts of invention and enterprise which have raised this country to unrivalled eminence in the useful arts. The novelty and powers of this machine, the model of which he is said to have stolen from the Piedmontese, into whose manufactories he introduced himself in the guise of a common workman, excited the highest admiration; and its parts and performances are described to us by the historians of the time with curious exactness; 26,586 wheels, 97,476 movements, which worked 73,726 yards of organzine silk by every revolution of the water-wheel, 318,504,960 yards in one day and a night: a single water-wheel giving motion to the whole machine, of which any separate movement might be stopped without obstructing the rest; and one fire communicating warmth by heated air to every part of the manufactory, not less

[1] See Ninth Report, Select Committee, 1783, p. 11.
[2] Anderson's History of Commerce, Anno 1727.

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than the eighth part of a mile in length.[1] London was increased by several new parishes. And from the year 1708 to the year 1730, the imports of Great Britain, according to the valuation of the custom-house, had increased from 4,698,663*l.* to 7,780,019*l.*; the exports from 6,969,089*l.* to 11,974,135*l.*[2]

During this period of national prosperity, the imports of the East India Company rose from 493,257*l.*, the importation of 1708, to 1,059,759*l.* the importation of 1730. But the other, and not the least important, the export branch of the Company's trade, exhibited another result. As the exportation of the year 1708 was exceedingly small, compared with that of 1709 and the following years, it is fair to take an average of four years from 1706 to 1709 (two with a small, two an increased exportation), producing 105,773*l.* The exportation of the year 1730 was 135,484*l.*; while that of 1709 was 168,357*l.*; that of 1710, 126,310*l.*; that of 1711, 151,874*l.*; and that of 1712, 142,329*l.*

With regard to the rate of profit, during this period, or the real advantage of the Indian trade, the Company, for part of the year 1708, divided at the rate of five per cent. per annum to the proprietors upon 3,163,200*l.* of capital; for the next year, eight per cent.; for the two following years, nine per cent.; and thence to the year 1716, ten per cent. per annum. In the year 1717, they paid dividends on a capital of 3,194,080*l.*, at the same rate of ten per cent. per annum, and so on till the yaar 1723. That year the dividend was reduced to eight per cent. per annum, at which rate it continued till the year 1732.[3]

In the year 1712, on the petition of the Company, the period of their exclusive trade was extended by act of parliament, from the year 1726, to which by the last regulation it stood confined, to the year 1733, with the usual allowance of three years for notice, should their privileges be withdrawn.[4]

In the year 1716, they obtained a proclamation against interlopers. Their complaints, it seems, were occasioned by the enterprises of British subjects, trading to India

[1] Anderson's History of Commerce, A.D. 1719.
[2] Sir Charles Whitworth's Tables, part I. p. 78.
[3] Third Report from the Secret Committee of the House of Commons on the State of the East India Company in 1773, p. 73.
[4] 10 Ann, c. 28. See Collection of Statutes, p. 42.

under foreign commissions. As this proclamation answered not the wishes of the Company, nor deterred their countrymen from seeking the gains of Indian traffic, even through all the disadvantages which they incurred by intrusting their property to the protection of foreign laws, and the fidelity of foreign agents; they were able, in 1718, to procure an act of parliament for the punishment of all such competitors. British subjects, trading from foreign countries, and under the commission of a foreign government, were declared amenable to the laws for the protection of the Company's rights; the Company were authorized to seize merchants of this description when found within their limits, and to send them to England, subject to a penality of 500*l.* for each offence.[1]

The Company's present alarm for their monopoly arose from the establishment for trading with India, which under the authority of the Emperor, was formed at his port of Ostend. After the peace of Utrecht, which bestowed the Netherlands upon the house of Austria, the people of those provinces began to breathe from the distractions, the tyranny, and the wars which had so long wasted their fruitful country. Among other projects of improvement, a trade to India was fondly embraced. Two ships, after long preparations, sailed from Ostend in the year 1717, under the passports of the Emperor; and several more soon followed their example. The India Companies of Holland and England were in the highest degree alarmed; and easily communicated their fears and agitations to their respective governments. These governments not only expostulated, and to the highest degree of importunity, with the Emperor himself; but, amid the important negotiations of that diplomatic period, hardly any interest was more earnestly contended for in the discussions at the courts both of Paris and Madrid.[2] The Dutch captured some of the Ostend East India ships. The Emperor, who dreamed of an inundation of wealth from Indian trade, persevered in his purpose; and granted his commission of reprisal to the merchants of Ostend

[1] Anderson's History of Commerce, A.D. 1716 and 1718, and Collection of Statutes.

[2] See Coxe's Memoirs of Sir Robert and Lord Walpole, and History of the House of Austria, *ad annos*.

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In the beginning of 1720, they sent no fewer than six vessels to India, and as many the year that followed. The English East India Company pressed the Government with renewed terrors and complaints. They asserted that, not only the capital, with which the trade was carried on, was to a great degree furnished by British subjects, but the trade and navigation were conducted by men who had been bred up in the trade and navigation of the British Company. They procured, in 1721, another act of parliament, enforcing the penalities already enacted; and as this also failed in producing the intended effects, another act was passed in the spring of 1723; prohibiting foreign adventures to India, under the penality of triple the sum embarked; declaring all British subjects found in India and not in the service, or under the license of the East India Company, guilty of a high misdemeanour; and empowering the Company to seize, and send them home for punishment.[1] The Emperor had been importuned, by the adventurers of Ostend, for a charter to make them an exclusive company; but, under the notion of saving appearances in some little degree with England and Holland, or the maritime powers, as they were called in the diplomatic language of the day, he had induced them to trade under passports as individuals. In the month of August, however, of 1723, the charter was granted; in less than twenty-four hours the subscription-books of the Company were filled up; and in less than a month the shares were sold at a premium of fifteen per cent. Notwithstanding the virulent opposition of all the other nations, already engaged in the Indian trade, the Ostend Company experienced the greatest success. At a meeting of Proprietors in 1726, the remaining instalment on the subscriptions, equal to a dividend of thirty-three and one-third per cent., was paid up from the gains of the trade. But by this time political difficulties pressed upon the Emperor. He was abandoned by his only ally, the King of Spain, and opposed by a triple alliance of France, England, and Holland. To give satisfaction to this potent confederacy, and to obtain their support to the pragmatic sanction, or the guarantee of his dominions to his daughter and only child, he submitted to sacrifice the Ostend Company. To save ap-

[1] 5 Geo. I. c. 24; 7 Geo. I. c. 21; 9 Geo. I. c. 26.

pearances, and consult the imperial dignity, nothing was stipulated in words, except that the business of the Ostend Company should be suspended for seven years; but all men understood that, in this case, suspension and extinction were the same.

By the act of 7 Geo. I. c. 5, the Company were authorized to borrow money on their common seal, to the amount of the sums lent by them to government, if not beyond the sum of five millions sterling in the whole. They were permitted, however to borrow solely for the purposes of their trade. They were expressly interdicted from receiving moneys in any of the capacities of a banker; and for that purpose several restrictive clauses were inserted in the act; they were not to borrow any sums payable on demand, or at a shorter date than six months; they were not to discount any bills; or to keep books or cash for any persons sole or corporate, or otherwise than for the real business of the Company.[1]

When the Company commenced operations in India, upon the new foundation on which their affairs were placed by the grand arrangements in 1708, Shah Aulum, successor of Aurungzeb, was Emperor of the Moguls. His second son Azeem-oos-Shaun had been appointed Viceroy of Bengal before the death of Aurungzeb; and having bent his chief attention to the amassing of a treasure, against the impending contest between the competitors for the throne, he accepted the bribes of the company, and granted them proportional privileges. Under his authority they had purchased, in 1698, the Zemindarship of the three towns of Sutanutty, Calcutta, and Govindpore, with their districts. When Azeem-oos-Shaun left Bengal to assist his father, in the war which ensued upon the death of Aurungzeb, he left his son Ferokhser his deputy. In 1712 Shah Aulum died; Azeem-oos-Shaun lost his life in the struggle for the succession; and Ferokhser, by the help of two able chiefs, the Syed brothers, gained the throne. The government of Bengal now devolved upon Jaffier Khan, and the company experienced a change. This chief, of Tartar extraction, was born at Boorhanpore, in the Deccan, and rose to eminence in the latter part of the reign of Aurungzeb, by whom he had been appointed dewan (or comptroller of

[1] Collection of Statutes, p. 50.

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the revenues) of Bengal. It would appear that he was nominated, by Shah Aulum, to the viceroyalty of Bengal, shortly after his accession to the throne; but it is probable that, during the short reign of that prince, the appointment never took place; as, at the time of his death, Ferokhser was in possession of the province. Upon the departure, however, of Ferokhser to ascend the imperial throne, Jaffier Khan was invested with entire authority, as subahdar of Bengal; and the English Company, along with his other subjects,[1] began speedily to feel the effects of his severe and oppressive administration.[1]

In 1713, the first year of the reign of Ferokhser, the President of Calcutta applied to the Company at home for leave to send an embassy, with a handsome present, to the Mogul durbar, in hopes of obtaining greater protection and privileges. Two of the Company's factors, under the direction of an Armenian merchant, named Serhaud, set out for Delhi; and the Emperor, who had received the most magnificent account of the presents of which they were the bearers, ordered them to be escorted by the governors of the provinces through which they were to pass.

They arrived at the capital on the eighth of July 1715, after a journey of three months; and, in pursuance of the advice which had been received at Calcutta, applied themselves to gain the protection of Khan Dowran,[2] a nobleman in favour with the Emperor, and in the interest of Emir Jumla. Whatever was promoted by the interest

[1] Orme's History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in India, i. 17—19. See Mutakharеen, i. 17 and 296.

[2] He is named Caundorah by Mr. Orme (Ibid. p. 20), who erroneously makes Houssain, instead of Abdoolah Khan, Vizir.—M. It has already been intimated, that a great distinction is to be made in the merits of Orme as an historian. For all that regards the transactions of the British in India he may be relied on: he was present at much that he relates; he was acquainted with the principal persons engaged, and maintained an active correspondence with them; and he made diligent use of many valuable public and private documents in the English language; but it is evident that he was no Orientalist; and, consequently, had no access to written native information in what regards transactions purely Indian; therefore he is by no means a safe authority, as he constantly misstates names, and confounds persons and events. Khan Dowran was the name of the nobleman whom he calls by the vulgar corruption Caundourah, and besides the misstatement of one Syed brother for the other, here pointed out, he is wrong as to the name of the father of Ferokhser's bride, who was Ajit Sinh, not Jesswant Sinh, as he calls him, and who bore an important part in the events of this period. Scott, who derives his knowledge from native historians, is much more accurate. Aurungzebe's Successors, 136. Tod's Rajasthan, i. 401.—W.

of Emir Jumla was opposed by that of the vizir. The influence also of Jaffier Khan was exerted to defeat an application, which tended to abridge his authority, and impeach his government. The embassy and costly present of the Company were doomed to imperial neglect, had not an accident, over which they had no control, and the virtue of a public-spirited man, who preferred their interest to his own, opened an avenue to the grace of Ferokhser. The intemperance of that prince had communicated to him a secret disease, from which the luxury of the harem does not always exempt. Under the unskilful treatment of Indian physicians, the disorder lingered: and the Emperor's impatience was augmented, by the delay which it imposed upon the celebration of his marriage with the daughter of the Raja of Jodpore. A medical gentleman of the name of Hamilton accompanied the embassy of the English Company. The Emperor was advised to make trial of his skill: a cure was the speedy consequence. The Emperor commanded his benefactor to name his own reward: and the generous Hamilton solicited privileges for the Company.[1] The festival of the marriage, however, ensued; during which it would not have been decorous to importune with business the imperial mind; and six months elapsed before the ambassadors could present their petition. It was delivered in January, 1716; and prayed, "that the cargoes of English ships, wrecked on the Mogul's coast, should be protected from plunder; that a fixed sum should be received at Surat in lieu of all duties; that three villages, contiguous to Madras, which had been granted and again resumed by the government of Arcot, should be restored in perpetuity; that the island of Diu, near the port of Masulipatam, should be given to the Company, for an annual rent; that all persons in Bengal, who might be indebted to the Company, should be delivered up to the presidency on the first demand; that a passport (*dustuck*, in the language of the country), signed by the president of Calcutta should exempt the goods which it specified from stoppage or examination by the officers of the Bengal

[1] This incident is related with some additional circumstances by Scott, History of Aurungzebe's Successors, p. 139. From the manner in which he speaks of the Emperor's disease (he speaks very vaguely), he appears not to have thought it of the sort which is generally represented: the question is of small importance.

government; and that the Company should be permitted to purchase the Zemindarship of thirty-seven towns, in the same manner as they had been authorized by Azeem-oos-Shaun to purchase Calcutta, Suttanutty, and Govindpore." The power of the vizir could defeat the grants of the Emperor himself; and he disputed the principal articles. Repeated applications were made to the Emperor, and at last the vizir gave way; when mandates were issued confirming all the privileges for which the petition had prayed. To the disappointment, however, and grief of the ambassadors, the mandates were not under the seals of the Emperor, but only those of the vizir, the authority of which the distant viceroys would be sure to dispute. It was resolved to remonstrate, how delicate soever the ground on which they must tread; and to solicit mandates to which the highest authority should be attached. It was now the month of April, 1716, when the Emperor, at the head of an expedition against the Seiks, began his march towards Lahore. No choice remained but to follow the camp. The campaign was tedious. It heightened the dissensions between the favourites of the Emperor and the vizir; the ambassadors found their difficulties increased; and contemplated a long, and probably a fruitless negotiation, when they were advised to bribe a favourite eunuch in the seraglio. No sooner was the money paid, than the vizir himself appeared eager to accomplish their designs, and the patents were issued under the highest authority. There was a secret, of which the eunuch had made his advantage. The factory of Surat, having lately been oppressed by the Mogul governor and officers, had been withdrawn by the Presidency of Bombay, as not worth maintaining. It was recollected by the Moguls, that, in consequence of oppression, the factory of Surat had once before been withdrawn; immediately after which an English fleet had appeared; had swept the sea of Mogul ships, and inflicted a deep wound upon the Mogul treasury. A similar visitation was now regarded as a certain consequence; and, as many valuable ships of the Moguls were at sea, the event was deprecated with proportional ardour. This intelligence was transmitted to the eunuch, by his friend the viceroy of Guzerat. The eunuch knew what effect it would produce upon the mind

of the vizir; obtained his bribe from the English: and then communicated to the vizir the expectation prevalent in Guzerat of a hostile visit from an English fleet. The vizir hastened to prevent such a calamity, by granting satisfaction. The patents were despatched; and the ambassadors took leave of the Emperor in the month of July 1717, two years after their arrival.

The mandates in favour of the Company produced their full effect in Guzerat and the Deccan: but in Bengal, where the most important privileges were conceded, the subahdar, or nabob as he was called by the English, had power to impede their operations. The thirty-seven towns which the Company had obtained leave to purchase, would have given them a district extending ten miles from Calcutta on each side of the river Hoogley; where a number of weavers, subject to their own jurisdiction, might have been established. The viceroy ventured not directly to oppose the operation of an imperial mandate; but his authority was sufficient to deter the holders of the land from disposing of it to the Company; and the most important of the advantages aimed at by the embassy was thus prevented. The nabob, however, disputed not the authority of the President's dustucks, a species of passport which entitled the merchandise to pass from duty, stoppage, or inspection; and this immunity, from which the other European traders were excluded, promoted the vent of the Company's goods.[1]

The trade of the Company's servants occasioned another dispute. Besides the business which the factors and agents of the Company were engaged to perform on the Company's account, they had been allowed to carry on an independent traffic of their own, for their own profit. Every man had in this manner a double occupation and pursuit; one for the benefit of the Company, and one for the benefit of himself. Either the inattention of the feebly interested Directors of a common concern had overlooked the premium for neglecting that concern, which was thus bestowed upon the individuals intrusted with it in India; or the shortness of their foresight made them count this neglect a smaller evil than the additional salaries which their servants, if debarred from other sources of emolument, would probably

[1] Orme, Hist. ut supra, ii. 20—25.

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require. The President of Calcutta granted his dustucks for protecting from the duties and taxes of the native government, not only the goods of the Company, but also the goods of the Company's servants; and possibly the officers of that government were too little acquainted with the internal affairs of their English visitants to remark the distinction. The Company had appropriated to themselves, in all its branches, the trade between India and the mother country. Their servants were thus confined to what was called "the country trade," or that from one part of India to another. This consisted of two branches, maritime and inland; either that which was carried on by ships from one port of India to another, and from the ports of India to the other countries in the adjacent seas; or that which was carried on by land between one town or province and another. When the dustucks of the President, therefore, were granted to the Company's servants, they were often granted to protect from duties, commodities, the produce of the kingdom itself, in their passage by land from one district or province to another. This, Jaffier Khan, the viceroy, declared it his intention to prevent; as a practice at once destructive to his revenue, and ruinous to the native traders, on whom heavy duties were imposed; and he commanded the dustucks of the President to receive no respect, except for goods, either imported by sea, or purchased for exportation. The Company remonstrated, but in vain. Nor were the pretensions of their servants exempt from unpleasant consequences; as the pretext of examining whether the goods were really imported by sea, or really meant for exportation, often produced those interferences of the officers of revenue, from which it was so great a privilege to be saved. Interrupted and disturbed in their endeavours to grasp the inland trade, the Company's servants directed their ardour to the maritime branch; and their superior skill soon induced the merchants of the province, Moors, Armenians, and Hindus, to freight most of the goods, which they exported, on English bottoms. Within ten years from the period of the embassy, the shipping of the port of Calcutta increased to 10,000 tons.

The year 1730 was distinguished by transactions of considerable moment in the history of the Company. In England a new sovereign had but lately ascended the throne;

an active and powerful Opposition made a greater use of the press, and more employed the public mind as a power in the state, than any party which had gone before them; success rendered the trading interest enterprising and high-minded; intellect was becoming every day more enlightened, more penetrating, more independent; and experience testified the advantages of freedom in all the departments of trade.

Though the gains of the East India Company, had they been exactly known, would not have presented an object greatly calculated to inflame mercantile cupidity; yet the riches of India were celebrated as proverbially great; the boastings of the Company, in the representations they had made of the benefit derived to the nation from trading with India, had confirmed the popular prejudice; and a general opinion seems to have prevailed, that the British subjects at large ought to be no longer debarred from enriching themselves in the trade which was invidiously, and, it seemed imprudently, reserved for the East India Company.

Three years were still unexpired of the period of the Company's exclusive charter: yet the plans of those who desired a total alteration in the scheme of the trade were moulded into form, and a petition, grounded upon them, was presented to the legislature so early as February, 1730.

As the payment of 3,200,000*l.* which the Company had advanced to government at an interest of five per cent. was a condition preliminary to the abolition of their exclusive privileges, the petitioners offered to lend to government an equal sum on far more favourable terms. They proposed to advance the money in five instalments, the last at Lady-day in 1733, the date of the expiration of the Company's charter; requiring, till that period, interest on the money paid at the rate of four per cent., but offering to accept of two per cent. for the whole sum, from that time forward: whence, they observed, a saving would accrue to the public of 92,000*l.* per annum, worth, at twenty-five years' purchase, 2,500,000*l.*[1]

[1] See a distinct summary of the proposals, and of the arguments *pro* and *con*, in Anderson's History of Commerce, A.D. 1730. For the proceedings in Parliament, consult the Journals, with Boyer's Political State, and Hansard's Parliamentary History.

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For the more profitable management of this branch of the national affairs, the following was the scheme which they proposed. They would constitute the subscribers to this original fund a company, for the purpose of opening the trade, in its most favorable shape, to the whole body of their countrymen. It was not intended that the Company should trade upon a joint stock, and in their corporate capacity; but that every man in the nation, who pleased, should trade in the way of private adventure. The Company were to have the charge of erecting and maintaining the forts and establishments abroad; and for this, and for other expenses, attending what was called "the enlargement and preservation of the trade," it was proposed that they should receive a duty of one per cent. on all exports to India, and of five per cent. on all imports from it. For ensuring obedience to this and other regulations, it should be made lawful to trade to India only under the license of the Company. And it was proposed that thirty-one years, with three years' notice, should be granted as the duration of the peculiar privileges.

It appears from this account, that the end which was proposed to be answered, by incorporating such a company, was the preservation and erection of the forts, buildings, and other fixed establishments, required for the trade in India. This was its only use, or intent; for the business of trading, resigned to private hands, was to be carried on by the individuals of the nation at large. And, if it were true, as it has been always maintained, that for the trade of India, forts and factories are requisite, of such a nature as no individual, or precarious combination of individuals, is competent to provide, this project offers peculiar claims to consideration and respect. It promised to supply that demand which has always been held forth, as peculiar to Indian trade, as the grand exigency which, distinguishing the traffic with India from all other branches of trade, rendered monopoly advantageous in that peculiar case, how much soever proved to be injurious in others. While it provided for this real or pretended want, it left the trade open to all the advantages of private enterprise, private vigilance, private skill, and private economy; the virtues by which individuals thrive, and nations prosper; and it afforded an interest

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to the proposed Company, in the careful discharge of its duty; as its profits were to increase in exact proportion with the increase of the trade, and of course, with the facilities and accommodation by which the trade was promoted.

As no trade was to be carried on by the Company, the source, whence dividends to the proprietors would arise, was the interest to be received from Government, and the duties upon the exports and imports: and as the territorial and other duties belonging to the forts and establishments in India were deemed sufficient to defray the expense of those establishments, this source was described as competent to yield an annual return of five or six per cent. upon the capital advanced. Under absence of risk, and the low rate of interest at the time, this was deemed a sufficient inducement to subscribe. Had the pernicious example, of lending the stock of trading companies to Government, been rejected, a very small capital would have sufficed to fulfil the engagements of such a company; and either the gains upon it would have been uncommonly high, or the rate of duties upon the trade might have been greatly reduced.

The friends of this proposition urged; that, as the change which had taken place in the African trade, from monopoly to freedom, was allowed to have produced great national advantages, it was not to be disputed, that a similar change in the India trade would be attended with benefits so much the greater, as the trade was more valuable; that it would produce a larger exportation of our own produce and manufactures to India, and create employment for a much greater number of ships and seamen; that it would greatly reduce the price of all Indian commodities to the people at home; that it would enable the nation to supply foreign markets with Indian commodities at a cheaper rate, and, by consequence, to a larger amount; that new channels of traffic would thence be opened, in Asia and America, as well as in Europe; that a free trade to India would increase the produce of the customs and excise, and "thereby lessen the national debt;" that it would introduce a much more extensive employment of British shipping from one part of India to another, from which great profit would arise; and that it

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would prevent the nation from being deprived of the resources of those who, for want of permission or opportunity at home, were driven to employ their skill and capital in the Indian trade of other countries.

The attention of the nation seems to have been highly excited. Three petitions were presented to the House of Commons, from the merchants, traders, &c., of the three chief places of foreign trade in England, London, Bristol, and Liverpool, in behalf of themselves and all other His Majesty's subjects, praying that the trade to India might be laid open to the nation at large, and that they might be heard by their counsel at the bar of the House. The press, too, yielded a variety of productions, which compared with one another the systems of monopoly and freedom, and showed, or pretended to show, the preference due to the last. Though competition might appear to reduce the gains of individuals, it would, by its exploring sagacity, its vigilance, address, and economy, even with an equal capital, undoubtedly increase the mass of business; in other words, the annual produce; that is to say, the riches and prosperity of the country. The superior economy, the superior despatch, the superior intelligence, and skill of private adventure, while they enable the dealers to traffic on cheaper terms, were found by experience to yield a profit on the capital employed, not inferior to what was yielded by monopoly; by the business, for example, of the East India Company, whose dividends exceeded not eight per cent. Whatever was gained by the monopolizing company, in the high prices at which it was enabled to sell, or the low prices at which it was enabled to buy, was all lost by its dilatory, negligent, and wasteful management. This was not production, but the reverse; it was not enriching a nation, but preventing its being enriched.[1]

The Company manifested their usual ardour in defence of the monopoly. They magnified the importance of the trade; and asked if it was wise to risk the loss of known advantages, of the greatest magnitude, in pursuit of others

[1] It was asserted by the merchants, and, as far as appears, without contradiction, that foreigners possessed at least a third part of the stock of the East India Company; and one-third of their gain was thus made for the benefit of other countries. Political State, A.D. 1730, xxxix. 240.

which were only supposed; they alleged that it was envy which stimulated the exertions of their opponents; coveting the gains of the Company, but unable to produce any instance of misconduct, without going forty years back for the materials of their interested accusations: the Company employed an immense stock in trade, their sales amounting to about three millions yearly. The customs, about £300,000 per annum, for the service of Government, ought not to be sacrificed for less than a certainty of an equal supply; and the maintenance of the forts and factories cost £300,000 a year. Where, they asked, was the security, that an open trade, subject to all the fluctuation of individual fancy, one year liable to be great, another to be small, would afford regularly an annual revenue of £600,000, for customs and forts? By the competition of so many buyers in India, and of so many sellers in Europe, the goods would be so much enhanced in price in the one place, and so much reduced in the other, that all profit would be destroyed, and the competitors, as had happened in the case of the rival companies, would end with a scene of general ruin.

Under the increased experience of succeeding times, and the progress of the science of national wealth, the arguments of the Company's opponents have gained, those of the Company have lost, a portion of strength. To exaggerate the importance of the Indian trade; and, because it is important, assume that the monopoly ought to remain, is merely to say, that when a thing is important, it ought never to be improved; in things of no moment society may be allowed to make progress; in things of magnitude that progress ought ever to be strenuously and unbendingly opposed. This argument is, unhappily, not confined to the case of the East India Company. Whoever has attentively traced the progress of government, will find that it has been employed by the enemies of improvement, at every stage; and only in so far as it has been disregarded and contemned, has the condition of man ascended above the miseries of savage life. Instead of the maxim, "A thing is important, therefore it ought not to be improved," reason would doubtless suggest that the more anything is important, the more its improvement should be studied and pursued. When a thing is of small importance, a

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small inconvenience may suffice to dissuade the pursuit of its improvement. When it is of great importance, a great inconvenience alone can be allowed to produce that unhappy effect. If it be said, that where much is enjoyed, care should be taken to avoid its loss; this is merely to say that men ought to be prudent; which is very true, but surely authorizes no such inference, as that improvement, in matters of importance, should be always opposed.

The Company quitted the argument, to criminate the arguers: The objections to the monopoly were the impure and odious offspring of avaricious envy. But, if the monopoly, as the opponents said, was a bad thing, and free trade a good thing; from whatever motive they spoke, the good thing was to be adopted, the evil to be shunned. The question of their motives was one thing; the truth or falsehood of their positions another. When truth is spoken from a bad motive, it is no less truth; nor is it less entitled to its command over human action, than when it is spoken from the finest motive which can enter the human breast; if otherwise, an ill-designing man would enjoy the wonderful power, by recommending a good course of action, to render a bad one obligatory upon the human race.

If, as they argued, the East India Company had a large stock in trade, that was no reason why the monopoly should remain. The capital of the mercantile body of Great Britain was much greater than the capital of the East India Company, and of that capital, whatever proportion could find a more profitable employment in the Indian trade, than in any other branch of the national industry, the Indian trade would be sure to receive.

With regard to the annual expense of the forts and factories, it was asserted by the opponents of the Company; and, as far as appears, without contradiction, that they defrayed their own expense, and supported themselves.

As to the customs paid by the East India Company; all trade paid customs, and if the Indian trade increased under the system of freedom, it would pay a greater amount of customs than it paid before; if it decreased, the capital now employed in it would seek another destination, and pay customs and taxes in the second channel as well as the first. To lay stress upon the customs paid by the Com-

pany, unless to take advantage of the gross ignorance of a minister, or of a parliament was absurd.

The argument, that the competition of free trade would make the merchants buy so dear in India, and sell so cheap in England, as to ruin themselves, however depended upon, was contradicted by experience. What hindered this effect, in trading with France, in trading with Holland, or any other country? Or what hindered it in every branch of business within the kingdom itself? If the two East India Companies ruined themselves by competition, why reason from a case which bore no analogy whatsoever to the one under contemplation; while the cases which exactly corresponded, those of free trade, and boundless competition, led to a conclusion directly the reverse. If two East India Companies ruined one another, it was only an additional proof, that they were ineligible instruments of commerce. The ruin proceeded, not from the nature of competition, but the circumstances of the competitors. Where two corporate bodies contended against one another, and the ruin of the one left the field vacant to the other, their contention might very well be ruinous; because each might hope, that, by exhausting its antagonist in a competition of loss, it would deliver itself from its only rival. Where every merchant had not one, but a multitude of competitors, the hope was clearly vain of wearing all of them out by a contest of loss. Every merchant, therefore, would deal on such terms alone, as allowed him the usual, or more than the usual rate of profit; and he would find it his interest to observe an obliging, rather than a hostile deportment towards others, that they might do the same toward him. As it is this principle which produces the harmony and prosperity of trade in all other cases in which freedom prevails, it remained to be shown why it would not produce them in the Indian trade.

The subject was introduced into parliament, and discussed. But the advocates for the freedom of the trade were there overruled, and those of monopoly triumphed.

In order to aid the parliament in coming to such a decision as the Company desired, and to counteract in some degree the impression likely to be made by the proposal of their antagonists to accept of two per cent. for the whole of the loan to Government, they offered to reduce

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the interest from five to four per cent., and, as a premium for the renewal of their charter, to contribute a sum of £200,000 to the public service. On these conditions it was enacted that the exclusive privileges should be prolonged to Lady-day in the year 1766, with the usual addition of three years' notice, and a proviso that nothing in this arrangement should be construed to limit their power of continuing a body corporate, and of trading to India on their joint stock with other of their fellow-subjects, even after their exclusive privileges should expire.[1]

On the ground on which the affairs of the East India Company were now established, they remained till the year 1744. From 1730 to that year, the trade of the Company underwent but little variation. Of goods exported, the amount indeed was considerably increased; but as in this stores were included, and as the demand for stores, by the extension of forts, and increase of military apparatus, was augmented, the greater part of the increase of exports may be justly set down to this account. The official value of the goods imported had kept rather below a million annually; sometimes indeed exceeding that sum, but commonly the reverse, and some years to a considerable amount; with little or no progressive improvement from the beginning of the period to the end. The exports had increased from £135,484, the exportation of the first year, to £476,274, that of the last. But the greater part of the increase had taken place after the prospect of wars and the necessity of military preparations; when a great addition was demanded in the article of stores.[2]

In the year 1732, the Company first began to make up annual accounts; and from that period we have regular statements of the actual purchase of their exports, and the actual sale of their imports. In the year 1732, the sales of the Company amounted to £1,940,996. In 1774, they amounted to £1,997,506; and in all the intermediate years were less. The quantity of goods and stores paid for in the year 1732 amounted to £105,230; the quantity paid

[1] As a corporate body is seldom hurt by its modesty, the Company alleged that they had a right, by a preceding Act of Parliament, to the *monopoly* in perpetuity; but, to avoid disputes, they consented to waive this claim for a certainty of thirty-six years. 3 Geo. II. c. 14. Collection of Statutes, p. 73. Anderson, ad. an. 1730. Political State, xxxix. 258.

[2] Sir Charles Whitworth's Tables, part ii. p. 9.

for in 1744, to £231,318. The quantity of bullion exported in 1732, was £393,377; the quantity exported in 1744, was £458,544. The quantity, then, of goods exported was increased, and in some degree, also, that of bullion, while the quantity of goods imported remained nearly the same. It follows, that the additional exportation, not having been employed in the additional purchase of goods, must have been not merchandise, but stores. It is to be observed also, that in the amount of sales, as exhibited in the Company's accounts, were included at this time the duties paid to Government, stated at thirty per cent.; a deduction which brings the amount of the sales to nearly the official valuation of the imports at the Custom-house.[1]

In 1732, the Company were obliged to reduce their dividends from eight to seven per cent. per annum; and at this rate they continued till 1744, in which year they returned to eight per cent.[2] The Dutch East India Company, from 1730 to 1736, divided twenty-five per cent. per annum upon the capital stock; in 1736, twenty per cent.; for the next three years, fifteen per cent. per annum; for the next four, twelve and a half per annum; and, in 1744, as much as fifteen per cent.[3] The grand advantage of the English East India Company, in the peculiar privilege of having their trade exempted from duties in Bengal and in the other concessions obtained by their embassy to the court of the Mogul, had thus produced no improvement in the final result, the ultimate profits of the trade.

The Company seem to have been extremely anxious to avoid a renewal of the discussion on the utility or fitness of the monopoly, and, for that purpose, to forestal the excitement of the public attention by the approach to the conclusion of the privileged term. At a moment accordingly, when no one was prepared to oppose them; and in the middle of an expensive war, when the offer of any pecuniary facilities was a powerful bribe to the Govern-

1 Third Report of the Committee of Secresy, on the State of the East India Company (House of Commons, 1773), p. 75.

2 Ibid. p. 73.

3 Histoire Philosoph. et Polit. des Etablisssemens, etc., dans les Deux Indes, par Guillaume Thomas Raynal, liv. ii. sect. 21. Table at the end of the volume.

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ment, they made a proposal to lend to it the sum of one million, at an interest of three per cent., provided the period of their exclusive privileges should be prolonged to three years' notice after Lady-day, 1780. On these conditions, a new Act was passed in 1744; and to enable the Company to make good their loan to Government, they were authorised to borrow to the extent of a million of their bonds.[1]

On the death of the Emperor Charles VI., in the year 1740, a violent war, kindled by competition for the imperial throne, and for a share in the spoils of the house of Austria, had begun in Germany. In this contest, France and England, the latter involved by her Hanoverian interests, had both engaged as auxiliaries; and in the end had become nearly, or rather altogether principals. From 1739, England had been at war with Spain, a war intended to annul the right claimed and exercised by the Spaniards, of searching English ships on the coast of America, for contraband goods. England and France, though contending against one another, with no ordinary efforts, in a cause ostensibly not their own, abstained from hostilities directly on their own account, till 1744; when the two Governments came to mutual declarations of war. And it was not long before the most distant settlements of the two nations felt the effects of their destructive contentions.

On the 14th[2] of September, 1746, a French fleet anchored four leagues to the south of Madras; and landed five or six hundred men. On the 15th the fleet moved along the coast, while the troops marched by land; and about noon it arrived within cannon-shot of the town. Labourdonnais, who commanded the expedition, then landed, with the rest of the troops. The whole force destined for the siege, consisted of 1000 or 1100 Europeans, 400 Sepoys, and 400 Caffres, or blacks of Madagascar, brought from the island of Mauritius: 1700 or 1800 men, all sorts included, remained in the ships.[3]

[1] Anderson's History of Commerce, ad. an. 1744; Collection of Statutes, p. 84, 17 Geo. II. c. 17.

[2] Mémoire pour Labourdonnais, i. 124. Mr. Orme, i. 67, says the third, the difference being that of the styles. The old style, it appears, was used by the English historian.

[3] Mémoire, ut supra, p. 125. Orme, p. 67.

Madras had, during the space of 100 years, been the principal settlement of the English on the Coromandel coast. The territory belonging to the Company extended five miles along the shore, and was about one mile in breadth. The town consisted of three divisions. The first, denominated the white town, in which resided none but the English, or Europeans under their protection, consisted of about fifty houses, together with the warehouses and other buildings of the Company, and two churches, one an English, the other a Roman Catholic church. This division was surrounded with a slender wall, defended with four bastions, and four batteries, but weak and badly constructed, decorated with the title of Fort St. George. Contiguous to it, on the north side, was the division in which resided the Armenian, and the richest of the Indian merchants, larger, and still worse fortified than the former. And on the northern side of this division was a space, covered by the hovels of the country, in which the mass of the natives resided. These two divisions constituted what was called the black town. The English in the colony exceeded not 300 men, of whom 200 were the soldiers of the garrison. The Indian Christians, converts or descendants of the Portuguese, amounted to three or four thousand; the rest were Armenians, Mohammedans, or Hindus, the last in by far the largest proportion; and the whole population of the Company's territory amounted to about 250,000. With the exception of Goa and Batavia, Madras was, in point both of magnitude and riches, the most important of the European establishments in India.[1]

The town sustained the bombardment for five days, when the inhabitants, expecting an assault, capitulated. They had endeavoured to save the place, by the offer of a ransom; but Labourdonnais coveted the glory of displaying French colours on the ramparts of fort St. George. He engaged, however, his honour to restore the settlement,

[1] A Letter to a proprietor of India Stock, published in 1750, by a person who was evidently concerned in the government of Madras at the time, states, that the soldiers were not only few, but of a very indifferent description; that the town was ill provided with ammunition stores, and that its fortifications were in a ruinous condition: the necessity for rigid economy at home, having withheld the means of maintaining the establishment abroad in a state of efficiency.—W.

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and content himself with a moderate ransom; and on these terms he was received into the town.[1] He had not lost so much as one man in the enterprise. Among the English four or five were killed by the explosion of the bombs, and two or three houses were destroyed, Labourdonnais protected the inhabitants, with the care of a man of virtue; but the magazines and warehouses of the Company, as public property, were taken possession of by the commissaries of the French.[2]

Labourdonnais, with the force under his command, had arrived in India in the month of June, 1746. At that time the settlements of France in the Indian seas were under two separate governments, analogous to the English Presidencies; one established at the Isle of France, the other at Pondicherry. Under the former of these governments were placed the two islands; the one called the isle of France, about sixty leagues in circumference, the other that of Bourbon, of nearly the same dimensions. These islands, lying on the eastern side of Madagascar, between the nineteenth and twentieth degrees of latitude, were discovered by the Portuguese, and by them called Cerne, and Mascarenhas. In 1660 seven or eight Frenchmen settled on the island of Mascarenhas; five years afterwards they were joined by twenty-two of their countrymen; the remains of the French colony which was destroyed in Madagascar sought refuge in this island; and when it became an object of some importance, the French changed its name to the island of Bourbon. The island of Cerne was, at an early date, taken possession of by the Dutch, and by them denominated the island of Mauritius, in honour of their leader Maurice, Prince of Orange; but, after the formation of their establishment at the Cape of Good Hope, was abandoned as useless. The French, who were subject to great inconvenience by want of a good harbour on the island of Bourbon, took possession of it in 1720, and changed its name from the isle of Mauritius to the isle of France. Both islands are fruitful, and pro-

[1] The memoir cited in the preceding note, describes discussions which took place at home, in regard to the payment of certain bonds given by the government of Madras, to raise money to the extent of 100,000 pagodas, which, it is intimated, were presented to the French commander as the price of his moderation.—W.

[2] Mémoire pour Labourdonnais, i. 126—142. Orme, i. 64—69.

duce the corn of Europe, along with most of the tropical productions. Some plants of coffee, accidentally introduced from Arabia, succeeded so well on the island of Bourbon, as to render that commodity the staple of the island.[1]

Pondicherry was the seat of the other Indian government of the French. It had under its jurisdiction the town and territory of Pondicherry; and three factories, or *Comptoirs*, one at Mahé, not far south from Tellicherry on the Malabar coast, one at Karical on one of the branches of the Coleroon on the Coromandel coast, and one at Chandernagor on the river Hoogley in Bengal.[2]

The form of the government at both places was the same. It consisted, like the English, the form of which was borrowed from the Dutch, of a Governor, and a Council; the Governor being President of the Council, and allowed, according to the genius of the government in the mother country, to engross from the council a greater share of power than in the colonies of the English and Dutch. The peculiar business of the Governor and Council was, to direct, in conformity with instructions from home, all persons in the employment of the Company; to regulate the expenditure, and take care of the receipts; to administer justice, and in general to watch over the whole economy of the establishment. Each of the islands had a Council of its own; but one Governor sufficed for both.[3]

In 1745, Labourdonnais was appointed Governor of the islands. This was a remarkable man. He was born at St. Malo, in 1699, and was entered on board a ship bound for the South Sea at the age of ten. In 1713, he made a voyage to the East Indies and the Philippine islands, and availed himself of the presence of a Jesuit, who was a passenger in the ship, to acquire a knowledge of the mathematics. After performing several voyages to other parts of the world, he entered for the first time, in 1719, into the service of the East India Company, as second lieutenant of a vessel bound to Surat. He sailed again to India, as first lieutenant in 1723; and a third time, as second

[1] Raynall, ii. 271. Mémoire pour Labourdonnais, i. 88, 95. Orme, i. 92.
[2] Mémoire, ut supra, p. 94. Raynal, ut supra, p. 217.
[3] Mémoire pour Labourdonnais, i. 95. Mémoire contre Dupleix, p. 8.

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captain in 1724. In every voyage he found opportunity to distinguish himself by some remarkable action; and during the last he acquired, from another passenger, an officer of engineers, a knowledge of the principles of fortification and tactics. He now resolved to remain in India, and to navigate a vessel on his own account. He is said to have been the first Frenchman who embarked in what is called the country trade; in which he conducted himself with so much skill, as to realize in a few years a considerable fortune. The force of his mind procured him an ascendancy wherever its influence was exerted: a violent quarrel was excited between some Arabian and Portuguese ships in the harbour of Mocha, and blood was about to be shed, when Labourdonnais interposed, and terminated the dispute to the satisfaction of the parties. So far did his service on this occasion recommend him to the Viceroy of Goa, that he invited him into the service of the King of Portugal, gave him the command of a King's ship, the order of Christ, the rank of Fidalgo, and the title of agent of his Portuguese Majesty on the coast of Coromandel. In this situation he remained for two years, and perfected his knowledge of the traffic and navigation of India; after which, in 1733, he returned to France. Apprized of his knowledge and capacity, the French government turned its eyes upon him, as a man well qualified to aid in raising the colonies in the eastern seas from that state of depression in which they remained. In 1734 he was nominated Governor General of the isles of France and Bourbon, where he arrived in June 1735. So little had been done for the improvement of these islands, that the people, few in number, were living nearly in the state of nature. They were poor, without industry, and without the knowledge of almost any of the useful arts. They had neither magazine, nor hospital, neither fortification, nor defensive force, military or naval. They had no roads; they had no beasts of burden, and no vehicles. Everything remained to be done by Labourdonnais; and he was capable of everything. With the hand to execute, as well as the head to contrive, he could construct a ship from the keel: he performed the functions of engineer, of architect, of agriculturist: he broke bulls to the yoke, constructed vehicles, and made roads: he apprenticed blacks to the few handicrafts whom

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he carried out with him: he prevailed upon the inhabitants to cultivate the ground; and introduced the culture of the sugar-cane and indigo: he made industry and the useful arts to flourish; contending with the ignorance, the prejudices, and the inveterate habits of idleness, of those with whom he had to deal, and who opposed him at every step. To introduce any degree of order and vigilance into the management even of the hospital which he constructed for the sick, it was necessary for him to perform the office of superintendent himself, and for a whole twelvemonth he visited it regularly every morning. Justice had been administered by the Councils, to whom that function regularly belonged, in a manner which produced great dissatisfaction. During eleven years that Labourdonnais was Governor, there was but one law-suit in the Isle of France, he himself having terminated all differences by arbitration.

The vast improvements which he effected in the islands did not secure him from the disapprobation of his employers. The captains of ships, and other visitants of the islands, whom he checked in their unreasonable demands, and from whom he exacted the discharge of their duties, filled the ears of the Company's Directors with complaints; and the Directors, with too little knowledge for accurate judgment, and too little interest for careful inquiry, inferred culpability, because there was accusation. He returned to France in 1740, disgusted with his treatment; and fully determined to resign the government: but the minister refused his consent. It is said that being asked by one of the Directors of the Company, how it was, that he had conducted his own affairs so prosperously, and those of the Company so much the reverse; he replied that he had conducted his own affairs according to his own judgment: those of the Company according to that of the Directors.[1]

Perceiving, by the state of affairs in Europe, that a rupture was approaching between France and the maritime powers, his fertile mind conceived a project for striking a fatal blow at the English trade in the East. Imparting the design to some of his friends, he projected that he should be aided with funds sufficient to equip, as ships of

[1] Raynal, liv. 4, sect. 20.

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war, six vessels and two frigates; with which, being on the spot when war should be declared, he could sweep the seas of the English commerce, before a fleet could arrive for its protection. He communicated the scheme to the ministry, by whom it was embraced, but moulded into a different form. They proposed to send out a fleet, composed partly of the King's and partly of the Company's ships, with Labourdonnais in the command: and though he foresaw opposition from the Company, to whom neither he nor the scheme was agreeable, he refused not to lend himself to the ministerial scheme. He sailed from L'Orient on the 5th of April, 1741, with five ships of the Company: one carrying fifty-six; two carrying fifty; one, twenty-eight; and one, sixteen guns; having on board about 1200 sailors, and 500 soldiers. Two King's ships had been intended to make part of his squadron; but they, to his great disappointment, received another destination. He also found that, of the ship's crews, three-fourths had never before been at sea: and that of either soldiers or sailors hardly one had ever fired a cannon or a musket. His mind was formed to contend with, rather than yield to difficulties: and he began immediately to exercise his men with all his industry; or rather with as much industry as their love of ease, and the opposition it engendered, rendered practicable. He arrived at the Isle of France on the 14th of August, 1741, where he learned that Pondicherry was menaced by the Mahrattas, and that the islands of France and Bourbon had sent their garrisons to its assistance. After a few necessary operations to put the islands in security, he sailed for Pondicherry on the 22d of August, where he arrived on the 30th of September. The danger there was blown over; but the settlement at Mahé had been eight months blockaded by the natives. He repaired to the place of danger; chastised the enemy; re-established the factory; and then returned to the islands to wait for the declaration of war between France and England. There he soon received the mortifying orders of the Company to send home all the vessels under his command. Upon this he again requested leave to resign, and again the minister refused his consent. His views were now confined to his islands, and he betook himself with his pristine ardour to their improvement. On the 14th of

September, 1744, in the midst of these occupations, the intelligence arrived of the declaration of war between France and England; and filled his mind with the mortifying conception of the important things he now might have achieved, but which the mistaken policy or perversity of his employers had prevented. 1746.

Unable to do what he wished, he still resolved to do what he could. He retained whatever ships had arrived at the islands, namely, one of forty-four guns, one of forty, one of thirty, one of twenty-six, one of eighteen, and another of twenty-six, which was sent to him from Pondicherry with the most pressing solicitations to hasten to its protection. The islands, at which unusual scarcity prevailed, were destitute of almost every requisite equipment of the ships; and their captains, chagrined at the interruption of their voyages, seconded the efforts of the governor with all the ill-will it was safe for them to show. He was obliged to make even a requisition of negroes to man the fleet. In want of hands trained to the different operations of the building and equipping of ships, he employed the various handicrafts whom he was able to muster; and by skilfully assigning to them such parts of the business as were most analogous to the operations of their respective trades, by furnishing them with models which he prepared himself, by giving the most precise directions, and with infinite diligence superintending every operation in person, he overcame in some measure the difficulties with which he was surrounded. In the meantime, intelligence was brought by a frigate, that five of the Company's ships which he was required to protect, and which he was authorized by the King to command, would arrive at the islands in October. They did not arrive till January, 1746. The delay had consumed a great part of the provisions of the former ships: those which arrived had remaining for themselves a supply of only four months; they were in bad order: and there was no time, nor materials, nor hands to repair them. Only one was armed. It was necessary they should all be armed; and the means for that purpose were totally wanting. The ships' crews, incorporated with the negroes and the handicrafts, Labourdonnais formed into companies; he taught them the manual exercise, and military movements; showed them how to scale a wall, and apply

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petards; exercised them in firing at a mark; and employed the most dexterous among them in preparing themselves to use a machine, which he had invented, for throwing with mortars grappling-hooks for boarding to the distance of thirty toises.[1]

He forwarded the ships, as fast as they were prepared, to Madagascar, where they might add to their stock of provisions, or at any rate save the stock which was already on board; and he followed with the last on the 24th of March. Before sailing from Madagascar, a storm arose by which the ships were driven from their anchorage. One was lost; and the rest, greatly damaged, collected themselves in the bay of a desert island on the coast of Madagascar. Here the operations of repairing were to be renewed; and in still more unfavourable circumstances. To get the wood they required, a road was made across a marsh, a league in circumference; the rains were incessant; disease broke out among the people; and many of the officers showed a bad disposition; yet the work was prosecuted with so much efficiency, that in forty-eight days the fleet was ready for sea. It now consisted of nine sail, containing 3342 men, among whom were 720 blacks, and from three to four hundred sick.

In passing the island of Ceylon, they received intelligence that the English fleet was at hand. Labourdonnais summoned his captains on board, many of whom had shown themselves ill-disposed in the operation of industry; but all of whom manifested an eagerness to fight. As Labourdonnais understood that he was superior to the English in number of men, but greatly inferior in weight of metal, he declared his intention to gain, if possible, the wind, and to board. On the 6th of July, on the coast of Coromandel, the English fleet appeared to windward, advancing with full sail towards the French.[2]

[1] This seems to be the same invention, exactly, with that of Captain Manby, for throwing a rope on board a vessel threatened with shipwreck. See an Essay on the Preservation of Shipwrecked Persons, by G. W. Manby, Esq., and Mémoire pour Labourdonnais, i. 80. The obvious expedient of training the sailors for land operations, is of high importance; and it argues little for the heads of those who have conducted enterprises in which the mariners might have been, or were to be, employed for land operations, that such training has so rarely been resorted to. How much more instructive than that of the vulgar details of war, is the contemplation of the ingenuity, the industry, and the perseverance of such a man as Labourdonnais, in the various critical situations in which he was placed!

[2] For the above details respecting Labourdonnais, see Mémoire, ut supra, pp. 10—92.

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Immediately after the declaration of war between France and England, a fleet, consisting of two ships of sixty guns each, one of fifty, and a frigate of twenty, commanded by Commodore Barnet, had been despatched to India. It cruized, at first, in two divisions; one in the Straits of Sunda, the other in the Straits of Malacca, the places best fitted for intercepting the French traders, of which it captured four. After rendezvousing at Batavia, the united fleet appeared on the coast of Coromandel, in the month of July, 1745. The Governor of Pondicherry, the garrison of which at that time consisted of only 436 Europeans, prevailed on the Mogul Governor of the province, to declare Pondicherry under his protection, and to threaten Madras, if the English fleet should commit hostilities on any part of his dominions. This intimidated the government of Madras, and they requested Commodore Barnet to confine his operations to the sea; who accordingly left the coast of Coromandel, to avoid the stormy season, which he passed at Mergui, a port on the opposite coast; and returned in the beginning of 1746. His fleet was now reinforced by two fifty gun ships, and a frigate of twenty guns from England; but one of the sixty gun ships had become unfit for service, and, together with the twenty gun frigate, went back to England. Commodore Barnet died at Fort St. David in the month of April; and was succeeded by Mr. Peyton, the second in command, who was cruizing in the southward of Fort St. David, near Negapatnam, when he descried the enemy just arriving on the coast.[1]

Labourdonnais formed his line, and waited for the English, who kept the advantage of the wind, and frustrated his design of boarding. A distant fight began about four in the afternoon, and the fleets separated for want of light about seven. Next morning Mr. Peyton called a council of war, and it was resolved, because the sixty gun ship was leaky, to sail for Trincomalee. The enemy lay to the whole day, expecting that the English, who had the wind, would return to the engagement. The French, however, were in no condition to pursue, and sailed for Pondicherry, at which they arrived on the eighth day of the month.[2]

[1] Orme, i. pp. 60—63.
[2] Orme, i. pp. 62, 63. Mémoire, ut supra, pp. 83—90. Mr. Orme says th

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Joseph Francis Dupleix was at that time Governor of Pondicherry; having succeeded to the supreme command of the French settlements in 1742. To this man are to be traced some of the most important of the modern revolutions in India. His father was a farmer-general of the revenues, and a Director of the East India Company. He had set his heart upon rearing his son to a life of commerce; and his education, which was liberal, was carefully directed to that end. As the study of mathematics, of fortification, and engineering, seemed to engross his attention too exclusively,[1] his father in 1715 sent him to sea; and he made several voyages to the Indies and America. He soon imbibed the taste of his occupation, and, desiring to pursue the line of maritime commerce, his father recommended him to the East India Company, and had sufficient interest to send him out in 1720 as first Member of the Council of Pondicherry. Impatient for distinction, the young man devoted himself to the business of his office; and became in time minutely acquainted with the commerce of the country. He embarked in it, on his own account; a species of adventure from which the poverty of the servants of the French Company had in general debarred them. In this station he continued for ten years, when his knowledge and talents pointed him out as the fittest person to superintend the business of the Company at their settlement at Chandernagor in Bengal. Though Bengal was the richest part of India, the French

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challenge of Labourdonnais was only a feint, and that he was in no condition to renew the engagement. He himself, in the Mémoire, says that it was not a feint, and that *ce fut avec un extrême regret qu'il vit les Anglois lui échapper.* —M.

. This assertion can scarcely be credited, as, although the French squadron was more numerous than the English, the former consisting of nine, the latter of five ships, yet of the latter, four exceeded in number and weight of guns, the largest vessel in Labourdonnais' fleet. It is very probable, therefore, that Orme was right.—W.

[1] The character he manifested at school bears a resemblance to what is reported of Napoleon Bonaparte: "La passion avec laquelle il se livra à l'étude des mathématiques, le dégout qu'elle lui inspira pour tous les arts aimables qui ne lui paroissoient que frivoles, le caractère taciturne, distrait, et méditatif, qu'elle parut lui donner, et la retraite qu'elle lui faisoit toujours préférer aux amusemens ordinaires de la société." Mémoire pour Dupleix, p. 2. The coincidence in character with these men of another remarkable personage, Frederick the Great of Prussia, while a boy, is, perhaps, worth the remarking. His sister says, "Il avoit de l'esprit; son humeur étoit sombre et taciturne; il pensoit long temps, avant que de répondre, mais, en récompense, il répondoit juste." Mémoires de Fréderique Sophie Wilhelmine de Prusse, Margravine de Bareith, i. 8—22.

factory in that province had, from want of funds and from bad management, remained in a low condition. The colony was still to be formed; and the activity and resources of the new manager soon produced the most favourable changes. The colonists multiplied; enterprise succeeded to langour; Dupleix on his own account entered with ardour into the country trade, in which he employed the inheritance he derived from his father, and had frequently not less than twelve vessels, belonging to himself and his partners, navigating to Surat, Mocha, Jedda, the Manillas, the Maldivias, Goa, Bussora, and the coast of Malabar. He realized a great fortune: during his administration more than 2000 brick houses were built at Chandernagor. He formed a new establishment for the French Company at Patna, and rendered the French commerce in Bengal an object of envy to the most commercial of the European colonies.

The reputation which he acquired in this situation pointed him out as the fittest person to occupy the station of Governor at Pondicherry. Upon his appointment to this chief command, he found the Company in debt; and he was pressed by instructions from home, to effect immediately a great reduction of expense.

The reduction of expense, in India, raising up a host of enemies, is an arduous and a dangerous task to a European governor. Dupleix was informed that war was impending between France and the maritime powers. Pondicherry was entirely open to the sea, and very imperfectly fortified even towards the land. He proceeded, with his usual industry, to inquire, to plan, and to execute. Though expressly forbidden, under the present circumstances of the Company, to incur any expense for fortifications, he, on the prospect of a war with the maritime powers, made the works at Pondicherry a primary object. He had been struggling with the difficulties of narrow resources, and the strong temptation of extended views, about four years, when Labourdonnais arrived in the roads.[1]

The mind of Dupleix, though ambitious, active, and ingenious, seems to have possessed but little elevation. His vanity was excessive, and even effeminate; and he was not exempt from the infirmities of jealousy and re-

[1] Mémoire pour Dupleix, pp. 9—26.

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venge. In the enterprise in which the fleet was destined to be employed, Labourdonnais was to reap the glory; and from the very first he had reason to complain of the air of haughtiness and reserve which his rival assumed. As the English were warned out of the seas, and nothing was to be gained by cruizing, Labourdonnais directed his thoughts to Madras. The danger, however, was great, so long as his ships were liable to be attacked, with the greater part of their crews on shore. He, therefore, demanded sixty pieces of cannon from Dupleix, to place him on a level, in point of metal, with the English fleet, and resolved to proceed in quest of it. Dupleix alleged the danger of leaving Pondicherry deprived of its guns, and refused. With a very inferior reinforcement of guns,[1] with a very inadequate supply of ammunition, and with water given him at Pondicherry, so bad, as to produce the dysentery in his fleet, Labourdonnais put to sea on the 4th of August. On the 17th, he descried the English fleet off Negapatnam, and hoisted Dutch colours as a decoy. The English understood the stratagem, changed their course, and fled. Labourdonnais says he pursued them all that day and the next; when, having the wind, they escaped.[2] He returned to Pondicherry on the 23rd, much enfeebled by disease, and found all hearty co-operation on the part of the governor and council still more hopeless than before. After a series of unfriendly proceedings, under which he had behaved with a manly temperance; after Dupleix had even commanded him to re-land the Pondicherry troops, he resolved to send the fleet, which he was still too much indisposed to command, towards Madras, for the double purpose, of seizing the vessels by which the people of Madras were preparing to send away the most valuable of their effects, and of ascertainining whether his motions were watched by the English fleet. The cruize was unskilfully conducted, and yielded little in the way of prize; it afforded presumption, however, that the English fleet had abandoned the coast. Labourdon-

[1] Labourdonnais (Mémoire, i. 109,) does not state the number of the guns from Pondicherry, with which he was obliged to content himself. Orme, i. 64, says, he obtained thirty or forty pieces; but it is a grievous defect of Mr. Orme's history, that he never gives his authorities.

[2] Mémoire pour Labourdonnais, ut supra, p. 110, and Orme, p. 64, who here adopts the account of Labourdonnais.

nais saw, therefore, a chance of executing his plan upon Madras. He left Pondicherry on the 12th of September, and on the 14th commenced the operations, which ended, as we have seen, in the surrender of the place.

It was in consequence of an express article in his orders from home, that Labourdonnais agreed to the restoration of Madras.[1] But nothing could be more adverse to the views of Dupleix. He advised, he entreated, he menaced, he protested; Labourdonnais, however, proceeded with firmness to fulfil the conditions into which he had entered. Dupleix not only refused all assistance to expedite the removal of goods, and enable the ships to leave Madras before the storms which accompany the change of monsoon; he raised up every obstruction in his power, and even endeavoured to excite sedition among Labourdonnais' own people, that they might seize and send him to Pondicherry. On the night of the 13th of October, a storm arose, which forced the ships out to sea. Two were lost, and only fourteen of the crew of one of them were saved. Another was carried so far to the southward, that she was unable to regain the coast; all lost their masts, and sustained great and formidable injury. Disregarding the most urgent entreaties for assistance, Dupleix maintained his opposition. At last, a suggestion was made, that the articles of the treaty of ransom should be so far altered, as to afford time to the French, for removal of the goods; and Labourdonnais and the English, though with some reluctance, agreed, that the period of evacuation should be changed from the 15th of October to the 15th of January. This was all that Dupleix desired. Upon the departure of Labourdonnais, which the state of the season rendered indispensable, the place would be delivered into the hands of Dupleix, and he was not to be embarrassed with the fetters of a treaty.[2]

[1] Il est expressément défendu au sieur de la Bourdonnais de s'emparer d'aucun établissement ou comptoir des ennemis pour le conserver. Mém. p. 105. This was signed by M. Orry, Controlleur Général. It appears, by the orders both to Labourdonnais and Dupleix, that the French government and East India Company shrunk from all idea of conquest in India.—M.

The letter to the proprietors explains the purport of M. Labourdonnais' instructions more correctly. He was not to form any new settlement, and the only alternatives in his power with regard to Madras, were to restore or destroy it. The object of the French East India Company was to improve their existing settlements, at least before new ones were established.—W.

[2] Mémoire, ut supra, pp. 142—220. Orme, i. 69—72. Dupleix, in his apo-

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The remaining history of Labourdonnais may be shortly adduced. Upon his return to Pondicherry, the opposition, which he had formerly experienced, was changed to open hostility. All his proposals for a union of councils and of resources were rejected with scorn. Three fresh ships had arrived from the islands; and, notwithstanding the loss occasioned by the storm, the force of the French was still sufficient to endanger, if not to destroy, the whole of the English settlements in India.[1] Convinced, by the counteraction which he experienced, that he possessed not the means of carrying his designs into execution, Labourdonnais acceded to the proposition of Dupleix that he should proceed to Acheen with such of the ships as were able to keep the sea, and return to Pondicherry after they were repaired; resigning five of them to Dupleix to carry out next year's investment to Europe. At its departure, the squadron consisted of seven ships, of which four were in tolerable repair; the rest were in such a condition that it was doubted whether they could reach Acheen; if this was impracticable, they were to sail for the islands. In conformity with this plan, Labourdonnais divided them into two parts. The first, consisting of the sound vessels, was directed to make its way to Acheen, without waiting for the rest: he himself remained with the second, with intention to follow, if that were in his power. The first division outsailed, and soon lost sight

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logy, involves the cause of his opposition to Labourdonnais in mystery. It was a secret, forsooth! And a secret, too, of the ministry and the company! The disgrace, then, was tripartite: Great consolation to Labourdonnais! And great satisfaction to the nation! "Le Sieur Dupleix," says the Mémoire, "respecte trop les ordres du ministère et ceux de la Compagnie pour oser publier ici ce qu'il lui a été enjoint d'ensévelir dans le plus profond secret:" p. 27. In the usual style of subterfuge and mystery, this is ambiguous and equivocal. The word *ordres* may signify orders given to him to behave as he did to Labourdonnais; and this is the sense in which it is understosd by Voltaire, who says, "Le gouverneur Dupleix s'excusa dans ses Mémoires sur des ordres secrets du ministère. Mais il n'avait pu recevoir à six mille lieues des ordres concernant une conquête qu'on venait de faire, et que le ministère de France n'avait jamais pu prévoir. Si ces ordres funestes avaient été donnés par prévoyance, ils étoient formellement contradictoires avec ceux que la Bourdonnais avoit apportés. Le ministère aurait eu à se reprocher la perte de neuf millions dont on priva la France en violant la capitulation, mais surtout le cruel traitement dont il paya le génie, la valeur, et la magnanimité de la Bourdonnais."—Fragm. Histor. sur l'Inde, Art. 3. But the word *ordres* may also signify, orders merely not to disclose the pretended secret. This is a species of defence which ought ever to be suspected; for it may be as easily applied to the greatest villany as to the greatest worth, and is far more likely to be so.

2 Orme, i. 69, 73.

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of the other; with which Labourdonnais, finding it in vain to strive for Acheen, at last directed his course to the islands. Hastening to Europe, to make his defence, or answer the accusations of his enemies, he took his passage in a ship belonging to Holland. In consequence of the declaration of war she was forced into an English harbour. Labourdonnais was recognized, and made a prisoner; but the conduct which he had displayed at Madras was known and remembered. All ranks received him with favour and distinction. That he might not be detained, a Director of the East India Company offered to become security for him with his person and property. With a corresponding liberality, the government declined the offer, desiring no security but the word of Labourdonnais. His treatment in France was different. The representations of Dupleix had arrived: A brother of Dupleix was a Director of the East India Company; Dupleix had only violated a solemn treaty; Labourdonnais had only faithfully and gloriously served his country; and he was thrown into the Bastile. He remained in that prison three years; while the vindication which he published, and the authentic documents by which he supported it, fully established his innocence, and the ardour and ability of his services. He survived his liberation a short time, a memorable example of the manner in which a blind government encourages desert.[1]

He had not taken his departure from Madras, when the troops of the Nabob appeared. Dupleix had been able to dissuade that native ruler from yielding his protection to Madras, a service which the English, who had prevailed on Commodore Barnet to abstain from molesting Pondicherry, claimed as their due. Dupleix had gained him by the promise of Madras. The Moor (so at that time the Moslems in India were generally called) quickly however perceived, that the promise was a delusion; and he now proposed to take vengeance by driving the French from the place. As soon as Labourdonnais and his fleet disappeared, a numerous army of the Nabob, led by his son, invested Madras. From the disaster, however, which had

[1] Mémoire, ut supra, pp. 221—280. Orme, i. 72, Raynal, liv. iv. sect. 20. Voltaire, amid other praises, says of him, "Il fit plus; il dispersa une escadre Angloise dans la mer de l'Inde, ce qui n'étoit jamais arrivé qu'à lui, et ce qu'on n'a pas revu depuis." Fragm. Histor. sur l'Inde, Art. 3.

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befallen the fleet, Labourdonnais had been under the necessity of leaving behind him about 1200 Europeans, disciplined by himself: the French, therefore, encountered the Indians; astonished them beyond measure by the rapidity of their artillery; with a numerical force which bore no proportion to the enemy, gained over them a decisive victory; and first broke the spell which held the Europeans in subjection to the native powers.[1]

The masters of mankind, how little soever disposed to share better things with the people, are abundantly willing to give them a share of their disgrace. Though, on other occasions, they may affect a merit in despising the public will, they diligently put on the appearance of being constrained by it in any dishonourable action which they have a mind to perform. In violating the treaty with the English, Dupleix recognised his own baseness; means were therefore used to make the French inhabitants of Pondicherry assemble and draw up a remonstrance against it, and a prayer that it might be annulled. Moved by respect for the general voice of his countrymen, Dupleix sent his orders to declare the treaty of ransom annulled; to take the keys of all magazines; and to seize every article of property, except the clothes of the wearers, the moveables of the houses, and the jewels of the women; orders which were executed with avaricious exactness. The governor and principal inhabitants were carried prisoners to Pondicherry, and exhibited, by Dupleix, in a species of triumph.[2]

The English still possessed the settlement of Fort St.

[1] Mémoire pour Dupleix, p. 28; Mémoire pour Labourdonnais, i. 243. "It was now more than a century," says Mr. Orme, i. 76, "since any European nations had gained a decisive advantage in war against the officers of the Great Mogul. The experience of former unsuccessful wars, and the scantiness of military abilities which prevailed in all the colonies, from a long disuse of arms, had persuaded them that the Moors were a brave and formidable enemy; when the French at once broke through the charm of this timorous opinion, by defeating a whole army with a single battalion."

[2] Mémoire pour Labourdonnais, i. 252. Orme, i. 77. Dupleix, in his apology (Mém. p. 27), declines defending this breach of faith, repeating the former pretence of secresy, to which, he says, the Ministry and the Company enjoined him. Experience justifies three inferences; 1. That the disgrace was such as explanation would enhance; 2. That the Ministry and the Company were sharers in it; 3. That having such partners, his safety did not depend upon his justification. He adds, that it is certain he was innocent, because the Ministry and the Company continued to employ him. It was certain, either that he was innocent, or that the Ministry and the Company were sharers in his guilt. And it was a maxim at that time in France, that a Ministry never can have guilt; if so, the inference was logical.

David, on the coast of Coromandel. It was situated twelve miles south from Pondicherry; with a territory still larger than that of Madras. Besides Fort St. David, at which were placed the houses of the Company, and other Europeans, it contained the town of Cuddalore, inhabited by the Indian merchants, and other natives; and two or three populous villages. The fort was small; but stronger than any of its size in India. Cuddalore was surrounded, on the three sides towards the land, by walls flanked with bastions. On the side towards the sea, it was open, but skirted by a river, which was separated from the sea by a mound of sand. A part of the inhabitants of Madras had, after a violation of the treaty of ransom, made their way to Fort St. David; and the agents of the Company at that place now took upon themselves the functions of the Presidency of Madras, and the general administration of the English affairs on the Coromandel coast.[1]

Dupleix lost no time in following up the retention of Madras with an enterprise against Fort St. David, the reduction of which would have left him without a European rival. In the night of the 19th of December, a force consisting of 1700 men, mostly Europeans, of which fifty were cavalry, with two companies of the Kaffre slaves trained by Labourdonnais, set out from Pondicherry, and arrived next morning in the vicinity of the English fort. The garrison, including the men who had escaped from Madras, amounted to no more than about 200 Europeans, and 100 Topasses. At this time the English had not yet learned to train Sepoys in the European discipline, though the French had already set the example, and had four or five disciplined companies at Pondicherry.[2] They had hired, however, 2000 of the undisciplined soldiers of the country, who are armed promiscuously with swords and targets, bows and arrows, pikes, lances, matchlocks or muskets, and known among the Europeans by the name of Peons; among these men they had distributed eight or nine hundred muskets, and destined them for the defence of Cuddalore. They had also applied for assistance to the

[1] Orme, i. 78.

[2] The two important discoveries for conquering India were: 1st, The weakness of the native armies against European discipline: 2dly, The facility of imparting that discipline to natives in the European service. Both discoveries were made by the French.

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Nabob; and he, exasperated against the French, by his defeat at Madras, engaged, upon the promise of the English to defray part of the expense, to send his army to assist Fort St. David. The French, having gained an advantageous post, and laid down their arms for a little rest, were exulting in the prospect of an easy prey, when an army of nearly 10,000 men advanced in sight. Not attempting resistance, the French made good their retreat, with twelve Europeans killed, and 120 wounded. Dupleix immediately entered into a correspondence with the Moors, to detach them from the English; and, at the same time, meditated the capture of Cuddalore by surprise. On the night of the 10th of January, 500 men were embarked in boats, with orders to enter the river and attack the open quarter of the town at daybreak. But, as the wind rose, and the surf was high, they were compelled to return.[1]

Dupleix was fertile in expedients, and indefatigable in their application. He sent a detachment from Madras into the Nabob's territory, in hopes to withdraw him to its defence. The French troops disgraced themselves by the barbarity of their ravages; but the Indian army remained at Fort St. David, and the resentment of the Nabob was increased. On the 20th of January, the four ships of Labourdonnais' squadron, which had sailed to Acheen to refit, arrived in the road of Pondicherry. Dupleix conveyed to the Nabob an exaggerated account of the vast accession of force which he had received; describing the English as a contemptible handful of men, devoted to destruction. "The governments of Indostan," says Mr. Orme on this occasion, "have no idea of national honour in the conduct of their politics; and as soon as they think the party with whom they are engaged is reduced to great distress, they shift, without hesitation, their alliance to the opposite side, making immediate advantage the only rule of their action." A peace was accordingly concluded; the Nabob's troops abandoned the English; his son, who commanded the army, paid a visit to Pondicherry; was received, by Dupleix, with that display in which he delighted; and was gratified by a considerable present.[2]

[1] Orme, i. 79—83.

[2] Mémoire pour Labourdonnais, i. 259. Mémoire pour Dupleix, p. 29. Orme, i. 84, 85.

Blocked up, as it would have been, from receiving supplies, by the British ships at sea, and by the Nabob's army on land, Pondicherry, but for this treaty, would soon have been reduced to extremity.[1] And now the favourable opportunity for accomplishing the destruction of Fort St. David was eagerly seized. On the morning of the 13th of March, a French army was seen approaching the town. After some resistance, it had crossed the river, which flows a little way north from the fort, and had taken possession of its former advantageous position; when an English fleet was seen approaching the road. The French crossed the river with precipitation, and returned to Pondicherry.[2]

The fleet under Captain Peyton, after it was lost sight of by Labourdonnais, on the 18th of August, off Negapatnam, had tantalized the inhabitants of Madras, who looked to it with eagerness for protection, by appearing off Pullicat, about thirty miles to the northward, on the 3rd of September, and again sailing away. Peyton proceeded to Bengal; because the sixty-gun ship was in such a condition as to be supposed incapable of bearing the shock of her own guns. The fleet was there reinforced by two ships, one of sixty and one of forty guns, sent from England with Admiral Griffin; who assumed the command, and proceeded with expedition to save Fort St. David, and menace Pondicherry. The garrison was reinforced by the arrival of 100 Europeans, 200 Topasses, and 100 Sepoys, from Bombay, besides 400 Sepoys from Tellicherry; in the course of the year 150 soldiers were landed from the Company's ships from England: and in the month of January, 1748, Major Lawrence arrived, with a commission to command the whole of the Company's forces in India.[3]

The four ships which had arrived at Pondicherry from Acheen, and which Dupleix foresaw would be in imminent danger, when the English fleet should return to the coast, he had, as soon as he felt assured of concluding peace with the Nabob, ordered from Pondicherry to Goa. From Goa they proceeded to Mauritius, where they were joined by three other ships from France. About the middle of June,

[1] So says Dupleix himself, Mém. p. 29.
[2] Orme, i. 87. Mém. pour Dupleix, p. 29.
[3] Orme, i. 66, 87, 88.

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this fleet was descried off Fort St. David, making sail, as if it intended to bear down upon the English. Admiral Griffin waited for the land wind, and put to sea at night, expecting to find the enemy in the morning. [1]But the French Admiral, as soon as it was dark, crowded sail, and proceeded directly to Madras, where he landed 300 soldiers, and £200,000 in silver, the object of his voyage ; and then returned to Mauritius. Admiral Griffin sought for him in vain.[1] But Dupleix, knowing that several days would be necessary to bring the English ships back to Fort St. David, against the monsoon, contrived another attack upon Cuddalore. Major Lawrence, by a well-executed feint, allowed the enemy at midnight to approach the very walls, and even to apply the scaling ladders, under an idea that the garrison was withdrawn, when a sudden discharge of artillery and musketry struck them with dismay, and threw them into precipitate retreat.[2]

The Government of England, moved by the disasters of the nation in India, and jealous of the ascendancy assumed by the French, had now prepared a formidable armament for the East. Nine ships of the public navy, one of seventy-four, one of sixty-four, two of sixty, two of fifty, one of twenty guns, a sloop of fourteen, a bomb-ketch with her tender, and an hospital-ship, commanded by Admiral Boscawen ; and eleven ships of the Company, carrying stores and troops to the amount of 1400 men, set sail from England toward the end of the year 1747. They had instructions to capture the island of Mauritius in their way ; as a place of great importance to the enterprises of the French in India. But the leaders of the expedition, after examining the coast, and observing the means of defence, were deterred, by the loss of time which the enterprise would occasion. On the 9th of August they arrived at

[1] Admiral Griffin, on his return to England, was brought to a court-martial and suspended the service, for negligence in not having stood out to sea upon first receiving information of the enemy's approach : by doing which, it was argued, he might have frustrated the object of the French squadron, if not have brought them to action. He published an appeal against the sentence, grounding his defence upon his having missed the land-wind on the day before the squadron was in sight, in necessary preparations to strengthen his own ships for an encounter with what his information represented as a superior force, by which he expected to be attacked.—W.

[2] Orme, i. 88—91. Orme says that 200 soldiers only were landed by the French at Madras. Dupleix himself says, *Trois cent hommes, tant sains que malades.* Mém. p. 32.

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Fort St. David, when the squadron, joined to that under Griffin, formed the largest European force that any one power had yet possessed in India.[1]

Dupleix, who had received early intelligence from France of the preparations for this armament, had been the more eager to obtain an interval of friendship with the Nabob, and to improve it to the utmost for laying in provisions and stores at Pondicherry and Madras; knowing well, as soon as the superior force of the English should appear, that the Nabob would change sides, and the French settlements, both by sea and land, would again be cut off from supplies.[2]

Preparations at Fort St. David had been made, to expedite the operations of Boscawen, and he was in a very short time ready for action; when all Englishmen exulted in the hope of seeing the loss of Madras revenged by the destruction of Pondicherry. Amid other points of preparation for attaining this desirable object, there was one, to wit, knowledge, which they had, unfortunately, overlooked. At a place called Ariancopang, about two miles to the south-west of Pondicherry, the French had built a small fort. When the English arrived at this place, not a man was found who could give a description of it. They resolved, however, to take it by assault; but were repulsed, and the repulse dejected the men. Time was precious; for the season of the rains, and the change of monsoon, were at hand: A small detachment, too, left at the fort, might have held the feeble garrison in check: but it was resolved to take Ariancopang at any expense: batteries were opened; but the enemy defended themselves with spirit: Major Lawrence was taken prisoner in the trenches. Several days were consumed, and more would have been added to them, had not a part of the enemy's magazine of powder taken fire, which so terrified the garrison, that they blew up the walls and retreated to Pondicherry. As if sufficient time had not been lost, the English remained five days longer to repair the fort, in which they resolved to leave a garrison, lest the enemy should resume possession during the siege.

They advanced to Pondicherry, and opened the trenches

[1] Orme, i. 91—98.
[2] Mémoire pour Dupleix, p. 31, 32.

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on the north-west side of the town, at the distance of 1,500 yards from the wall, though it was even then customary to open them within 800 yards of the covered way. The cannon and mortars in the ships were found capable of little execution; and, from want of experience, the approaches, with much labour, went slowly on. At last they were carried within 800 yards of the wall; when it was found impossible to extend them any further, on account of a large morass; while, on the northern side of the town, they might have been carried to the foot of the glacis. Batteries, at the distance of 800 yards, were constructed on the edge of the morass; but the enemy's fire proved double that of the besiegers; the rains came on; sickness prevailed in the camp; very little impression had been made on the defences of the town; a short time would make the roads impracticable; and hurricanes were apprehended, which would drive the ships from the coast. It was therefore determined, by a council of war, thirty-one days after the opening of the trenches, that the siege should be raised. Dupleix, as corresponded with the character of the man, made a great ostentation and parade on this unexpected event. He represented himself as having gained one of the most brilliant victories on record; he wrote letters in this strain, not only to France, but to the Indian princes, and even to the Great Mogul himself; he received in return the highest compliments on his own conduct and bravery, as well as on the prowess of his nation; and the English were regarded in India as only a secondary and inferior people.[1]

In November news arrived that a suspension of arms had taken place between England and France: and this was shortly after followed by intelligence of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, in which the French Government had agreed to restore Madras. It was delivered up in August, with its fortifications much improved. At the distance of four miles south from Madras, was the town of San Tomé, or St. Thomas, built by the Portuguese, and, in the time of

[1] Orme, i. 80, 98—106. Dupleix (Mém. p. 32) says that the trenches were open forty-two days, and that the siege altogether lasted fifty-eight. The memoir drawn up by the French East India Company, in answer to Dupleix, alleges more than once that Dupleix was defective in personal courage; and says he apologized for the care with which he kept at a distance from shot, by acknowledging *que le bruit des armes suspendoit ses réflexions, et que le calme seul convenoit à son génie.* p. 18.

their prosperity, a place of note. It had long, however, been reduced to obscurity, and though inhabited mostly by Christians, had hardly been regarded as a possession by any of the European powers. It had been found that the Roman Catholic priests, from the sympathy of religion, had conveyed useful information to the French in their designs upon Madras. To prevent the like inconvenience in future, it was now taken possession of by the English, and the obnoxious part of the inhabitants ordered to withdraw.[1]

No events of any importance had occurred at the other presidencies, during these years of war. The Viceroy of Bengal had prohibited the French and English from prosecuting their hostilities in his dominions. This governor exacted contributions from the European colonies, for the protection which he bestowed; that, however, which he imposed upon the English did not exceed £100,000. A quantity of raw silk, amounting to 300 bales, belonging to the Company, was plundered by the Mahrattas; and the distress which the incursions of that people produced in the province, increased the difficulties of traffic.[2]

The trade of the Company exhibited the following results:—

	Gold and Stores exported.	Bullion do.	Total.
1744	£231,318	£458,544	£689,862
1745	91,364	476,853	568,217
1746	265,818	560,020	825,838
1747	107,979	779,256	887,235
1748	127,224	706,890	834,114

The Bills of Exchange for which the Company paid during those years were:—

1744	£103,349	1747	£441,651
1745	98,213	1748	178,419
1746	417,647		

The amount of sales for the same years (including thirty per cent of duties, which remained to be deducted) was:

1744	£1,997,506	1747	£1,739,159
1745	2,480,966	1748	1,768,041[3]
1746	1,602,388		

[1] Orme, i. 107, 75, 131.
[2] Orme, ii. 55.
[3] Third Report from the Committee of Secrecy, 1773, p. 75.

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The official value at the Custom-house of the imports and exports of the Company, during that period, was as follows:

	Imports.	Exports.
1744	£743,508	£476,274
1745	973,705	293,113
1746	646,697	893,540
1747	128,733	345,526
1748	1,098,712	306,357[1]

The dividend was eight per cent. per annum, during the whole of the time.[2]

During the same period, the trade of the nation, notwithstanding the war, had considerably increased. The imports had risen from £6,362,971 official value, to £8,136,408; and the exports from £11,429,628 to £12,351,433; and, in the two following years, to £14,099,366 and £15,132,004.[3]

CHAPTER II.

Origin, Progress, and Suspension, of the Contest for establishing Mohammed Ali, Nabob of the Carnatic.

A NEW scene is now to open in the history of the East India Company. Before this period they had maintained the character of mere traders, and, by humility and submission, endeavoured to preserve a footing in that distant country, under the protection or oppression of the native powers. We shall now behold them entering the lists of war; and mixing with eagerness in the contests of the princes. Dupleix, whose views were larger than, at that time, those of any of the servants of the Company, had already planned, in his imagination, an empire for the French, and had entered pretty deeply into the intrigues of the country powers. The English were the first to draw the sword; and from no higher inducement than the promise of a trifling settlement on the Coromandel coast.

A prince who, amid the revolutions of that country, had, some years before, possessed and lost the throne of Tanjore, repaired to Fort St. David, and entreated the as-

[1] Sir C. Whitworth's Tables, part ii. p. 9.
[2] Report, ut supra, p. 74. [3] Whitworth's Tables, p. i. part 78.

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sistance of the English. He represented his countrymen as ready to co-operate for his restoration; and promised the fort and country of Devi-Cotah, with the payment of all expenses, if, with their assistance, he should recover his rights. The war between the French and English had brought to the settlements of both nations in that quarter of India, a greater quantity of troops than was necessary for their defence; and with the masters of troops it seems to be a law of nature, whenever they possess them in greater abundance than is necessary for defence, to employ them for the disturbance of others. The French and English rulers in India showed themselves extremely obedient to that law. The interests of the Tanjore fugitive were embraced at Fort St. David; and, in the beginning of April, 1749, 430 Europeans and 1000 Sepoys, with four field-pieces and four small mortars, marched with him for Tanjore.

Tanjore was one of those rajaships, or small kingdoms, into which the Mohammedans, at their first invasion of India, found the country in general divided. It occupied little more than the space enclosed and intersected by the numerous mouths of the river Cavery. The Coleroon, or most northern branch of that river, bounded it on the north, and it extended about seventy miles along the coast, and nearly as much inland from the sea. Like the rest of the neighbouring country, it appears to have become dependent upon the more powerful rajaship of Beejanuggur, before the establishment of the Mohammedan kingdoms in the Deccan; and afterwards upon the kingdom of Beejapore, but subject still to its own laws and its own sovereign or raja, who held it in the character of a Zemindar. In the time of Aurungzeb, it has been already seen, that a very remarkable personage, the father of Sivajee, who had obtained a footing in the Carnatic, had entered into a confederacy with the Raja or Polygar of Mudkul or Madura, against the Raja or Zemindar or Naig (for we find all these titles applied to him) of Tanjore, whom they defeated and slew; that afterwards quarrelling with the Raja of Mudkul, about the division of the conquered territory, the Mahratta stripped him of his dominions, took possession both of Mudkul and Tanjore, and transmitted them to his pos-

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terity.[1] His grandson Shaojee was attacked and taken prisoner by Zulfikar Khan, who, to strengthen his party, restored him to his government or zemindary, upon the death of Aurungzeb. Shaojee had two brothers, Shurfajee and Tukojee. They succeeded one another in the government, and all died without issue, excepting the last. Tukojee had three sons, Baba Saib, Nana, and Sahujee. Baba Saib succeeded his father, and died without issue. Nana died before him, but left an infant son, and his widow was raised to the government, by the influence of Seid, the commander of the fort. This powerful servant soon deprived the Queen of all authority, threw her into prison, and set up as raja a pretended son of Shurfagee. It suited the views of Seid to allow a very short existence to this prince and his power. He next placed Sahujee, the youngest of the sons of Tukojee, in the seat of government. Sahujee also was soon driven from the throne. Seid now vested with the name of sovereign, Prataup Sing, a son by one of the inferior wives of Tukojee. This was in 1741. The first act of Prataup Sing's government was to assassinate Seid. It was Sahujee who now craved the assistance of the English.[2] And it was after having corresponded for years with Prataup Sing, as King of Tanjore; after having offered to him the friendship of the English nation; and after having courted his assistance against the French; that the English rulers now, without so much as a pretence of any provocation, and without the allegation of any other motive than the advantage of possessing Devi-Cotah, despatched an army to dethrone him.[3]

[1] Vide supra. Also Aurungzeb's Operations in the Deccan, by Scott, p. 6.—M. Also Duff's History of the Mahrattas, i. 199.—W.

[2] History and Management of the East India Company, from an authentic MS. account of Tanjore. See also Orme, i. 108, who, in some particulars, was misinformed.—M. Duff calls him Syajee, and adds he was a legitimate son. Prataup Sing was the son of a concubine.—W.

[3] "The meaning of this letter is to let your Majesty know, I shall esteem it a great honour to be upon such terms with your Majesty, as may be convenient to both; for which reason, I hope, this will meet with a gracious acceptance, as likewise the few things I send with it." Letter from Governor Floyer to Prataup Sing, King of Tanjore, dated 30th November, 1746.—"I received your letter, and am glad to hear of the King of Tanjore's regard and civility towards the English: You may be assured, that after the arrival of our ships, which will be very soon, I will serve the King, and all the people that will do us good against the French, who are enemies to all the world." Letter from Governor Floyer to Maccajeeniko, officer of the King of Tanjore, dated 3d Jan. 1747.—"This is to acquaint your Majesty of the good news we have received from Europe two days past. The French nation (enemies both to your Majesty and

The troops proceeded by land, while the battering-cannon and provisions were conveyed by sea. They had begun to proceed when the monsoon changed, with a violent hurricane. The army, having crossed the river Coleroon, without opposition, were on the point of turning into a road among the woods, which they would have found inextricable. Some of the soldiers, however, discovered a passage along the river, into which they turned by blind but lucky chance; and this led them, after a march of about ten miles, to the neighbourhood of Devi-Cotah. They had been annoyed by the Tanjorines; no partisans appeared for Sahujee; it indeed appears not that so much as a notice had been conveyed to them of what was designed; and no intelligence could be procured of the ships, though they were at anchor only four miles off at the mouth of the river. The army threw at the fort what shells they had, and then retreated without delay.

The shame of a defeat was difficult to bear; and the rulers of Madras resolved upon a second attempt. They exaggerated the value of Devi-Cotah; situated in the most fertile spot on the coast of Coromandel; and standing on the river Coleroon, the channel of which, within the bar, was capable of receiving ships of the largest burden, while there was not a port from Masulipatam to Cape Comorin, which could receive one of 300 tons: it was true the mouth of the river was obstructed by sand; but if that could be removed, the possession would be invaluable. This time, the expedition, again commanded by Major Lawrence,[1] proceeded wholly by sea; and from the mouth of the river the troops and stores were conveyed up to

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the English) had fitted out a force with design to drive the English out of India: and had they been successful, they would never have stopped there; but would have made settlements in whatever parts of your country they liked best, as they have already done at Carical. But it pleased God that their vile designs have been prevented; for our ships met them at sea, and took and destroyed the whole of them..... I do not at all doubt, but that in a short time we shall be able to put you in possession of Carical, which I hear you so much wish for." Letter from Governor Floyer to the King of Tanjore, dated 19th Jan. 1743. See i. 25, 26, of a Collection of Papers, entitled Tanjore Papers, published by the East India Company in three 4to volumes, in 1777, as an Appendix to a Vindication of the Company, drawn up by their counsel, Mr. Rous, in answer to two pamphlets; one entitled, "State of Facts relative to Tanjore:" the other, "Original Papers relative to Tanjore." This Collection of Papers I shall commonly quote, under the short title of Rous's Appendix.

[1] Major Lawrence did not command on the first invasion of Tanjore, the force was led by Captain Cope. Rous's Appendix, 30.—W.

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Devi-Cotah in boats. The army was landed on the side of the river opposite to the fort, where it was proposed to erect the batteries, because the ground on the same side of the river with the fort, was marshy, covered with wood, and surrounded by the Tanjore army. After three days' firing a breach was made; but no advantage could be taken of it till the river was crossed. This was dangerous, as well from the breadth and rapidity of the stream, as from the number of soldiers in the thickets which covered the opposite shore. To the ingenuity of a common ship's carpenter, the army was indebted for the invention by which the danger was overcome. A raft was constructed sufficient to contain 400 men; but the difficulty was to move it across. John Moore, the man who suggested and constructed the raft, was again ready with his aid. He swam the river in the night; fastened to a tree on the opposite side a rope which he carefully concealed in the bushes and water; and returned without being perceived. Before the raft began to move, some pieces of artillery were made to fire briskly upon the spot where the rope was attached; and moved the Tanjorines to a distance too great to perceive it. The raft was moved across; it returned, and recrossed several times, till the whole of the troops were landed on the opposite bank. Major Lawrence resolved to storm the breach without delay. Lieutenant Clive, who had given proofs of his ardent courage at the siege of Pondicherry, offered to lead the attack. He proceeded with a platoon of Europeans and 700 Sepoys; but rashly allowing himself, at the head of the platoon, to be separated from the Sepoys, he narrowly escaped with his life; and the platoon was almost wholly destroyed. Major Lawrence advanced with the whole of his force, when the soldiers mounted the breach, and after a feeble resistance took possession of the place. An accommodation between the contending parties was effected soon after. The reigning king agreed to concede to the English the fort for which they contended, with a territory of the annual value of 9000 pagodas; and they, on their part, not only renounced the support of him for whom they had pretended to fight as the true and lawful king, but agreed to secure his person, in order that he might give no further molestation to Prataup Sing, and

demanded only 4000 rupees, about £400, for his annual expenses.[1] It may well be supposed, that to conquer Tanjore for him would have been a frantic attempt. But no such reflection was made when a zeal for the justice of his cause was held up as the impelling motive of the war; nor can it be denied that his interests were very coolly resigned. It is even asserted that, but for the humanity of Boscawen, he would have been delivered into the hands of Prataup Sing.[2] He found means to make his escape from the English; who imprisoned his uncle and kept him in confinement for nine years, till he was released by the French, when they took Fort St. David in 1758.[3]

While the English were occupied with the unimportant conquest of Devi-Cotah, the French had engaged in transactions of the highest moment; and a great revolution was accomplished in the Carnatic. This revolution, on which a great part of the history of the English East India Company depends, it is now necessary to explain. Carnatic is the name given to a large district of country along the coast of Coromandel, extending from near the river Kistna, to the northern branch of the Cavery. In extending westward from the sea, it was distinguished into two parts, the first, including the level country between the sea and the first range of mountains, and entitled Carnatic below the Ghauts; the second, including the table land between the first and second range of mountains, and called Carnatic above the Ghauts. A corresponding tract, extending from the northern branch of the Cavery to Cape Comorin, sometimes also receives the name of Carnatic; but in that case it is distinguished by the title of the Southern Carnatic.[4]

[1] Orme, i. 109—119. History and Management of the East India Company p. 68—70.

[2] History and Management, p. 69.

[3] This is related by Orme, (ii. 318,) who tells us not who this uncle was (he must have been maternal) but only that he was the guide of his nephew, and the head of his party.

[4] According to Colonel Wilks, (p. 5,) the ancient name was Canara, and the Canara language is *only* found within a district bounded by a line, beginning near the town of Beder, about sixty miles N.W. from Hyderabad, waving S.E. by the town of Adoni, then to the west of Gooti, next by the town of Anatpoor, next Nundidroog, next to the eastern Ghauts, thence along the range of the eastern Ghauts southwards to the pass of Gujjelhutty, thence by the chasm of the western hills, between the towns of Coimbetoor, Palatchi, and Palgaut, thence northwards along the skirts of the western Ghauts, nearly as far as the sources of the Kistna, thence in an eastern and afterwards north-eastern direction to Beder. He adds, (p. 6,) that the Tamul language was spoken in the tract extending from Pullicat, (the boundary of the Talinga language on the south,) to Cape Comorin, and from the sea to the eastern Ghauts. This tract bore,

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The district of Carnatic had fallen into dependence upon the great rajaships of Beejanuggur and Warankul; and after the reduction of these Hindu powers, had been united to the Mohammedan kingdoms of Beejapore and Golconda. Upon the annexation of these kingdoms to the Mogul empire, in the reign of Aurungzeb, the Carnatic was included in the general subjugation, and formed part of the great Subah of the Deccan. In the smaller provinces or viceroyalties, the districts or subdivisions, were proportionally small; and the sub-governors of these divisions were known by the titles of Zemindar, and Phouzdar or Foujdar. In the great Subahs, however, particularly that of the Deccan, the primary divisions were very large, and the first rank of sub-governors proportionally high. They were known by the name of nabob or deputy; that is, deputy of the Subahdar or Viceroy, governor of the Subah; and under these deputies or nabobs were the Zemindars and Foujdars of the districts. The Carnatic was one of the nabobships, or grand divisions of the great Subah of the Deccan. During the vigour of the Mogul government, the grand deputies or nabobs, though immediately subject to the Subahdar, or Viceroy, were not always nominated by him. They were often nominated immediately by the Emperor; and not unfrequently as a check upon the dangerous power of the Subahdar. When the Subahdar, however, was powerful, and the Emperor weak, the nabobs were nominated by the Subahdar.

When Nizam al Mulk was established Subahdar of the Deccan, a chief, named Sadatullah, was nabob of the Carnatic, and held that command under the Nizam till the year 1732, when he died. Sadatullah, who had no issue male, adopted the two sons of his brother: Dost Ali, and Bâkir Ali. Bâkir Ali he made governor of Velore: and he had influence to leave Dost Ali in possession of the nabobship at his death. Nizam al Mulk claimed a right to nominate his deputy in the government of the Carnatic; and took displeasure that Dost Ali had been intruded into the office with so little deference to his authority;

anciently, the name of Dravida, "although," says the Colonel, "the greater part of it is known to Europeans exclusively by the name of Carnatic." It was called by the Mohammedans, Carnatic below the Ghauts, as Canara proper was called Carnatic above the Ghauts.

but he happened to be engaged at the time in disputes with the Emperor, which rendered it inconvenient to resent the affront. Dost Ali had two sons and four daughters. Of these daughters one was married to Mortiz Ali, the son of his brother Bâkir Ali, governor of Velore; another to Chunda Saheb, a more distant relative, who became dewan, or minister of the finances, under Dost Ali, his father-in-law. 1749.

Trichinopoly was a little sovereignty bordering on the west upon Tanjore. Though subdued by the Mogul, it had been allowed, after the manner of Tanjore, to retain, as Zemindar, its own sovereign, accountable for the revenues and other services, required from it as a district of the Mogul empire. The rajas of Tanjore and Trichinopoly were immediately accountable to the nabobs of the Carnatic; and, like other Zemindars, frequently required the terror of an army to make them pay their arrears. In the year 1736 the Raja of Trichinopoly died, and the sovereignty passed into the hands of his wife. The supposed weakness of female government pointed out the occasion as favourable for enforcing the payment of the arrears; or for seizing the immediate government of the country. By intrigue and perfidy, Chunda Saheb was admitted into the city; when, imprisoning the queen, who soon died with grief, he was appointed, by his father-in-law, governor of the kingdom.[1]

The Hindu Rajas were alarmed by the ambitious proceedings of the Nabob of the Carnatic and his son-in-law,

[1] By Mr. Orme, i. 41. Colonel Wilks states, on verbal authority, that the Mahrattas were invited by the eldest son of the Nabob, jealous of Chunda Saheb, ubi supra, p. 251.—M.

This is rather incorrectly abridged from Orme, who states that the collection of the revenue was only a pretext, the real object being to take advantage not of female weakness, but of a disputed succession. The Hindu princes of Tanjore and Trichinopoli had never been subdued by the Mogul, and although at times compelled to purchase the forbearance of the Mohammedan states of Bijapur or Golconda, they had preserved their independence from a remote date. The expulsion of their native princes was owing to domestic dissensions, which transferred Tanjore to a Mahratta ruler, and gave Trichinopoli to a Mohammedan. The latter was a relic of the Hindu kingdom of Madura, and according to original authorities, Chanda Sahib obtained possession of it, not under the circumstances described by the European writers, who were avowedly ill informed of the real merits of the case, but by an act of treachery to his ally Minakshi Amman, the reigning queen, whose adopted son he had zealously defended against a competitor for the principality—grateful for his support, and confiding in his friendship, the Queen gave him free access to the citadel, and he abused her confidence by making himself treacherously master of the fortress. See Historical Sketch of the Kingdom of Pandya. J. Roy. As. Society, vol. iii. p. 199.—W.

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and incited the Mahrattas, as people of the same origin and religion, to march to their assistance. The attention of Nizam al Mulk was too deeply engaged in watching the motions of Nadir Shah, who, at that very time, was prosecuting his destructive war in Hindustan, to oppose a prompt resistance to the Mahrattas; it has, indeed, been asserted, though without proof, and not with much probability, that as he was but little pleased with the appointment or proceedings of Dost Ali, he instigated the Mahrattas to this incursion, for the sake of chastising the presumption of his deputy.

An army, commanded by Ragojee Bonslah, appeared on the confines of Carnatic, in the month of May, 1740. The passes of the mountains might have been successfully defended by a small number of men; but an officer of Dost Ali, a Hindu, to whom that important post was committed, betrayed his trust, and left a free passage to the Mahrattas. Dost Ali encountered the invaders; but lost his life in the battle. Sufder Ali, the eldest son of the deceased, retired to the strong fort of Velore, and began to negotiate with the Mahrattas. A large sum of money was partly promised, and partly paid; and Trichinopoly, which rendered Chunda Saheb an object of jealousy to the new Nabob, was secretly offered to them, if they chose the trouble of making the conquest. They returned in a few months and laid siege to Trichinopoly. Chunda Saheb defended himself gallantly for several months, but was obliged to yield on the 26th of March, 1741; and was carried a prisoner to Satarah; while Morari Row, a Mahratta chief, was left Governor of Trichinopoly. Sufder Ali, afraid to trust himself in the open city of Arcot, the capital of the Carnatic, took up his residence at Velore. Bâkir Ali was dead, the late governor of Velore, and uncle of the Nabob; and Mortiz Ali, his son, was now governor in his place. By instigation of this man, whose disposition was perfidious and cruel, Sufder Ali was assassinated; and an attempt was made by the murderer to establish himself in the government of the province; but, finding his efforts hopeless, he shut himself up in his fort of Velore; and the infant son of Sufder Ali was proclaimed Nabob.[1]

[1] For this part of the History of the Deccan in detail, see Orme, i. 36—62; Cambridge's War in India, p. 1—6; History and Management of the East India

Nizam al Mulk, however, had now left the court of Delhi, and returned to his government of the Decoan. To arrange the troubled affairs of the Carnatic, he arrived at Arcot in the month of March, 1743. He treated the son of Sufder Ali with respect; but appointed his general Cojah Abdoolla, to the government of the Carnatic; and compelled Morari Row, and the Mahrattas, to evacuate Trichinopoly. Cojah Abdoolla died suddenly, apparently through poison, before he had taken possession of his government; and the Nizam appointed Anwar ad din Khan, to supply his place. Anwar ad din Khan, the son of a man noted for his learning and piety, had been promoted to a place of some distinction, by the father of Nizam al Mulk, and after his death attached himself to the fortunes of his son. When Nizam al Mulk became Subahdar of the Deccan, he made Anwar ad din Nabob of Ellore and Rajamundry where he governed from the year 1725 to 1741; and from that period till the death of Cojah Abdoolla, he served as Governor of Golconda. In ostent, Nizam al Mulk conferred the government of the Carnatic upon Anwar ad din, only for a time, till Seid Mohammed, the young Son of Sufder Ali, should arrive at the years of manhood; but, in the mean while, he consigned him to the guardianship of Anwar ad din, and in a short time the young Nabob was murdered by a party of Patan soldiers, who clamoured for arrears of pay, due to them, or pretended to be due, by his father. Anwar ad din escaped not the imputation of being the author of the crime, but he was supported by Nizam al Mulk, and appointed Nabob in form. It was Anwar ad din, who was the Governor of the Carnatic when the French and English contended for Madras, and whom Dupleix treated alternately as a friend and a foe.

1742.

Nizam al Mulk, whose abilities and power were calculated to confirm the arrangements which he had made in the Deccan, died in 1748, after a whole life spent in the toils and agitations of oriental ambition, at the extraordinary age of 104. The government of Sadatullah and his family had been highly popular in the Carnatic; that of

Company, p. 50—72; Mémoire pour Dupleix, p. 35—43; Mémoire contre Dupleix, p. 19—59; Révolution des Indes, i. 67—289. This last work was published anonymously in two volumes 12mo. in 1757. It is written with partiality to Dupleix; but the author is well informed, and a man of talents. The leading facts are shortly noticed by Wilks, ch. vii.

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Anwar ad din Khan was very much hated. A strong desire prevailed that the government of Anwar ad din should be subverted, and that of the family of Sadatullah restored: the death of Nizam al Mulk opened a channel through which the hope of change made its way. Chunda Saheb was the only member of the family of Sadatullah, who possessed talents likely to support him in the ascent to the proposed elevation. The keen eye of Dupleix had early fixed itself upon the prospect of the ascendency of Chunda Saheb; and if that chief should, by the assistance of the French, acquire the government of the Carnatic, the most important concessions might be expected from his gratitude and friendship. At the first irruption of the Mahrattas, the whole family of Dost Ali had been sent to Pondicherry, (so strongly had the Indians already learned to confide in the superiority of European power,) as the place of greatest safety in the province. They received protection and respect; and the wife and family of Chunda Saheb, during the whole time of his captivity, had never been removed. Dupleix treated them with the attention calculated to make a favourable impression on the man whom he wished to gain. He even corresponded with Chunda Saheb in his captivity; and agreed to advance money to assist in raising the sum which the Mahrattas demanded for his ransom. He was liberated in the beginning of the year 1748, and even furnished, it is said, with 3000 Mahratta troops. He entered immediately into the quarrels of some contending Rajas, whose dominions lay inland between the coast of Malabar and the Carnatic, with a view to increase his followers, and collect treasure; and he was already at the head of 6000 men, when the death of Nizam al Mulk occurred.

To maintain his authority, in his absence, both at court and in his province, Nizam al Mulk had procured the high office of Ameer al Omrah, for his eldest son, Ghazee ad din Khan, who always attended the person of the Emperor. His second son, Nazir Jung, had resided for the most part in the Deccan, and had officiated as his father's deputy as often as the wars of the empire, or the intrigues of the court, had called him away. Though the obedience of Nazir Jung had been so little perfect as to have been

lately chastised even by imprisonment, he was present when his father died; the army was accustomed to obey him; he got possession of his father's treasures; the Emperor was far too weak to assert his right of nomination; and Nazir Jung assumed the power and titles of Subahdar of the Deccan. 1749.

There was, however, a favourite grandson of Nizam al Mulk, the son of a descendant of Sadhoollah Khan, Vizir to Shah Jehan, by a daughter of Nizam al Mulk. His name was Hedayet Mohy ad din; to which he added the title of Moozuffer Jung. He had been Nabob of Beejapore for several years, during the life of his grandfather; who, it was now given out and believed, had nominated him successor by his will.[1] Such a competitor for the government of the Deccan appeared to Chunda Saheb the very man on whom his hopes might repose. He offered his services, and they were greedily received. To attain the assistance of Duploix was regarded by them both as an object of the highest importance; and in a Subahdar of the Deccan, and a Nabob of the Carnatic, whom he himself should be the chief instrument in raising to power, Dupleix contemplated the highest advantages, both for himself and for his country. Chunda Saheb persuaded Moozuffer Jung that they ought to commence their operations in the Carnatic; where the interest of the family of Chunda Saheb would afford advantages. Their troops had increased to the number of 40,000 men, when they approached the confines of the Carnatic. They were joined here by the French, who consisted of 400 Europeans, 100 Caffres, and 1800 Sepoys, commanded by M. d'Auteuil.[2] They immediately advanced towards Anwar ad din, whom on the 3rd of August, 1749, they found encamped under the fort of Amboor, fifty miles west from Arcot. The French offered to storm the intrenchment; and though twice beaten back, they advanced three times to the charge, and at last prevailed. Anwar ad din was slain in the engagement, at the uncommon age of 107 years; his eldest son was taken prisoner; and his second son Mohammed Ali, with the wreck

[1] Seer Mutakhareen, iii. 115. Wilks says he was governor of the strong fort of Adoni, ch. vii.

[2] Mémoire pour la Compagnie des Indes contre le Sieur Dupleix, p. 39.

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of the army, escaped to Trichinopoly, of which he was Governor.[1]

Dupleix affirms, that had the victorious leaders, according to his advice, advanced without delay against Trichinopoly, while the consternation of defeat remained, they would have obtained immediate possession of the place, and the success of their enterprise would have been assured. They chose, however, to go first to Arcot, that they might play for a while the Subahdar and Nabob; they afterwards paid a visit at Pondicherry to M. Dupleix, who gratified himself by receiving them with oriental display; and was gifted with the sovereignty of eighty-one villages in the neighbourhood of the settlement.[2]

They marched not from Pondicherry till the very end of October; and instead of proceeding directly against Trichinopoly, as they had settled with Dupleix, they directed their march to the city of Tanjore. The urgency of their pecuniary wants, and the prospect of an ample supply from the hoards of Tanjore, made them undervalue the delay. The king was summoned to pay his arrears of tribute, and a large sum as compensation for the expense of the war. By negotiation, by promises, and stratagems, he endeavoured, and the softness of his enemies enabled him, to occupy their time till the very end of December, when news arrived that Nazir Jung, the Subahdar, was on his march to attack them.[3]

Nazir Jung had been summoned, upon his accession, to the imperial presence; and had advanced with a considerable army as far as the Nerbudda, when a counter-order arrived. Informed of the ambitious desings of his nephew, he accelerated his return; and was arrived at Aurungabad, when he heard of the overthrow and death of the Nabob of the Carnatic.[4] The impolitic delays of his enemies afforded

[1] Orme, i. 127; Mémoire, ut supra, p. 40; Mémoire pour le Sieur Dupleix, p. 45.

[2] Mémoire pour Dupleix, p. 47. The French Company assert, in their Memoir against Dupleix (p. 44), that it was to gratify his vanity by this display, that the chiefs delayed the march to Trichinopoly: which seems the invention of malignity. Orme says, with better reasons, that to keep the army in obedience, it was necessary to obtain money, which they levied by contribution in the province.

[3] Orme, i. 133—136; Mém. pour Dupleix, p. 51. The French Company accuse Dupleix again falsely of being the author of the ill-timed invasion of Tanjore: Mém. contre Dupleix, p. 45.

[4] Seer Mutakhareen, iii. 115. Mr. Orme (i. 136) is mistaken when he says that Nazir Jung had marched toward Delhi, to oppose his elder brother: it was at a subsequent date that Ghazee ad din marched for the Deccan.

time for his preparations; and they were struck with consternation when they now heard of his approach. They broke up their camp with precipitation; and, harassed by a body of Mahrattas, in the service of Nazir Jung, returned to Pondicherry.[1]

Dupleix was admirably calculated for the tricks of Indian policy. Though he exerted himself with the utmost vigour to animate the spirits, and augment the force of his allies; lending them 50,000*l*., declaring that he would lend them still more, and increasing the French forces to the number of 2000 Europeans; yet contemplating now, with some terror, the chance of a defeat, he sought to be prepared for all events, and endeavoured secretly to open a negotiation with Nazir Jung. He addressed to him a memorial, in which he set forth the enmity which was borne by Anwar ad din to the French nation; and the necessity under which they were placed to avail themselves of any allies, to secure themselves from its effects; that the death of that Nabob, however, had now freed them from such obligation, and they were ready to detach themselves from the enemies of Nazir Jung; that they had already manifested their friendly dispositions towards him, in sparing Tanjore, and suspending the siege of Trichinopoly, which the victorious army of them and their allies, there was no doubt, might have easily taken.[2] It was only, says Dupleix, the arrival of an English force in the camp of Nazir Jung, that prevented the Subahdar from embracing the proposal.[3]

From the beginning of 1747, the English had been intriguing, both with Nizam al Mulk and with Nazir Jung, against the French. Besides a letter from the English Governor to the same effect, Commodore Griffin, in a letter to Nizam al Mulk, dated March 6, 1747, said, "I shall not enter into a particular detail of all the robberies, cruelties, and depredations, committed on shore upon the King my Master's subjects, by that insolent, perfidious nation the French; connived at, and abetted by those under your Excellency, (the Nabob of Arcot,) whose duty it was to have preserved the peace of your country, instead of selling the interest of a nation, with whom you have had the

[1] Orme, i. 136, 137.
[2] Mémoire pour Dupleix, p. 53.
[3] Ib'd. p. 54.

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strictest friendship time out of mind; a nation that has been the means not only of enriching this part of the country, but the whole dominions of the grand Mogul; and that to a people who are remarkable all over the world for encroaching upon, and giving disturbances and disquiet to all near them; a people who are strangers in your country, in comparison of those who have been robbed by them of that most important fortress and factory, Madras; and now they are possessed of it, have neither money nor credit, to carry on the trade.——And now, excellent Sir, we have laid this before you, for your information and consideration; and must entreat you, in the name of the King of Great Britain, my Royal Master, to call the Nabob to an account for his past transactions, and interpose your power to restore, as near as possible in its original state, what has been so unjustly taken from us." Application was at the same time made to Nazir Jung for his interest with his father, which that prince assures the English by letter he had effectually employed. A favourable answer was received from Nizam al Mulk, and a mandate was sent to Anwar ad din Khan, called at that time by the English Anaverdy Khan in which were the following words: "The English nation, from ancient times, are very obedient and serviceable to us: besides which they always proved to be a set of true people, and it is very hard that they met with these troubles, misfortunes, and destruction. I do therefore write you, to protect, aid, and assist them in all respects, and use your best endeavours in such a manner, that the French may be severely chastised and rooted off, that his Majesty's sea-port town may be recovered, and that the English nation may be restored to their right, establish themselves in their former place, as before, and carry on their trade and commerce for the flourishment of the place." An agent of the English, a native, named Hajee Hodee, who dates his letter from Arcot, the 10th of March, 1747, presents them with the real state of the fact in regard to Anwar ad din, the Nabob: "I take the liberty to acquaint your worship, that as the Nabob is but a *Renter*, he does not much regard the distress of the people of this province, but in all shapes has respect to his own interest and benefit; therefore there is no trusting to his promises. The French are very generous in making presents of other

people's goods, both to the old and young." He advises the English to be equally liberal with their gifts, and says, "Don't regard the money, as Governor Morse did, but part with it for the safety of your settlement." Another of their agents, Boundla Mootal, informed them that if they expected any cordial assistance from Anwar ad din, they must send him money for it. The second son of Anwar ad din, Mohammed Ali Khan, showed himself during this period of French ascendency, rather favourable to the English: probably, from that spirit of discord which prevails in the ruling families of the East, because his eldest brother displayed a partiality to the French.[1]

When, after the deaths of Nizam al Mulk and Anwar ad din Khan, and the captivity of the eldest son of Anwar ad din Khan, Nazir Jung marched into the Carnatic against Chunda Saheb and Moozuffer Jung, he summoned Mohammed Ali to join him from Trichinopoly, and sent to Fort St. David to solicit assistance from the English. The arrival of Moozuffer Jung, the defeat of Anwar ad din, which happened when they were engaged in the attack of Tanjore, and the apprehended schemes of Dupleix, had struck the English with alarm. "They saw," says Mr. Orme, "the dangers to which they were exposed, but were incapable of taking the vigorous resolutions which the necessity of their affairs demanded." They allowed Mr. Boscawen, with the fleet and troops, to set sail for England at the end of October, and sent only 120 Europeans to support Mohammed Ali at Trichinopoly.[2] The presence, however, of Nazir Jung, at the head of a great army, encouraged them to command the detachment at Trichinopoly to accompany Mohammed Ali; and a few days after their arrival in the camp, Major Lawrence, with 600 Europeans from Fort St. David, joined the army of the Subahdar.

The two armies were now sufficiently near to skirmish; when thirteen French officers, displeased that they had not shared in the spoils of Tanjore, resigned their commissions, and infused terror and alarm into the men they were destined to command. D'Auteuil, considering it no longer safe to venture into action with men thus affected, decamped the night before the expected battle, and retreated in the direction of Pondicherry, leaving Moozuffer

[1] Rous's Appendix, i. 8—22.

[2] Orme, i. 130, 133, 138.

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Jung and Chunda Saheb, in a state of despair. Moozuffer Jung thought it best to yield himself up to his uncle, by whom he was immediately put in fetters; Chunda Saheb, with his own troops, made his way to Pondicherry.[1]

The dangers were formidable and imminent which now stared Dupleix in the face; but he had confidence in the resources of his own genius, and the slippery footing of an oriental prince. He sent an embassy to the camp of the victorious Subahdar, offering terms of peace; and at the same time entered into correspondence with some disaffected chiefs in his army; these were leaders of the Patan troops, which Nizam al Mulk, as the principal instrument of his ambition, had maintained in his service; and of which he had made the principal captains Nabobs of different districts in his Subah. It was the standing policy of all the Mohammedan princes in India to compose a great part of their armies of men drawn from the more hardy people of the north, the Tartars and Afghans. Of these people the men who arrived in India were mere soldiers of fortune, accustomed to seek for wealth and distinction through crimes. If the master whom they served were able to chastise their perfidy, and feed their hopes of plunder and aggrandizement by the prospect of his conquests, they were useful and important instruments. The moment they appeared to have more to gain by destroying than by serving him, they were the most alarming source of his danger.

Nazir Jung had the usual character of a man educated a prince. He devoted his time to pleasure, and withdrew it from business; decided without consideration, hence unwisely; and was at once too indolent and too proud to correct his mistakes. Under such a master, the Patan lords expected, by selling their services to a competitor, to add both to their treasures, and to the territories of which the government was lodged in their hands.

The deputies of Dupleix had returned from the camp of Nazir Jung, when D'Auteuil, who continued to watch the motions of the army, observing the negligence with which the camp was guarded during the night, detached an

[1] Cambridge's War in India, p. 6—11; Orme, i. 138—142; History and Management of the East India Company, p. 73; Mémoire pour Dupleix, p. 54; Mémoire contre Dupleix, p. 47; Révolution des Indes, i. 232—238.

officer with 300 hundred men, who entered it unobserved; penetrated into it a mile; spread terror and alarm; killed upwards of a thousand of the enemy; and returned with the loss of only two or three men; another proof of the extraordinary weakness of an Indian army, when opposed to the force of the European mind.

The Subahdar, alarmed at the presence of so enterprising an enemy, hastened to Arcot; while the English quarrelling with him about the performance of his promises, and the abandonment of their cause by withdrawing his army, left the camp in disgust, and removed the only important obstacle to the machinations of the conspirators and Dupleix.

While the Subahdar spent his time at Arcot in the pleasures of the harem and the chase, of both of which he was immoderately fond, the French exhibited new specimens of their activity and enterprise. A small body of troops sailed to Masulipatam, at the mouth of the river Kistna, once the principal mart of that region of India; attacked it by surprise in the night, and gained possession with a trifling loss: and another detachment seized the Pagoda of Trivadi, about fifteen miles west from Fort St. David. Mohammed Ali obtained permission to detach himself from the army of the Subahdar, for the purpose of dislodging them from Trivadi; in this he obtained assistance from the English, who were deeply interested in preventing the French from gaining a position so near. Some attacks which Mohammed Ali and the English made upon the pagoda were unsuccessful; and these allies began to quarrel. Mohammed Ali would neither advance pay to the English, nor move his troops between the pagoda and Pondicherry; upon which they left him. The French, who expected this event, waited for its arrival; attacked Mohammed Ali; gained an easy victory, and made him fly to Arcot, with two or three attendants. The French, still aiming at further acquisitions, advanced against the celebrated Fort of Gingee, situated on a vast insulated rock, and deemed the strongest fortress in the Carnatic. They stormed the fortifications to the very summit of the mountain; and contemplating afterwards the natural strength of the place, felt astonished at their own success.

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This last exploit disturbed the tranquillity and the amusements of the Subahdar; and he offered to enter upon negotiation. The demands of the French were lofty; Nazir Jung, therefore began his march to Gingee. But it was now October, 1750, and the rains began. The Subahdar kept the field; but felt exceedingly weary of the contest; and at last appeared inclined to concede whatever was demanded by the French. Dupleix negotiated at once with the traitors and the Subahdar. He had just concluded his treaty with the Subahdar, when his commander at Gingee receives from the traitors the concerted call. He marches with his whole force; attacks the camp of the Subahdar, and is joined by the traitors; by one of whom Nazir Jung is shot through the heart. In his Memoir, Dupleix affirms, that he wrote immediately to inform the Commander at Gingee of the conclusion of the treaty, and to prevent further hostilities, but that his letter arrived not till after the revolution was performed.[1]

Moozuffer Jung was now freed from his imprisonment, and vested with the authority of Subahdar. Immediately, however, the enormous demands of the Patan nobles, to whose perfidy he owed his power, began to oppress him; and he only parried their importunities by asserting the necessity of forming his arrangements in concert with Dupleix. Lofty were the hopes, in which that ambitious leader seemed now entitled to indulge himself. Moozuffer Jung advanced to Pondicherry, and lavished upon him every testimony of gratitude and friendship. Dupleix exerted himself to satisfy the Patan lords; who, seeing his determination to support their master, permitted him to retrench their demands, and treasured up their resentments for a future day. An adept in Indian policy, when he had men of their dangerous character within the walls of Pondicherry, would have taken care how they made their escape.

Dupleix was appointed Governor of the Mogul domi-

[1] It is worthy of remark that the death of Nazir Jung, and the troubles that ensued, might possibly have been prevented if there had been one amongst the English qualified to converse with the Subahdar in any native language. Major Lawrence had been informed of some of the intrigues between the Patans and the French, and "at an audience endeavoured to acquaint Nazir Jung with what he had heard, but his interpreter had not courage to make a declaration which would probably have cost him his life, and misrepresented what he was ordered to say.—Orme i. 145.—W.

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nions on the coast of Coromandel from the river Kistna to Cape Comorin; and Chunda Saheb his Deputy at Arcot. Mohammed Ali, who had fled to Trichinopoly, upon the assassination of Nazir Jung, now offered to resign his pretensions to the nabobship of the Carnatic, provided Dupleix, who listened to the overture, would obtain from the new Subahdar a command for him, in any other part of his dominions.

Moozuffer Jung left Pondicherry in the month of January, 1751, accompanied by a body of French troops, with M. Bussy, who had signalized himself in the late transactions, at their head. The army had marched about sixty leagues; when a disturbance, in appearance accidental, arose among a part of the troops; presently it was discovered, that the Patan chiefs were in revolt; and that they had seized a pass in front through which it behoved the army to proceed. They were attacked with great spirit; the French artillery carried every thing before it; and a victory was gained, when the impetuosity of the Subahdar carried him too far in the pursuit, and he was shot dead with an arrow.[1] M. Bussy was not a man who lost his presence of mind, upon an unexpected disaster. He represented to the principal commanders the necessity of agreeing immediately upon the choice of a master; and as the son of Moozuffer Jung was an infant, and the present state of affairs required the authority of a man of years, he recommended Salabut Jung, the eldest surviving son of Nizam al Mulk, who was present in the camp, and who without delay was raised to the vacant command. Salabut Jung promised the same concessions to the French which had been made by his predecessor, and the army continued its march towards Golconda.[2]

The Europeans in India, who hitherto had crouched at the feet of the meanest of the petty governors of a district, were astonished at the progress of the French, who now

[1] Orme says he was killed in personal conflict with the Nabob of Canoul, by whom he was thrust through the forehead with a javelin. i. 64.—W.

[2] For the above details see Orme, i. 142—166. History and Management of the East India Company, p. 74—79; Cambridge's War in India; p. 10—16: Seer Mutakhareen, iii. 116—118, the author of which says that Moozuffer Jung had a plot against the Patans, who on this occasion were not the aggressors; Mémoire pour Dupleix, p. 55—68, who says he entered into the conspiracy against Nazir Jung because he would not listen to peace; Mémoire contre Dupleix, p. 47—61: Wilks, chap. vii., with whom Dupleix is a favourite.

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seemed to preside over the whole region of the Deccan. A letter to Dupleix, from a friend in the camp of Salabut Jung, affirmed that in a little time the Mogul on his throne would tremble at the name of Dupleix;[1] and however presumptuous this prophecy might appear, little was wanting to secure its fulfilment.

The English, sunk in apathy or despair, were so far as yet from taking any vigorous measures to oppose a torrent by which they were likely to be overwhelmed, that Major Lawrence, the commander of the troops, on whose military talents and authority their whole dependence was placed, took the extraordinary resolution, not opposed, it would seem, by the Council, of returning at this critical juncture to England. They used their influence, indeed, to prevent Mohammed Ali from carrying into execution the proposal he had made to the French of surrendering Trichinopoly; but Mohammed Ali, and the English in concert, made offer to acknowledge Chunda Saheb, Nabob of all the Carnatic, with the exception of Trichinopoly and its dependencies. This the French treated as a departure from the original proposal of Mohammed Ali, and replied with haughtiness and contempt. The English now engaged to support him, and he resolved to hold out. The governor of Madura, however, a small adjacent province, formerly a Hindu rajaship, declared for Chunda Saheb, and an attempt, made by a party of the English, to reduce it, was repelled.

Towards the beginning of April, Chunda Saheb began his march from Arcot; and about the same time Captain Gingens, with the English, was despatched from Fort St. David. Chunda Saheb was encamped near the Fort of Volcondah, on the great road between Trichinopoly and Arcot, when the English approached. A battle was brought on; but the English officers spent so much time in deliberation as to discourage the men; and the European soldiers fled shamefully from the field, even while the Caffres and native troops maintained the contest. The army retreated; and though it posted itself, and encamped at two different places, Utatoor and Pichonda; it quitted both upon the arrival of the enemy, and at last took shelter under the walls of Trichinopoly. Chunda

[1] Mémoire contre Dupleix.

Saheb and the French lost no time in following, and sat down on the opposite side of the town.

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The city of Trichinopoly, at the distance of about ninety miles from the sea, is situated on the south side of the great river Cavery, about half a mile from its bank; and, for an Indian city, was fortified with extraordinary strength. About five miles higher up than Trichinopoly, the Cavery divides itself into two branches, which, after separating to the distance of about two miles, again approached, and being only prevented from uniting, about fifteen miles below Trichinopoly, by a narrow mound, they form a peninsula, which goes by the name of the Island of Seringham; celebrated as containing one of the most remarkable edifices, and one of the most venerated pagodas, in India; and henceforward remarkable for the struggle, constituting an era in the history of India, of which it was now to be the scene.

The presidency of Fort St. David, somewhat roused by seeing the army of Mohammed Ali driven out of the Carnatic, and obliged to take shelter beyond the Cavery, made several efforts to reinforce the troops they had sent him; whom, after all, they were able to augment to the number of only 600 men. There was another misfortune; for notwithstanding the urgency with which, in the depressed and alarming state of their affairs, the English were called upon for the utmost exertions of their virtue, "a fatal spirit of division," says Major Lawrence, "had unhappily crept in among our officers, so that many opportunities and advantages were lost, which gave the country alliance but an indifferent opinion of our conduct."[1] The French, however, made but feeble efforts for the reduction of the place; and the English were too much impressed with an opinion of their own weakness to hazard any enterprize to dislodge them.[2]

[1] Lawrence's Narrative in Cambridge's War in India, p. 28. "In the middle of July," says Orme, i. 182, "the discontent which prevailed among the officers, made it necessary to remove several of them, at a time when there were very few fit to succeed to their posts.

[2] Law, the commander of the French forces, whom I am much more inclined to believe than Dupleix, one of the most audacious contemners of truth that ever engaged in crooked politics, asserts his want of strength for any efficient operation; as Dupleix, who had entered into a correspondence with Mohammed Ali, and relied upon his promise to open to the French the gates of Trichinopoly, sent him, not to attack Trichinopoly, but to receive possession of it. He adds, that when they were surprised by Mohammed Ali's firing upon

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While the war thus lingered at Trichinopoly, Clive, who had been made a captain, to supply some of the removals occasioned by the recent discontents, persuaded the Presidency to create a diversion, by sending him to attack Arcot, the capital of Chunda Saheb, left with a very slender defence. This young man was the son of a gentleman of small fortune in Shropshire. From the untractableness of his own disposition, or the unsteadiness of his father's, he was moved when a boy from one to another, through a great variety of schools; at which he was daring, impetuous, averse to application, and impatient of control. At the age of nineteeen he was appointed a writer in the service of the East India Company, and sent to Madras. There his turbulence, though he was not ill-natured, engaged him in quarrels with his equals; his dislike of application and control prevented his acquiring the benevolence of his superiors.[1] When the capitulation with Madras was violated, Clive made his escape in a Mohammedan dress to Fort St. David, and when the siege of Pondicherry was undertaken, he was allowed to enter into the military service, with the rank of an ensign. At the siege of Pondicherry, and the enterprise against Devi-Cotah, he rendered himself conspicuous by courting posts of danger, and exhibiting in them a daring intrepidity. Discerning men, however, perceived, along with his rashness, a coolness and presence of mind, with a readiness of resource in the midst of danger, which made Lawrence, at an early period, point him out as a man of promise. Upon the conclusion of the affair at Devi-Cotah, Clive returned to his civil occupation; but no sooner did his countrymen resume the sword, than his own disposition,

them from the walls, they had not a single piece of battering or heavy cannon in the camp; that it was three months before they were supplied with any; that at first the whole army consisted of 11,860, but after the detachment sent for the recovery of Arcot, it consisted only of 6,680, of whom 600 only were Europeans. See Plainte du Chevalier Law, contre sieur Dupleix, p. 21—23. Dupleix, on the other hand (Mémoire, p. 74), speaking in round numbers, says that the natives who had joined Chunda Saheb, raised the army to 30,000 men. So widely asunder are the statements of these two men, at the head of the departments, civil and military.

[1] See a panegyrical life of him, for which his family furnished materials, in Kippis's Biographia Britannica, vol. iii. art. Clive.—M.

The late biographer of Clive, Sir J. Malcolm, adverting to this passage, remarks, that the justice of the application of the epithet turbulent, is not borne out by the facts. Certainly there is nothing in the history of his adolescence to warrant the application; he seems to have been stubborn and dogged, rather than turbulent.—W.

and the scarcity of officers, again involved him in operations, far better suited to his restless, daring, and contentious mind. He had accompanied the troops sent for the defence of Trichinopoly, till after the affair at Volcondah, and had been employed by the Presidency in conducting the several reinforcements which they had attempted to forward. He was now furnished with 200 Europeans and 300 Sepoys; and to spare even these, Fort St. David and Madras were left, for their defence, the one with 100, and the other with fifty men. To command them he had eight officers, of whom six had never been in action, and four were young men in the mercantile service of the Company, whom his own example had inflamed. For artillery they had three field-pieces; and two eighteen pounders were sent after him. The enemy, who remained in garrison at Arcot, which was an open town, defended by a fort, abandoned the place, and gave him possession without resistance. Expecting a siege, he exerted his utmost diligence to supply the fort; and that he might prevent the fugitive garrison, who hovered around, from resuming their courage, he made frequent sallies; beat up their camp in the middle of the night; defended himself with vigour when assailed; and harassed them by incessant and daring attacks. In the meantime Chunda Saheb detached 4000 men from his army at Trichinopoly, which were joined by his son with 150 Europeans from Pondicherry; and, together with the troops already collected in the neighbourhood, to the number of 3000, entered the city. Clive immediately resolved upon a violent attempt to dislodge them. Going out with almost the whole of the garrison, he with his artillery forced the enemy to leave the street in which they had posted themselves; but filling the houses they fired upon his men, and obliged him to withdraw to the fort. In warring against the people of Hindustan, a few men so often gain unaccountable victories over a host, that on a disproportion of numbers solely no enterprise can be safely condemned as rash; in this, however, Clive ran the greatest risk, with but a feeble prospect of success. He lost fifteen of his Europeans, and among them a lieutenant; and his only artillery officer, with sixteen other men, was disabled.

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Next day the enemy was reinforced with 2000 men from

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Velore. The fort was more than a mile in circumference; the walls in many places ruinous; the towers inconvenient and decayed; and everything unfavourable to defence: yet Clive found the means of making an effectual resistance. When the enemy attempted to storm at two breaches, one of fifty and one of ninety feet, he repulsed them with but eighty Europeans and 120 Sepoys fit for duty; so effectually did he avail himself of his feeble resources, and to such a pitch of fortitude had he exalted the spirit of those under his command. During the following night the enemy abandoned the town with precipitation, after they had maintained the siege for fifty days. A reinforcement from Madras joined him on the following day; and, leaving a small garrison in Arcot, he set out to pursue the enemy. With the assistance of a small body of Mahrattas, who joined him in hopes of plunder, he gave the enemy, now greatly reduced by the dropping away of the auxiliaries, a defeat at Arni, and recovered Conjeveram, into which the French had thrown a garrison, and where they had behaved with barbarity to some English prisoners; among the rest two wounded officers, whom they seized returning from Arcot to Madras, and threatened to expose on the rampart, if the English attacked them. After these important transactions, Clive returned to Fort St. David about the end of December. The enemy no sooner found that he was out of the field than they re-assembled, and marched to ravage the Company's territory. Reinforced by some troops which had arrived from Bengal, he went out to meet them in the end of February. They abandoned their camp upon his approach; but with intent to surprise Arcot, from which the principal part of the garrison had marched to the reinforcement of Clive. They expected the gates to be opened by two officers of the English Sepoys, whom they had corrupted; but the plot being discovered, and their signals not answered, they did not venture to make an attack, and suddenly withdrew. Though informed of their retreat, Clive was still hastening his march to Arcot, when at sun-set his van was unexpectedly fired upon by the enemy's artillery; and a hot engagement ensued. The superior force of the enemy afforded them great advantages, and seemed likely to decide the contest, unless by

some expedient their cannon could be seized. At ten at night Clive detached a party, who, favoured by the darkness, came upon it unexpectedly in the rear; defeated the troops who were placed for its defence; and succeeded completely in that important enterprise. After this disaster, the enemy dispersed; and before Clive could undertake any new exploit, he was ordered to the presidency; where it was determined to send him, with all the troops under his command, to Trichinopoly. It was fortunate that the enemy, dispirited by the last, in addition to so many former disappointments and defeats, disbanded themselves at the same moment; the country troops departing to their homes, and the French being recalled to Pondicherry.

While these active operations were performing in the province of Arcot, Mohammed Ali, though he appeared to have little to fear from the attacks of the French upon Trichinopoly, began to have everything to dread from the deficiency of his funds. The English, whom he engaged to maintain out of his own treasury, were now obliged to be maintained at the cost of the Presidency. His own troops were without pay, and there was no prospect of keeping them long from mutiny or dispersion. He had applied for assistance to the Government of Mysore, a considerable Hindu kingdom, which had risen out of the wreck of the empire of Beejanugger, and viewed with dread the elevation of Chunda Saheb, who had formerly aimed at its subjugation. Mohammed Ali renewed his importunities; and, by promising to the Mysoreans whatever they chose to ask, prevailed upon them to march to his assistance. They arrived at Trichinopoly about the middle of February, 20,000 strong, including 6000 Mahrattas, who had entered into their pay, and of whom a part were the same with those who had assisted Clive after the siege of Arcot. Their arrival determined the King of Tanjore, who till then had remained neutral, to send 5000 men. A few days after Clive was recalled to Fort St. David, he was again prepared to take the field; but on the 26th of March, Major Lawrence returned from England, and put himself at the head of the reinforcement which consisted of 400 Europeans and 1100 Sepoys, with eight field-pieces, and a large quantity of military stores.

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Both parties had their eyes fixed upon the reinforcement, and Dupleix sent repeated orders that it might be intercepted at all events. The efforts, however, of the enemy, proved unavailing; and Lawrence in safety joined the camp.[1]

It was now determined to attack the enemy in their camp. This attack the French had not the resolution, or the means to withstand, and formed the determination of passing over to the island of Seringham. Chunda Saheb, it is said, remonstrated, but without avail. In the hurry of their retreat, the enemy were able to carry over only a part of their baggage, and burned what they were unable to remove of the provisions which they had collected in their magazines.[2]

As delay was dangerous to the English, from the circumstances of their allies, it was their policy to reduce the enemy to extremities within the shortest possible time. With this view Clive advised them to detach a part of the army to the other side of the Coleroon, for the purpose of intercepting the enemy's supplies. Though there was hazard in this plan; for an enterprising enemy, by

[1] Dupleix accuses Law with great violence, for not intercepting this convoy; and the English writers have very readily joined with him. But, if the facts asserted by Law are true, it was from want of means, not of capacity or inclination, that he failed. He says, that the whole army, even after it was joined by the remains of the detachment sent to Arcot, and by the body under Aulum Khan, did not amount to 15,000; while the enemy were three times the number. That the cavalry of Chunda Saheb, who had long been without pay, refused to act; and were joined by several other corps of the native army. That from the importunate commands of Dupleix, to blockade and starve Trichinopoly, he had extended his posts much beyond what the smallness of his means rendered advisable; and was weak at every point. That he made every effort to intercept the convoy at a distance, but the cavalry of Chunda Saheb refused to act; and Aulum Khan, after promising to support the detachment, failed, on the pretext that there was not a farthing to give him. See the details, as stated by Law, *Plainte*, p. 23—28. The Company, in their reply to Dupleix, defend the conduct of Law. Mem. contre Dupleix, p. 74.

[2] This movement has been violently condemned, and Dupleix ascribes to it the defeat of his schemes; but Major Lawrence (Narrative, p. 31) says, that "they (the English officers) reckoned it a prudent measure at the time." From the weakness of the French, a retreat was unavoidable. Law asserts that had they permitted the English to take possession of Seringham, they were taken in Caudine forks. He asserts, also, that they were already suffering for want of provisions; and that, between abandoning Trichinopoly altogether, and the resolution which he adopted, there was no middle course. The wise course would have been, no doubt, to abandon Trichinopoly; and of this, Law says, he was abundantly aware. But this, the reiterated and pressing commands of Dupleix absolutely forbad. I confess the defence of Law seems to me satisfactory. Plainte du Chev. Law, p. 29—31. Orme says that the enemy burned a great store of provisions, when they passed over into Seringham; but what Law says, is much more probable—that the army was already beginning to be in want.

attacking one of the divisions, might gain a decisive advantage before the other could arrive, Lawrence accepted the advice; and Clive was detached for the performance of the service. It was executed with his usual activity, spirit, and success. Dupleix made the strongest exertions to reinforce and supply his army; but was baffled in every attempt. D'Auteuil, at the head of a large convoy, was first compelled to suspend his march; was afterwards attacked in the fort to which he had retired, and at last taken prisoner. The enemy were soon in distress for provisions; their camp was cannonaded by the English; the troops of Chunda Saheb left his service; and he himself, looking round for the means of personal safety, chose at last to trust to the generosity of the King of Tanjore, and delivered himself, under the promise of protection, into the hands of the Tanjorine commander. The French soon after capitulated, and surrendered themselves prisoners of war.

The fate of Chunda Saheb was lamentable. He was immediately put in fetters by the faithless Tanjorine. A dispute, under the power of which of them he should remain, arose between the Mysorean and Mahratta chiefs, the Tanjorine Generals, and Mohammed Ali. To compromise the dispute, Major Lawrence proposed that he should be confined in one of the English forts. The parties separated without coming to an agreement; and the Tanjorine immediately ordered him to be assassinated. Dupleix affirms that he was murdered by the express command of Major Lawrence, which it is difficult to suppose that Dupleix must not have known to be untrue. But it is true, that Lawrence showed an indifference about his fate which is not very easy to be reconciled with either humanity or wisdom. He well knew that his murder was, in the hands of any of them, the probable, in those of some of them, the certain consequence, of their obtaining the charge of his person. He well knew, that if he demanded him with firmness, they would have all consented to his confinement in an English fort.[1] And, if he did not know, it is not the less true, that in the hands of the English he

[1] Orme says it was so proposed by Lawrence, but that the confederates would not assent. At this period, the English were not so well assured of their power as to pretend to dictate to the native princes with whom they co-operated.—W.

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might have become a powerful instrument with which to counterwork the machinations of Dupleix. At any rate, Dupleix, of all men, on this ground, had the least title to raise an accusation against the English, since he had resolved to imprison for life his unfortunate ally, and to reign sole Nabob of the Carnatic himself.[1]

The failure of the enemy at Trichinopoly, the possession of which both parties appear to have valued too high, produced in the breasts of the English hopes of undisputed superiority and of that tide of riches, which unbounded sway in the affairs of the Carnatic promised to their deluded imaginations. Major Lawrence was in haste to march through the province, investing his triumphant Nabob; and saw no place, except Gingee, which he imagined would retard his progress.[2]

He was not a little surprised when the delays of the Nabob indicated much less impatience. The Nabob was, in fact, engaged in a troublesome dispute. Among the inducements which he had employed to gain the assistance of the Mysoreans, he had not scrupled to promise the possession of Trichinopoly and its dependencies. The Mysorean chief now insisted upon performance; and the Mahratta captain, who eagerly desired an opportunity of obtaining Trichinopoly for himself, encouraged his pretensions.

Intelligence of this dispute was a thunderstroke to Lawrence. His country had paid dear for Trichinopoly; yet now it appeared that it could not be retained, by him for whom it was gained, without a flagrant violation of honour and faith. The violation of honour and faith the Nabob, in the Indian manner, treated as a matter of entire insignificance. The Mysorean could not but know, he said,

[1] This is directly affirmed by the French East India Company (Mémoire contre Dupleix, p. 70), and evidenced by extracts which they produce from the letters to Dupleix, written by his own agent at the court of the Subahdar. Mr. Orme says (i. 252), that the patent of Nabob was actually procured before Chunda Saheb's death. The truth is, that each of them, Chunda Saheb and himself, wished to get rid of the other, and to be Nabob alone; and they were endeavouring, by mutual treachery, to disappoint each other's designs. Mém. ut supra, and its Appendix, No. vi. For the above details, from the death of Moozuffer Jung, see Orme, i. 186—242; History and Management of the East India Company, p. 80—82; Cambridge's War in India, 16—37; Mémoire pour Dupleix, p. 71—77; Mémoire contre Dupleix, p. 70—74; Plainte du Chevalier Law, p. 19—35. Law says, p. 33, that they made some attempts for the escape of Chunda Saheb by water, but the river was too shallow at the time to float the boat.

[2] Lawrence's Narrative, p. 38.

that such a promise was never made to be fulfilled; and doubtless no Indian can believe of any man, that he will keep more of a promise than it is his interest, or than he is compelled, to keep.[1]

After some time lost in altercation, the Nabob promised to fulfil his engagement, and deliver up the fort in two months; and with this the Mysorean, finding no more could be obtained, allowed himself for the present to appear satisfied. The English, leaving a garrison in the fort, set forward to establish their Nabob; but the auxiliary troops of Tanjore, and of Tondeman, had marched to their homes; and the Mysoreans and Mahrattas refused to depart from Trichinopoly.

Dupleix was not reduced to despondency, by the stroke which the English imagined had realized their fondest hopes. As it was the character of this man to form schemes, which from their magnitude appeared romantic, so was it his practice to adhere to them with constancy, even when the disasters which he encountered in their execution seemed to counsel nothing but despair. Nor did the resources of his mind fail to second its firmness. He still found means to oppose a nearly equal, in a little time a more than equal, force to his opponents.

It was resolved, and very unwisely, that the first operation of the English should be the reduction of Gingee; garrisoned by the French; and the only place in the province expected to yield a serious resistance. Major Lawrence condemned this plan of operations, and recommended the previous recovery of the province, and the collection of the rents; but by the influence of Mr. Sanders, the President, his opinion was over-ruled.[2] Dupleix despatched a force for the purpose of seizing the passes of the mountains by which Gingee is surrounded, and of intercepting the English convoys. The detachment of the English army, which had arrived at Gingee, marched to dislodge them; but, instead of succeeding in their object, sustained a defeat.

The French, elevated by this advantage, reinforced their victorious party with as many troops as they found it pos-

[1] Colonel Wilks is very severe on the treachery of the Nabob, and on the English for abetting it. Historical Sketches, ut supra, p. 285—291.
[2] Lawrence's Narrative, p. 42.

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sible to send into the field. This army, by way of triumph, marched close to the very bounds of Fort St. David. A company of Swiss, in the English service, were sent on this emergency from Madras to Fort St. David, in boats, contrary to the advice of Lawrence, who entreated they might be sent in a ship of force; and Dupleix, unrestrained by the vain forms of a treaty of peace, subsisting between England and France, while both parties were violating the substance of it every day, took them prisoners of war by a ship from Pondicherry road. Lawrence hastened toward the enemy. His force consisted of 400 Europeans, 1700 Sepoys, 4000 troops belonging to the Nabob, and nine pieces of cannon. The French army consisted of 400 Europeans, 1500 Sepoys, and 500 horse; who declined a battle, till Lawrence, by a feigned retreat, inspired them with confidence. The action, which took place near Bahoor, two miles from Fort St. David, was decidedly in favour of the English; but would have been far more destructive to the French had the Nabob's cavalry done their duty, who, instead of charging the routed foe, betook themselves to the more agreeable operation of plundering their camp. After this seasonable victory, Captain Clive was employed, with a small detachment, to reduce the two forts, called Covelong and Chingliput, which he executed with his usual vigour and address; and then returned to Europe for his health. About the same time the monsoon compelled the army to withdraw from the field.

During these transactions, Nunjeraj, the Mysorean General, was not idle before Trichinopoly. He made several attempts to get into the fort by surprise, as well as to corrupt the troops; and his efforts held Captain Dalton, commanding the English garrison, perpetually on the watch. The views of that chief were now, also, directed toward the French; and so much progress had been made in the adjustment of terms, that a body of 3000 Mahrattas were actually on their march to join the enemy, when the victory at Bahoor produced a revolution in their minds; and they joined the English, as if they had marched from Trichinopoly with that express design. During the interval of winter-quarters, the negotiations with the French were completed, and the Mahrattas, at an early period,

marched to Pondicherry; while the Mysoreans, to give themselves all possible chances, remained before Trichinopoly, as still allies of the English; but they declared themselves, before the armies resumed their operations; and attacked an advanced post of Captain Dalton's, defended by sixty Europeans and some Sepoys, whom they destroyed to a man.

Before these designs of the Mysorean and Mahratta chiefs were brought to maturity, Major Lawrence had given his advice to seize them, in one of their conferences with Captain Dalton.[1] If there was any confidence, during negotiation, reposed in the English by the Indians, beyond what they reposed in one another, a confidence of which the loss would have been risked by such a blow, we are not informed; the danger which might have been averted by securing the persons of those enemies, was of considerable amount.

Dupleix, though so eminently successful in adding to the number of combatants on his side, was reduced to the greatest extremity for pecuniary supplies. The French East India Company were much poorer than even the English; the resources which they furnished from Europe were proportionally feeble; and though perfectly willing to share with Dupleix in the hopes of conquest, when enjoyment was speedily promised, their impatience for gain made them soon tired of the war; and they were now importunately urging Dupleix to find the means of concluding a peace. Under these difficulties Dupleix had employed his own fortune, and his own credit, in answering the demands of the war; and, as a last resource, he now turned his thoughts to Mortiz Ali, the Governor of Velore. He held up to him the prospect of even the Nabobship itself, in hopes of drawing from him the riches which he was reputed to possess. Mortiz Ali repaired to Pondicherry, and even advanced a considerable sum; but finding

[1] In justice to Major Lawrence, it must be remarked that this advice was given only upon the detection of a plot, set on foot by the Mysorean general, to assassinate Captain Dalton, and surprise Trichinopoly, there being no open rupture yet even with Mohammed Ali, much less with the English. "It was on the discovery of this," says the Major, "that I proposed Dalton should seize on the Maissorean and Morarow, which he might easily have done by a surprise, as he often had conferences with them; and I must own I thought, in justice, it would have been right to have done it, but the Presidency were of another opinion." Lawrence's Narrative, p. 39.—W.

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that much more was expected, he broke off the negotiation, and retired to his fort.

The contending parties looked forward with altered prospects to the next campaign. By the co-operation of the Mysoreans, and the junction of the Mahrattas, the latter of whom, from the abilities of their leader, and their long experience of European warfare, were no contemptible allies, the French had greatly the advantage in numerical force. In the capacity, however, of their officers, and in the quality of their European troops, they soon felt a remarkable inferiority. Lawrence, without being a man of talents, was an active and clear-headed soldier; and the troops whom he commanded, both officers and men, appeared, by a happy contingency, to combine in their little body all the virtues of a British army. The European troops of the enemy, on the other hand, were the very refuse of the French population; and Lawrence, himself, candidly confesses that their officers were frequently seen, in the hour of action, making the greatest efforts, and without effect, to retain them in their ranks. Among their commanders, not a man showed any talents; and Dupleix with great bitterness complains, that, with the exception of Bussy, he never had an officer on whose ability he could place the smallest reliance.[1]

[1] In his letter to the French minister, dated 16th October, 1753, he says the recruits whom the Company sent him were, "enfans, décroteurs, et bandits." He says, "L'exemple que vous a présenté l'Angleterre en n'envoyant que des troupes aguerries auroit du engager la Compagnie à avoir la même attention dans le choix." He adds, "Je ne sais que penser de celui qui est chargé des recrues, mais je crois qu'il n'y employe pas la somme que la Compagnie lui passe pour chaque homme: ce n'est sans doute pas votre intention ni la sienne, mais il n'en est pas moins vrai que tout ce qui nous parvient n'est qu'un ramassis de la plus vile canaille.—Permettez moi, monseigneur, de vous supplier de donner à ce sujet les ordres les plus précis; la gloire du roi y est intéressée, ce motif vous paroîtra plus que suffisant pour exiger toute votre attention. Je n'ose vous dire tous les mauvais propos qui se tiennent sur l'envoi de ces malheureuses troupes; l'Anglois en fait de gorges chaudes, il n'a eu que trop d'occasions de les mépriser; les Maures et les Indiens commencent à perdre la haute idée qu'ils avoient conçue de nous, et nos officiers ne se mettent que malgré eux à leur tête; ce n'est qu'un cri à ce sujet." Mémoire pour Dupleix, Pièces Justific. Lett. de M. Dupleix, à M. de Machault, p. 50. In the same letter he says, "Pour les officiers il y en a peu, ou pour mieux dire point du tout qui soient en état de commander; la bravoure ne leur manque point, mais les talens n'y répondent pas; dans le nombre sur-tout de ceux arrivés l'année dernière, la plupart n'étaient que des enfans, sans la moindre teinture du service; le soldat s'en moque, et souvent avec juste raison." Ibid. p. 51. Speaking in the same letter of the services of Bussy, along with Salabut Jung, he says, "Si j'en avois un second ici, je vous proteste, monseigneur, que toutes les affaires de cette partie seroient terminées, il y a plus de deux ans." Ibid. p. 57. Nor was this an empty boast: So near was he to the accomplishment of his object, without any such important assistance, that the talents of a man like Bussy, in the Carnatic, would soon have placed him at its head.

Early in January the two armies again took the field: the French, consisting of 500 European infantry and sixty horse; 2000 Sepoys; and 4000 Mahrattas, commanded by Morari Row. The English consisted of 700 European infantry, 2000 Sepoys, and 1500 horse belonging to the Nabob. The French, to avail themselves of their superiority in cavalry, avoided an action, and employed themselves in making war upon the English convoys. This they did, with so much effect, that Major Lawrence was frequently obliged to escort his stores and provisions with his whole army from Fort St. David. In this manner the time was consumed till the 20th of April, when an express arrived from Captain Dalton, that he had only three weeks' provisions remaining in the fort.

When the English, after the capitulation of the French at Seringham, marched from Trichinopoly, and left Captain Dalton Commandant of the English garrison, the brother of the Nabob was at the same time appointed Governor of the town. By an unhappy oversight the magazines were left under direction of the Mohammedan Governor; and Captain Dalton satisfied himself with asking, from time to time, in what condition they remained. When the Mysoreans, however, had shut him up in his fort, and, scouring the adjacent country with their cavalry, had prevented for some time the arrival of supplies, it occurred to him, rather too late, that he had better see with his own eyes on what he had to depend. His ally, he found, had been selling the provisions at an enormous price to the people of the town; and he was left in that alarming condition, of which he hastened to make report to Major Lawrence.

Only one resolution was left to the English commander, that of marching directly to the support of Trichinopoly. His army suffered greatly on the march, both by desertion and sickness; and, upon his arrival at the place, he found that all the force he could muster for offensive operations, after leaving the proportion necessary for the duties of the garrison, consisted of 500 Europeans, and 2000 Sepoys. The Nabob had 3000 horse, but they were badly paid, and executed their duty with proportional neglect and disobedience. The French followed with 200 Europeans and 500 Sepoys, to the support of the Mysoreans; and Trichinopoly

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became once more the seat of a tedious and harassing warfare.

It deserves remark, that Major Lawrence, who had recommended the seizure of the Mysorean and Mahratta chiefs, uniformly disapproved of the attempt to retain Trichinopoly after the promise to give it up.[1] It is equally worthy of remark, that the delicacy of the Presidency withheld their hands from the persons of the hostile chiefs; but easily endured the violation of the engagement respecting Trichinopoly. Delicacy would have been less violated in the one instance, by following the advice of Lawrence, and prudence would have been more consulted by following it in both. The cession of Trichinopoly to the Mysoreans would have enabled the English to establish their nabob, with little opposition, in the sovereignty of the Carnatic, and would have saved them from two years of expensive warfare.

It was on the 6th of May, 1753, that Major Lawrence again arrived at Trichinopoly; and from that day to the 11th of October, 1754, the most active operations were carried on. Neither the French, with their allies, were sufficiently powerful to reduce Trichinopoly; nor had the English sufficient force to compel them to raise the siege. The two parties, therefore, bent their endeavours; the English, to supply the garrison with a sufficient quantity of food, to enable them to prosecute their objects in another quarter; the French, by cutting off the supplies, to compel the garrison to surrender. On both sides the greatest exertions were made; severe conflicts were frequently sustained, in some of which decisive advantages, at one time on one side, at another on the other, were on the point of being gained: and never did English troops display more gallantry and good conduct, than in defence of the unimportant city of Trichinopoly. More than a year had been spent; and neither of the contending parties seemed nearer their object, when a new scene was introduced.[2]

[1] This fact is stated on the satisfactory authority of Col. Wilks, who had an opportunity of perusing the correspondence of Lawrence with the Presidency. Historical Sketches, ut supra, p. 342.

[2] For this war, Lawrence's Narrative, in Cambridge's War, p. 38—95; Orme, i. 245—249, 253—322, 337—365; Mém. pour Dupleix, p. 78—111; Wilks, ut supra, p. 285—340, yield the most important materials.

The objects, which fired the ambition of the European Governors in India, were too distant to warm the imaginations of the Directors and Proprietors of the French and English Companies in Europe; and to them the burden of the war had become exceedingly hateful. Aware of the passion for peace which now animated his employers, and of the opinion disseminated in Europe of his ambitious and warlike views, Dupleix had opened a negotiation with Saunders, the Governor of Madras, in January, 1754. The real point in dispute was whether or not Mohammed Ali should be acknowledged Nabob of the Carnatic; the English contending that he should be recognised by the French, the French contending that he should be given up by the English. The parties were far from being disposed, on either side, to concede the point; and the state of circumstances was little calculated to facilitate a compromise: the negotiation turned, therefore, on matters of form; and never, surely, did negotiation find more ridiculous matters of form on which to employ itself. In a country in which all questions of dominion are determined by the sword; in a question which, without any consideration of right, they themselves had, during four years, been labouring to decide by the sword, they affected to sit down gravely to a comparison of pretended titles and grants. The authority to which both parties appealed was that of the Mogul, though the Mogul himself, in the district in question, was a usurper, and that of a very recent date; though the power, too, of the Mogul was such, that he had no more authority in the Deccan than he had at Rome. The authority on which the government of the Carnatic immediately depended was that of the Subahdar of the Deccan; and the Subahdar of the Deccan was Salabut Jung, the friend of the French: so far, in point of title, they had the undoubted advantage. The patents, however, which Dupleix had received from Salabut Jung, and which placed the nabobship of the Carnatic entirely at his disposal, he asserted to have been confirmed by the Mogul. The English, on their side, affirmed that they had a patent constituting Mohammed Ali Nabob of the Carnatic; and they called upon the French to produce their documents. The French did exhibit some papers, which the English, and probably with truth, asserted to be forged. The English

Dupleix admits the forgery.

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were called upon to produce their pretended patent, and had none to produce: upon this, with mutual crimination, the proceedings broke off.[1]

The parties upon whom the decision depended in Europe came together with minds more disposed to accommodation. The English Company had, from an early period of the war, importuned the ministry with complaints, that during the existence of a treaty of peace between England and France, they were oppressed by the burden of a dangerous war, produced by the ambition of a French governor in India. The same subject had formed the matter of remonstrance between the English and French governments; and it was at last agreed that the dispute should be terminated by a distinct negotiation. M. Duvelaer arrived in London, vested with the powers of the French East India Company; Lord Holdernesse negotiated on the part of the English; while the Duke of Newcastle, as minister of England, and the Duc de Mirepoix, as ambassador of France, shared, when, necessary, in the conferences and decisions.

Dupleix, in stating afterwards the reasons of his conduct, asserted that, in the situation into which the Deccan was thrown, upon the death of Nizam al Mulk, an interference in the affairs of the country was not a matter of choice. The chiefs who contended for power, supreme and subordinate, were all ready to tempt, and by the most important concessions, the European nations to grant them support. If one nation, from an extraordinary effort of self-denial, should decline such advantages, what was to be expected but that another would embrace them? and that, rising in power above its rivals, it should first oppress, and finally expel them from the country? Dupleix was the first to perceive these consequences; and, from the promptitude and decision of his character, the first to act upon

[1] Orme, i. 337; Lawrence's Narrative, p. 81; Mém. pour Dupleix, p. 83; Wilks, p. 338. The English writers, with the exception of Wilks, make no allusion to any pretence of a patent held out by the English. But it is so distinctly asserted by Dupleix, who appeals to the letters of Saunders, to which his opponents had access, that I doubt not the fact. The English writers, who are very severe upon the French forgeries, say that the conferences were broken off when the French, who had permitted their papers to be so far copied by the English, withdrew them upon the English allegations that they were forged. Dupleix, on the other hand, says, that he refused to permit the French papers any longer to be copied, when the English failed to produce any on their side which might undergo the same operation.

this discovery. This priority, which naturally promised to be advantageous to him, was the reverse. It stamped his whole career with the character of aggression; though the English themselves drew the same conclusions, as soon as they were suggested to them by the proceedings of Dupleix; and guided their proceedings by the belief that it was not safe for them to see their rival aggrandized by favour of the native powers. That to play a high game in India, was a wish dear to the heart of Dupleix, sufficiently appears; but that there were strong reasons for the part which he acted, no one acquainted with the affairs of India will attempt to dispute.

The French East India Company, however, and the French Ministers, were but little acquainted with the affairs of India; those who envied, and those who hated Dupleix, accused him of wasting the resources of the Company in ambitious wars; and the English Company and the English ministry accused him of embroiling the two nations in India; and there was a general prejudice against him and his proceedings, both in France and in England, at the time when the conferences in London were held. The English ministry prudently despatched a considerable fleet to India, while the negotiation was still proceeding. The French ministry had no fleet to spare; and dreaded the superiority which such a force might bestow. The French Company were, at the same time, extremely eager to taste the gains of commerce, which they promised themselves in peace; and, from all these causes, were disposed to make ample concessions. It ultimately appeared, that no definite arrangement could be made except upon the spot. The English, however, exclaimed against any negotiation which was to be conducted by Dupleix, the object of which, they affirmed, his ambition and artifice would be sure to defeat. The French ministry were not far from harbouring the same opinion; and easily enough assented to the proposition of sending commissioners from Europe to settle the differences of the two nations in India.

A point was thus gained in favour of the English, on which their fortune in India very probably hinged; for when, after the short interval of two years, war was renewed between the English and French; when the English

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were expelled from Bengal; and the influence of Bussy was paramount at the court of the Subahdar; had Dupleix remained at the head of French affairs in India, the scheme of that enterprising governor, to render himself master of the Carnatic, and the Subahdar master of Bengal, would have stood a fair chance of complete accomplishment.

On the second of August, 1754, M. Godheu, appointed commissary to negotiate a peace with the English, and vested with authority to supersede Dupleix in the government of all the French possessions in India, arrived at Pondicherry. Dupleix affirms, that in the negotiations at London, for the sake of removing all local prejudices and views, it had been established that the governors in India on both sides should be removed; and commissioners, free from all bias, should be sent from England to terminate the costly disputes.[1] If this was a condition really made, the French, it would appear, consented to a departure from it, as they raised no complaint against Mr. Saunders, who continued the President of Madras. The English, in this manner, obtained the important advantage of having the negotiation conducted on their side by a person conversant with the affairs and interests of the two nations in India, while it was conducted, on the part of their antagonists, by a man to whom they were in a great measure unknown.

Godheu lost no time in taking upon himself the exercise of his authority, and in commencing his negotiations with Saunders. The strong desire of his employers for peace appears to have been the predominating consideration in his mind; and he manifested, from the beginning, a disposition to concede, of which the English made ample advantage. On the 11th of October, a suspension of arms was established for three months; and on the 26th of December, a provisional treaty, to be confirmed or altered in Europe, was signed at Pondicherry. By this treaty, everything for which they had been contending was gained by the English; every advantage of which they had come into possession was given up by the French. By the sti-

[1] Mém. pour Dupleix, p. 89. As this assertion (made before persons highly competent to contradict it, and for which an appeal is made to the Journal of Duvelaer) is not denied in the Answer of the Company to the Mémoire of Dupleix, it is entitled to credit.

pulation to withdraw effectually from interference in the affairs of the native princes, Mohammed Ali was left, by the fact, Nabob of the Carnatic or Arcot. And by the stipulation to arrange the territorial possessions of the two nations on the principle of equality, the important acquisition of the four Circars was resigned.[1] Till the decision of the two Companies in Europe should be given, the contracting parties were to abstain from hostilities, direct or indirect; and their possessions to remain as they were.

That the severe strictures which Dupleix made upon this treaty were in some degree overcharged, is not to be denied. There is no reason to believe him, when he asserts that Trichinopoly was on the point of surrendering for want of supplies; for, at the time of the suspension of arms, the relative advantages of the contending parties appear to have been nearly the same as they had been twelve months before. It is equally impossible to believe, what the English writers affirm, that the advantages of the English were now so great as to make it politic on the part of the French to conclude the treaty, unfavourable as it was. Admiral Watson had indeed arrived with a fleet, consisting of three ships and a sloop; having on board a king's regiment of 700 men, with forty artillerymen, and 200 recruits. But 1500 European troops had arrived with Godheu on the part of the French;[2] and Dupleix boasts, with some reason, that he could have added to these the Mahrattas, the Mysoreans, and, on certain conditions, the King of Tanjore.[3] Bussy, too, had improved with so much ability his situation with Salabut

[1] Col. Wilks (p. 345) must have read the treaty very carelessly, to imagine that "the substantial Moorish government and dignity of the extensive and valuable provinces of the Northern Circars were not noticed in the treaty," when the very first article of the treaty says, "The two Companies, English and French, shall renounce for ever *all* Moorish government and dignity, and shall never interfere in any differences that arise between the princes of the country." Mr. Orme, too (so easily is the judgment warped of the best of men when their passions are engaged), imagined it would have been no infringement of the treaty, to assist the Mahrattas with English troops from Bombay, for the purpose of compelling Salabut Jung to dismiss Bussy and the French, and deprive them of the Northern Circars. Orme, i. 406.

2. This is the number stated by Lawrence, Narrative, p. 95; Orme, i. 371, calls it 1200; Godheu, in his letter to Dupleix, received two days before his landing, calls it 2000 (Mém. pour Dupleix, p. 101). And Dupleix himself asserts (Ibid. p. 111), that by the troops newly arrived his force was rendered superior to that of the English.

[3] Mémoire pour Dupleix, p. 111.

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1754. After displaying, in the most brilliant manner, the extraordinary superiority of European soldiers, in the subjugation of the Patan rebels, he compelled Salabut Jung to raise the son of Moozuffer Jung, the late Subahdar, and friend of the French, to the government, originally enjoyed by that unfortunate prince, of the strong-hold of Adoni and its territory, augmented by the possessions of two of the Patan nobles, by whose treachery the father was slain. "An example of generosity," says Mr. Orme, "which, if true, could not fail to raise admiration in a country, where the merits of the father are so seldom of advantage to the distresses of the son." [1]

The settlement of the dominions of Salabut Jung was formidably opposed by the Mahrattas, who, in the weakness which ensued upon the death of Nizam al Mulk, were actively employed in adding to their conquests as much as possible of the Subah of the Deccan. A Mahratta general, named Balajee Row, had opposed himself, at the head of 25,000 horse, to the march of the Subahdar, between the Kistnah and Golconda, but, by negotiation and a suitable present, was induced to withdraw. Within a few months he appeared again, with a force which would have enabled him to gain important advantages, had not the talents of Bussy, and the execution of European firearms, which astonished the Indians, decided in a variety of engagements the fortune of the day. Danger came not from one quarter alone. Ghazee ad din Khan, the eldest son of Nizam al Mulk, destined by his father to maintain the interests of his family at the court of the Mogul, had apparently acquiesced in the accession of his second brother to the government of the Deccan, to which, as to a destined event, he had been accustomed to look. Upon the death, however, of Nazir Jung, as he had become very uneasy in his situation at court, he solicited, as the eldest son and successor of Nizam al Mulk, the appointment of Subahdar of the Deccan. The assent of the Emperor, which was now a mere form without power, was easily obtained; and Ghazee ad din arrived at Aurungabad in the beginning of October, 1752, at the head, it is said, of

[1] Orme, i. 249.

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150,000 men, of whom a large body were Mahrattas, commanded by Holkar Malhar Rao. At the same time Balajee Row, and another Mahratta general, named Ragojee Bonsla, in concert, it is said, with Ghazee ad din Khan, entered the province of Golconda with 100,000 horse. To meet these formidable armies, Salabut Jung and Bussy took the field with very unequal numbers; when Ghazee ad din Khan suddenly died. He was an old man, worn out by the pleasures of the harem; and his sudden death was by no means a surprising event; but, as it was singularly opportune for Salabut Jung, it was ascribed to poison, said to be administered, at his instigation, by the mother of the deceased; and, as the event was favourable to the French, the story of its odious cause has been adopted, with patriotic credulity, by the English historians.[1] The Mahratta generals still continued the war; but were in every encounter repulsed with so much slaughter by the French, that they soon became desirous of peace, and Salabut Jung was happy to purchase their retreat by the cession of some districts to Balajee Row, in the neighbourhood of Boorhanpore, and to Ragojee Bonsla, in the neighbourhood of Berar; where that Mahratta chief had acquired for himself an extensive dominion. By the services which, in all these dangers, Bussy had rendered to the cause of Salabut Jung,[2] whom he alone preserved upon the throne, his influence with that prince had risen to the greatest height: and though the envy and jealousy of the ministers, and the weak character of the Subahdar, exposed his power to perpetual jeopardy; and on one occasion, when he was absent for the recovery of his health, had almost destroyed it; the prudence and dexterity of that able leader enabled him to triumph over all opposition. In the latter end of 1753, he obtained for his country

[1] The author of the Seer Mutakhareen, whom, as better informed, I follow in all affairs relating at this period to the Court of Delhi, says (iii. 19), that he died suddenly, without any mention of poison. The story of the poison is indeed, presented in a note by the translator; who does not, however, impute the fact to the mother of Ghazee ad Din, but to the ladies of his harem in general.

[2] The oriental historian describes the efficacy of the French operations in battle in such expressions as these: "At which time the French, with their quick musketry and their expeditious artillery, drew smoke from the Mahratta breasts:" "they lost a vast number of men, whom the French consumed in shoals at the fire-altars of their artillery." Seer Mutakhareen, ii. 118.

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the four important provinces of Mustaphanagar, Ellore, Rajamundry, and Chicacole, called the Northern Circars; "which made the French," says Mr. Orme, "masters of the sea-coast of Coromandel and Orixa, in an uninterrupted line of 600 miles from Medapilly to the Pagoda of Jagernaut;"[1] and "which," says Colonel Wilks, "not only afforded the requisite pecuniary resources, but furnished the convenient means of receiving reinforcements of men and military stores from Pondicherry and Mauritius; and thus enabled Bussy to extend his political views to the indirect or absolute empire of the Deccan and the south."[2] All these brilliant advantages were now cordially resigned by M. Godheu; and it will certainly be allowed that few nations have ever made, to the love of peace, sacrifices relatively more important.

"Dupleix," says Mr. Orme, whose concluding strictures upon his enemy are equally honourable to the writer and the subject, "departed on his voyage to Europe, on the 14th of October, having first delivered his accounts with the French Company to M. Godheu, by which it appeared that he had disbursed on their account near three millions of rupees more than he had received during the course of the war. A great part of this sum was furnished out of his own estate, and the rest from moneys which he borrowed at interest, from the French inhabitants at Pondicherry, upon bonds given in his own name. M. Godheu referred the discussion of these accounts to the Directors of the Company in France, who, pretending that M. Dupleix had made these expenses without sufficient authority, refused to pay any part of the large balance he asserted to be due to him; upon which he commenced a law-suit against the Company; but the ministry interfered and put a stop to the proceedings by the king's authority, without entering into any discussion of M. Dupleix's claims, or taking any measures to satisfy them. However, they gave him letters of protection to secure him from being prosecuted by any of his creditors. So that his fortune was left much less than that which he was possessed of before he entered upon the government of Pondicherry, in 1742. His conduct certainly merited a very different requital from his nation, which never had a subject so desirous

[1] Orme, i. 334.

[2] Wilks, ut supra, p. 338.

and capable of extending its reputation and power in the East Indies; had he been supplied with the forces he desired immediately after the death of Anwar-ad-din Khan, or had he afterwards been supported from France in the manner necessary to carry on the extensive projects he had formed, there is no doubt but that he would have placed Chunda Saheb in the Nabobship of the Carnatic, given law to the Subah of the Deccan, and perhaps to the throne of Delhi itself, and have established a sovereignty over many of the most valuable provinces of the empire; armed with which power he would easy have reduced all the other European settlements to such restrictions as he might think proper to impose. When we consider that he formed this plan of conquest and dominion at a time when all other Europeans entertained the highest opinion of the strength of the Mogul government, suffering tamely the insolence of its meanest officers, rather than venture to make resistance against a power which they chimerically imagined to be capable of overwhelming them in an instant, we cannot refrain from acknowledging and admiring the sagacity of his genius, which first discovered and despised this illusion."[1]

In a short time after the conclusion of this treaty, both Saunders and Godheu took their departure for Europe; pleasing themselves with the consideration that, by means of their exertions, the blessings of peace between the two nations in India were now permanently bestowed. Never was expectation more completely deceived. Their treaty procured not so much as a moment's repose. The English proceeded to reduce to the obedience of their Nabob the districts of Madura and Tinivelly. The French exclaimed against these transactions, as an infringement of the treaty with Godheu; but finding their remonstrances without avail, they followed the English example, and sent a body of troops to reduce to their obedience the petty sovereignty of Terriore.

Madura was a small kingdom, bordering on Trichinopoly towards the south; and Tinivelly was a kingdom of similar extent, reaching from the southern extremity of Madura

[1] Orme, i. 377. Voltaire says (Précis du Siècle de Louis XIV. ch. xxxix.), Dupleix fut réduit à disputer à Paris les tristes restes de sa fortune contre la Compagnie des Indes, et à solliciter des audiences dans l'anti-chambre de ses juges. Il en mourut bientôt de chagrin.

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to Cape Comorin. These countries had acknowledged the supremacy of the Mogul government of the Deccan, and had paid tribute through the Nabob of Arcot. When Chunda Saheb was master of Trichinopoly, he had set up his own brother as Governor of Madura; but during the disturbances which followed, a soldier of fortune, named Aûlum Khan, obtained possession of the city and government. When Aulum Khan marched to the assistance of Chunda Saheb at Trichinopoly, where he lost his life, he left four Patan chiefs to conduct his government, who acted as independent princes, notwithstanding the pretensions of Mohammed Ali, as Nabob of Arcot. To compromise the dispute about Trichinopoly, Mohammed Ali had offered to resign Madura to the Mysoreans. And upon his liberation from the terror of the French arms, by the treaty of Godheu, he prevailed upon the English to afford him a body of troops to collect, as he hoped, and as the English believed, a large arrear of tribute from the southern dependencies of his nabobship.

The troops proceeded to the city of Madura, which they took. The Polygars, as they are called; the lords, or petty sovereigns of the several districts; overawed by the terror of European arms, offered their submissions, and promised to discharge the demanded arrears; but for the present had little or nothing which they were able to pay. Instead of the quantity of treasure which the Nabob and the English expected to receive, the money collected sufficed not to defray the expense of the expedition. The disappointment and ill-humour were consequently great. The conduct of the English officer who commanded became the subject of blame. He formed a connexion, which promised to be of considerable importance with Marawar, a district, governed by two Polygars, which extended along the coast on the eastern side of Madura, from the kingdom of Tanjore till it joined Tinivelly; but this connexion gave umbrage to the Polygar Tondeman, and the Raja of Tanjore, in satisfaction to whom it was renounced. With Maphuz Khan the brother of the Nabob, who attended the expedition, as future governor of the country, the officer formed an agreement, at a rent which was afterwards condemned, as not one half of the requisite amount: and the English detachment, upon its return, was imprudently exposed in a narrow pass, where it suffered severely by the people of

the country. From all these causes, the existing displeasure found an object and a victim, in the unlucky officer, who was tried, and dismissed from the Company's service.[1]

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About the same time with these transactions in Madura, Salabut Jung, accompanied by Bussy and the French troops, marched against the kingdom of Mysore, to extort arrears of tribute, said to be due from it, as a dependency of the Subah of the Deccan. Upon this emergency, the Mysorean army before Trichinopoly (the Mysoreans had refused to abandon their pretensions upon Trichinopoly, when the treaty was concluded between the English and French,) was recalled. As the Mysoreans were threatened at the same time by an army of Mahrattas under Balajee Row, they were happy to acquire the protection of Salabut Jung, by acknowledging his authority, and paying as large a sum as it was possible for them to raise.

By the departure of the Mysoreans from Trichinopoly Mohammed Ali was left without an ostensible opponent in the Carnatic: and he was vested, as pompously as circumstances would permit, with the ensigns of his office and dignity, at Arcot. It still remained to compel the Zemindars or Polygars, and other Governors of forts and districts, to yield him a revenue. The English, after stipulating to receive one half of all the moneys collected sent with him a large detachment to enforce a tribute from the northern chiefs, who recognised the authority of the Nabob, and produced a portion of the demanded sums. The reputed riches of Mortiz Ali, the Governor of Velore rendered his subjugation the main object of desire. The English detachment was strongly reinforced, and encamped with the Nabob within cannon-shot of the fort. Mortiz Ali applied to the French. M. Deleyrit, who was Governor of Pondicherry, informed the English Presidency, that he regarded their proceedings at Velore as a violation of the treaty, and that he should commence hostilities, if their troops were not immediately withdrawn. The English rulers, soon aware that Velore could not be easily taken, and unwilling to put to proof the threat of Deleyrit, who had made 700 Europeans and 2000 Sepoys take the field, recalled the army to Madras. An attempt was made to

[1] Orme, i. 380—387; Cambridge's War in India, p. 109—113.

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obtain a contribution for the Company from Mortiz Ali, but the negotiation terminated without any effect.[1]

Meanwhile the Polygars of Madura and Tinivelly, who had made an ostensible submission during the presence of the English troops, were affording dangerous employment to the Governor Maphuz Khan. A confederacy was formed, which it soon appeared that the Governor was altogether unable to withstand. The English sent a large body of Sepoys; but in spite of this support, the refractory chiefs continued unsubdued; the country was thrown into confusion by a petty warfare which extended itself into every corner of the provinces, and no tribute could be raised. Highly dissatisfied with the unproductive state of a country which they had fondly believed to be the richest dependency of the Carnatic Nabob, the English determined to manage it themselves; and Maphuz Khan was ordered to return to Trichinopoly. But the chief entered immediately into confederacy with the Polygars; set himself in opposition to the English; obtained possession of the town and fort of Madura by a stratagem: and, with much uneasiness to the English, the disturbances in Madura and Tinivelly were prolonged for several years.[2]

During these transactions of the English, not very consistent with their agreement not to interfere in the disputes of the native princes, or add to their territory in India, the French were restrained from that active opposition which, otherwise, it is probable, they would have raised, by the dangerous situation of their affairs under the government of the Subahdar.

The enemies of Bussy, in the service and in the confidence of Salabut Jung, were both numerous and powerful; and exerted themselves in concert and with eagerness, to change the confidence and attachment of their feeble-minded master into distrust and hatred. It was now about two years and a half since the grant of the northern Circars; when certain favourable circumstances[3]

[1] Orme, i. 388, 398, 419; Cambridge, p. 111, 117, 119.
[2] Orme, i. 399, 420; Cambridge, p. 188.
[3] It is not extraordinary that there should have been a strong party in the court of the Nizam opposed to the French, who were ready to avail themselves of every opportunity to influence the mind of Salabut Jung against them. Native accounts confirm the statement of Orme, that Shahnavaz Khan, the chief minister, was at their head; the circumstance of which he made present use might have been related, as it is fully detailed by Orme. The Nizam had laid

enabled them to make so deep an impression on the mind of this prince, that the French troops were ordered to quit his territories without delay. Bussy, in expectation, probably, that the necessities of the Subahdar would speedily make him eager to retract his command, showed no hesitation in commencing his march. It was continued for eight days without interruption: but his enemies had a very different intention from that of allowing him to depart in safety. When he approached the city of Hyderabad, he found his progress impeded by large bodies of troops, and the road obstructed by all the chiefs of the neighbouring countries, who had orders to intercept his march. Upon this he resolved to occupy a post of considerable strength, adjoining the city of Hyderabad, to defend himself, and try the effect of his arms, and of his intrigues among the chiefs, whom he well knew, till the reinforcements which he expected from Pondicherry should arrive. Though surrounded by the whole of the army of the Subahdar, and so feeble in pecuniary means, that his Sepoys deserted for want of pay, and he durst not venture them in sallies, for fear of their joining the enemy, he found the means of supplying himself fully with provisions, and of resisting every attack, till his succours arrived; when the Subahdar sent to demand a reconciliation, and he was restored to a still higher degree of influence and authority than he had previously enjoyed.

Among the means which had been employed to reconcile the mind of Salabut Jung to the dismissal of the French, was the prospect held up to him of replacing them by the English. No sooner, therefore, were the measures against Bussy devised, than an application was made for a body of troops to the Presidency of Madras. To the Presidency of Madras, few things could have presented a more dazzling

siege to Savanore, the residence of a disobedient vassal, who was supported in his resistance by the Mahratta partisan, Morari Rao. The government of Pondicherry was indebted to the latter, who finding himself and his ally hard pressed, engaged to relinquish his claims upon the French on condition that Bussy, who was with the Nizam, should negotiate a peace, and the preservation of the citadel of Savanore. The condition was effected, and Shahnavaz Khan represented to the Nizam what was no more than the truth, that Bussy had preferred the interests of his countrymen to those of Salabut Jung. It was in resentment of this conduct that the French were dismissed from his service, upon the strong representation, as is stated by the author of the life of Shahnavaz Khan, of that nobleman. Calcutta Quarterly Magazine, Dec. 1825.—W.

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prospect of advantage; and in any ordinary situation of their affairs, the requisition of the Subahdar would have met with an eager acceptance. But events had before this time taken place in Bengal, which demanded the utmost exertions of the English from every quarter; made them unable to comply with the proposal of the Subahdar; and thenceforward rendered Bengal the principal scene of the English adventures in India.[1]

CHAPTER III.

Suraja Dowla, Subahdar of Bengal—takes Calcutta—attacked by an army from Madras—dethroned—Meer Jaffier set up in his stead.

DURING the latter part of the reign of Aurungzeb, the Subahs of Bengal and Orissa, together with those of Allahabad and Bahar, were governed by his grandson Azeem-oos-Shan, the second son of Shah Aulum, who succeeded to the throne. Azeem-oos-Shan appointed as his deputy, in the provinces of Bengal and Orissa, Jaffier Khan, who had been for some time the dewan, or superintendent of the finances, in Bengal; a man of Tartar descent, but a native of Boorhanpore in the Deccan, who had raised himself to eminence in the wars of Aurungzeb. Upon the death of Shah Aulum, and the confusions which ensued, Jaffier Khan remained in possession of his important government, till he was too powerful to be removed. While yet a resident in his native city, he had married his daughter and only child to a man of eminence in the same place, and of similar origin with himself, by name Shujah Khan. This relative had repaired with him to Bengal; and when Jaffier Khan was elevated to the Subahdarry of Bengal and Orissa, Orissa was placed under the government of Shujah Khan, as deputy or nawab of the Subahdar.[2]

[1] Orme, i. 429—436, and ii. 89—104; Wilks, p. 380—388. It is amusing to compare the account of Bussy's transactions on this trying occasion, in the pages of Owen Cambridge (War in India, p. 132—135), written under half information, and fulness of national prejudice, with the well-informed and liberal narratives of Orme and of Wilks.

[2] Seer Mutaklıareen, i. 17, 43, 296.

Among the adventurers who had been in the service of Azeem Shah, the second son of Aurungzeb, was a Tartar, named Mirza Mohammed. Upon the death of that prince, and the ruin of his party, Mirza Mohammed remained without employment, and was overtaken, after some years, with great poverty. His wife not only belonged to the same place from which the family of Shujah Khan was derived, but was actually of kin to that new ruler. By this wife he had two sons: the eldest named Hajee Ahmed; the youngest, Mirza Mohammed Ali. Upon the news of the elevation of their kinsman, it was determined, in this destitute family, that Mirza Mohammed, with his wife, should repair to his capital, in hopes of receiving his protection and bounty. The disposition of Shujah Khan was benevolent and generous. He received them with favour. The success of his father and mother induced Mirza Mohammed Ali, the youngest of the two sons, to hope for similar advantages. With great difficulty his poverty allowed him to find the means of performing the journey. He obtained employment and distinction. His prospects being now favourable, he sent for his brother Hajee Ahmed, and removed the whole of his family to Orissa. The talents of the two brothers were eminent. Hajee Ahmed was insinuating, pliant, discerning, and in business equally skilful and assiduous. Mirza Mohammed Ali to all the address and intelligence of his brother added the highest talents for war. They soon acquired a complete ascendency in the councils of Shujah Khan, and by their abilities added greatly to the strength and splendour of his administration. 1735.

Jaffier Khan died in 1725; but destined Sereffraz Khan his grandson, instead of Shujah Khan, the father of that prince, with whom he lived not on friendly terms, to the succession. By the address and activity of the two brothers, the schemes of Jaffier were entirely defeated; patents were procured from Delhi; and Shujah Khan, with an army, was in possession of the capital and the government before any time was given to think of opposition. The province of Bahar was added to the government of Shujah Khan in 1729; and the younger of the two brothers, on whom was bestowed the title of Aliverdi Khan, was intrusted with its administration. He exerted

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himself, with assiduity and skill, to give prosperity to the province, and to acquire strength in expectation of future events.[1] In 1739, the same year in which Nadir Shah ravaged Delhi, Shujah Khan died, and was succeeded by Sereffraz Khan, his son. Sereffraz Khan had been educated a prince; and had the incapacity, and the servile subjection to pleasure, which that education usually implies. He hated the brothers; and began with disgusting and affronting when he should have either exterminated, or reconciled. The resolution of Aliverdi was soon taken. He employed his influence, which was great, at Delhi, to obtain his nomination to the government of Bengal and the united provinces; and marched with an army to dethrone Sereffraz, who lost his life in the battle. With the exception of the Governor of Orissa, whom he soon reduced, the whole country submitted without opposition. He governed it with unusual humanity and justice; and defended it with splendid ability and unwearied perseverance.

The Mahrattas, who had spread themselves at this time over a great part of the continent of India, seemed resolved upon the conquest of Bengal, the richest portion of the Mogul empire.[2] The dependence of the greatest events upon the slightest causes is often exemplified in Asiatic story. Had Sereffraz Khan remained Subahdar of Bengal, the Mahrattas might have added it, and all the adjoining provinces, to their extensive dominion. The English, and other European factories, might have been expelled. Nothing afterwards remained to check the Mahratta progress. The Mohammedans might have been exterminated; and the government of Brahmens and Kshatriyas might have extended once more from Caubul to Cape Comorin.

Aliverdi was on his return from the expedition against the Governor of Orissa, and had disbanded a great portion of his army, in contemplation of tranquillity and enjoyment, when he learned that a large army of Mahrattas had entered through the valleys in the mountains, at eight days' journey west of his capital Moorshedabad. The Mahrattas, besides possessing themselves of Kandeish and

[1] Holwell (Interesting Historical Events, i. 70) represents his conduct as highly cruel and unjust, and gives an account of five baskets of human heads, which he saw conveying to him in a boat.

[2] Seer Mutakharеen, i. 298—382; Orme, ii. 26—32.

Malwa, had, before this period, overrun and subdued the whole province of Berar, where a general, named Ragojee Bonsla, of the family of Sivajee, had established himself in a widely-extended sovereignty which acknowledged but a nominal subjection to the primitive throne. The dominions of Ragojee Bonsla were separated from Bahar, Bengal, and Orissa, by only a chain of mountains, which it was easy for the Mahrattas to penetrate in many parts. And now it was that the said chief, either urged by the hope of adding the richest part of Hindustan to his empire, or at the instigation, as was alleged, of Nizam al Mulk, sent an army under a Brahmen general to invade Bengal.[1] Aliverdi marched against them instantly with the small number of troops which he had about his person, and was hardy enough to venture a battle; but the Afghan troops in his service were discontented with some recent treatment, and were inclined to make their advantage of his necessities. They acted coldly and feebly during the engagement. Aliverdi found it difficult to avoid a total defeat, and remained surrounded on all sides by a numerous and active enemy. He resolved to fight his way back; and though he suffered prodigiously from the sword, from fatigue, and from famine, he effected a glorious retreat; but reached not his capital till a detachment of the enemy had taken and plundered the suburbs.[2]

The Mahrattas, instead of returning to their own country, determined to remain during the period of the rains: and collected the revenue of almost the whole of territory south of the Ganges. Aliverdi made the greatest exertions to collect an army; and marching out at the termination of the rains, surprised the Mahrattas in their camp, and put them to flight; pursued them from post

[1] The Mahratta accounts, which appear to be most authentic, refer the invasion of Bengal to a different cause—the invitation of Meer Hubeeb, the Dewan of the Governor of Orissa. The Mahrattas, however, were too late in their invasion of the latter province, and therefore turned northwards, penetrating into the districts of Midnapore and Burdwan; in the latter they defeated Aliverdi Khan. They were prevented from following up their success, and marching to Moorshedabad, by the rise of the Ganges, but a party of horse under Meer Hubeeb made a predatory incursion to the capital, where he carried off his brother, and plundered the banker Jagat Set of two millions and a half sterling, in Arcot Rupees. Seer Mutakhareen, i. 426.—W.

[2] Holwell, who was in the province, and must have had opportunities of learning many of the particulars, gives (Interesting Historical Events, i. 118) a detailed account of this retreat, which he celebrates as one of the most brilliant exploits in the annals of warfare.

BOOK IV. CHAP. III. to post; and at last compelled them to evacuate his dominions.[1]

1755. If Aliverdi flattered himself that he was now delivered from a dangerous foe, he knew not the people with whom he had to contend. The Mahrattas appeared the very next year with Ragojee Bonsla himself at their head. Another army of Mahrattas, belonging to the government of Satarah, entered the province; but whether with hostile or friendly intentions, is variously asserted. It is not doubtful that, at this time, Aliverdi delivered himself from his enemies by a sum of money, upon receipt of which they retired.[2]

After a little time the general of Ragojee again entered by the province of Orissa, whence he advanced towards Bengal. By a train of artful and base negotiation, he was brought to trust himself at a conference in the tent of Aliverdi. He was there assassinated; and his death was the signal of dispersion to his troops.

The next invasion of the Mahrattas was encouraged by the rebellion of one of Aliverdi's principal officers. The good fortune of that chief still seconded his vigour. The formidable rebel was killed in battle, and the Mahrattas were compelled to retire.

The Mahratta pressure, incessantly returning, though frequently repelled, seldom failed, in the long run, to make the opposing body recede. The subjects of Aliverdi were grievously harassed, and the produce of his dominions was greatly impaired by these numerous invasions, and by the military exertions which were necessary to oppose them. In a new incursion, headed by Janojee, the son of Ragojee, the Mahrattas possessed themselves almost com-

[1] Seer Mutakhareen, i. 407—438; Orme, ii. 35. Both Orme and the author of the Seer Mutakhareen mention the instigation of Nizam al Mulk, but after all it seems to have been only a vague conjecture; and there were motives enough to Ragojee Bonsla without prompting. Holwell (Interesting Historical Events, i. 108) says they were instigated by the Court of Delhi.

[2] The author of the Seer Mutakhareen, who had the best opportunities of knowing, says (i. 450), that the Emperor claimed, as due on account of the payment of the chout, the assistance, for the province of Bengal, of the government of Sattarah, against Ragojee Bonsla; and that it was in compliance with this request, that the army of Balajee Row came into Bengal. Holwell, i. 140, and Orme, ii. 37, say that the two armies came in concert, and only differed about the division of the plunder.—M.

* The native authority is best entitled to confidence; especially as the Peshwa and Ragojee Bonsla had been at variance, and were but imperfectly reconciled. Duff, Mahrattas, ii. 10.—W.

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pletely of Orissa. The attention of the Subahdar was engaged in another quarter. Discontent again prevailed among his Afghan and Tartar officers, which it required some address to allay. His youngest nephew, who was the most distinguished for ability of all his relations, and whom he had appointed Nabob or Deputy Governor of Bahar, had taken into his pay two Afghan officers, who had retired in discontent from the service of Aliverdi. These leaders murdered their young master, the nephew of the Subahdar; and with a body of Mahrattas, who had entered the province on purpose to join them, and a considerable army of their own countrymen, whom the host of Ahmed Shah Abdallee, then covering the upper provinces of Hindustan, enabled them to collect, erected against Aliverdi the standard of revolt. Never was that governor, or rather king, for it was but a nominal obedience which he now paid to the throne of Delhi, in greater danger. He was obliged to meet the enemy, with a very inferior force; yet he gained a complete victory; and the Afghan lords were killed in the battle. The Mahrattas, however, only retired on the road towards Orissa, without crossing the mountains, and halted at Midnapore. He followed; pursued them into Orissa, with great slaughter; and even recovered the capital Cuttack; but was obliged to leave the province in so defenceless a condition, that the Mahrattas were not long deprived of their former acquisitions.

During the fifteen years of Aliverdi's government or reign, scarcely a year passed free from ruinous invasions of the Mahrattas; though during the infirmities of his latter years he had, by a tributary payment, endeavoured to procure some repose. He died at the age of eighty on the 9th of April, 1756.[1] Aliverdi never had a son. He had three daughters, and his brother had three sons.[2] He married his three daughters to his three nephews; all of whom were men of considerable merit. The youngest was slain by the Afghan lords, as already related; and the two elder both died a little before the decease of Aliverdi.

[1] For a minute and very interesting account of the government of Aliverdi, see Seer Mutakhareen, i. 355—681. The narrative of Orme (ii. 28—52), and that of Holwell (Interesting Historical Events, i. 85—176), do not exactly agree either with Gholam Hosein or with one another. Scrafton's account (Reflection, &c.) Holwell says was stolen from him.

[2] Orme, ii. 34, says that Aliverdi had only one daughter. The author of the Seer Mutakhareen, who was his near relation, says he had three, i. 304.

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The eldest son of his youngest nephew had from his birth been taken under the immediate care of Aliverdi himself; and was the object of extreme and even doting fondness. The youth, on whom had been bestowed the title of Suraj-ad-dowla, was, upon the death of his uncles, regarded as the destined successor of Aliverdi;[1] and took the reins of government without opposition upon his decease.

Suraj-ad-dowla was educated a prince, and with more than even the usual share of princely consideration and indulgence. He had, accordingly, more than the usual share of princely vices. He was ignorant; he was voluptuous; on his own pains and pleasures he set a value immense, on the pains and pleasures of other men, no value at all; he was impatient, irascible, headstrong.

The first act of Suraj-ad-dowla's government was to plunder his aunt, the widow of his senior uncle, eldest daughter of Aliverdi, reputed immensely rich. To this uncle had belonged the government of the province of Dacca; and orders were despatched to that place, to seize the receivers and treasurers of the family. His second uncle, who was Nabob of Poorania or Purneah, a province on the northern side of the Ganges, died during the last illness of Aliverdi, and left the government in the hands of his son, whose conduct was imprudent, and his mind vicious. Jealousy, or the desire of showing power by mischief, excited the young Subahdar to resolve upon the destruction of his cousin, the Nabob of Purneah. He had advanced as far as Baj Mahl, when he received intelligence that one of the principal officers of finance in the service of his late uncle at Dacca, had given the slip to his guards and found an asylum at Calcutta.

Suraj-ad-dowla had manifested aversion to the English, even during the life of his grandfather; the appearance of protection, therefore, shown to a man who had disappointed his avarice, and was probably imagined to have escaped with a large treasure, kindled his rage; the army was that moment commanded to halt, and to march back towards the capital. A messenger was despatched to Cal-

[1] Orme, ii. 47, says that Aliverdi had declared Suraj-ad-dowla his successor, before the death of his uncle. But the author of the Seer Mutakhareen, who was in the confidential service of Seid Hamet, the surviving nephew, tells us that he regarded himself as the successor of Aliverdi till the time of his death; which was during the last illness of Aliverdi.

cutta to remonstrate with the governor; but as the messenger entered the town in a sort of disguise, the governor thought proper to treat him as an impostor, and dismissed him from the Company's territory. With a view to the war between France and England, the Presidency had begun to improve their fortifications. This, too, was matter of displeasure to the Subahdar; and the explanation offered by the English, which intimated that those strangers were audacious enough to bring their hostilities into his dominions, still more inflamed his resentment. The factory at Cossimbuzar, near Moorshedabad, was seized; and its chief, Mr. Watts, retained a prisoner. The Presidency were now very eager to appease the Subahdar; they offered to submit to any conditions which he pleased to impose; and, trusting to the success of their humility and prayers, neglected too long the means of defence. The Subahdar had a wish for a triumph, which he thought might be easily obtained; and he was greedy of riches, with which, in the imagination of the natives, Calcutta was filled.

The outposts of Calcutta were attacked on the 18th of June, 1756. There was but little of military skill in the place, and it was badly defended. After a short experiment of resistance, a general consultation decided upon the policy of retreat. It was agreed that the women and effects should be put on board the ships in the course of the next day; and that the persons employed in the work of defence should escape in the same manner the following night. There was hardly a chance of mishap, for the natives always close their operations with the close of the day; but by some strange inadvertence no orders were published respecting the mode in which the plan was to be carried into effect. It was generally known that retreat was intended: when the embarkation next morning began, every person imagined he was to shift for himself, and hurried on board by the readiest conveyance. During the confusion, an apprehension arose in the ships respecting the security of their situation; and they began to move down the river: the danger of being left without the means of retreat now flashed on the minds of the spectators on shore; and the boats were filled and gone in an instant. "Among those who left the factory in this un-

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accountable manner were, the Governor Mr. Drake, Mr. Macket, Captain Commandant Minchin, and Captain Grant."[1] Great was the indignation among the people of the fort, upon hearing that they were in this manner abandoned. Mr. Holwell, though not the senior servant, was by the general voice called to assume the command; and exerted himself with great vigour to preserve order, and maintain the defence. "Signals were now thrown out," says Mr. Cooke, "from every part of the fort, for the ships to come up again to their stations, in hopes they would have reflected (after the first impulse of their panic was over) how cruel as well as well as shameful it was, to leave their countrymen to the mercy of a barbarous enemy, and for that reason we made no doubt they would have attempted to cover the retreat of those left behind, now they had secured their own; but we deceived ourselves; and there never was a single effort made, in the two days the fort held out after this desertion, to send a boat or vessel to bring off any part of the garrison."[2] "Never, perhaps," says Mr. Orme, "was such an opportunity of performing an heroic action so ignominiously neglected; for a single sloop, with fifteen brave men on board, might, in spite of all the efforts of the enemy, have come up, and anchoring under the fort, have carried away all who suffered in the dungeon."[3] During these trying days Mr. Holwell made several efforts, by throwing letters over the wall, to signify his wish to capitulate; and it was during a temporary pause in the fire of the garrison, while expecting an answer, that the enemy approached the walls in numbers too great to be resisted, and the place was carried by storm. The Subahdar, though humanity was

[1] Evidence of John Cooke, Esq. (who at that time was Secretary to the Governor and Council of Calcutta), in the First Report of the Committee of the House of Commons, appointed "to inquire into the Nature, State, and Condition of the East India Company," in 1772.—M.

Mr. Holwell adds to these Messrs. Manningham and Franckland, members of the Council, who set the example of this disgraceful desertion. They, in the Dodaly, dropped down the river on the night of the 18th of June. The *President*, with the rest of the ships, followed on the morning of the 19th. The Fort was taken on the 20th. There can be no doubt that the whole of the garrison might have been carried off by the shipping had there been either conduct or courage amongst the principal servants of the Company. Holwell's Address to the Secret Committee. India Tracts.—W.

[2] Report, ut supra. Mr. Cooke, from notes written immediately after the transactions, gives a very interesting narrative, from the death of Aliverdi, till the morning after the night of the *Black Hole*.

[3] Orme, ii. 78.

no part of his character, appears not on the present occasion to have intended cruelty; for when Mr. Holwell was carried into his presence with his hands tied, he ordered them to be set loose, and assured him, upon the faith of a soldier, that of the heads of him and his companions, not a hair should be touched. When evening, however, came, it was a question with the guards to whom they were intrusted, how they might be secured for the night. Some search was made for a convenient apartment; but none was found; upon which information was obtained of a place which the English themselves had employed as a prison. Into this, without further inquiry, they were impelled. It was unhappily a small, ill-aired, and unwholesome dungeon, called the Black Hole; and the English had their own practice to thank for suggesting it to the officers of the Subahdar as a fit place of confinement.[1] Out of 146 unfortunate individuals thrust in, only twenty-three were taken out alive in the morning. The horror of the situation may be conceived, but it cannot be described. "Some of our company," says Mr. Cooke, "expired very soon after being put in; others grew mad, and having lost their senses, died in a high delirium." Applications were made to the guard, with the offer of great rewards; but it was out of their power to afford relief. The only chance consisted in conveying intelligence, by means of a bribe,

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[1] The atrocities of English imprisonment at home, not then exposed to detestation by the labours of Howard, too naturally reconciled Englishmen abroad to the use of dungeons: of *Black Holes*. What had they to do with a *black hole?* Had no *black hole* existed (as none ought to exist anywhere, least of all in the sultry and unwholesome climate of Bengal), those who perished in the Black Hole of Calcutta would have experienced a different fate. Even so late as 1782, the common gaol of Calcutta is described by the Select Committee, "a miserable and pestilential place." That Committee examined two witnesses on the state of the common gaol of Calcutta. One said, "The gaol is an old ruin of a house; there were very few windows to admit air, and those very small. He asked the gaoler how many souls were then confined in the prison? Who answered, upwards of 170, blacks and whites included—that there was no goal allowance, that many persons had died for want of the necessaries of life. The nauseous smells, arising from such a crowded place, were beyond expression. Besides the prisoners, the number of women and attendants, to carry in provisions and dress victuals, was so great, that it was astonishing that any person could long survive such a situation. It was the most horrible place he ever saw, take it altogether." The other witness said, "It is divided into small apartments, and those very bad; the stench dreadful, and more offensive than he ever experienced in this country—that there is no thorough draft of air—the windows are neither large nor numerous—the rooms low—that it would be impossible for any European to exist any length of time in the prison—that debtors and criminals were not separated—nor Hindoos, Mohammedans, and Europeans." First Report, Appendix, No. xi.

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to some officer of high authority; and to no one does it appear that this expedient occurred.[1]

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The news of the capture of Cossimbuzar arrived at Madras on the 15th of July, of that of Calcutta on the

[1] The account of the capture of Calcutta has been taken from the Report above quoted; from the accounts of Mr. Holwell and Mr. Watts; from Scrafton, p. 52—62; Orme, ii. 49—80; and Seer Mutakhareen, i. 716 - 721. The translator of this work says, in a note, "There is not a word here of those English shut up in the Black Hole, to the number of 131, where they were mostly smothered. The truth is, that the Hindostanees, wanting only to secure them for the night, as they were to be presented the next morning to the prince, shut them up in what they heard was the prison of the fort, without having any idea of the capacity of the room; and indeed the English themselves had none of it. This much is certain, that this event, which cuts so capital a figure in Mr. Watts' performance, is not known in Bengal; and even in Calcutta it is unknown to every man out of the 400,000 that inhabit that city: at least, it is difficult to meet a single native that knows anything of it: so careless, and so incurious are those people. Were we, therefore, to accuse the Indians of cruelty, for such a thoughtless action, we should of course accuse the English, who, intending to embark 400 Gentoo Sepoys, destined for Madras, put them in boats, without one single necessary, and at last left them to be overset by the bore, when they all perished after a three days' fast."—M.

The spirit in which this transaction is noticed, in this and the preceding note, as well as in the text, is wholly unjustifiable. It extenuates a deliberate act of wanton cruelty by erroneous assumptions and inapplicable analogies. The Black Hole was no dungeon at all; it was a chamber above ground — small and ill-aired only with reference to the number of persons forced into it, but affording abundant light and air to many more than it had ever lodged under the English administration. According to Holwell (Letter to Dr. Davis, 28th Feb. 1757; published in Holwell's India Tracts), it was a room eighteen feet square, with a door on one side, and two windows on another. In 1808 a chamber was shown in the Old Fort of Calcutta then standing, said to be the Black Hole of 1756: its situation did not correspond exactly with Mr. Holwell's description of it, but if not the same, it was a room of the same description and size, such as is very common amongst the offices of both public and private buildings in Calcutta, and no doubt accurately represented the kind of place which was the scene of this occurrence. It bore by no means the character of a prison. It was much more light, airy, and spacious, than most of the rooms used formerly by the London watch, or at present by the police, for purposes of temporary durance. Had a dozen or twenty people been immured within such limits for a night, there would have been no hardship whatever in their imprisonment, and in all probability no such number of persons ever was confined in it. The English, then, in the objectionable sense in which the author chooses to understand the "Black Hole," never had such a prison. The state of the Calcutta gaol, in 1782, like that of the common gaols in England or in Europe, was, no doubt, bad enough; but it is not said that its inmates had ever died of want of air, or that one hundred and twenty perished in a single night, and, as the story which the translator of the Seer Mutakhareen relates, it requires to be authenticated. If the boats were upset by the bore, the men perished in the Ganges; but, if they were in the Ganges, it is quite impossible that they should have been there three days without food. There is no doubt some gross exaggeration in the anecdote, but a case of inadvertency, however culpable, is no set-off against deliberate persevering barbarity. Even if the excuse of inconsiderateness might be urged for driving the prisoners into a space so utterly inadequate to their numbers, there was abundant opportunity to correct the mistake, when it was seen what suffering it occasioned. The whole transaction admits of no defence: it was an exemplification of Mohammedan insolence, intolerance, and cruelty; and in contemplating the signal retribution by which it has been punished, a mind susceptible of reverence, though free from superstition, can scarcely resist the impression, that the course of events was guided by higher influences than the passions and purposes of man.—W.

5th of August. It was fortunate that Admiral Watson and Colonel Clive were now both upon the coast. Admiral Watson was commander of the squadron which the English ministry had prudently sent to India during the progress of the negotiation in 1754. Soon after his arrival on the coast of Coromandel, the monsoon obliged him to sail to Bombay, from which he returned in the January following, by a very able navigation against a contrary monsoon; and was now joined by Mr. Pocock, who had arrived from England with two ships of superior force. He remained on the coast of Coromandel till the 10th of October, when he again sailed to Bombay, to escape the monsoon. At this place matters of great importance were already in agitation.

Captain Clive had arrived from England, where he had obtained the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in his Majesty's service, and the appointment of Deputy Governor of Fort St. David. He had landed at Bombay, with three companies of the king's artillery, and between three and four hundred of the king's troops, with a view to a project, concerted in England, of attacking Salabut Jung, in conjunction with the Mahrattas, and driving the French out of the Deccan. The report which the directors in England had received of the brilliant exploits of Captain Clive in India had made them desirous of intrusting to *him* a service, highly delicate, of the greatest importance, and requiring the fullest acquaintance with the manners and circumstances of the country. "But from that dependence on the ministry," says Mr. Orme, "to which their affairs will always be subject, whilst engaged in military operations, the Court of Directors, in compliance with very powerful recommendations, appointed Lieutenant Colonel Scott to command the expedition."[1] This officer had sailed to India, in the capacity of Engineer-General, the preceding year. Clive was still directed to land at Bombay, in hopes that some accident might take the business out of the hands of Scott; which in reality happened, for that officer died before the other arrived. But in the meantime, the truce had been concluded between the

[1] Orme, i. 406. "Colonel Scott," says Clive himself, in his evidence before the Committee (See Report, ut supra), "had been strongly recommended by the Duke of Cumberland."

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English and French; and the Presidency of Bombay refused to engage in a measure by which it would be violated. There was another enterprise, however, in which they had already embarked, and in which, with the great force, military and naval, now happily assembled at Bombay, they had sanguine hopes of success.

The Mahrattas, as early as the time of Sivajee, had raised something of a fleet, to protect them against the enterprise of the Siddees. In this service a common man distinguished himself; and rose from one post to another, till he became Admiral of the fleet. He was appointed Governor of a strong fort, called Severndroog, situated on a rocky island, within cannon-shot of the continent, about eight miles north from Dabul. This adventurer quarrelled with the Mahratta government; and revolted with the greater part of the fleet. He not only set the Mahratta state at defiance, but was able to render himself master of the coast to an extent of sixty leagues, from Tanna to Rajapore; and the Mahrattas compounded their dispute with him, by receiving a small annual tribute as a mark of subjection. The name of the successful rebel was Conajee Angria; and he made piracy his trade.[1] The nature of the coast is well adapted to that species of depredation; because it is intersected by a great number of rivers, and the breezes compel ships to keep close to the land. The European nations had been harassed by this predatory community for nearly half a century; they had made several efforts to subdue them, but the power of Angria had always increased; and his fleets now struck terror into all commercial navigators on the western coast of India.

Several approaches towards the formation of a union for the extirpation of these corsairs had been made by the English and Mahrattas; but without effect, till 1755, when an English squadron, under Commodore James, and a land-army of Mahrattas, attacked Severndroog, and took it, as well as the fort of Bancoote. It was toward the conclu-

[1] These circumstances are not quite correctly stated. It was the father of Kanhajee who first acquired distinction in the service of Sivajee, he was made admiral of the fleet by Raja Ram, and took part with his widow against Shao, the grandson of Sivajee, but was induced to acknowledge the latter by the grant of ten forts, including Severndroog and Viziadroog, or Gheriah. Duff's Mahrattas, i. 436.—W.

sion of the same year that Admiral Watson with his fleet, and Colonel Clive with his forces, arrived at Bombay: the final reduction of the piratical state was therefore decreed. On the 11th of February, 1756, the fleet, consisting of eight ships, besides a grab, and five bomb-ketches, having on board 800 Europeans and 1000 Sepoys commanded by Colonel Clive, arrived at Gheriah: while a Mahratta army approached on the other side. Gheriah, the capital of Angria, stood on a rocky promontory, nearly surrounded by the sea, and had a fort of extraordinary strength. But the number of the assailants, and the violence of the cannonade, terrified both Angria and his people, and they made a feeble use of their advantages.[1] Angria, with a view to effect an accommodation, placed himself in the hands of the Mahrattas; the fort surrendered; and the object of the expedition was completely attained.[2] Watson arrived at Madras on the 16th of May, and Clive repaired to his government at Fort St. David, from which, in the month of August, he was summoned to assist in the deliberations for recovering Calcutta.[3]

1756.

It was resolved, after some debate, that the reestablishment of the Company's affairs in Bengal should be pursued at the expense of every other enterprise. A dispute, however, of two months ensued, to determine in what manner prizes should be divided; who should command; and what should be the degree of power intrusted with the commander. The parties, of whom the pretensions were severally to be weighed, were Mr. Pigot, who had been Governor of Madras since the departure of Saunders, but was void of military experience; Colonel Aldercron, who claimed as senior officer of the King, but was unacquainted with the irregular warfare of the natives; Colonel Lawrence, whose experience and merit were unquestionable, but to whose asthmatical complaints the close and sultry climate of Bengal was injurious; and Clive, to whom none of these exceptions applied. It was at last determined, that Clive

1 This was Toolajee Angria, son of Kanhajee.—W.

2 The author was not aware of the circumstances under which Gheriah was taken and retained by the English, in contravention of the terms under which they were engaged to co-operate with the Mahrattas, whom they contrived to anticipate in a mutually projected scheme of deception. See Duff's Mahratta History, ii. 88.—W.

3 See for this account, Orme, i. 406—417; Cambridge's War in India, p. 120—130; Lord Clive's Evidence, Report, ut supra.

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should be sent. It was also determined, that he should be sent with powers independent of the Presidency of Calcutta. Among his instructions, one of the most peremptory was, that he should return, and be again at Madras with the whole of the troops, in the month of April; about which time it was expected that in consequence of the war between France and England, a French fleet would arrive upon the coast. It was principally, indeed, with a view to this return, that independence of the Calcutta rulers, who might be tempted to retain him, was bestowed upon Clive.

The force which sailed from the road of Madras, on the 16th of October, consisted of five King's ships with Admiral Watson as Commander, and five Company's ships, serving as transports; having on boards 900 European troops, and 1500 Sepoys. All the ships, with the exception of two, arrived in the Ganges on the 20th of December, and found the fugitives from Calcutta at Fulta, a town at some distance down the river, to which the ships had descended, and where they had found it practicable to remain.

After forwarding letters, full of threats, to Suraj-addowla, which the Governor of Calcutta sent word that he dared not deliver, it was resolved to commence operations, by the capture of a fort, which stood, on the river, between Fulta and Calcutta. On the 27th of December, at the time when the fort was to be attacked by the ships, Clive marched out, with the greater part of the troops, to lay an ambush for intercepting the garrison, who were not expected to make a tedious defence. The troops, fatigued in gaining their position, were allowed to quit their arms to take a little repose; "and from a security," says Mr. Orme, "which no superiority or appearances in war could justify, the common precaution of stationing sentinels was neglected." In a few minutes they were all asleep; and in this situation, surprised by a large body of the enemy. The presence of mind and steady courage, which never deserted Clive in sudden emergencies, enabled him, even in those unfavourable circumstances, to disperse a band of irregular troops, led by a cowardly commander. "But had the enemy's cavalry," says Orme, "advanced and charged at the same time that the infantry

began to fire, it is not improbable that the war would have been conclued on the very first trial of hostilities."[1]

The ships came up and cannonaded the fort; but the garrison frustrated the project of Clive; and, totally unperceived, made their escape in the night. The other forts on the river were deserted, as the English approached; and on the 2d of January, 1757, the armament arrived at Calcutta. The garrison withstood not the cannon of the ships for two hours; and evacuated the place. The merchandise belonging to the Company was found mostly untouched, because it had been reserved for the Subahdar; but the houses of individuals were totally plundered.

Intelligence was received from the natives, who began to enter the town, that Hoogly, a considerable city, about twenty-three miles up the river from Calcutta, was thrown into great consternation by these recent events. In this situation an attack upon it was expected to produce a very favourable result. One of the ships sent on this service struck on a sandbank, and five days retarded the progress of the detachment. On the 10th of January they reached the spot; made a breach in the wall before night; and the troops no sooner mounted the rampart, than the garrison fled and escaped.

During the expedition to Hoogly news arrived of the commencement of hostilities between England and France.[2] The French in Bengal had a force of 300 Europeans, and a train of field artillery; which, if added to the army of the Subahdar, would render him an irresistible enemy. The English were now very desirous to make their peace with that formidable ruler; but the capture of Hoogly, undertaken solely with a view to plunder,[3] had so augmented his

[1] Scrafton, p. 62, sinks the culpable circumstances.—M. Sir J. Malcolm himself a soldier, shows that no such catastrophe was possible, "the thick jungle which concealed the approach of the infantry, was impervious to cavalry, who had no means of advancing, except through openings where they must have been seen, and the possibility of surprise defeated." Life of Clive, i. 152.—W.

[2] The Indian historian gives an amusing account of the relations between England and France: "Just at this crisis," says he, "the flames of war broke out between the French and English; two nations who had disputes between themselves of five or six hundred years' standing; and who, after proceeding to bloodshed, wars, battles, and massacres, for a number of years, would lay down their arms by common agreement, and take breath on both sides, in order to come to blows again, and to fight with as much fury as ever." Seer Mutakhareen, i. 759.

[3] As observed by the biographer of Clive, there are no facts to warrant the imputation that plunder was the sole object of the attack upon Hoogly. The

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rage, that he was not in a frame of mind to receive from them any proposition; and his army received its orders to march. Happily for the English the same spirit by which Dupleix was reproached for not having negotiated a neutrality between the French and English Companies in India, though the nations were at war in Europe, prevailed in the Councils at Chandernagor. The rulers at that settlement refused to assist Suraj-ad-dowla; and proposed that they and the English should engage by treaty, notwithstanding the war between their respective countries, to abstain from hostilities against one another in Bengal.[1] Still the power of the Subahdar presented an appalling aspect to Clive; and no sooner had he received intimation of an abatement in the irritation of that enemy, than he renewed his application for peace. The Subahdar received his letter, and even proposed a conference; but continued his march, and on the 3d of February surrounded Calcutta with his camp. Clive resolved to surprise it before dawn of the following morning. The design was no less politic than bold; both as the audacity of it was likely to alarm a timorous enemy; and as the difficulty of procuring provisions, surrounded by a large body of cavalry, must soon have been great. The execution, however, was badly planned; and a thick mist augmented the causes of misfortune. The troops suffered considerably; and were several times exposed to the greatest dangers. Yet they marched through the camp; and produced on the minds of the Subahdar and his army the intended effect. Eager

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opportunity of striking a successful blow against an enemy's town, was so obvious a reprisal for his capture of Calcutta, that it is very unnecessary to seek for any other motives than the most ordinary rules of warfare.—W.

[1] There is some contradiction in the statements of different authorities on this subject, which can be reconciled only by a consideration of dates and circumstances. It appears probable, that the French were not informed of the war in Europe, until after the march of the Nawab to Calcutta, and the negotiations for peace with the English. They could not, therefore, have joined him sooner, and to prevent that junction taking place, was one of Clive's reasons for agreeing to the treaty more readily than was thought advisable by Admiral Watson. He writes to the Chairman, "I know there are many who think I have been too precipitate in the conclusion of the treaty, but they never knew that the delay of a day or two might have ruined the Company's affairs, by the junction of the French with the Nawab, which was on the point of being carried into execution." Life, i. 179. With the conclusion of the treaty, the French lost their opportunity of co-operating with the Nawab. Their negotiations for a neutrality were subsequent to the Nawab's retreat; and if Clive's account of the matter be correct, the English had not much reason to be grateful for their forbearance.—W.

to be removed from an enemy capable of those daring attempts, Suraj-ad-dowla was now in earnest to effect an accommodation. Overtures were received and returned; and on the 9th of February a treaty was concluded, by which the Nabob, as he was styled by the English, agreed to restore to the Company their factories, and all the privileges they had formerly enjoyed; to permit them to fortify Calcutta; and to make compensation to them for such of the plundered effects as had been brought to account in the books of his government. So greatly was he pleased with this treaty, that two days after its conclusion, he proposed to conclude with the English an alliance offensive and defensive; a contract which the English eagerly formed, and which both parties ratified on that very day. 1757.

In return to the French for that neutrality of theirs which had saved the English,[1] Clive, at the very moment of making peace with the Nabob, sounded him to know if he would permit the English to attack the settlement at Chandernagor, for which there still would be time before the setting in of the southern monsoon. The proposition was hateful to the Subahdar; but for the present he returned an evasive answer. As this was not a prohibition, Clive resolved to construe it as a permission; and he sent his army across the river. The Subahdar now interfered with efficacy; sent an express prohibition; and took measures for opposing the attempt.

The Council at Calcutta, no longer expecting the consent of the Subahdar, and alarmed at the thought of attempting the enterprise in defiance of his authority, entered into negociation with the French. They had mutually agreed upon terms; and obtained the assent of the Subahdar to guarantee between them a treaty of neutrality and pacification. But the factory at Chandernagor was dependent on the government of Pondicherry, and could only ratify the treaty provisionally; the government of Calcutta signed with definitive powers. This difference started a scruple in the brain of Admiral Watson; and he refused to sign. In the opinion of Clive, there was but one alternative: that of embracing the neutrality, or instantly attacking Chandernagor. But Watson

[1] See preceding note.

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refused to attack without the Nabob's consent; and Clive urged the necessity of accepting the neutrality. In a letter to the Select Committee he said, "If the neutrality be refused, do but reflect, Gentlemen, what will be the opinion of the world of these our late proceedings. Did we not, in consequence of a letter received from the Governor and Council of Chandernagor, making offers of a neutrality within the Ganges, in a manner accede to it, by desiring they would send deputies, and that we would gladly come into such neutrality with them?[1] And have we not, since their arrival, drawn out articles that were satisfactory to both parties; and agreed that such articles should be reciprocally signed, sealed, and sworn to? What will the Nabob think, after the promise made him on our side, and after his consenting to guarantee this neutrality? He, and all the world, will certainly think, that we are men without principles, or that we are men of a trifling insignificant disposition."[2] While the altercations on this subject continued, news reached the Subahdar, that Ahmed Shah, the Abdallee, had taken Delhi; and meant to extend his conquests to the eastern provinces of the Mogul empire. This intelligence, which filled him with consternation, suggested the vast importance of securing the co-operation of the English; and he immediately sent a letter to Colonel Clive, the object of which was to pave the way for attaining it, on almost any terms. The very same day on which the letter of the Nabob reached Calcutta, the arrival was announced of three ships with troops from Bombay, and of one of the ships, also bearing troops, which sailed with Clive from Madras, but was compelled to return. "With such additions," says Mr. Orme, "the English force was deemed capable of taking Chandernagor, although protected by the Nabob's army. Colonel Clive therefore immediately dismissed the French deputies, who were then with him waiting to sign the treaty, which was

[1] Admiral Watson asserts, in a letter to the Nawab, that the proposal for a neutrality originated with the English. Life of Clive, i. 187. This account of the failure of the negotiation, agrees in the main with that in the text; but there can be little doubt, that neither of the parties had the power of exempting themselves from the consequences of international warfare. It was the duty of the English to attempt the reduction of Chandernagore, as it would have been that of the French to capture Calcutta, had they been in sufficient strength.—W.

[2] Report, ut supra, Appendix, No. vi.

even written out fair, and which they supposed had been entirely concluded." [1]

The English force advanced; while the scruples of Admiral Watson, under the great accession of force, were vanquished by some supposed contradictions in the letters of the Subahdar; and the opposition of the Subahdar was suspended by his apprehension of the Afghans. On the 14th of March, the detachment from Bombay having joined the English army, hostilities commenced. The French defended themselves with great gallantry: the Nabob, roused at last,[2] and eager to prevent their fall, sent peremptory orders to the English to desist; and even put a part of his army in motion. But the fire from the ships was irresistible, and the reduction of the fort anticipated the effects of his intended resistance. The resentment of the Nabob was checked by his remaining dread of the Abdallees; and he still courted the friendship of the invaders. He, however, eluded their request to give up all the other French factories and subjects in his dominions; and afforded protection to the troops who had escaped from the fort of Chandernagor.

The time was now arrived when, according to his instructions, Clive ought no longer to have deferred his return to Madras. He himself, in his letter to the Select Committee, dated the 4th of March, had said respecting Watson's objection to the treaty of neutrality; "this leads me to consider seriously the situation of the Company's affairs on the *coast*, and the positive orders I have received from the President and the Committee at Madras, to return at all events with as great a part of the forces under my command as could possibly be spared." [2] "The situation of

[1] Orme, ii. 139. Clive himself gives a curious account of the deliberation upon this measure: "That the members of the Committee were—Mr. Drake (the Governor), himself (Col. Clive), Major Kilpatrick, and Mr. Becher:—Mr. Becher gave his opinion for a neutrality, Major Kilpatrick, for a neutrality; he himself gave his opinion for the attack of the place; Mr. Drake gave an opinion that nobody could make anything of. Major Kilpatrick then asked him, whether he thought the forces and squadron could attack Chandernagor and the Nabob's army at the same time?—he said, he thought they could; upon which Major Kilpatrick desired to withdraw his opinion, and to be of his. They voted Mr. Drake's no opinion at all; and Major Kilpatrick and he being the majority, a letter was written to Admiral Watson, desiring him to co-operate in the attack on Chandernagor." Report, ut supra. There is something ludicrous in voting a man's opinion, to be no opinion; yet the undecisive, hesitating, ambiguous propositions, of men who know not what resolution to take, cannot, in general, perhaps, be treated by a better rule.

[2] Report, ut supra. Appendix. No. vi.

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the Company's affairs on the coast," that is in the Carnatic, was indeed in no small degree alarming, if they remained without the protection of their military force, sent for the restoration of the settlements in Bengal. The Presidency of Madras had not left themselves troops sufficient to make head against the French even then in the country; and it was known at Madras, before the departure of Clive, that, in consequence of the expected hostilities, a powerful armament was destined by the French government for India; and without doubt would make its first landing in the Carnatic. On the other side Clive beheld an opening for exploits, both splendid and profitable, in Bengal; overlooked all other considerations; violated his instructions; and remained.[1]

The French, who had collected themselves at Cossimbazar, became the first subject of dispute. Instead of yielding them up, on the repeated solicitations of the English, the Nabob furnished M. Law, who was the head of the factory at Cossimbazar, with money, arms, and ammunition, and sent them into Bahar; Clive, to the great displeasure of his new ally, threatening, and even preparing to detach a part of his army to intercept them. By the author of the Seer Mutakhareen, we are told that M. Law, before his departure, revealed to Suraj-ad-dowla the disaffection of his principal officers; the connexion which they would be sure to form with the English for his destruction; and the necessity of retaining the French about his person if he wished to preserve himself from that deplorable fate. The persons, however, who meditated his ruin, and who saw the importance of removing the French, pressed upon his mind the impolicy of quarrelling with the victorious English on account of the vanquished and fugitive French. He therefore dismissed M. Law, telling him, "that if there should happen any thing

[1] It is quite clear that Clive judged soundly what was his duty, when he determined to remain. To have withdrawn any part of the force from Bengal, would have been not only to forfeit the advantages that had been gained, but would have ensured the expulsion of the English from the province. The feelings of Suraj-ad-dowla were unchanged, his power was unbroken, and he had now the certain assistance of the French. It is quite impossible that the English could have made head against them, or could have hoped for any conditions whatever. Clive would have been a traitor, not only to his own fame, but the interests of his country, had he obeyed the calls from Madras, where the danger was less imminent, and the consequences of discomfiture less irreparable.—W.

new, he would send for him again."—"Send for me again?" answered Law, "Be assured, my lord Nawab, that this is the last time we shall see each other; remember my words,—we shall never meet again; it is nearly impossible."[1]

Lord Clive, in his statement to the House of Commons, said, "that after Chandernagor was resolved to be attacked, he repeatedly said to the committee, as well as to others, that they could not stop there, but must go further; that, having established themselves by force, and not by consent of the Nabob, he would endeavour to drive them out again; that they had numberless proofs of his intentions, many upon record; and that he did suggest to Admiral Watson and Sir George Pococke, as well as to the Committee, the necessity of a revolution; that Mr. Watson and the gentlemen of the Committee, agreed upon the necessity of it;[2] and that the management of that revolution was, with consent of the committee, left to Mr. Watts, who was resident at the Nabob's capital, and himself; that great dissatisfaction arising among Suraj-ad-dowla's troops, Meer Jaffier was pitched upon to be the person to place in the room of Suraj-ad-dowla, in consequence of which a treaty was formed."[3]

A complicated scene took place, which it would be little instructive to unfold,[4] of plotting and intrigue. The first proposals were made by an officer named Yar Khan Latty; and they were greedily embraced; till intimation was received that Meer Jaffier Khan was inclined to enter into a confederacy for deposing the Subahdar. This was a personage of much greater power and distinction. He had

[1] Seer Mutakhareen, i. 762.

[2] Captain Brereton, who was Lieutenant with Admiral Watson, declared in evidence, "that he had heard Admiral Watson say, he thought it an extraordinary measure to depose a man they had so lately made a solemn treaty with." Report, ut supra.—M.

Better evidence, Admiral Watson's own, proves, that he entirely approved of the proceedings. He writes to Clive: "I am glad to hear that Meer Jaffier's party increases, I hope every thing will turn out, in the expedition, to your wishes, and that I may soon have to congratulate you on the success of it." Life of Clive, i. 242.—W.

[3] Report, ut supra.—M. From the manner in which this is stated, it would seem as if the project of a revolution originated with the English, although, from what follows, it is clear that it was suggested to them by proposals from the principal persons at Murshedabad, both Mohammedan and Hindu: amongst the latter, and a most influential individual, was the opulent banker Juggut Set. Life of Clive, i. 227.—W.

[4] It has been done with exemplary minuteness and patience by Mr. Orme, ii. 149—175.

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been married at an early period to the sister of Aliverdi, and held a high rank in his army. Between him and Aliverdi had not been always the best understanding; and Meer Jaffier had at one time entered into a project of treason. But the interest of the two parties taught them to master their dissatisfaction; and at the death of Aliverdi, Meer Jaffier was paymaster general of the forces, one of the highest offices in an Indian government. Suraj-ad-dowla hated Meer Jaffier, and was too ignorant and headstrong to use management with his dislikes. Shortly after his accession, Meer Jaffier was removed from his office, and remained exposed to all that might result from the violent disposition of the Subahdar. According to the constitution, however, of an Indian army, in which every General maintains his own troops, a considerable portion of the army belonged to Meer Jaffier; and this he exerted himself to increase, by enlisting as many as possible of the adventurers, with whom the nature of Indian warfare made the country abound.

In manufacturing the terms of the confederacy, the grand concern of the English appeared to be money. "The Committee really believed," says Mr. Orme, "the wealth of Suraj-ad-dowla much greater than it possibly could be, even if the whole life of the late Nabob Aliverdi had not been spent in defending his own dominions against the invasion of ruinous enemies; and even if Suraj-ad-dowla himself had reigned many, instead of only one year."[1] They resolved accordingly not to be sparing in their demands; and the situation of Jaffier Khan, and the manners and customs of the country, made him ready to promise whatever they desired. In name of compensation for losses by the capture of Calcutta, 10,000,000 rupees were promised to the English Company, 5,000,000 rupees to English inhabitants, 2,000,000 to the Indians, and 700,000 to the Armenians. These sums were specified in the formal treaty. Over and beside this, it was resolved by the Committee of the Council, that is, the small number of individuals by whom the business was performed, that a donation of 2,500,000 rupees should be asked for the squadron; and another of equal amount for the army.[2]

[1] Orme, ii. 163.

[2] These presents, which were afterwards made use of by the personal enemies of Clive, to effect his annoyance and attempt his ruin, detract much from the

"When this was settled," says Lord Clive,[1] "Mr. Becher (a member) suggested to the Committee, that he thought that Committee, who managed the great machine of government, was entitled to some consideration, as well as the army and navy." Such a proposition, in such an assembly, could not fail to appear eminently reasonable. It met with a suitable approbation. Mr. Becher informs us, that the sums received were 280,000 rupees by Mr. Drake the Governor; 280,000 by Colonel Clive; and 240,000 each, by himself, Mr. Watts, and Major Kilpatrick, the inferior members of the Committee.[2] The terms obtained in favour of the Company were, that all the French factories and effects should be given up; that the French should be for ever excluded from Bengal; that the ter-

splendour of his reputation, and reflect discredit upon all who were parties to their acceptance. That General, Admiral, and Members of the Select Committee, were alike influenced by a grasping and mercenary spirit is undeniable, and they seized, with an avidity which denoted a lamentable absence of elevated principles, upon an unexpected opportunity of realizing princely fortunes. At the same time, many considerations may be urged in their excuse, and a more disinterested conduct would have exhibited in them, a very extraordinary exception to the prevailing practices and feelings of the times. The servants of the Company had never been forbidden to receive presents from the natives of rank, and as they were very ill paid, it was understood that they were at liberty to pay themselves in any manner they could which did not injure their employers. The making of presents was an established practice amongst the natives, and is one which they even yet consider as a necessary part of friendly or formal intercourse, and although, agreeably to their notions, it is most incumbent on the inferior to approach his superior with an offering, yet on great public occasions, and especially upon any signal triumph, the distribution of liberal donations to the army and the chief officers of the court is a natural result. There was nothing more than customary, therefore, in the gift of large sums of money by Mir Jaffier to those to whom he was indebted for his accession; and, as there was neither law nor usage opposed to the acceptance of his donations by the servants of the Company, and as they were avowedly expected and openly received, there was nothing dishonest in the transaction. That the amount of the presents was excessive, may be attributed, in some degree, to the erroneous opinion entertained probably by Mir Jaffier, and certainly by the Company's servants, of the great wealth in the treasury of Suraj-ad-dowla, which admitted of such deduction. With a just regard to circumstances and seasons, therefore, it is unjust to expect from the servants of the Company a lofty disregard of personal advantage, although they would have merited more unqualified admiration had they disdained their private enrichment in the noble aim of promoting the public good: much unhappiness would have been avoided by themselves, much misery would have been spared to Bengal.

[1] Evidence before the Committee, Report, ut supra.

[2] Ibid. These latter receipts were the occasion of a dispute. "Upon this being known," said Clive (Report, ut supra) "Mr. Watson replied, that *he* was entitled to a share in that money. He (Clive) agreed in opinion with the gentlemen, when this application was made, that Mr. Watson was not one of the Committee, but at the same time did justice to his services, and proposed to the gentlemen to contribute as much as would make his share equal to the Governor's and his own; that about three or four consented to it, the rest would not."

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ritory surrounding Calcutta to the distance of 600 yards beyond the Mahratta ditch, and all the land lying south of Calcutta as far as Culpee, should be granted them on Zemindary tenure, the Company paying the rents in the same manner as other Zemindars.

For effecting the destruction of Suraj-ad-dowla it was concerted, that the English should take the field, and that Meer Jaffier should join them at Cutwa, with his own troops, and those of as many of the other commanders as it should be in his power to debauch. When the English arrived at Cutwa, no allies, however, appeared: Letters were received from Moorshedabad by some of the natives in the camp, stating that the conspiracy was discovered, and that Meer Jaffier had obtained his pardon, on condition of aiding the Nabob with all his resources against the English. Instead of Meer Jaffier and his troops, a letter from Meer Jaffier arrived. In this it was stated, that the suspicions of the Nabob had been raised; that he had constrained Meer Jaffier to swear fidelity on the Koran; that it had thus become impossible for Meer Jaffier to join the English before the day of battle; but that it would be easy for him, in the action, to desert the Nabob, and decide the fortune of the day. The mind of the English commander was disturbed. The treachery of Meer Jaffier could not be regarded as improbable; and "he thought it extremely hazardous" (to use his own words) "to pass a river which is only fordable in one place, march 150 miles up the country, and risk a battle, when, if a defeat ensued, not one man would have returned to tell it."[1]

In these difficulties he called a council of war. "It is very rare," says Mr. Orme, "that a council of war decides for battle."[2] Clive himself says, "that this was the only council of war that ever he held, and if he had abided by that council, it would have been the ruin of the East India Company."[3] The singularity is, that in the council Clive himself was of the same opinion with the majority, and by delivering his opinion first, which was far from the usual practice, had no doubt considerable influence in determining others; yet that afterwards he disregarded that

1 Evidence, ut supra.
2 Orme, ii. 171.
3 Evidence, Report, ut supra.

decision, and took upon himself to act in direct opposition to it. The army was ordered to cross the river the next morning; and at a little past midnight arrived at Plassy.[1]

At this place, a part of the army of the Subahdar had been intrenched for a considerable time; and the Subahdar himself had reached it with the remainder of his forces the evening before the arrival of the English. The army with which he was now to contend for his power and his life consisted of 50,000 foot, 18,000 horse, and fifty pieces of cannon.[2] Of the English force, 900, including 100 artillery-men and fifty sailors, were Europeans; 100 were Topasses; and 2100 Sepoys. The battle was nothing but a distant cannonade. This was maintained during the greatest part of the day, and sufficed to terrify the Subahdar, who, by the advice of those who desired his ruin, issued orders of preparation for retreat. Upon this, Jaffier Khan was observed moving off with his troops: Clive was then convinced of his intention to join him: he now, therefore, ordered the English to advance, and attack that part of the line which still maintained its position. The knowledge of these two events determined the mind of the Subahdar, he mounted a fleet camel and fled with 2000 attendants. No further resistance was offered; and the English entered the camp at five o'clock, having, by the assistance of a weak and vicious sovereign, determined the fate of a great kingdom, and of 30,000,000 of people, with the loss of twenty Europeans killed and wounded, of sixteen Sepoys killed, and only thirty-six wounded.[3]

The army advanced, about nine miles, to Daudpore, the

[1] Scrafton (Reflections, p. 90) says, that the Colonel's resolution was founded upon a letter he received from Jaffier in the course of the day. Orme, who loves a little of the marvellous, says, "that as soon as the council of war broke up he retired alone into the adjoining grove, where he continued near an hour in deep meditation; and gave orders, on his return to his quarters, that the army should cross the river the next morning." ii. 170.—M.

It is clear that the alteration in Clive's views must have been the result of his private meditations; and the circumstances particularized by Orme, are not unlikely to have been communicated to him by Clive himself.—W.

[2] Clive says 15,000 horse and 35,000 foot, and forty pieces of cannon. Letter to the Secret Committee. Life, i. 263.

[3] Lord Clive stated (Report, ut supra), "that the battle's being attended with so little bloodshed arose from two causes; first, the army was sheltered by so high a bank that the heavy artillery of the enemy could not possibly do them much mischief; the other was, that Suraje-ad-dowla had not confidence in his army, nor his army any confidence in him, and therefore they did not do their duty upon that occasion."

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same evening, with little occasion to pursue the enemy, who had almost entirely dispersed. At this place, Meer Jaffier sent a message to the English commander, that he, with many more of the great officers, and a considerable part of the army, waited his commands. The next morning Clive sent to conduct him to his quarters; and he arrived, under some apprehensions, which the Colonel, thinking it no time for reproaches, hastened to dispel. It was arranged that Meer Jaffier should march to the capital immediately, to prevent the escape of Suraj-ad-dowla, and the removal of his wealth.

That wretched prince had arrived at his palace the night after the battle, where, now apprized that he had not a friend on whom he could rely, and utterly uncertain what course to pursue, he remained till the evening of the following day, when Meer Jaffier entered the city. Then his fears dictated a resolution. He disguised himself in a mean dress, and about ten o'clock at night went secretly out of a window of the palace, with his favourite concubine and a single eunuch, intending to join M. Law, and escape into Bahar, where he counted upon the protection of the Governor. The rowers, however, of his boat, worn out before the morning with fatigue, stopped at Raj Mahl, where he endeavoured to conceal himself in a garden. He was there, at break of day, discovered by a man, whom he had formerly treated with cruelty, and who now revealed him to the Governor. Covered with indignity, he was hurried back to Moorshedabad, and presented to Meer Jaffier, who placed him under the custody of his son. The son, a brutal, ferocious youth, the same night gave orders for his assassination. M. Law, who received the summons to join the Nabob as soon as war with the English appeared inevitable, immediately began his march; but had not passed Tacriagully when he received reports of the battle of Plassy, and halted for further information. "Had he immediately proceeded twenty miles further," says Mr. Orme, "he would the next day have met and saved Suraj-ad-dowla, and an order of events, very different from those which we have to relate, would, in all probability, have ensued."[1]

The battle was fought on the 23rd of June, and on the

[1] Orme, ii. 185.

25th Colonel Clive with his troops arrived at Moorsheda-bad. On the next day a meeting was held to confer about the stipulated moneys; when the chief officer of finance declared that the whole of Suraj-ad-dowla's treasures was inadequate to the demand. "The restitution," says Mr. Orme, "with the donations to the squadron, the army, and the committee, amounted to 22,000,000 of sicca rupees, equal to 2,750,000*l*. But other donations were promised, which have since been the foundation of several fortunes."[1] The scantiness of the Bengal treasury was most unexpected, as well as most painful news, to the English, who had been accustomed to a fond and literal belief of Oriental exaggeration on the subject of Indian riches. With great difficulty were they brought to admit so hateful a truth. Finding at last that more could not be obtained, they consented to receive one half of the moneys immediately, and to accept of the rest by three equal payments in three years. Even of the portion which was now to be received, it was necessary to take one third not in specie, which was all exhausted, but in jewels, plate, and other effects, at a valuation. Before the 9th of August, after a multitude of difficulties, the stipulated half, all but 584,905 rupees, was delivered and discharged.[2]

[1] Ibid. ii. 180.

[2] A piece of consummate treachery was practised upon an individual. Among the Hindu merchants established at Calcutta was Omichund, "a man," says Mr. Orme, "of great sagacity and understanding," who had traded to a vast amount, and acquired an enormous fortune. "The extent of his habitation," continues Mr. Orme, "divided into various departments, the number of his servants continually employed in various occupations, and a retinue of armed men in constant pay, resembled more the state of a prince than the condition of a merchant. His commerce extended to all parts of Bengal and Bahar, and by presents and services he had acquired so much influence with the principal officers of the Bengal government, that the Presidency, in times of difficulty, used to employ his mediation with the Nabob. This pre-eminence, however, did not fail to render him the object of much envy." (Orme, ii. 50.) When the alarm, excited by the hostile designs of Suraj-ad-dowla, threw into consternation the minds of Mr. Drake and his council, among other weak ideas which occurred to them, one was, to secure the person of Omichund, lest, peradventure, he should be in concert with their enemies. He was seized and thrown into confinement. His guards, believing that violence, that is dishonour, would next fall upon his house, set fire to it, after the manner of Hindus, and slaughtered the inmates of his harem. Notwithstanding this, when Mr. Holwell endeavoured to parley with the Nabob, he employed Omichund to write letters to his friends, importuning them to intercede, in that extremity, with the prince. At the capture, though his person was liberated, his valuable effects and merchandise were plundered. No less than 400,000 rupees in cash were found in his treasury. When an order was published that such of the English as had escaped the black hole might return to their homes, they were supplied with provisions by Omichund, "whose intercession," says Orme, "had probably procured their return." Omichund, upon the ruin of Calcutta, followed the Nabob's army, and soon acquired a high degree of con-

BOOK IV. CHAP. III. Upon the news of the seizure and death of Suraj-ad-dowla, M. Law, with the French party, hastened back to

1757. fidence both with the Nabob's favourite, and with himself. After the recovery of Calcutta, when the Nabob, alarmed at the attack of his camp, entered into negotiation, and concluded a treaty, Omichund was one of the principal agents employed. And when Mr. Watts was sent to Moorshedabad as agent at the durbar (court) of Suraj-ad-dowla, "he was accompanied," says Mr. Orme (ii. 137), "by Omichund, whose conduct in the late negotiation had effaced the impression of former imputations, insomuch that Mr. Watts was permitted to consult and employ him without reserve on all occasions." He was employed as a main instrument in all the intrigues with Jaffier. It was never surmised that he did not second, with all his efforts, the projects of the English; it was never denied that his services were of the utmost importance. Mr. Orme says expressly (p. 182), that "his tales and artifices prevented Suraj-ad-dowla from believing the representations of his most trusty servants, who early suspected, and at length were convinced, that the English were confederated with Jaffier." When the terms of compensation for the losses sustained by the capture of Calcutta were negotiated between Mr. Watts and Meer Jaffier, 3,000,000 of rupees were set down to Omichund, which, considering the extent of his property, and that "most of the best houses in Calcutta were his," (Orme, ii. 128), was probably not more than his loss. Looking forward to the rewards, which he doubted not that Jaffier, if successful, would bestow upon those of the English who were the chief instruments of his exaltation; estimating also the importance of his own services, and the risk, both of life and of fortune, which, in rendering those services, he had incurred, Omichund conceived that he too might put in his claim for reward; and, according to the example of his countrymen, resolved not to injure himself by the modesty of his demand. He asked a commission of five per cent., on the money which should be received from the Nabob's treasury, and a fourth part of the jewels; but agreed, upon hearing the objections of Mr. Watts, to refer his claims to the committee. When the accounts were sent to Calcutta, the sum to be given to Omichund, even as compensation for his losses, seemed a very heavy grievance to men who panted for more to themselves. To men whose minds were in such a state, the great demands of Omichund appeared (the reader will laugh—but they did literally appear) a crime. They were voted a crime; and so great a crime, as to deserve to be punished—to be punished, not only by depriving him of all reward, but depriving him of his compensation, that compensation which was stipulated for to everybody: it was voted that Omichund should have nothing. They were in his power, however, therefore he was not to be irritated. It was necessary he should be deceived. Clive, whom deception, when it suited his purpose, never cost a pang, proposed, that two treaties with Meer Jaffier should be drawn up, and signed. one, in which satisfaction to Omichund should be provided for, which Omichund should see; another, that which should really be executed, in which he should not be named. To his honour be it spoken, Admiral Watson refused to be a party in this treachery. He would not sign the false treaty; and the committee forged his name. When Omichund, upon the final adjustment, was told that he was cheated, and found that he was a ruined man, he fainted away, and lost his reason. He was from that moment insane. Not an Englishman, not even Mr. Orme, has yet expressed a word of sympathy or regret.—M.

In this statement some very material circumstances are omitted, which palliate, if they do not justify the deception that was practised. Before the attack upon Calcutta, Omichund was in friendly correspondence with the ministers and servants of the Nawab, and upon its being taken, was treated with civility by Suraj-ad-dowla, whom he accompanied to Murshedabad, and there obtained from him repayment of the money which in the plundor of Calcutta had been carried off from his house. Notwithstanding this, he was one of the first, through his connexion, no doubt, with the Hindu ministers, and Sets the bankers, to engage in the plot against Suraj-ad-dowla. The English had, therefore, no great reason to look upon him as their friend, and as it is evident that he was a stranger to every principle except love of money, there is nothing in his character to awaken any sympathy for his fate. Still it is undeniable, that thus far he merited no treachery, and that his services were

join the Governor of Bahar at Patna, the capital of the province. Upon the assassination of the father of Suraj-ad-dowla, Aliverdi had nominated Suraj-ad-dowla himself to the nabobship of that important province; but appointed Ramnarain, a Hindu, in whom he reposed great confidence, to be Deputy Governor in the absence of the Prince. Ramnarain had administered the affairs of the province during the life of Aliverdi, and had continued in the government since the accession of Suraj-ad-dowla. From him Meer Jaffier expected no co-operation, and displayed anxiety that the French party should be pursued. He suspected, however, the fidelity of any part of his own army; and a large detachment of the English were sent under Major Coote. They were detained too long in preparation; they were poorly provided with the means of expedition; and the European part of the detachment,

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entitled to consideration. It was intended to reimburse his losses and remunerate his assistance, but his want of principle instigated him to enrich himself by the secret to which he had been admitted, and when all was prepared for action, he waited on Mr. Watts, the Agent at Cassimbazar, and threatened to acquaint the Nawab with the conspiracy, unless a donation was secured to him of thirty lacs of rupees, about 350,000*l*. The demand was exorbitant, and infinitely beyond the amount of any losses he could have sustained by the plunder of Calcutta, for which losses, also, it is to be remembered, he had already received compensation. Mr. Mill thinks it probably not more than his loss, because the best houses in Calcutta, according to Orme, were his. But admitting that they were of great value, which is not very likely, they were still his. Calcutta was not razed to the ground, the buildings were still there, and on its recapture had of course reverted to their owners. The claim was wholly inadmissible, and its unreasonableness was aggravated by the threat of treachery with which it was enforced. What was to be done? To have rejected it at once would have been followed by the certain murder of the Company's servants at Cassimbazar, and of Mir Jaffier with all his family and adherents, and by the probable defeat of the British projects and their destruction. The menaced treason of Omichund, and its fatal consequences, are scarcely adverted to in the preceding account, although it was that, and not the mere demand of extravagant compensation, which was naturally enough denounced by the committee as a crime, and determined to be worthy of punishment. Clive, who had all along advocated his cause, and defended his character, "received with equal surprise and indignation the incontrovertible proofs "offered of his guilt. Viewing him as a public enemy, he considered, as he "stated at the period, and publicly avowed afterwards, every artifice that "could deceive him to be not only defensible, but just and proper." There may be a difference of opinion, on this subject, and it would have been more for the credit of the European character, that however treacherously extorted, the promise should have been performed, the money should have been paid; but there can be no doubt, that in order to appreciate with justice the conduct of Clive and the Committee, the circumstance of Omichund's menaced treason should not be kept out of sight. As to the reputed effects of his disappointment upon his intellects and life, there is good reason to doubt their occurrence, for in the month of August following, Clive recommends him to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, as "a person capable of rendering "great services, and, therefore, not wholly to be discarded." See Life of Clive, I. 289.—W.

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exasperated at the fatigue they had to endure, behaved mutinously on the way. Before they reached Patna the French had arrived; and, to obviate disputes, had been sent forward by Ramnarain into the territory of the Subahdar of Oude, with whom he had begun to negotiate an alliance. Major Coote was at first instructed to endeavour by intrigue and by force to wrest the government from Ramnarain: but while he was meditating the execution of these orders, he received further instructions which led to an accommodation ;[1] and he returned to Moorshedabad on the 13th of September. The detachment which he had conducted was stationed at Cossimbuzar, near Moorshedabad; the rest of the army was sent into quarters at Chandernagor, as a more healthy situation than the seat of the Presidency; and on the day after the arrival of Major Coote, Colonel Clive left Moorshedabad and returned to Calcutta.[2]

CHAPTER IV.

Renewal of the War with the French in the Carnatic.—Arrival of Lally.—French power superior to the English.—English power superior to the French.—Pondicherry taken.—And the French driven out of the Carnatic.

WHEN the English detachment for the recovery of Calcutta, and the French detachment for the relief of Bussy, left the Carnatic, the contending parties were so far diminished in force as to meditate quietness and forbearance: the English, till the troops which they had sent to Bengal should return; the French, till the armament should arrive which they expected from Europe. In the mean time it was felt by the English as a grievous mis-

[1] Ramnarain was avowedly a subject of the Subahdar of Bengal and Behar. His conduct was equivocal, and it was necessary to compel him to submission, or deprive him of his government. As soon as he saw that Meer Jaffier was resolutely supported by the English, he satisfied Clive of his being free from all treasonable intentions, and there was no longer any motive for his removal.—W.

[2] The chief authorities which have been followed for this series of transactions in Bengal, have been the Seer Mutakhareen, i. 298—772; the First Report from the Committee on the Nature, State, and Condition of the East India Company, in 1772, which is full of curious information; Orme's War in India, ii. 28—196; and the tracts published by the various actors in the scene, Scrafton, Watts, &c.

fortune, that though their Nabob Mohammed Ali was now without a rival in the Carnatic, its pecuniary produce was remarkably small.[1] The governors of forts and districts, the zemindars, polygars, and renters, employed, as usual, all their means of artifice and force to withhold their payments; and the rabble employed by Mohammed Ali as soldiers, ill paid and weakly governed, were found altogether inadequate to the establishment of an efficient authority in the province. The notion which was early entertained of the great pecuniary supplies capable of being drawn from Madura and Tinivelly, appears still to have maintained a determining influence in the councils of Madras; and notwithstanding the general resolution to remain inactive, Captain Calliaud, the commanding officer at Trichinopoly, before the end of the year 1756, received instructions to renew his attempts for the reduction of those dependencies. In the hope of prevailing upon the King of Tanjore to afford some assistance—a hope which, as usual, he took care to disappoint—Captain Calliaud directed his march through Tanjore, and crossing Marawar, arrived in Tinivelly. The troops who accompanied him, joined to the body of Sepoys who had remained in the country, and the troops of the Polygars who had espoused the English interest, composed a formidable army. But it was unable to proceed to action for want of money; and the utmost exertions of Calliaud produced but an insignificant supply. Intelligence that the rebellious polygars were treating with the Mysoreans, who had a station at the fort of Dindigul, presented in strong colours the necessity of expedition; yet he was unable to leave Tinivelly before the 10th of April, when he marched to attack Madura with 180 Europeans, 2500 Sepoys, six field-pieces, and 500 horse. Upon arriving at the town he found it a place of much greater strength than he had been led to suppose; and, without battering cannon, not easy, if possible to be reduced. He planned an effort to take it by surprise. The first ladders were planted; and Calliaud himself, with twenty men, had got into the fausse-bray, when the guard within received the alarm, and they were obliged to retreat. Two companies of

[1] It was a real evil to the government, that the revenues were withheld by refractory tributaries and contumacious dependants.—W.

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Sepoys were soon after despatched to bring pieces of battering artillery from Trichinopoly; and Calliaud had commenced an intrigue with some of the jematdars, or captains of the enemy's troops, when he received intelligence that the French had arrived at Trichinopoly.

During these efforts to obtain possession of the revenues of Madura and Tinivelly, similar efforts had been undertaken in other parts of the province. A brother of the Nabob, by name Nujeeb Oolla, who was Governor of Nelore and its district, situated in the northern quarter of the Carnatic, evaded or refused payment of the sums demanded of him; and the Nabob, who possessed not the means of coercion, was urgent with the English to perform it in his stead. The rupture between the two brothers took place towards the end of February, and it was the 1st of April before the English troops were ready to march. By the end of the month they had erected batteries against the fort; on the 2d of May a breach was effected, which they deemed practicable; and a storm was attempted the next morning. But the English were repulsed from the breach, nor was it deemed expedient to renew the attack till more battering-cannon should be received from Madras. In the mean time the detachment received orders to return to the Presidency with all expedition.

The Government of Pondicherry, nothwithstanding the pacific policy inculcated by the recall of Dupleix, and the commands which they had received to abstain from all operations of hazard till the arrival of the forces which they expected from Europe, determined, when they saw the English so largely at work, and their small force separated to such a distance as Tinivelly and Nelore, to avail themselves of an opportunity which good fortune seemed to present. They took the field on the 6th of April; but, to cover their designs, with only a small number of troops, and for an object of minor importance. By forced marches they appeared before Ellavanasore on the 10th, a fort possessed by a chief who had hitherto refused to acknowledge either the English or the French Nabob. In a sally, in which he threw the French army into great jeopardy, he received a mortal wound, of which he died in a few days, and the garrison, during the night, evacuated the

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fort. The French, after this acquisition, marched in the direction leading to the territory of some polygars with whom they had disputes; and Captain Calliaud received a letter from the Madras Presidency, on the very day on which he attempted to surprise Madura, that from the late intelligence received of the motions of the French, no design on their part was apprehended against Trichinopoly.[1] The season for the arrival of the English troops from Bengal was elapsed; and it was impossible now that any should return before September. The French, therefore, suddenly barring their garrisons; leaving in Pondicherry itself none but invalids; and enrolling the European inhabitants to man the walls, despatched every soldier to the field; and the army took post before Trichinopoly on the 14th of May. The garrison, deprived of the troops which had marched to Madura, were insufficient to guard the walls; and they had 500 French prisoners in the fort. Calliaud received intelligence before Madura of the imminent danger of Trichinopoly, at three o'clock in the afternoon of the 21st; at six he was on his march; on the 25th, at day-break, he halted nineteen miles from Trichinopoly. An army five times as great as his watched his approach, and guarded every avenue by which it was supposed he could enter the fort. On one side of the town was a large plain, about seven miles in extent, consisting of rice-fields covered with water, which the French deemed impassable. Calliaud continued his march, as if he intended to enter by one of the ordinary inlets, till night; when he suddenly took another direction, and arrived at the margin of the rice-fields about ten o'clock. The fatigue of marching through the rice-fields up to the knees in mud, after forced marches of several days, was excessive. At day-break, however, the main body of the detachment reached the fort, and were received with that ardent welcome by its inmates, which the greatness of the danger, and the exertions which the detachment had made to save it, naturally inspired. The French commander, astonished at the news of their entrance, and now despairing of success, marched away for Pondicherry the following day.[2]

[1] Cambridge, p. 140.

[2] Orme, ii. 197—217; Cambridge's War in India, pp. 137—153; Wilks' Historical Sketches of the South of India, pp. 392, 393.

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Intelligence of the march of the French against Trichinopoly, and of the repulses sustained by their own troops, in the two assaults upon Madura and Nelore, reached the Presidency of Madras at nearly the same time. They recalled immediately the detachment from Nelore; sent as many troops as possible into the field; and were uncertain whether, to relieve Trichinopoly, they should recall the French to the defence of their own settlements, or march to attack them before the place; when the welcome news arrived of the fact and consequences of Calliaud's return. To possess and garrison the forts which were scattered over the country, and which, by commanding the adjacent districts, afforded the only chance of revenue, was a principal object of desire to both contending parties. Several transactions took place about this time, relating to places of minor importance; but Wandewash was a fortress to the reduction of which peculiar value was attached. The Governor of Wandewash had paid no revenue since 1752; he had perpetually favoured the French, who from that station had been enabled to make incursions into every part of the province; it not only afforded a large revenue, it was also a barrier to the surrounding districts. In hopes that it might be taken before the French army could arrive from Trichinopoly to its relief, the English commander sent to the attack was ordered to push his operations with the greatest vigour. He got possession of the town, which was contiguous to the fort, after a slight resistance. The French, however, were now hastening to its relief; and Colonel Aldercron, whose march had not displayed any wonderful despatch, thought it prudent to renounce the enterprise before they arrived. At his departure he set fire to the defenceless town: though no peculiar circumstance is alleged to justify an act so cruel to the innocent inhabitants.

The English Presidency, to whom the Nabobship of Arcot continued as yet but little productive, were straitened in their treasury. Anxious therefore to diminish expense, they gave directions, upon hearing that the army had retired from Wandewash, for its proceeding immediately to the Presidency. Unhappily the enemy were in the field, of which they were thus left entirely the masters; and they performed a successful incursion as far as Conje-

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veram, where they burned the town, to revenge the outrage committed upon Wandewash. The Presidency, now aware of their blunder, ordered back the army into the field. The two armies were nearly equal. The English offered battle; but the French kept within their intrenchments. The English, after remaining in their presence for some weeks, retired again at the end of July, and marched to the several stations from which they had been drawn. The French were no sooner masters of the field, than they renewed their incursions, collected the revenues, and levied contributions in several districts.

A pressure was now sustained of another description. The Mahratta general Balajee Row had paid a visit of exaction to the kingdom of Mysore the preceding season; and, upon marching back to his own country, before the period of the rains, left an officer with a large detachment, who, after taking several intervening forts, made himself master of one of the passes into the Carnatic, about sixty miles north-west from the city of Arcot, and sent a peremptory demand of the chout for the whole nabobship. The city of Arcot was thrown into the utmost alarm: the Nabob dreaded the incursion of Mahratta parties into the very town; and accepted the invitation of the English to send his family to Madras. The Mahrattas pretended that the chout had been settled by Nizam al Mulk, at 600,000 rupees a year; two thirds for the Carnatic, and one for Trichinopoly and the southern dependencies. Of this they asserted that six years were due; and presented their demand, in the whole, at 4,000,000 of rupees. The Nabob, who knew the weakness of his physical, if not of his intellectual resources, was glad to negotiate. After much discussion, the Mahratta agent consented to accept of 200,000 rupees, in ready money, and the Nabob's draughts upon the governors of forts and polygars for 250,000 more. To these terms the Nabob agreed; but he required that the money should be found by the English, and should be furnished out of the revenues which he had assigned to them for the expenses of the war. At this time the English might have obtained important assistance against the Mahrattas. Morari Row, and the Patan Nabobs of Savanore, Canoul, Candanore, and Cudapa, who, since the assassination of Nazir Jung, had maintained a sort of

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independence, offered their alliance. But the English could spare no troops, and were as much afraid to admit such allies into the province as the Mahrattas themselves. After as much delay and evasion as possible, they were induced, notwithstanding the danger of the precedent, in fear of greater evils, to comply with the demand.

During all this period, the attention of the Presidency of Madras may be considered as chiefly divided between two objects; the French in the Carnatic, and the Polygars of Madura and Tinivelly. When Calliaud was obliged to march from Madura for the defence of Trichinopoly, he left about sixty Europeans, and upwards of 1000 Sepoys, who were not inactive; and, as soon as he was convinced that no further danger was to be apprehended from the French, he despatched a reinforcement from Trichinopoly. In compliance with the recommendation of the Presidency Calliaud himself, with as great a portion of the troops from Trichinopoly as it was safe to withdraw, marched on the 25th of June, and arrived at Madura on the 3rd of July. Having effected a breach on the 10th, he resolved to storm. He was repulsed with great loss. For some days the operations of the besiegers were retarded by the sickness of their leader. The admission of supplies into the town was now, however, cut off; and the negotiations for its surrender were renewed. After some time was spent in bargaining about the price, Calliaud, on the 8th of August, on payment of 170,000 rupees, was received into the town.

On the 8th of September a French fleet of twelve ships anchored in Pondicherry road; but, after landing about a thousand men, it again set sail for Mauritius. This was not the grand armament which the government of Pondicherry expected; and, till the arrival of which, all operations of magnitude were to be deferred. The army, however, which had been scouring the country, was still in its camp at Wandewash. It was now strongly reinforced by the troops newly arrived; and marched against the fort of Chittapet. The Nabob, Mohammed Ali, had a personal dislike to the Governor of Chittapet, and had infused into the English suspicions of his fidelity, which imprudently diminished the efforts necessary for his support. He fell, defending his fort to the last extremity; and thus another

place of considerable importance was gained by the French. From Chittapet they marched to Trincomalee, which was abandoned by the Governor and garrison, upon their approach. After this they divided themselves into several detachments; and before the 6th of November, when they were recalled, they had reduced eight forts in the neighbourhood of Chittapet, Trincomalee, and Gingee; and established collectors in the dependent districts.

On the news of the arrival of the French fleet, Captain Calliaud returned to Trichinopoly, with all the Europeans, and was soon after followed by the Sepoys, who, however, went back as soon as it appeared that Trichinopoly was not in danger. The Mysoreans, who had been long expected to the assistance of the confederate Polygars, arrived in the month of November, took the fort of Sholavenden, and plundered to the walls of Madura, under which they remained for several days. They allowed themselves, however, to be attacked in a narrow pass, by the commander of the British Sepoys, and suffered a severe defeat. In the mean time Captain Calliaud, under the safeguard of a passport from Pondicherry, repaired in person to the Presidency, to represent the state of the southern dependencies, for the reduction of which so many useless efforts had been made; and declared his opinion that the settlement of the country could not be achieved, or a revenue drawn from it, without a greater force, or the removal of Maphuz Khan. It was agreed with the Nabob that an annual income, adequate to his maintenance should be offered to this his elder brother, provided he would quit the province and disband his troops. Maphuz Khan, however, would listen to no terms importing less than the government of the whole country; and the confederates continued in formidable force.

Though after the recall of the French troops in November, no army was in the field; the garrisons left in the several forts continued to make incursions one upon another, and mutually ravaged the unhappy country. As these operations, "being always levelled at defenceless villages, carried," says Mr. Orme, "the reproach of robbery, more than the reputation of war;" each side, too, losing by them more than it gained; the French officer at Wandewash proposed a conference, for the purpose of

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ending this wretched species of warfare; and an English officer was authorized to conclude an agreement. The governments of Madras and Pondicherry were both now disposed to suspend their efforts — the French, till the arrival of the forces which they boasted were to render them irresistible in the Carnatic — the English, that they might husband their resources for the danger with which they were threatened. In this situation they continued till the 28th of April, when a French squadron of twelve sail arrived in the road of Fort St. David.

Upon the breaking out of the war between France and England in 1756, the French ministry resolved to strike an important blow in India. The Count de Lally, a member of one of those Irish families, which had transported themselves into France along with James II., was appointed Commander-in-Chief of all the French forces in India. He had distinguished himself in the battle of Fontenoy, where he took several English officers with his own hand, and received the rank of Colonel from the King upon the field of battle: it was he who proposed the daring plan of landing in England with 10,000 men, while the Prince, Charles Edward, was trying his fortune for a crown in another part of the island: and his hatred of the English, and his reputation for courage, now pointed him out as the fittest person to crush the pretensions of that nation on the coast of Coromandel. He was accompanied by his own regiment of Irish, 1080 strong; by fifty of the royal artillery, and a great number of officers of distinction. They left the port of Brest on the 4th of May, 1757, when a malignant fever raged in the town, of which they carried the infection along with them. No fewer than 300 persons died in the fleet before they reached Rio Janeiro, where they remained for two months, and after all, departed with a residue of the sickness on board, At Mauritius they were joined by a part of the ships which had landed the troops at Pondicherry in the preceding year: and, after a tedious voyage, made the coast of Coromandel on the 26th of April, 1758.

The court of Versailles anticipated nothing but triumphs from this splendid armament: and the presumption of Lally well assorted with that of his government. It was even laid down in the instructions of the ministers, that

he should commence his operations with the siege of Fort St. David. For this purpose, before communicating with the land, he made the fleet anchor at the place of attack. He proceeded with two of the vessels to Pondicherry, where he arrived at five in the afternoon;[1] and before the night closed he had 1000 Europeans, and as many Sepoys, on their march to Fort St. David. In military operations, notwithstanding the importance of despatch, something more than despatch is necessary. The troops marched without provisions, and with unskilful guides, who led them astray, and brought them to Fort St. David at seven o'clock in the morning, worn out with hunger and fatigue.[2] This gave them a motive and an apology for commencing a system of plunder and insubordination, from which they could not easily be recalled.

These troops had scarcely arrived at Fort St. David, when the ships in the road descried the English fleet making way from the south. Mr. Pococke, with the ships of war from Bengal, had arrived at Madras on the 24th of February; on the 24th of the following month a squadron of five ships from Bombay had arrived under Admiral Stevens; and on the 17th of April, the whole sailed to the southward, looking out for the French. Having in ten days worked as high to the windward as the head of Ceylon, they stood in again for the coast, which they made, off Negapatnam, on the 28th, and proceeding along shore, discovered the French fleet, at nine the next morning, riding near Cuddalore. The French immediately weighed, and bore down towards Pondicherry, throwing out signals to recall the two ships which had sailed with Lally; and the English Admiral gave the signal for chase. The summons for the two ships not being answered, the French

[1] He himself complains that little preparation was made to co-operate with him. Among the proofs of carelessness, one was that he was saluted with five discharges of cannon, loaded with ball, of which three pierced the ship through and through, and the two others damaged the rigging. Mémoire pour Lally, i. 39.

[2] Lally complains, and with good reason, of the deplorable ignorance of the French Governor and Council. They could not tell him the amount of the English forces on the coast; nor whether Cuddalore was surrounded with a dry wall or a rampart: nor whether there was any river to pass between Pondicherry and Fort St. David. He complains that he lost forty-eight hours at Cuddalore, because there was not a man at Pondicherry who could tell him that it was open on the side next the sea; that he was unable to find twenty-four hours' provisions at Pondicherry; and that the Governor, who promised to forward a portion to him on the road, broke his word; whence the troops were two days without food, and some of them died. Ibid. 40, 41.

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fleet stood out to sea, and formed the line of battle. The French consisted of nine sail, the English only of seven. The battle was indecisive; the loss of a few men, with some damage to the ships, being only the result.[1] Both fleets fell considerably to leeward during the engagement; and the French were six days in working up to the road of Pondicherry, where the troops were landed. Lally himself had some days before proceeded to Fort St. David with the whole force of Pondicherry, and the troops from the fleet were sent after him, as fast as they came on shore.

The English were thrown into the greatest alarm. So much was the power of the enemy now superior to their own, that they scarcely anticipated any other result, than their expulsion from the country; and had Dupleix been still the guide and conductor of the enemy's affairs, it is more than probable that their most gloomy apprehensions would have been realized.[2] Not only had an overwhelming addition been made to a force, against which they had previously found it difficult to maintain themselves; but in the meantime, Bussy, in the northern parts of the Deccan, had obtained the most important advantages, and brought upon the English the heaviest disasters. After the brilliant exploit of 1756, when he defended himself at Hyderabad against the whole power of the Subahdar, and imposed his own terms upon his enemies, he had proceeded to the Northern Circars, where his presence was necessary, to collect the revenues, and, by an adjustment of the government, to provide for the future regularity of their payment. He began his march on the 16th of November of that year, with 500 Europeans and 4000 Sepoys; leaving only a small detachment to attend to the person of the Subahdar.[3] In accomplishing his progress through

[1] A French ship was driven on shore, and obliged to be abandoned; but this was owing to an accident after the battle.

[2] Lord Clive himself said, in his evidence before the Committee, in 1772: "Mr. Lally arrived with a force as threatened not only the destruction of all the settlements there, but of all the East India Company's possessions, and nothing saved Madras from sharing the fate of Fort St. David, at that time, but their want of money, which gave time for strengthening and reinforcing the place." Report, ut supra.

[3] Orme (ii. 103) says he left 100 Europeans and 1000 Sepoys. Wilks (Histor. Sketches, p. 387) says he left 200 Europeans and 500 Sepoys. Orme again (Ibid. p. 264) speaks of the detachment as consisting of 200 Europeans and 500 Sepoys.

the country, he encountered no considerable resistance. The Polygar of Bobilee defended his fort to the last extremity; and exhibited the customary spectacle of Hindu desperation, the fortress in flames, and the people in garrison butchered by their own hands. But he was excited to this desperation by the command to exchange the government of his present for that of another district, on account of the annoyance he gave to a neighbouring chief, from whom Bussy had received a train of important services. When Bussy had nearly completed the arrangement which he intended to make, he received, about the 1st of April, letters from Suraj-ad-dowla, inviting him, by the largest offers, to assist him in expelling the English from Bengal. Bussy waited on his northern frontier, ready to march through Orissa into Bengal, as soon as he should receive satisfactory intelligence; but, learning the capture of Chandernagor, and the imbecility of the Subahdar, he changed his purpose, and proceeded to the attack of the English establishments within the Circars. There were three factories, on three different branches of the Godavery, in a district remarkable for the excellence and cheapness of its cloths. They were places of no strength, and surrendered on the first requisition. Vizagapatam, however, was one of the places of greatest importance belonging to the English in India. It was a fort, garrisoned by 150 Europeans, and 300 Sepoys; but so injudiciously constructed, that the attempt to defend it was unanimously determined to be vain. The van of Bussy's army appeared before it on the 24th of June; and a capitulation was concluded; that all the Europeans, both military and civil, should be regarded as prisoners, and all the effects of the Company as prize of war. The Sepoys, and other natives, Bussy allowed to go where they pleased; he also promised to respect the property of individuals. "And he kept his word," says Mr. Orme, "with the utmost liberality, resigning, without discussion, whatsoever property any one claimed as his own."

During these transactions, however, a great revolution was preparing in the army of Salabut Jung. He had two younger brothers, whom Bussy, acquainted with the temper of Oriental governments, had advised the Subahdar to provide with establishments, and every indul-

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gence suitable to their rank, but from whom he had exhorted him carefully to withhold those governments and places of power, which, in the hands of the near relations of the prince, were the cause of so many revolutions in India. This prudent course was pursued till the period of the alienation from Bussy of the mind of the Subahdar; when that prince was easily persuaded, by his designing courtiers, to reverse the policy which the sagacity of Bussy had established. The oldest of the two brothers, Bassalut Jung, was appointed Governor of the strong fort and country of Adoni; and Nizam Ali, the youngest and most dangerous, was made Governor of Berar, the most extensive province of the Deccan, of which the Mahrattas now possessed the principal part.

Towards the end of the year 1757, while a body of Mahrattas insulted Aurungabad, which was then the residence of the Subahdar, a mutiny, under the usual shape of clamour for pay, was excited in his army. The utmost alarm was affected by the Dewan, or minister, who took shelter in a strong fort. The Subahdar, without resources, was driven to dismay: Nizam Ali, who had acquired some reputation, and intrigued successfully with the troops, offered to interpose and allay the tumult, provided the requisite powers, and among other things the great seal of the Subah, were committed to his hands: the requisition was obeyed: and Nizam Ali, leaving only the name of Subahdar to his brother, grasped the whole powers of the state. With an affectation of indifference he committed the seal to his brother Bassalut Jung, but under sufficient security that it would be used agreeably to his directions.[1]

Bussy received intelligence of these events in the beginning of January; immediately began his march with the whole of his army; and by a road never travelled before by European troops, arrived in twenty-one days at Aurungabad, a distance by the perambulator of nearly

[1] There are some important differences between Orme's account of these events, and that given by the biographer of Shahnawaz Khan, the dewan or minister of Salabut Jung. The discontent was real, and the dewan only saved his life by flying to Dowlatabad. Bassalut Jung was concerned in the disturbance, but the other brother, Nizam Ali, was not on the spot, nor did he join his brother for two or three months. The result of his junction was that described in the text. Nizam Ali was declared heir and successor of Salabut Jung, and associated with him in the government, engrossing the real authority. Calcutta Magazine, Dec. 1825.—W.

400 miles.[1] Four separate armies were encamped about the city; that of Nizam Ali from Berar; that of the Subah, of which Nizam Ali had now the command; that of Bassalut Jung from Adoni; and that of the Mahrattas commanded by Balajee Row. The presence of Bussy, with his handful of Europeans, imposed respect upon them all; and every eye was fixed upon his movements. His first care was to restore the authority of the Subahdar, whom the presence alone of the French detachment, which had vigilantly guarded his person, had probably saved from the assassination which generally forms the main ingredient of Indian revolutions. BOOK IV. CHAP. IV. 1758.

The two brothers at first assumed a high tone; and when obliged to part with the seal, exhibited unusual marks of rage and indignation. Bussy clearly saw that the safety of the Subahdar, and the existence of the present government, demanded the resumption of the power which had been intrusted to Nizam Ali; but when the proposition of a large pension was made to him in lieu of his government, he had the art to interest his troops in his behalf, and Bussy found it necessary to temporize. To remove still further the umbrage which he found was gaining ground at the uncontrollable authority with which a stranger disposed of the powers of the Deccan, and of the sons of the great Nizam al Mulk, he re-committed the seal of state to Bassalut Jung, but under securities which precluded any improper use.

To provide a permanent security for his predominating influence in the government of the Subah, there was wanting, besides the distant provinces which yielded him the necessary revenue, a place of strength near the seat of government, to render him independent of the sudden machinations of his enemies. The celebrated fortress of Dowlatabad, both from locality and strength, was admirably adapted to his views. It was at present in possession of the prime minister, the mortal foe of Bussy, the chief actor in the late commotions, and the assured instrument of others in every hostile design. By a sum of money, Bussy gained the Deputy Governor to admit him secretly with his troops into the fort; and this invaluable instru-

[1] Mr. Orme states the days on report merely; but we may presume it was the best information which that careful historian could procure.

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ment of power was gained without the loss of a man. As the utmost efforts, however, of the resentment of the minister were now assured, Bussy secured the means of rendering him a prisoner in the midst of the camp of the Subahdar, at the very hour when he himself was received into the fort Dowlatabad. These events alarmed Nizam Ali into submission; and an accommodation was effected, by which he agreed to divest himself of his government of Berar, and accept of Hyderabad in its stead. When holding his court, to receive the compliments of the principal persons, before his departure for his new government, he was waited upon, among others, by Hyder Jung, the Dewan of Bussy. This personage[1] was the son of a Governor of Masulipatam, who had been friendly to the French; and he had attached himself to Bussy, since his first arrival at Golconda. Bussy was soon aware of his talents, and discovered the great benefit he might derive from them. He became a grand and dexterous instrument for unravelling the plots and intrigues against which it was necessary for Bussy to be incessantly on his guard; and a no less consummate agent in laying the trains which led to the accomplishment of Bussy's designs. To give him the greater weight with his countrymen, and more complete access to the persons and the minds of the people of consequence, he obtained for him titles of nobility, dignities, and riches; and enabled him to hold his Durbar, like the greatest chiefs. He was known to have been actively employed in the late masterly transactions of Bussy; and an occasion was chosen, on which a blow might be struck, both at his life, and that of Salabut Jung. A day was appointed by the Subahdar for paying his devotions at the tomb of his father, distant about twenty miles from Aurungabad; and on the second day of his absence, Nizam Ali held his court. Hyder Jung was received with marked respect; but, on some pretext, detained behind the rest of the assembly, and assassinated. The first care of Bussy, upon this new emergency, was to strengthen the slender escort of Salabut Jung. The next was to

[1] His original name was Abd-al-Rahman, he was taken whilst young to Pondicherry, and early employed as an interpreter to Bussy's detachment, in which capacity he gained the confidence of that officer. Life of Shahnawaz Khan.—W.

secure the person of the late minister;[1] of whose share in the present perfidy he had no doubt, and whom he had hitherto allowed to remain under a slight restraint in the camp. That veteran intriguer, concluding that his life was in danger, excited his attendants to resist, and was slain in the scuffle. Struck with dismay, upon the news of this unexpected result, Nizam Ali abandoned the camp in the night, taking with him his select cavalry alone; and pursued his flight towards Boorhanpore, about 150 miles north from Aurungabad, with all the speed which the horses could endure. Thus was Bussy delivered from his two most formidable enemies, by the very stroke which they had aimed against him; and in this state of uncontrollable power in the wide-extended government of the Deccan, was he placed, when the arrival of Lally produced an extraordinary change in his views; and ensured a new train of events in the Subah. 1758.

The character of that new Governor was ill adapted to the circumstances in which he was appointed to act. Ardent and impetuous, by the original structure of his mind, his early success and distinction had rendered him vain and presumptuous.

With natural talents of considerable force, his knowledge was scanty and superficial. Having never experienced difficulties, he never anticipated any. For him it was enough to will the end; the means obtained an inferior portion of his regard. Acquainted thoroughly with the technical part of the military profession, but acquainted with nothing else, he was totally unable to apply its principles in a new situation of things. Unacquainted with the character and manners of the people among whom he was called upon to act; he was too ignorant of the theory of war to know, that on the manage-

[1] According to the Mazir al Omra, whence the biography of Shahnawaz Khan is derived, he was already in confinement through the treachery of Hyder Jung, who was plotting, it is asserted, the arrest of Nizam Ali, when he paid that prince the visit in the course of which he was murdered. Upon the death of Hyder Jung, the prince mounted his horse and fled, and in the alarm which these occurrences excited amongst the French, some of Bussy's attendants hastened to the place where the minister was confined, and killed him, along with his youngest son, and another of Salabut Jung's chief officers, Yamin-ad-dowlah. The native historian is, no doubt, misled by his prejudices, in ascribing to the French commandant any share, however indirect, in the assassination of the dewan; but had Clive been implicated in any similar transaction, it is very probable that the English historian would have given a very different account of it.—W.

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ment of his intellectual and moral instruments, the success of the general mainly depends.

He began by what he conceived a very justifiable act of authority; but which was in reality a cruel violation of the customs, the religion, and, in truth, the legal rights of the natives. As there was not at Pondicherry, of the persons of the lower castes, who are employed in the servile occupations of the camp, a sufficient number to answer the impatience of M. Lally, in forwarding the troops to Fort St. David, he ordered the native inhabitants of the town to be pressed, and employed, without distinction of caste, in carrying burdens, and performing whatever labour might be required. The terror and consternation created by such an act, was greater than if he had set fire to the town and butchered every man whom it contained. The consequence was, that the natives were afraid to trust themselves in his power; and he thus ensured a deficiency of attendants.[1]

The feeble bullocks of the country, and the smallness of the number which the Governor and Council of Pondicherry were able to supply, but ill accorded with Lally's ideas of a sufficiency of draught cattle. The very depressed state of the treasury precluded the possibility of affording other facilities, the want of which his impatience rendered a galling disappointment. He vented his uneasiness in reproaches and complaints. He had carried out in his mind one of those wide and sweeping conclusions, which men of little experience and discrimination are apt to form; that his countrymen in India were universally rogues. And to this sentiment, that ignorance and avidity at home, which recalled Dupleix, were well calculated to

[1] This, at least, is stated by the English historians, and by the numerous and too successful enemies of Lally. In the original correspondence, there is no proof that I can perceive. In one of Lally's letters (to De Leyrit, 18th of May), he presses him to prevail upon the inhabitants of Pondicherry, by extra rewards, to lend their assistance. This looks not like a general order to impress the inhabitants. The truth is, that he himself brings charges, which were too well founded, of oppression committed by others against the natives. In his letter to De Leyrit, 25th of May, 1758, he says, "J'apprend que dans votre civil et dans votre militaire, il se commet des vexations vis-à-vis des gens du pays qui les éloignent et les empêchent de vous faire les fournitures nécessaires à la subsistance de l'armée." Lally says, in his Mémoire, p. 50, "Des employés du Sieur Des Vaux, protégé par le Sieur de Leyrit, arrêtoient des provisions qui arrivoient au camp, et exigeoient de l'argent des noirs, pour leur accorder la liberté du passage. Un de ces brigands avoit été pris en flagrant délit. On avoit saisi sur lui un sac plein d'espèces et de petits joyaux enlevés aux paysans."

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conduct him. The Directors had told him in their instructions; "As the troubles in India have been the source of fortunes, rapid and vast, to a great number of individuals, the same system always reigns at Pondicherry, where those who have not yet made their fortune hope to make it by the same means; and those who have already dissipated it hope to make it a second time. The Sieur de Lally will have an arduous task to eradicate that spirit of cupidity; but it would be one of the most important services which he could render to the Company."[1] Every want, therefore, which he experienced, every délay which occurred, he ascribed to the dishonesty and misconduct of the persons employed;[2] and had so little prudence as incessantly to declare those opinions in the most pointed and offensive terms which his language could supply. These proceedings rendered him in a short time odious to every class of men in the colony; precluded all cordial co-operation, and ensured him every species of ill-office which it was safe to render. The animosity at last between him and his countrymen became rancour and rage; and the possibility of a tolerable management of the common concerns was utterly destroyed.

On the 1st of May, Lally himself arrived at Fort St. David; and when joined by the troops from the ships, and those whom he had drawn from the forts in the Carnatic, he had, according to Mr. Orme, 2500 Europeans, exclusive of officers, and about the same number of Sepoys, assembled for the attack. The garrison consisted of 1600 natives, and 619 Europeans, of whom eighty-three were sick or infirm, and 250 were seamen.[3] The place

[1] Mém. pour Lally, p. 21. In their letter of the 20th March, 1759, they say, "Vous voudrez bien prendre en considération l'administration des affaires de la Compagnie, et l'origine *des abus sans nombre* que nous y voyons: *Un despotisme absolu* nous paroit la première chose à corriger."—They add, "Nous trouvons par-tout des preuves de la prodigalité la plus outrée, et du plus grand désordre."

[2] There is no doubt at all, that the neglect of all preparation, to enable him to act with promptitude, though they had been expecting him at Pondicherry for eight months, was extreme, and to the last degree culpable. There was a total want of talent at this time at Pondicherry; a weak imagination that the expected armament was to do everything, and that those who were there before had no occasion to do anything; otherwise, with the great superiority of force they had enjoyed since the arrival of the 1000 Europeans, in the beginning of September, they might have performed actions of no trifling importance, and have at least prepared *some* of the money and other things requisite for the operations of Lally.

[3] Orme. Lally (Mém. p. 42) says, "Il y avoit dans le Fort de Saint David sept cent Européens, et environ deux mille Cipayes. Les troupes du Comte de

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held out till the 1st of June, when, having nearly expended its ammunition, it yielded on capitulation. It was expected to have made a better defence; and the English historians have not spared the conduct of the commanding officer. He had courage and spirit in sufficient abundance; but was not very rich in mental resources, or very accurate in ascertaining the conduciveness of his means. In consequence of instructions brought from France, Lally immediately issued orders for razing the fortifications to the ground. As soon as the fort capitulated, he sent a detachment against Devi-Cotah, which the garrison immediately abandoned; and on the 7th of June, he returned with the army, in triumph, and sung *Te Deum* at Pondicherry.

The English, in full expectation that the next operation of Lally would be the siege of Madras, had called in the troops from all the forts in the interior, except Trichinopoly; and had even debated whether they should not abandon that city itself. All the troops from Tinivelly and Madura were ordered to return to Trichinopoly, and, together with the garrison, to hold themselves in readiness for any emergency.

The great poverty, however, of the French exchequer, and the inability, created or greatly enhanced by the unpopular proceedings of Lally, of supplying its deficiencies by credit, cramped his operations, and sharpened the asperities of his temper. He had written from Fort St. David to the Governor of Pondicherry, in the following terms: "This letter shall be an eternal secret between you, Sir, and me, if you afford me the means of accomplishing my enterprise. I left you 100,000 livres of my own money to aid you in providing the funds which it requires. I found not, upon my arrival, in your purse, and in that of your whole council, the resource of 100 pence. You, as well as they, have refused me the support of your credit. Yet I imagine you are all of you more

Lally consistoient en seize cents Européens, et six cents noirs, tant cavalerie qu'infanterie, ramassés à la hâte. Son régiment qui avoit essayé un combat de mer, où il avoit perdu quatre-vingt-quatre hommes, et à qui on n'avoit donné depuis son débarquement à Pondicherry, que quarante-huit heures de repos, étoit à peine en état de lui fournir deux piquets." It is at least to be remembered, that this statement of facts was made in the face of Lally's numerous and bitter enemies.

indebted to the Company than I am. If you continue to leave me in want of everything, and exposed to contend with universal disaffection, not only shall I inform the King and the Company of the warm zeal which their servants here display for their interest, but I shall take effectual measures for not depending, during the short stay I wish to make in this country, on the party spirit and the personal views with which I perceive that every member appears occupied, to the total hazard of the Company." [1]

Despairing of funds from any other source, he resolved to devote to this object the next operations of the war.[2] He at the same time recalled Bussy, against whose character he fostered the strongest prejudices, and the importance of whose transactions under the Subahdar he treated as interested pretence and imposture.

Two plans presented themselves for the supply of his wants. All the western and northern districts of the Nabobship, evacuated by the English, lay open to his incursions, and in the rents which might be collected offered a certain resource. But the collection of rents was a tedious operation, and the expected produce a scanty supply. The King of Tanjore, when pressed in 1751 by Chunda Saheb and the French, had, among his other efforts to procrastinate and evade, given his bond, which still remained at Pondicherry, for 5,600,000 rupees. This sum, could it only be extorted from him, was a large and present resource; and in Fort St. David, as a prisoner, had been found the pretender to the throne of Tanjore, who

[1] Mémoire, ut supra, Pièces Justificatives, p. 30. De Leyrit defended himself by asserting the want of means; "Je vous rendrai compte," says he, "de ma conduite, et de la disette de fonds dans laquelle on m'a laissé depuis deux ans, et je compte vous faire voir que j'ai fait à tous égards plus qu'on ne devoit attendre de moi. Mes ressources sont aujourd'hui épuisés, et nous n'en avons plus à attendre que d'un succès. Où en trouverois-je de suffisantes dans un pays ruiné par quinze ans de guerre, pour fournir aux dépenses considérables de votre armée et aux besoins d'une escadre, par laquelle nous attendions bien des espèces de secours, et qui se trouve au contraire denuée de tout?" Ibid. No. 20. Lett. du Sieur De Leyrit au Comte de Lally, 24th May. 1758. Lally, however, asserts that he had received two millions of livres by the arrival of the fleet. Mém. p. 49.

[2] This at least is the account of the English historians. Lally himself says, that it was his own design to proceed directly from Fort St. David to Madras; but the commander of the fleet absolutely refused to co-operate with him; *would* go upon a cruize to the south, for the purpose of intercepting such vessels as might arrive from England; and carried with him the detachment which Lally had put on board to prevail upon him to trust himself again at sea after the first engagement. Mém. p. 57.

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might now be employed as an instrument to frighten the Rajah into compliance. The expedition against Tanjore was accordingly undertaken; and on the 18th of June Lally took the field.[1]

From the terror of the natives, the alienation of the Europeans, and the want of money, the equipment of the expedition, in attendants, draught cattle, and even provisions and ammunition, was in the highest degree defective. In seven days the army arrived at Carical, not without suffering, at this early stage, both from fatigue and from hunger.[2] At this place Lally was met by a messenger from the King, who was desirous to treat. Lally understood, that some of his predecessors had been duped into impolitic delay, by the artful negociations of the King of Tanjore. He resolved to display superior wisdom, by a conduct directly the reverse. He proceeded to Nagore, a town accounted rich, about four miles to the north of Negapatnam; but the merchants had time to remove their most valuable effects, and the acquisition yielded only a trifle. On the 28th he arrived at Kiveloor, the seat of a celebrated Pagoda, which eastern exaggeration represented as containing enormous riches, the accumulated offerings of the piety of ages: had it been plundered by a Mohammedan conqueror, and the transaction recorded by a Persian historian, he would have described his hero as bearing away, in his fortunate chariots, a mountain of gold. Under the vulgar persuasion, Lally ransacked, and even dug the houses; dragged the tanks, and took away the idols; but no treasures were found, and the idols, instead of gold were only of brass. Six unhappy Brahmens lingered about the camp, in hopes, it is probable, of recovering some of their beloved divinities. The suspicions of Lally took them for spies; his violence and precipitation took his

[1] Lally repeats with what regret he postponed the siege of Madras; and shows that it was by earnest persuasions of the Governor, and the Jesuit Lavaur (a missionary of a most intriguing spirit, who had contrived to gain a vast influence in the Councils of Pondicherry), that he undertook the expedition to Tanjore. Mém. p. 62.

[2] Lally was, of course, obliged to trust to the information of those acquainted with the country; and the letters of Lavaur and De Leyrit, make it sufficiently appear that they extenuated beyond measure the difficulties of the undertaking; and made him set out upon representations which they knew to be false, and promises which were never intended to be fulfilled. In fact, it would have required a cooler and a more fertile head than that of Lally, to counteract the malignity, to stimulate the indifference, and to supply the enormous deficiencies, by which he was surrounded.

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suspicions for realities; and he ordered the six Brahmens to be treated as the Europeans are accustomed to treat the natives convicted as spies; that is, to be shot away from the muzzles of the guns. The King's army took the field; and after a slight show of resistance, retreated to the capital, near which Lally arrived on the 18th of July. Conferences ensued: The King offered a sum of money, but greatly inferior to what was required: Lally offered to abate in his pecuniary demand, provided he were furnished with 600 bullocks, and a supply of gunpowder. His agents were more prudent than himself, and suppressed the article of gunpowder, the deficiency of which, if known to the King, was not likely to improve his disposition to compliance; and the bullocks, the King observed, that his religion did not permit him to grant. The cannonade and bombardment began. After a few days, the King renewed his efforts for an accommodation. The obliquities of Eastern negotiation wore out the temper of Lally; and he threatened to carry the King and all his family slaves to Mauritius. This outrage produced in the Hindu a final resolution to defend himself to the last extremity. He had early, among his applications for assistance, implored the co-operation of the English; and Captain Calliaud at Trichinopoly was commissioned to make all those efforts in his favour which his own security might appear to allow. That officer sent to him without delay a small detachment, which might feed his hopes of a more efficient support, and afford him no apology for making his peace with the French. But he was afraid to intrust him with any considerable portion of his troops, fully aware that the French might at any time make with him an accommodation, and receive his assistance to destroy the very men who had come to protect him. Upon this last occurrence Calliaud inferred that the time for accommodation was elapsed, and sent an additional detachment. Lally continued his operations, and on the 7th of August effected a breach.

At this time, however, only 150 charges of powder for the cannon, not twenty cartouches a man for the troops, and not provisions for two days, remained in the camp.[1]

[1] This is the statement of Orme (ii. 27). That of Lally is, "qu'il ne restoit au parc d'artillerie que trois milliers de poudre pour les canons, et vingt coups

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The next morning intelligence was received that the English fleet, after a fresh engagement with the French, had anchored before Carical, from which alone the French army could derive its supplies. Lally summoned a council of war. Out of thirteen officers, two, the Count d'Estaign, and M. Saubinet, advised an immediate assault, considering the success as certain, and the landing of the English at Carical, while the French fleet kept the sea, as highly improbable. It was determined, in conformity with the opinion of the other eleven, to raise the siege.[1] Intelligence of this resolution of the enemy, and of the negligence and security in which they encamped, encouraged the Tanjorines to attempt a surprise; which brought Lally and his army into imminent danger. After a disastrous march, in which they suffered severely, from the enemy, from fatigue, and from famine,[2] they arrived on the 28th at Carical, and saw the English fleet at anchor off the mouth of the river.

After the first of the naval engagements, the English fleet, before they could anchor, were carried a league to the north of Sadras; the French, which had suffered less in the rigging, and sailed better, anchored fifteen miles to the windward. The English, as soon as possible, weighed again, and after a fruitless endeavour to reach Fort St. David, discovered the French fleet on the 28th of May in the road of Pondicherry. The next day, the French, at the remonstrance of Lally, who sent on board a considerable body of troops, got under sail; but instead of bearing down on the English, unable to advance against the wind, proceeded to Fort St. David, where they arrived on the evening after the surrender. The English sailing

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par soldat en cartouche." He adds, that he had no other balls for the cannon but those which were shot by the enemy, of which few corresponded with the calibre of his guns; that twenty-four hours' battering were still requisite to make the breach practicable; that he had but a few days' provisions for the European part of his army, while the native part and the attendants were entirely without provisions, and had, the greater part of them, deserted. Mém. ut supra, p. 73.

[1] Lally says, that he had at the same time received a letter from the commanding officer at Pondicherry, announcing that a body of 1,200 English, who had marched from Madras, were menacing Pondicherry; and one from Gopal Row, the Mahratta, threatening with a visit the territory of the French, if their army did not immediately evacuate Tanjore. Mém, p. 73.

[2] Notwithstanding their hardships and fatigues, Lally asserts that they lost but little. Ibid. p. 81.

badly, fell to leeward as far as Alamparva, where intelligence was received of the loss of the fort. The admiral, therefore, not having water on board for the consumption of five days, made sail, and anchored the next day in the roads of Madras. The fleet had numerous wants; Madras had very scanty means of supply; and nearly eight weeks elapsed before it was again ready for sea. On the 3rd of July, three of the Company's ships arrived from Bengal, with money, merchandise, and stores, but no troops. The monsoon had obliged them to make the outward passage towards the Acheen, and they came in from the southward. The French admiral, after touching at Fort St. David, had stood to the southward, to cruize off Ceylon; in opposition to the remonstrances of Lally, who desired the fleet to co-operate in the destined enterprise against Madras. Lally hastened from Fort St. David to Pondicherry, and summoned a council by whose authority he recalled the fleet. The injunction reached the admiral at Carical on the 16th of June, and he anchored the next day in the road of Pondicherry. Had he continued his destined course to the southward, he could not have missed the three English East Indiamen from Bengal, and by their capture would have obtained that treasure, the want of which alone disconcerted the scheme of English destruction. On the 25th of July, the English fleet were again under sail; and on the 27th appeared before Pondicherry, where the French lay at anchor. They put to sea without delay: but the difficulties of the navigation, and the aims of the commanders, made it the 2nd of August before the fleets encountered off Carical. The French line consisted of eight sail; the English, as before, of seven. The fight lasted scarcely an hour; when three of the French ships, being driven out of the line, the whole bore away, under all the sail they could carry. The English Admiral gave chase; but in less than ten minutes the enemy were beyond the distance of certain shot. Toward night the English gave over the pursuit, and came to anchor off Carical. The French steered for Pondicherry, when the Admiral declared his intention of returning to Mauritius. Lally sent forward the Count d'Estaign to remonstrate with him on the disgrace of quitting the sea before an inferior enemy, and to urge him to renewed operations.

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D'Estaign offered to accompany him on board, with any proportion of the troops. Lally himself moved with the army from Carical on the 24th of August, and, having passed the Coleroon, hurried on with a small detachment to Pondicherry, where he arrived on the 28th. He immediately summoned a mixed council of the administration and the army, who joined in a fresh expostulation to the Admiral on the necessity of repairing to Madras, where the success of an attack must altogether depend upon the union of the naval and military operations. That commander, representing his ships as in a state of the greatest disablement, and his crews extremely enfeebled and diminished by disease, would yield to no persuasion, and set sail with his whole fleet for Mauritius on the 2nd of September.[1]

If we trust to the declaration of Lally, his intention of besieging Madras, still more his hopes of taking it, were abandoned from that hour. Before the fleet departed, an expedition against Arcot, with a view to relieve the cruel pressure of those pecuniary wants which the disastrous result of the expedition to Tanjore had only augmented, was projected and prepared. Arcot, the capital of the Carnatic, had been left under the government of one of the principal officers of Mohammed Ali, the English Nabob, with a small body of Sepoys and native cavalry. With this officer, Rajah Saheb, (the eldest son of the late Chunda Saheb,) now decorated by the French with the title of Nabob, had opened a correspondence; and a treaty was concluded, according to which the Governor was to deliver up the place, to receive as a reward 13,000 rupees, and to be taken, along with his troops, into the pay and service of Lally. As auxiliary measures, the previous possession of the secondary forts of Trivatore, Trincomalee, Carangoly, and Timery, was deemed expedient. Lally divided his army into four parts, to two of which the forts of Carangoly and Timery surrendered without resistance; Trivatore and Trincomalee were taken by assault. On the

[1] These events are minutely recorded by Orme, ii. 197—352. The Sketches and Criticisms of Colonel Wilks, p. 379—398, are professional and sensible. Cambridge, p. 135—185, goes over the same ground. A spirited abstract is given, p. 96—102, by the author of the History and Management of the East India Company. For the operations of Lally, his own Memoir, with the original documents in the Appendix, is in the highest degree instructive and entertaining.

terms of a pretended capitulation, on the 4th of October, Lally, amid the thunder of cannon, made his entrance into Arcot.

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The fort of Chinglapet, the occupation of which, from want of funds, or ignorance of its importance, Lally had postponed to the acquisition of Arcot, covered the country whence chiefly, in a case of siege, Madras would find it necessary to draw its provisions. In the consternation under which the English had withdrawn their troops from the country forts, upon the arrival of Lally, Chinglapet among the rest had been left in a very defenceless condition; and when the French marched against Carangoly, they might have taken Chinglapet by escalade in open day. The English, awakened to a sense of its importance, left Arcot to its fate, and made all their exertions to save Chinglapet. A fleet had arrived from England in the middle of September, which brought 850 of the king's troops, and with them Colonel Draper and Major Brereton. Captain Calliaud, with the whole of the European troops, was recalled from Trichinopoly. And before Lally entered Arcot, Chinglapet was supplied with a strong garrison. The applications of Lally to the government of Pondicherry for 10,000 rupees, which were necessary, after the acquisition of Arcot, to put the troops in motion for Chinglapet, were answered only by representations of the complete exhaustion of their resources; and that General, obliged for want of funds to place the troops in cantonments, returned to Pondicherry full of mortification and chagrin.[1]

He had been joined by Bussy about the time at which he entered Arcot. That officer, who had conducted himself with such rare ability in the dominions of the Subahdar, and with his handful of French had raised himself to an elevated station among the princes of India, had left the Subahdar on a tottering throne, which nothing but his strong support could much longer uphold. The Subahdar, when informed of the intended departure of the French, was too much amazed to believe the dreadful intelligence; and, when too well assured of its ominous reality, took his leave of Bussy, in an agony of grief and despair. Bussy, it is possible, took his departure with the more alacrity, as he hoped, through the representations which in person he

[1] Mém. pour le Comte de Lally, p. 86—99; Orme, ii. 341—370.

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would be able to make, that he could prevail upon Lally to send him back, and with augmented force, to his important station. Having, on his march, been joined by Moracin, the Governor of Masulipatam, who with his troops was also recalled, he left the march to be conducted by Moracin, and under a safeguard granted him from Madras, hastened to the meeting with Lally.

The head of that General was filled with the importance of his own project, the expulsion of the English from India; and with contempt for the schemes of Bussy, as of all other men who had different views from his own. In his letter to Bussy, upon the taking of Fort St. David, he had said, "It is the whole of British India which it now remains for us to attack. I do not conceal from you that, having taken Madras, it is my resolution to repair immediately, by land or by sea, to the banks of the Ganges, where your talents and experience will be of the greatest importance to me." Bussy employed every effort to convince him of the importance of retaining the advantages which he had gained in the dominions of the Subahdar; and the most pressing and passionate letters arrived from the Subahdar himself.[1] But Lally, who had already treated the representations of Bussy as the visions of a madman, and had told the Governor of Pondicherry that he thought himself too condescending in reading his letters, lent a deaf ear to remonstrances which inwardly he reregarded as the fruit of delusion or imposture.[2] Apprized of the money which Dupleix had raised on his personal credit, he was not without hopes that Bussy might be possessed of similar resources; and he states as a matter of great surprise, mixed with incredulity, the averment of Bussy, that in this way he was altogether incapable of aiding the general cause.

A high testimony from another quarter was yielded to the merits of Bussy. His rank as an officer was only that of Lieutenant-Colonel. Besides a Major-General, six Colonels had arrived with the army of Lally. The six Colo-

[1] Lally himself informs us, that these letters uniformly began with such expressions as these, "Renvoyez M. de Bussy avec un corps de troupes; vous savez que je ne peux pas m'en passer;" or, "vous savez que je ne peux pas me passer de M. de Bussy; renvoyez le moi avec un corps de troupes," &c. Mém. pour le Comte de Lally, p. 93.

[2] Letter to De Leyrit, 28th of June, 1758. Mém. ut supra, Appen. No. xxxvi.

nels, yielding to the nobler impulses of the human mind, signed a requisition that Bussy might supersede them. "Their names," says Mr. Orme, "highly worthy of record on this occasion, were mostly of ancient and noble descent; d'Estaign, de Landivisiau, de la Faire, Breteuil, Verdière, and Crillon."

To whatever quarter Lally turned his eyes, he found himself beset with the greatest difficulties. The government of Pondicherry declared, as they had frequently declared before, that in their exhausted situation it was altogether impossible for them to find the means of subsisting the army at Pondicherry. When a council of war was called, the Count d'Estaign, and other officers, pronounced it better to die by a musket ball, under the ramparts of Madras, than by hunger, within those of Pondicherry. The idea of undertaking a siege, says Lally, the total want of funds excluded from the mind of every one. But it was deemed expedient to bombard the place, to shut up the English within the fort, to obtain the pillage of the black town, and to lay waste the surrounding country.[1]

The Governor of Pondicherry declared that he was destitute of every species of resource, either for the pay or the maintenance of the soldiers. Lally advanced 60,000 rupees of his own money, and prevailed upon some members of the council, and other individuals in Pondicherry, to follow, in some degree, his example. From this species of contribution or loan, he obtained 34,000 rupees, which, added to his own, made a sum of 94,000. This was the treasure with which, at the head of 2700 European troops, and 4000 Indians, he marched against Madras.

The expedition was ready for its departure at the beginning of November, but the continuance of the rains retarded its arrival before Madras till the 12th of December, when Lally had not funds to ensure the subsistence of the army for a single week. The English had made active use of the intervening period for providing themselves with the means of defence. When Admiral Pocock quitted the coast in October to avoid the monsoon, he left behind him the marines of the squadron, and was expected back in January. A body of cavalry, under an adventurer of the

[1] Mém. ut supra, i. 98, 100.

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country, was taken into pay; and so posted, along with the Sepoys from Trichinopoly, as to make war upon the line of the enemy's convoys. The veteran Lawrence, who was still in Madras, was put at the head of the troops; and took post with the greater part of the army on elevated ground at some distance from the town. It was not, however, his intention to run the risk of an action; and as the enemy advanced, he gradually yielded ground, till on the 12th he entered the fort with all his army. The command in the fort belonged to the Governor Pigot. But he was an intelligent, and an active man; and the harmony of the defence experienced no interruption. The military within the walls now consisted of 1758 Europeans, 2220 Sepoys, and 200 horse of the Nabob, on whom by experience little dependance was placed. The other Europeans were 150 men, who were employed without distinction in serving out stores, and other auxiliary operations.

On the 13th the enemy remained on the plain, and reconnoitred the place. On the 14th, early in the morning, they took possession of the black town, where the soldiery, from want of skill or authority on the part of their commander, abandoned themselves to intemperance and disorder. In hopes of profiting by this opportunity, the English made a strong sally with 600 chosen men. They penetrated into the black town before the enemy were collected in sufficient numbers; but were at last opposed by a force which they could not withstand; and, had the division of the enemy, which was under the command of Bussy, advanced with sufficient promptitude to cut off their retreat, it is highly probable that few of them would have made their escape. Lally adduces the testimony of the officers, who commanded under Bussy, that they joined in urging him to intercept the English detachment; but that he, alleging the want of cannon, absolutely refused. Mr. Orme says that he justified himself by the delay of Lally's orders, without which it was contrary to his duty to advance. To gain, however, a great advantage at a critical moment, a zealous officer will adventure somewhat, under some deficiency both of cannon and of orders. The loss on the part of the English was not less than 200 soldiers, and six officers. In mere numbers that of the enemy was nearly the same.

The capture of the black town had furnished to Lally for the demands of the service only 80,000 livres, lent to him by an Armenian merchant, whom he had saved from plunder; and to these were added 12,000 livres furnished by a Hindu partisan. With these funds he began to construct his batteries, in the intention, as he repeats, of only bombarding the place, when intelligence was brought, on the 24th of December, that a frigate from the islands had arrived at Pondicherry with a million of livres. It was this circumstance, he says, which now determined him to convert the bombardment into a siege.

With only two engineers, and three artillery officers, excepting the few who belonged to the Company, all deficient both in knowledge and enterprise; with officers in general dissatisfied and ill-disposed, with only the common men on whom he could depend, and of whose alacrity he never had reason to complain, he carried on the siege with a vigour and activity which commanded the respect even of the besieged, though they were little acquainted with the difficulties under which he toiled. By means of the supplies which had plentifully arrived from Bengal, and the time which the Presidency had enjoyed to make preparation for siege, the English were supplied with an abundance both of money and of stores. The resolution to defend themselves to the utmost extremity, which has seldom been shared more universally and cordially by any body of men, inspired them with incessant vigilance and activity. The industry of the enemy was perpetually counteracted by a similar industry on the part of their opponents. No sooner had those without erected a work, than the most active, and enterprising, and often skilful exertions were made from within to destroy it. Whatever ingenuity the enemy employed in devising measures of attack, was speedily discovered by the keen and watchful eyes of the defenders. A breach, in spite of all those exertions, was however effected; and the mind of Lally was intensely engaged with preparations for the assault; when he found the officers of his army altogether indisposed to second his ardour. Mr. Orme declares his opinion that their objections were founded on real and prudential considerations, and that an attempt to storm the place would

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have been attended with repulse and disaster. Lally, however, says that the most odious intrigues were carried on in the army, and groundless apprehensions were propagated, to shake the resolution of the soldiers, and prevent the execution of the plan: that the situation of the General was thus rendered critical in the highest degree, and the chance of success exceedingly diminished; yet he still adhered to his design, and only waited for the setting of the moon, which in India sheds a light not much feebler than that of a winter sun, on the very day on which an English fleet of six sail arrived at Madras.

The fleet under Admiral Pocock, which had left Madras on the 11th of October, had arrived at Bombay on the 10th of December, where they found six of the Company's ships, and two ships of the line, with 600 of the King's troops on board. On the 31st of December the Company's ships, with all the troops, sailed from Bombay, under the convoy of two frigates, and arrived on the 16th of February, at a critical moment, at Madras. "Words," says Lally, "are inadequate to express the effect which the appearance of them produced. The officer who commanded in the trenches deemed it even inexpedient to wait for the landing of the enemy, and two hours before receiving orders retired from his post."

Lally was now constrained to abandon the siege. The officers and soldiers had been on no more than half pay during the first six weeks of the expedition, and entirely destitute of pay during the remaining three. The expenses of the siege and the half pay had consumed, during the first month, the million livres which had arrived from the islands. The officers were on the allowance of the soldiers. The subsistence of the army for the last fifteen days had depended almost entirely upon some rice and butter, captured in two small vessels from Bengal. A very small quantity of gunpowder remained in the camp; and not a larger at Pondicherry. The bombs were wholly consumed three weeks before. The Sepoys deserted for want of pay, and the European cavalry threatened every hour to go over to the enemy. The defence of Pondicherry rested upon 300 invalids; and, within twelve hours, the English, with their reinforcements, might land and take possession

of the place. On the night of the 17th the French army decamped from Madras; and the English made no efforts to molest their retreat.[1]

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We may judge of the feelings towards one another, of Lally and his countrymen, when he tells us, that the retreat of the army from Madras produced at Pondicherry the strongest demonstrations of joy, and was celebrated by his enemies as an occasion of triumph.

The Nabob, Mohammed Ali, who had retreated into Madras when the French regained the ascendancy in the province, had been removed during the siege to Trichinopoly; and of his two refractory brothers Abdul Wahab and Nujeeb Oolla, who had taken the side of the French, the former returned to the English connexion, before the siege of Madras, and was joined to the party of the English kept in the field to act upon the enemy's communications: the latter, induced by the event of the siege to anticipate success to the party which he had renounced, murdered all the French in his service, except a single officer, and professed himself a partisan of the English.

The English now elevated their hopes to the recovery of the province, but found their operations cramped by the narrowness of their funds. It was the 6th of March before the army, consisting of 1156 Europeans, rank and file, 1570 Sepoys, 1120 collieries (irregular troops of the southern Polygars,) and 1956 horse, was in a condition to move. The countries of Madura and Tinivelly at the same time recalled the attention of the Presidency. No sooner had the troops been withdrawn for the defence of Madras, than the refractory chiefs began their encroachments. Only the towns of Madura and Palam-Cotah, preserved by the steadiness of the Sepoys in garrison, remained in obedience to the English. And Mohammed Issoof, who had commanded with reputation the Company's native troops, in their former attempts in that country, was now sent back in the quality of renter, with a body of Sepoys, for the recovery of the country.

[1] Orme, ii. 383—459; Mém. pour Lally, p. 99—117. Of the sick and wounded, those who were too ill to be removed, to the number of thirty-three, according to Lally's own account, to that of forty-four according to Mr. Orme's, were left behind, and recommended by a letter of Lally to the English commander. They were treated, as Lally himself declares, with all the care which the laws, both of war and of humanity, prescribed.

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The French army had marched from Madras in the direction of Conjeveram; and there the French and English armies remained in sight of one another, without any operation of importance, for two and twenty days. The English, at the end of this time, made a march upon Wandewash; took possession of the town, and began to open ground against the fort. This brought the French army to defend it; upon which the English decamped in the night; by a forced march of two days arrived at Conjeveram, and took it by assault. The two armies continued to watch one another till the 28th of May, when they both went into cantonments.

On the 28th of April, Admiral Pococke had arrived upon the coast from Bombay, but had continued to windward of Pondicherry, and principally at Negapatnam, with a view to intercept the French squadron, which was expected from the isles. And near the end of June three of the usual ships arrived at Madras, with 100 recruits of the Company, and intelligence that Lieutenant-Colonel Coote, with 1000 of the King's troops, might be shortly expected on the coast. The satisfaction, however, which this good fortune was calculated to excite, was grievously damped by an attendant piece of advice; that the Court of Directors, "dazzled," as Mr. Orme expresses it, "by representations of the great wealth acquired by the conquest of Bengal, and of its sufficiency to supply their other presidencies, had determined to send no more treasure to any of them till the year 1760." From the first moment of Indian conquests to a late period in their history, were the Company led into blunders, and were but too successful in misleading the councils of the nation, by their absurd estimates of the pecuniary value of Indian dominion. This intelligence was so disastrous, and full of discouragement, "that for every reason," says Mr. Orme, "it was kept within the Council."

Towards the end of July, five of the expected ships, with the first division of the troops, arrived at Negapatnam, and having given out the provisions and stores which they had brought for the use of the squadron, sailed for Madras. On the 20th of August the squadron left Negapatnam, and sailed for Trincomalee, in the island of Ceylon, where the French fleet was descried, on the 2d of September. D'Aché

had been reinforced by the arrival of three ships from France; but as the resources of the islands were inadequate to refit and supply the fleet, not only much time had been lost, but he had been compelled to return to sea in a state of very imperfect equipment. It was the 10th of September before the state of the winds and the weather permitted the encounter of the fleets. The English, having the wind, came down a-breast, while the French, who were farthest out at sea, lay-to in line of battle a-head. The English squadron consisted of nine ships of the line, a frigate, the Queensborough, two of the Company's ships, and a fire-ship. The French were eleven sail of the line, and three frigates; and their total battery exceeded that of the English by 174 guns, and consequently, by eighty-seven in action. The engagement lasted scarcely two hours, when the greater part of the French ships having quitted the line, the whole fleet sailed away, and, in a few minutes, were beyond the reach of the English shot. Such was the indecisive character of naval actions in general, at the period to which we now refer. The English, though they had clearly the victory, had also the principal share of the loss. In point of men the injury was supposed to be nearly equal on both sides; but all the French ships, one only excepted, carried topsails when they retired from the fight; none of the English ships, after the engagement, could set half their sails, and two were obliged to be taken in tow. The English fleet anchored the next day in the road of Negapatnam, and the French in four days arrived at Pondicherry.

As nothing could exceed the distress of the French in respect to supplies, so their hopes were ardent of relief by the arrival of the ships. The fort of Covrepawk had surrendered upon summons to a detachment of the English army in the beginning of July. In the beginning of August, Lally's own regiment mutinied for want of pay, and, by their example, subverted the discipline of the whole army. The confidence of the English had mounted so high, that Major Brereton, who commanded the troops, and who burned for an opportunity of performing some exploit before the arrival of Coote, persuaded the Presidency to sanction an attempt for the reduction of Wandewash. After waiting till the roads were passable, the whole army

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marched from Conjeveram on the 26th of September. The principal part of the French forces were concentrated at Wandewash; and the enterprise was unsuccessful. The English made a spirited attack on the night of the 29th, but were resisted with great gallantry, and finally repulsed with a loss of more than 200 men. In this action, a detachment of grenadiers were very expeditiously quitting the vicinity of danger; when their officer, instead of calling after them, an imprudence which would, in all probability, have converted their retreat into a flight, ran till he got before them, and then, turning suddenly round, said, "Halt," as giving the ordinary word of command. The habit of discipline prevailed. The men stopped, formed according to orders, and marched back into the scene of action. But this success of the French, however brilliant, neither clothed the men nor supplied them with provisions. Neither the English nor the French had ever been able to draw from the districts which they held in the country sufficient funds to defray the expense of the troops, employed in conquering and defending them. A considerable portion of those districts, which the French had been able to seize upon the arrival of Lally, the English had again recovered. The Government of Pondicherry, left almost wholly destitute of supplies from Europe, was utterly exhausted, first, by the long and desperate struggle in which they had been engaged; and secondly, (for the truth must not be disguised, though the complaints of Lally have long been treated with ridicule,) by the misapplication of the public funds: a calamity, of which the violent passion of individuals for private wealth was a copious and perennial fountain. Lally had, from his first arrival, been struggling on the borders of despair, with wants which it was altogether out of his power to supply. The English had received, or were about to receive, the most important accession to their power. And nothing but the fleet, which had now arrived, and the supplies which it might have brought, could enable him much longer to contend with the difficulties which environed him.

M. d'Aché had brought, for the use of the colony, 16,000*l.* in dollars, with a quantity of diamonds, valued at 17,000*l.*, which had been taken in an English East India-

man ; and, having landed these effects, together with 180 men, he declared his resolution of sailing again immediately for the islands. Nothing could exceed the surprise and consternation of the colony upon this unexpected and alarming intelligence. Even those who were the most indifferent to the success of affairs, when the reputation of Lally, and the interest of their country alone were at stake, now began to tremble, when the very existence of the colony, and their interests along with it, were threatened with inevitable destruction. All the principal inhabitants, civil and military, assembled at the Governor's house, and formed themselves into a national council. A vehement protest was signed against the departure of the fleet. But the resolution of the Admiral was inflexible ; and he could only be induced to leave 400 Caffres, who served in the fleet, and 500 Europeans, partly marines and partly sailors.

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At the same time the departure of Bussy had been attended, in the dominions of the Subahdar, with a rapid succession of events, ruinous to the interests of the French. An expedition from Bengal, fitted out by the English against the Northern Circars, those important districts of which Bussy had obtained the dominion from Salabut Jung, had been attended with the most brilliant success ; had not only driven the French entirely out of the country, but had compelled the Subahdar to solicit a connexion with the English. Nizam Ali, whose audacious and aspiring character rendered him extremely dangerous to the feeble resources and feebler mind of his brother, had returned from his flight, to which he had been urged by the spirit and address of Bussy, at the head of a considerable army ; and compelled the Subahdar to replace him in that commanding situation, from which he had recently been driven. Bassalut Jung, the second of the three brothers, who anticipated the revolution which the victorious return of Nizam Ali portended, promised himself important advantages from the assistance of the French, in the changes which he expected to ensue : and despatched a letter to Lally, in which he told him he was coming to throw himself into his arms.[1] Bussy urged in strong terms the policy of declaring Bassalut Jung Nabob

[1] Mém. pour Lally, p. 135.

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of the Carnatic. This was opposed by the step which had been recently taken by Lally, of making this declaration, with much ceremony and pomp, in favour of the son of Chunda Saheb. It was, however, agreed that a body of troops, under the command of Bussy, should be sent to join Bassalut Jung, who hovered upon the borders of the Carnatic. He had left Hyderabad, under pretence of regulating the affairs of his government of Adoni; but he soon directed his march toward the south-east, supporting his army by levying contributions as he proceeded, and approached Nelore in the month of July.

M. Bussy arrived at Wandewash the very day after the repulse of the English; and, having placed himself at the head of the detachment, which was destined to accompany him to the camp of Bassalut Jung, proceeded on his march. But the French army, which had long been enduring extraordinary privations, now broke out in the most alarming disorders. More than a year's pay was due to them; they were destitute of clothing, and many times ill-supplied with provisions. The opinion was disseminated, that a much larger sum than was pretended had been left by the fleet; and that the General was acquiring immense wealth by dilapidation. On the 16th of October the whole army was in mutiny, and the officers deprived of all authority. Intelligence of these disastrous events overtook Bussy at Arcot, and induced him to suspend his march. The troops were at last restored to obedience by the payment of six months of their arrears, and a complete amnesty. But the delays which had intervened had exhausted the resources which enabled Bassalut Jung to remain on the borders of the Carnatic. He was at the same time solicited, by a promised enlargement of his territory, to join with Nizam Ali, who dreaded the re-appearance of M. Bussy in the territories of the Subahdar: his ardour for the French alliance was cooled by the intelligence of the disorders among their troops: he was alarmed by the presence of an English corps of observation, which had been sent to act upon his rear, if he should advance into the province: and on the 19th of October he struck off across the hills into the district of Kurpa; where Bussy, who followed him by a different route, arrived on the 10th of November. Bassalut Jung offered to accompany the French detach-

ment to Arcot, provided he was recognised by the French as sovereign of the Carnatic, and furnished with four lacks of rupees for the payment of his troops. The French were not without objections to the first of these conditions, and altogether incapable of fulfilling the last. The negotiation, therefore, proved fruitless; and Bussy returned, with an addition, however, of 400 good horse, whom he had found the means of attaching to his service.[1]

Urged by the necessity of making efforts for the supply, and even subsistence, of the army, Lally, shortly after the reconciliation of his troops, thought proper to divide his army into two parts; with the one of which he proposed to collect the rents of the southern; with the other, stationed at Wandewash and Arcot, to protect what belonged to the French in the northern districts. De Leyrit and the Council of Pondicherry represented the danger, which could not be concealed from Lally himself, of dividing the army in the presence of a superior enemy; but they pointed out no means by which it was possible to preserve it together. On the 20th of November, the division which marched to the south took possession of the rich island of Seringham, which the garrison at Trichinopoly was too feeble to defend.

The English took the field. Colonel Coote, with the last division of his regiment, had arrived on the 27th of October; and on the 21st of November proceeded to Conjeveram, where the troops were cantoned for the rains. The first of his acts was to assemble a council of the principal officers; that he might obtain from them a knowledge of facts, and profit by their observations. To divide the attention of the enemy, he began with movements which indicated an attack upon Arcot; but his real intention was to gain possession of Wandewash, which was attacked and carried on the 29th. The inaction of the French army, at Chittapet, which, probably deeming itself too weak, made no effort for the protection of Wandewash, induced the English to march immediately to Caran-

[1] In the account of Bussy's march, I have followed his own and Orme's account. Lally (Mém. p. 136) complains of his delays, and insinuates that to the misconduct through which these delays took place, the loss of Bassalut Jung's alliance ought to be ascribed.

BOOK IV. CHAP. IV. goly, which made a feeble resistance, and surrendered on the 10th of December.

1759. The loss of Arcot, and with it the command of all the northern districts of the province, now presented itself to the eyes of Lally as threatening to an alarming degree. The greater part of the troops was hastily recalled from Seringham; Bussy at the same time arrived from his expedition to the camp of Bassalut Jung; a Mahratta chief and his body of horse were taken into pay; and Lally was eager to strike a blow for the recovery of Wandewash.

Bussy, on the other hand, was of opinion, as the French were superior in cavalry, which would render it dangerous for the English to hazard a battle, except in circumstances of advantage, that they should avail themselves of this superiority, by acting upon the communications of the English, which would soon compel them either to fight at a disadvantage, or retire for subsistence to Madras; whereas if they besieged Wandewash, the English would have two important advantages; one, that of fighting with only a part of the French army, while another part was engaged in the siege; the other, that of choosing the advantage of the ground, from the obligation of the French to cover the besiegers.

At the same time the motives of Lally were far from groundless. The mental state of the soldiers required some brilliant exploit to raise them to the temper of animated action. He was deprived of all means of keeping the army for any considerable time in the field. By seizing the English magazines, he counted upon retarding for several days their march to the relief of Wandewash; and as the English had breached the fort and taken it in forty-eight hours, he counted, and not unreasonably, upon rendering himself master of the place before the English could arrive.

Amusing the English, by some artful movements, he surprised and took Conjeveram, which he concluded was the place of the English magazines. The fact however was, that the English had no magazines, but were dependent on the purchases of the day, and already straitened for supplies by the extensive excursions of his Mahratta horse. Lally repaired to Wandewash; but several days

elapsed before his battery was ready to play; and in the meantime the English approached. Lally throws the blame upon his engineer, whom he ordered to batter in breach with three cannon upon one of the towers of the fort, which was only protected by the fire of a single piece, and which, five weeks before, the English with inferior means had breached in forty-eight hours. But the engineers insisted upon erecting a battery in exact conformity with the rules of the schools; and the soldiers in derision asked if they were going to attack the fortifications of Luxemburgh.[1]

The project of Lally having in this manner failed, now was the time, at any rate, to have profited by the judicious advice of Bussy, and, abandoning the siege, to have made war upon the English means of supply. But Lally, who was aware that his character had fallen low with the army, could not brook the imputation of retreating before his enemy; he prepared, therefore, to meet the attack of the English army, and to continue his operations. It was the policy of the English commander to leave the enemy at work, till they were ready to assault the fort, when he was sure of attacking separately, at his choice, either the troops engaged in the siege, or those who covered them. His movements were judiciously made; and on the morning of the 22d, he was on the ground before the French camp, his army drawn up in two lines in a most advantageous position, where he had a free communication with the fort, and one of his flanks protected by its fire. The French occupied the ground in front of their line, where the field of battle had previously been marked out. The English army consisted of 1900 Europeans, of whom eighty were cavalry, 2100 Sepoys, 1250 black horse, and twenty-six field-pieces. The French, including 300 marines and sailors from the squadron, consisted of 2250 Europeans, and 1300 Sepoys; for the Mahrattas kept aloof at the distance of some miles from the field of battle.[2] Lally, and apparently with reason, com-

[1] Mém. pour Lally, p. 161; Orme (ii. 577) says that cannon for the battery, which did not open till the 20th, six days after Lally took possession of the Pettah or town adjoining the fort, were brought from Valdore on carriages sent from Pondicherry.

[2] Orme, ii. 582. Lally (Mém. p. 161) gives a very different account of the respective numbers: that the French had 900 infantry, 150 cavalry, 300 marines

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plains that his troops did their duty ill in the action. While the English army were advancing, Lally, who imagined he perceived some wavering on their left, occasioned by the fire of his artillery, though Mr. Orme says they had not yet come within cannon-shot, put himself at the head of the cavalry, to profit by the favourable moment. The cavalry refused to march. The General suspended the Commanding Officer, and ordered the second Captain to take the command. He, also, disobeyed. Lally addressed himself to the men; and a Cornet crying out that it was a shame to desert their General in the day of battle, the officer who commanded on the left offered to put the troop in motion. They had not advanced many paces, when a single cannon-shot, says Lally, the rapid firing of two pieces, says Mr. Orme, put them to flight, and they gallopped off, leaving him absolutely alone upon the plain.[1] Lally returned to the infantry, and brought up his line. The French fired rashly, and ineffectually, both with artillery and musketry; the English leader, who was cool, and perfectly obeyed, made his men reserve their fire, till sure of its execution. The regiment that occupied the enemy's right, when the distance between them and the English was now inconsiderable, threw themselves into column, and rushed forward at a rapid pace. Coote, directing the opposite regiment to be firm, and preserve their fire, gave the command when the enemy were at fifty yards' distance. The fire fell heavy, both on their front and flanks. Yet it stopped not the course of the column; and in an instant the two regiments were mingled at the push of the bayonet. The weight of the column bore down what was opposed to it; but as it had been left unprotected by the flight of the cavalry posted on its right, its flanks were

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and sailors, in all 1350 Europeans, with 1800 Sepoys; and that the English had 2500 infantry, and 100 cavalry, all Europeans; of black troops nearly an equal number with the French.—There is some appearance that Mr. Orme's account of the French force is conjectural, and hence exaggerated, as all his numbers are round numbers, one regiment 400, another 700, another 400, cavalry 300, &c. Perhaps we ought to trust to Lally's account of his own forces, because it was given in the face of his enemies, who were interested, and well able, to contradict it if untrue; and we need not hesitate to take Mr. Orme's account of the English, where his knowledge was complete.

[1] Mr. Orme (ii. 583) says, that two field-pieces, which fired several times in one minute, and brought down ten or fifteen men or horses, caused the flight.

completely exposed, and in a few moments the ground was covered with the slain, when it broke, and fled in disorder to the camp. Almost at the same time a tumbril blew up in the redoubt in front of the enemy's left; and during the confusion which this accident produced, the English took possession of the post. No part of the French line continued firm much longer. When ordered to advance, the Sepoys absolutely refused. Bussy, who put himself at the head of one of the regiments, to lead them to the push of the bayonet, as the only chance of restoring the battle, had his horse wounded under him, was abandoned by the troops, and taken prisoner. Lally frankly acknowledges, that his cavalry, who had behaved so ill at the beginning of the action, protected his retreat with great gallantry: he was thus enabled to wait for the junction of the detachment at Wandewash, and to carry off his light baggage and the wounded. The black cavalry of the English were too timid, and the European too feeble in numbers, to impede the retreat.

Lally retired to Chittapet, from which, without strengthening the garrison, he proceeded the following day towards Gingee. The enterprise next resolved on by Colonel Coote was the reduction of Arcot, toward which, the day after the battle, he sent forward a body of troops. Intelligence, however, of the defenceless state in which the enemy had left Chittapet, gave him hopes of making that a previous acquisition. In two days the English effected a breach, and the garrison surrendered. On the 1st of February, Coote arrived at Arcot. On the 5th three batteries opened on the town. On the night of the 6th the army began their approaches. Although operations were retarded for want of ammunition, on the morning of the 9th the sap was carried near the foot of the glacis; and by noon, two breaches, but far from practicable, were effected; when, to the great surprise of the English, a flag of truce appeared, and the place was surrendered. Not three men had been lost to the garrison, and they might have held out ten days longer, before the assault by storm could have been risked.

From Gingee Lally withdrew the French troops to Valdore, both to prevent the English from taking post between them and Pondicherry, and to protect the districts to the

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south, from which alone provisions could be obtained. The difficulties of Lally, which had so long been great, were now approaching to extremity. The army was absolutely without equipments, stores, and provisions, and he was destitute of resources to supply them. He repaired to Pondicherry to demand assistance, which he would not believe that the governor and council were unable to afford. He represented them as embezzlers and peculators; and there was no imputation of folly, of cowardice, or of dishonesty, which was spared against him in return.

To proceed with the reduction of the secondary forts which the enemy held in different parts of the province; to straiten Pondicherry, and, if sufficient force should not arrive from France for its relief, to undertake the reduction of that important place, was the plan of operations which the English embraced.[1] The country between Alamparva and Pondicherry was plundered and burnt; Timery surrendered on the 1st of February; Devi-Cotah was evacuated about the same time: on the 29th of the same month Trincomalee surrendered; the fort of Permacoil was taken after some resistance in the beginning of March; and Alamparva on the 12th. Carical now remained the only station on the coast, except Pondicherry, in possession of the French; and of this it was important to deprive them, before the shortly expected return of the fleet. A large armament was sent from Madras, and the officer who commanded at Trichinopoly was ordered to march to Carical with all the force which could be spared from the garrison. Lally endeavoured to send a strong detachment to its relief; but the place made a miserable defence, and yielded on the 5th of April before assistance could arrive. On the 15th of that month Valdore surrendered after a feeble resistance; as did Chillambaram on the 20th. Cuddalore was taken about the same time, and several strong attempts by the enemy to regain it were successfully resisted.

[1] Lally says (Tableau Histor. de l'Expédition de l'Inde, p. 32), and apparently with justice, "Il n'est pas douteux que si l'ennemi se fût porté tout de suite [after the battle of Wandewash] sur Pondichéry, il s'en fût rendu maître en huit jours. Il n'y avoit pas un grain de riz dans la place; les lettres, prières, ordres, et menaces que le Comte De Lally employoit depuis deux ans vis-à-vis du Sieur de Leyrit, n'avoient pu le déterminer à y former un seul magazin." The English leaders appear to have had no conception of the extremely reduced state of the French, and how safe it would have been to strike a decisive blow at the seat of the colony.

By the 1st of May the French army was confined to the bounds of Pondicherry, and the English encamped within four miles of the town; the English powerfully reinforced from England, and elated with remembrance of the past, as well as hope for the future; their antagonists abandoned, by neglect at home, to insuperable difficulties; and looking with eager eyes to the fleet, which never arrived. On the part of the English, Admiral Cornish had reached the coast with six ships of the line, before the end of February: On the 25th of April Admiral Stevens, who now commanded in room of Pocock, arrived with four ships of the line; and on the 23d of May came another ship of the line, with three companies of the royal artillery on board.

As the last remaining chance of prolonging the struggle for the preservation of the French colony, Lally turned his eyes towards the natives; and fixed upon the Mysoreans as the power most capable of rendering him the assistance which he required. The adventurer Hyder Ali was now at the head of a formidable army, and, though not as yet without powerful opponents, had nearly at his disposal the resources of Mysore. Negotiation was performed; and an agreement was concluded. On the one hand the Mysorean chief undertook to supply a certain quantity of bullocks for the provision of Pondicherry, and to join the French with 3000 select horse, and 5000 Sepoys. On the other hand the French consented to give the Mysoreans immediate possession of the fort of Thiagar, a most important station, near two of the principal passes into the Carnatic, at an easy distance from Baramhal, about fifty miles E.S.E. from Pondicherry. Even Madura and Tinivelly were said to be promised, if by aid of such valuable allies the war in the Carnatic were brought to a favourable conclusion. This resource proved of little importance to the French. The Mysoreans (who routed however a detachment of the English army sent to interrupt their march) were soon discouraged by what they beheld of the condition of the French; and soon recalled by an emergency which deeply affected Hyder at home. They remained in the vicinity of Pondicherry about four weeks, during which time Lally had found it impossible to draw from them any material service; and departing in the night, without his know-

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ledge, they marched back to Mysore. A few days before their departure six of the English Company's ships arrived at Madras with king's troops to the amount of 600 men: On the 2nd of September, one month later, several other ships of the Company arrived, and along with them three ships of war, and a portion of a Highland regiment of the King, increasing the fleet in India to the amount of seventeen sail of the line.

Lally had now, and it is no ordinary praise, during almost eight months since the total discomfiture of his army at Wandewash, imposed upon the English so much respect, as deterred them from the siege of Pondicherry; and, notwithstanding the desperate state of his resources, found means to supply the fort, which had been totally destitute of provisions, with a stock sufficient to maintain the garrison for several months. And he still resolved to strike a blow which might impress them with an opinion that he was capable of offensive operations of no inconsiderable magnitude. He formed a plan, which has been allowed to indicate both judgment and sagacity, for attacking the English camp by surprise in four places on the night of the 4th of September. But one of the four divisions, into which his army was formed for the execution of the enterprise, fell behind its time, and disconcerted the operations of the remainder.

A circumstance now occurred in the English army which affords another proof (we shall find abundance of them as we proceed) of the impossibility of governing any country well from the distance of half the circumference of the globe. No government, which had any regard to the maxims either of justice or of prudence, would deprive of his authority a commander, who, like Colonel Coote, had brought a great and arduous service to the verge of completion, at the very moment when, without a chance of failure, he was about to strike the decisive blow which would give to his preceding operations the principal part of their splendour and renown. Yet the East India Company, without intending so reprehensible a conduct, and from their unavoidable ignorance of what after many months was to be the state of affairs, had sent out a commission, with the fleet just arrived, for Major Monson the second in command, to supersede Coote, who was destined

for Bengal. Monson was indeed directed to make no use of his commission while Coote remained upon the coast; but the spirit of Coote would not permit him to make any advantage of this indulgence; and had he been less a man of sense and temper, had he been more governed by that boyish sensibility to injury, which among vulgar people passes for honour, this imprudent step of the Company would have been attended with the most serious consequences. When Coote was to proceed to Bengal it was the destination of his regiment to proceed along with him. The Council of Madras were thrown into the greatest alarm. Monson declared that if the regiment were removed he would not undertake the siege of Pondicherry. Coote consented that his regiment should remain, to encircle the brows of another with laurels which belonged to his own.

Around Pondicherry, like many other towns in India, ran a hedge of the strong prickly shrubs of the country, sufficiently strong to repel the sudden incursions of the irregular cavalry of the country. As the position of the French was contrived to give it whatsoever protection this rampart could yield, the first operation of Monson was intended to deprive them of that advantage. The attack was, indeed, successful; but through mismanagement on the part of some of the officers, the plan was badly executed; and considerable loss was incurred. Among the rest, Monson himself was wounded, and rendered incapable for a time of acting in the field. Colonel Coote had not yet sailed for Bengal; and Monson and the Council joined in requesting him to resume the command. He returned to the camp on the 20th of September, and actively proceeded with the reduction of the outposts. When the rains began, in the beginning of October, the camp was removed to an elevated ground at some distance from the town; and during the rains no efforts were made, except those on the part of the French, to introduce provisions, and those on the part of the English, to frustrate their attempts. About the beginning of December, the rains drawing to a close, preparations were made for improving the blockade into more expeditious methods of reduction. Several batteries were prepared, which played on the town from the 8th to the 30th of December. On that day a

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dreadful storm arose, which stranded three of the English ships in the road, and seriously damaged the greater part of the fleet; while it tore up the tents of the soldiers, and threw the camp into the utmost confusion. Fortunately the inundation produced by the storm rendered it impracticable for the enemy to move their artillery, nor could the troops carry their own ammunition dry. The greatest diligence was exerted in restoring the works. An attempt failed, which was made on the 5th of January, to obtain possession of a redoubt still retained by the enemy. But on the 12th of January the trenches were opened. The enemy were now reduced to the last stage of privation. Lally himself was sick; worn out with vexation and fatigue. The dissensions which raged within the fort had deprived him of almost all authority: a very feeble resistance was therefore made to the progress of the English works. The provisions, which such arduous efforts had been required to introduce into the fort, had been managed without economy; the importunities of Lally to force away the black inhabitants, who consumed the stores of the place with so much rapidity, were resisted, till matters were approaching to the last extremity. While provisions for some days yet remained, Lally urged the Council, since a capitulation must regard the civil as well as the military affairs of the colony, to concert general measures for obtaining the most favourable terms; and procured nothing but chicanery in return. The device of the Council was to preserve to themselves, if possible, the appearance of having had no share in the unpopular transaction of surrender, and the advantage, dear to their resentments, of throwing with all its weight the blame upon Lally. When at last not two days' provisions remained in the magazines, Lally informed them that he was reduced to the necessity of delivering up the military possession of the place; for the civil affairs it rested with them to make what provision was in their power. Towards the close of day on the 14th, a commissioner from Lally, together with a deputation from the council, approached the English camp. The enemy claimed the benefit of a cartel which had been concluded between the two crowns, and which they represented as precluding them from proposing any capitulation for the town of Pondicherry. As

a dispute respecting that cartel remained still undecided, Coote refused to be guided by it, or to accept any other terms than those of an unconditional surrender. Their compliance, as he concluded with sufficient assurance, the necessity of their affairs rendered wholly indispensable.

On the fourth day after the surrender, there arose between the English civil and military authorities a dispute, which, had the military been as daring as the civil, might have been attended with the most serious consequences. Mr. Pigot, the Governor of Madras, made a formal demand, that Pondicherry should be given up to the Presidency, as the property of the East India Company. Coote assembled a council of war, consisting of the chief officers, both of the fleet and the army, who were of opinion that the place ought to be held for the disposal of the King. Pigot, with a hardihood which subdued them; though, in a man without arms in his hands, toward men on whose arms he totally depended, it might have been a hardihood attended with risk; declared that, unless Pondicherry were given up to the Presidency, he would furnish no money for the subsistence of the King's troops or the French prisoners. Upon this intimation the military authorities submitted.

Two places in the Carnatic, Thiagar, and the strong fort of Gingee, still remained in possession of the French. The garrisons, however, who saw no hope of relief, made but a feeble resistance; and on the 5th of April Gingee surrendered, after which the French had not a single military post in India: for even Mahé and its dependencies, on the Malabar coast, had been attacked and reduced by a body of troops which the fleet landed in the month of January. The council of Madras lost no time in levelling the town and fortifications of Pondicherry with the ground.[1]

Dreadful was the fate which awaited the unfortunate Lally, and important are the lessons which it reads. By the feeble measures of a weak and defective government, a

[1] This, as Orme remarks, was in retaliation of the design of the French Government, avowed as the object of the expedition of Labourdonnais, the policy of Dupleix, and the armament of Lally, the utter extirpation of the English, and destruction of their settlements in the Peninsula. ii. 734.—W.

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series of disasters, during some preceding years, had fallen upon France; and a strong sentiment of disapprobation prevailed in the nation against the hands by which the machine of government was conducted. When the total loss of the boasted acquisitions of the nation in India was reported, the public discontent was fanned into a flame: and the ministry were far from easy with regard to the shock which it might communicate to the structure of their power. Any thing was to be done which might have the effect to avert the danger. Fortunately for them, a multitude of persons arrived from India, boiling with resentment against Lally, and pouring out the most bitter accusations. Fortunately for them, too, the public, swayed as usual by first appearances, and attaching the blame to the man who had the more immediate guidance of the affairs upon which ruin had come, appeared abundantly disposed to overlook the ministry in their condemnation of Lally. The popular indignation was carefully cultivated; and by one of those acts of imposture and villany of which the history of ministries in all the countries of Europe affords no lack of instances, it was resolved to raise a screen between the ministry and popular hatred, by the cruel and disgraceful destruction of Lally. Upon his arrival in France, he was thrown into the Bastille; from the Bastille, as a place too honourable for him, he was removed to a common prison. An accusation, consisting of vague or frivolous imputations, was preferred against him. Nothing whatsoever was proved, except that his conduct did not come up to the very perfection of prudence and wisdom, and that it did display the greatest ardour in the service, the greatest disinterestedness, fidelity and perseverance, with no common share of military talent, and of mental resources. The grand tribunal of the nation, the parliament of Paris, found no difficulty in seconding the wishes of the ministry, and the artificial cry of the day, by condemning him to an ignominious death. Lally, confident in his innocence, had never once anticipated the possibility of any other sentence than that of an honourable acquittal. When it was read to him in his dungeon, he was thrown into an agony of surprise and indignation; and taking up a pair of compasses, with which he had been sketching a chart of the Coromandel

coast, he endeavoured to strike them to his heart; but his arm was held by a person that was near him. With indecent precipitation he was executed that very day. He was dragged through the streets of Paris in a dirty dung-cart; and lest he should address the people, a gag was stuffed into his mouth, so large as to project beyond his lips. Voltaire, who had already signalized his pen by some memorable interpositions in favour of justice and the oppressed, against French judges and their law, exerted himself to expose, in a clear light, the real circumstances of this horrid transaction; which Mr. Orme scruples not to call "a murder committed with the sword of justice." It was the son of this very man, who, under the name of Lally Tolendal, was a member of the Constituent Assembly, and by his eloquence and ardour in the cause of liberty, contributed to crumble into dust a monarchy, under which acts of this atrocious description were so liable to happen. Thus had the French East India Company, within a few years, destroyed three, the only eminent men who had ever been placed at the head of their affairs in India, Labourdonnais, Dupleix, and Lally. It did not long survive this last display of its imbecility and injustice.[1]

1761.

CHAPTER V.

First Nabobship of Meer Jaffier.—Expedition against the Northern Circars.—Emperor's eldest Son, and Nabobs of Oude and Allahabad, invade Bengal.—Clive resigns the Government, and is succeeded by Mr. Vansittart.—Jaffier dethroned, and Meer Casin set up.—Disorders by the private Trade of Company's Servants.—War with Casim.—He is dethroned, and Jaffier again set up.—War with the Nabob of Oude.—Death of Jaffier.—His Son made nominal Nabob.—Courts of Proprietors and Directors.—Clive sent back to govern Bengal.

A DEFECTIVE treasury is the grand and perennial source of the difficulties which beset the sovereigns of India. This evil pressed with peculiar weight upon

[1] For these events see Mém. pour le Comte de Lally; Mém. pour le Sieur De Leyrit; Mém. pour Bussy; Orme, vol. ii.; Cambridge; Wilks; Voltaire, Fragmens Hist. sur l'Inde, et sur la Mort du Comte de Lally.

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Meer Jaffier. Before the battle of Plassy, which rendered him Subahdar, his own resources were scanty and precarious. The liberality of Aliverdi, the expence of his war with the Mahrattas, and the ravages of that destructive enemy, left in the treasury of the province a scanty inheritance to Suraj-ad-dowla. The thoughtless profligacy of that prince, even had his reign been of adequate duration, was not likely to add to the riches of the state. To purchase the conspiracy of the English, Meer Jaffier, with the prodigality of Eastern profession, had promised sums which he was altogether unable to pay; the chiefs whom he had debauched by the hopes of sharing in his fortunes, were impatient to reap the fruits of their rebellion; and the pay of the troops was deeply in arrear. In these circumstances it was almost impossible for any man to yield satisfaction. The character of Meer Jaffier was ill calculated for approaching to that point of perfection.

In making promises, with a view to the attainment of any great and attractive object, an Indian sovereign seldom intends to perform any more than just as much as he may, find it unavoidable to perform; and counts in general, too, with a well-grounded certainty, upon evading a considerable part at least of that for which he had engaged. To Meer Jaffier the steadiness with which the English adhered to the original stipulations appeared, for a time, the artifice merely of cunning men, who protract an accommodation for the purpose of rendering it more advantageous. Private bribes to defeat public ends, in Oriental politics, an engine seldom worked in vain, were applied with some perseverance. When he found the rigid fulfilment of the vast engagements to the English, still peremptorily and urgently claimed, he was not only surprised but exasperated; and began to hope, that some favourable event would deliver him from such obstinate and troublesome associates.[1]

The English were not the parties against whom his animosities were first displayed. Aliverdi Khan, aware of the rebellious and turbulent spirit which almost always reigned among those adventurers from Iran and Turan, who commonly rose to the chief command in the armies of the Mohammedan princes in Hindustan, had adopted

[1] Clive's Letter to the Proprietors of E. I. Stock, in 1764, p. 30.

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the sagacious policy of bringing forward the gentle, the less enterprising, and less dangerous Hindus. And he had raised various individuals of that race to the principal places of power and emolument under his government. Of Ramnarain, whom he intrusted with the important government of Berar, the reader has already received information. Dooloob Ram, another Hindu, held the grand office of Dewan, or Superintendent of the Finances. That celebrated family, the Sets, of Moorshedabad, who by merchandise and banking had acquired the wealth of princes, and often aided him in his trials, were admitted largely to share in his councils, and to influence the operations of his government. Aliverdi had recommended the same policy to Suraj-ad-dowla; and that prince had met with no temptation to depart from it.[1]

Meer Jaffier was placed under the deepest obligations to Dooloob Ram. When he was convicted of malversation in his office, and stood in disgrace with his master, it was Dooloob Ram who had made his peace.[2] In the late revolution, Dooloob Ram had espoused his interests, when the influence of that minister, and his command of treasure, might have conferred the prize upon another chief. Whether he dreaded the power of the Hindu connexion, or was stimulated with a desire of their wealth, Meer Jaffier resolved to crush them; and with Dooloob Ram, as the most powerful individual, it was prudent to begin. Before the departure of Clive, he had summoned Ramramsing, the Governor of Midnapore, and head of the Spy-office, to repair to the capital to answer for the arrears of his government; but the cautious Hindu, already alarmed, evaded the mandate by sending two of his relations. The Naboh—so by the English now was Jaffier styled, threw both into prison; and easily reconciled Clive, by informing him, that Ramramsing was an enemy to the English, and had been the agent through whom the correspondence between Suraj-ad-dowla and Bussy had been carried on. A close connexion had long subsisted between Ramramsing and Dooloob Ram; and the latter, to whose sagacity the designs of Jaffier were not a secret, regarded the present step as a preliminary part of the plan which was laid for his own destruction.

[1] Orme, ii. 53.

[2] Seer Mutakhareen, ii. 8.

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Meantime opposition began to display itself in various parts of the provinces. The Raja of Midnapore took arms upon the news of the detention of his relatives: an insurrection in favour of a son of Sereffraz Khan, whom Aliverdi deposed, was raised at Dacca: in the province of Poorania, the dewan of the late government had raised a creature of his own to the chief command: and Jaffier had resolved on the removal of Ramnarain from the province of Berar. Colonel Clive found the means of reconciling Ramramsing; and, with the assistance of the English, the insurrection at Dacca was easily quelled. But when the troops were drawn out to proceed to Poorania, they refused to march, without payment of their arrears. Clive was preparing to join the Nabob; but his troops, with the prize-money distributed among them in consequence of the battle of Plassy, had indulged in such intemperance, that many of the Europeans had died, a still greater proportion were sick, and the army was unable to leave Chandernagor before the 17th of November.

The Nabob's troops were ordered to march on the 6th of October. Partial payments, and other means of overcoming their disobedience, were employed till the 7th of November, when the Nabob repaired to the camp. No sooner had he left the city, than his son Meeran, who was to act as Governor, distributed intelligence that a confederacy was formed, under the authority of the Emperor at Delhi, between Ramnarain, the Subahdar of Oude, and Dooloob Ram, to raise to the government of Bengal the son of a younger brother of Suraj-ad-dowla.[1] He then commissioned a band of ruffians to enter in the night the palace of the widow Aliverdi, with whom the mother of Suraj-ad-dowla, and grandmother of the prince, resided. They murdered the child, and sent the two princesses to Dacca. The Nabob, who denied all participation in the action, received from the English, says Mr. Orme, "no reproaches."[2]

[1] Orme, ii. 272. Clive, however (Report, ut supra, and the author of the Seer Mutakhareen (ii. 8), both say that the murdered prince was a brother of Suraj-ad-dowla.

[2] There can be no doubt that many treasonable projects were on foot against Mir Jaffier for some time after his accession, which were only prevented from effecting his downfall and destruction by dread of his English friends. His fears, and those of his son, explain, if they do not excuse, some of their cruelties. It may also be observed, that although some acts of atrocity are unques-

Clive arrived at Moorshedabad on the 25th of November, where Dooloob Ram, who, under pretence of sickness, had refused to accompany Jaffier, remained with his troops. On the 3d of December he joined the Nabob at Raj Mahl. Cuddum Hussun, who had long been an associate in the pleasures of Jaffier, was destined for the government of Poorania;[1] and some days had elapsed since he crossed the river into that province with a body of troops. The terror inspired by the Nabob's army, the intrigues which Cuddum Hussun, by means of letters and spies, was able to raise in the enemy's camp, together with the rawness of the insurgent troops, made them take flight and disperse, upon the very approach of Cuddum Hussun; who took quiet possession of the government, and began immediately to gratify his avarice by the severest exactions. 1757.

The mind of the Nabob, now tranquil on account of other quarters, turned itself to the more arduous proceedings which it meditated in Bahar. Clive perceived his opportunity, and refused to proceed with him, unless all the sums due upon the agreements with the English were previously discharged. No payments could be made without Dooloob Ram. A reconcilement, therefore, was necessary; and, Clive undertaking for his security, Dooloob Ram joined the camp with 10,000 troops. Twenty-three lacks of rupees were now due: orders were signed upon the treasury for one half; and tuncaws, that is, orders to the local receivers to make payment out of the revenues as they come in, were granted on certain districts for the remainder.

Clive, however, now stated, as objections to the removal of Ramnarain; the strength of his army; the probability that he would receive assistance from the Subahdar of

tioned, yet we must not assent to all that is avouched by the author of the Seer Mutakhareen without hesitation. He and the other members of his family had been intimate with Mir Jaffier and his son before the elevation of the former, and somewhat too sanguinely anticipated distinguished notice from him. For reasons that do not appear they were treated with contumely, and ordered not to approach Murshedabad. The author himself afterwards became intimate with Ramnarain, and still further, therefore, an object of dislike to the Nawab. The resentment thus inspired, pervades all his notices of Mir Jaffier and his son.—W.

[1] Orme calls him Jaffier's relation; but the author of the Seer Mutakhareen (ii. 9), who had better opportunities of knowing, says he was only the son, by a concubine, of a man who had married Jaffier's sister.

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Oude; the likelihood that the English would be recalled to the defence of their own settlement by the arrival of the French; and the danger lest Ramnarain should bring an army of Mahrattas to his aid. Jaffier was not willing to oppose directly an opinion of Clive; and offered to accept his mediation; reserving in his mind the use of every clandestine effort to accomplish his own designs. The army began its march to Patna; and was joined by Ramarain, after receipt of a letter by Clive, assuring him, that both his person and government should be safe. The intended delays and machinations of the Nabob were cut short, by intelligence that the Subahdar of Oude, with the French party under M. Law, and a great body of Mahratta horse, was about to invade the province; and by the actual arrival of a Mahratta chief, who came in the name of the principal Mahratta commanders to demand the arrears of chout, amounting to twenty-four lacks of rupees, which were due from Bengal. These events produced a speedy accommodation with Ramnarain. The Nabob, indeed, used various efforts to remain behind the English, in order to defeat the securities which that Governor had obtained. But Clive penetrated, and disappointed his designs. He even extorted from him another grant, of no small importance to the English treasury. A leading article in the European traffic was the salt-petre produced in Bengal, the whole of which was made in the country on the other side of the Ganges above Patna. This manufacture had in general been farmed for the benefit of the Government; and Clive saw the advantage of obtaining the monopoly for the English. He offered the highest terms which the government had ever received; but the Nabob knew he could not demand from the English the regular presents which he would derive from a renter placed at his mercy; he was not, therefore, inclined to the arrangement; but, after a variety of objections, the necessity of his circumstances compelled him to comply.

Clive got back to Moorshedabad on the 15th of May; and, on the same day, received intelligence from the coast of Coromandel of the arrival of the French fleet, and of the indecisive first engagement between it and the English. A friend to the use which governments commonly make of their intelligence of the events of war, "Clive spread,"

says Orme, "the news he received, as a complete naval victory; two of the French ships sunk in the fight, instead of one stranded afterwards by a mischance; the rest put to flight, with no likelihood of being able to land the troops which they had brought from Pondicherry."

On the 24th, Clive departed from Moorshedabad without waiting for the Nabob. On the 20th of June, a ship arrived at Calcutta from England; and brought along with with it a commission for new modelling the government. A council was nominated consisting of ten; and, instead of one Governor, as in preceding arrangements, four were appointed, not to preside collectively, but each during three months in rotation. The inconvenience of this scheme of government was easily perceived. "But there was another cause," says Mr. Orme, "which operated on opinions more strongly. Colonel Clive had felt and expressed resentment at the neglect of himself in the Company's orders, for no station was marked for him in the new establishment." Convinced that he alone had sufficient authority to over-awe the Nabob into the performance of his obligations, the council, including the four gentlemen who were appointed the governors, came to a resolution, highly expressive of their own disinterestedness and patriotism, but full of disregard and contempt for the judgment and authority of their superiors.[1] This high legislative act of the Company they took upon them to set aside, and, with one accord, invited Clive to accept the undivided office of President. With this invitation he assures us, that "he hesitated not one moment to comply."[2]

[1] Mr. Scrafton (Reflections on the Government, &c. of Indostan, p. 115) says, "At this crisis, when military virtue and unanimity were more immediately necessary, the Directors, divided by violent contests among themselves, which certainly did them no honour, were so unfortunate in their judgment, as to appoint four Governors of Bengal, to govern each four months, and left Colonel Clive entirely out of this list. The absurdity of such a system was too apparent to take place," &c.—M.

There was no display of disregard or contempt, however for their superiors, The council, in writing to Clive, express their belief "that had their employers been apprized of the present state of affairs in Bengal, they would have placed the presidentship in some one person, as the clearest and easiest method of conducting their concerns." And that they had rightly judged, appeared from the event, for as soon as the Directors heard of the battle of Plassy, they appointed Clive to the station of Governor. Life, i. 352.—W.

[2] Report, ut supra. The influence of the Colonel is depicted by the following anecdote. There was an officer of rank, to whom Jaffier had been often indebted before his elevation, remarkable for his wit. This, from their former intimacy, and a jealousy of present neglect, he did not spare on the Nabob himself. While the armies of the Nabob and of Clive were at Patna, he was

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In the mean time considerable events were preparing at Moorshedabad. On the approach of Clive and Dooloob Ram, Meeran had thrown the city into violent agitation, by quitting it with demonstrations of fear, summoning all the troops and artillery of the government, and giving it out as his intention to march for the purpose of joining his father. Clive wrote with much sharpness to the Nabob; and Meeran apologized in the most submissive strain. Though inability to discharge the arrears due to the troops, who could with much difficulty be preserved from tumults, compelled the Nabob to delay his proceedings, he was impatient for the destruction of Dooloob Ram; the severity of his despotism increased; and he declared to one of his favorites, who betrayed him, "that if a French force would come into the province he would assist them, unless the English released him from all their claims of money, territory, and exemptions."[1] Among the Hindus, who had risen to high employment under the encouraging policy of the late Subahdars, was Nuncomar, who acted as Governor of Hoogly at the time of Suraj-ad-dowla's march against Calcutta. Nuncomar had followed the armies to Patna, and, as conversant with the details of the revenue, was employed by Dooloob Ram. When the difficulties of obtaining payment upon the tuncaws granted to the English began to be felt, he proffered his assistance; and, if supported by the government of the Nabob, assured the English, that he would realize the sums. He was vested with such authority as the service appeared to require; but as he expected not to elude the knowledge of Dooloob Ram, in the practices which he meditated, for raising out of his employment a fortune to himself, he resolved to second the designs of the Nabob for the removal

one day accused to the Nabob of having permitted a fray between some of his own soldiers and some of Clive's. "It chanced," says the author of the Seer Mutakhareen, ii. 19, "that Mirza Shemseddin himself made his appearance at that very moment: it was in full durbar and in the hall of audience. The Nawab fixed his eyes upon him, and spoke a few words that seemed to border upon reprimand: 'Sir,' said he, 'your people have had a fray with the Colonel's people: Is your honour to learn who is that Colonel Clive, and in what station heaven has seated him?' 'My Lord Nawab,' answered the Mirza, getting up instantly, and standing bolt-upright before him: 'Me, to quarrel with the Colonel! me! who never get up in the morning, without making three profound bows to his very jackass! How then could I be daring enough, after that, to fall out with the rider himself!'"

[1] Orme, ii. 356.

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of that vigilant Dewan. He persuaded the Sets to withdraw their protection from this troublesome inspector, by awakening their fears of being called upon for money, if Dooloob Ram withheld the revenues, and supplied not the exigencies of the state. He assured the Nabob and Meeran, that the English would cease to interfere in their government if the money was regularly paid. Dooloob Ram took the alarm, and requested leave to retire to Calcutta, with his family and effects. Permission was refused, till he should find a sum of money sufficient to satisfy the troops. Under profession of a design to visit Colonel Clive at Calcutta, the Nabob quitted the capital; but under pretence of hunting, remained in its neighbourhood. On the second day after his departure, Meeran incited a body of the troops to repair to the residence of Dooloob Ram, and to clamour tumultuously for their pay. The English agent interfered; but as the troops were directed by Meeran to make sure of Dooloob Ram, the agent found great difficulty in preserving his life. Clive at last desired that he should be allowed, with his family, to repair to Calcutta; and the consent of the Nabob was no longer withheld.

Within a few days after the return of the Nabob from Calcutta, a tumult was excited in his capital by the soldiers of one of the chiefs, and assumed the appearance of being aimed at the Nabob's life. A letter was produced, which bore the character of a letter from Dooloob Ram to the commander of the disorderly troops, inciting him to the enterprise, and assuring him that the concurrence of Clive, and other leading Englishmen, was obtained. Clive suspected that the letter was a forgery of Jaffier and Meeran, to ruin Dooloob Ram in the opinion of the English, and procure his expulsion from Calcutta; when his person and wealth would remain in their power. All doubts might be resolved by the interrogation and confrontation of the commander, to whom the letter was said to be addressed. But he was ordered by the Nabob to quit his service, was way-laid on his departure, and assassinated.

In the mean time advices had arrived from the Presidency at Madras, that Fort St. David had yielded, that a second engagement had taken place between the fleets, that the French army was before Tanjore, that M. Bussy

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was on his march to join Lally: and the most earnest solicitations were subjoined, that as large a portion of the troops as possible might be sent, to afford a chance of averting the ruin of the national affairs in the Carnatic. "No one," says Orme, "doubted that Madras would be besieged as soon as the monsoon had sent the squadrons off the coast, if reinforcements should not arrive before."[1] Clive chose to remain in Bengal, where he was master, rather than go to Madras, where he would be under command; and determined not to lessen his power by sending troops to Madras, which the Presidency, copying his example, might forget to send back. An enterprise, at the same time, presented itself, which, though its success would have been vain, had the French in the Carnatic prevailed, bore the appearance of a co-operation in the struggle, and afforded a colour for detaining the troops.

One of the leading Polygars in the Northern Circars, fixing his eye upon the advantages which he might expect to derive from giving a new master to the provinces, communicated to the English in Bengal his desires to co-operate with them in driving out the French, while Bussy was involved in a struggle with the brothers of the Subahdar. The brilliancy of the exploit had no feeble attractions for the imagination of Clive; and after the recall of Bussy to Pondicherry, he imparted his intentions to the Council. The project met with unanimous condemnation.[2] But Clive, disregarding all opposition, prepared his armament. It consisted of 500 Europeans, 2000 Sepoys, and 100 Lascars, with six field-pieces, six battering cannon, one howitzer, and one eight-inch mortar. This expedition, commanded by Colonel Forde, was destined to proceed by sea; but the altercations in the council, which the disapprobation of the measure produced, and the delays which occurred in the equipment of the ships, retarded its departure till the end of September.[3]

[1] Orme says (ii. 363), "Clive did not entertain a surmise that it would be taken whilst it had provisions." But Clive himself says (Report, ut supra), "Nothing saved Madras from sharing the fate of Fort St. David, but their [the French] want of money, which gave time for strengthening and reinforcing the place."

[2] Orme only says (ii. 364), "The measure was too vigorous to be acceptable to all the members of the council." But Clive himself says (Report, ut supra), that he undertook it, "contrary to the inclination of his *whole* council."

[3] Orme, ii. 269—287, and 352—363; Seer Mutakhareen, ii. 4—24.

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On the 20th of October Colonel Forde disembarked at Vizagapatam, and joined his troops with those of the Raja Anunderauz; at whose instigation the exploit was undertaken. It was expected, that this chief would afford money for the maintenance of the troops; and hence but a small supply of that necessary article was brought from Bengal. The Raja was in the usual state of Rajas, Nabobs, Subahdars, and Emperors in India; he was reputed by the English immensely rich, while in reality he was miserably poor: he was, therefore, not very able to provide the sums expected from him; and still less willing. The delays by which he contrived to elude the importunities of the English were highly provoking; and by retarding their movements, threatened to deprive them of all the great advantages of rapidity and surprise. A sort of treaty was at last concluded by which it was agreed that, excepting the seaports, and towns at the mouths of the rivers, the conquered country should all be given up to Anunderauz, upon the condition of his advancing a certain monthly sum for the maintenance of the troops.

M. Conflans, who had been sent to command the French troops upon the recall of Bussy, had concentrated his forces about Rajamundri; towards which the English and and the Raja directed their march. The force, which remained under the command of Conflans, after the departure of the troops which were recalled with Bussy, was still considerably superior to that which had arrived with the English; but when the troops for other services were deducted, he took the field against the English with numbers nearly equal. A battle was brought on, and the French were completely defeated; they were not only stript of their camp, but fled from Rajamundri.

During the battle, the Raja and his troops remained cowering in the hollow of a dry tank, which protected them from shot. After the battle all his operations were tardy; what was worse, no money could be extracted from him; all the cash which had been brought from Bengal was expended; and during fifty days, when advantage might have been taken of the want of preparation on the part of the enemy, and of the dejection arising from their defeat, the English were unable to move. At last, by a new arrangement, a small sum was obtained from the Raja;

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the troops were put in motion, and on the 6th of February arrived at Ellore or Yalore, where they were joined by the Zemindar or chief of the district.

Conflans had no longer confidence to meet the English in the field, but withdrew to defend himself in Masulipatam, the principal fort, and principal station of the French, on that part of the coast; while he urged the Subahdar of the Deccan to march to the defence of his own territories, the French being occupants under his authority, and subject to his law, while the English intended to wrest the country wholly from his hands. The views of the courtiers of the Subahdar happened at the moment to coincide with his own wishes to preserve for himself the protection of the French, and he put his army in motion towards Masulipatam.

This prevented not the English commander from hastening to attack the place. He arrived on the 6th of March. The French treated his pretensions with ridicule. Masulipatam, for an Indian town, and against Indian means of attack, was of no inconsiderable strength. The defenders within were more numerous than the besiegers. A considerable army of observation was left in the field. The Subahdar, with the grand army of the Deccan, was on the march; and a reinforcement of Europeans was expected from Pondicherry. A sum of money for the English had arrived from Bengal; but the French army of observation rendered it dangerous, or rather impracticable, to send it to the camp. The English troops mutinied for want of pay; and it was with much difficulty, and by large promises, that they were induced to resume the discharge of their duty.

Three batteries continued a hot fire on three different parts of the town, without having effected any considerable damage, from the 25th of March to the 6th of April, when the situation of the English began to wear a very threatening aspect. Salabut Jung was approaching; the French army of observation had retaken Rajamundri, and might effect a junction with the Subahdar; it was impossible for the English now to retreat by the way which they had come, or even to embark at Masulipatam with their cannon and heavy stores; the monsoon had begun; the reinforcement from Pondicherry was expected; and to

crown all, the engineers reported that no more than two days' ammunition for the batteries remained unconsumed. In these circumstances, however apparently desperate, Colonel Forde resolved to try the chance of an assault. The batteries were directed to play with the utmost activity during the whole of the day; and the troops to be under arms at ten at night. The attack, in order to divide the attention of the enemy, and render uncertain the point of danger, was to be in three places at once; and the three divisions of the army were to be on their respective grounds exactly at midnight. The struggle was expected to be severe; from the superior numbers of the enemy, and the little damage which the works had sustained. A part of the army faltered considerably; nor did all the officers meet the danger with perfect composure. They got, however, within the walls with comparative ease; where, being met by superior forces, they might have paid dear for their temerity, had not surprise aided their arms, and had not M. Conflans confounded by uncertainty, and by various and exaggerated reports, after a short resistance, surrendered the place. 1759.

Within one week two ships appeared with a reinforcement of 300 troops from Pondicherry. The Subahdar, whose arrival had been anticipated but a very few days by the fall of Masulipatam, found himself in circumstances ill calculated to carry on by himself a war against the English. He was anxious on the other hand, being now deprived of the French, to cultivate a friendship with the English, and to obtain from them a body of troops, to protect him against the dangerous ambition of his brother Nizam Ali, who, since the departure of Bussy, had returned at the head of a considerable body of troops, and filled him with serious alarm. Colonel Forde repaired to his camp, where he was received with great distinction, and concluded a treaty, by which a considerable territory about Masulipatam was ceded to the English, and the Subahdar engaged to allow no French settlement for the future to exist in his dominions. The French army of observation, which it was by the same treaty stipulated, should cross the Kistna in fifteen days, joined the army of Bassalut Jung, the elder brother of the Subahdar, who had accompanied him on the expedition to the Northern Circars,

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and now marched away to the south. The two ships which had brought the reinforcement from Pondicherry, upon discovering the loss of Masulipatam, sailed away to the north, and landed the troops at Ganjam. They made several efforts to render some useful service, but entirely fruitless; and after enduring a variety of privations, returned greatly reduced in numbers to Pondicherry.[1]

While the detachment from the army of Bengal was engaged in these operations, the solicitude of Clive was attracted by an enemy of high pretensions in a different quarter. Toward the close of the history of the Mogul Emperors, it appeared, that the eldest son of the Emperor Aulumgeer II., not daring to trust himself in the hands of the Vizir, the daring Umad al Mulk, by whom the emperor was held in a state of wretched servitude, had withdrawn into the district of Nujeeb ad Dowla, the Rohilla, who was an opponent of the Vizir, and a partisan of the Imperial family. At this time, the revolution effected by the English in Bengal, the unpopularity and disorders of Jaffier's administration, and the presumed weakness of his government, excited hopes in the neighbouring chiefs, that an invasion of his territories might be turned to advantage. The imagination of Mohammed Koollee Khan, the Subahdar of Allahabad, was the most highly elevated by the prospect of sharing in the spoils of the English Nabob. He was instigated by two powerful Zemindars, the Rajas, Sunder Sing, and Bulwant Sing. And the Nabob of Oude, his near kinsman, one of the most powerful chiefs in Hindustan, joined with apparent ardour in the design. The Nabob of Oude entertained a double purpose; that of obtaining, if any thing was to be seized, as great a share as possible of Bahar or Bengal; and that of watching his opportunity, while his ally and kinsman was intent upon his expected acquisitions, to seize by force or stratagem the fort of Allahabad. The influence of the imperial name appeared to them of no small importance in the war with Jaffier; and as the prince, who had fled into Rohilcund, was soliciting them for protection, it was agreed to place him ostensibly at the head of the enterprise. Preparations were made; and the Prince, having obtained from the Emperor legal investiture, as Subahdar of Bengal,

[1] Orme, ii. 375—380, 472—491, 554; Wilks, p. 401.

Bahar, and Orissa, crossed the Carumnassa, a river which bounds the province of Bahar, towards the conclusion of the year 1758. From the exhaustion of the treasury when Jaffier was raised to the government, the great sums which he had paid to the English, the difficulty of extracting money from the people, his own negligent and wasteful administration, and the cruel and brutal character of his son Meeran, Jaffier was ill-prepared to meet a formidable invasion. From his own rabble of ill-paid and mutinous soldiers, he was obliged to turn, and place all his hopes of safety in the bravery and skill of the English, whom, before the news of this impending danger, he had been plotting to expel. The English appear to have had no foresight of such an event. By the absence of the troops in the Northern Circars, their force was so inconsiderable, and both they and Jaffier needed so much time to prepare, that had the invaders proceeded with tolerable expedition and skill, they might have gained, without difficulty, the whole province of Bahar. A blow like this, at so critical a period, would have shaken to such a degree the tottering government of Jaffier, that the incipient power of the English might have despaired of restoring it; and a momentary splendour might again have surrounded the throne of the Moguls.

The march of the Prince and his confederates towards Patna placed Ramnarain the Governor between two dreadful fires. To Jaffier he neither felt, nor owed attachment. But, joining the prince, he risked every thing, if Jaffier should succeed; adhering to Jaffier, he risked as much, if the prince should succeed. The situation was calculated to exercise Hindu duplicity and address. An application to Mr. Amyatt, the chief of the English factory, was the first of his steps; from whom as he could receive no protection, he expected such latitude of advice, as would afford a colour to any measures he might find it agreeable to pursue. It happened as he foresaw. Mr. Amyatt informing him that the English would remain at Patna, if assistance should arrive; if not, would retire from the danger; frankly and sincerely instructed him, to amuse the prince as long as possible; but if all hopes of succour should fail, to provide for himself as events might direct. Ramnarain studied to conduct himself in such a manner as to be able

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to join with the greatest advantage the party for whom fortune should declare. He wrote to Bengal importuning for succour; and he at the same privately sent a messenger to propitiate the Prince. He was even induced, when the English of the factory had retired down the river, to pay him a visit in his camp; and the troops of the Prince might have entered Patna along with him. The opportunity however was lost; and the observations which the Hindu made upon the Prince's camp and upon the councils which guided him, induced him to shut the gates of the city when he returned, and to prepare for defence.

The hardihood of Clive was seldom overcome by scruples. Yet the Emperor Aulumgeer was legitimate sovereign of Bengal; and had undoubted right to appoint his eldest son to be his deputy in the government of that province. To oppose him, was undisguised rebellion.[1] The English forces, a slender band, marched to Moorshedabad, and being joined by the best part of Jaffier's troops, commanded by Meeran, they advanced towards Patna; where Ramnarain had amused the prince by messages and overtures as long as possible, and afterwards opposed him. Though the attack was miserably conducted, a breach was made, and the courage and resources of Ramnarain would have been soon exhausted; when intelligence reached the camp, that the Subahdar of Oude, who was on his march with an army under pretence of joining the prince, had treacherously seized the fortress of Allahabad. Mohammed Koollee Khan, by whom the prince's affairs were conducted, and whose forces were his

[1] The prince, Holwell assures us (Memorial, p. 2), repeatedly offered to grant the English their own terms, if they would assist him in recovering his rights. On what side justice lay, is evident enough. On what side policy, whether on that which Clive rejected, or that which he chose, is a more subtle inquiry.—M.

It was not a question of policy, but one of good faith. By the treaty with Mir Jaffier, as well as by the nature of their connexion with him,—the English were pledged to assist him against all enemies whatever, and few of the Governors of the Provinces would have scrupled to consider the Emperor as an enemy if he had sought to dispossess them of their Subahs. Even, however, if the theory of obedience to a monarch, who at the very seat of Empire was no longer his own master, could be urged with any show of reason, it would not be applicable in the present instance, for the Shah-zada was not appointed by the Emperor to be his deputy in Bengal, and as Clive pleaded to the Prince himself, no communication of his movements or purposes had been made from Delhi. On the contrary the Prince was there treated as a rebel to his father. He could not plead, therefore, the Emperor's authority for his incursion, and no other pretext could have afforded him the semblance even of right. Life of Clive, i. 406.—W.

entire support, resolved to march immediately for the recovery or protection of his own dominions; and though he was joined at four miles' distance from the city by M. Law, who had hastened from Chutterpore with his handful of Frenchmen, and importuned him to return to Patna, of which he engaged to put him in possession in two days, the infatuated Nabob continued his march, and being persuaded by the Subahdar of Oude to throw himself upon his generosity, was first made a prisoner, and afterwards put to death.

When Clive and Meeran approached, the enemy had already departed from Patna; and the unhappy prince, the descendant of so many illustrious sovereigns, the legal Subahdar of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, and the undoubted heir of the throne, once among the loftiest of the globe, was so bereft of friends and resources, that he was induced to write a letter to Clive, requesting a sum of money for his subsistence, and offering in requital to withdraw from the province. Upon these easy terms was Clive, by his good fortune, enabled to extricate himself from a situation of considerable difficulty. Ramnarain obtained, or it was convenient to grant him, credit for fidelity; the Zemindars who had joined the prince hastened to make their peace; and Clive returned to Calcutta in the month of June.[1]

This was a fortunate expedition for Clive. So unbounded was the gratitude of Jaffier, that after obtaining for his defender the rank of an Omrah of the empire, he bestowed upon him, under the title of Jaghire, the whole of the revenue or rent which the Company in quality of Zemindar, were bound to pay for the territory which they held round Calcutta. The grant amounted to the enormous sum of 30,000*l.* per annum. "Clive's Jaghire" is an expression of frequent recurrence, and of considerable weight in the History of India.

The Shazada (such was the title by which the eldest son of the Mogul was then distinguished in Bengal) was thus fortunately repulsed, and Colonel Forde with his troops was no less fortunately returned from the south,

[1] Scott's History of Bengal, p. 379—391; Seer Mutakhareen, vol. ii. part ii. p. 42—89; Francklin's Shah Aulum, p. 8—11; First Report of the Select Committee in 1772; Holwell's Memorial, p. 2.—M.

To these may be added Life of Clive, in which Ramnarain's conduct is very differently represented, i. 410.—W.

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when the English were alarmed by the news of a great armament, fitted out by the Dutch at Batavia, and destined for Bengal. The Dutch were not then at war with England, and being excited to cupidity by the lofty reports of the rich harvest lately reaped by the English in Bengal, possibly aimed at no more than a share of the same advantages, or to balance before its irresistible ascendency the increasing power of their rivals. They had received encouragement from Jaffier; but that ruler, since the invasion of the Mogul prince, felt so powerfully his dependence on the English, that when called upon by the English for the use of his authority and power, he durst not decline. In the month of August a Dutch ship arrived in the river, filled with troops; and this was speedily followed by six more, the whole having on board 700 Europeans, and 800 Malays. To attack without provocation the ships or troops of a nation in friendship with this country, was not regarded by Clive as less than a hazardous step. The advantages, however, of standing without a rival in Bengal, outweighed his apprehensions; he obtained an order of the Subahdar, commanding the Dutch to leave the river; and, under pretence of seconding his authority, resolved upon hostilities. The seven ships ascended the river as far as a few miles below Calcutta, and landed their troops, which were thence to march to the Dutch factory at Chinsura. Clive detached Colonel Forde with a force, consisting of 300 Europeans, 800 Sepoys, and about 150 of Jaffier's Cavalry, to intercept them; and at the same time commanded three of the Company's ships, fitted out and manned for the purpose, to attack the Dutch East Indiamen. Colonel Forde, by the dexterity and success of his exploit, converted it into one of the most brilliant incidents of the war; and of the 700 Europeans, not above fourteen were enabled to reach Chinsura, the rest being either taken prisoners, or slain. The attack upon the ships was equally successful; after an engagement of two hours, six of them were taken, and the seventh was intercepted by two English ships which lay further down the river. After this heavy blow the Dutch, to prevent their total expulsion from Bengal, were contented to put themselves in the wrong, by paying the expenses of the war; and the irregularity of his inter-

ference made Clive well pleased to close the dispute, by restoring to the Dutch their ships, with all the treasure and effects. The agreement with the Dutch was ratified on the 5th of December; and Clive, who for some months had been meditating return with his fortune to Europe, resigned the government early in February, and sailed from Calcutta.[1]

He left not the country in peace. Meeran, before he departed from Patna, the preceding year, had sown the seeds of a future war. He treated with injustice some officers of considerable rank and influence; and no sooner was he gone, than a confederacy was formed between them and some neighbouring Zemindars to support the Shazada in a fresh invasion. Intelligence of their designs had reached Calcutta before the contest with the Dutch was decided. And the Nabob of Poorania, whom Meeran had already endeavoured to cut off by treachery, had taken the field, and was expected to join the Mogul prince.

Colonel Calliaud had been called from the Carnatic to take the command of the forces in Bengal, when Clive and Forde, who meditated simultaneous departure, should sail for Europe. He arrived with a reinforcement of troops towards the end of November; and it was necessary that he should proceed to stop the menaced invasion without a moment's delay. He left Calcutta with a detachment of 300 Europeans, 1000 Sepoys, and fifty artillery-men, with six pieces of cannon, and arrived at Moorshedabad on the 26th of December. He was joined by Clive on the 6th of January, who, having made his arrangements with the Subahdar, or Nabob, set out after a week for Calcutta. Calliaud, being joined by 15,000 horse and foot, and twenty-five pieces of cannon, of the Nabob, under command of Meeran, resumed his march on the 18th.

In the meantime, the Mahrattas, who had been incited by the Vizir, Umad al mulk, to invade the provinces of Oude and Rohilcund, had been defeated and obliged to fly; while the powerful King of the Abdallees was again

[1] First Report from the Select Committee in 1772; Holwell's Memorial; Calliaud's Narrative. The author of the Seer Mutakhareen wonders greatly what could be the reason of Clive's quitting the government; a sentiment very natural to him, who well understood the pleasures of governing; but could not so easily conceive the passion of an Englishman to see lodged a princely fortune in his own country.

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on his march for the invasion of Hindustan. Excited by the approach of formidable danger, the Vizir, in a fit of exasperation or despair, ordered the murder of the Emperor, the wretched Aulumgeer; and the news of this tragical event reached the Shazada, just as he had passed the Carumnassa into the province of Bahar. He was advised to assume immediately the state and title of Emperor; to confer the office of Vizir upon Shuja-ad-dowla, the Nabob of Oude, and to confirm Nujeeb-ad-dowla in the office of Ameer ul Omrah. The majesty of the imperial throne, and his undoubted title, had an influence still upon the minds of men. It was now clear and immediate rebellion to resist him; and whatever guilt could be involved in making war upon their rightful sovereign, must be incurred by those who carried arms against him. The English had already familiarized themselves with the idea of rebellion in India; and the consideration of legitimate sovereignty, though the sovereign would have purchased their protection by unlimited grants, appears not to have excited a scruple in a single breast. The new dignity, however, of Vizir, called upon the Nabob of Oude for some exertions in favour of his sovereign; and the fascination of the imperial title was still of force to collect around him a considerable army.[1]

The march of the English was retarded by the necessity of settling terms with the Nabob of Poorania, who had encamped on the left bank of the river between Moorshedabad and Patna, and professed a desire of remaining obedient to Jaffier, provided the English would engage for his security. This negotiation wasted seven days; and in the meantime the Emperor advanced towards Patna. Ramnarain, whom the sagacity of Aliverdi had selected to be deputy Governor of Bahar, on account of his skill in matters of finance, was destitute of military talents; and considering his situation, under the known hatred of Jaffier, as exceedingly precarious, he was unwilling to lay out any of the wealth he had acquired, in providing for the defence of the country. He was still enabled to draw forth a respectable army, reinforced by seventy Europeans and a battalion of English sepoys, commanded by Lieu-

[1] It is stated at 60,000 men by Calliaud (Narrative of what happened in Bengal in 1760, p. 7); but this we conceive is an exaggerated conjecture.

tenant Cochrane; and he encamped under the walls, with a view to cover the city. He had received by letter the strongest injunctions from Calliaud, on no account to hazard a battle till Meeran and he should arrive. An action, however, took place; the army of Ramnarain was attacked with impetuosity; some of his officers behaved with treachery; his troops were giving way on all sides; and he himself was dangerously pressed; when he sent an importunate request to the English for immediate assistance. The Lieutenant had advised him at the beginning of the action to place himself, for the security of his person, near the English battalion; an advice with which his vanity did not permit him to comply. That officer marched to his relief without a moment's delay; but he imprudently divided his handful of troops; they were unable to withstand the force of numbers: all the European officers of the Sepoys fell, when the Sepoys dispersed and were cut to pieces. The English, who remained alive, resolved to fight their way to the city; and such was the awe and terror which the sight of their courage inspired, that the enemy, not daring to resist, opened instantly to the right and left, and allowed them to retire.[1]

Had the troops of the Emperor pushed on with vigour, immediately after this victory, when Ramnarain was

[1] The remarks of the Mogul nobleman, who was in Patna at the moment of the action, are amusing at least. "What remained of their people," he says, "was rallied by Doctor William Fullerton, a friend of mine, and possibly by some English officers whose names I know not, who ranged them in order again; and as one of their guns was to be left on the field of battle, they found means to render it useless and of no avail, by thrusting a large needle of iron into its eye. The other being in good condition, they took it with them, together with its ammunition; and that handful of men had the courage to retire in the face of a victorious enemy without once shrinking from their ranks. During their journey, the cart of ammunition chanced to receive some damage; the Doctor stopped unconcernedly, and after having put it in order, he bravely pursued his route again; and it must be acknowledged, that this nation's presence of mind, firmness of temper, and undaunted bravery, are past all question. They join the most resolute courage to the most cautious prudence; nor have they their equals in the art of ranging themselves in battle array, and fighting in order. If to so many military qualifications they knew how to join the arts of government; if they showed a concern for the circumstances of the husbandman and the gentleman, and exerted as much ingenuity and solicitude in relieving and easing the people of God, as they do in whatever concerns their military affairs, no nation in the world would be preferable to them, or prove worthier of command. But such is the little regard which they show to the people of these kingdoms, and such their apathy and indifference for their welfare, that the people under their dominion groan everywhere, and are reduced to poverty and distress. Oh God! come to the assistance of thine afflicted servants, and deliver them from the oppressions they suffer." Seer Mutakharcen, ii. 101.

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severely wounded, his army panic-struck and dispersed, and the city without defenders, they might have taken Patna with the greatest ease. But they employed themselves in ravaging the open country, and in receiving messengers and overtures from Ramnarain till the 19th of February, when they learned that Meeran and the English were distant from them but twenty-eight miles. The resolution was taken to march and engage them; the next day the two armies approached. Colonel Calliaud urged immediate attack; but Meeran and his astrologers found that the stars would not be favourable before the 22nd. Early on the morning of that day, Calliaud was in motion; but before he could reach the enemy the day was so far spent, "by the insufferable delays," as he himself complains, "of Meeran's march," that, wishing to have time before him, he was unwilling to engage till the following morning. The enemy, however, advanced, and Calliaud drew up his men between two villages which covered both his flanks, advising Meeran to form a second line, the whole of which, except the two wings, would have been covered by the English and the villages. But though this was agreed upon, "he crowded his army upon the right, and, in spite of the most pressing and repeated solicitations, presented to battle a body of 15,000 men, with a front of scarcely 200 yards in a tumultuous unformed heap." With a feigned appearance of directing the main attack upon the English, the enemy advanced with the best part of their army against Meeran, who in about ten minutes began to give way. Colonel Calliaud, however, marched with a battalion of Sepoys to his aid, and immediately decided the fate of the day. The Sepoys drew up within forty yards upon the enemy's flank, and having poured in a couple of fires, advanced with the bayonet, when the enemy recoiled upon one another, and fell into confusion, and, being charged with Meeran's cavalry, dispersed and fled. Calliaud was eager to pursue, but Meeran, who had received a trifling wound in the battle, preferred an interval of ease and pleasure at Patna. He would not even permit the service to be performed without him; and though Calliaud offered to proceed with his own troops alone, if only a few horse, which he earnestly entreated, were granted him, he found all he could urge without avail.

The Emperor fled the same night to Bahar, a town about ten miles from the field of battle. Here a measure of great promise suggested itself: to leave Meeran and the English behind: and, marching with the utmost expedition to Bengal, surprise Moorshedabad, and take the Nabob prisoner. It was the 29th of the month before Meeran could be prevailed upon to abandon the indulgences of Patna; when he and the English marched towards Bahar, and were surprised to learn that the enemy had already performed two marches towards Bengal. The strongest motives pressed for despatch: the English embarked in boats, and along with Meeran's cavalry in three days overtook the foe, who adopted a bold and politic resolution. No longer able to proceed along the river, the Emperor directed his march across the mountains; and Calliaud still resolved to follow his steps. The route was long and difficult, and it was near the end of March before the Emperor emerged on the plains of Bengal, about thirty miles west from Moorshedabad. During this interval, intelligence was in sufficient time received by Jaffier to enable him to collect an army and obtain a body of 200 Europeans from Calcutta: but the Emperor was joined by a body of Mahrattas, who had lately broken into that part of the country; and had he rapidly attacked the Nabob, he still enjoyed, in the opinion of Calliaud, the fairest prospect of success. But he lingered till Meeran and the English joined the Nabob on the 4th of April; and on the 7th, when they advanced to attack him, he set fire to his camp and fled. Calliaud again urged for cavalry to pursue, and again was absolutely refused.

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One object of hope was even yet reserved to the Emperor. By the precipitation with which his pursuers had followed him, Patna was left in a miserable state of defence. Could he return with expedition, and anticipate the arrival of succour, it must fall into his hands. At this very time M. Law, with his small body of Frenchmen, passing that capital, to join the Emperor, who had again invited him from Chitterpore, threw it into the greatest alarm. It was almost entirely destitute of the means of defence; but Law was ignorant of its situation, and proceeded to Bahar, to wait for the Emperor. At this time the Naib of Poorania took off the mask, espousing openly the cause of the

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Emperor; and had he seized the present opportunity of marching to Patna, nothing could have prevented it from falling into his hands. The exertions, however, of Ramnarain, and of the gentlemen of the English factory, had collected, before the Emperor was able to arrive, a sufficient body of defenders to secure the city against the first impression; and Colonel Calliaud, who foresaw the danger, formed a detachment of 200 chosen Europeans, and a battalion of Sepoys, of which he gave the command to Captain Knox, and commanded them to march with the utmost expedition to Patna. The Emperor had lost no time in commencing the siege; and after several days of vigorous operation, during which Mr. Fullerton, the English Surgeon, and Raja Shitabroy, had distinguished themselves peculiarly within the walls, Law attempted an assault. Though repulsed, he, in two days, renewed the attempt; and, part of the wall being demolished, the rampart was scaled. The enemy were still compelled to retire; but the city was now thrown into the greatest alarm; a renewed assault was expected the following night; and scarcely a hope was entertained of its being withstood; when Captain Knox, with a flying party, was seen approaching the walls. He had performed the march from Moorshedabad to Patna, under the burning heat of a Bengal sun, in the extraordinary space of thirteen days, himself marching on foot, as an example and encouragement to the men. That very night the Captain reconnoitred the enemy's camp in person; and next day, watching the hour of afternoon's repose, surprised them when asleep, and drove them from their works, to which they never returned.

While the Emperor, conscious of his weakness, withdrew to the neighbourhood of Teekaury, waiting the result of his applications to the Abdallee Shah, who was now commanding, from the ancient seat of the Mogul government, the whole of the upper provinces of Hindustan, the Naib or Deputy Governor of Poorania had collected his army, and was on the march to join him. To counteract his designs, the English army under Calliaud, and that of Jaffier under Meeran, rendezvoused at Raje-mahl, on the 23d of May. They moved upwards on the one side of the river, the Naib advancing on the other; and orders were

forwarded to Captain Knox to cross over from Patna, and harass his march till the main army should arrive; while his boats, which were not able to ascend the river so fast as he marched, were overtaken and seized. Captain Knox amazed the inhabitants of Patna by declaring his resolution, as soon as the enemy appeared, of crossing the river with his handful of men and giving them battle. Part of Ramnarain's troops were placed under his command; but as the enterprise appeared to them an act of madness, they formed a determined resolution to have no share in it. Raja Shitabroy having between two and three hundred men in his pay, with whom he had performed important services in the defence of Patna, joined the Captain with a real disposition to act. Two hundred Europeans, one battalion of Sepoys, five field-pieces, and about 300 horse, marched to engage an army of 12,000 men, with thirty pieces of cannon. Arrived within a few miles of the enemy, Knox proceeded in the dark to the quarters of Shitabroy, to communicate his design of surprising the enemy's camp during the night: he found that gallant associate fully prepared to second his ardour; the troops were allowed a few hours for repose; and a little after midnight they began to march. The guide having missed his way from the darkness of the night, they wandered till within two hours of day-break, and having lost the time for attacking the enemy by surprise, abandoned the design. They had laid down their arms, and prepared themselves for a little repose, when the vanguard of the enemy appeared. The gallantry of Knox allowed not a moment's hesitation. He took his ground with skill; and though completely surrounded by the enemy, repulsed them at every point; sustained a conflict of six hours, in which Shitabroy fought with the greatest activity and resolution; and having compelled them at last to quit the field, pursued them till night.[1]

[1] The author of the Seer Mutakhareen, who had a distant view of the battle from the walls of Patna, describes, with much effect, the alternation of hopes and fears which agitated the inhabitants, as the various reports of the battle reached the city, or the tokens which came to their eyes and their ears were variously interpreted. 'At last, he says, "when the day was far spent, a note came to Mr. Amyatt from Captain Knox, which mentioned that the enemy was defeated and flying. This intelligence was sent to all the principal men of the city, and caused a deal of joy. I went to the factory to compliment the gentlemen, when in the dusk of the evening Captain Knox himself crossed over, and

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In consequence of this defeat, the Naib postponed his resolution of joining the Emperor, and marched towards the north. In a few days Calliaud and Meeran crossed the Ganges to pursue him, and, as his army was encumbered with baggage and artillery, soon overtook him. He immediately formed his line, as if to engage; but unloading the treasure, and the most valuable part of the baggage, putting it upon camels and elephants; and skirmishing only till the English came up, he marched away with great expedition, leaving his heavy baggage and artillery behind.[1] The rains were now set in with unusual violence, yet Calliaud, animated by the reports of the rich treasure (the English were credulous on the subject of treasure) which the Naib carried in his train, resolved to make the utmost exertions to overtake him before he could reach the forests and mountains. The pursuit had been continued four days, when during the night of the 2nd of July, which proved exceedingly tempestuous, the tent of Meeran was struck with lightning, and he, with all his attendants, was killed on the spot. The death of their leader is, to an Indian army, the signal to disband. The probability of this event, which would deliver the province of Bahar into the hands of the Emperor, struck the English commander with the utmost alarm. His whole attention was now occupied in keeping the army together, till re-conducted to Patna, toward which he marched with

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came with Shitabroy in his company. They were both covered with dust and sweat. The Captain then gave some detail of the battle, and paid the greatest encomiums on Shitabroy's zeal, activity, and valour. He exclaimed several times, 'This is a real Nawab; I never saw such a Nawab in my life.' A few moments after, Ramnarain was introduced. He had in his company both Mustapha Koollee Khan, and the Cutwal of the city, with some other men of consequence, who, on hearing of the arrival of these two men, had flocked to the factory; and on seeing them alone, could not help believing that they had escaped from the slaughter; so far were they from conceiving that a few hundreds of men could defeat a whole army. Nor could they be made to believe (impressed as they were with Hindu notions) that a commander could quit his army so unconcernedly, unless he had indeed run away from it: nor would listen to what Mr. Amyatt repeatedly said, to convince Ramnarain and others of their mistake." Seer Mutakhareen, ii. 123.

[1] Calliaud, on this occasion, too, complains heavily of Meeran: "The young Nabob and his troops behaved in this skirmish in their usual manner, halting above a mile in the rear, nor ever once made a motion to sustain the English. Had he but acted on this occasion with the least appearance of spirit, and made even a semblance of fighting, the affair must have proved decisive; nor could Cuddum Houssein Khan or his treasure have escaped." Calliaud's Narrative, p. 34.

all possible expedition; and distributed the troops in winter quarters on the 29th of July.[1]

The political affairs of the province were hastening to another crisis. The government of Jaffier was in a state approaching to dissolution. The English Presidency was distressed by want of pecuniary resources, and the seeds of violent discords were sown in the council.

When Jaffier got possession of the viceroyalty by the dethronement and death of his master Suraj-ad-dowla, and when the English leaders were grasping the advantages which the revolution placed in their hands, both parties, dazzled with first appearances, overlooked the consequences which necessarily ensued. The cupidity natural to mankind, and the credulity with which they believe what flatters their desires, made the English embrace, without deduction, the exaggerations of Oriental rhetoric on the riches of India; and believe that a country which they saw was one of the poorest, was nevertheless the most opulent upon the surface of the globe. The sums which had been obtained from Jaffier were now wholly expended. "The idea of provision for the future," to use the words of a governor, "seemed to have been lost in the apparent immensity of the sum stipulated for compensation of the Company's losses at Calcutta." No rational foresight was applied, as the same observer remarks, to the increased expenditure which the new connexion with the government of the country naturally produced; and soon it appeared that no adequate provision was made for it. "In less than two years it was found necessary to take up money at interest, although large sums had been received besides for bills upon the court of Directors."[2] The situation of Jaffier was deplorable from the first. With an

[1] On the history of this second invasion of the Mogul Prince, see Scott's Hist. of Bengal, p. 392—397; Seer Mutakhareen, ii. 91—139; Calliaud's Narrative of what happened in Bengal in 1760, p. 1—36; Calliaud's Evidence before the Committee of 1772; Calliaud's Letters in Holwell's Tracts, p. 27; Francklin's Shah Aulum, p. 12.

[2] Vansittart's Narrative, i. 19, 22. The distress at home, created by these bills, was not inferior to what was endured in India. "The funds of the Company in Europe," says the same unquestionable authority, "were not sufficient to pay the bills when they became due; and it is a fact well known upon the Royal Exchange, that, in the year 1758, the Directors prevailed, not without difficulty, upon the bill-holders, to grant a further time for the payment of their bills; if this accommodation had failed, the consequence would have been what I need not name." A Letter to the Proprietors of the East India Stock, from Mr. Henry Vansittart, p. 13.

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exhausted treasury, an exhausted country, and vast engagements to discharge, he was urged to the severest exactions; while the profusion with which he wasted his treasure upon his own person, and some unworthy favourites, was ill calculated to soothe the wretched people, under the privations to which they were compelled. The cruelties of which he and Meeran were guilty, made them objects of general detestation: the negligence, disorder, and weakness of their government, exposed them to contempt: and their troops, always mutinous from the length of their arrears, threatened them every moment with fatal extremities. When the news arrived at Moorshedabad of the death of Meeran, the troops surrounded the palace, scaled the walls, and threatened the Nabob with instant death; nor were they, in all probability, prevented from executing their menaces, otherwise than by the interference of Meer Casim, his son-in-law, who, on promise of succeeding to the place and prospects of Meeran, discharged a part of their arrears from his own treasury, and induced them to accept of Jaffier's engagements to pay the whole within a limited time.

When Clive resigned the government of Bengal, instead of leaving the elevation to the chair in the established order of succession, his influence was successfully exerted to procure the nomination of Mr. Vansittart, who was called from Madras. Mr. Holwell, on whose pretensions there had been violent debates in the Court of Directors, was promoted to the office in virtue of his seniority, till July, when Mr. Vansittart arrived. The new governor found the treasury at Calcutta empty, the English troops at Patna on the very brink of mutiny, and deserting in multitudes for want of pay; the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay totally dependent upon Bengal for pecuniary resources; the provision of an investment actually suspended; the income of the Company scarcely sufficient for the current expenses of Calcutta: the allowance paid by the Nabob for the troops several months in arrear; and the attainment of that, as well as of a large balance upon his first agreements, totally hopeless, Some change by which the revenue of the Company could be placed on a level with their expenditure, was indispensable.[1] They

[1] The necessity of an increased expenditure, and the total want of funds for defraying it, under the arrangements of Clive, is satisfactorily defended

might retire from all concern with the government of the country, and protect themselves with the protection of Calcutta, for which a small body of troops and a small expenditure would suffice. But not to speak of the golden hopes which had been so fondly cherished, fears suggested themselves (fears when they favour wishes are potent counsellors) that the place which the Company might resign in directing the government of the country would be occupied by the French or the Dutch. From the administration of Jaffier, resigned as he was to a set of unworthy favourites—old, indolent, voluptuous, estranged from the English, and without authority—no other consequences were to be expected, than those which had already been experienced. From a strong sense of the incurable vices of Jaffier and his family, Mr. Holwell, during the few months of his administration, had advised the council to abandon him; and, embracing the just cause of the Emperor, to avail themselves of the high offers which that deserted monarch was ready to make. An idea, however, of fidelity to the connexion which they had formed, though with a subject in rebellion to his king, prevailed in the breasts of the council; and a middle course was chosen. Of all the members of Jaffier's family, whose remaining sons were young, Meer Casim, the husband of his daughter, who passed for a man of talents, appeared the only person endowed with qualities adapted to the present exigencies of the government. It was agreed that all the active powers of administration should be placed in his hands; Jaffier not being dethroned in name, but only in reality. A treaty was concluded with Meer Casim on the 17th of September. He agreed, in return for the powers thus placed in his hands, to assign to the Company the revenues of the three districts of Burdwan, Midnapore, and Chittagong, to pay the balance due by Jaffier, and a present of five lacks for the war in the Carnatic. On the 2d of October, Mr. Vansittart, accompanied by Colonel Calliaud and a detachment of troops, proceeded to Moorshedabad to persuade or to compel the Nabob to accede to the arrangements which had been formed. Jaffier discovered intense reluctance;

against objectors by Mr. Vansittart, in his Letter to the Proprietors, p. 17—22.

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and Mr. Vansittart wavered. Meer Casim, who could be safe no longer in the power of Jaffier, exclaimed against the perfidy of making and not fulfilling an engagement such as that which was contracted between them; and formed his resolution of joining the Emperor with all his treasure and troops. The resolution of Mr. Vansittart was at last confirmed; and a favourable moment was chosen for occupying the palace of Jaffier with the troops. When assured that no designs against his person or authority were entertained; that nothing was proposed beyond a reform of his government in the hands of his son-in-law, who would act as his deputy; he replied, with disdain, that he was no stranger to the meaning of such language; and too well acquainted with the characters of men, particularly that of his son-in-law, to be in doubt respecting the consequences. He peremptorily refused to remain a vain pageant of royalty, and desired permission to retire to Calcutta, to lead a private life under the English protection.[1]

When the pecuniary distresses of the Company's government, and the enormous disclosures in that of the Nabob, were under the deliberation of the board at Calcutta, there was but one opinion concerning the necessity of some important change. To vest Meer Casim with the power requisite for reforming the government of the Nabob, was the plan approved of unanimously in the Select Committee. The force which might be necessary to subdue his reluctance was provided; and though it was not anticipated that he would resign the government rather than comply, the step which that resolution made necessary was a natural consequence; and was without hesitation decreed. When Mr. Vansittart returned to Calcutta on the 7th of November, he found there were persons by whom those measures were by no means approved. Mr. Verelst and Mr. Smyth, two members of the Council, who were not of the Select Committee, entered a minute on the 8th, in which they complained that a measure of so much importance had not been submitted to

[1] First Report of the Committee in 1772; Vansittart's Narrative, i. 19—123; Holwell's Memorial; Scrafton's Observations on Vansittart's Narrative; Vansittart's Letter to the Proprietors of East India Stock in answer to Scrafton; Verelst's View of the English Government in Bengal; Seer Mutakhareen, ii. 130—160; Scott's Hist. of Bengal, p. 399—401.

the Council at large; and laying great stress upon the engagements which had been formed with Jaffier, insinuated their ignorance of the existence of any cause why those engagements should be abandoned and betrayed. When Clive made his plan for the government of Bengal, by the irregular elevation of Mr. Vansittart, he seems to have overlooked, or very imperfectly to have estimated, the passions which it was calculated to excite. Mr. Amyatt, who was a man of merit, and next to the chair, could not behold himself postponed or superseded without dissatisfaction; and those among the Bengal servants who stood next to him in hopes, regarded their interests as involved in his. A party thus existed with feelings averse to the Governor; and they soon became a party opposed to his measures. Other passions, of a still grosser nature, were at this time thrown into violent operation in Bengal. The vast sums, obtained by a few individuals, who had the principal management of the former revolution, when Meer Jaffier trode down Suraj-ad-dowla his master, were held in vivid remembrance; and the persuasion that similar advantages, of which every man burned for a share, were now meditated by the Select Committee, excited the keenest emotions of jealousy and envy. Mr. Amyatt was now joined by Mr. Ellis, a person of a violent temper, whom, in some of his pretensions, the Governor had opposed; and by Major Carnac, who had lately arrived in the province to succeed Calliaud, but whom the Governor had offended by proposing that he should not take the command till the affairs at Patna, in which Calliaud was already engaged, and with which he was well acquainted, should be conducted to a close. A minute, in which Mr. Ellis and Mr. Smyth coincided, and in which the deposition of Jaffier was formally condemned, was entered by Mr. Amyatt on the 8th of January. No attempt was made to deny the extreme difficulties in which the English government was placed, or the disorders and enormities of Jaffier's administration: it was only denied that any of these evils would be removed by the revolution of which, in violation of the national faith, the English, by the Select Committee, had been rendered the instruments.[1]

[1] Objections to the removal of Jaffier were made not only by those whose personal feelings might be suspected of influencing their judgment, but by

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Meer Casim, aware that money was the pillar by which alone he could stand, made so great exertions that, notwithstanding the treasury of Meer Jaffier was found almost empty, he paid in the course of a few months the arrears of the English troops at Patna; so far satisfied the troops of the Subah, both at Moorshedabad and Patna, that they were reduced to order and ready to take the field; and provided six or seven lacks in discharge of his engagements with the Company, insomuch that the Presidency were enabled in November to send two lacks and a half to Madras, whence a letter had been received, declaring that without a supply the siege of Pondicherry must be raised.

In the month of January, Major Carnac arrived at Patna, and took the command of the troops. The province of Bahar had suffered so much from the repeated incursions of the Emperor; and the finances both of the Nabob and of the Company were so much exhausted by the expense of the army required to oppose him, that the importance was strongly felt of driving him finally from that part of the country. The rains were no sooner at an end than the English commander, accompanied by the troops of Ramnarain, and those which had belonged to Meeran, advanced towards the Emperor, who was stationed at Gyah Maunpore. The unhappy Monarch made what exertions he could to increase his feeble army; but Carnac reached his camp by three days' march; forced him to an engage-

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others, prior to his appointment. The scheme was originally Mr. Holwell's, who communicated in April, to Colonel Calliaud, his anticipation of the necessity of deposing Mir Jaffier. The Colonel, in reply, observes, "bad as the man may be whose cause we now support, I cannot be of opinion that we can get rid of him for a better, without running the risk of much greater inconveniences attending on such a change than those we now labour under. I presume the establishing tranquillity in these provinces, would restore to us all the advantages of trade we can wish, for the profit and honour of our employers, and I think we bid fairer to bring that tranquillity about by our present influence over the Subah, and by supporting him, than by any change that can be made." Scrafton's Observations on Vansittart's Narrative, 12. The removal of Jaffier was an ill-advised measure; there was no absolute impossibility in his performing his engagements with the English, or paying his own troops, for both objects were speedily accomplished by his successor, and he created no new resources. The same means of acquitting his obligations, were in Mir Jaffier's reach. There only wanted such support as should enable him, and such control as should compel him, to discharge those demands to which he had rendered himself liable, and the due acquittance of which was essential to the maintenance of that English force upon which his own power, and even his existence depended. Had Clive remained in Bengal, there would probably have been no revolution.—W.

ment, and gained a victory. The only memorable incident of the battle was, that M. Law was taken prisoner: and the British officers exalted themselves in the eyes even of the rude natives, by treating him with the highest honour and distinction.[1]

[1] It is interesting and delightful to hear the account of the native historian. "When the Emperor left the field of battle, the handful of troops that followed M. Law, discouraged by his flight, and tired of the wandering life which they had hitherto led in his service, turned about likewise, and followed the Emperor. M. Law, finding himself abandoned and alone, resolved not to turn his back; he bestrode one of his guns, and remained firm in that posture, waiting for the moment of his death. This being reported to Major Carnac, he detached himself from his main body, with Captain Knox and some other officers, and he advanced to the man on the gun, without taking with him either a guard or any Talingas (Sepoys) at all. Being arrived near, this troop alighted from their horses, and pulling their caps from their heads, they swept the air with them, as if to make him a *salám*: and this salute being returned by M. Law in the same manner, some parley in their language ensued. The Major, after paying high encomiums to M. Law for his perseverance, conduct, and bravery, added these words: 'You have done everything which could be expected from a brave man; and your name shall be undoubtedly transmitted to posterity by the pen of history: now, loosen your sword from your loins, come amongst us, and abandon all thoughts of contending with the English.' The other answered, 'That if they would accept of his surrendering himself just as he was, he had no objection; but that as to surrendering himself with the disgrace of being without his sword, it was a shame he would never submit to; and that they might take his life if they were not satisfied with that condition.' The English commanders, admiring his firmness, consented to his surrendering himself in the manner he wished: after which the Major, with his officers, shook hands with him, in their European manner, and every sentiment of enmity was instantly dismissed on both sides. At the same time the Major sent for his own palankeen, made him sit in it, and he was sent to camp. M. Law, unwilling to see or to be seen, shut up the curtains of the palankeen for fear of being recognised by any of his friends at camp; but yet some of his acquaintances, hearing of his being arrived, went to him. The Major, who had excused him from appearing in public, informed them that they could not see him for some days, as he was too much vexed to receive any company. Ahmed Khan Koteishee, who was an impertinent talker, having come to look at him, thought to pay his court to the English by joking on the man's defeat; a behaviour that has nothing strange, if we consider the times in which we live, and the company he was accustomed to frequent; and it was in that notion of his, doubtless, that with much pertness of voice and air, he asked him this question; 'And Bibi (Lady) Law, where is she?' The Major and officers present, shocked at the impropriety of the question, reprimanded him with a severe look, and very severe expressions: 'This man, they said, 'has fought bravely, and deserves the attention of all brave men; the impertinences which you have been offering him may be customary amongst your friends and your nation, but cannot be suffered in ours, which has it for a standing rule, never to offer an injury to a vanquished foe.' Ahmed Khan, checked by this reprimand, held his tongue, and did not answer a word. He tarried about one hour more in his visit, and then went away much abashed; and, although he was a commander of importance, and one to whom much honour had been always paid, no one did speak to him any more, or made a show of standing up at his departure. This reprimand did much honour to the English; and, it must be acknowledged, to the honour of those strangers, that as their conduct in war and in battle is worthy of admiration, so, on the other hand, nothing is more modest and more becoming than their behaviour to an enemy, whether in the heat of action, or in the pride of success and victory; these people seem to act entirely according to the rules observed by our ancient commanders, and our men of genius." Seer Mutakhareen, ii. 165, 166.

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At this time the Zemindars of Beerboom and Burdwan, two important districts of Bengal, not far from Moorshedabad, took arms. It has been alleged that they acted in concert with the Emperor, with whom it had been arranged during his former campaign, that a body of Mahrattas should penetrate into Bengal immediately after the rains; that he himself should advance to Bahar, and, by as menacing an appearance as possible, engage the attention of the English and Nabob; that the Zemindars should hold themselves in readiness, till the Emperor, giving his enemies the slip, should penetrate into Bengal, as he had done the year before; when they should fall upon the province by one united and desperate effort. There seems in this too much of foresight and of plan for Oriental politicians, especially the weak-minded Emperor and his friends. At any rate the movements of the Zemindars betrayed them. Meer Casim, attended by a detachment of English under Major Yorke, marched in haste to Beerboom, defeated the troops which were opposed to them, reduced both provinces to obedience, and drove the Mahrattas to the south.

Immediately after the battle with the Emperor, Major Carnac sent to him the Raja Shitabroy, to make an overture of peace, and to ask permission to visit him in his camp. At first, by the instigation of one of the restless Zemindars who supported him, he declined the proposal; presently afterwards, having listened to other councils, he became eager to make his terms. He was tired of his dependence upon the rude and insolent chiefs who hitherto had upheld his cause; and cherished hopes that the late revolution at Delhi might produce some turn in his favour. The Abdallee Shah, after his great victory over the Mahrattas, had acknowledged him as sovereign of Hindustan; had appointed his son to act in the quality of his deputy at Delhi; and had recommended his cause to the Afghan chiefs, and to his vizir, the Nabob of Oude. Major Carnac paid his compliments to him as Emperor, in his own camp, and, after the usual ceremonies, conducted him to Patna.

Meer Casim was not easy upon the prospect of a connexion between the Emperor and the English; and hastened to Patna, to observe and to share in the present

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proceedings. Upon his arrival, he declined waiting upon the Emperor in his own camp; either because he was afraid of treachery, of which there was no appearance; or because (so low was the house of Timur fallen) he was pleased to measure dignities with his King. After much negotiation, the English invented a compromise, by planning the interview in the hall of the factory, where a musnud was formed of two dining tables covered with cloth. The usual ceremonies were performed; and Meer Casim, upon condition of receiving investiture as Subahdar of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, engaged to pay annually twenty-four lacks of rupees to the Emperor, as the revenue of the provinces, with the government of which he was intrusted. After a short stay at Patna, where the intrigues of the Nabob had as yet prevented his being proclaimed as sovereign, Shah Aulum accepted the invitation of the Subahdar of Oude, of Nujeeb-ad-dowla, and other Afghan chiefs, to whom his cause was recommended by the Abdallee Shah, to place himself under their protection, and marched toward his capital. He was escorted by Major Carnac to the boundaries of the province of Bahar; and made a tender to the English of the dewanee of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, for which, and all their other privileges, he offered to grant phirmâns, whenever the petition for them should be presented in form. The intention was distinctly formed at Calcutta, to afford assistance for placing and confirming him on his paternal throne; but the want of money, and the disinclination of the Nabob, proved decisive obstructions.

Meer Casim, who had supplied his first necessities by squeezing out of those persons, who were suspected of having made riches in the public service, all that terror or cruelty, under pretence of making them account for their balances, was calculated to extort, regarded the supposed treasures of Ramnarain, as well as the revenues of his government, with a craving appetite; and resolved to omit no effort or contrivance to get both in his power. As Ramnarain, however, had been assured of protection by the English, it was necessary to proceed with caution and art. The pretence of calling upon him to account for the receipts of his government was the instrument employed. It was the purpose of the Nabob to accede to no accom-

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modation which should not leave Ramnarain at his mercy. It was the purpose of Ramnarain to avoid, by every effort of chicanery, the rendering of a fair account. These endeavours, truly Oriental, of the Nabob on the one side, and Ramnarain on the other, operated to the ruin of both.

Mr. Vansittart, and the party who supported him, desirous of finding the conduct of Meer Casim, whom they had raised, of a nature to justify their choice, were disposed to interpret all appearances in his favour. The opposite party, who condemned the elevation of Meer Casim, were not less disposed to interpret all appearances to his disadvantage. Unfortunately for Ramnarain, and, in the end, not less unfortunately for the Nabob, the persons at Patna, in whose hands the military power of the English at this time was placed, belonged to the party by whom the Governor was opposed. Major Carnac was indeed superseded in the chief command by the arrival of Colonel Coote, soon after the Emperor was received at Patna; but Coote fell so entirely into the views of his predecessor, that Carnac, though in a subordinate station, remained at Patna, to lend his countenance and aid to measures, the line of which he had contributed to draw.

So far was Mr. Vansittart from intending to permit any injustice towards Ramnarain, that Major Carnac, in his first instructions, was particularly informed of the engagements subsisting between the English government and Ramnarain; and of the necessity of supporting his life, fortune, and government against the Nabob, should any hostile design appear to be entertained. Mr. Vansittart, however, listened to the representations which the Nabob artfully sent him, of the artifices by which Ramnarain evaded the settlement of his accounts. The exigencies of the Calcutta government urgently required the payments due from the Nabob: the Nabob declared that the recovery of the balances from Ramnarain was the only fund from which those payments could be made: and Vansittart with the usual credulity, believed the vulgar reports of the great treasures, as well as the vast balances, in the hands of Ramnarain; though the accounts of only three years of his government were unexamined, and though in each of those years his country had been regularly overrun by

hostile armies, and he had been obliged for defence to keep on foot an army greater than he was able to pay.[1]

Major Carnac and Colonel Coote, on the other hand, allowed their minds to be entirely engrossed by the evidence which appeared of the resolution of the Nabob to destroy Ramnarain. The proof which they possessed was indeed but too conclusive, since they have both left their declarations upon record, that the Nabob tempted them with enormous bribes to leave Ramnarain in his power.[2] Their opposition to the Nabob, which was often offensive and exceptionable in the mode, appeared to Vansittart to have no better aim than vexation to himself; it lessened the care of Ramnarain to save appearances in evading the extortion with which he was threatened; and it enabled the Nabob at last to persuade Vansittart, that it was a man requiring nothing but justice, which Ramnarain was labouring to defeat; and that his government was hastening to ruin from the obstinate dishonesty of one man, supported by two English commanders.

So far did these altercations and animosities proceed, that on the 25th of June, Vansittart, who had a majority in the council, came to the unhappy resolution of recalling both Coote and Carnac from Patna, and of leaving Ramnarain at the mercy of the Nabob. He made that use of his power, which it was the height of weakness in Vansittart not to foresee. Ramnarain was immediately seized and thrown into prison; his very house was robbed; his

[1] Major Carnac (see his Evidence in the Third Report of the Committee of 1772) believed that he owed nothing at all.

[2] Both insisted upon the fact, that Ramnarain was ready to account fairly. In a letter of Major Carnac's to the Select Committee, dated 13th April, 1761, he says, "I have long had reason to suspect the Nabob had ill designs against Ramnarain, and have now found my suspicions to be too true. His Excellency (the Nabob) made a heavy complaint to me yesterday, in the presence of Mr. M'Guire, Major Yorke, Messrs. Lushington and Swinton, that there was a considerable balance due on the revenues of this province. Ramnarain has declared to me, that he was ready to lay the accounts before him; however, as the two parties differ widely in their statements, Mr. M'Guire and I proposed, that they should each make out their accounts, and refer them to your board, who would fairly decide between them. This, which I thought was a reasonable proposal, was so far from being satisfactory to the Nabob, that he plainly declared, nothing less could satisfy him than the Mahraje's being removed from the Naibut of this province before he returned to Moorshedabad." First Report of the Committee in 1772, App. No. 13. In his evidence before the Committee, Carnac says, "The plea of his being in arrear was the pretext always made use of for oppressing him, but without foundation; for in the frequent conversations I had with Ramnarain on the subject, he always seemed ready to come to a fair and equitable account."

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friends were tortured to make confession of hidden treasures; his life was only for the moment spared, lest the indignation of the English should be too violently roused; and after all, the quantity of treasure which he was found to possess was insignificant, a sum barely sufficient for the daily expenses of his government.[1]

This was the fatal error of Mr. Vansittart's administration: because it extinguished among the natives of rank all confidence in the English protection; and because the enormity to which, in this instance, he had lent his support, created an opinion of a weak or a corrupt partiality, and diminished the weight of his interference when the Nabob was really the party aggrieved. For now began the memorable disputes between the Nabob and the Company's service about the internal trade; and, at the same time, such changes were produced in the Council at Calcutta, as impaired considerably the Governor's power. These changes constitute an incident in the history of the Company, the memory of which is of peculiar importance.

Just before Colonel Clive resigned the government in Bengal, the 147th paragraph of one of the last of the despatches, to which he affixed his name, addressed the Court of Directors in the following terms:—"Having fully spoken to every branch of your affairs at this Presidency, under their established heads, we cannot, consistent with the real anxiety we feel for the future welfare of that respectable body from whom you and we are in trust, close this address without expostulating with freedom on the unprovoked and general asperity of your letter *per Prince Henry packet.* Our sentiments on this head, will, we doubt not, acquire additional weight, from the consideration of of their being subscribed by a majority of your Council, who are, at this very period, quitting your service, and consequently, independent and disinterested. Permit us to say, that the diction of your letter is most unworthy yourselves and us, in whatever relation considered, either as masters to servants, or gentlemen to gentlemen. Mere inadvertencies, and casual neglects, arising from an un-

[1] Vansittart's Narrative, i. 141—271; The evidence of Carnac and Coote in the First Report, and that of Clive, M'Guire, and Carnac, in the Third Report of the Committee, 1772; Scott's Hist. of Bengal, p. 404—409; Seer Mutakhareen, ii. 160—181; Verelst's View of the English Government in Bengal, p. 47.

avoidable and most complicated confusion in the state of your affairs, have been treated in such language and sentiments, as nothing but the most glaring and premeditated faults could warrant. Groundless informations have, without further scrutiny, borne with you the stamp of truth, though proceeding from those who had therein obviously their own purpose to serve, no matter at whose expense. These have received from you such countenance and encouragement, as must most assuredly tend to cool the warmest zeal of your servants here and every where else; as they will appear to have been only the source of general reflections, thrown out at random against your faithful servants of this Presidency, in various parts of your letter now before us,—faithful to little purpose,— if the breath of scandal, joined to private pique or private or personal attachments, have power to blow away in one hour the merits of many years' services, and deprive them of that rank, and those rising benefits, which are justly a spur to their integrity and application. The little attention shown to these considerations in the indiscriminate favours heaped on some individuals, and undeserved censures on others, will, we apprehend, lessen that spirit of zeal so very essential to the well-being of your affairs, and, consequently, in the end, if continued, prove the destruction of them. Private views may, it is much to be feared, take the lead here, from examples at home; and no gentlemen hold your service longer, nor exert themselves further in it, than their own exigencies require. This being the real present state of your service, it becomes strictly our duty to represent it in the strongest light, or we should, with little truth, and less propriety, subscribe ourselves,

"May it please your Honours,

"Your most faithful servants,

"ROBERT CLIVE,
"J. Z. HOLWELL,
"WM. B. SUMNER,
"W. M'GUIRE."

The Company were even then no strangers to what they have become better acquainted with the longer they have acted; to that which, from the very nature of their authority, and from their local circumstances, it was evident

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they must experience; a disregard of their orders, when contrary to the interests or passions of their servants: but as they never before had a servant of such high pretensions, and so audacious a character as Clive, they had never before been treated with so much contumely in words. They were moved accordingly to resent it highly. In the very first paragraph of their general letter to Bengal, dated the 21st of January, 1761, they said, "We have taken under our most serious consideration the general letter from our late President and council of Fort William, dated the 29th December, 1759, and many paragraphs therein containing gross insults upon and indignities offered to the Court of Directors; tending to the subversion of our authority over our servants, and a dissolution of all order and good government in the Company's affairs: to put an immediate stop therefore to this evil, we do positively order and direct, that, immediately upon receipt of this letter, all those persons still remaining in the Company's service, who signed the said letter, viz. Messieurs John Zephaniah Holwell, Charles Stafford Playdell, William Brightwell Sumner, and William M'Guire, be dismissed from the Company's service; and you are to take care that they be not permitted, on any consideration, to continue in India, but that they are to be sent to England by the first ships which return home the same season you receive this letter."

The dismissal of which this letter was the signal, not only gave a majority in the Council to the party by whom Vansittart was opposed; but sent Mr. Ellis, the most intemperate and arbitrary of all his opponents, to the chiefship of the factory at Patna. He treated the Nabob with the most insulting airs of authority; and broke through all respect for his government. So early as the month of January he gave his orders to the commander of the troops to seize and keep prisoner one of the Nabob's collectors, who had raised some difficulties in permitting a quantity of opium, the private property of one of the Company's servants to pass duty free as the property of the Company. This outrage the discretion of the officer avoided, by suspending obedience to the order, and sending a letter to the Nabob, to redress by his own authority whatever might appear to be wrong. About the same time another servant of the Nabob, a man of high connexions and influence,

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purchased for the Nabob's use a quantity of nitre. But the monopoly of the saltpetre trade had been conveyed to the Company. Though an exception in favour of the Nabob to the extent of his own consumption was, from standing usage, so much understood, that to express it had appeared altogether useless and vain, this purchase was converted by Mr. Ellis into such an invasion of the English rights, that the Nabob was not to be consulted in the punishment of his own servant. The unfortunate man was seized, put in irons, and sent down a prisoner to Calcutta, to receive whatever chastisement the Council might direct. It required the utmost address and power of the President to get him sent back to be punished by his master. As to sending him back for the purpose of ascertaining whether he was guilty or innocent, that was a preliminary which it would have been absurd to propose. Some of the Council insisted that he should be publicly whipped at Calcutta; others, that he should have his ears cut off. Not many days after these violent proceedings, Mr. Ellis, having heard, by vague report, that two English deserters were concealed in the fort of Mongeer, despatched a company of Sepoys, with orders to receive the deserters, or to search the fort. The Governor declared that no Europeans were there; and for ampler satisfaction carried two officers of the Company round the fort. From apprehension, however, of some evil design, or from a very plain principle of military duty, he refused without orders to admit a body of armed men; shut the gates; and threatened to fire upon them if they approached the walls. This Mr. Ellis treated as the highest excess of insolence; and obstinately refused to withdraw the Sepoys till they had searched the fort. By these repeated invasions of his government, the pride of the Nabob was deeply wounded. He complained to the President in bitter terms; and with reason declared that the example, which was set by the servants of the Company, of trampling upon his authority deprived him of all dignity in the eyes of his subjects, and rendered it vain to hope for their obedience. After a dispute of three months, during which Ellis was supported by the Council, the difference was compromised, by the Nabob's consenting to admit any person to search the fort whom Mr. Vansittart should name; when Lieutenant Ironside, after the strictest investigation, was convinced that no

BOOK IV. CHAP. V. European whatsoever, except an old French invalid, whose freedom Mr. Hastings procured, had been in the fort.

1762. Hitherto Meer Casim had conducted his government with no ordinary success. He had reduced to obedience all the rebellious Zemindars. What was of still greater importance, he had, as was declared by the President, in his minute of the 22nd of March, 1762, discharged the whole of his pecuniary obligations to the English; and satisfied both his own and his predecessor's troops.[1] He had extorted money with unsparing hands from the Zemindars and other functionaries. In the financial department of his government, he was clear-sighted, vigilant, and severe. He had introduced a strict economy, without appearance of avarice, in his whole expenditure: and he had made considerable progress in new-modelling and improving his army; when the whole internal economy of his government became involved in disorder by the pretensions of the Company's servants.

In India, as under most uncivilized governments, the transit of goods within the country was made subject to duties; and upon all the roads and navigable rivers, toll-houses, or custom-houses, (in the language of the country *chokeys*) were erected, which had power of stopping the goods, till the duties were levied. By the rude and oppressive nature of the government these custom-houses were exceedingly multiplied; and in long carriages the inconvenience of numerous stoppages and payments was very severe. As in all other departments of the government, so in this, there was nothing regular and fixed; the duties varied at different times and different places; and a wide avenue was always open for the extortion of the collectors. The internal trade of the country was by these causes subject to ruinous obstructions.

The English Company had at an early period availed themselves of a favourable opportunity to solicit exemption from such oppressive interruptions and expense; and the rulers of the country, who felt in their revenues the benefits of foreign commerce, granted a *phirman* by which the export and import trade of the Company was completely relieved, as both the goods which they imported

[1] His payments to the Company consisted of twenty-six lacs of sicca rupees, of 2*s*. 8½*d*., together with fifty-three lacs of current rupees, of 2*s*. 4*d*., derived from the ceded districts. See Vansittart's Minute, Narrative, ii 33.

were allowed to pass into the interior, and those which they purchased in the interior for exportation were allowed to pass to the sea without either stoppage or duties. A certificate, signed by the English President, or chiefs of factories, (in the language of the country a *dustuck*), shown at the toll-houses or chokeys, protected the property. The Company, however, engrossed to themselves the import and export trade between India and Europe, and limited the private trade of their servants to the business of the country. The benefit of this exemption therefore accrued to the Company alone; and though attempts had been sometimes made to extend the protection of the Company's dustuck to the trade carried on by their servants in the interior, this had been always vigorously opposed by the Subahdars, both as defrauding the public revenue, and injuring the native merchants.

No sooner had the English acquired an ascendancy in the government by the dethronement of Suraj-ad-dowla, and the elevation of Meer Jaffier, than the servants of the Company broke through the restraints which had been imposed upon them by former Subahdars, and engaged largely in the interior trade of the country. At first, however, they carried not their pretensions beyond certain bounds; and they paid the same duties which were levied on the subjects of the Nabob. It appears not that during the administration of Clive, any of the Company's servants, unless clandestinely, attempted to trade on any other terms. According, however, as they acquired experience of their power over the government of the country; and especially after the fresh and signal instance of it, the elevation of a new sovereign in the person of Meer Casim, the Company's dustuck or passport, which was only entitled to protect the goods of actual exportation and importation, was employed by the Company's agents of all descriptions to protect their private trade in every part of the country. So great was now the ascendancy of the English name, that the collectors or officers at the chokeys or toll-houses, who were fully aware of the dependence of their own government on the power and pleasure of the English, dared not in general to scrutinize the use which was made of the Company's dustuck, or to stop the goods which it fraudulently screened. The Company's servants, whose goods were thus conveyed entirely free from duty, while

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those of all other merchants were heavily burdened, were rapidly getting into their own hands the whole trade of the country, and thus drying up one of the sources of the public revenue. When the collectors of these tolls, or transit duties, questioned the power of the dustuck, and stopped the goods, it was customary to send a party of Sepoys to seize the offender and carry him prisoner to the nearest factory. Meer Casim was hardly seated on the musnud, when grievous complaints of these enormities came up to him from all quarters, and he presented the strongest remonstrances to the President of the Council. In his letter to the Governor, dated March 26th, 1762, he says, "From the factory of Calcutta to Cossimbuzar, Patna, and Dacca, all the English chiefs, with their gomastahs, officers and agents in every district of the government, act as collectors, renters, and magistrates, and setting up the Company's colours, allow no power to my officers. And besides this, the gomastahs and other servants in every district, in every market and village, carry on a trade in oil, fish, straw, bamboo, rice, paddy, betel-nut, and other things; and every man with a Company's dustuck in his hand regards himself as not less than the Company." It is abundantly proved that the picture drawn by the Nabob was not overcharged. Mr. Hastings, in a letter to the President, dated Baugulpore, 25th April, 1752, said, "I beg to lay before you a grievance, which loudly calls for redress, and will, unless duly attended to, render ineffectual any endeavours to create a firm and lasting harmony between the Nabob and the Company;—I mean, the oppressions committed under the sanction of the English name, and through the want of spirit to oppose them. This evil I am well assured, is not confined to our dependants alone, but is practised all over the country, by people falsely assuming the habit of our Sepoys, or calling themselves our gomastahs. As on such occasions the great power of the English intimidates the people from making any resistance; so, on the other hand, the indolence of the Bengalees, or the difficulty of gaining access to those who might do them justice, prevents our having knowledge of the oppressions. I have been surprised to meet with several English flags flying in places which I have passed; and on the river I do not believe that I passed a boat without one. By whatever title they have been assumed,

I am sure their frequency can bode no good to the Nabob's revenues, the quiet of the country, or the honour of our nation.—A party of Sepoys, who were on the march before us, afforded sufficient proofs of the rapacious and insolent spirit of those people, where they are left to their own discretion. Many complaints against them were made me on the road; and most of the petty towns and serais were deserted at our approach, and the shops shut up from the apprehensions of the same treatment from us,"[1]

At first the Governor attempted to redress these evils by gentle means; by cautioning the servants of the Company; by soothing the irritation of the Nabob, and lending his own authority to enable the native toll-gatherers to check the illegitimate traffic of the English. The mischief, however, increased. The efforts of the collectors were not only resisted, and the collectors themselves punished as heinous offenders on the spot; but these attempts of theirs excited the loudest complaints; they were represented as daring violations of the Company's rights; and undoubted evidence of a design on the part of the Nabob to expel the English from the country. As usual, one species of enormity introduced another. When the officers of government submitted to oppression, it necessarily followed that the people must submit. At the present time it is difficult to believe, even after the most undeniable proof, that it became a common practice to force the unhappy natives, both to buy the goods of the Company's servants, and of all those who procured the use of their name, at a greater; and to sell to the Company's servants the goods which they desired to purchase, at a less than the market price. The native judges and magistrates

[1] Mr. Verelst says, (View of Bengal, p. 8 and 46) "The reader must here be informed, that a trade, free from duties, had been claimed by the Company's servants, supported by their forces, and established by the last treaty with Meer Jaffier; and that this article, though condemned by the Directors, was afterwards transcribed into the treaty with his son Nudjum al Dowlah. The contention during two years with Meer Cossim, in support of this trade, greatly weakened the country government, which his subsequent overthrow quite annihilated. At this time many black merchants found it expedient to purchase the name of any young writer in the Company's service, by loans of money, and under this sanction harassed and oppressed the natives. So plentiful a supply was derived from this source, that many young writers were enabled to spend 1500*l.* and 2000*l.* per annum, were clothed in fine linen, and fared sumptuously every day."—"A trade was carried on without payment of duties, in the prosecution of which infinite oppressions were committed. English agents or gomastahs, not contented with injuring the people, trampled on the authority of government, binding and punishing the Nabob's officers, whenever they presumed to interfere. This was the immediate cause of the war with Meer Cossim."

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were resisted in the discharge of their duties; and even their functions were usurped. The whole frame of the government was relaxed: and in many places the Zemindars and other collectors refused to be answerable for the revenues.[1]

The President, aware of the prejudices which were fostered, by a majority of the board, against both the Nabob and himself, submitted not to their deliberation these disorders and disputes, till he found his own authority inadequate to redress them. The representations, presented to them, of the enormities to which the private trade of the Company's servants gave birth in the country, were treated, by the majority of the Council, as the effect of a weak or interested subservience to the views of the Nabob; while they received the complaints of the servants and their agents against the native officers, more often in fault, according to Hastings and Vansittart, from laxity than tyranny, as proofs of injustice demanding immediate punishment, and of hostile designs against which effec-

[1] The following letter to the Nabob from one of his officers, affords a specimen of the complaints; it is dated Backergunge, May 25, 1762. "The situation of affairs at this place obliges me to apply to your honour for instructions for my further proceedings.—My instructions which I brought here were, that in case any Europeans or their servants committed any disorders, they were to be sent to Calcutta, notwithstanding any pretence they shall make for so doing.—Notwithstanding the rigour of these orders, I have ever made it my business (when anything trifling happened) to endeavour, by gentle means, to persuade the gentlemen's gomastahs here to act in a peaceable manner; which, although repeated several times, has had no effect; but, on the contrary, has occasioned their writing complaints of me to their respective masters, that I obstructed them in their business, and ill-used them; and in return I have received menacing letters from several gentlemen, threatening, if I interfere with their servants, to use such measures as I may repent; nor have the gentlemen only done this, their very gomastahs have made it public here, that in case I stop them in any proceeding, they will use the same methods; of the truth of which I have good proofs. Now, Sir, I am to inform you what I have obstructed them in. This place was of great trade formerly, but is now brought to nothing by the following practices. A gentleman sends a gomastah here to buy or sell. He immediately looks upon himself as sufficient to force every inhabitant, either to buy his goods or sell him theirs: and on refusal, (in case of non-capacity) a flogging or confinement immediately ensues. This is not sufficient even when willing, but a second force is made use of, which is to engross the different branches of trade to themselves, and not to suffer any persons to buy or sell the articles they trade in; and if the country people do it, then a repetition of their authority is put in practice; and again, what things they purchase, they think the least they can do is, to take them for a considerable deal less than another merchant, and oftentimes refuse paying that, and my interfering occasions an immediate complaint.—These, and many other oppressions which are daily practised, is the reason that this place is growing destitute of inhabitants, &c.—Before, justice was given in the public cutcheree, but now every gomastah is become a judge: they even pass sentences on the Zemindars themselves, and draw money from them by pretended injuries." Vansittart's Narrative ii. 112.

tual securities could not be too spedily taken. Of the Council a great proportion were deriving vast emoluments from the abuses, the existence of which they denied; and the President obtained support from Mr. Hastings alone, in his endeavours to check enormities, which, a few years afterwards, the Court of Directors, the President, the servants of the Company themselves, and the whole world, joined in reprobating, with every term of condemnation and abhorrence. 1762.

Observing the progress of these provocations and resentments, Vansittart anticipated nothing but the calamity of war, unless some effectual measures could be adopted to prevent them. Dependence upon the English, though it had been light, was a yoke which the Nabob would doubtless have been very willing to throw off. This presumed inclination the majority of the Council treated as a determined purpose; and every measure of his administration was, according to them, a proof of his hostile designs. The Nabob, aware of the strength of the party to whom his elevation was an object of aversion, naturally considered the friendship of the English as a tenure far from secure. The report was spread, that the views of his enemies would be adopted in England; and it is no wonder if, against a contingency so very probable, he was anxious to be prepared. Vansittart, however, who was not mistaken as to the interest which the Nabob had in maintaining his connexion with the English, and his want of power to contend with them, remained assured of his disposition to peace, unless urged by provocations too great for his temper to endure. He formed the plan, therefore, of a meeting with Meer Casim, in hopes that, by mutual explanations and concessions, there might be drawn, between the rights of the government on the one hand, and the pretensions of the Company's servants on the other, such a line of demarcation as would preclude all future injuries and complaints. With Mr. Hastings, as a coadjutor, he arrived at Mongeer on the 30th of November, and was received with all the marks of cordiality and friendship. After some bitter complaints, the Nabob agreed that all preceding animosities should be consigned to oblivion, and that the present interview should be wholly employed in preventing the recurrence of such

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dangerous evils. For this purpose, he insisted that the interior trade, or that from place to place within the country, should be entirely renounced, as a trade to which the Company had no claim, and in which their servants had never been allowed to engage by any Subahdar preceding Meer Jaffier; a trade which introduced innumerable disorders into his government, and was not carried on for the benefit of the Company, but of individuals, who reaped the profit of their own offences. Mr. Vansittart, though fully aware, as he himself declares, that the interior trade, which had been grasped by the Company's servants, was purely usurpation, was yet, he says, "unwilling to give up an advantage which had been enjoyed by them, in a greater or less degree, for five or six years." A still stronger reason probably was, that he knew himself unable to make them "give it up;" and, therefore, limited his endeavours to place it upon such a foundation as appeared the best calculated for the exclusion of abuse. He proposed that the interior trade should be open to the servants of the Company, but that they should pay the same duties as other merchants; and that, for the prevention of all disputes, a fixed and accurate rate of duties should be established. To this arrangement, the Nabob, who saw but little security against a repetition of the preceding evils in the assignment of duties which, as before, the servants of the Company might refuse to pay, manifested extreme aversion. At last, with great difficulty, he was induced to comply; but declared his resolution, if this experiment should fail, to abolish all duties on interior commerce, and in this way at least place his own subjects on a level with the strangers. To prevent the inconvenience of repeated stoppages, it was agreed that nine per cent., immensely below the rate exacted of other traders,[1] should be paid upon the prime cost of the goods, at the place of purchase, and that no further duties should be imposed. Mr. Vansittart returned to Calcutta on the 16th of January.

[1] Clive, in his speech, March 30, 1772, afterwards published by himself, said, "The natives paid infinitely more—and that this was no remedy to the grievance of which the Nabob complained." See Almon's Debates, from April 1772 to July 1773, where the speech is reprinted, p. 9. The Company afterwards rated the duties at forty per cent., and called this "a treaty exacted by force to obtain to their servants a sanction for a trade to enrich themselves."

The President believed that he had left Calcutta fully authorized, by the Council, to settle with the Nabob the terms of an amicable arrangement; and he expected to find the Members of the Council pleased that the servants of the Company were now vested with a right to that plentiful source of gain, in which they had hitherto participated only by usurpation. He was not as yet sufficiently acquainted with the boundless desires of his colleagues. Before his arrival, unlimited condemnation had passed on the whole of his proceedings; and the precipitation of the Nabob added to the disorder and combustion. The regulations which the President had formed were couched in a letter addressed to the Nabob. It was the plan of Vansittart, that, as soon as they were confirmed by the Council, instructions should be sent to the English factories and agents; and that corresponding instructions should at the same time be transmitted by the Nabob to his officers, informing them of the powers which they were authorized to exert. The Nabob, who was not sufficiently warned or sufficiently patient to observe this order of proceeding, immediately transmitted copies of Vansittart's letter to his different officers, as the code of laws by which their conduct was to be guided. The officers, of course, began to act upon those laws immediately; and as the English had no commands to obey, they resisted. The native officers, who imagined they had now authority for retaliating some of the indignities to which they had been subject, were in various instances guilty of severity and oppression. It followed of course, that the dissatisfaction which the Members of the Council were prepared to display, was rendered more confident and loud by these transactions, and by the complaints which they failed not to produce. It was speedily resolved, that the President had no authority for forming those regulations to which he had assented; and instructions were sent to the factories and agents to trade upon the previous terms, and to seize and imprison any of the Nabob's officers who should dare to offer any obstructions. In a solemn consultation, which was held on the 1st of March, it was determined, with only two dissenting voices, those of the President and Mr. Hastings, that by the imperial phirman, under which the Company had traded so long, their servants had a right

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(which, however, all preceding Nabobs had disallowed) to the internal trade, and that it was out of compliment, not by obligation, that they had in any case consented to the payment of duties. It was decided, after many words, that, as an acknowledgement to the Nabob, and out of their own liberality and free choice, they would pay a duty of two and a half per cent. upon the article of salt alone, and no other; instead of the nine per cent. upon all articles for which Vansittart had agreed. It was, however, at the same time decreed, that all disputes between the gomastahs of the English, and the subjects of the native government, should be referred, not to the native tribunals, but to the heads of factories and residents: that is, should be referred to men, not only, in the great majority of cases far too distant to receive the complaints; but, what was still more shameful, men reaping exorbitant profits from the abuses over which they were thus exclusively vested with the judicial power.

When Vansittart took leave of the Nabob, he was setting out upon an expedition against the kingdom of Nepaul, a small country, completely surrounded, after the manner of Cashmere, by the northern mountains. It was a country which the Mohammedan arms had never reached; and on the subject of its riches, oriental credulity, influenced by the report of its yielding gold, had room for unlimited expansion. The conquest of a country, abounding with gold, held out irresistible temptations to the Nabob. He ascended the ridge of mountains by which it is separated from Bengal; but he was met by the Nepaulese in a dangerous pass; and, after a contest, which appalled him, abandoned the enterprise. He was met, upon his return, by accounts of the reception which the regulations of Vansittart had experienced in the Council; of the resistance which had been opposed to his officers in their attempts to execute his orders; and of the seizure and imprisonment which in various instances they had undergone. He wrote, in terms of the highest indignation; and called upon the English to relieve him from the burden of the Subahdarry, since they deprived him of the powers without which the government of the country could not be carried on. His patience was nearly exhausted: he now, therefore, executed his resolution of abandoning all duties

on the transit of goods, and laid the interior trade of his country perfectly open.

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The conduct of the Company's servants, upon this occasion, furnishes one of the most remarkable instances upon record, of the power of interest to extinguish all sense of justice, and even of shame. They had hitherto insisted, contrary to all right and all precedent, that the government of the country should exempt their goods from duty. They now insisted that it should impose duties upon the goods of all other traders; and accused it as guilty of a breach of peace toward the English nation, because it proposed to remit them.[1]

To enforce these conditions, and yet to maintain the appearance of omitting no effort to obtain the consent of the Nabob, it was proposed in the Council to send to him a deputation. For this purpose, Mr. Amyatt and Mr. Hay volunteered their services. They departed with their instructions on the 4th of April. In the meantime, in all parts of the country, the disputes between the officers of the government and the Company's servants, were carried to the greatest height. Many complaints arrived at Calcutta of the resistance which the gomastahs of the English experienced in the conduct of their business, and even of the outrages to which they were sometimes exposed. On the other hand, a multitude of instances were produced, in which the English Sepoys had been employed to seize and bind, and beat the officers of the government, and to protect the agents of the Company's servants in all the enormities and operessions which they exercised upon the

[1] In the Council, the President and Mr. Hastings were, as before, the only dissentients, and said (see their minute, Consultation, March 24), "We cannot think the Nabob to blame (in abolishing the duties); nor do we see how he could do otherwise. For although it may be for our interest to determine, that we will have all the trade in our hands, take every article of the produce of the country off the ground at the first hand, and afterwards send it where we please free of customs, yet it is not to be expected that the Nabob will join with us in endeavouring to deprive all the merchants of the country of the means of carrying on their business, which must undoubtedly soon be the case, if they are obliged to pay heavy duties, and we trade in every article on the footing before-mentioned.—Neither in our opinion could the Nabob, in such circumstances, collect enough to pay the expense of the chokeys, collectors, &c. As to the Nabob's rights to lay trade open, it is our opinion, that the Nizam of every province has a right to anything for the relief of the merchants trading under his protection." Vansittart, iii. 74.—M. There can be no difference of opinion on these proceedings. The narrow-sighted selfishness of commercial cupidity, had rendered all the members of the Council, with the two honourable exceptions of Vansittart and Hastings, obstinately inaccessible to the plainest dictates of reason, justice, and policy.—W

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people. At Patna, from the animosities and violence of Mr. Ellis, the flames of discord were the most vehemently fanned; the Sepoys were employed under his directions in opposing the government in bodies of 500 at a time; and blood had been shed in the disputes which ensued. Before the 14th of April, the position of the Nabob and the Company had become so threatening, that in the consultation of that day measures of war were eventually planned. The Nabob, on his part, though well acquainted with his own weakness, (for the short duration and the difficulties of his government had rendered the collection of more than a very small army impossible,) yet fully persuaded of the resolution of the Council to depose him, now applied for assistance to the Emperor and the Nabob of Oude; and prepared himself for a conclusion which he deemed inevitable.

On the 25th of May some boats, laden with arms for the troops at Patna, arrived at Mongeer. This circumstance tended to confirm the Nabob in his opinion that the English were arming for war. He had the resolution to order the arms to be stopped. The deputation from the Council had already arrived; but he treated their new propositions as unreasonable; and enumerating the outrages committed upon his servants, and the disorders introduced into his government, insisted, that the resolution of the Council to protect such proceedings imported nothing less than a design to deprive him of his authority. Though he offered to let the arms proceed to Patna, if either Mr. Amyatt, Mr. M'Guire, or Mr. Hastings, were placed over the factory, he refused to send them to Ellis, as a man determined to employ them against him. He even insisted that the troops which were stationed at Patna, and for whom he paid, under the pretence of their being employed for the protection of his government, should not remain at the disposal of his enemy, but should be sent either to Calcutta or Mongheer.

The Council were unanimous in treating the detention of the arms as a very serious offence; and the deputation were instructed to take their departure, unless the boats were allowed to proceed. The Nabob wavered; and on the 19th of June, the gentlemen of the deputation wrote to the Council, that he had consented to release

the boats of arms immediately; to enter upon negotiation without persisting, as before, in his preliminary demand of removing the troops from Patna; and that they had accordingly agreed to wait upon him the following day. The hopes, which were drawn from this communication, by those Members of the Council to whom peace was really dear, were speedily destroyed. Mr. Ellis, at an early period of the disputes, had presented urgent expostulations to the Council upon the necessity of being entrusted with discretionary powers, not only to act upon the defensive if attacked by the Nabob, but even to anticipate any hostile attempt by the seizure of Patna. This demand the President had very earnestly opposed, from a strong conviction that the precipitation of Mr. Ellis would force the Company into war. By alarming representations, however, of the imminent dangers to which the factory was exposed, and of the impossibility of receiving instructions from Calcutta in time for the adoption of measures indispensable for its safety, the permission which Mr. Ellis solicited was at last conferred. After a variety of reports received by the Nabob of operations, openly carried on by this gentleman, which could have nothing in view but a state of war, a letter was brought to him from the Governor of Patna, on the 20th or 21st, informing him that Mr. Ellis had made preparations, and even constructed ladders, for attacking the fort. This seems to have put an end to the inclination, if any, which he had still retained for avoiding, by accommodation, the hazard of war. Commands were sent to stop the arms, which had already proceeded up the river: Mr. Amyatt was allowed to return to Calcutta: but Mr. Hay was detained, as a hostage for the Nabob's aumils, imprisoned by the English. Intelligence of the departure of Amyatt reached Mr. Ellis on the 24th. On that very night, he surprised and took the city of Patna. The news of this attack carried the resentment of the Nabob to that degree of violence, to which a long course of provocation, terminated by a deadly injury, was calculated to raise that passion in a half-civilized mind. He dispatched his orders to seize and make prisoners of the English wherever they were to be found; among the rest to stop Mr. Amyatt, and send him with his retinue to Mongheer. As Mr. Amyatt refused to stop his boats,

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and answered the command which he received for that purpose by firing upon the Nabob's people, the boats were immediately boarded, and in the struggle he himself, with several others, was slain.

Both parties now hastened to take the field. The Nabob was speedily encouraged by tidings from Patna. After Captain Carstairs, the officer commanding the English troops, which were sent a little before day-break on the morning of the 25th to surprise Patna, had, without much difficulty, finding the guards for the most part off their duty, scaled the walls; and after the Governor of Patna, who suddenly collected a portion of the garrison, and made a very short resistance, had left the city and fled towards Mongheer; the English, masters of the whole place, except the citadel, and a strong palace, into which an officer had thrown himself, broke through the rules of prudence as much in the prosecution, as they had broken through those of caution in the commencement of their operations. The troops were allowed to disperse, and were plundering the houses of the inhabitants; when the Governor, who had only marched a few miles before he met a detachment which had been sent to reinforce him from Mongheer, receiving at the same time intelligence of the resistance made by the citadel and palace, returned. The English were ill prepared to receive him. After a slight resistance they spiked their cannon, and retired to their factory. It was soon surrounded; when, fear taking place of their recent temerity, they evacuated the place during the night, and taking to their boats which were stationed at their cantonments at Bankipore they fled up the river to Chopperah, and towards the frontiers of Oude, where being attacked by the Fojedar of Sirkaur Sarun, they laid down their arms. The factory at Cossimbuzar was plundered about the same time; and all the English who belonged to it, as well as those who had fled from Patna, were sent prisoners to Mongheer.

It had, some time before, been determined in the Council, the President and Mr. Hastings refusing to concur, that in case of a war with Meer Casim, the door should be closed against accommodation, by divesting him of the government, and elevating another person to his throne. When the melancholy death, therefore, of Mr.

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Amyatt became known, a negotiation was immediately commenced with Meer Jaffier, whose puerile passion to reign made him eager to promise compliance with any conditions which were proposed. Besides confirming the grant which had been obtained from Meer Casim of the revenues of the provinces of Burdwan, Midnapore, and Chittagong, for defraying the expense of the English troops employed in the defence of the country, the new Subahdar granted exemption to the trade of the Company's servants from all duties, except the two and a half per cent. which these servants themselves, out of their own liberality, agreed to pay upon the single article of salt. He consented also to rescind the ordinance of Meer Casim for the general remission of commercial imposts, and to levy the ancient duties upon all except the English dealers. He engaged to maintain 12,000 horse, and 12,000 foot; to pay to the Company thirty lacks of rupees, on account of their losses and the expense of the war; to reimburse the personal losses of individuals, and to permit no Europeans but English to erect fortifications in the country.

On the 2d of July the English army was ordered to march from Gherettee. It consisted of 650 Europeans, and 1200 Sepoys, exclusive of the black cavalry, commanded by Major Adams, of the King's Eighty-fourth regiment; and was afterwards joined by 100 Europeans and a battalion of Sepoys from Midnapore. After concluding the treaty on the 11th, the new Nabob proceeded to the army, which he joined at Agurdeep on the 17th.

The first defensive movement of Meer Casim was to send three of his generals, with their respective troops, to post themselves, for the protection of Moorshedabad, between that city and the English army. That army encountered them on the 19th; and gave them a total defeat. They retreated from the battle towards Geriah, where they received command to post themselves, and where they were reinforced by the principal part of Meer Casim's army, among the rest by the German Sumroo,[1] who commanded the Sepoys, or the troops disciplined in the European manner, in the service of that Nabob. On

[1] This adventurer came to India as a serjeant in the French army.

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the 23d, the English army advanced to Chuna Cullee, and on the 24th in the morning stormed the lines at Mootejil, which gave them possession of Moorshedabad. On the 2d of August they reached the plain of Geriah, near Sootee, where the enemy waited and gave them battle. It was the severest conflict which the English had yet sustained with an Indian army. Meer Casim had been very ambitious to introduce the European order among his troops; and he was now defended by a body of men better appointed and better disciplined than those which any native commander had ever brought into the field. The battle lasted four hours, during which the enemy once broke a part of the English line, took possession of two guns, and attacked the Eighty-fourth regiment in front and rear. The steadiness, however, of the English exhausted the impetuosity of their assailants, and in the end bestowed upon them a complete and brilliant victory. The enemy abandoned all their cannon, with 150 boats laden with provisions, and fled to a strong post on a small stream, called the Oodwa, where Meer Casim had formed a very strong entrenchment. On every reverse of fortune, the fears and the rage of that unhappy man appear to have inflamed him to a renewed act of cruelty; and Ramnarain, who hitherto had been retained a prisoner, with several chiefs and persons of distinction, was, upon the present disaster, ordered for execution. It was at this time only that Meer Casim, among whose qualities contempt of personal danger had no share, having first conveyed his family and treasures to the strong hold of Rotas, left Mongheer. He marched towards Oodwa, but halting at a distance, contented himself with forwarding some bodies of troops. The English approached the entrenchment on the 11th. It occupied the whole of a narrow space which extended between the river and the foot of the hills. The ditch, which was deep, was fifty or sixty feet broad, and full of water. The ground in front was swampy, and admitted no approach, except for a space of about 100 yards on the bank of the river. At this place the English, harassed daily by numerous bodies of cavalry both in front and rear, were detained for nearly a month. On the 5th of September, while a feigned attack at the bank of the river engaged the attention of the enemy, a grand effort was

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made at the foot of the hills, and, in spite of an obstinate resistance, was crowned with success. Meer Casim, upon intelligence of this new misfortune, left his camp privately the succeeding night, and hastened to Mongheer, whither he was followed by the army in great disorder. He remained, however, only a few days, to secure some of his effects, and refresh his troops; and then proceeded towards Patna. He carried with him the English prisoners; and killed by the way the two celebrated Sets, the great Hindu bankers, whom, in the progress of his disputes with the English, he had seized and brought from Moorshedabad.

Mean time the English army advanced towards Mongheer, which they were obliged to attack regularly; but early in October they made a practicable breach, when the garrison, consisting of 2000 Sepoys, capitulated. The loss of this place, which he had made his capital, threw Meer Casim into a paroxysm of rage; during which he ordered the English prisoners to be massacred; and Sumroo, the German, executed with alacrity the horrid command. Mr. Fullerton, the Surgeon, who, in the exercise of his profession, had gained a place in the affections of Meer Casim, was the only individual whom he spared. As the English were advancing towards Patna, Meer Casim departed to some distance from the city. The garrison defended it with spirit; even took one of the English batteries, and blew up their magazine. But the ruinous fortifications were not calculated for a prolonged resistance, and Patna was taken by storm on the 6th of November. After the loss of this place, Meer Casim made no further resistance. He formed his resolution to throw himself upon the protection of the Nabob of Oude the Vizir, and made haste to take refuge in his dominions. The English army followed him to the banks of the Carumnassa, which they reached early in December.

A treaty, in which the Vizir had bound himself by his oath on the Coran to support the ejected Nabob, had been concluded, before that unfortunate chief crossed the boundary of his own dominions. At that time the Emperor and Suja-ad-dowla were encamped at Allahabad, preparing an expedition against Bundelcund, the predatory inhabitants of which had refused to pay their revenues.

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Meer Casim was received by them with all the distinction due to the greatest viceroy of the Mogul empire. As the enterprise against the Bundelas threatened to retard the assistance which he was impatient to receive against the English, he offered to reduce them with his own battalions, crossed the Jumna, took one of their fortresses, and so alarmed them, by his artillery, and his Sepoys, dressed and disciplined in the European manner, that they hastened to make their submission; and Suja-ad-dowla who, under pretence of assisting Meer Casim, already grasped in his expectation the three provinces of the East, marched with his allies to Benares, to make preparations for his selfish enterprise.

In the mean time the English, who were ignorant of his designs, and not without hopes that he would either deliver Meer Cassim into their hands, or at least deprive him of his treasures and troops, directed that the army should be cantoned on the frontiers for the purpose of watching his motions. In this situation an alarming disaffection broke out among the troops. The importance and difficulties of the service which they had rendered in recovering the provinces from Meer Casim, had raised a high expectation of some proportional reward. Nor had the opportunity of acting upon them been neglected by the emissaries of the enemy. On the 11th of February, the European battalion stood to their arms, and, after loading their pieces and fixing their bayonets, took possession of the artillery parks, and marched towards the Carumnassa. The Sepoys were also in motion; but, of them, by the exertions of their officers, a great proportion were induced to return. Of the Europeans, the English, with few exceptions, desisted and came back; the rest, in number about 300, of whom some were Germans, and the greater part were French, proceeded towards Benares. At the beginning of the month of March, when Major Carnac arrived to take the command, a mutinous disposition still prevailed among the troops; provisions were in great scarcity, and the preparations making for the invasion of the province by the Nabob of Oude were no longer a secret. Though urged by the Governor and Council to act upon the offensive, and to push the war into Suja-ad-dowla's dominions, he agreed with all his officers in opinion, that

without a greater certainty of provisions, especially in the present temper of the troops, the hazard ought not to be incurred. At the beginning of April, when the enemy crossed the Ganges, and began to advance, the English, straitened for provisions, and afraid lest by a circuitous route a detachment of the hostile army should get between them and Patna, retreated to that city and encamped under the walls. Early in the morning of the 3rd of May, the enemy approached in order of battle, and began a cannonade, which before noon was converted into a general and vigorous attack. Sumroo, with the choice of the infantry, supported by a large body of cavalry, assailed the English in front; while the main body of the army made an onset in the rear. The English army, and particularly the Sepoys, who bore the principal weight of the attack, behaved with great steadiness and gallantry. It was sunset before the enemy was completely repulsed. At that time, the English were too much worn-out with fatigue to be able to pursue. Their loss, at least in Europeans, was inconsiderable: the slaughter of the assailants great. From this day till the 30th, the enemy hovered about Patna, continually shifting their position, and keeping the English in perpetual expectation of a renewed attack, without allowing them an opportunity, such at least as Carnac thought it prudent to seize, of acting on the offensive. During this time Suja-ad-dowla opened a correspondence with Meer Jaffier, the new Nabob. But as the English would listen to no proposal without the preliminary condition of surrendering Meer Casim, Sumroo, and the deserters; and as the pretensions of Suja-ad-dowla extended to nothing less than the province of Bahar, it led to no agreement. The rains being now at hand, and the treasury of the Vizir severely feeling the burden of so great an army in the field, he marched away on the 30th, with great expedition. At this time, the Emperor, uneasy under the treatment which he received from the greedy and unprincipled Vizir, sent a private message, offering to form a separate connexion with the English; but Major Carnac refused to open a correspondence. Without venturing to pursue the enemy, he sent a strong detachment across the Ganges, to threaten Suja-ad-dowla's frontier; which had the effect of making him hasten to his own dominions.

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In the month of May, Major, afterwards Sir Hector Munro, arrived from Bombay with a body of troops, partly King's and partly Company's; and hastened with them to Patna, to take the command of the army. He found the troops, Europeans as well as Sepoys, extremely mutinous, deserting to the enemy, threatening to carry off their officiers, demanding higher pay, and a large donation, promised, as they affirmed, by the Nabob.[1] The Major resolved to subdue this spirit by the severest measures. He had hardly arrived when a whole battalion of Sepoys, with their arms and accoutrements, went off to join the enemy. He immediately detached a body of troops on whom he thought he could depend, to pursue them and bring them back. They overtook them in the night, when asleep, and made them prisoners. The Major ready to receive them with the troops under arms, ordered their officers to select fifty, whom they deemed the most depraved and mischievous, and of this fifty to select again twenty-four of the worst. He then ordered a field court-martial, composed of their own black officers, to be immediately held; and addressed the court, impressing them with a sense of the destruction which impended over an army in which crimes like these were not effectually repressed. The prisoners were found guilty of mutiny and desertion, and sentenced to suffer death in any manner which the commander should direct. He ordered four of them to be immediately tied to the guns, and blown away; when four grenadiers presented themselves, and begged, as they had always had the post of honour, that they should first be allowed to suffer. After the death of these four men, the European officers of the battalions of Sepoys who were then in the field came to inform the Major that the Sepoys would not suffer the execution of any more. He ordered the artillery officers to load the field pieces with grape; and drew up the Europeans, with the guns in their intervals. He then desired the officers to return to the head of their battalions; after which he commanded the battalions to ground their arms, and assured them if a man attempted to move that he would give orders to fire. Sixteen more of the twenty-four men were then blown

[1] It appears by Munro's evidence (First Report, Committee, 1772) that such a promise was made to them, and through Major Adams.

away; the remaining four were sent to another place of cantonment, and executed in the same manner. Nothing is more singular, than that the same men, in whom it is endeavoured to raise to the highest pitch the contempt of death, and who may be depended upon for meeting it, without hesitation at the hand of the enemy, should yet tremble, and be subdued, when threatened with it by their own officers.

The rains drawing to a close, Munro appointed the 15th of September as the day of rendezvous from the several places of cantonment. He then advanced toward the Soane, to which the enemy had forwarded several bodies of horse; and where they had thrown up some breast-works, to impede the passage of their assailants. Having sent a detachment to cross the river at some distance below, for the purpose of attacking the enemy at a concerted moment and covering the passage of the troops, he gained the opposite side without molestation; and advanced toward Buxar, where the hostile armies were encamped. For the last two or three days the line of march was harassed by the enemy's cavalry; and the Major encamped on the 22nd of October within gun shot of the enemy's camp, entrenched with the Ganges on its left, and the village and fort of Buxar in the rear. An attack was intended the same night; but the spies not coming in till towards morning, it could not take place. About eight o'clock in the morning the enemy were seen advancing; and as the troops were encamped in order of battle, they were in a few minutes ready for action. The battle began about nine, and lasted till twelve; when the enemy gave way, and retired slowly, blowing up some tumbrils and magazines of powder as they withdrew. The Major ordered the line to break into columns and follow: but the enemy, by destroying a bridge of boats upon a stream of water two miles from the field of battle, effectually impeded the pursuit. This was one of the most critical and important victories in the history of the British wars in that part of the globe. It broke completely the force of Suja-ad-dowla, the only Mogul chief who retained till this period any considerable strength; it placed the Emperor himself under the protection of the English; and left them without dispute the greatest power in India.

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The very day after the battle, the Emperor sent his application to the English commander; who immediately wrote to the Presidency for directions; and received authority to conclude an agreement. The Emperor complained that he had been the state prisoner of Suja-ad-dowla; and before the answer from Calcutta arrived, marched along with the English, and encamped with his guards close to them every night. When the army arrived at Benares, Suja-ad-dowla sent his minister with overtures of peace; promising twenty-five lacks of rupees to reimburse the Company for the expenses of the war; twenty-five lacks to the army: and eight lacks to the Commander himself. The preliminary surrender of Meer Casim and Sumroo was still however demanded. The perfidious Vizir had already violated the laws of hospitality and honour towards his wretched guest. A quarrel was picked, on account of the non-payment of the monthly subsidy which the Ex-Nabob had promised for the troops employed in attempting his restoration; the unhappy fugitive was arrested in his tent; and his treasures were seized. Still the Nabob dreaded the infamy of delivering him up; but, if that would satisfy the English, he offered to let him escape. With regard to Sumroo, his proposal was to invite him to an entertainment, and have him despatched in presence of any English gentleman who might be sent to witness the scene. As this mode of their enemies was not agreeable to English morality, the negociation ceased: but Meer Casim, who dreaded the conclusion to which it might lead, contrived to escape with his family and a few friends into the Rohilla country, whither he had providently, before the plunder of his treasures, despatched a dependant with some of his jewels.

The negotiation with the Emperor proceeded with less obstruction. It was proposed, as far as mutual approbation extended, agreed and contracted; that the English, by virtue of the imperial grant, should obtain possession of Gauzeepore, and the rest of the territory of Bulwant Sing, the Zemindar of Benares; that on the other hand they should establish the Emperor in the possession of Allahabad, and the rest of the dominions of Suja-ad-dowla; and the Emperor engaged to reimburse them after-

wards, out of the royal revenues, for the whole of the expense which this service might oblige them to incur.

In the mean time, affairs of no trivial importance were transacting in the Council. They had been extremely urgent with Meer Jaffier to leave the army, and come down to Calcutta, before Major Carnac quitted the command. The treasury of the Company was in a most exhausted state; and every effort was to be used to make Jaffier yield it a more abundant supply. In addition to the sums for which he had contracted in the recent treaty, a promise was drawn from him to pay five lacks per month toward the expense of the war so long as it should last. But his former engagements to the Company were not yet discharged. The payments also to individuals, stipulated under the title of compensation for losses, were swelled to an oppressive amount. When this article was first inserted in the treaty, the Nabob was informed that the demand at the utmost would extend to a sum of about ten lacks. That demand, however, was soon after stated at twenty, then at thirty, afterwards at forty, and at last was fixed at fifty-three lacks of rupees. We are assured, by a Director of the Company, "That all delicacy was laid aside in the manner in which payment was obtained for this sum, of which seven-eighths was for losses sustained, or said to be sustained, in an illicit monopoly of the necessaries of life, carried on against the orders of the Company, and to the utter ruin of many thousands of the Indian merchants; that of the whole one half was soon extorted from him, though part of the payments to the Company was still undischarged, and though the Company was sinking under the burden of war, and obliged to borrow great sums of money of their servants at eight per cent. interest, and even with that assistance unable to carry on the war and their investment, but obliged to send their ships half loaded to Europe."[1] By the revenues of the three ceded districts, added to the monthly payment for the war, "the Company," we are informed by Clive, "became possessed of one half of the Nabob's revenues. He was allowed," says that great informant, "to collect the other half for himself; but in fact he was no more than a banker for the Company's servants, who could draw

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[1] Scrafton's Observations on Vansittart's Narrative, p. 48, 49.

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upon him" (meaning for presents) "as often, and to as great an amount as they pleased."[1] "To all other causes of embarrassment in the finances of Jaffier were added the abuses perpetrated in conducting the private trade of the Company's servants, which not only disturbed the collection of the taxes, but impeded the industry of the whole country.[2] In such circumstances it was to no purpose to harass the Nabob for larger payments. The importunities to which he was subjected[3] only conspired, with the infirmities of age and of a body worn out with pleasure, to hurry him to his grave. After languishing several weeks at Calcutta, he returned to Moorshedabad, loaded with disease, and died in January, 1765.

The making of a new Nabob, the most distinguished of all occasions for presents, was never disagreeable to the Company's servants. The choice lay between the next surviving son of Jaffier, Nujum-ad-dowla, a youth of about twenty years of age; and the son of Meeran, his eldest, a child of about six. According to the laws and customs of the country, the title of both might be regarded as equal In point of right, the office of Subahdar was not only not hereditary, it was, like any other office under the Mogul government, held at the will of the Emperor; and, during the vigorous days of the Mogul dynasty, no Subahdar had ever been permitted to enjoy it long. In the decline of that power, the Subahdars became frequently, during their

[1] Clive's Speech, March 30th, 1772, in Almon's Debates, x. 14.

[2] Mr. Gray, resident at Maulda, of date January, 1764, wrote to the President, "Since my arrival here, I have had an opportunity of seeing the villanous practices used by the Calcutta gomastahs in carrying on their business. The government have certainly too much reason to complain of their want of influence in their country, which is torn to pieces by a set of rascals, who in Calcutta walk in rags, but when they are set out on gomastahships, lord it over the country, imprisoning the ryots and merchants, and writing and talking in the most insolent, domineering manner, to the fouzdars and officers." In like manner, Mr. Senior, Chief at Cossimbuzar, wrote, in March, 1764, "It would amaze you, the number of complaints that daily come before me of the extravagancies committed by our agents and gomastahs all over the country." See Verelst, p. 49.

[3] Your Committee then examined Archibald Swinton, Esq., who was Captain in the army in Bengal in 1765, and also Persian interpreter, and Aide-de-Camp to General Carnac. And he informed your Committee, that he had frequent conversations with Meer Jaffier about the five lacks of rupees per month, stipulated to be paid by Meer Jaffier in October, 1764, and the other demands made on him by the Board; of which he frequently heard Meer Jaffier complain bitterly; and of all the demands made upon him at that time, which had not been stipulated in the treaty with the Company on his restoration—*particularly the increased demand for restitution of losses*, and the donation to the navy." Third Report, Committee, 1772.

lives, too formidable to be removed; and the Emperors contented themselves with resuming their power when the provincial chief expired. But it sometimes also happened, that a son, brother, or other relative, succeeded too rapidly and too completely to the power of the deceased, to render it convenient to attempt his removal. The Emperor contented himself with a nominal, when an efficient choice was out of his power; and on these terms had the Subahdaree of the eastern provinces been held for some generations. The right of choice belonged unquestionably to the Emperor; but to this right the servants of the Company never for a moment thought of paying any regard.[1] That unhappy, dependent sovereign, now stript of all his dominions, while great kingdoms were still governed in his name, might have recovered the immediate sovereignty of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, at the word of the English; or, despairing of so generous and self-denying a policy, would gladly have bestowed the Subahdaree upon them. The dewanee or collection, receipt and disbursement of the revenue, which in the present state of the country implied all the powers of government, he had repeatedly offered to them; and very recently, through Major Munro. But the modesty of the English, still alarmed at the thought of declaring themselves sovereigns of Bengal, grasped powerfully at the reality, though it desired to shun the appearance of power. The long minority, which would have followed the choice of the infant son of Meeran, would have placed the government, even to the minutest details, in the hands of the Company; and the present rulers were blamed by their successors for not securing so great an advantage. But they looked for some assistance in the drudgery of governing, from a Nabob of mature age, and had no difficulty in believing that the shadow of power with which he was to be invested would little interfere with either the pleasure or the profits of English domination. Another motive had doubtless some weight: Nujum-ad-dowla could give presents; the infant son of Meeran, whose revenues must be accounted for to the Company, could not.

[1] On this Sir J. Malcolm observes, "However politic it might have been to have gained the sanction of the Emperor and the Nawab Vizir, after the measure was adopted, a previous application would have been the height of folly and of weakness." Life of Clive, ii. 293.—W.

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In the treaty with the new Nabob, dated in February, 1765, it was resolved by the English, to take the military defence of the country entirely into their own hands; and to allow the Nabob to keep only so many troops as should be necessary for the parade of government, the distribution of justice, and the business of the collections. They had two motives; one was to preclude the possibity of inconvenience from the power of the Nabob; the second was to make provision for the defence of the country, which they found, by experience under Meer Jaffier, would depend almost entirely upon themselves. And we may suppose that another consideration was not without its influence; that a still greater share of the revenues might pass through their hands. The civil government of the country was no less effectually transferred from the Nabob to his faithful allies. He bound himself to choose, by the advice of the Governor and Council, a Deputy, who, under the appellation of Naib Subah, should have the entire management of all the affairs of government, and not be removeable without their consent. The Nabob suffered more in submitting to this condition than to all the rest; and showed extreme solicitude about the choice of the person who was to fill that important office. Mohammed Reza Khan was appointed by the Governor and Council; and appears to have been one of the best men, whom, under Indian morality, it was easy to find. The Nabob was eager for the nomination of Nuncomar, who, beyond dispute, was one of the worst. This man, who was governor of Hoogley, at the time when Suraj-ad-dowla took Calcutta, had rendered himself conspicuous by a restless ambition, and unbounded avarice, which he sought to gratify by the vilest arts of intrigue, by dissimulation and perfidy. He had, at an early period, become odious to the English, as a deceitful and dangerous character, and was a prisoner in Calcutta for having corresponded with their enemies, while Meer Jaffier resided there, during the Nabobship of Meer Casim. During this time, he paid his court so very successfully to the dethroned Nabob, that upon his restoration, he solicited, as an object of the first importance to be allowed to employ Nuncomar as his minister. Though Vansittart, and even some of those who in general

concurred not in his views, objected to this arrangement, on account of the exceptionable character of the man, the Council, as the last triumph, according to Vansittart, of a factious party, decided, that the Nabob might enjoy his choice. Nuncomar redeemed not his character with the English, while he governed the Nabob. The want of corn, under which the operations of the army were impeded at Patna, the disappointments in the receipt of monies from the Nabob, were all principally laid to the charge of Nuncomar; who was also vehemently suspected of having carried on a traitorous correspondence with the Nabob of Oude. Mr. Vansittart had, a little before this time, returned to Europe, and was succeeded in the chair by Mr. Spencer, as the oldest member of the Board. As opposition to the Governor, therefore, no longer actuated the Council, the general opinion of the character of Nuncomar produced its proper effect; and he was peremptorily excluded from the government of the country. The other conditions of the treaty were nearly the same as those of the treaty with the old Nabob. Beside the revenues of Burdwan, Midnapore, and Chittagong, the five lacks per month were to be continued during the war, and as much of them after the war as the state of the country might, to the English, seem to require. And the grand privilege to the Company's servants of trading free from the duties which other merchants paid within the country, and of paying only two and a half per cent. upon the single article of salt, was carefully preserved. The government of the country was now so completely in the hands of the English, that the accountants of the revenue were not to be appointed except with their approbation.

During the military and political transactions which so intensely engaged their servants in India, the Courts of Directors and Proprietors remained for several years rather quiet spectators and warm expectants, than keen and troublesome controllers. When they had been agitated for a while, however, by the reports of mismanagement which were mutually transmitted to them by Vansittart and his opponents; and, at last, when they were alarmed by the news of a war actually kindled with the Nabob, of the massacre of so many of their servants, and the extensive spirit of mutiny among the troops, their sense of

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danger roused them to some acts of authority. Though Clive had quitted India with an act of insult towards his employers, which they had highly resented; though the Directors had disputed and withheld payment of the proceeds of his jaghire, for which he had commenced a suit against them in the Court of Chancery; he was now proposed for Governor, as the only man capable of retrieving their disordered and desperate affairs. Only thirteen Directors, however, were found, after a violent contest, to vote for his appointment; while it was still opposed by eleven.[1] Yet the high powers which he demanded, as

[1] Clive's reappointment was the act of the Proprietors, and was forced by them upon the Court of Directors, after a series of angry discussions. A general court was called on Monday the 27th February, 1764, upon the requisition of the usual number of Proprietors, "having," as they declared, "just reason to be alarmed at the present dangerous and critical state of the Company's affairs in Bengal, and other parts of India;" and desiring that the affairs might be taken into consideration. The meeting was occupied with the communication of such of the correspondence with Bengal, as related to the recent transactions there, and a second meeting having been principally engaged with similar matters, the main question was adjourned to a third, on the following day. When a motion was made that the nomination of Mr. Spencer, as Governor of Bengal, should be referred back to the Court of Directors for their reconsideration, a warm debate ensued which ended in a resolution that the question should not be put, which was carried by a majority of 184 to 141. The friends of Lord Clive were however not to be thus baffled—a number of new shareholders was immediately created, and a second requisition was addressed to the Directors, in consequence of which a fourth general court took place on the 12th of March, when, after a violent discussion, a motion was made and carried, "that it was the desire of the General Court, that Lord Clive be requested to take upon him the station of President of Bengal, and the command of the Company's military forces upon his arrival at that Presidency."

The business was not yet terminated, for Lord Clive, on thanking the Court for their nomination, suspended his acquiescence until he should be satisfied that the Court of Directors was as well disposed towards him as he was towards them; no further discussion then took place, but on the 21st March, on the occasion of a Quarterly General Court, an inquiry was made whether Lord Clive would signify his immediate acceptance of the station he had been requested to take upon him. To this, Clive, who was in Court, replied, he would give his answer as soon as the next election of Directors should be determined. On which a motion was made by a member of the opposite party, that as Lord Clive declined to accept immediately the service proposed to him, the Court of Directors should be desired to make other arrangements. This was followed by a long debate, in which Clive explained his objection to be directed especially against the influence of the Deputy Chairman, Mr. Sulivan, who in return pledged his faith and honour to the Court, that he was ready to co-operate with the proposed Governor in a friendly spirit, and many persons joining in urging "with great energy and very pathetically," a mutual oblivion of all differences, Clive so far relented, as to promise, that he would declare his determination in a few days if indulged with the delay: with this compromise, the motion, which does not seem to have been seconded, was dropped, and the Court adjourned.

Clive carried his point, for before another General Court could be assembled, the annual election of Directors took place, and his antagonist Sulivan, although returned, resumed his seat by a majority of only one vote, whilst the Chairs were filled by Messrs. Rous and Bolton, both friends of Lord Clive. His answer was now promptly given, and on the 2nd of May, 1764, it was announced to the Proprietors that he had been sworn in President and Governor of Bengal, and Commander of the Forces. MSS. Records.—W.

indispensable for the arduous services necessary to be performed, though strongly opposed, were also finally conferred. He was invested with the powers of Commander-in-Chief, President, and Governor in Bengal; and, together with four gentlemen, named by the Directors, was to form a Select Committee, empowered to act by their own authority, as often as they deemed it expedient, without consulting the Council, or being subject to its control.

The Directors, at the same time, condemned, in the severest terms, the rapacious and unwarranted proceedings of their servants. In their letter to the Governor and Council of Bengal, dated the 8th of February, 1764, "One grand source," they said, "of the disputes, misunderstandings, and difficulties, which have occurred with the country government, appears evidently to have taken its rise from the unwarrantable and licentious manner of carrying on the private trade by the Company's servants, their gomastahs, agents, and others, to the prejudice of the Subah, both with respect to his authority and the revenues justly due to him; the diverting and taking from his natural subjects the trade in the inland parts of the country, to which neither we, or any persons whatsoever dependent upon us, or under our protection, have any manner of right. In order, therefore, to remedy all these disorders, we do hereby positively order and direct, —That from the receipt of this letter, a final and effectual end be forthwith put to the inland trade in salt, betel-nut, tobacco, and all other articles whatsoever, produced and consumed in the country." † In his correspondence

† See the Extract at length in the Second Report, Select Committee, 1772. In another letter to the Governor and Council of Bengal, dated 24th December, 1765, the Directors say, "Your deliberations on the inland trade have laid open to us a scene of most cruel oppression, which is indeed exhibited at one view of the 13th article of the Nabob's complaints, mentioned thus in your Consultation of the 17th October, 1764: 'The poor of the country, who used always to deal in salt, betel-nut, and tobacco, are now deprived of their daily bread by the trade of the Europeans, whereby no kind of advantage accrues to the Company, and the Government's revenues are greatly injured.' We shall for the present observe to you, that every one of our servants concerned in this trade has been guilty of a breach of his covenants, and a disobedience to our orders. In your consultations of the 3rd of May, we find among the various extortionate practices, the most extraordinary one of burjaut, or forcing the natives to buy goods beyond the market price, which you there acknowledged to have been frequently practised. In your resolution to prevent this practice you determine to forbid it, 'but with such care and discretion as not to affect the Company's investment, as you do not mean to invalidate the right derived to the Company from the phirmaund, which they have always held over the weavers.' As the Company are known to

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with the Court of Directors, on the subject of his return to Bengal, Clive expressed himself in the following manner: "The trading in salt, betel-nut, and tobacco, having been one cause of the present disputes, I hope these articles will be restored to the Nabob, and your servants absolutely forbidden to trade in them. This will be striking at the root of the evil."[1] At a general meeting, however, of proprietors, held on the 18th of May, 1764, it was urged by several active members, and urged to the conviction of the majority, that the servants of the Company in India ought not to be deprived of such precious advantages; which enabled them to revisit their native countries with such independent fortunes as they were entitled to expect. The Court therefore RESOLVED, "That it be recommended to the Court of Directors to reconsider the orders sent to Bengal relative to the trade of the Company's servants in salt, betel-nut, and tobacco, and to regulate this important point, either by restrictions framed at home, or by referring it to the Governor and Council of Fort William."[2] In consequence of this recommendation, the Court of Directors by letter dated 1st of June, 1764, and sent by the same ship which carried out Lord Clive, instruct the Governor and Council, after "consulting the Nabob, to form a proper and equitable plan for carrying on the inland trade."

The presents which, since their acquiring an ascendency in the government, their servants had been in the habit of

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purchase their investment by ready money only, we require a full explanation how this can affect them, or how it ever could have been practised in the purchase of their investment, (which the latter part of Mr. Johnstone's minute, entered on Consultation the 21st July, 1764, insinuates); for it would almost justify a suspicion, that the goods of our servants have been put off to the weavers, in part payment of the Company's investment."

[1] Letter to Directors, dated 27th April, 1764. Fourth Report, App. No. 2.

[2] In quoting this resolution, some important omissions have been made; as no reference is given, it is not possible to say with whom they originate. The entire resolution runs, "that it be recommended to the Court of Directors to reconsider the orders sent to Bengal relative to the Trade of the Company's servants in the articles of Salt, Betel, and Tobacco, and that they do give such directions for regulating the same, *agreeably to the interests of the Company and the Subah*, as to them may appear prudent, either by settling here at home the restrictions under which this trade ought to be carried on, or by referring it to the Governor and Council of Fort William, to regulate this important point in such a manner *as may prevent all future disputes* between the Subah and the Company." The professed object of the resolution, therefore, was not the advantage of the Company's servants, although it is possible that it had in prospect the arrangement afterwards adopted by Clive in Bengal. MSS. Records.—W.

receiving, sometimes to a very large amount, from the Nabobs and other chiefs of the country, were another subject which now engaged the serious attention of the Company. The practice which prevails in all rude governments of accompanying any application to a man in power with a gratification to some of his ruling passions, most frequently to the steadiest of all his passions, his avarice or rapacity, has always remarkably distinguished the governments in the East, and hardly any to so extraordinary a degree as the governments of the very rude people of India. When the English suddenly acquired their extraordinary power in Bengal, the current of presents, so well accustomed to take its course in the channel drawn by hope and fear, flowed very naturally, and very copiously, into the lap of the strangers. A person in India, who had favours to ask, or evil to deprecate, could not easily believe, till acceptance of his present, that the great man to whom he addressed himself was not his foe. Besides the sums, which we may suppose it to have been in the power of the receivers to conceal, and of the amount of which it is not easy to form a conjecture, the following were detected and disclosed by the Committee of the House of Commons, in 1773.

"*Account of such Sums as have been proved or acknowledged before the Committee to have been distributed by the Princes and other Natives of Bengal, from the Year* 1757 *to the Year* 1766, *both inclusive; distinguishing the principal Times of the said Distributions, and specifying the Sums received by each Person respectively.*

Revolution in favour of Meer Jaffier in 1757.

Mr. Drake (Governor) . .	Rupees.	280,000	£31,500
Colonel Clive as second in the Select Committee . .	280,000		
Ditto as Commander in Chief	200,000		
Ditto as a private donation .	1600,000 [1]		
		2,080,000	234,000

[1] It appears, by the Extract in the Appendix, No. 102, from the evidence given on the trial of Ram Churn before the Governor and Council in 1761, by Roy Dulip, who had the principal management in the distribution of the treasures of the deceased Nabob Surajah Dowla, upon the accession of Jaffier Ally Cawn—that Roy Dulip then received, as a present from Colonel Clive, one lack, 25,000 rupees, being five per cent. on 25 lacks. It does not appear that this evidence was taken on oath."

BOOK IV. CHAP. V. 1765.		Rupees.	Rupees.	£
	Mr. Watts as a Member of the Committee	240,000		
	Ditto as a private donation	800,000		
			1,040,000	117,000
	Major Kilpatrick		240,000	27,000
	Ditto as a private donation		300,000	33,750
	Mr. Maningham		240,000	27,000
	Mr. Becher		240,000	27,000
	Six Members of Council one lack each		600,000	68,200
	Mr. Walsh		500,000	56,250
	Mr. Scrafton		200,000	22,500
	Mr. Lushington		50,000	5,625
	Stipulation to the navy and army			600,000
				1,261,075
	Memorandum, the sum of two lacks to Lord Clive, as Commander in Chief, must be deducted from this account, it being included in the donation to the army			22,500
	Lord Clive's jaghire was likewise obtained at this period[1]			
				1,238,575

Revolution in favour of Cossim, 1760.

Mr. Sumner			28,000
Mr. Holwell	270,000		30,937
Mr. M'Guire	180,000		20,625
Mr. Smyth	134,000		15,354
Major Yorke	134,000		15,354
General Caillaud	200,000		22,916
Mr. Vansittart, 1762, received seven lacks; but the two lacks to General Caillaud are included; so that only five lacks must be counted for here	500,000		58,333
Mr. M'Guire 5000 gold mohrs	75,000		8,750
			200,269

[1] This, as noticed by Sir J. Malcolm, Life of Clive, ii. 187, is incorrect. The Jaghire was not granted till the end of 1759, two years after Mir Jaffier had been seated on the throne.—W.

	Rupees.		
Revolution in favour of Jaffier, 1763.			
Stipulation to the army . . .	2,500,000	291,666	
Ditto to the navy	1,250,000	145,833	
		437,499	
Major Munro[1] in 1764 received from Bulwan Singh		10,000	
Ditto from the Nabob . .		3,000	
The officers belonging to Major Munro's family from ditto		3,000	
The army received from the merchants at Banaras	400,000	46,666	
		62,666	
Nudjum ul Dowla's Accession, 1765.			
Mr. Spencer	200,000	23,333	
Messieurs Pleydell, Burdett, and Gray, one lack each	300,000	35,000	
Mr. Johnstone	237,000	27,650	
Mr. Leycester	112,500	13,125	
Mr. Senior	172,500	20,125	
Mr. Middleton	122,500	14,291	
Mr. Gideon Johnstone	50,000	5,833	
		139,257[2]	
General Carnac received from Bulwansing in 1765	80,000	9,333	
Ditto from the King . .	200,000	23,333	
Lord Clive received from the Begum in 1766	500,000	58,333	
		90,999	

[1] It appears Colonel Munro accepted a jaghire from the King, of £12,500 a-year, which he delivered to the Nabob Meer Jaffier, the circumstances of which are stated in the Journals of last year, 1825."

[2] These sums appear by evidence to have been received by the parties; but the Committee think proper to state, that Mohammed Reza Cawn intended a present of one lack of rupees to each of the four deputies sent to treat with Nudjum al Dowla upon his father's death; viz. Messieurs Johnstone, Leycester, Senior, and Middleton; but Mr. Middleton and Mr. Leycester affirm that they never accepted theirs, and Mr. Johnstone appears to have tendered his back to Mohammed Reza Cawn, who would not accept them. These bills (except Mr. Senior's, for 50,000 rupees) appear to have been afterwards laid before the Select Committee, and no further evidence has been produced to your Committee concerning them. Mr. Senior received 50,000 rupees of his, and it is stated against him in this account."

Restitution——Jaffier, 1757.

	£
East India Company	1,200,000
Europeans	600,000
Natives	250,000
Armenians	100,000
	2,150,000

Cossim, 1760.

East India Company	62,500

Jaffier, 1763.

East India Company	375,000
Europeans, Natives, &c.	600,000
	975,000

Peace with Suja-ad-dowla.

East India Company	5,000,000	583,333

Total of Presents, 2,169,665*l.*
Restitution, &c. 3,770,833*l.*
Total Amount, exclusive of Lord Clive's jaghire £5,940,498

Memorandum. The rupees are valued according to the rate of exchange of the Company's bills at the different periods."[1]

That this was a practice presenting the strongest demand for effectual regulation, its obvious consequences render manifest and indisputable. In the first place, it laid the nabobs, rulers, and other leading men of the country, under endless and unlimited oppression; because, so long as they on whom their whole power and influence depended were pleased to desire presents, nothing could be withheld which they either possessed or had it in their power to ravage and extort. That the temptations under which the servants of the Company were placed carried them to those heights of exaction which were within their reach, is far from true. They showed, on the contrary, a reserve and forbearance, which the education received in no other country, probably in the world, except their own, could have enabled men, in their extraordinary circum-

[1] Third Report on the Nature, State, and Condition of E. I. Company, 1772, p. 20—23.

stances, to maintain. Besides the oppression upon the people of the country, to which the receiving of presents prepared the way, this dangerous practice laid the foundation of perpetual perfidy in the servants of the Company to the interests of their employers. Not those plans of policy which were calculated to produce the happiest results to the Company, but those which were calculated to multiply the occasions for presents, and render them most effectual, were the plans recommended by the strongest motives of interest to the agents and representatives of the Company in India. It is still less true, in the case of perfidy to the Company, than in the case of oppression to the natives, that the interests of the Company's servants were to the greatest practicable extent pursued. There seems not upon the most jealous scrutiny, any reason to believe that any one of the greatest transactions or revolutions, in which the English, up to this period were instrumental, was not sincerely regarded at the time, by the men on whom the decision depended, as required by the interests of their employers and country; nor has it yet been certainly made appear, that in any of the instances in question, the circumstances of the moment admitted of a better decision.

The Company now resolved that the benefit of presents should at any rate change masters: and they ordained and commanded, that new covenants, dated May, 1764, should be executed by all their servants, both civil and military, binding them to pay to the Company the amount of all presents and gratuities in whatsoever shape, received from the natives, in case the amount exceeded four thousand rupees; and not to accept any present or gratuity, though not exceeding four thousand rupees, if amounting to so much as one thousand, without the consent of the President and Council. An unbounded power was still reserved by the Honourable Company for receiving or extorting presents in benefit to themselves. But as their servants were in no danger of being so rapacious for their masters' emolument as their own, any effects which this regulation was calculated to produce were all naturally good.

With these powers and regulations, Lord Clive (such was now the rank and title of this Anglo-Indian chief) sailed from England on the 4th of June, 1764, and arrived

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at Madras on the 10th of April, 1765; where he received intelligence that the dangers of which the alarm had sent him to India were entirely removed; that the troops were obedient; that not only Meer Casim was expelled, but all his supporters subdued; that the Emperor had cast himself upon the protection of the English; and that the Nabob, Meer Jaffier, was dead. His sentiments upon this intelligence were communicated in a private letter to Mr. Rous, dated seven days exactly after his arrival:[1] "We have at last," said he, "arrived at that critical period *which I have long foreseen;* I mean that period which renders it necessary for us to determine, whether we can or shall take the whole to ourselves. Jaffier Ally Khan is dead, and his natural son is a minor; but I know not whether he is yet declared successor. Suja-ad-dowla is beaten from his dominion; we are in possession of it, and it is scarcely hyperbole to say, to-morrow the whole Mogul empire is in our power. The inhabitants of the country, we know by long experience, have no attachment to any obligation. Their forces are neither disciplined, commanded, nor paid as ours are. Can it then be doubted that a large army of Europeans will effectually preserve us as sovereigns: not only holding in awe the attempts of any country Prince, but by rendering us so truly formidable that no French, Dutch, or other enemy will presume to molest us.—You will, I am sure, imagine with me, that after the length we have run, the Princes of Indostan must conclude our views to be boundless; they have such instances of our ambition, that they cannot suppose us capable of moderation. The very Nabobs whom we might support, would be either covetous of our possessions, or jealous of our power. Ambition, fear, avarice, would be daily watching to destroy us: a victory would be but a temporary relief to us; for the dethroning the first Nabob would be followed by setting up another, who, from the same principles, would, when his treasure admitted of his keeping up an army, pursue the very path of his predecessor. We must indeed become Nabobs ourselves, in fact, if not in name;—perhaps totally so without disguise; but on this subject I cannot be certain until my arrival in

[1] See other letters on his arrival in Bengal, from Clive to General Carnac and Mr. Palk. Life, ii, 318.—W.

Bengal." With these views of the bold and splendid measures which it was now the time to pursue; and anticipating the important effects which those dazzling transactions would have on the price of the Company's Stock, this great man forgot not to deliberate how they might be directed to bear upon his own pecuniary interests. He wrote on the very same day to his private agent in London, as follows: "I have desired Mr. Rous to furnish you with a copy of my letter to him of this day's date, likewise with the cipher, that you may be enabled to understand what follows: 'The contents are of such great importance, that I would not have them transpire. Whatever money I may have in the public Funds, or any where else, and *as much as can be borrowed in my name*, I desire may be, without loss of a minute, invested in East India Stock. You will speak to my Attorneys on this point. Let them know I am anxious to have my money so disposed of; and press them to hasten the affair as much as possible.'"[1] The letter to Mr. Rous, and the shortness of the period which intervened between the arrival of Lord Clive in Bengal and his assuming the dewanee or revenues, would leave no doubt that he commanded all the money which he possessed, or which he could borrow, to be invested in India Stock, in contemplation of the rise of price which that measure was calculated to produce; had he not, when examined on the subject of this letter by the Committee of the House of Commons, declared absolutely, "that he had not while at Madras formed the resolution to seize the dewanee."

CHAPTER VI.

Political state of the Carnatic.—Views of the Nabob on Governor of Velore, King of Tanjore, and Marawars.—Treaty with Tanjore—Company's Jaghire.—War on Mohammed Issoof.—Mound of the Cavery.

BY the final overthrow of the French in the Carnatic, the British in that part of India had accomplished an object far greater than any to which, at the beginning of

[1] Extracts of both Letters are given in the Appendix, No. lxxxii. and lxxxiii. of the Third Report of the Committee, 1772.

the contest, they had ever elevated their hopes. To see the Carnatic under the Government of a chief, who should have obligations to them for his elevation, and from whose gratitude they might expect privileges and favour, was the alluring prospect which had carried them into action. They not only now beheld the man, whose interest they had espoused, in possession of the government of the country, but they beheld him dependent upon themselves, and the whole kingdom of the Carnatic subject to their absolute will.

It was the grand object of deliberation, and the grand practical difficulty, to settle in what proportion the powers and advantages should be divided between the nominal sovereign and the real one. Clear, complete, well-defined and unambiguous regulations, are naturally employed for the prevention of discordance, when the parties have wisdom, and are free from clandestine views.[1] On the present occasion, according to the slovenly mode in which the business of government is usually transacted, few things were regulated by professed agreement; the final distribution was left to come out among the practical, that is, the fortuitous results of government; and of the two parties each inwardly resolved to appropriate as great a share of the good things as power and cunning would allow.

The English were not disposed to forget that upon them the whole burden of the war had devolved; that they alone had conquered and gained the country; that the assistance of Mohammed Ali had been of little or rather of no importance; and that even now he possessed not resources and talents sufficient to hold the government in his hands, unless they continued to support him.

On the other hand, Mohammed Ali looked upon himself as invested with all the dignity and power of Nabob; and the absolute ruler of the country. During the whole progress of the dispute, the English had represented themselves as contending only for him; had proclaimed that his rights were indisputable; and that their zeal for justice was the great motive which had engaged them so

[1] It is scarcely just, however, to expect complete regulations affecting untried circumstances and novel relations; to legislate before experience, is to invert the order of things, and except in some lucky hits, to ensure failure.—W.

deeply in the war. The Nabob, therefore, hesitated not to consider himself the master; though a master owing great obligations to a servant who had meritoriously exerted himself in his cause.

The seeds of dissatisfaction between the rulers of the Carnatic, abundantly sown in a fruitful soil, were multiplied by the penury of the country. The avidity, which made the English so long believe that every part of India abounded with riches, had filled them with hopes of a great stream of wealth, from the resources of the Carnatic. And although they had already experienced how little was to be drawn, and with how great difficulty, from the districts which had come into their power; though they were also aware how the country had been desolated by the ravages of war, they still expected it to yield a large supply to their treasury, and accused and complained of the Nabob when their expectations were not fulfilled.

The Nabob, who was the weakest party, and as such had the greatest occasion for the protection of well-defined regulations, had, before the surrender of the French in Pondicherry, presented a draught of the conditions to which it appeared to him expedient that the two parties should bind themselves. He offered to pay to the Company, in liquidation of the sums for which in the course of the war he had become responsible, twenty-eight lacs of rupees annually till the debts should be discharged; and three lacs of rupees annually to defray the expense of the garrison at Trichinopoly. Should Pondicherry be reduced, and the Company afford him an adequate force to extract from the renters and other tributaries of the country, the contributions which they owed, he would discharge his debt to the Company in one year: should any of the districts between Nelore and Tinivelly, be taken or plundered by an enemy, a proportional deduction must take place, from the twenty-eight lacs which were assigned to the Company: on the other side, the Nabob desired, that the Company would not countenance the disobedience of the local governors and administrators; that the English officers in the forts or garrisons should not interfere in the affairs of the country, or the disputes of the inhabitants; that the Nabob's flag, instead of the Com-

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pany's, should be hoisted in the different forts; and that the Company should, when required, assist his officers in the collection of the revenue.

The President, whether he decided without reflection, or thought a promise which would keep the Nabob in good humour, and might be broken at any time, was an obligation of no importance, expressed by letter his assent to these conditions.[1] In a short time, however, the President and Council presented to the Nabob a demand for fifty lacs of rupees. The Nabob, as this was a sum which he did not possess, endeavoured by all the means in his power to evade the contribution. Unable to resist the importunities of his allies, he was driven to his credit, which was very low; and under disadvantageous terms, which heaped upon him a load of debt, he raised by loan the money they exacted.

The expense of the war, the exhaustion of their own treasury, and their exaggerated conception of the riches of the country of which they had made him sovereign, rendered the President and Council by no means sparing in their requisitions upon the Nabob. It was stipulated that he should repay the whole expenses of the siege of Pondicherry. Even to this he agreed, upon condition of receiving all the stores which should be taken in the place. The servants of the Company, however, appropriated the stores to themselves; and they met the complaints of the Nabob, by promising to allow for them a certain sum in his account: in other words, they took for their own benefit what by their own contract belonged to the Nabob, and promised to make their masters pay him something, more or less, by way of compensation. Their masters, however, were on this occasion not less alive to their own interests than their servants had been to theirs; and no sooner heard of the sum which had been allowed to the Nabob in their books than they ordered it to be recharged to his account; while their servants were left in undisturbed possession of the stores.[2]

From the mode in which the country was governed; by sub-division into local commands, with a military force

[1] Mr. Pigot's letter to the Nabob, June 23, 1760. Nabob's Papers, iii. 24.
[2] Sir John Lindsay's Narrative, Oct. 13, 1770, Secretary of State's Office. Quoted by the author of the History and Management of the East India Company, p. 116.

and places of strength in the hands of every local commander, who withheld the revenue of his district, as often as he beheld a prospect of escaping punishment for his faults; it has frequently been seen what difficulties attended the realizing of revenue, whenever the government became disordered or weak. For a series of years, the Carnatic had been subject to no regular government; the different antagonists had collected the revenues, and raised contributions, in those districts which had at any time fallen into their hands; and the commanders of districts and forts had eluded payment as often as it was in their power. From this wasted and disordered country, with an insignificant army, and no resources for its augmentation, was Mohammed Ali required to find means for the support of his own government, for the gratification of his own taste and passions, and to satisfy the unbounded expectations of the English.

The hopes of the Nabob, who knew the poverty of the country, and with what severity everything had been stripped from those among the district Governors who enjoyed not extraordinary means of defence, were chiefly fixed upon the supposed treasures of Mortiz Ali, Governor of Velore, the riches of Tanjore, and the two Marawars. The fort and district of Velore was an acknowledged portion of the Carnatic territory. Tanjore and the Marawars were separate principalities, which, as often as they were pressed by the strength of their neighbours, had, according to Indian practice, occasionally paid them tribute; as Bengal and the Carnatic themselves had paid to the Mahrattas; but which had never been incorporated with the Mogul empire, nor regarded their dependence as more than casual, temporary, and unjust.

The strength, however, of the Nabob was altogether inadequate to the coercion of such powerful chiefs; and for the accomplishment of so important an object, he importuned the Presidency to join their forces to his. The state of the treasury at Madras, exhausted by the efforts of so tedious and expensive a war, rendered the English by no means desirous of engaging immediately in fresh adventures. And it was not without difficulty that in the summer of 1761 they were induced to lend their aid for the reduction of Velore. It resisted the exertions of the

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army for three months, and but ill repaid the conquerors by the treasure which it contained.

1763.

The conquest of Tanjore was an object of still greater promise. As it had not yet been ravaged by foreign armies, the ideas of Indian wealth, which so long had sparkled in the imaginations of men, were not altogether extinct. The country, though small, was undoubtedly fertile; the incompatibility between the existence of a rude government and people, and the production and accumulation of wealth, was not understood; and the expectations which had misled both the French and the English still maintained their sway in the mind of Mohammed Ali. Besides, as ruler of the Carnatic, it was his interest to add a principality of some importance to his dominions, and to remove a neighbour who might on every emergency become a dangerous foe.

The English, however, either because they had descended in their estimate of the riches of the country, or because they had ascended in their estimate of the difficulty of its subjugation, discovered an aversion, which the Nabob was unable to overcome, to embark in the conquest of Tanjore. The Governor recommended negotiation; and offered himself as mediator. To settle with the subordinate agents of his own government belonged, he said, to the Nabob himself: but the King of Tanjore was a sovereign Prince; and a tribunal, distinct from that of either party, namely, that of an independent mediator, was necessary to adjust the differences between them.[1]

The Nabob resisted this mode of adjustment, with great eagerness; and, rather than adopt it, would have postponed the enforcement of his claims, trusting to the chapter of accidents, and a time to come, at which the Raja might yield at discretion. The Presidency, however, knew their power; they sent, therefore, an agent to Tanjore, to hear the allegations of both parties, and suggest the conditions of an agreement. The following were the terms which they resolved to confirm: That twenty-two lacs of rupees, at five instalments, should be paid by the Raja to the Nabob, as arrears; four lacs as a present; and

[1] This is evidently the meaning of Mr. Pigot's letter to the Nabob, of May 31, 1762; from which, by a misinterpretation, the author of the Hist. and Management of the E. I. C. draws an accusation, p. 124.

four annually as a tribute: That the districts, on the other hand, of Coiladdy and Elangad should be ceded to the Raja; and that Arni should be restored to its former Governor or Killedar. The pecuniary exactions were greatly inferior to the claims of the Nabob; and so great reluctance did he show to the ratification of the treaty, that Mr. Pigot is said to have seized his chop or seal, and applied it to the paper with his own hand.[1] Aware that the inflated conceptions diffused among their countrymen of the riches of India, and of Tanjore as a distinguished part of India, might lead the Court of Directors to regard the sum extracted from the Raja as criminally small, the Presidency wrote, in their own defence; that, without their assistance, the Nabob was unable to extract a single rupee; that the reduction of Tanjore would have been a difficult enterprise; that they had not an army sufficient for the purpose; that the expedition would have occasioned an expense which they were unable to bear; and that a rupture with the Raja would have tended to raise up other enemies. The inability of the country to sustain, without oppression, a heavier exaction, they were either not yet aware of, or did not care to allege. When the Directors afterwards transmitted their reflections, they said: "If four lacs were given as a present, it seems as if the Company ought to have it, for their interposition and guarantee of the treaty. We shall be glad to have this affair explained to us, that we may know the real state of the case, with respect to that donation."[2] The twenty-two lacs were directed to be paid to the Company, and credit was given for them in the Nabob's account.

The war between the English and French, which had ceased in India with the fall of Pondicherry, was terminated in Europe by the treaty of Paris, definitively signed on the 10th of February, 1763. Of this treaty the eleventh article, intended to define the rights of the two nations in India, or those advantages, in the enjoyment of which

[1] This is stated on the authority of the Nabob's Letter to Mr. Palk, October 8, 1776. The author of the Hist. and Management, &c., says, "General Lawrence, Mr. Bouchier, and particularly Colonel Call, and Mr. Palk, were either present at this transaction, or were convinced of the truth of it, from the incontestable information, given by others as well as by the Nabob, who made heavy complaints to them of the President's conduct:" p. 127.

[2] Letters from the Court of Directors to the President and Council of Fort St. George, 30th December, 1763.

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the relative strength of the two parties made them willing to engage not to molest one another, was in the following words: "That Great Britain shall restore to France, in the condition they now are, the different factories[1] which that crown possessed, as well on the coast of Coromandel and Orissa, as on that of Malabar, as also in Bengal, at the beginning of the year 1749. And France renounces all pretensions to the acquisitions which she has made on the coast of Coromandel and Orissa.[2] And his most Christian Majesty shall restore, on his part, all that he may have conquered from Great Britain in the East Indies during the present war, and will expressly cause Natal and Tapanouly,[3] in the island of Sumatra, to be restored. And he further engages not to erect fortifications, or to keep troops, in any part of the dominions of the Subahdar of Bengal; and in order to preserve future peace on the coast of Coromandel and Orissa, the English and French shall acknowledge Mohammed Ali Khan, for lawful Nabob of the Carnatic, and Salabut Jung for lawful Subahdar of the Deccan, and both parties shall renounce all demands and pretensions of satisfaction, with which they might charge each other, or their Indian allies, for the depredation or pillage committed on either side during the war."

In the distribution of the advantages of the Carnatic sovereignty, for such it now might truly be deemed, as scarcely even a nominal subjection was acknowledged either to the Subahnar of the Deccan, or the Emperor himself, the English imagined they had as yet not appropriated to themselves the requisite share. They began accordingly to represent to the Nabob, the necessity of bestowing upon the Company a jaghire: or a grant of lands, the rents and revenues of which, free from any deduction to the Nabob's treasury, should accrue to themselves. The Nabob urged the narrowness of his own resources, the load of debt under which he laboured, the great proportion of his revenue already allowed to the Company, and the cession which he had made, not only of lands, but of the tribute which the Company owed for Madras itself.

The Company, in truth, had now placed themselves in

[1] Comptoirs. [2] Fort St. David and its dependencies. [3] Bencoolen.

a situation of considerable difficulty. The Presidency could not help observing, that under the weakness of both the mind and the resources of the Nabob, the defence of the Carnatic must rest upon them; and that they must, therefore, maintain at all times an army sufficient to oppose its enemies. This, without the revenue of the country, was a burden which they knew they could not sustain. And yet to strip of all his revenue a sovereign Prince, of whose rights they had so often proclaimed themselves the champions, was a procedure which bore a most unfavourable appearance, and from which formidable accusations against them could hardly fail to be drawn.

The Company took the course which power, though less supported by reasons, will most commonly pursue. They adopted the alternative which was most agreeable to themselves; and the revenues of the Carnatic gradually passed into their hands. The President, however, was anxious that, at this time, the donation should wear the appearance of a voluntary act on the part of the Nabob; and amid his efforts of persuasion assured him, if we can believe the Nabob himself, "that if four districts were given, the Company would be extremely pleased and obliged to him, and would ever assist him and his children with a proper force of Europeans, without desiring any thing further; that till he had cleared off his debts to the Company, the revenues of those districts, after defraying the expenses of the soldiers, should be placed to the credit of his account."[1] When the President began to pass from the tone of suggestion to that of requisition, and the Nabob perceived that compliance could not be escaped, he endeavoured to obtain the security of at least a written promise for those terms which had been offered in order to gain his consent. But when he transmitted the draft of an agreement, in which those terms were specified, and which he requested the Governor and Council to sign, the temper of the President broke through his policy; and he pulled off the mask with which he had hitherto endeavoured, though it must be confessed but awkwardly, to cover from the Nabob and the world the view of his real

[1] Rous's Appendix, p. 161. This declaration is made in a subsequent correspondence between the Nabob and the Governor and Council, and not denied by the Governor and Council, though such a bargain, they say, was a bad one for the Company.

situation. He sent back the agreement unsigned, with strong marks of his displeasure; and told the Nabob by letter, that it ill became the situation in which he stood, to make conditions with the Company; since "they," said he, "do not take any thing from you; but they are the givers, and you are a receiver."[1]

It was not till the summer of 1763, that the Nabob and Presidency were enabled to turn their attention to Madura and Tinivelly. Though Mohammed Issoof had been vigorously employed, from the raising of the siege of Madras, till the fall of Pondicherry, in reducing the refractory Polygars and other local commanders, obedience and tranquillity were by no means established. And when that active and useful partisan proposed to take the country as renter, and to become responsible, though for a small revenue, from a region which hitherto had cost much and yielded nothing, the offer was not unwillingly embraced. Mohammed Issoof, like other renters of India, had no doubt an inclination to withhold if possible the sum which he engaged to pay out of the taxes which he was empowered to collect: and, like other Governors, contemplated, it is probable, from the very beginning, the chance of independence. It cannot, however, be denied, that the enemies with whom he had as yet been obliged to struggle, and who had heretofore rendered the country not only unproductive, but burdensome, left him no revenue to pay. It appears, accordingly, that none had ever been received. For this failure, the Nabob and the Company now proceeded to inflict chastisement, and in the month of August, 1763, a combined army of natives and English marched to Madura. Mohammed Issoof endeavoured by negotiation, and the influence of those among the English whom he had rendered his friends, to ward off the blow. But when he found these efforts unavailing, he resolved to give himself the chance of a struggle in his own defence. He was not a man of whom the subjugation was to be expected at an easy price. He baffled all the efforts of the Nabob and the Company, till the month of October, 1764; when he had already forced them to expend a million sterling, and no ordinary quantity of English blood; and without a deed of treachery which placed his person in their hands,

[1] Mr. Pigot's Letter to the Nabob, August 13, 1763.

it is uncertain how far he might have prolonged his resistance. Among a body of French troops whom he had received from the Raja of Tanjore, was a person of the name of Marchand, by whom he was seized and delivered to his enemies. 1764.

The occasions on which the interests of the Nabob and of the Raja of Tanjore were liable to clash or to interfere, became, through their jealousy and mutual hatred, a perpetual source of contention. The treaty which had been formed under the coercive authority of the English, had defined the terms of their pecuniary relation: with the usual want of foresight, every thing else was left vague and disputable. The river Cavery, about six miles to the north-west of Trichinopoly, is divided into two streams, of which the northern takes the name of Coleroon, and, by a course not far from direct, joins the sea at Devi-Cotah. The southern branch, which retains the name of Cavery, passes through the flat alluvial territory of Tanjore; and dividing itself into a great number of smaller streams, overflows, and fructifies the country. But it so happens that the two branches of this great river, after flowing at some distance from one another, for a space of about twenty miles, again approach, forming what is called the island of Seringham, and are only prevented by a narrow neck of land, which requires continual repairs, from reuniting their streams, and falling down the channel of the Coleroon to the ocean. The kingdom of Tanjore was thus in the highest degree interested in the preservation of the mound of the Cavery, upon the waters of which its vegetative powers so greatly depended; and it must have anciently been a powerful instrument of coercion in the hands of the neighbouring kingdom of Trichinopoly, within the territories of which it appears to have been always included.

The Nabob, as sovereign of Trichinopoly, now assumed authority over the mound of the Cavery; and the dispute between him and the Raja grew to importance. The Raja endeavoured to make the reparation of the mound the condition of paying the money which he owed by the treaty; and the President, after writing several letters to the Nabob, appointed a deputy to inquire into the subject and to make his reports. The rights in question were

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actually two. The first was the right of sovereignty in the mound; the second was the right of having the mound preserved and repaired. The first, as no one disputed, belonged to the Nabob. The second, if prescription and equity constituted any title, as undeniably belonged to the Raja. Ignorantly and awkwardly, and not without English co-operation, they blended them together in one question; and the dispute became interminable. Who had the right of repairing the mound, was the subject about which they contended; the Nabob claiming it, as inherent in the sovereignty; and the Raja as inherent in the title which he possessed to the waters of the Cavery. Unhappily, in the right which, as sovereign, the Nabob claimed, of permitting no one but himself to repair the mound, he tacitly included the right of omitting all repairs whenever he pleased. The Raja, who dreaded the consequences, solicited an interview; and by making ample submission and protestations, effected a temporary compromise. It was not long, however, before he had again occasion to complain; and wrote the most pressing letters to Madras, beseeching the Presidency to lay their commands upon the Nabob for the repair of the mound. The Nabob hardly disguised his intention of allowing it to be washed away; alleging the wishes of his own people, who, on account of the overflowing of the low grounds to the eastward of Trichinopoly, desired the waters of the Cavery to be turned into the channel of the Coleroon. The English at last interfered, with a determination to prevail; and the Nabob, but not before the month of January, 1765, and with great reluctance, gave his consent, that the mound of the Cavery should be repaired by the King of Tanjore.[1]

CHAPTER VII.

Second Administration of Clive.—Company's Orders respecting the Private Trade disregarded.—Arrangements with the Vizir.—With the Emperor.—Acquisition of the Dewannee.—Private Trade created a Monopoly for the

[1] Official Papers in Rous's Appendix, Nos. vi. x. xii. xiii.

Benefit of the superior Servants.—Reduction of the Military Allowances.—Its effects.—Clive resigns, and Verelst succeeds.—Proceedings in England relative to the Rate of Dividend on Company's Stock.—Financial Difficulties.—Verelst resigns, and Cartier succeeds.

LORD CLIVE, together with Mr. Sumner and Mr. Sykes, who had accompanied him from England, and were two of the persons empowered to form the Select Committee, arrived at Calcutta, on the 3d of May, 1765. The two other persons of whom that extraordinary machine of government was to be composed, were absent; General Carnac, beyond the confines of the province of Bahar, with the army; and Mr. Verelst, at the distant settlement of Chittagong. For as much as the disturbances, which guided the resolves of the Company, when they decreed that such a new organ of government should exist, were now removed; and for as much as the Select Committee were empowered to exercise their extraordinary powers for so long a time only as those disturbances should remain; it was a question, whether they were entitled to form themselves into a governing body; but a question of which they speedily disposed.[1] On the 7th of May, exactly four days after their arrival, Lord Clive, and the two gentlemen who accompanied him, assembled: and without waiting for communication with the rest of the destined members declared the Select Committee formed;[2] assumed the whole powers of government civil and military; and administered to themselves and their secretaries an oath of secrecy.

The great corruption which they represented as prevailing in the government, and tainting to a prodigious degree the conduct of the Company's servants, was the foundation on which they placed the necessity for the establishment of the Committee. The picture which they drew of these corruptions exhibited, it is true, the most

[1] "Upon my arrival in Bengal," said Clive (in his speech in the House of Commons, ut supra. p. 3), "I found the powers given were so loosely and jesuitically worded, that they were immediately contested by the Council. I was determined, however, to put the most extensive construction upon them, because I was determined to do my duty to my country."

[2] The rest were "two," and to one of these at least, General Carnac, Lord Clive wrote the moment of his arrival. There was no occasion to wait for his presence or that of Verelst. Life of Clive, ii. 318.—W.

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hideous and the most disgusting features. But the impartial judge will probably find, that the interest of the Committee to make out the appearance of a strong necessity for investing themselves with extraordinary powers, after the original cause for them had ceased to exist, had *some* influence on their delineations. In the letter, addressed to the Committee, with which Lord Clive opened their proceedings, on the 7th of May, "A very few days," he says, "are elapsed since our arrival; and yet, if we consider what has already come to our knowledge, we cannot hesitate a moment upon the necessity of assuming the power that is in us of conducting, as a Select Committee, the affairs both civil and military of this settlement. What do we hear of, what do we see, but anarchy, confusion, and, what is worse, an almost general corruption. Happy, I am sure, you would have been, as well as myself, had the late conduct of affairs been so irreproachable as to have permitted them still to continue in the hands of the Governor and Council." Yet one would imagine that four days afforded not a very ample space for collecting a satisfactory body of evidence on so extensive a field,[1] especially if we must believe the noble declarer, that the determination to which it led was a disagreeable one.

"Three paths," observed his Lordship, when afterwards defending himself, "were before me. 1. One was strewed with abundance of fair advantages. I might have put myself at the head of the government as I found it. I might have encouraged the resolution which the gentlemen had taken not to execute the new covenants which prohibited the receipt of presents: and, although I had executed the covenants myself, I might have contrived to return to England with an immense fortune, infamously added to the one before honourably obtained. 2. Finding my powers disputed, I might in despair have given up the commonwealth, and have left Bengal without making an effort to save it. Such a conduct would have been deemed the effect of folly and cowardice. 3. The third path was intricate. Dangers and difficulties were on every side. But I resolved to pursue it. In short, I was determined

[1] Most of the Evidence was supplied in the minutes and proceedings of the Committee; much was furnished by the avowal of the parties themselves. Life, ii. 222.—W.

to do my duty to the public, although I should incur the odium of the whole settlement. The welfare of the Company required a vigorous exertion, and I took the resolution of cleansing the Augean Stable."[1]

Another circumstance deserves to be mentioned, of which Lord Clive takes no notice in his speech, though on other occasions it is not forgotten; that without the formation of the Select Committee, he would, as Governor, have enjoyed only a shadow, or at best a small fragment of power. In his letter to the Directors, dated the 20th of February, in which he describes the transactions of the first five months of his new administration, he says, "The gentlemen in Council of late years at Bengal, seem to have been actuated, in every consultation, by a very obstinate and mischievous spirit. The office of Governor has been in a manner hunted down, stripped of its dignity, and then divided into sixteen shares,"—the number of persons of whom the board consisted. "Two paths," he observes, in nearly the same language as was afterwards used in his speech, "were evidently open to me: the one smooth, and strewed with abundance of rich advantages that might easily be picked up; the other untrodden, and every step opposed with obstacles. I might have taken charge of the government upon the same footing on which I found it; that is, I might have enjoyed the name of Governor, and have suffered the honour, importance, and dignity of the post to continue in their state of annihilation. I might have contented myself as others had before me, with being a cipher, or, what is little better, the first among sixteen equals: and I might have allowed this passive conduct to be attended with the usual douceur of sharing largely with the rest of the gentlemen in all donations, perquisites, &c., arising from the absolute government and disposal of all places in the revenues of this opulent kingdom; by which means I might soon have acquired an immense addition to my fortune, notwithstanding the obligations in the new covenants; for the man who can so easily get over the bar of conscience as to receive presents after the execution of them, will not scruple to make use of any evasions that may protect him from the consequences. The settlement, in general, would thus have been my friends, and only the

[1] Speech, ut supra, p. 4.

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natives of the country my enemies." It deserves to be remarked, as twice declared by this celebrated Governor, that the covenants against the receipt of presents afforded no effectual security, and might be violated, by the connivance and participation of the presiding individuals, to any amount. It follows, as a pretty necessary consequence, that independent of that connivance they might in many instances be violated to a considerable amount.[1]

The language in which Clive describes the corruption of the Company's government and the conduct of their servants, at this era, ought to be received with caution; and, doubtless, with considerable deductions; though it is an historical document, or rather a matter of fact, singularly curious and important. "Upon my arrival," he tells the Directors, "I am sorry to say, I found your affairs in a condition so nearly desperate, as would have alarmed any set of men, whose sense of honour and duty to their employers had not been estranged by the too-eager pursuit of their own immediate advantages. The sudden, and among many, the unwarrantable acquisition of riches, had introduced luxury in every shape, and in its most pernicious excess. These two enormous evils went hand in hand together through the whole presidency, infecting almost every member of each department. Every inferior seemed to have grasped at wealth, that he might be enabled to assume that spirit of profusion, which was now the only distinction between him and his superior. Thus all distinction ceased; and every rank became, in a manner, upon an equality. Nor was this the end of the mischief: for a contest of such a nature among our servants necessarily destroyed all proportion between their wants and the honest means of satisfying them. In a country where money is plenty, where fear is the principle of government, and where your arms are ever victorious, it is no wonder that the lust of riches should readily embrace the proffered means of its gratification, or that the instruments of your power should avail themselves of their authority,

[1] This conclusion is scarcely justified by the premises. Clive, in the first instance, intimates that he might have done what had been already done by the Committee, delay the execution of the covenants until his own fortune had been made, and in the second case he asserts that an individual who violated the covenants would be ready to urge any plea whatever in mitigation of the consequences. He gives no reason to infer that in either case a breach of the covenants could be attempted with impunity.—W.

and proceed even to extortion in those cases where simple corruption could not keep pace with their rapacity. Examples of this sort, set by superiors, could not fail of being followed in a proportionable degree by inferiors. The evil was contagious, and spread among the civil and military, down to the writer, the ensign, and the free merchant."[1] The language of the Directors held pace with that of the Governor. In their answer to the letter from which this extract is taken, they say, "We have the strongest sense of the deplorable state to which our affairs were on the point of being reduced, from the corruption and rapacity of our servants, and the universal depravity of manners throughout the settlement. The general relaxation of all discipline and obedience, both military and civil, was hastily tending to a dissolution of all government. Our letter to the Select Committee expresses our sentiments of what has been obtained by way of donation; and to that we must add, that we think the vast fortunes acquired in the inland trade have been obtained by a series of the most tyrannic and oppressive conduct that ever was known in any age or country."[2]

The letters from the Court of Directors, commanding the immediate and total abandonment of the inland trade, and the execution of the new covenants against the receipt of presents, had arrived on the 24th of January, 1765, previous to the formation of the treaty with Nujum-ad-dowla. Yet so far was the inland trade from being abandoned, that the unlimited exercise of it, free from all duties except two and a half per cent. upon the article of salt, and along with that unlimited exercise, the prohibition, or what amounted

[1] Letter, dated Calcutta, 30th September, 1765, from Lord Clive to the Court of Directors, Third Report of Committee, 1772, Appendix, No. 73. In the letter of the same date from the Select Committee, which was merely another letter from Clive, by whose nod the other Members of the Committee were governed, they express themselves bound "to lay open to the view of the Directors a series of transactions too notoriously known to be suppressed, and too affecting to their interest, to the national character, and to the existence of the Company in Bengal, to escape unnoticed and uncensured;—transactions which seem to demonstrate that every spring of this government was smeared with corruption; that principles of rapacity and oppression universally prevailed, and that every spark of sentiment and public spirit was lost and extinguished in the unbounded lust of unmerited wealth." Ib. App. No. 86.—M.

That many of their charges were not ill-founded, is manifest from the Minutes of Council quoted in Vansittart's Narrative, and from Johnstone's vindication of himself in his Letter to the Proprietors. London, 1766.—W.

[2] Report, ut supra, Appendix, No. 74.

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to the prohibition, of all other traders, the exaction of oppressive duties, from which the English were exempt, had been inserted, as leading articles, in the treaty. Again, as to what regarded the covenants, not only had presents, upon the accession of Nujum-ad-dowla been received, with unabated alacrity, in defiance of them; but they remained unexecuted to that very hour. The Committee of the House of Commons could not discover from the records that the Governor had so much as brought them under the consultation of the Council Board;[1] and it is certain that no notice whatsoever had been communicated to the other servants of the Company, that any such engagements were required.

The execution of the covenants, as a very easy and simple transaction, was one of the earliest of the measures of the Committee. They were signed, first by the Members of the Council, and the servants on the spot; and afterwards transmitted to the armies and factories, where they were immediately executed by everybody; with one remarkable exception. General Carnac, when they arrived, distributed them to his officers, among whom the signature met with no evasion. But General Carnac himself, on the pretence that they were dated several months previous to the time at which intimation of them was conveyed to him, forbore privately to execute his own. A few weeks afterwards, upon his return to Calcutta, he signed it, indeed, without any scruple; but, in the interval, he had received a present of two lacks of rupees from the reduced and impoverished Emperor.[2]

[1] In a letter of Clive to General Carnac, of the 6th May, he says the Council had "left to the Committee the getting the covenants signed, which they say is of such consequence, that they cannot think of settling anything final about them until Lord Clive's arrival." Life of Clive. Johnstone, one of the Council, and an active agent in the whole business of the presents, gives a rather different account. "It is true," he says, "the covenants had arrived before the death of Meer Jaffier, who was not at that time thought to be in any danger of dying; I was not at the Council when they arrived, nor at any time after, till I was called down to assist their deliberation upon the event of the Nabob's death. The covenants never were offered to me, and I certainly could not be bound by covenants which I not only did not sign, but never was even required to sign. I have heard from the gentlemen of the Council, that their reason for not signing the covenants was, that the regulation appeared to them so new and extraordinary, and seemed liable to so many objections, that they did propose to send home a remonstrance against it, setting forth the reasons for judging the regulation unexpedient and improper." Johnstone's Letter to the Proprietors, 63.—W.

[2] "This transaction is not accurately stated. General Carnac's objection to sign the covenant was perfectly reasonable. As it would have bound him to

The Nabob, Nujum-ad-dowla, hastened to Calcutta, upon the arrival of Clive; and being exceedingly displeased with restraints imposed upon him, presented a letter of complaints. Mohammed Reza Khan, whose appointment to office of Naib Subah was the most offensive to the Nabob of all the hard conditions to which he had been compelled to submit, had given presents on account of his elevation to the amount of nearly twenty lacks of rupees. There was nothing, in this, unusual or surprising; but the Nabob, who was eager to obtain the ground of an accusation against a man whose person and office were alike odious to him, complained of it as a dilapidation of his treasury. The servants of the Company, among whom the principal part of the money was distributed, were those who had the most strongly contested the authority of Clive's Committee; and they seem to have excited, by that opposition, a very warm resentment. The accusation was treated as a matter of great and serious importance. Some of the native officers engaged in the negotiation of the presents, though required only for the purpose of evidence, were put under arrest. A formal investigation was instituted. It was alleged that threats had been used to extort the gifts. And the Committee pronounced certain facts to be proved; but in their great forbearance reserved the decision to the Court of Directors. The servants, whose conduct was arraigned, solemnly denied the charge of using terror or force; and it is true that their declaration was opposed by only the testimony of a few natives, whose veracity is always questionable when they have the smallest interest to depart from the truth:[1] who in the

the observance of a law of which he did not know the existence, and which he would have violated unwittingly, having between the date of the covenant and its reaching him, avowedly received a present of 70,000 rupees from the Bulwant Sinh. There was no intention of evading its prospective operation, as the interval was short before he did sign it, and the General declared in his evidence before the Committee of the House, that from the moment he was publicly apprised of the Company's pleasure on the subject, he considered himself equally bound by the covenant, whether he signed it or not. With regard to the two lacks of rupees, said to have been received by him from the King, after he knew of the covenants, the charge is untrue. General Carnac declined accepting it without the permission of the Governor and Council, to whom, therefore, the King wrote to request that their permission might be granted. The Council referred it to the Court of Directors, and if finally received, therefore, it was with their approbation. Appen. 3rd Report, 1773, p. 390.—W.

[1] There is little reason to question the veracity of such men as Mohammed Reza, Jaggat Set, and other natives of respectability, who gave evidence in

present case were not examined upon oath; were deeply interested in finding an apology for their own conduct, and had an exquisite feeling of the sentiments which prevailed towards the persons whom they accused in the breasts of those who now wielded the sceptre. There seems not, in reality, to have been any difference in the applications for presents on this and on former occasions, except perhaps in some little ceremoniousness of manner. A significant expression escapes from Verelst, who was an actor in the scene; "Mohammed Reza Khan," he says, "affirms that these sums were not voluntarily given. This the English gentlemen deny. Perhaps the reader, who considers the increased power of the English, may regard this as a *verbal* dispute."[1]

On the 25th of June Lord Clive departed from Calcutta, on a progress up the country, for the purpose of forming a new arrangement with the Nabob for the government of the provinces, and of concluding a treaty of peace with Suja-ad-dowla the Vizir.

The first negotiation was of easy management. Whatever the Committee were pleased to command, Nujum-ad-dowla was constrained to obey. The whole of the power reserved to the Nabob, and lodged with the Naib Subah, was too great, they said, to be deposited in a single hand; they resolved, therefore, to associate the Raja Dooloob Ram, and Juggut Seet, the Hindu banker, with Mohammed Reza Khan, in the superintendence of the Nabob's affairs. To preserve concord among these colleagues, it was determinated to employ the vigilant control of a servant of the Company, resident upon the spot. The Nabob was also now required to resign the whole of the revenues, and to make over the management of the Subahdaree, with every advantage arising from it, to the Company; by whom an annual pension of fifty lacks of rupees, subject to the

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the present transaction, and who had less inducement to depart from the truth than the Europeans, who were personally interested. The same inference is presently admitted in the significancy attached to the words quoted from Verelst. The conflicting assertions were a mere verbal dispute. The Europeans, it is true, did not employ force to compel the donations which they received; but there can be no doubt that they did intimate their expectations, and that the young Nabob, and his advisers, dared not disappoint them.—W.

[1] Verelst's View of the English Government in Bengal, p. 50. For the sums received, and the rate they bore to the sums received by the managers of the preceding revolutions, see the preceding table, p. 369.

management of their three nominees, were to be allowed to himself. The final arrangement of these terms was notified to the Committee on the 28th of July, by a letter despatched from Moorshedabad, whence, a few days before, Clive had proceeded on his journey.

The army had prosecuted the advantages gained over the Vizir; and at this time had penetrated far into the territories of Oude. The arrangement, however, which had been concluded with the Emperor, and in conformity with which the English were to receive the Gauzeepore country for themselves, and to bestow the dominions of Suja-ad-dowla on the Emperor, had been severely condemned by the Court of Directors. They denounced it, not only as a violation of their repeated instructions and commands not to extend the dominions of the Company; but as in itself an impolitic engagement; full of burden, but destitute of profit.[1] Lord Clive, and, what is the same thing, Lord Clive's Committee, professed a deep conviction of the wisdom of that policy (the limitation of dominion) which the Directors prescribed;[2] declaring, "that an influence maintained by force of arms was destructive of that commercial spirit which the servants of the Company ought to promote; oppressive to the country, and ruinous to the Company; whose military expenses had hitherto rendered fruitless their extraordinary success, and even the cession of rich provinces."[3]

After the battle of Buxar, the Vizir, who no longer considered his own dominions secure, had sent his women and treasures to Bareily, the strong fort of a Rohilla chief; and, having gained as much time as possible by negotiations with the English, endeavoured to obtain assistance from Ghazi-ad-din Khan, from the Rohilla chiefs, and a body of Mahrattas, who were at that time under Mulhar Row, in the vicinity of Gualior. The Mahrattas, and Ghazi-ad-din Khan, with a handful of followers, the miserable re-

[1] See the Letters to Bengal, dated 24th Dec. 1765, and 19th Feb. 1766, in the Appendix to the Third Report.

[2] Clive, in his letter to the Directors, dated 30th Sept. 1765, says, "My resolution was, and my hopes will always be, to confine our assistance, our conquest, and our possessions, to Bengal, Bahar, and Orixa: to go further is, in my opinion, a scheme so extravagantly ambitious and absurd, that no governor and council in their senses can ever adopt it, unless the whole scheme of the Company's interest be first entirely new modelled."

[3] Instructions from the Select Committee to the President, dated 21st June, 1765; and their Letter to General Carnac, dated 1st July.

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mains of his former power, had, in reality, joined him. But the Rohillas had amused him with only deceitful promises: and he had been abandoned even by Sumroo; who, with a body of about 300 Europeans of various nations, and a few thousand Sepoys, was negotiating for service with the Jaats.

The English had detached two battalions of Sepoys, which took possession of Lucknow, the capital of Oude, and made an attempt upon the fortres of Chunar, the strength of which enabled the garrison to make a succesful resistance; when the preparations of Suja-ad-dowla induced Sir Robert Fletcher, on whom, till the arrival of Carnac, after the departure of Sir Hector Munro, the command of the troops had devolved, to endeavour to anticipate that Nabob by taking the important fortress of Allahabad. Nujuf Khan, as a partisan of the Emperor, had joined the English with his followers from Bundelcund, and being well acquainted with the fortress, pointed out the weakest part. It was speedily breached; and the garrison, too irresolute to brave a storm, immediately surrendered. Soon after this event General Carnac arrived, and took the command of the army. The situation of the enemy which rendered their designs uncertain, puzzled, for a time, the General; who over-estimated their strength, and was afraid of leaving the frontiers exposed. Having received undoubted intelligence that the enemy had begun to march on the Corah road; and suspecting that an attack was designed upon Sir Robert Fletcher, who commanded a separate corps in the same direction he made some forced marches to effect a junction with that commander; and, having joined him, advanced with united forces towards the enemy. On the 3d of May a battle was fought in the neighbourhood of Corah; or rather a skirmish, for, by the absence of the Rohillas, and the weakness of Ghazi-ad-din Khan, the force of the Vizir was inconsiderable, and he was still intimidated by remembrance of Buxar. The Mahrattas, on whom he chiefly depended, were soon dispersed by the English artillery. The Vizir separated from them; and they retired with precipitation towards the Jumna. Observing the English to remit the pursuit in order to watch the Vizir, who made no attempt to join his allies, they ventured a second effort to enter Corah.

To stop their incursions the General resolved to drive them beyond the Jumma; crossed that river on the 22d; dislodged them from their post on the opposite side; and obliged them to retire to the hills.

The Vizir impelled, on the one side by the desperate state of his affairs, on the other by hopes of moderate treatment from the English, resolved to throw himself entirely upon their generosity, by placing his person in their hands. On the 19th of May, General Carnac received, written by the Nabob with his own hand, a letter, in which he informed that officer that he was on his way to meet him. The General received him with the highest marks of distinction; and all parties recommended a delicate and liberal treatment. The final settlement of the terms of pacification was reserved for the presence of Clive. As it was unanimously agreed, that it would cost the Company more to defend the Country of the Vizir, than it would yield in revenue; that Suja-ad-dowla was more capable of defending it than the Emperor, to whom it had been formerly promised, or than any other chief who could be set up; and that in the hands of the Vizir it might form a barrier against the Mahrattas and Afghans; it was determined to restore to him the whole of his dominions, with the exception of Allahabad and Corah, which were to be reserved to the Emperor.

When the first conference was held with the Vizir on the 2nd of August, he strongly expressed his gratitude for the extent of dominion which his conquerors were willing to restore; and readily agreed to the payment of fifty lacks of rupees demanded in compensation for the expenses of the war: but, when it was proposed to him to permit the English to trade, free from duties, and erect factories in his dominions, he represented so earnestly the abuses which, under the name of trade, the Company's servants and their agents had perpetrated in the provinces of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa; and expressed with so much vehemence his apprehension of disputes, and the impossibility they would create of long preserving the blessings of peace, that Clive agreed, in the terms of the treaty, to omit the very names of trade and factories.

The Raja Bulwant Sing, who held, as dependencies of the Subah of Oude, the Zemindarees of Banares and Gau-

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zeepore, had joined the English and rendered important service, in the late wars against the Vizir. It was, therefore, incumbent upon them to yield him protection against the resentment of a chief whose power he could not resist. The Vizir bound himself not to molest the Raja in the possession of his former dominions; and the Raja was held bound to pay him the same tribute as before. The Vizir and the English engaged to afford assistance, each to the other, in case the territory of the other was invaded; and the Vizir engaged never to harbour or employ Meer Casim or Sumroo.

The business with the Emperor was the next subject of negociation which claimed the exertions of Clive. Of the annual tribute to the Emperor, contracted for in the names of Meer Jaffier, Meer Casim, and Nujum-ad-dowla, as the imperial revenue from Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, thirty lacks were unpaid. Of this debt, the indigent sovereign was frankly and definitively told, that not a single rupee would ever be given him. The sum which had, under the English authority, been assigned as the share due to him of the revenue of these provinces, was twenty-six lacks of rupees in money, and jaghires or land to the annual amount of five lacks and a half. The jaghires, it was now made known to him, he must henceforth renounce. He expressed warmth, and even resentment, upon the hardness of these arbitrary conditions; but the necessities of the humbled monarch left him without means of relief. The twenty-six lacks of rupees were continued as his portion of the revenues; and he was put in possession of the countries of Corah and Allahabad. On his part was required the imperial grant of the dewannee, or collection and receipt of the revenues, in Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa. The phirmaun of the dewannee, which marks one of the most conspicuous eras in the history of the Company, constituting them masters of so great an empire, in name and in responsibility, as well as in power,[1] was dated the 12th day of August, 1765. Along with the dewannee was required of the Emperor his imperial confirmation of all the territory which the Company possessed throughout to nominal

[1] The Select Committee express strongly their sense of the ostensible change; in their Consultation, 18th Sept. 1765, describing the Company as having "come into the place of the country government, by his Majesty's royal grant of the dewannee." See Fourth Report, Committee of Secrecy of House of Commons, 1773. Appendix, No. 38.

extent of the Mogul empire. Among these confirmations was not forgotten the jaghire of Lord Clive; a possession, the dispute about which that powerful servant had compromised before his departure from England, by yielding the reversion to the Company, after ten years' payment, if so long he should live. 1765.

It was in the course of this summer that, in pursuance of the terms of the treaty concluded in Europe between the English and the French, the settlements of that nation at Chandernagor and other places in Bengal, were restored.

On the 7th of September, Lord Clive resumed his seat in the Select Committee; in which the urgent questions respecting the inland trade now constituted the grand subject of consultation. The Company's letter of the 8th of February, 1764, completely prohibiting the inland trade of their servants, was taken into consideration by the board, on the 17th of October, in the same year. And it was resolved that all the branches of that trade, which it was worth while to carry on, should still be steadfastly retained; but that proper respect should be shown to the commands of their masters; and what was of no value to keep should be immediately and completely resigned. The grand articles of the interior trade of Bengal were salt, betel-nut, and tobacco; of which salt was out of all proportion the most important. Tobacco in particular, was so inconsiderable, that few, if any, of the Company's servants had engaged in it. The determination was, to give up the tobacco, preserving and securing the betel-nut and the salt. It must not, however, be forgotten that an order was now issued, prohibiting the practice of forcing the natives to buy and sell at any price which the Company's servants thought proper to command.

On the 1st of June, 1764, a letter was written by the Court of Directors, in consequence of the resolution of the Court of Proprietors, that the letter of the 8th of February should be reconsidered. In this, the Directors declared, that the terms imposed upon Meer Casim for the regulation of the private trade in the interior, "appeared to them so injurious to the Nabob and the natives, that they could not, in the very nature of them, tend to any thing but the producing general heart-burning and dissatisfaction: that the orders, therefore, in their letter of

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the 8th of February should remain in force until a more equitable and satisfactory plan could be formed and adopted; and, as it was impossible for them to frame such a plan at home, destitute as they were of the informations and lights necessary to guide them in settling such an important affair—the Committee were therefore ordered, as soon after the receipt of this letter as might be convenient, to consult the Nabob as to the manner of carrying on the inland trade, and thereupon to form a proper and equitable plan for that purpose, and transmit the same to the Directors, accompanied by such explanations, observations, and remarks, as might enable them to give their sentiments and directions thereupon in a full and explicit manner:—And in doing this, as before observed, they were to have a particular regard to the interest and entire satisfaction of the Nabob." It was agreed, in general consultation at Fort William, on the 26th of January, 1765, to defer all proceedings on this order, till the arrival of Lord Clive; and in the mean time, in defiance of both letters, the course of the inland trade remained undisturbed.

One important circumstance in the letter of the 1st of June, the Directors themselves interpreted one way; their servants in India chose to interpret another. The servants inferred that the letter empowered them not only to contrive a plan, but also to put it in practice. It was maintained on the other hand, that the letter only authorized them to devise a plan, and transmit the account of it to the Directors. The letter, as usual, was vague and ambiguous; and those who had to act upon it, at so vast a distance, preferred, as might have been expected, the interpretation which best suited their own interests.

It is worthy of particular remark, that Lord Clive, as he declares to the Directors themselves,[1] framed the plan which was afterwards adopted, during his voyage to India. But, as he could not then have any lights which he had not in England, he might, unless he had determined not to be governed by the Directors, have opened to them his project before he departed; and have allowed to his masters the privilege of deciding.

It is not less worthy of remark, that Clive and the other Members of the Select Committee—Carnac ex-

[1] In his Letter, dated Calcutta, 1st February, 1766.

cepted, who had not left the army—formed a partnership before the beginning of June, for buying up large quantities of salt; that all the purchases were made during the month of June, and that in nine months the parties realized a profit, including interest, of about forty-five per cent. In apology for Clive, it was stated, that he brought out with him three gentlemen from England, Mr. Strachey, his secretary; Mr. Maskelyne, an old friend and fellow-servant of the Company; and Mr. Ingham, his surgeon; and that for the sake of making a fortune to them he engaged in that suspicious transaction. If a proceeding, however, is in its own nature shameful, there is but little saved, when the emolument is only made to go into the pocket of a connexion.[1]

On the 10th of August, after these purchases had for some time been completed, and after certain inquiries had been made respecting the usual prices of salt in different places; it was resolved, in a Select Committee composed of only Mr. Sumner and Mr. Verelst, That a monopoly should be formed of the trade in salt, betel-nut, and tobacco, to be carried on exclusively for the benefit of the superior servants of the Company. After several consultations, the following rules were adopted: That, deducting a duty to the Company, computed to produce 100,000*l.* per annum, the profits should be divided among three classes of proprietors: That, in the first class, should be allowed—to the governor, five shares; to the second in council, three shares; to the general, three shares; ten gentlemen of council, each two shares: two colonels, each two shares—in all thirty-five: That, in the second class, consisting of one chaplain, fourteen senior merchants, and three lieutenant-colonels, in all eighteen persons, two-thirds of one share should be granted to each, or twelve shares to the whole: In the third class, consisting of thirteen factors, four majors, four first surgeons at the presidency, two first surgeons at the army, one secretary to the council, one sub-accountant, one Persian translator, and

[1] There was nothing "shameful" in the nature of the transaction. The wisdom of the scheme may be questioned, but it was adopted deliberately and openly, as the only practicable expedient of providing for the indisputable necessity of giving liberal pay to responsible officers, whilst depriving them of the opportunity of remunerating themselves, and whilst the only legitimate source of public recompense, the public treasury was yet unopened. —W.

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one sub-export-warehouse-keeper, in all twenty-seven persons, one-third of a share should be distributed to each, or nine shares to the whole: That a committee of four, empowered to make by-laws, borrow money, and determine the amount of capital, should be appointed for the entire management of the concern: that the purchases should be made by contract: That the goods should be conveyed by the agents of the association to certain fixed places, and there sold to the native merchants and retailers at established and invariable prices: That the exclusive power of making those purchases should be ensured to the association for one year: And that European agents should be allowed to conduct the business of the society in different parts of the country.

In defence of this scheme, it was urged, that by the prohibition of presents, and the growing share of the export and import trade engrossed by the Company's investment, the pay of their servants was reduced to the means of a bare subsistence;[1] that besides the hardship of this policy, the wisdom was very defective, since it was absurd to suppose that men deprived of the means of enriching themselves by legitimate, would abstain from illegitimate means, when placed to a boundless extent in their power; that a too rapid enriching of their servants, by enabling them to hurry to England, and leaving none but inexperienced youths to conduct their affairs, was ruinous to their interests; and that, by the admirable arrangements of the trade society, a proper fortune was secured to those who had attained a certain station in the service, without incurring the danger of sending them home enriched at too early a period.

Upon these arguments, one reflection cannot be withheld, because the occasions for its application are exceed-

[1] It was wholly inadequate as a means of subsistence. Johnstone, in vindication of the unwillingness of the Council to sign the covenants, very fairly urges the insufficiency of the salaries of the Company's servants; the allowance of a councillor, he writes, is not more than 250*l.*, of a factor, 140*l.*, of a writer, as lately increased 130*l.*; but the rent of a very indifferent house in Calcutta, is 200*l.*, nearly the whole of even a councillor's salary. Letter to the Proprietors. So Clive, in his Speech to the House of Commons, observes, "the salary of a councillor is I think scarcely 300*l.* per annum, and it is well known that he cannot live in that country for less than 3000*l.*" Life, iii. 100. As long as the salaries of the civil and military services left the Company's servants to starve, it was monstrous to expect that they would not use the power they possessed of providing for their own necessities, and for something more.—W.

ingly numerous, and because it appears, unhappily, to be not unfrequently made. It is contrary to experience, that by deriving large emoluments from an office, the person who holds it will be less eager to grasp at any unlawful gains which are within his reach. The avidity for more is not in general diminished by the amount of what is possessed. A trifling sum will doubtless lose something of its apparent magnitude in the eye of a man of wealth; but the vast sums are those alone which are of much importance; and they, we find, are as resistless a temptation to the rich as to the poor. The prevalence of the idea that satiating the servants of the public with wealth is a secret for rendering them honest, only proves how little the art of government has borrowed as yet from the science of human nature. If, with immense emoluments, a door is left open to misconduct, the misconduct is but the more ensured; because the power of the offender affords him a shield against both popular contempt and legal chastisement. If the servants of the Company, as Clive and his Committee so positively affirmed, had it in their power, and in their inclination, to pillage and embezzle, when their incomes were small, the mere enlargement of their incomes would add to the power, and could not much detract from the inclination.[1]

At the time of these proceedings, the Select Committee were deprived of the shelter even of an ambiguous expression; and knew that they were acting in express defiance of the wishes and commands of their superiors. Under date the 15th of February, 1765, the Directors had written in the following terms: "In our letters of the 8th February, and 1st June last, we gave our sentiments and directions very fully in respect to the inland trade of

[1] This reflection is not founded upon so careful a consideration of human nature as might have been expected from our author. Although cases of insatiable cupidity may from time to time occur, yet in general a man who has in his hands the means of securing, at no very remote period, a moderate fortune for himself and his family, is removed from the temptation of accelerating that period by illicit gains. He is also likely to be deterred from yielding to the temptation by the amount of loss which he hazards. To him who has nothing, the consequences of exposure offer little terror, to him who has much, disgrace, and eventually diminished wealth, will be very reluctantly risked. All consideration of moral principle is omitted in the text, but in the instance of insufficient means, integrity is manifestly powerfully assailed, whilst in that of competent means it is strengthened and confirmed. That these views are sound is established by events, and the generally unimpeached integrity of the Company's servants in India has

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Bengal;—we now enforce the same in the strongest manner, and positively insist that you take no steps whatever towards renewing this trade, without our express leave; for which reason you must not fail to give us the fullest information upon the subject, agreeably to our above-mentioned directions.

Having thus established the Private-trade Society, the Committee proceeded to introduce other regulations which the state of affairs appeared to require. It had been a common practice with members of the Council, instead of remaining at the Board for the business of the Presidency, to receive nomination to the chiefship of factories, as often as additional means of accumulating money were there placed in their hands. To this practice the Committee, on very good grounds, resolved to put an end. "We are convinced," they said, "by very late experience, that the most flagrant oppressions may be wantonly committed in those employments, by members of the Board, which would not be tolerated in junior servants; and that the dread and awe annexed to their station, as councillors, has too frequently screened them from complaints which would be lodged without fear or scruple against inferior servants." Yet, with this experience before them, they recommend great emoluments as a security against corruption.[1] The Committee further remarked, that not only the business, which was thus engrossed by Members of the Board, could be as well transacted by a junior servant, at much less expense; but that other inconveniences, still more pernicious, were incurred; that by the absence of so many members of the board, it had been necessary to increase their numbers from twelve to sixteen; that by the regular departure to the out-settlements of those Members of the Council who had the greatest influence to procure their own appointment, there was so rapid a change of councillors at the board, where only the youngest and most inexperienced remained, that the business of the Presidency was obliged to be conducted by men deficient

followed the elevation of their pay in proportion to the responsibility of their stations, and their reasonable prospects of returning with a sufficiency to their native country.—W.

[1] The emoluments in this case, it is to be remembered, were in their very nature fertile sources of oppression; they were indefinite, limited by no bounds except the power and cupidity of the individual.—W.

in the knowledge and experience necessary for carrying it on.

Another measure, productive of considerable irritation and disturbance, was promoted by Clive. The rapid acquisition of riches in Bengal had recently sent so many of the superior servants, along with their fortunes, to Europe, that few remained to fill up the vacancies in the Council except either men very young and inexperienced, or those whom Clive described as tainted with the corruptions which had vitiated the administration. The Committee say, "It is with the utmost regret we think it incumbent on us to declare, that in the whole list of your junior merchants, there are not more than three or four gentlemen whom we could possibly recommend to higher stations at present." They accordingly forbore to supply the vacancies which occurred in the Council, and resolved upon calling a certain number of servants at the other presidencies, to supersede those in Bengal. They paid to their employers the compliment of recommending the measure to their consideration; but waited not for their decision, for, in two months from the date of their letter, four gentlemen arrived from Madras, and soon after took their seats at the Board.[1]

Among the circumstances most strongly recommended to Lord Clive by the Company, was the reduction of the military expenses, which absorbed all their revenues, and

[1] The effects of this measure are thus described by the Committee themselves: "As soon as this measure became known by reports from Madras, the young gentlemen of the settlement had set themselves up for Judges of the propriety of our conduct, and the degree of their own merit." It is to be observed that by "young gentlemen," here is to be understood all those, without exception, who were not of the council, that is, all those whose interests were affected by this unusual proceeding; and they were even joined by several Members of the Council. That Clive should treat it as unendurable in such persons to express an unfavourable opinion upon his conduct, or upon a treatment which they naturally regarded as highly injurious to themselves, is in the genuine strain of power, both in India and Europe. The Committee continue: "They have not only set their hands to the memorial of complaint, but entered *into associations* unbecoming at their years, and destructive of that subordination, without which no government can stand; all visits to the President are forbidden; all invitations from him and the Members of the Committee are to be slighted; the gentlemen called down by our authority from Madras are to be treated with neglect and contempt." Even the Secretary to the Council, distinguishing himself in this association, was dismissed from his office, and suspended the service. The Committee adds, "You will be astonished to observe at the head of this list, two members of your Council who subscribe their names in testimony of their sense of the injustice done to the younger servants." Letter from the Select Committee to the Directors, dated 1st January, 1766.

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rendered their ascendancy in the country a burden rather than an advantage. As service in the field is, in India, attended with peculiar charges to the officers, the Company had, at an early period of their wars, found it necessary to allow their officers, during the time of campaign, a certain addition to their daily pay, which, in the language of the country, was styled *batta*, or indemnity for field expenses.

When the English forces took the field with Meer Jaffier after the battle of Plassy, to cherish their good-will, on which he was so dependent, that Nabob afforded to the officers twice the ordinary sum, and this allowance was distinguished by the name of *double batta*. As long as the troops continued to be paid by Meer Casim, the Company felt no prevailing motive to lessen an expense, which pleased the officers, and oppressed only the Nabob. When they perceived, upon the assignment of territorial revenues for the expense of the army, that what could be withheld from the army would accrue to themselves, they issued repeated orders for the reduction of the batta. But the dangers of the country had rendered the exertions of the army so necessary; and they to whom the powers of government were intrusted had so little dared to venture their authority in a contest with the military, that double batta had hitherto been allowed to remain.

Upon the conclusion of the war with Suja-ad-dowla, the troops were regimented, according to a plan proposed by Clive, and sanctioned by the Company before his departure from England; divided into three brigades, each consisting of one regiment of European infantry, one company of artillery, six battalions of Sepoys, and one troop of black cavalry; and were stationed, one brigade at Mongheer, 300 miles from Calcutta; another at Bankipore, near Patna, 100 miles beyond Mongheer; and the third at Allahabad, 200 miles beyond Patna, whither it had been sent as a security against the Mahrattas, whom the Emperor and Vizir were far too reduced to be able to oppose.

In this situation, the Select Committee issued an order, that on the 1st January, 1766, the double batta should cease; and that the officers in Bengal, with some exceptions in favour of the troops in the most distant and expensive stations, should be placed on the same footing

with those on the coast of Coromandel; that is, receive single batta when in the field; and in garrison or cantonments, no batta at all.

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The officers, who, along with the rest of their countrymen, had formed unbounded notions of the wealth of India, and whose imaginations naturally exaggerated the fortunes which were making in the civil branch of the service, had received every previous intimation of this reduction with the loudest complaints and remonstrances; and treated the peremptory decree which was now issued, as an act of the highest injustice; and as a most unworthy attempt to deprive them of a share of those rich advantages for which they had fought and bled, only that a larger stream of emolument might flow into the laps of those very men who were the instruments of their oppression.

At all times, and especially in situations in any degree resembling that of the British in India, it has been found a hazardous act to reduce the advantages of any army; and Clive appears to have greatly miscalculated either the weight of his own authority, or the delicacy of the operation. Without any endeavour to prepare the minds of the men, the order was issued and enforced; and without any care to watch its effects, the Governor remained in perfect security and ignorance, till the end of April, when he received a letter informing him, that a most alarming conspiracy, embracing almost every officer in the army, was ripe for execution.

As early as the month of December, a combination began. Private meetings and consultations were held, secret committees were formed, and correspondence carried on. The combustion first began in the brigade of Mongheer; but was soon, by letter, communicated to the rest, whose bosoms were perfectly prepared for inflammation. The plan concerted was, that the officers should resign their commissions in a body, and, by leaving the army totally ungoverned, make the constituted authorities submit to their terms. Nearly two hundred commissions of captains and subalterns were in a short time collected. Besides a solemn oath of secresy, they bound themselves by a similar obligation, to preserve at the hazard of their own lives, the life of any officer, whom a Court Martial might

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condemn to death. Each officer executed a penalty bond of 500*l.*, not to accept his commission till double batta was restored. A subscription was raised among them to establish a fund for the indemnification of those who might suffer in the prosecution of the enterprise; and to this, it was understood, that the gentlemen in the civil service, and even those at the Presidency, largely contributed.

When the army was in this situation, a body of between fifty and sixty thousand Mahrattas appeared on the frontiers of Corah, about one hundred and fifty miles from Allahabad. To watch their motions, the brigade remaining in garrison at that city was ordered to encamp at Suragepore. Early in April, Lord Clive, accompanied by General Carnac, had repaired to Moorshedabad, in order to regulate the collections of the revenue for the succeeding year, to receive from Suja-ad-dowla the balance of his payments, and to hold a congress of the native chiefs or princes, who were disposed to form an alliance for mutual defence against the Mahrattas. On the 19th, was transmitted to him, from the Select Committee, a remonstrance received from the officers of the third brigade,[1] expressed in very high language, which he directed to be answered with little respect. It was not till late in the evening of the 28th; when he received a letter from Sir Robert Fletcher, the commanding officer at Mongheer; that Clive had the slightest knowledge or suspicion of a conspiracy so extensive, and of which the complicated operations had been going on for several months.

At Bankipore, a considerable part of the cantonments had been burnt down; and a Court Martial was held upon one of the officers, accused of having been the voluntary cause. The act proceeded from a quarrel between him and another officer who attempted to take away his commission by force: and, upon exploring the reason of this extraordinary operation, the existence of the combination was disclosed. The commanding officer immediately despatched an account of the discovery to Sir Robert Fletcher at Mongheer; who was by no means unacquainted with the proceedings in his own brigade, but was only now induced

[1] That is of the Brigade stationed at Bankypore, not, as might be supposed, from the previous specification of the Brigades, that which was quartered at Allahabad, which was the second, not the third Brigade.—W.

to give intimation of them to his superiors. It was the plan of the officers to resign their commissions on the 1st of June; but this discovery determined them, with the exception of the brigade at Allahabad, to whom information could not be forwarded in time, to execute their purpose a month earlier.

Clive at first could not allow himself to believe that the combination was extensive; or that any considerable number of men, the whole of whose prospects in life were founded upon the service, would have resolution to persevere in a scheme, by which the danger of exclusion from it, not to speak of other consequences, was unavoidably incurred. It was one of those scenes, however, in which he was admirably calculated to act with success. Resolute and daring, fear never turned him aside from his purposes; or deprived him of the most collected exertion of his mind in the greatest emergencies. To submit to the violent demands of a body of armed men, was to resign the government. He had a few officers in his suite upon whom he could depend; a few more, he concluded might yet be found at Calcutta, and the factories; and some of the free merchants might accept of commissions. The grand object was to preserve the common soldiers in order and obedience, till a fresh supply of officers from the other Presidencies could be obtained.

He remained not long without sufficient evidence that almost all the officers of all the three brigades were involved in the combination, and that their resignations were tendered. Directions were immediately sent to the commanding officers, to find, if possible, the leaders in the conspiracy; to arrest those officers whose conduct appeared the most dangerous, and detain them prisoners; above all things to secure the obedience of the Sepoys and black commanders, if the European troops should appear to be infected with the disobedience of their officers. Letters were despatched to the Council at Calcutta, and the Presidency at Fort St. George, to make the greatest exertions for a supply of officers; and Clive himself hastened towards Mongheer. On the road he received a letter from Colonel Smith, who commanded at Allahabad, informing him that the Mahrattas were in motion, and that Ballajee Row was at Calpee with 60,000 men

BOOK IV. CHAP. VII. collecting boats. If reduced to extremity, but not before, Smith was instructed to promise the officers compliance with their demands.

1766. Expecting their resignation to produce all the effects which they desired, the officers had concerted no ulterior measures. Their desperation had not led them to make any attempts to debauch the common soldiers. The Sepoys everywhere exhibited a steady obedience; and the commanding officers of all the brigades remained in perfect confidence of being able, in case of mutiny, to put every European soldier to death. Except, however, at Mongheer, where symptoms of mutiny among the Europeans were quickly dispelled by the steady countenance of the Sepoys drawn out to attack them, no disturbance occurred. The officers at Mongheer submitted quietly to be sent down to Calcutta; the greater part of those belonging to the other brigades retracted: and this extraordinary combination, which, with a somewhat longer sight on the part of the officers, or less of vigour and of the awe of a high reputation on the part of the Governor, would have effected a revolution in India, produced, as ineffectual resistance generally does, a subjection more complete than what would have existed, if the disturbance had never been raised. Some of the officers, upon profession of repentance, were allowed to resume the service; others were tried and cashiered. The case of Sir Robert Fletcher was the most remarkable. He had been active in subduing the confederacy; but was found to have encouraged its formation. He apologized for himself on two grounds; that he wished, through the guilt of the conspiracy, to be able to dismiss a number of officers, whose bad conduct rendered them an injury to the service; and that he wished, through the appearance of favouring the views of the officers in some things, to have the advantage of a complete knowledge of their proceedings: a Court Martial, notwithstanding, found him guilty of mutiny, of sedition, and concealment of mutiny; and he was punished by ejection from the service.

Upon the termination of this dangerous disaffection, Lord Clive proceeded to Chupprah, where he was met by Suja-ad-dowla, by the Minister of the Emperor, and by deputies from the Mahratta Chiefs. Suja-ad-dowla con-

tinued to express the highest satisfaction with the treaty which he had lately concluded with the Company; and cheerfully advanced the remainder of the sum which he had promised as the price of peace. The grand desire of the Emperor was to regain possession of the capital of his ancestors, and to mount the throne at Delhi. He had exhausted all his arts of negotiation and intrigue to obtain the assistance of the English; and had, without their concurrence, formed engagements with the Mahrattas, who, at his persuasion, it now appeared, and under assurances that the English would join them in escorting him to his capital, were assembled on the confines of Corah. This ambition of the Emperor was offensive to the English; who, as they had no intention to second his views, dreaded violently his connexion with the Mahrattas. The formation of a treaty for mutual defence, including the Emperor, the Company, the Jaat and Rohilla chiefs, was left to be conducted by Suja-ad-dowla.

During these transactions died the Nabob of Bengal, Nujum ud Dowla. He expired on the 8th of May, a few days after Clive had left him at Moorshedabad. He was an intemperate youth, of a gross habit of body; and his death had in it nothing surprising. Its suddenness, however, failed not, in a country habituated to deeds of darkness around a throne, to cover it with odious suspicions. His brother, Syeff ud Dowla, a youth of sixteen, was elevated to his nominal office; a change of less importance now than that of the chief of a factory.

Upon the return of Clive to the Presidency, the private trade, so dear to individuals, demanded the attention of the Committee. The native merchants, to whom the salt had been disposed of, at the places of the society's sales, had re-sold or retailed it at a profit which the Committee deemed extravagant. Instead of inquiring whether, if the trade, as alleged by the Committee, was monopolized and engrossed by a combination, the means could not be devised of yielding it the benefit of free competition; they contented themselves with the easy and despotical expedient of ordering the commodity to be retailed at an established price: and by an *ex-post-facto* law fined the native merchants to the amount of their additional gains.[1]

[1] Select Consultation, 15th August, 1766.—M.
It should be stated, however, that the merchants had purchased, under an

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On the 3d of September the Select Committee proceeded to arrange the business of the inland trade society for another year. The Company in their letter of the 19th of February, already received, had declared that they considered the continuance of this trade "as an express breach and violation of their orders, and as a determined resolution to sacrifice the interests of the Company, and the peace of the country, to lucrative and selfish views." Pronouncing, "that every servant concerned in that trade stood guilty of a breach of his covanants, and of their orders," they added, "Whatever government may be established, or whatever unforeseen circumstances may arise, it is our resolution to prohibit, and we do absolutely forbid, this trade of salt, betel-nut, and tobacco, and of all articles that are not for export and import, according to the spirit of the phirmaund, which does not in the least give any latitude whatsoever for carrying on such an inland trade; and moreover, we shall deem every European concerned therein, directly or indirectly, guilty of a breach of his covenants; and direct that he be forthwith sent to England, that we may proceed against him accordingly."

Notwithstanding these clear and forcible prohibitions, the Committee proceeded to a renewal of the monopoly, as if the orders of the Directors deserved not a moment's regard. Clive, in his Minute, turned them carelessly aside, observing that when the Company sent them, "they could not have the least idea of that favourable change in the affairs of these provinces, whereby the interest of the Nabob, with regard to salt, is no longer immediately concerned." As a reason against lodging the government of India in hands at the distance of half the circumference of the globe, the remark would merit attention: for the disobedience of servants to those who employed them, it is no justification at all; because, extended as far as it is applicable, it rendered the servants of the Company independent; and constituted them masters of India.[1]

agreement with the Committee of Trade, to sell at a fixed rate of profit, and it was the excess upon the agreed rate, which they were, somewhat arbitrarily, but not unjustly, compelled to refund.—W.

[1] A discretionary power to suspend the execution of the orders of the home authorities, so as to afford them the opportunity of considering circumstances of which they may not have been apprized, is a very different thing from positive disobedience, and is indispensable to the due administration of government in India. It still rests with the authorities in England to countermand or enforce the instructions they have sent out.—W.

One change alone, of any importance, was introduced upon the regulations of the preceding year: the salt, instead of being conveyed to the interior, was to be sold at Calcutta, and the several places of manufacture. The transportation of the commodity to distant places, by the agents of the society, was attended with great trouble and expense: by selling it immediately at the places of manufacture, so much was saved: and by reserving the distribution to the merchants of the country, a pretended boon was granted to the natives. A maximum price was fixed; and, on the 8th of September, a Committee of Trade was formed, with directions for carrying the plan into execution.

No sooner was this arrangement formed, than Clive brought forward a proposition for prohibiting all future Governors and Presidents from any concern whatsoever in trade. On the 19th of the very same month, in a Minute presented to the Select Committee, he represented, that, "Where such immense revenues are concerned, where power and authority are so enlarged, and where the eye of justice and equity should be ever watchful, a Governor ought not to be embarrassed with private business. He ought to be free from every occupation in which his judgment can possibly be biassed by his interest." He, therefore, proposed, that the Governor should receive a commission of one and one-eighth per cent. upon the revenues; and in return should take a solemn and public oath, and bind himself in a penalty of 150,000*l.* to derive no emolument or advantage from his situation as Governor of Bengal, beyond this commission, with the usual salary and perquisites: and a covenant to this effect was formally executed by him. That good reasons existed for precluding the Governor from such oblique channels of gain, both as giving him sinister interests, and engrossing his time, it is not difficult to perceive: that the same reasons should not have been seen to be good, for precluding, also, the members of the Select Committee and the Council, might, though it need not, excite our surprise.

On the 8th of December, letters arrived from England, dated the 17th of May, addressed both to Clive and the Committee. In these documents, the Directors pronounced the inland trade society to be a violation of their repeated

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orders; declared that all those servants who had been engaged in that society should be held responsible for a breach of their covenants; and commanded that the trade should be abandoned, and should be reserved, free from European competition, to the natives. There was no longer any room for direct disobedience. The dissolution of the society was pronounced. But on the score of the contracts which had been formed and the advances made, the whole of the existing year was reserved; and the society was not abolished, in fact, till the 14th of September, 1768.[1]

Upon the 16th of January, 1767, Lord Clive declared his intention of returning immediately to Europe, on account of his health; and directed the attention of the Select Committee to the regulations which, previous to his departure, it might appear expedient to adopt. By recent instructions the Directors had empowered him either to abolish, or continue the Select Committee, upon his departure, according as the state of affairs might to him appear to require. He felt no hesitation in deciding for its continuance; and named as members Mr. Verelst, who was to succeed him in the chair, Mr. Cartier, Colonel Smith, Mr. Sykes, and Mr. Beecher. He departed in the Britannia; and, on the 17th of February, Mr. Verelst took his oath as successor in the chair.[2]

It was the interest of the servants in India, diligently cultivated, perpetually to feast the Company with the most flattering accounts of the state of their affairs. The magnitude of the transactions, which had recently taken place; the vast riches with which the new acquisitions were said to abound; the general credulity on the subject

[1] Governor Vansittart is very severe in his condemnation of this society. "As I am of opinion," he says, "that an universal equality of trade in these articles (salt, betel-nut, and tobacco,) would be the most beneficial footing it could stand upon; so I think that a monopoly of it in the hands of a few men of power is the most cruel and oppressive. The poor people of the country have not now a hope of redress.—It is a monopoly, in my opinion, of the most injurious nature.—I could set forth the unhappy condition of the people under this grievous monopoly, in the words of a letter, which I have received from one of the country merchants; but I think it needless, because it must occur sufficiently to every reader who has any feeling." A Letter to the Proprietors of India Stock, from Mr. Henry Vansittart, 1767, p. 88, 89, 93.

[2] For the preceding train of events, the principal sources of information were the Reports of the Two Committees of the House of Commons in 1772 and 1773; Vansittart's Narrative; Verelst's View of Bengal; Scott's History of Bengal; Seer Mutakhareen; Clive's Speech.

of Indian opulence, and the great fortunes with which a few individuals had returned to Europe; inflamed the avarice of the proprietors of East India Stock; and rendered them impatient for a share of treasures, which the imaginations of their countrymen, as well as their own, represented as not only vast, but unlimited. This impulse carried them, in 1766, to raise their dividend from six to ten per cent. The inflated conceptions of the nation at large multiplied the purchasers of India stock; and it rose so high as 263 per cent. The proprietors called with importunity for a higher return. It was in vain that the Directors represented the heavy debts of the Company; and pointed out the imprudence of taking an augmented dividend, when money at a heavy interest must be taken up to discharge it. In a General Court held on the 6th of May, 1767, a dividend of twelve and a half per cent. was voted for the year.[1] The public attention was vehemently roused. Even the interference of the minister was commanded. He had condemned the rapacity of the proprietors in augmenting the dividend; and recommended a Committee of the House of Commons, which was actually formed in November 1766, for the purpose of inquiring into the state of their affairs. The relation between the public, and the territory now held by the Company in India, called for definition. It was maintained on the one hand, as an indisputable maxim of law, supported by the strongest considerations of utility, that no subjects of the

1 The opposition of the Directors to this increase of the dividend, founded on a knowledge of the state of the Company's affairs, rendered them unpopular with the body of the proprietors; and advantage was taken of the circumstance to baffle them in a measure which was the natural consequence of the proceedings in Bengal upon Clive's resumption of the government, but of which no notice is taken in the text. As the presents received by the members of the Council upon Nujum-ud-dowla's accession were subsequent to the arrival of the covenants, legal opinions had pronounced that although not formally executed, they were binding in equity, and that the parties were liable to a prosecution for their violation. The Directors had accordingly instituted a suit against those of their servants who had accepted the presents in question. As these persons were now at home, with wealth and friends, great efforts were made to induce the court to drop the proceedings, and the question was mixed up with that of the increase of the dividends; accordingly, on the day when the Directors were overruled on the latter point, and resentment as violent as unmerited, had been excited against them, it was moved and carried that the prosecutions which had been instituted should be dismissed. Life of Clive, iii. 185. The party animosities and angry feelings called into opposition by these discussions, were the motives of the Parliamentary Debates and Investigations that ensued, much more than any sober and statesman-like desire to provide for India the best form of government of which its condition was susceptible.—W.

1767.

Crown could acquire the sovereignty of any territory for themselves, but only for the nation. On the side of the Company, the abstract rights of property, and the endless train of evils which arise from their infringement, were vehemently enforced; while it was affirmed that the Company held not their territories in sovereignty, but only as a farm granted by the Mogul, to whom they actually paid an annual rent. An Act was passed, which directed that, after the 24th of June, 1767, dividends should be voted only by ballot, in General Courts summoned expressly for that purpose; and that no dividend above ten per cent. for the year should be made before the next Session of Parliament. The resolution of the Court of Proprietors respecting a dividend of twelve and a half per cent. was thus rescinded; and the right of Parliament to control and command the Company in the distribution of their own money asserted and established. The question of the sovereignty was not pushed at that time to a direct and express decision; though a decision was virtually involved in another Act, by which the Company, in consideration of holding the territorial revenues for two years, were obliged to pay annually 400,000*l.* into the public exchequer.

The opinion which Lord Clive had artfully[1] raised of the high prosperity of the Company's affairs, and of his own extraordinary share in producing it, directed the overflowings of their gratitude towards himself; and a proposition was brought forward and carried, to grant him, for ten years certain, the produce of his jaghire.

Other acquisitions of Clive come subsequently to view. Notwithstanding the covenants executed by the servants of the Company, not to receive any presents from the natives, that Governor had accepted five lacks of rupees during his late residence in Bengal from the Nabob Nujum-ud-dowla. It was represented, indeed, as a legacy left to him by Meer Jaffier, though all indications pointed out a present, to which the name of legacy was artfully attached.

[1] There does not seem to be any just cause for this epithet. The extension of the Company's territory and power was notorious, and was unquestionably attributable in the main to Clive's genius. The general opinion was the natural result of events, and was not stimulated in any degree by designing or false representations on the part of Clive. He may have overrated the value of the acquisition; but the exaggeration was the honest expression of his own belief, not an artful misrepresentation.—W.

At any rate, if any sums might be acquired under the name of legacies, the covenants against receiving presents were useless forms. Lord Clive represented, that upon the first intimation of this gift, his resolution was to refuse it; that he changed his mind, upon reflecting of what importance it would prove as a fund for the benefit of invalided officers and soldiers in the Company's service; and that he afterwards prevailed upon Syeff-ud-dowla, the successor of Nujum-ud-dowla, to bestow three lacks more for this excellent end. The Company sanctioned the appropriation; and to this ambiguous transaction the Institution at Poplar owes its foundation.[1]

Upon this, as upon his former departure, the regulations which Clive left behind, calculated for present applause rather than permanent advantage, produced a brilliant appearance of immediate prosperity, but were fraught with the elements of future difficulty and distress. A double government, or an administration carried on in name by the Nabob, in reality by the Company, was the favourite policy of Clive;[2] to whose mind a certain degree of crooked artifice seems to have presented itself pretty congenially in the light of profound and skilful politics. The collection of the revenues was still made as for the exchequer of the Nabob; justice was still administered by

[1] The fact is unambiguous. Clive did not benefit by the donation.—W.

[2] The following is an extract of Clive's Letter to the Select Committee of 16th of January, 1767, upon his leaving India: "The first point in politics which I offer to your consideration is the form of government. We are sensible that since the acquisition of the dewanny, the power formerly belonging to the Subah of these provinces is totally, in fact, vested in the East India Company. Nothing remains to him but the name and shadow of authority. This name, however, this shadow, it is indispensably necessary we should seem to venerate.—Under the sanction of a Subah (Subahdar) every encroachment that may be attempted by foreign powers can effectually be crushed, without any apparent interposition of our own authority; and all real grievances complained of by them can, through the same channel, be examined into and redressed. Be it, therefore, always remembered, that there is a Subah; and that though the revenues belong to the Company, the territorial jurisdiction must still rest in the chiefs of the country, acting under him and this Presidency in conjunction. To appoint the Company's servants to the offices of collectors, or indeed to do any act by any exertion of the English power, which can easily be done by the Nabob at our instance, would be throwing off the mask, would be declaring the Company Subah of the provinces. Foreign nations would immediately take umbrage; and complaints preferred to the British court might be attended with very embarrassing consequences. Nor can it be supposed, that either the French, Dutch, or Danes, would readily acknowledge the Company's Subahship, and pay into the hands of their servants the duties upon trade, or the quit-rents of those districts which they may have long been possessed of by virtue of the royal phirmauns, or grants from former Nabobs."

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his officers and in his name; and all transactions with foreign powers were covered with the mask of his authority. For the benefit of certain false pretexts which imposed upon nobody, the government of the country, as far as regarded the protection of the people, was dissolved. Neither the Nabob nor his officers dared to exert any authority against the English, of whatsoever injustice and oppression they might be guilty. The gomastahs, or Indian agents employed by the Company's servants, not only practised unbounded tyranny, but, overawing the Nabob and his highest officer, converted the tribunals of justice themselves into instruments of cruelty, making them inflict punishment upon the very wretches whom they oppressed, and whose only crime was their not submitting with sufficient willingness to the insolent rapacity of those subordinate tyrants. While the ancient administration of the country was rendered inefficient, this suspension of the powers of government was supplied by nothing in the regulations of the English. Beyond the ancient limits of the Presidency, the Company had no legal power over the natives: beyond these limits, the English themselves were not amenable to the British laws; and the Company had no power of coercion except by sending persons out of the country; a remedy always inconvenient, and, except for very heinous offences, operating too severely upon the individual to be willingly applied. The natural consequence was, that the crimes of the English and their agents were in a great measure secured from punishment, and the unhappy natives lay prostrate at their feet. As the revenue of the government depended upon the productive operations of the people; and as a people are productive only in proportion to the share of their own produce which they are permitted to enjoy; this wretched administration could not fail, in time, to make itself felt in the Company's exchequer.[1] Other sources were not

[1] Governor Verelst, in his letter to the Directors, immediately before his resignation, dated 16th December, 1769, says, "We insensibly broke down the barrier betwixt us and government, and the native grew uncertain where his obedience was due. Such a divided and complicated authority gave rise to oppressions and intrigues, unknown at any other period; the officers of government caught the infection, and, being removed from any immediate control, proceeded with still greater audacity. In the meantime, we were repeatedly and peremptorily forbid to avow any public authority over the officers of government in our own names," &c.

wanting, whence a copious stream of evils was derived. Though the Governor and Council placed the powers of the Nabob in a sort of commission, by compelling him to resign the entire management of business to one or more persons of their own choosing; and though they placed a confidential servant of the Company to watch them at the Nabob's durbar; yet they possessed not over these depositaries of power, whom they could only punish by dismissal, sufficient means of control. Before detection, or much of suspicion, it was always possible for each of them to appropriate a treasure, and be gone; leaving his place to be filled by another who had both temptation and opportunity to repeat his crimes. With men whose interests were so little united with those of their employers, and whose situation was so very precarious, the Zemindars, Rajas, and other agents of the revenue, might easily settle their own terms, and place the fallacy of their accounts beyond the reach of detection. The mischief was less in practice than reason would have anticipated; because in the choice of these native functionaries, the English were both judicious and happy. Another, and that the most pernicious perhaps of all the errors into which Clive exerted himself to mislead the Company, was, the belief which he created, that India overflowed with riches, the expectations he raised, and on which the credulous Company so fondly relied, that a torrent of treasure was about to flow into their laps. As such expectations were adverse to the best use and improvement of their resources, they only hastened that disappointment and distress which their inconsistency with the matters of fact rendered a necessary consequence. In political affairs, it is long before even experience teaches wisdom. Till the present moment, incessant promises of treasure have never failed to deceive without ceasing to delude. As often as the pain of disappointment has become exceedingly severe, we have condemned a Governor, in whose conduct we believed that we had found the cause of our misery; and have begun immediately to pamper our fancy anew, with endless hopes and delusions.

Under the feebleness of Suja-ad-dowla, and the quarrels which occupied the Mahrattas at home, the Company enjoyed profound tranquillity in Bengal for a considerable

1767.

number of years; and during the administrations of Mr. Verelst and Mr. Cartier, who occupied the chair till the elevation of Mr. Hastings, and were calm, unambitious men, few events of historical importance occurred. It was during a period like this, if ever, that the Company ought to have replenished their exchequer, and to have attained financial prosperity. During this period, on the other hand, financial difficulties were continually increasing; and rose at last to a height which threatened them with immediate destruction. Doubtless, the anarchical state, in which, by the double government, the provinces were placed, contributed powerfully to impoverishment; but the surplus revenue, with which the people of England were taught to delude themselves, was hindered by more permanent causes. Though no body should believe it, India, like other countries, in which the industrious arts are in their infancy, and in which law is too imperfect to render property secure, has always been poor. It is only the last perfection of government which enables a government to keep its own expense from absorbing every thing which it is possible to extract from the people: and the government of India, under the East India Company, by a delegation of servants at the distance of half the circumference of the globe from control, was most unhappily circumstanced for economy. On a subject like this, authority is useful. "With regard to the increase of the expenses," says Clive, "I take the case to stand thus: Before the Company became possessed of the dewannee, their agents had other ways of making fortunes. Presents were open to them. They are now at an end. It was expedient for them to find some other channel—the channel of the civil and military charges. Every man now who is permitted to make a bill, makes a fortune."[1]

During the year 1767, a march of the Abdallee Shah towards Delhi, excited the attention, though not much the alarm, of the Presidency. After some contests with the Seiks, and overrunning a few of the provinces, that powerful Chief returned to his own country. An expedition was undertaken for the restoration of the Raja of Nepaul, who had been dispossessed by his neighbour the

[1] Clive's Speech, as published by himself, reprinted in Almon's Debates for 1772, p. 44.

Ghurka. The motives were: that Nepaul had carried on a considerable traffic with the province of Behar; that its vicinity to the district of Bettea afforded great opportunities for the improvement of trade; that all intercourse was now destroyed; and that the accomplishment of the object was easy. On the last point, at least, the authors of the war were not very correctly informed; and found they had miscalculated the difficulties of subduing a country, surrounded by mountains, and accessible only by a few narrow and nearly impenetrable defiles. The officer sent to command the expedition was unable to proceed, and wrote for reinforcements. The Presidency were violently disappointed; and felt a strong inclination to wreak their vengeance upon the Commander. Being obliged to send assistance to Madras, they were unable to afford reinforcements, and recalled the detachment.[1] The war with Hyder Ali had now broken out in the Carnatic; and considerable supplies, both in men and money, were demanded from Bengal. This year financial distress began to be experienced. Complaints were first emitted of the scarcity of money, ascribed, not to impoverishment of the country, but to a drain of specie, occasioned by the annual exportation of the precious metals, chiefly to China, on account of the Company's investment, and also in other directions; while the usual supplies of bullion from Europe (the Company providing their investment from the revenues, the Dutch and French from the fortunes of the English consigned to them for transmission) were almost wholly cut off.[2]

[1] Letters from the Presidency, to the Directors, Verelst's Appendix.

[2] In the letter of the Select Committee to the Directors, dated Fort William, September 26th, 1767, they say, "We have frequently expressed to you our apprehensions lest the annual exportation of treasure to China would produce a scarcity of money in the country. This subject becomes every day more serious, as we already feel in a very sensible manner, the effects of the considerable drain made from the silver currency." And in their letter of the 16th of December, they add, "We foresee the difficulties before us in making provision agreeably to your orders for supplying China with silver bullion even for this season. We have before repeatedly requested your attention to the consequences of this exportation of bullion; and we now beg leave to recommend the subject to your most serious consideration — assuring you, that, should we find it at all practicable to make the usual remittances next year to China, the measure will prove fatal to your investment, and ruinous to the commerce of Bengal."—The absurdity of the theory which they invented to account for the want of money, that is, of resources, (to wit, the drain of specie,) is shown by this fact; that the price of commodities all the while, instead of falling, had immensely risen. See the testimonies of Hastings and Francis, in their minutes on the revenue plans. Sixth Report of the Select Committee in 1781, Appendix xiv. and xv.

BOOK IV. CHAP. VII. 1768.

Early in the year 1768, arrived the Company's peremptory order for abolishing entirely the trade of their servants in salt, and other articles of interior traffic; for laying it open, and confining it to the natives; and for restricting their servants entirely to the maritime branches of commerce.[1]

The commission of one and one-eighth per cent. upon the dewannee revenues, which by the Select Committee had been settled upon the Governor as a compensation for relinquishing his share in the salt trade, was also commanded to cease. For as much, however, as the income of their servants, if thus cut off from irregular sources of gain, was represented as not sufficiently opulent, the Company granted a commission of two and a half per cent. upon the net produce of the dewannee revenues, to be divided into 100 equal shares, and distributed in the following proportions: to the Governor, thirty-one shares; to the second in Council, four and a half; to the rest of the Select Committee, not having a chiefship, each three and a half shares; to the Members of the Council not having a chiefship, each one and a half; to the Commander-in-Chief, seven and a half shares; to Colonels each, two and a half; Lieutenant-Colonels, each, one and a half; and to Majors, three fourths. An additional pay was allotted to Captains, of three shillings, Lieutenants two shillings, and Ensigns one shilling per day.

Some uneasiness still continued with respect to the designs of Suja-ad-dowla, between whom and the Emperor considerable discordance prevailed. The directors had forwarded the most positive orders for recalling the brigade from Allahabad; and for confining the operations of the Company's army entirely within the limits of the Company's territory. The Council thought it necessary to disobey; and in their letter went so far as to say that they "must express their great astonishment at such an absolute restriction, without permitting them upon the

[1] "Past experience," they say, "has so impressed us with the idea of the necessity of confining our servants, and Europeans residing under our protection, within the ancient limits of our export and import trade, that we look on every innovation in the inland trade as an intrusion on the natural right of the natives of the country, who now more particularly claim our protection; and we esteem it as much our duty to maintain this barrier between the two commercial rights, as to defend the provinces from foreign invasion." Letter from the Directors, dated 20th November, 1767.

spot to judge how far, from time and circumstances, it might be detrimental to their affairs."

1768.

The most important particular in the situation of the Company in Bengal was the growing scarcity of pecuniary means. In the letter from the Select Committee to the Court of Directors, dated 21st November, 1768, "You will perceive," they say, "by the state of your treasury, a total inability to discharge many sums which you are indebted to individuals for deposits in your cash, as well as to issue any part of the considerable advances required for the service of every public department. And you will no longer deem us reprehensible, if a decrease in the amount of your future investments, and a debasement of their quality, should prove the consequence."

By a correspondence between the Presidencies of Fort William and Fort St. George, in the beginning of March, 1769, the dangerous consequences to be apprehended from the exhausted state of their treasuries, and the necessity of establishing a fund against future emergencies, were mutually explained and acknowledged. In two separate consultations, held by the President and Council at Fort William, in the months of May and August, the utility, or rather the indispensable necessity, of such a fund underwent a solemn discussion, and was pronounced to be without dispute. But as the expences of the government left no resource for the creation of it, except the diminution of the investment, or quantity of goods transmitted to the Company in England, they resolved upon that reduction, and limited to forty-five lacks the investment of the year.

Even this resource was in a very short time perceived to be insufficient. On the 23rd of October, a deficiency of 6,63,055 rupees appeared on the balance of receipts and disbursements; and the President and Council in their Minute declared, "That however the public might have been flattered, they could not flatter themselves, with any expectations from their revenue; and that the only expedient within their reach was to open their treasury doors for remittances." [1]

[1] The President and Council of Fort William, in their letter (dated the 21st of March, 1769) to the President and Council of Fort St. George, speak in pathetic terms of "the incontestible evidence they had transmitted to their

1768.

These remittances consisted chiefly of the money or fortunes of the individuals who had grown rich in the Company's service, and who were desirous of transmitting their acquisitions to Europe. Such persons were eager to pay their money to the Company's government in India, upon receiving an obligation for repayment from the Company in England; in the language of commerce, for a bill upon the Company payable in England. The money thus received, in other words borrowed, was applied to the exigences of the service; and by augmenting their resources, was always highly agreeable to the servants in India. The payment, however, of these loans or bills in England was apt to become exceedingly inconvenient to the Directors. The sole fund out of which the payment could be made was the sale of the investment, or the goods transmitted to them from India and China. If the quantity of these goods was less in value than afforded a surplus equal to the amount of the bills which were drawn upon them, they remained so far deficient in the ability to pay. And if the goods were sent in too exorbitant a quantity, the market was insufficient to carry them off.

An opposition of interests was thus created between the governing part of the servants abroad, and the Court of Directors and Proprietors at home. For the facility of their operations, and the success of their government, it was of great importance for the servants to preserve a full treasury in India, secured by a small investment, and the receipt of money for bills. It was the interest of the Directors to have an ample supply of money at home, which on the other hand could only be produced by a large investment and a moderate transmission of bills. The Directors, accordingly, had given very explicit instructions on this subject; and in their letter of the 11th of November, 1768, after acknowledging the growing deficiency of the funds in India, had said: "Nevertheless, we cannot suffer ourselves to be drawn upon to an unlimited amount, the state of the Company's affairs here not yet admitting us to answer large drafts upon us from India; but should the exigency of your affairs require

honourable masters of the exaggerated light in which their new acquired advantages had been placed," and the change of views which they expected them in consequence to adopt.

your receiving money into your treasury, we prefer the mode of borrowing at interest to that of granting bills upon us. We therefore permit you to take up such sums on interest, for one year certain, as will answer your various demands, which are to be paid off at the expiration of that period, or as soon after as the state of your treasury will admit of. You are, therefore, to confine your drafts upon us, by the ships to be despatched from your Presidency in the season of 1769, to the same amount we allowed last year, viz., 70,000*l*." [1]

When the amount of the sums which it was the desi of individuals to send home exceeded the amount whi it was permitted to the government in India to receive, other words to draw bills for upon the Company at hom the parties who were deprived of this channel of remi tance betook themselves to the French and Dutch fact ries, and paid the money into their treasuries for bil upon their respective companies, payable in Europe. Th from an early period of Mr. Verelst's administration, h constituted a heavy subject of complaint; as maki these subordinate settlers to abound with money, whi the English were oppressed with want. As he ascrib the financial difficulties of the Company's governme merely to a defect of currency not of revenue, as ascribed the defect of currency to the remittances whi were forced into the Dutch and French channels; thou neither of these nations carried any specie out of Ind and were only saved to a certain extent the necessity importing bullion; to him it appeared surprising that t Dutch and French Companies should find it easy to pay t bills which were drawn upon them for money received India, but that the English Company should find it ir

[1] Eighth Report from the Committee of Secrecy, 1773, Appendix, No. In their letter, 17th March, 1769, they so far modify their former directio as to say, "Upon reconsidering the subject of remittances, we find it so co nected with that of the investment, that the increase of the former m always depend on that of the latter. The produce of our sales here is t only channel of our receipts; and our flourishing situation in India would n avail us, if we were to suffer ourselves to be drawn upon to the amount of t cost of our homeward cargoes. In order therefore to unite the advantag of the Company and their servants, we do permit you to increase your r mittances, by the ships despatched from Bengal in the season of 1769, beyo the limitation in our letter of the 11th November last, so far as one half of t sum which your investment sent home in that season shall exceed the amou of sixty lacs. But if you do not send home an investment exceeding t sum, you must then confine your drafts upon us agreeably to our said lett of the 11th November last."

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possible; and he ascribed the restrictions which they imposed to a timid and narrow spirit.[1] One circumstance, however, which constituted a most important difference, he was ill situated to perceive. The French and Dutch Companies were chiefly commercial; and whatever money was received in India was laid out in the purchase of goods; these goods were carried to Europe, and sold before the bills became due; the bills were paid out of the proceeds; and a great trade was thus carried on upon English capital. The English Company, on the other hand, was become a regal, as well as a commercial body; the money which was paid for remittance into their treasury in India was absorbed in the expence of the government;[2] and so

[1] In his letter to the Directors, dated 26th September, 1768, he says, "The extent of the Dutch and French credit exceeds all conception, and their bills are even solicited as favours. The precise sums received by them for some years I have endeavoured to ascertain, though hitherto without success: but if we only form our idea from the bills drawn this year from Europe on individuals here and Madras, the amount will appear prodigious and alarming. Advices of drafts and letters of credit have been already received to the amount of twenty-eight lacs on Bengal, and ten on Madras; and I have the most certain information that their treasuries at Pondicherry and Chandernagore, are amply furnished with all provision for both their investments and expenses for three years to come. You have often complained of the increase and superiority of the French and Dutch investments; but your orders and regulations have furnished them with the most extensive means of both. It is in vain to threaten dismission from your service, or forfeiture of your protection, for sending home money by foreign cash, while you open no doors for remittances yourselves. Such menaces may render the practice more secret and cautious; but will never diminish, much less remove the evil." Verelst's Appendix, p. 113. So much did Mr. Verelst's imagination deceive him, in regard to the prosperity of the English rivals, that the exclusive privileges of the French Company, after they had struggled for some time on the verge of bankruptcy, were suspended by the King, and the trade laid open to all the nation. They were found unable to extricate themselves from their difficulties; and resigning their effects into the hands of government, for certain government annuities to the proprietors of stock, the Company were in reality dissolved. Raynal, viii. sect. 26, 27.

[2] This is not warranted by the facts: a slight examination of the general accounts of receipts and disbursements exhibited in the accounts of the Bengal Presidency published by the Select Committee shows, that the financial difficulties experienced there arose not from the political, but the commercial transactions of the Company. From 1761 to 1772, there was a surplus on the territorial account of about 5,475,000*l.* (the smaller figures are purposely omitted). The whole produce of the import cargoes was 1,437,000*l.*, the cost value of the goods remitted to England, 5,291,000*l.*, of which, therefore, 3,854,000*l.* had been provided out of the revenue. Besides this, large remittances for commercial purposes had been made to other settlements, and to China, exceeding those received by 2,358,000*l.*, and consequently, exceeding the whole territorial receipt by 737,000*l.* It is not matter of surprise, therefore, that the territorial treasury was embarrassed, nor is it to be wondered at that the resources of the country were in progress of diminution, the constant abstraction of capital, whether in bullion or goods could not fail in time to impoverish any country however rich, and was very soon felt in India, in which no accumulation of capital had ever taken place from the unsettled state of the Government, and the insecurity of property, and the constant tendency of the population to press upon the means of subsistence.—W.

much only as could be spared was employed in the purchase of investment. This was the cause undoubtedly of the comparative inability of the English Directors to pay the bills which were drawn upon them.

In the Consultation of the 23d of October, in consideration of great exigency, it was resolved, that the board would receive all moneys tendered to the Company's treasury from that day to the 1st of November, 1770; and at the option of the lenders, grant, either interest notes payable in one year; or receipts bearing interest at eight per cent. for bills to be granted at the sailing of the first ship after the 22nd of November, 1770, payable with three per cent. interest, in equal proportions on each tender, at one, two, and three years' sight. And as a resource to the Directors, it was resolved to enlarge the investment by purchasing, not with ready money, but with bonds at eight per cent. and one year's credit. This was the last considerable act in which the Governor was engaged. He resigned his office on the 24th of December, and was succeeded by Mr. Cartier. A new treaty had been concluded with Suja-ad-Dowla, which allayed whatever suspicions the ambiguous conduct of that Governor had raised, and Mr. Verelst left the three provinces in profound tranquillity.[1]

CHAPTER VIII.

Subahdar of the Deccan dethroned by his Brother.—The English take possession of the Northern Circars.—Make a Treaty with the Subahdar of the Deccan.—Which embroils them with Hyder Ali.—Hyder's first War with the English.—New Treaty with the Subahdar.—Peace with Hyder.

THE Carnatic remained but a short time free from the pressure of the neighbouring powers. In the superior government of the Deccan, Nizam Ali, who had resumed, upon the departure of Bussy, the commanding station which he formerly occupied, made no delay in

[1] The principal materials, before the public, for the history of Verelst's administration, are found in the Reports of the Two Committees of 1772, and in the Appendix to his own View of Bengal. Information, but needing to be cautiously gleaned, is obtained from the numerous Tracts of the day.

employing all his advantages to effect the dethronement of his feeble-minded brother. On the 18th of July, 1761, he committed the Subahdar to a prison; and invested himself with the full powers and insignia of the government.

1765.

The treaty, by the provisions of which the pretensions of England and France were at this time adjusted, affords a singular illustration of the obvious and neglected truth, that the knowledge requisite for good government in India cannot be possessed by rulers sitting and deliberating in Europe. By the treaty of Paris, concluded on the 10th of February, 1763, Salabut Jung was acknowledged as lawful Subahdar of the Deccan, after he had been nearly two years dethroned, and another reigning in his stead. This instrument, indeed, which recognised Salabut Jung as a great sovereign, was the immediate cause of his death; for Nizam Ali, who had been withheld by dread of the restoration of the French power in India, no sooner received intelligence of the treaty of Paris, by which the French resigned the Carnatic, and appeared to abandon the contest, than he felt himself delivered from all restraint, and ordered his brother to be murdered in September, 1763.

With little concern about Bassalut Jung, who nevertheless was elder brother of Nizam Ali, that usurper, at once a regicide and fratricide, now grasped, without a rival, the power of Subahdar of the Deccan. The personal title or name of himself and his father have by the English been converted into the appellative of his sovereignty; and it is under the title of the Nizam, that the Subahdar of the Deccan is commonly known.

In the beginning of the year 1765, the English and Mohammed Ali their Nabob were summoned to action, by the irruption of Nizam Ali into the Carnatic. With a great army, which seemed to have no object in view but plunder and destruction, he laid waste the open country with a ferocity, even greater than the usual barbarity of Indian warfare. The troops of the English and Nabob were put in motion from Arcot, under the command of Colonel Campbell, and came in sight of the enemy at the Pagoda of Tripeti. The Nizam felt no desire to fight. His army was reduced to great distress for provisions and

water. He decamped accordingly on a sudden, and marching forty miles in one day, evacuated the Carnatic by way of Colastri and Nelore.

1765.

It was at this time that Lord Clive, on his passage from Europe to Bengal, arrived at Madras. The ascendancy of the English over the Mogul, the unfortunate and nominal Emperor Shah Aulum, rendered it extremely easy to procure from him those imperial grants which, however little respected by the sword, still gave the appearance of legal right to territorial possession within the ancient limits of the Mogul empire. A firmaun was solicited and obtained for the maritime districts, known by the title of the Northern Circars. Like the rest of India, this tract was held by renters responsible for a certain portion of revenue. Of these some were of recent appointment; others were the ancient Rajas and Polygars of the country; a set of men who were often found to be the most convenient renters, and who, on the regular payment of the expected revenue, were seldom displaced. The country fell within the government of the Subahdar of the Deccan, and was managed by a deputy or commissioner of his appointment. After the English, however, had expelled from it the French, the authority of the Subahdar had been rather nominal than real. The English held possession of their factories and forts; the Rajas and Polygars assumed a species of independence; Salabut Jung had offered it to Mohammed Ali at the time of his quarrel with Bussy at Hyderabad; and Nizam Ali himself had proposed to surrender it to the English, on the condition of military assistance against Hyder Ali and the Mahrattas. The advantage of possessing the whole line of coast which joined the English territories in the Carnatic to those in Bengal, suggested to Clive the importance of obtaining it on permanent terms.[1] A firmaun was accordingly received from the Emperor, by which, as far as the formality of his sanction could extend, the Northern Circars were freed from their dependence upon the Subahdar of the Deccan, and bestowed upon the English. Nor was this the only diminution which the nominal empire of the Nizam

[1] The acquisition of the Northern Circars did not give the English the whole of the sea-coast: the province of Orissa held by the Mahrattas separated them from Bengal.—W.

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sustained; for another firmaun was procured from the Emperor, by which the Carnatic itself was rendered independent of his authority; and bestowed, holding immediately of the Emperor, upon the Nabob Mohammed Ali, together with the new titles of Walla Jah, Ummir ul Hind, which he ever afterwards used.[1]

To take possession of the Circars, on its new and independent footing, General Calliaud marched with the troops of the Carnatic, and on the part of the Rajas and Polygars found little opposition to subdue. The Nizam, or Subahdar, was at that time engaged in the country of Barad, making head against the Mahrattas. But he no sooner heard of the operations of the English, than he proceeded with great expedition to Hyderabad; and to avenge himself for the usurpation, as it appeared to him, of an important part of his dominions, made preparations for the invasion of the Carnatic. The Presidency, whom their pecuniary weakness rendered timid, were alarmed at the prospect of a war with the Subahdar; and sent orders to Calliaud to hasten to Hyderabad with full powers to negociate a peace. A treaty was concluded on the 12th of November, 1766, by which the Company agreed to pay to the Nizam an annual tribute of five lacks of rupees for the three Circars of Rajamundry, Ellore, and Mustephanagur; and for those of Siccacole (Chicacole) and Murtezanagur, two lacks each, as soon as they were definitively placed in their hands. Murtezanagur, commonly called Guntoor, had been assigned as a jaghire to Bassalut Jung; and the Company

[1] It is stated that Clive even entertained the project of obtaining for Mohammed Ali the firmaun of Subahdar of the Deccan; but that the Nabob, who it is true was worn out with the struggle which he had already sustained, who now panted for ease and enjoyment, and whose qualities Clive estimated at more than their actual value (in his correspondence with the Directors he represents his word as more trustworthy than that of any Mohammedan whom he had ever known. Reports of Committee, 1772), shrunk from the prospect of the arduous enterprise, and declared that "the Deccan was too great for him to desire to have the charge of its government." Letter from the Nabob to Clive in 1765, MS. quoted (p. 150) by the author of the History and Management of the East India Company.—It is also affirmed, perhaps on better grounds (Observations by the President and Council, on Sir John Lindsay's Letter of the 22nd of June, 1771: Papers in Rous's Appendix, p. 371) that the Nabob used his endeavours to obtain the exertion of the English power to procure him this high elevation; but met not with a corresponding disposition in the servants of the Company. The point is not of sufficient importance to require that we should spend any time in endeavouring to ascertain whether the one allegation or the other is the truth.—M.

It is wholly incredible that Mohammed Ali would have refused the Subahdari of the Deccan, if he had had a reasonable prospect of obtaining it. —W.

1767.

were pleased to suspend their occupation of it, so long as Bassalut Jung should live, or so long as he should remain a faithful subject to Nizam Ali. They further engaged to hold a body of troops in readiness, "to settle in every thing right and proper, the affairs of his Highness's government." And they give him a present of five lacks of rupees, which the Nabob was ordered to find money to pay.[1]

This treaty has been severely condemned. But the Presidency were not mistaken in regard to their own pecuniary difficulties, though they probably over-estimated the power of the Nizam, whose unpaid and mutinous troops the money which he received by the treaty scarcely enabled him for a short time to appease. The most imprudent article of the agreement was that which stipulated for the Nizam the assistance of English troops; because this had an evident tendency to embroil, and in the event did actually embroil them, with other powers. The exploit in which they were first to be employed, the reduction of the fort of Bangalore, was not, it is probable, disliked by the Presidency; because they were already upon hostile terms with Hyder Ali, to whom it belonged. The Nizam, however, after availing himself of the assistance of the British troops in collecting the tribute of the Polygars, on his march, listened to the overtures of Hyder, who was too eminent a master in the arts of intrigue to let slip an opportunity of dividing his enemies. The Nizam concluded with him a treaty of alliance, in consequence of which they united their forces at Bangalore: and in August 1767, they began to make incursions into the Carnatic.

Hyder Ali, who began to occupy the attention of the English, and who proved the most formidable enemy whom they had ever encountered in India, had now rendered himself entire master of the kingdom of Mysore. The principality of Mysore, a region of considerable magnitude, had formed one of the dependencies of the great Hindu Government of Bijanuggur, which was broken up by the formation of the Mohammedan kingdoms in the Deccan. When the declining power of the sovereigns of Bijanuggur

[1] Second Report of the Committee of Secrecy in 1761, p. 22; Hist. and Management, p. 151; Collection of Treaties, p. 364.

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enabled Mysore to throw off its dependence upon that ancient monarchy, its distance and other local circumstances saved it from subjection to any of the Mohammedan powers. It continued, therefore, till the period of Hyder's usurpation, under a pure Hindu government, and afforded a satisfactory specimen of the political institutions of the native Hindus. The arts of government were less understood in that, than in the Mohammedan districts of India. Hardly ever have mankind been united in considerable societies under a form of polity more rude, than that which has every where been found in those parts of India which remained purely Hindu.[1] At a period considerably prior to the rise of Hyder, the government of Mysore had assumed that state, which, if we may judge by its own example, and that of the Mahrattas, Hindu governments had a general tendency to assume. The Raja, or Monarch, was stripped of all power, while a minister kept him a prisoner, and governed absolutely in his name. At the time when the wars of the English in the Carnatic commenced, the powers of the Raja of Mysore were usurped by two brothers, named Deoraj, and Nunjeraj. It was this same Nunjeraj, whom the French were enabled to bring to their assistance at Trichinopoly; and who there exhibited so many specimens of the rudeness of his people, and of his own ignorance and incapacity. And it was in the station of a subordinate officer in the service of this commander, that Hyder Ali began his career.

Mohammed Beloli, the great grandfather of Hyder, was a native of the Punjab, who came into the Deccan in the character of a fakir, and, settling in the district of Calburga, about 110 miles in a north-west direction from Hyderabad, acquired considerable property by the exercise of his religious talents. Mohammed Beloli had two sons, Mohammed Ali, and Mohammed Wullee. They left their father's house, and travelling southward, became at Sera, revenue peons, or armed men, employed, according to Indian practice, in the forced collection of the taxes. Mohammed Ali died at Colar, and Mohammed Wullee, for the sake of his property, expelled his widow and son, and drove them from his doors. The name of the son was

[1] See the illustrations of the Mysore Government, in the instructive volume of Col. Wilks.

1767.

Futtuh Mohammed, the father of Hyder. He obtained along with his mother, protection from a petty officer, called a Naik of peons, by whom he was brought up, and employed as a peon, or common foot soldier, in the party under his command. Futtuh Mohammed found means to distinguish himself, and, in the service of the Nabob of Sera, became, first a Naik of peons, and afterwards the Fojedar, or military superintendent of a district. But misfortune overtook his master. The Nabob was dethroned, his family plundered; and Futtuh Mohammed lost his life in their defence. He left two sons, the elder Shabas, the youngest Hyder, and a widow, who had a brother, the Naik of a few peons, in the service of a Killedar of Bangalore. With this man, the mother of Hyder sought, and, together with her sons, obtained protection. When Shabas, the elder of the brothers, grew towards manhood, he was recommended by his uncle to an officer in the service of the Raja of Mysore. The youth quickly rose to distinction, and obtained the command of 200 horse and 1000 peons. Hyder, till the age of twenty-seven, could be confined to no serious pursuit, but spent his life between the labours of the chase, and the pleasures of voluptuous indolence and riot. He joined, however, the troops of Mysore, as a volunteer at the siege of Deonhully, the castle of a Polygar, about twenty-four miles north-east from Bangalore, which, in 1749, Nunjeraj undertook to reduce. On this occasion the ardour, the courage, and the mental resources of Hyder, drew upon him the attention of the general; and, at the termination of the siege, he was not only raised to the command of fifty horse, and 200 peons, or foot, but was intrusted with the charge of one of the gates of the fortress.

He continued to recommend himself with so much success to Nunjeraj, that, when the efforts of the English to establish their authority in Madura and Tinivelly, in 1755, rendered precarious the possession of the fort of Dindegul, Hyder was chosen as the man on whom its defence could, with greatest security, repose. It was situated on a high rock in the middle of a plain, at nearly an equal distance, of about fifty miles from Madura and Trichinopoly; and amid the confusions of the Carnatic had fallen into the hands of the Mysoreans about ten years before. This ele-

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vation added fuel to the ambition of Hyder; and from this period his exertions in its gratification became conspicuous and incessant.

The depredations upon which all Indian, and other barbarous warriors, are so much accustomed to subsist, he reduced to a system. There are in India, and in particular in that part of it to which he belonged, a species of troops, or of men bearing the title of soldiers, who are particularly skilled in all the arts of plunder and of theft; who receive, indeed, no pay in the armies of most of the Indian states, but are understood to provide for themselves by the devastations which they commit. A body of these men Hyder engaged in his service; and employed in the business of depredation. Hyder had never learned either to write or to read; but he valued himself upon the faculty of performing exactly by memory arithmetical calculations, with greater velocity than the most expert accountants. He agreed with his depredators to receive from them one half of the spoil; and so skilfully, we are told, were his checks contrived, that it was nearly impossible for any part of it to be concealed. It was of little importance to Hyder, or to his gang, when the convenience and safety were equal, whether the property which they acquired was taken from friends or from foes. Valuables of every description were their prey; "from convoys of grain," says Mr. Wilks, "cattle and sheep, which were among the most profitable heads of plunder, down to the clothes, turbans, and earrings of travellers and villagers, men, women, and children." Thus it was, that Hyder acquired the sinews of war; and before he left Trichinopoly, to which he had repaired in the army of Nunjeraj, he was a commander of 1500 horse, 3000 regular infantry, 2000 peons, and four guns. Having enlisted the most select of the men discharged by Nunjeraj, he departed for Dindegul at the head of 2500 horse, 5000 regular infantry, and 2000 peons, with six guns. He employed against the polygars of his district and its neighbourhood the arts of fraud and of force, with equal success. His vigilant eye discovered, and his activity drained, every source of revenue. He excelled in deceiving the government with false musters and accounts; and the treasures of Hyder were daily augmented. The distracted state of Madura, in 1757, encou-

raged him to make an effort to gain possession of that country; but Mohammed Issoof marched against him at the head of the English Sepoys, and gave him a severe defeat at the mouth of the narrow pass of Natam. 1767.

The weak and distracted state of the government of Mysore afforded opportunity to Hyder of ascending gradually to higher and higher situations and power. The Raja, who was uneasy at the state of insignificance in which he was held, harassed the ministers with perpetual intrigues; and the brothers themselves were so little united, that Deoraj, who had most of years and of prudence, retired from the scene in disgust, and left Nunjeraj alone to sustain the weight of affairs. The treasury had been exhausted by repeated exactions of the Mahrattas; and 1758 the troops of Nunjeraj mutinied for payment of arrears.

This was an occasion on which Hyder conceived that he might interpose his authority with advantage. He marched from Dindegul with the whole of his disposable troops; exerted himself with success in effecting a reconciliation between the brothers, and between the brothers and the Raja; with his strict and experienced eye he examined and reduced the false accounts of the army; and, by effecting a partial payment of arrears, restored the troops to obedience. In this transaction he had sustained the character of a friend to all; and took care to be rewarded in proportion. An assignment was made to him of the revenues of a tract of country for sums due by the government; and the fort and district of Bangalore were bestowed upon him in personal jaghire. The moment looked favourable for securing what he probably deemed a greater advantage. Herri Sing was one of the most powerful chiefs in the service of Mysore, and the declared enemy of Hyder. Under pretence of forwarding part of his troops to Dindegul, Hyder sent a large detachment to attack the camp of Herri Sing, who, reposing in careless security, was surprised, with a large portion of his troops, and massacred in the middle of the night.

An invasion of the Mahrattas, which immediately followed, in the beginning of 1759, contributed more remarkably to the elevation of Hyder. Though several of the principal commanders disdained to serve under a man

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whom they had so lately seen in a very subordinate station, he was appointed to the chief command against this formidable enemy; and acquitted himself with so much vigour and success, that before the end of the campaign he reduced them to an inclination for peace; and concluded a treaty on what were deemed favourable terms.

Hyder was now advanced to the rank and power of commander-in-chief, and had only his friend and patron Nunjeraj, for Deoraj was dead, between him and the entire control of the resources of the state. Hyder's impatience admitted little delay. To secure the countenance of the Raja against a man who was at once his robber and his gaoler, was an easy intrigue; and the troops, whose arrears had not been fully paid, and had again increased, were artfully incited to mutiny against Nunjeraj, and to place Hyder, by compulsion, at their head. The Raja now imposed, and offered to procure pay for the troops, as soon as Hyder should take an oath to be obedient, and to renounce his connexion with the usurping minister. Hyder failed not to exhibit reluctance; but at last allowed himself to be constrained; and Nunjeraj, who could not any longer misunderstand the game, and whose courage was not remarkable, consented to retire, upon the condition of receiving an honourable provision. The Raja was complimented with the show of greater liberty; but Hyder, to be enabled to provide for the arrears, and the regular pay of the troops, took care to procure the assignment of the revenues of so many districts, that what was now in his direct possession exceeded half the territory of the state.

In March, 1751, Hyder received overtures from Lally, inviting him to his assistance against the English; and, amid the contentions of the rival strangers, looked forward to acquisitions in the Carnatic. To pave the way for the share which he proposed to take in determining the fate of that important region, he resolved to obtain possession of the territory which separated Mysore from the confines of the Carnatic, and which consisted first of the territory of Anicul, situated on the eastern verge of the tract of woody hills, between Savendy Droog and the Cavery, and next of the Baramahal, a province situated on the intermediate level between the first and second ranges of

hills. Immediately after the termination of the stratagem against Nunjeraj, a part of the troops, with a confidential general, were detached to occupy this intermediate territory, which opened a safe communication into the very centre of the province of Arcot. Anicul and Baramahal were secured; and the General proceeded to Pondicherry, under orders from Hyder, to settle the terms of co-operation with the French. These were speedily adjusted; and, on the 4th of June, 1760, a detachment of the Mysorean army arrived at Thiagar, which was surrendered to them by the treaty. The defeat which was sustained by a detachment of the English army, sent to intercept the Mysoreans on their march to Pondicherry, greatly elevated the spirits of Hyder; and inspired him with a resolution to exert his strength in the war of the Carnatic. Several divisions of his troops were ordered to assemble in Baramahal; and the affairs of the Carnatic might have undergone a revolution, had not a storm arisen in another quarter which it required all the address and power of Hyder to elude.

The distant employment of the troops of Hyder, and his own position, with a small detachment, under command of the guns of the palace, and surrounded by the river, which, being now full, it was impossible to pass, suggested to the queen-mother the possibility of cutting him off, and delivering her son from the thraldom in which it was the evident intention of Hyder to retain him. The assistance was secured of a Mahratta chief, who was at the head of an army in a neighbouring territory; and a cannonade began. Hyder soon discovered that his situation was desperate: but the main attack being deferred till the arrival of the Mahrattas, night came on, when Hyder, with the assistance of a few boats, crossed the river unperceived, with a small body of horse, leaving his family behind him; and having travelled ninety-eight miles in twenty hours, the first seventy-five on the same horse, he arrived at Bangalore. He was just in time to precede the orders of the Raja, by which the gates of the fort would have been shut against him; and he now hastened to collect his forces, of which those serving with Lally constituted a principal part.

The fortunes of Hyder tottered on the verge of a pre-

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cipice. The troops, which were hastening towards him from the Carnatic and Baramahal, were intercepted by the Mahrattas, who had joined the Raja, and besieged in their camp. The utmost efforts of Hyder were ineffectual to relieve them; and his power was ready to drop from his hands; when the Mahrattas agreed to march off, upon receiving the cession of Baramahal, and the payment of three lacks of rupees. They had engaged their services to Lally, now besieged in Pondicherry; but had afterwards accepted the promise of a large sum from the English Nabob, on condition of returning immediately to Poonah. It was in consequence of this stipulation, so fortunate for Hyder, that they accepted his additional bribe; and the man, who was destined to bring the English interests to the brink of ruin, was saved by a stroke of English politics.

Hyder took the field against the forces of the Raja, but still perceiving himself to be inferior to his enemies, he took a resolution, which it required Oriental hypocrisy and impudence to form, and of which nothing less than Oriental credulity could have been the dupe. Unexpected, unarmed, and alone, he presented himself as a suppliant at the door of Nunjeraj, and, being admitted, prostrated himself at his feet. He acknowledged, in terms of bitter anguish, the wrongs of which he was guilty toward the first and greatest of his friends; vowed to devote his future life to their reparation; and entreated a firm and sincere union, that he might establish Nunjeraj in the station of honour and power in which he had formerly beheld him. It requires a high degree of improbability to prevent the greater part of mankind from believing what they vehemently wish. Nunjeraj was gained; and lent his troops, his exertions, his name, and his influence, to give ascendancy to the cause of Hyder. Fraud was an operative instrument in the hands of this aspiring general. Finding himself intercepted with a small detachment which had accompanied him on his sudden journey to the retreat of Nunjeraj, and his junction with the main body of his army which he had left to hang during his absence upon the rear of the enemy, rendered difficult, and his situation dangerous, he forged letters, in the name of Nunjeraj, to the principal commanders in the hostile army,

letters purporting to be the result of a conspiracy into which these commanders had already entered to betray their General to Nunjeraj. The bearer was seized of course; and the letters delivered into the hands of the General, who fulfilled the fondest wishes of Hyder, by taking the panic, and running away from the army. During its confusion it was assailed by the main body of Hyder's forces in the rear, by the detachment with himself in front: and yielded an easy and decisive victory. The triumph of Hyder was now secured. He delayed, only till he augmented his army, and took possession of the lower country; when he ascended the Ghauts, and early in the month of May, 1761, arrived at the capital. He sent to the Raja a message: "That large sums were due to Hyder by the State, and ought to be liquidated: after the payment of these arrears, if the Raja should be pleased to continue him in his service, it was well; if not, Hyder would depart, and seek his fortune elsewhere." The meaning of this humble communication no one misunderstood. It was arranged, that districts should be reserved to the amount of three lacks of rupees for the personal expenses of the Raja, and one lack for those of Nunjeraj; and that of the remainder of the whole country the management should be taken by Hyder, with the charge of providing for the expenses, civil and military, of the government. From this period Hyder was undisputed master of the kingdom of Mysore.

Hyder was fortunately cast at one of those recurring periods in the history of Oriental nations; when, the springs of the ancient governments being worn out, and political dissolution impending, a proper union of audacity and intrigue has usually elevated some adventurer to the throne. The degraded situation of the Raja, and the feeble and unskilful administration of the two brothers, opened an avenue to power, of which Hyder was well qualified to avail himself. The debilitated and distracted government of the Subahdar of the Deccan; the dreadful blow which the Mahrattas had just received at the battle of Paniput; and the fierce and exhaustive contentions which the rival strangers in the Carnatic were waging against one another, left all around a wide expanse, in which, without much resistance, he might expect to reap an opulent harvest:

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and had it not happened, by a singular train of circumstances, that he was opposed by the arms of a people, whose progress in knowledge and in the arts was far superior to his own, he, and his son, would probably have extended their sway over the greater part of India.

In prosecution of the design which Bassalut Jung had formed to render himself independent of Nizam Ali, he proceeded, about the month of June in 1761, to the reduction of Sera. This was a province, formerly governed by a Nabob, or deputy, of the Subahder of the Deccan. It was now possessed by the Mahrattas. But the shock which the Mahratta power had sustained by the disaster of Paniput, inspired Bassalut Jung with the hope of making a conquest of Sera. By his approach to the territories of Hyder, that vigilant chief was quickly brought near to watch his operations. Bassalut Jung was, by a short experience, convinced that his resources were unequal to his enterprise; and as his elder brother was imprisoned by Nizam Ali, on the 18th of July, his presence at the seat of his own government was urgently required. That the expedition might not appear to have been undertaken in vain, he made an offer to Hyder of the Nabobship of Sera, though yet unconquered, for three lacks of rupees; and formally invested him with the office and title, under the name of Hyder Ali Khan Behauder, which he afterwards bore. The allied chiefs united their armies, and, having speedily reduced the country to the obedience of Hyder, took leave of each other about the beginning of the year 1762.

Hyder continued to extend his conquests over the two Balipooas; over Gooti, the territory of the Mahratta chieftain Morari-Row; received the submission of the Polygars of Raidroog, Harponelly, and Chittledroog; and early in 1763 he marched under the invitation of an impostor, who pretended to be the young Raja of Bednore, to the conquest of that kingdom. The territory of Bednore includes the summit of that part of the range of western hills, which, at a height of from four to five thousand feet above the level of the sea, and for nine months of the year involved in rain and moisture, which clothe them with the most enormous trees, and the most profuse vegetation, overlook the provinces of Canara and Malabar.

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The capital and fort of Bednore situated in a basin surrounded by hills, extended its sway over the maritime region of Canara, and on the eastern side of the mountains, as far as Santa Bednore and Hoolalkera, within twenty miles of Chittledroog. This country had suffered little from the calamities of recent war; and the riches of the capital, which was eight miles in circumference, are represented as having been immense. Hyder made the conquest with great ease, and confessed that the treasure which he acquired in Bednore was the grand instrument of his future greatness.[1]

Hyder devoted his mind with great intensity to the establishment of a vigorous and efficient administration in this country; which opened to him a new scene of conquest. He took possession of Soonda, a district on the northern frontier of Bednore: he reduced to submission and dependance the Nabob of Savanoor, a territory which formed a deep indentation between his recent acquisitions of Sera and Soonda: and he rapidly extended his northern frontier across the rivers Werda, Malpurba, and Gutpurba, almost to the banks of the Kistna.

This daring progress, however, again brought the Mahrattas upon his hands. Since the battle of Paniput, they had, in this quarter of India, been pushed with some vigour by Nizam Ali, the new Subahdar, who, at the commencement of his reign, gave some signs of military ardour and talent. He had constrained them to restore the celebrated fortress of Dowlatabad, in 1762; and, in 1763, carried his arms to Poona, the capital; which he reduced to ashes. The accommodation which succeeded this event, and the occupation which the Nizam was now receiving by the war for the reduction of his brother Bassalut Jung, seemed to present an opportunity to the Mahrattas of chastising the encroachments of a neighbour,

[1] Col. Wilks thinks he estimates the amount of it very low at 12,000,000*l.* sterling. More likely it was not a third of the sum. "The immense property," he calls it, "of the most opulent commercial town of the East, and full of rich dwellings." The sound judgment of Col. Wilks generally preserves him, much better than Oriental gentlemen in general, from the strain of Eastern hyperbole. The richest commercial town of the East, neither a sea-port, nor on any great line of communication, in a situation almost inaccessible, on the top of unwholesome mountains! Besides, there is little opulence in any house in India, or in any shop. The chief articles of splendour is jewels, which almost always are carried away, or hid, upon the appearance of danger.

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whom as yet they despised. Madoo Row, who, third in order of time, had, under the title of Peshwa, or Prime Minister, succeeded to the supreme authority among the Mahratta states, crossed the Kistna in May, 1764, with an army which greatly outnumbered that which Hyder was able to bring into the field.[1] He sustained a tedious, unequal conflict, which greatly reduced and disheartened his army, till 1765; when the Mahrattas agreed to retire, upon condition that he should restore the districts wrested from Morari Row, relinquish all claims upon the territory of Savanoor, and pay thirty-two lacks of rupees.

He hastened to give order to his recent conquests in the east, which the late interruption of his prosperity had animated into rebellion. As his forts and garrisons had remained firm, these disturbances were speedily reduced, and he immediately turned his eye to new acquisitions. Having employed the greater part of the year 1765 in regulating the affairs of his government, and repairing his losses, he descended into Canara in the beginning of 1766, with the declared intention of making the conquest of Malabar. After an irregular war of some duration with the Nairs, the whole country submitted; and a few subsequent struggles only afforded an opportunity for cutting off the most refractory subjects, and establishing a more complete subjection. He had accomplished this important enterprise before the end of the year 1766, when he was recalled to Seringapatam, by intelligence of the utmost importance. Madoo Row had issued from Poona; Nizam Ali, with an English corps, was advancing from Hyderabad; the English had already sent to attack some of his districts which interfered with the Carnatic; and all these powers were joined, according to report, in one grand confederacy, for the conquest of Mysore. Nizam Ali, however, and the English, were the only enemies whom it was im-

[1] Col. Wilks makes, on this occasion, a judicious remark, the spirit of which should have saved him from the pecuniary exaggerations mentioned above. "I have found it proper," he says, "to distrust my manuscripts in statements of numbers, more than in any other case. In no country, and in no circumstance, is it safe to trust to any statement of numbers that is not derived from actual returns. Even Sir Eyre Coote, whose keen and experienced eye might be considered as a safe guide, and whose pure mind never harboured a thought of exaggeration, states the force of Hyder, in the battle of Porto Novo, 1st of July, 1781, to have been from 140,000 to 150,000 horse and irregular cavalry, besides twenty-five battalions of regulars; when it is certain that the whole did not exceed 80,000." Hist. Sketches, p. 461.

mediately necessary to oppose; and the Nizam, as we have already seen, he easily converted into an ally. In this state of his kingdom and fortunes, he began his first war with the English, in 1767.[1]

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He was exasperated, not only by the readiness with which, in the late treaty with the Nizam, the English had agreed to join in hostilities against him, but by an actual invasion of his dominions. Under the pretence that it formerly belonged to the Carnatic, but chiefly induced, we may suppose, by the consideration of the passage which it afforded an enemy into the heart of that country, the English had sent a Major, with some Europeans, and two battalions of Sepoys, into Baramahl, who, unhappily were just strong enough to overrun the open territory, and enrage its master; but were unable to make any impression upon the strong forts, much less to secure possession of the country.

It was by the means of Maphuz Khan, the brother of the English Nabob, who had acted as an enemy of the English from the period of his recall as renter of Madura and Tinivelly, that Hyder effected his alliance with the Nizam. The English corps, under Colonel Smith, which had followed the Nizam into Hyder's dominions, had separated from his army, upon intimation of the design which that faithless usurper was supposed to entertain. The Nabob Mohammed Ali, who had early intelligence of the views of the Nizam, urged the Presidency to attack his camp before the junction of the Mysorean. The advice, however, was neglected, and in the month of September, Colonel Smith was attacked on his march, near Changama by the united forces of the new allies. He sustained the attack, which, for the space of an hour[2] was vigorously maintained; and for that time repelled the enemy. He found himself, however, under the necessity of flight; and marching thirty-six hours, without refreshment, he arrived at Trinomalee. He here enclosed himself within the walls of the fort, from which he soon beheld the sur-

[1] For the Life of Hyder, the Researches of Col. Wilks, p. 240—278, are the best source of intelligence.

[2] This action commenced at two, and continued till dark. With regard to the subsequent retreat Colonel Wilks states that the men had been twenty-seven hours without refreshment or repose when they arrived at Trinomalee on the 4th.—W.

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rounding country covered by the troops of the enemy, and desolated with fire and sword.

He remained not long an idle spectator, though his weakness compelled him to act with caution. He encamped for a few days under the walls of Trinomalee, and afterwards near a place called Calishy-Wâcum, about ten miles farther to the north. While the army lay in this situation, Hyder planned an expedition, from which important consequences might have ensued. He detached into the Carnatic 5000 horse, who marched without opposition to the very precincts of Madras. The place was completely taken by surprise. The President and Council were at their garden houses, without the town; and had not the Mysoreans been more eager to plunder than to improve the advantages which their unexpected arrival had procured, the seizure of the English chiefs might have enabled them to dictate the terms of peace.

Before the rains compelled the English army to retire into cantonments at Wandewash, Colonel Smith attacked the enemy, with some advantage,[1] before Trinomalee. In the mean time Nizam Ali, whose resources could ill endure a protracted contest, or the disordered state of his government a tedious absence, grew heartily sick of the war; and during the period of inactivity signified to the English his desire of negotiation. As a security against deception Colonel Smith insisted that he should first separate his troops from those of Hyder. But in the mean time the period of operations returned; and the English commander, now respectably reinforced, marched towards the enemy, who in the month of December had taken the field on the further side of Velore. The two armies met, and came to action, between Amboor and Wanumbaddy, when Hyder and his ally were defeated, and fled to Caverypatnam. This disaster quickened the decision of the Nizam, who now lost not any time in separating his troops from the Mysoreans, and commencing his negotiation with the English. A treaty was concluded between the Subahdar, the Nabob, and the English, in February, 1768; by which the titles of the Nabob, and the grants which he had re-

[1] "With some advantage" means the entire defeat of the allies, with a loss of about 4000 men, 64 guns, and a large quantity of military stores. The Nizam, immediately after the battle, withdrew from the scene of action, and Hyder fell back within his own frontier. Wilks ii. 41.—W.

ceived, were confirmed; the former conditions respecting the Northern Circars were renewed; the dewannee, or revenues, in other words the government of the Carnatic Balagaut, a country possessed by Hyder, was in name consigned to the English, subject to a payment of seven lacks per annum to the Nizam, and the tribute or chout to the Mahrattas; the English agreed to assist the Nizam with two battalions of Sepoys, and six pieces of cannon, as often as required; and the tribute due to the Nizam for the Circars was reduced from nine lacks perpetual, to seven lacks per annum, for the space of six years.[1]

The victory gained over the united forces of the allies, and their final separation by treaty, elevated the Madras government to a high tone of ambition. They resolved not only to carry their arms into Mysore, but to make the conquest and acquisition of the country. They pressed Mohammed Ali to join the army, that the war might as far as possible appear to be his. "They pompously" (as the Directors afterwards reproached them) "appointed him Phousdar of Mysore," and afterwards accused him, for accepting that very title, "of an insatiable desire of extending his dominions."[2] To bring the conduct of the

[1] Collection of Treaties (printed 1812), p. 364, 372. The Presidency held up to the Directors the necessity of supporting the Nizam, as a barrier against the Mahrattas—a policy of which the Directors entirely disapproved. Bengal Letter, 16th March, 1768; Fifth Report, Secret Committee, 1781, Appendix No. 6. See too a letter, 13th May, 1768, Rous's Appendix, p. 517, in which the connexion with the Nizam is strongly reprobated. "It is not," they say, "for the Company to take the part of umpires of Indostan. If it had not been for the imprudent measures you have taken, the country powers would have formed a balance of power among themselves. We wish to see the Indian Princes remain as a check upon one another, without our interfering."—They declare expressly, "With respect to the Nizam and Hyder Ali, it is our interest that neither of them should be totally crushed." To the same purpose, see p. 529. In another letter, dated 17th March, 1769, after telling the Madras Presidency that they had paid no regard to the above injunctions, and to the whole tenor, which was to the same effect, of all the instructions of their employers, they say, "It is with the utmost anxiety and displeasure that we see the tenth article of the treaty with the Subah, by which he cedes to the Company the Dewannee of the Carnatic Balaghaut; a measure so totally repugnant to our most positive and repeated orders, not to extend our possessions beyond the Carnatic. . . . . Our displeasure hereat is aggravated, by the disingenuous manner in which these affairs are represented to us in your advices." They express a strong opinion on the passion of their servants for interfering extensively with the native powers. "We cannot take a view of your conduct, from the commencement of your negotiation for the Circars, without the strongest disapprobation; and when we see the opulent fortunes, suddenly acquired by our servants, who are returned since that period, it gives but too much weigh, to the public opinion, that the rage for negotiations, treaties, and alliances, *has private advantage for its object more than the public good.*" Ibid. p. 520, 521.

[2] Letters from the Directors to Governor and Council of Madras, 17th March, 1769.

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war still more under the control of the Presidency, they sent to the army two members of council, as field deputies, without whose concurrence no operations should be carried on. These members compelled the commander of the troops to renounce his own scheme of operations, that he might act offensively against Mysore. The English army, however, too feeble for the enterprise, acted without energy; and the summer of 1768 passed in unavailing movements and diminutive attempts. Hyder, the newness of whose government could not long dispense with his presence, was well inclined to postpone his struggle with the English, and made in September an overture towards peace. It was received, however, with great haughtiness by the Presidency, whose persuasion of the weakness of their enemy, and hopes of a speedy conquest of his realm, it only tended to increase and inflame. In the mean time Hyder was by no means inattentive to the war. He took the considerable fort of Mulwaggle; and gained some advantages over Colonel Wood, who attempted in vain to recover the place. The Presidency, dissatisfied with the progress of the war under Colonel Smith, who was highly exasperated by the control of the field deputies, recalled that respectable officer; and Mohammed Ali, whom they had in some measure forced to join the army, but who was now unwilling to leave it, they commanded, under pain of deprivation, to return. The army became weak and despondent through sickness and desertion. Hyder displayed increasing vigour. He attacked Colonel Wood, who was unable to save his baggage. Before the end of the year he had recovered all the conquered districts; and in January, 1769, carried his usual ravages into the Carnatic. He penetrated into the district of Trichinopoly; and detached one of his Generals into the provinces of Madura and Tinivelly, which he plundered and laid waste. The English army were unprovided with horse, and could neither overtake the march of Hyder, nor interrupt his devastations. No part of the southern division of the Carnatic escaped his destructive ravages, except the dominions of the Raja of Tanjore, who saved himself by a timely accommodation, and whose alliance Hyder was solicitous to gain. Colonel Smith was again placed at the head of the English forces, and by judicious movements

straitened the operations of Hyder. He even interposed with dexterity a detachment between Hyder and his own country, which was of the less importance, however, to that warrior, as he drew his resources from the country in which he fought.

Hyder now meditated a stroke, which he executed with great felicity and address. Sending all his heavy baggage and collected plunder home from Pondicherry, which during this incursion he had twice visited to confer with the French, he drew the English army, by a series of artful movements, to a considerable distance from Madras, when, putting himself at the head of 6000 cavalry, and performing a march of 120 miles in a space of three days, he appeared suddenly en the mount of San Thomé, in the immediate vicinity of the English capital. From this he dispatched a message to the Governor, requiring that a negotiation for peace should be immediately opened; and that in the mean time the approach of the army in the field should be forbidden. The Presidency were struck with consternation. The fort might undoubtedly have held out till the arrival of Smith; but the open town, with its riches, the adjacent country, and the garden houses of the President and Council, would have been ravaged and destroyed. The Presidency were now seriously inclined to peace; and notwithstanding the unfavourableness of their situation, they agreed to negotiate upon Hyder's terms. A treaty was concluded on the 4th of April, 1769, consisting of two grand conditions: first, a mutual restitution of conquests, including the cession to Hyder of a small district, which had formerly been cut off from the Mysorean dominions; and secondly, mutual aid, and alliance in defensive wars.

The disasters of the war in the Carnatic, with the disorders which pervaded the government of Bengal, excited the most violent apprehensions in the Company, and reduced sixty per cent. the price of East India Stock. The treaty with Hyder was the bed on which the resentments of the Directors sought to repose. It is very observable, however, that their letters on this subject abound much more with terms of vague and general reproach, than with any clear designation of mischief to which the conditions of the treaty were calculated to give birth,

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They accuse the Presidency of irresolution and incapacity; and tell them that by the feebleness with which they had carried on the war, and the pusillanimity with which they had made peace at the dictation of an enemy, "they had laid a foundation for the natives of Hindustan to think they may insult the Company at pleasure with impunity." Yet they pretended not, that a mutual renunciation of conquests was not better than a continuation of the war; or that the vain boast of driving Hyder's light cavalry from the walls of Madras would not have been dearly purchased with the ravage of the city of Madras and the surrounding country. The Presidency affirm that they "were compelled to make peace for want of money to wage war."[1] And the only imprudent article of the treaty, in which, however, there was nothing of humiliation or inconsistency with the train of the Company's policy, was the reciprocation of military assistance; because of this the evident tendency (a circumstance, however, which seemed not ever to be greatly deprecated,) was, to embroil them with other powers.[2]

CHAPTER IX.

Public opinion in England.—Proceedings in the India House and in Parliament.—Plan of Supervisors.—Plan of a King's Commissioner.—Increase of pecuniary Difficulties.—Dividend raised.—Company unable to meet their Obligations.—Parliamentary Inquiry.—Ministerial relief.—An Act, which changes the Constitution of the Company.—Tendency of the Change.—Financial and Commercial State.

THE affairs of the Company excited various and conflicting passions in England, and gave rise to measures of more than ordinary importance. The act of parliament having expired which limited the amount of dividend in

[1] Letters to the Court of Directors, 23rd March, 1770; Rous's App. p. 1415.

[2] For these transactions, besides the printed official documents, the well-informed, but not impartial author, of the History and Management of the East India Company, has been, with caution, followed, together with Robson's Life of Hyder Ali, corrected from authentic MSS. by Mr. Grant.—M.

A more authentic and accurate account is to be found in Col. Wilks's Historical Sketches of the South of India.—W.

1767, the Directors exclaimed against a renewal of the restriction, as transferring the powers of the Company to parliament, subverting the privileges of their charter, and rendering insecure the property of every commercial and corporate body in the kingdom. They even presented to parliament a petition, in which these arguments were vehemently enforced; and so well by this time were they represented in that assembly, that a sufficiency of orators was not wanting, who in both Houses supported their claims. Opposite views, notwithstanding, prevailed; and an act was passed to prevent the increase of the dividend beyond ten per cent. till the 1st day of February, 1769.

Before the expiration of this term, the Company, who were anxious to evade the question respecting the public claim to the sovereignty of the Indian territory, very assiduously negotiated with the minister a temporary arrangement. After a great deal of conference and correspondence, an act was passed, in April, 1769, to the following effect: That the territorial revenues in India should be held by the Company for five years to come; that in consideration of this benefit they should pay into the exchequer 400,000*l.* every year; that, if the revenues allowed, they might increase the dividend, by augmentations not exceeding one per cent. in one year, to twelve and a half per cent.; that if, on the other hand, the dividend should fall below ten per cent., the payment into the exchequer should obtain a proportional reduction, and entirely cease if the dividend should decline to six per cent.; that the Company should, during each year of the term, export British merchandise, exclusive of naval and military stores, to the amount of 380,837*l.*; and that when they should have paid their simple contract debts bearing interest, and reduced their bonded debt to an equality with their loans to government, they should add to these loans the surplus of their receipts at an interest of two per cent.[1] This agreement between the public and the Company was made, it is obvious, upon the same supposition, that of a great surplus revenue, upon which succeeding agreements have been made, and with the same result.

In the meantime, the grievous failure in the annual trea-

[1] Act 9, Geo. III. c. 24.

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sures, which they had been so confidently promised; and which, with all the credulity of violent wishes, they had so fondly and confidently promised themselves: excited, both in the Company, and in the nation, the most vehement complaints against the managers in India, to whose misconduct was ascribed the disappointment of hopes which no conduct could have realized.[1] A grand investigation and reform were decreed. And for the performance, after great consultation, it was resolved: That three persons should be chosen, whose acquaintance with Indian affairs, and whose character for talents, diligence, and probity, should afford the best security for the right discharge of so important a trust; and that they should be sent out, in the name and with the character of Supervisors, and with powers adapted to the exigence of the case. Mr. Vansittart, the late Governor of Bengal, Mr. Scrafton, and Colonel Ford, were recommended as the three commissioners; and it was proposed to invest them with almost all the powers which the Company themselves, if present in India, would possess; a power of superseding the operations and suspending the authority of the Presidents and Councils, of investigating every department of the service, and establishing such regulations as the interests of the Company might seem to require. The scheme was indeed opposed with great vehemence by all those who favoured the persons now invested with the governing powers in India; by all those who had any pique against the individuals proposed; and by all those who disliked the accumulation of exorbitant authority in a small number of hands. But though they formed no inconsiderable party, the disappointment of the golden dreams of the Proprietors prevailed in the General Court; and supervisors with extraordinary powers, it was resolved, were the very remedy which the maladies of the Indian government required.

But the pretensions of the ministry again interfered. Not only was the legality disputed of the commission by

[1] The manner in which Clive, to enhance the merit of his own services, had puffed the importance of the Indian territory, and inflamed the hopes of treasure which it was to produce, misled the Company. The perpetually recurring interests of their servants to delude them with these hopes, and their perpetual readiness to believe flattering accounts, has been a perennial fountain of misgovernment.

which the supervisors were appointed; but a share was claimed in the government of India, which the Directors regarded with alarm and abhorrence. As an accession to their power and influence in India, which they imagined would be of the utmost importance, they had applied to government for two ships of the line, and some frigates. No aversion to this proposition was betrayed by the ministry; but when the Company were elated with the hopes which a compliance was calculated to inspire, they were suddenly informed that the naval officer whom the Crown should appoint to command in India, must be vested with full powers to adjust all maritime affairs; to transact with the native princes; and, in short, to act the principal part in the offensive and defensive policy of the country. The Directors represented this proposal as affecting the honour, and the very existence of the Company. The General Court was adjourned from time to time to afford sufficient space for the consideration of so important a subject; and the Proprietors were entreated to consider the present moment as the very crisis of their fate; and to devote to the question a proportional share of their attention. To vest the officers of the Crown in India with powers independent of the Company, was in reality, they said, to extrude the Company from the government; to lay the foundation of endless contests between the servants of the King and those of the Company; and to prepare the ruin of the national interest in that part of the world; if the Company were incapable of maintaining their territorial acquisitions, to surrender them to the powers of the country, upon terms advantageous to their commerce, was better, it was averred, than to lie at the mercy of a minister: and the fatal effects of the interference of the servants of the Crown in the affairs of a Company, formed for upholding a beneficial intercourse with India, were illustrated by contrasting the ruin of the French East India Company, the affairs of which the ministers of the French King had so officiously controlled, with the prosperity of the Dutch East India Company, the affairs of which had been left entirely to themselves. The grand argument, on the other side, was furnished by Clive and the Directors themselves; who had used so many and such emphatical terms to impress a belief that the unprosperous state of their govern-

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ment was wholly produced by the rapacity and misconduct of those who conducted it in India. In the first place, the authority of a King's officer was held up as an indispensable security against the vices of the Company's servants; and in the next place the dignity of the master whom he served was represented as necessary to give majesty to the negotiations which a company of merchants might be required to conduct with the potentates of India.[1] After long and acrimonious debates, the powers demanded for an officer of the Crown were condemned in a Court of Proprietors; and the ministers were not disposed to enforce, by any violent procedure, the acceptance of their terms. The Company would agree to sanction the interference of the officer commanding the ships of the King only within the Gulf of Persia, where they were embroiled with some of the neighbouring chiefs; the demand of two ships of the line for the Bay of Bengal was suspended; and the legal objection to the commission of the supervisors was withdrawn. In this manner, at the present conjuncture, was the dispute between the Government and the Company compromised. Two frigates, beside the squadron for the Gulf of Persia, were ordered upon Indian service. In one of them the supervisors took their passage. Their fate was remarkable. The vessel which carried them never reached her port; nor was any intelligence of her or her passengers ever received.

Mr. Cartier assumed the government of Bengal at the beginning of the year 1770.

[1] These debates are reported in various periodical publications of the time. A good abstract of them is presented in the Annual Register for 1769. A variety of pamphlets was produced by the dispute; of those which have come under the author's inspection, the following are the titles of the more remarkable: "An Address to the Proprietors of India Stock, showing, from the political State of Indostan, the Necessity of sending Commissioners to regulate and direct their Affairs abroad; and likewise the Expediency of joining a Servant of Government in the Commission. Printed for S. Bladon in Paternoster Row, 1769;" "A Letter to the Proprietors of East India Stock, containing a brief Relation of the Negotiations with Government, from the Year 1767 to the present Time, respecting the Company's Acquisitions in India, together with some Considerations on the principal Plans for Adjusting the Matters in dispute, which have been discussed in the General Court of Proprietors. Printed for B. White, at Horace's Head, in Fleet Street, 1769;" "A Letter to the Proprietors of India Stock, containing a Reply to some Insinuations in AN OLD PROPRIETOR'S LETTER TO THE PROPRIETORS on the 13th Inst. relative to the Ballot of that Day. Printed for W. Nicholl, No. 51, St. Paul's Church Yard, 1769;" "A Letter to the Proprietors of E. I. Stock, by Governor Johnstone. Printed for W. Nicholl, 1769;" "A Letter to the Proprietors of East India Stock, relative to some Propositions intended to be moved at the next General Court, on Wednesday the 12th of July." Printed as above, 1769.

The first year of his administration was distinguished by one of those dreadful famines which so often afflict the provinces of India; a calamity by which more than a third of the inhabitants of Bengal were computed to have been destroyed.[1]

On the 10th of March, 1770, the Nabob Syef ad Dowla died of the small-pox; and his brother Mubarek ad Dowla, a minor, was appointed to occupy his station. The President and Council made with him the same arrangements, and afforded the same allowance for the support of his family and dignity, as had been established in the time of his predecessor. But this agreement was condemned in very unceremonious terms by the Directors. "When we advert," say they, "to the encomiums you have passed on your own abilities and prudence, and on your attention to the Company's interest (in the expostulations you have thought proper to make on our appointment of commissioners to superintend our general affairs in India), we cannot but observe with astonishment, that an event of so much importance as the death of the Nabob Syef al Dowla, and the establishment of a successor in so great a degree of non-age, should not have been attended with those advantages for the Company, which such a circumstance offered to your view. Convinced, as we are, that an allowance of sixteen lacks per annum will be sufficient for the support of the Nabob's state and rank, while a minor, we must consider every addition thereto as so much to be wasted on a herd of parasites and sycophants, who will continually surround him; or at least be hoarded up, a consequence still more pernicious to the Company. You are, therefore, during the non-age of the Nabob, to reduce his annual stipend to sixteen lacks of rupees."[2]

By the last regulations of the Directors, the inland trade in salt, betel-nut, and tobacco, was reserved to the natives, and Europeans were excluded from it. By a letter of theirs, however, dated the 23d of March, 1770, it was commanded to be laid open to all persons, Europeans as well as natives, but without any privileges to their countrymen or servants beyond what were enjoyed by natives and other subjects.

[1] Letter of the Governor and Council to the Directors, 3rd Nov. 1772.
[2] General Letter to Bengal, 10th April, 1771.

BOOK IV. CHAP. IX. —These regulations were promulgated on the 12th of December.

1771. In the meantime financial difficulties were every day becoming more heavy and oppressive. On the 1st of January, 1771, when the President and Council at Fort William had received into their treasury 95,43,855 current rupees, for which they had granted bills on the Court of Directors, the cash remaining in it was only 35,42,761 rupees. At the same period the amount of bond debts in Bengal was 612,628*l*. And at the beginning of the following year it had swelled to 1,039,478*l*.

Notwithstanding the intelligence which the Directors had received of the inadequacy of their revenues, and the accumulation of their debts in all parts of India; and notwithstanding their knowledge of the great amount of bills drawn upon them, for which they were altogether unable to provide, they signalized their rapacity on the 26th of September, 1770, by coming to a resolution for recommending it to the General Court, to avail themselves of the permission accorded in the late Act, by making a dividend at the rate of twelve per cent. per annum. The approbation of the General Court was unanimous. On the 14th of March and 25th of September, 1771, it was resolved, by the Court of Directors, to recommend to the General Court an augmentation of the dividend to six and a quarter per cent. for the six months respectively ensuing: approved in the General Court, by ninety-four voices against five in the first instance, and three hundred and seventy-four against thirty in the second. On the 17th of March, 1772, the Directors again resolved to recommend a dividend of six and a quarter per cent. for the current half year, which the Court of Proprietors in a similar manner confirmed.

These desperate proceedings hurried the affairs of the Company to a crisis. On the 8th of July, on an estimate of cash for the next three months, that is, of the payments falling due, and the cash and receipts which were applicable to meet them, there appeared a deficiency of no less than 1,293,000*l*. On the 15th of July the Directors were reduced to the necessity of applying to the Bank for a loan of 400,000*l*. On the 29th of July they applied to it for an additional loan of 300,000*l*., of which the Bank was prevailed upon to advance only 200,000*l*. And, on the 10th

of August, the Chairman and Deputy waited upon the Minister, to represent to him the deplorable state of the Company, and the necessity of being supported by a loan of at least one million from the public.[1]

The glorious promises which had been so confidently made of unbounded riches from India, their total failure, the violent imputations of corrupt and erroneous conduct which the Directors and the agents of their government mutually cast upon one another, had, previous to this disclosure raised a great ferment in the nation, the most violent suspicions of extreme misconduct on the part of the Company and their servants, and a desire for some effectual interference on the part of the Legislature. In the King's speech, on the 21st of January, at the opening of the preceding session, it had been intimated that one branch of the national concerns which, "as well from remoteness of place, as from other circumstances, was peculiarly liable to abuses, and exposed to danger, might stand in need of the interposition of the Legislature, and require new laws, either for supplying defects or remedying disorders." On the 30th of March a motion was made by the Deputy-Chairman for leave to bring in a Bill for the better regulation of the Company's servants, and for improving the administration of justice in India. The grand evil of which the Directors complained was the want of powers to inflict upon their servants adequate punishment either for disobedience of orders, or any other species of misconduct. The Charter of Justices, granted in 1753, empowered the Mayor's Court of Calcutta, which it converted into a Court of Record, to try all civil suits arising between Europeans, within the town or factory of Calcutta, or the factories dependent upon it: it also constituted the President and Council a Court of Record, to receive and determine appeals from the Mayors; it further erected them into Justices of the Peace, with power to hold quarter sessions; and into Commissioners of oyer and terminer, and general gaol-delivery, for the trying and punishing of all offences, high treason excepted, committed within the limits of Calcutta and its dependent factories. This extent of jurisdiction, measured by the sphere of the Company's possessions at

[1] For the details and documents relative to this curious part of the history of the Company, see the Eighth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, 1773.

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the time when it was assigned, deprived them of all powers of juridical coercion with regard to Europeans over the wide extent of territory of which they now acted as the sovereigns. They possessed, indeed, the power of suing or prosecuting Englishmen in the Courts of Westminster; but under the necessity of bringing evidence from India, this was a privilege more nominal than real.

One object, therefore, of the present bill was to obtain authority for sending a chief justice with some puisne judges, and an attorney-general, according to the model of the Courts of England, for the administration of justice throughout the territory of the Company.

The next object was, the regulation of the trade. The author of the motion, the Deputy Chairman of the Company, represented it as a solecism in politics, and monstrous in reason, "that the governors of any country should be merchants; and thus have a great temptation to become the only merchants, especially in those articles which were of most extensive and necessary consumption, and on which, with the powers of government, unlimited profits might be made." It was, therefore, proposed that the Governors and Councils, and the rest of the Company's servants, should be debarred from all concern in trade. But it neither occurred to the Deputy Chairman, nor was it pressed upon his notice by any other member of the legislative body, that the argument against the union of trade and government was equally conclusive, applied to the Company, as applied to their servants; to those who held the powers of government in the first instance, as to those who held them by delegation and at will.

It was in the debate upon this motion that Lord Clive made the celebrated speech, in which he vindicated his own conduct against the charges to which, as well from authority as from individuals, it had been severely exposed. He spared not the character either of his fellow-servants, or of the Directors. "I attribute the present situation of our affairs," he said, "to four causes; a relaxation of government in my successors; great neglect on the part of administration; notorious misconduct on the part of the Directors; and the violent and outrageous proceedings of general courts." To hear his account, no one would believe that any creature who had ever had any thing to do

with the government had ever behaved well but himself. It was much easier for him, however, to prove that his conduct was liable to no peculiar blame, than that it was entitled to extraordinary applause. With great audacity, both military and political, fortunately adapted to the scene in which he acted, and with considerable skill in the adaptation of temporary expedients to temporary exigencies, he had no capacity for a comprehensive scheme, including any moderate anticipation of the future; and it was the effect of his shortsighted regulations, and of the unfounded and extravagant hopes he had raised, with which the Company were now struggling on the verge of ruin, and on account of which the conduct both of them and of their servants was exposed to far more than its due share of obloquy and condemnation.

The suspicions of the nation were now sufficiently roused to produce a general demand for investigation; and on the 13th of April a motion was made and carried in the House of Commons for a select Committee to gratify the public desire. The bill which had been introducted by the Deputy Chairman was thrown out on the second reading, to afford time for the operations of the Committee, and parliament was prorogued on the 10 of June.

During the recess, took place the extraordinary disclosure of the deficiency of the Company's funds, their solicitation of loans from the Bank, and their application for support to the Minister. He received their propôsals with coldness; and referred them to parliament. That assembly was convened on the 26th of November, much earlier, as the King from the throne informed them, than had been otherwise intended, to afford them an opportunity of taking cognizance of the present condition of the East India Company. The Minister had already come to the resolution of acceding to the request of the Directors; it therefore suited his purpose to affirm that how great soever the existing embarrassment, it was only temporary; and a Committee of Secrecy was appointed, as the most effectual and expeditious method for gaining that knowledge of the subject from which it was proper that the measures of parliament should originate.

Among the expedients which the urgency of their affairs had dictated to the Company, a new commission of super-

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vision had been resolved upon during the recess; and six gentlemen were selected for that important service. The measure, however, was not approved by the ministry; and on the 7th of December, the Committee of Secrecy presented a report, stating, that notwithstanding the financial difficulties of the Company, they were preparing to send out a commission of supervisors at a great expense, and that, in the opinion of the Committee, a bill ought to be passed to restrain them from the execution of that purpose for a limited time. The introduction of this bill excited the most vehement remonstrances on the part of the Company, and of those by whom their cause was supported in the two houses of parliament. It was asserted to be a violation of property, by curtailing the powers which the Company possessed by charter of managing their own affairs; and all the evils which can arise from shaking the security of property were held up in their most alarming colours to deter men from approbation of the threatened restraint. The Company's claims of property, however, so frequently, during the whole course of their history, brought to oppose the interposition of parliament in their affairs, proved of as little force upon this as upon other occasions; and their privileges, they were told, to which the term property, in its unlimited sense, could not without sophistry be applied, were insufficient to set aside that for which all property is created—the good of the community; now in one important article so formidably threatened in their mismanaging hands.

After this decisive act of control, the next ostensible proceeding was the petition for a loan, presented by the Company to parliament on the 9th day of March. The propositions urged by the Directors were: that they should receive a loan of 1,500,000*l.* for four years, at four per cent. interest; that they should make no dividend of more than six per cent. per annum until the loan should be reduced to 750,000*l.*; that the dividend in that event should rise to eight per cent.; that the surplus of receipts above disbursements in England should be applied to the reduction of the Company's bond debts to 1,500,000*l.*; that after such reduction, the surplus should be divided equally between the public and the Company; and that the Com-

pany should be released from payment of the annual 400,000*l.* to the public, for the remainder of the five years specified in the former agreement, and from the payments to which they were bound in consequence of the late acts for the indemnity on teas. In lieu of these, the following ing were the propositions offered by the Minister: to lend the Company 1,400,000*l.* at an interest of four per cent.; to forego the claim of 400,000*l.* a-year from the territorial revenue till that debt is discharged; to restrict them from making any dividend above six per cent. till that discharge is accomplished, and from making any dividend above seven per cent. till their bond debt is reduced to 1,500,000*l.*; after that reduction to receive from them, in behalf of the public, three-fourths of the surplus receipts at home, the remaining fourth being appropriated either for the further reduction of the bond debt, or the formation of a fund to meet contingent exigencies; and, under these conditions, to permit the territorial acquisitions to remain in their possession for six years, the unexpired term of their charter.

The Company treated these conditions as harsh, arbitrary, and illegal; petitioned against them in the strongest terms; and were supported with great vehemence of language by their own friends, and the enemies of the Minister, in both houses of parliament. The restriction of the dividend after payment of the debt, the exaction of so great a proportion of the surplus receipts, and in particular the appropriation even of that part which it was proposed to leave as their own, they arraigned as a violent disposal of their property without their own consent, equalling the most arbitrary acts of the most despotical governments, and setting a precedent which lessened the security of every right of a British subject. These considerations, however vehemently urged, produced but little effect: the ministerial influence was predominating; the Company were odious; and it was felt, perhaps, rather than distinctly seen, that the rules of individual property were not applicable, without great restrictions, to an artificial body, whose proceedings were of such magnitude as deeply to affect the interests of the nation at large. Of all these pretensions, however, that which seemed most to alarm the Company was the claim now distinctly asserted by

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the government to the territorial acquisitions; and though a definitive discussion was still waved by the Minister, the Company expostulated against the limitation of their possession to six years, as involving in it a decision of the question at issue.

A more important exercise of power over their affairs was still meditated by the Minister; an entire change in the constitution of the Company. On the 3rd of May, he introduced a series of propositions, as the foundation for a law, which should raise the qualification to vote in the Court of Proprietors from 500*l.* to 1000*l.*, and give to every proprietor possessed of 3000*l.* two votes, possessed of 6000*l.* three votes, and of 10,000*l.* four votes; which should change the annual election of the whole number of Directors to that of six new ones, or one-fourth of the whole number each year; vest the government of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, in a governor-general, with a salary of 25,000*l.*, and four councillors of 8000*l.* each; render the other Presidencies subordinate to that of Bengal: establish at Calcutta a supreme court of judicature, consisting of a chief justice with 8000*l.* a-year, and three other judges each with 6000*l.* a-year, appointed by the Crown.

As subsidiary articles, it was proposed: that the first governor-general and councillors should be nominated by parliament in the act, and hold their office for five years, after which the patronage of those great offices should revert to the Directors, but still subject to the approbation of the Crown; that every thing in the Company's correspondence from India, which related to the civil or military affairs, to the government of the country, or the administration of the revenues, should be laid before the ministry; that no person in the service, either of the King or of the Company, should be allowed to receive presents; and that the governor-general, the councillors, and judges, should be excluded from all commercial profits and pursuits.

If the alarm and indignation of the Company, Directors, and Proprietors, were excited before, that body were now struck with the highest terror and resentment. They exclaimed, that the very constitution was threatened with subversion, and the rights conferred by charter treated as dust. They tendered a direct application to the city of

London, to join them with its influence in resisting a measure which destroyed the principle on which its own privileges and those of every chartered body in the nation depended; and threatened the very freedom of the people, both by setting a conspicuous and prolific example of the arbitrary violation of law, and by adding the whole of the revenue and government of India to the power and influence of the Crown. They represented, that by the clause which raised the qualification of the voters, about twelve hundred Proprietors were disfranchised; violently, and without compensation, robbed of an important right, and excluded from all share, direct or indirect, in the management of their own immediate property: that by destroying the annual election of Directors, those Trustees for the Company were placed above the control of their constituents, and vested with new powers to gratify their own ease or corruption; at the expense of those whose interests were lodged in their hands: that by reducing to a small number the votes of the Proprietors, the ministerial management of that body became more easy; that, by rendering the situation of Director permanent for so great a number of years, under the incapacitation of the Proprietors either to punish or reward, and under the great power of the Minister to do both, the subserviency of the Court of Directors to all ministerial purposes was perfectly secured; and that, from these sources combined, the power of the Minister over the Company was rendered hardly any thing inferior to absolute: that the whole government of the settlements in India was taken from the Company, and, in effect, transferred to the Crown, by establishing a general presidency over all their affairs, of which the agents were in the first instance named by parliament, and ever after, in reality, under the condition of its approbation, named by the Crown: and that, "notwithstanding the Company were thus deprived of their franchise in the choice of their servants, by an unparalleled strain of injustice and oppression, they were compelled to pay such salaries as ministers might think fit to direct, to persons in whose appointment, approbation, or removal, the Company were to have no share." [1]

[1] Message from the East India Company to the Right Hon. the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Commons of the city of London, in Common Council assembled, dated 27th May, 1773.

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These considerations were frequently urged, with the utmost vehemence and asperity, in both assemblies of Parliament. Every question, every clause, was warmly debated, and pressed to a division. The city of London, the Company themselves, and those stockholders who were deprived of their votes, presented strong and earnest petitions. In behalf of the Company and the disfranchised Proprietors, counsel, at their prayer, were heard. And two protests, couched in censorial language of extraordinary strength, obtained a numerous signature in the upper house.

All this opposition, however, and all this ferment were of little avail. The propositions of the ministry were all carried by great and decisive majorities, and being reduced into two acts, the one relating to the financial relief of the Company, the other to the establishment of their new constitution, received the royal assent on the 21st of June and the 1st of July. The arrangements which concerned the business at home were appointed to commence from the 1st of October, 1773; those which concerned the foreign administration not till the 1st of August, 1774.[1]

Practical statesmen, so apt to assume to themselves the monopoly of political wisdom, are commonly short-sighted legislators.

In one respect, the present experiment fulfilled the purpose very completely for which it was intended. It followed the current of that policy, which for many reasons has run with perfect regularity and considerable strength, diminishing the influence of numbers in affairs of government, and reducing things as much as possible to the oligarchical state.

For the rest; it had not so much as a tendency to remove the principal evils to which it pretended to find a remedy; and it created some of the greatest magnitude which previously had no existence.

The evils in question were—I. Such as had their operation in India; and—II. Such as had their operation in England.

I. Those which had their operation in India might all be ranked under two heads; 1. The absorption of more than

[1] See 13 Geo. III. c. 63, and 13 Geo. III. c. 64.

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the revenues by expense; and 2. The plunder and oppression of the people.

The only parts of the new constitution which had a direct influence upon the government in India were—1. The new appointment and powers of the Governor-general and Council; and 2. The Supreme Court of Judicature.

1. The mode of appointing public functionaries, and the extent of their power, distinct from the motives to good or evil conduct which operate upon them in the discharge of their functions, are evidently of no avail. Upon the Governor and Council in India the motives to evil conduct, and the scope for its exercise, were, if not augmented by the new regulations, at any rate not impaired.[1] As ingenuity may be challenged to refute this proposition, it follows, that from this branch of the arrangement no good was derived.[2]

2. The Supreme Court of Judicature was intended to supply the limited powers of criminal jurisdiction, which in their ancient commercial capacity, had been committed to the Company. The terrors of law, brought nearer home to the inferior servants of the Company, and those who enjoyed their protection, might have restrained in some degree their subordinate oppressions. But it was easy to see that the operations of the supreme functionaries in India must remain exempt from the control of the Supreme Court; otherwise, that court became itself the government. This consequence was not sufficiently foreseen; and the vague and indefinite powers assigned to the judicatory, introduced immediately, between the Governor-general and

[1] They were previously debarred from the acceptance of presents, and the Governor from trade. Reliance for probity was placed, as it is so commonly placed, on the greatness of the salaries; as if there was a point of saturation in cupidity; as if the great power which great salaries confer was not the most effectual of all instruments for the undue acquisition of more, and the most effectual of all instruments for covering such acquisition from inquiry or punishment. In as far, then, as the prospect of impunity is a motive, and it is one of the strongest, so far great salaries do not take from, they add to the temptations of corruption. Even Burke, upon this particular, remarked, that "ample salaries removed the necessity indeed, but by no means the inducements, to corruption and oppression." See Ninth Report of the Select Committee, 1781.

[2] That part of the regulations which subjected to the Bengal Council the other Presidencies in matters of peace and war with foreign states, had some effect, though not without drawbacks, in giving unity to the international proceedings of the Company. With the goodness or badness of the internal government, it had no connexion.

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the Judges, those struggles which threatened the existence of English authority.

So long, on the other hand, as the Governor-general and Council remained exempt from the control of law, the great oppressors were safe; and, from the community of interests, and the necessity of mutual compliance and mutual concealment, between the high offenders and the low, impunity was pretty well secured to the class.

The grand source, however, of mischief to the natives, in the jurisprudential plan, was the unfortunate inattention of its authors to the general principles of law, detached from its accidental and national forms. As the vulgar of every nation think their language the natural one, and all others arbitrary and artificial; so, a large mass of Englishmen consider English law as the pure extract of reason, adapted to the exigencies of human nature itself; and are wholly ignorant that, for the greater part, it is arbitrary, technical, and ill-adapted to the general ends which it is intended to serve; that it has more of singularity, and less capacity of adaptation to the state of other nations, than any scheme of law to be found in any other civilized country. The English law, which in general has neither definition nor words, to guide the discretion or circumscribe the license of the Judge, presented neither rule nor analogy in cases totally altered by diversity of ideas, manners, and pre-existing rights; and the violent efforts which were made to bend the rights of the natives to a conformity with the English laws, for the purpose of extending jurisdiction, and gratifying a pedantic and mechanical attachment to the arbitrary forms of the Westminster courts, produced more injustice and oppression and excited more alarm, than probably was experienced, through the whole of its duration, from the previous imperfection of law and judicature.[1]

[1] Mr. Burke, in the Ninth Report of the Select Committee, in 1783, says, "The defect in the institution seemed to be this; that no rule was laid down, either in the act or the charter, by which the Court was to judge. No descriptions of offenders, or species of delinquency, were properly ascertained, according to the nature of the place, or to the prevalent mode of abuse. Provision was made for the administration of justice in the remotest part of Hindostan, as if it were a province in Great Britain. Your Committee have long had the constitution and conduct of this Court before them, and they have as yet been able to discover very few instances (not one that appears to them of leading importance) of relief given to the natives against the corruptions or oppressions of British subjects in power.—So far as your Com-

II. If, towards the amelioration of *the government in India*, the new effort in legislation performed no more than this, it injured, rather than improved, the condition of both the Company and the natives. Against *the government at home*, the only objection, of any real moment, was its inefficiency as the ruling power to produce, by means of its servants a good government in India, or, what in this case was meant by good government, a large surplus of revenue or treasure to England, without oppression to the natives. The total change which was effected in the Constitution of the Company pretended to have for its *End* the improvement and perfection of the Company in that respect: and it employed as its whole and only *Means*, dependence upon the Minister.

If the Minister had more knowledge of the affairs in India, more leisure to devote to their management, and more interest in their being well managed, this was an improvement. If he had less knowledge, less leisure, and, far above all, if his interest was likely to be most promoted by that system of patronage which creates dependence, and which is at irreconcileable enmity with the very principle of good government, the change was wholly the reverse. How dependence upon the Minister was to render the agents of government more faithful and economical stewards of the revenues in India, or less disposed to accumulate wealth at the expense of the prostrate natives, it is not easy to make appear: in regard to responsibility, or eventual punishment, the only caution was, to act in concert with the minister; and then they were out of all comparison more assured of impunity than before.

From dependence upon the Court of Proprietors, by annual elections, to render the Directors in a great degree independent of their constituents by elections in four years, gave them greater powers, and hence motives, to pursue their own interests at the expense of the Proprietors; but that it should increase their interest in the good government of India, and hence their motives for exertion to procure it, is impossible.

mittee have been able to discover, the Court has been generally terrible to the natives, and has distracted the government of the Company, without substantially reforming any one of its abuses."

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To diminish the number of votes in the court of Proprietors, and confine the power to the rich, was contrived, it was said, to render that assembly less tumultuous. But tumultuousness, in itself, is not an evil. It is evil only when it has a tendency to produce evil effects. What is more tumultuous than a public market, a theatre, or a church? To know the merit then of a reform of tumultuousness, we ought to know the specific evils which the tumultuousness in question produced. In the case of the East India Company the authors of the measure failed in exhibiting any mischievous effects; though by their reform they unquestionably created a field for other effects of a pernicious description. "If tumult and disorder," as was well remarked by an illustrious Committee of the Commons House, "were lessened by reducing the number of Proprietors, private cabal and intrigue were facilitated at least in an equal degree; and it is cabal and corruption, rather than disorder and confusion, that are most to be dreaded in transacting the affairs of India;"[1] that are most to be dreaded in transacting the affairs of every country under the sun.

The virtues of a Court of Proprietors, as of every political body, are intelligence and probity. The owner of £500 stock was just as likely to be intelligent as the owner of £1000. But a small number of men are much more easily corrupted than a large; and, where the matter of corruption operates, much more sure of being corrupt.[2]

To the grand complaint against the Court of Proprietors, that, being filled by the servants of the Company who had returned loaded to Europe with ill-gotten wealth, it proved a barrier against exposure and punishment, the amount of the qualification provided no sort of remedy, but rather facilitated and confirmed the abuse.

As soon as the management of the East India Company's affairs became a source of great patronage and power, it necessarily followed that stock was generally held for the promotion of interests of much greater value than the dividend. It was distributed mostly among three great

[1] Ninth Report of the Select Committee, in 1783.

[2] "The whole of the regulations concerning the Court of Proprietors, relied upon two principles, which have often proved fallacious; namely, that small numbers were a security against faction and disorder; and that integrity of conduct would follow the greater property." Ninth Report, ut supra.

classes of Proprietors; 1. Those who aspired to a share in the Direction, and who were careful to possess themselves of whatever share of stock was calculated to strengthen their influence; 2. The large class of those who were competitors for the Company's favours and employment, all those concerned in the immense supply of their shipping and goods, constituting a considerable proportion of the ship-owners and tradesmen in London, who strengthened their influence with the great customer, by the number of votes which they could assure to the Directors in the General Court; 3. Those who aspired to contracts with the Treasury, Admiralty, and Ordnance, and clerks in public offices, who discovered that one ground of influence with the Minister was, to have votes at his disposal in the East India Proprietary Court.[1]

By every thing which tended to lessen the number of voting Proprietors, the force of all these sinister interests was increased. The only expedient which had a tendency to counteract them was, to render such Proprietors as numerous as possible. This would have promoted the interests of the public, but not those of the minister; the interests of the many, but not those of the few.[2]

One part of the ancient constitution, for the preservation of which the authors of the present reform were condemned by the Select Committee of 1783, was the ballot; "by means of which, acts," they said, "of the highest concern to the Company and to the state, might be done by individuals with perfect impunity." There are occasions on which the use of the ballot is advantageous. There are occasions on which it is hurtful. If we look steadily

[1] This is pretty nearly the description of the East India Proprietary which is given by the Committee of the House of Commons. See Ninth Report of the Select Committee in 1783.

[2] It was urged by the Minister, that by raising the qualification from 500*l.* to 1000*l.*, the value of the dividend would govern the Proprietor more than that of the vote; with what sincerity, or what discernment, it is easy to see. Burke, however, very justly remarked, that this pecuniary interest might be most effectually served by some signal misdemeanour, which should produce a great immediate advantage, though productive of ultimate ruin. "Accordingly," he adds, "the Company's servants have ever since covered over the worst oppressions of the people under their government, and the most cruel and wanton ravages of all the neighbouring countries, by holding out, and for a time actually realizing, additions of revenue to the territorial funds of the Company, and great quantities of valuable goods to their investment." He added, with obvious truth, "The Indian Proprietor will always be, in the first instance, a politician: and the bolder his enterprise, and the more corrupt his views, the less will be his consideration of the price to be paid for compassing them." Ninth Report, ut supra.

BOOK IV. CHAP. IX. 1773.

to the end, to which all institutions profess to be directed, we shall not find it very difficult to draw the line of demarcation.

A voter may be considered as subject to the operation of two sets of interests: the one, interests rising out of the good or evil for which he is dependent upon the will of other men: the other, interests in respect to which he cannot be considered as dependent upon any determinate man or men.

There are cases in which the interests for which he is not dependent upon other men impel him in the right direction. If not acted upon by other interests, he will, in such cases, vote in that direction. If, however, he is acted upon by interests dependent upon other men, interests more powerful than the former, and impelling in the opposite direction, he will vote in the opposite direction. What is necessary, therefore, is, to save him from the operation of those interests. This is accomplished by enabling him to vote in secret; for in that case, the man, who could otherwise compel his vote, is ignorant in what direction it has been given. In all cases, therefore, in which the independent interests of the voter, those which in propriety of language may be called his *own* interests, would dictate the good and useful vote; but in which cases, at the same time, he is liable to be acted upon in the way either of good or of evil, by men whose interests would dictate a base and mischievous vote, the ballot is a great and invaluable security. In this set of cases is included, the important instance of the votes of the people for representatives in the legislative assembly of a nation. Those interests of each of the individuals composing the great mass of the people, for which he is not dependent upon other men, compose the interests of the nation. But it is very possible for a majority out of any number of voters to be acted upon by the will of other men, whose interests are opposite to those of the nation. It is, therefore, of the highest importance that they should be protected from that influence.

There is, however, another set of cases, in which those interests of the voter, which have their origin primarily in himself, and not in other men, draw in the hurtful direction; and in which he is not liable to be operated

upon by any other interests of other men than those which each possesses in common with the rest of the community. If allowed, in this set of cases, to vote in secret, he will be sure to vote as the sinister interest impels. If forced to vote in public, he will be subject to all the restraint which the eye of the community, fixed upon his virtue or knavery, is calculated to produce: and in such cases, the ballot is only an encouragement to evil. If it cannot be affirmed that the interests of the individuals, composing the Court of Proprietors of the East India Company, are incapable of being promoted at the cost of the British and Indian communities, it cannot be denied that the case of these Proprietors belongs to this latter description.[1]

At the very time when the discussions upon the new regulations were taking place, the Chairman of the Select Committee of the House of Commons came forward with a motion for inquiry into the circumstances of the deposition and death of Suraj-ad-dowla; into the imposture, by a fictitious treaty, practised upon Omichund; the elevation of Meer Jaffier; and the sums of money, in the shape of presents, obtained at the time of that revolution. Crimes of the blackest dye, rapacity, treachery, cruelty, were charged upon the principal actors in that suspicious scene; and the punishment, even of Clive, as the first and principal delinquent, was represented as a necessary act of justice and policy. On the 10th of May, the following resolutions were moved: 1. "That all acquisitions, made under the influence of a military force, or by treaty with foreign Princes, do of right belong to the state; 2. That to appropriate acquisitions so made, to the private emolument of persons intrusted with any civil or military

[1] No inconvenience has been found to attend the alterations made in the constitution of the general courts. They are still sufficiently numerous to present both the merits and defects of popular assemblies, in which vehemence of feeling commonly overbears an appeal to calm and rational argument. The ballot is a commodious method of receiving the votes, the purport of which, there is rarely, if ever, any desire to conceal. By making it imperative on proprietors to have been possessed of their stock a reasonable period before they could exercise a vote, and by limiting the number of votes, which any single proprietor enjoyed, a real improvement was effected, as it put an end to the splitting of votes, by which, upon any emergency, a number of nominal shareholders was created to carry a particular question, of the merits of which they knew and cared nothing, and it prevented any individual from possessing an undue influence, which he might exercise, as was often done, for his own advantage, to the detriment of the Company.—W.

BOOK IV. CHAP I. 1773.

power of the state, is illegal; 3. That very great sums of money, and other valuable property, have been acquired in Bengal, from Princes and others of that country, by persons intrusted with the military and civil powers of the state, by means of such powers; which sums of money and valuable property have been appropriated to the private use of such persons." These resolutions were warmly adopted by the house. But when the application of them came to be made to individuals—and especially when the ruin was contemplated which that application would draw down upon Clive—compassion for the man, and the consideration of his services, blotted by offences, yet splendid and great, operated with effect in the breasts of the assembly, and put an end to the inquiry.[1] According to the style, which the spirit of English laws renders predominant in English councils, inquiry was rejected ostensibly upon a subterfuge, of the nature of a legal shuffle; incompetence, to wit, in the reports of the Select Committee to be received as evidence. As if that were true! As if no other evidence had been to be found! On the other hand, the considerations which fairly recommended the rejection, or at least a very great modification of the penal proceeding, were not so much as mentioned; that the punishment threatened was more grievous than the offence; that it was punishment by an *ex-post-facto* law, because, however contrary to the principles of right government the presents received from Meer Jaffier, and however odious to the moral sense the deception practised upon Omichund, there was no law at the time which forbade them; that the presents, how contrary soever to European morals and ideas, were perfectly correspondent to those of the country in which they were received, and to the expectations of the parties by whom they were bestowed; that the treachery to Omichund was countenanced and palliated by some of the principles and many of the ad-

[1] The concluding debate did not take place until the 31st of May. After a long discussion, a declaratory motion, to the effect that Lord Clive did receive certain presents upon the enthronement of Meer Jaffier was carried. It was then moved that "in so doing he abused the powers with which he was intrusted to the evil example of the servants of the public." The motion was rejected without a division: a motion was finally made about "five in the morning," that Robert Lord Clive, did at the same time render great and meritorious services to his country, which passed unanimously. Life of Clive, iii. 360.—W.

mired incidents of European diplomacy; that Clive, though never inattentive to his own interests, was actuated by a sincere desire to promote the prosperity of the Company, and appears not in any instance to have sacrificed what he regarded as their interests to his own; and that it would have required an extraordinary man, which no one ought to be punished for not being, to have acted, in that most trying situation in which he was placed, with greater disinterestedness than he displayed.[1]

The inquiry into the financial and commercial state of the Company exhibited the following results: The whole of their effects and credits in England, estimated on the 1st day of March, 1773, amounted to 7,784,689*l.* 12*s.* 10*d.*; and the whole of their debts to 9,219,114*l.* 12*s.* 6*d.*; leaving a balance against the Company of 1,434,424*l.* 19*s.* 8*d.* The whole of their effects and credits in India, China, and St. Helena, and afloat on the sea, amounted to 6,397,299*l.* 10*s.* 6*d.* The whole of their debts abroad amounted to 2,032,306*l.*; producing a balance in their favour of 4,364,993*l.* 10*s.* 6*d.* Deducting from this sum the balance against the Company in England, we find the whole amount of their available property no more than 2,930,568*l.* 10*s.* 10*d.*; so that of their capital stock of 4,200,000*l.*, 1,269,431*l.* 9*s.* 2*d.* was expended and gone.[2]

[1] This vindication of Clive is unanswerable, and should have protected him against some of the remarks and insinuations to his discredit, which have previously occurred. Whatever errors he may be charged with they were those of his time, and his situation; his merits were his own. The whole of the parliamentary proceedings against him originated in a spirit of vindictive retaliation, which his private and public measures had provoked:—the vehemence with which he had opposed an influential party in the Direction, and the unmitigated sternness with which he had repressed all opposition to his will in the government of Bengal. He was himself a good hater, and had, therefore, little reason to complain of having incurred the like animosity from others, but when his enemies assailed him through the pretext of public justice, they converted the great council of the nation into an instrument of personal revenge, and disgraced parliament more than they dishonoured Clive.—W.

[2] Second Report of the Committee of Secrecy in 1773. The Committee say, "They have not included in the above account any valuation of the fortifications and buildings of the Company abroad. They can by no means agree in opinion with the Court of Directors, 'That the amount of the fortifications, &c., should be added to the annual statement.'"—Undoubtedly no assets of any party can be compared with his debts, further than they can be disposed of for the payment of those debts; the manure which a farmer has spread upon his fields, or the hedges and ditches with which he has surrounded them, are nothing to him, the moment his lease is expired. The money expended in fortifications and buildings, from May 1757, was stated at nearly four millions.—M.

The illustration is not wholly applicable, nor as far as it is applicable is it true. The connexion between the country and the Company is not exactly

From the year 1744, the period to which in a former passage[1] is brought down the account of the dividend paid annually to the Proprietors on the capital stock, that payment continued at eight per cent. to the year 1756, in which it was reduced to six per cent. It continued at that low rate till Christmas, 1766, when it was raised by the General Court, repugnant to the sense of the Court of Directors, to five per cent. for the next half-year. On the 7th of May, 1767, it was resolved in the General Court, that for the following half-year the dividend should be six and a quarter per cent. But this resolution was rescinded by act of parliament, and the dividend limited, till further permission, to ten per cent. per annum. It was continued at ten per cent. till the year commencing at Christmas, 1769, when, in pursuance of the new regulations, it was advanced to eleven per cent. The next year it rose to twelve per cent. The following year it was carried to its prescribed limits, twelve and a-half per cent.; at which it continued for eighteen months, when the funds of the Company being totally exhausted, it was suddenly reduced to six per cent. per annum, by a resolution passed on the 3d of December, 1772.[2]

In the interval between 1774 and 1772, the sales at the India House had increased from about 2,000,000*l.* to 3,000,000*l.* annually; their annual exports, including both goods and stores, had fully doubled. In the year 1751, the total amount of shipping in the service of the Company was 38,441 tons; in the year 1772 it was 61,860.[3]

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that of a tenant on lease, and the occupant of an estate in which he has more than a passing interest, may equitably expect an equivalent for permanent improvements.—W.

[1] Supra, vol. iii. p. 36.

[2] See the Third and Eighth Reports of the Committee of Secrecy in 1773.

[3] Fifth Report of the Committee of Secrecy.

BOOK V.

FROM THE FIRST GREAT CHANGE IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY AND IN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, IN 1773, TILL THE SECOND GREAT CHANGE BY THE ACT COMMONLY CALLED MR. PITT'S ACT, IN 1784.

CHAPTER I.

Administration of Hastings till the Time when the Parliamentary Members of the Council arrived and the Operations of the New Constitution commenced, including — Arrangements for collecting the Revenue and administering Justice ostensibly as Dewan.—Treatment of Mohammed Reza Khan and the Raja Shitab Roy.—Elevation of Munny Begum.—Destruction of the Rohillas.—Sale of Corah and Allahabad to the Vizir.—Payment refused of the Emperor's Revenue.—Financial Results.

BY the new parliamentary authority, Mr. Hastings was appointed Governor-General, and General Clavering, Colonel Monson, Mr. Barwell, and Mr. Francis, the members of Council; not removable, except by the King, upon representation made by the Court of Directors, during the period assigned in the act. Mr. Hastings had ascended with reputation through the several stages of the Company's service; possessed the rank of a member of Council at the time of Mr. Vansittart's administration, and generally concurred in the measures which the party opposed to that Governor so vehemently condemned. After a visit to his native country, to which he proceeded at the same time with Vansittart, he returned to India in 1769, to fill the station of second in council at Madras; and in the beginning of 1772 was raised to the highest situation in the service of the Company, being appointed to succeed Mr. Cartier in the government of Bengal.

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The sense which the Directors entertained of the vices which up to this time had stained their administration in India, is recorded thus: "We wish" (the words of their letter to the President and Council at Fort William, dated the 7th of April, 1773,) "we could refute the observation, that almost every attempt made by us and our administrations at your Presidency, for the reforming of abuses, has rather increased them, and added to the miseries of the country we are anxious to protect and cherish. The truth of this observation appears fully in the late appointment of supervisors and chiefs—instituted, as they were, to give relief to the industrious tenants, to improve and enlarge our investments, to destroy monopolies, and retrench expenses, the end has by no means been answerable to the institution. Are not the tenants, more than ever, oppressed and wretched? Are our investments improved? Have not the raw silk and cocoons been raised upon us fifty per cent. in price? We can hardly say what has not been made a monopoly. And as to the expenses of your Presidency, they are at length settled to a degree we are no longer able to support. These facts (for such they are) should have been stated to us as capital reasons, why neither our orders of 1771, nor indeed any regulations whatever, could be carried into execution. But, perhaps, as this would have proved too much, it was not suggested to us; for nothing could more plainly indicate a state of anarchy, and that there was no government existing, in our servants in Bengal... When oppression pervades the whole country; when youths have been suffered with impunity to exercise sovereign jurisdiction over the natives, and to acquire rapid fortunes by monopolizing of commerce, it cannot be a wonder to us, or yourselves, that native merchants do not come forward to contract with the Company; that the manufactures find their way through foreign channels; or that our investments are at once enormously dear, and of a debased quality.—It is evident, then, that the evils which have been so destructive to us, lie too deep for any partial plans to reach to correct. It is, therefore, our resolution to aim at the root of those evils." Their expectation of assistance from Mr. Hastings in these reforms, was expressed in the following terms: "Our President, Mr. Hastings, we trust will set the

example of temperance, economy, and application; and upon this we are sensible, much will depend. And here we take occasion to indulge the pleasure we have in acknowledging Mr. Hastings' services upon the coast of Coromandel, in constructing with equal labour and ability, the plan which has so much improved our investments there; and as we are persuaded he will persevere, in the same laudable pursuit, through every branch of our affairs in Bengal, he, in return, may depend on the steady support and favour of his employers." [1]

The double, or ambiguous administration, in name and in ostent by the Nabob, in reality by the Company, which had been recommended as ingenious policy by Clive, and admired as such by his employers and successors, had contributed greatly to enhance the difficulties in which, by the assumption of the government, the English were involved. All the vices of the ancient polity were saved from reform; and all the evils of a divided authority were superinduced. The revenues were under a complicated, wasteful, and oppressive economy; the lands being partly managed by the native agents of the collectors, partly farmed from year to year, partly held by Zemindars, and Talookdars, responsible for a certain revenue. The administration of justice, of which, under the military and fiscal Governors of the Mogul provinces, the criminal part belonged to the Nazim, or military Governor, the civil to the Dewan, or fiscal Governor, was, as a heavy and unproductive burden, left in the hands of the Nabob, who, being totally without power, was totally unable to maintain the authority of his tribunals against the masters of the country; and the people were given up to oppression.[2]

The Company and their servants were little satisfied, from the beginning, with the produce of the dewannee: and soon began to be as little satisfied with the expedients adopted by Clive for ensuring a faithful collection. In the month of August, 1769, before the close of Mr. Verelst's administration, a supplementary security was

[1] Minutes of Evidence on Mr. Hastings' trial, p. 966.

[2] This is expressly stated by Hastings, and the Committee of Revenue, in their letter of the 3rd of Nov., 1772, in the Sixth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, in 1773.

BOOK V. CHAP. I. 1769.

devised. It was held expedient, that servants of the Company should be stationed in appropriate districts, throughout the whole country, for the purpose of superintending the native officers, both in the collection of the revenue, and, what was very much blended with it, the administration of justice. These functionaries received the title of Supervisors. And, in the next year was added a second supplementary security; two councils, with authority over the supervisors, one at Moorshedabad, and another at Patna.

Among the duties recommended to the supervisors, one was to collect a body of information with respect to the amount of the revenues; with respect to the state, produce, and capabilities of the great source of the revenue, the lands; with respect to the cesses or arbitrary taxes; the whole catalogue of imposts laid upon the cultivator; the manner of collecting them, and the origin and progress of all the modern exactions; with respect to the regulations of commerce, and the administration of justice. The reports of the supervisors, intended to convey the information which they collected under those heads, represent the government as having attained the last stage of oppressiveness and barbarism. "The Nazims exacted what they could from the Zemindars and great farmers of the revenue, whom they left at liberty to plunder all below; reserving to themselves the prerogative of plundering them in their turn, when they were supposed to have enriched themselves with the spoils of the country." The Select Committee of the House of Commons, in 1810, quoting this passage, remark, "The whole system thus resolved itself, on the part of the public officers, into habitual extortion and injustice; which produced on that of the cultivator the natural consequences—concealment and evasion, by which government was defrauded of a considerable part of its just demands." With respect to the administration of justice, the supervisors reported, "That the regular course was every where suspended: but every man exercised it, who had the power of compelling others to submit to his decisions." The Committee of the House of Commons, whose remark on the state of the fiscal collections has just been adduced, subjoin to this quotation that which fills up the picture: "Seven years had elapsed,

from the acquisition of the dewannee, without the government deeming itself competent to remedy these defects." [1]

1771.

Grievously disappointed in their expectations of treasure, the Directors resolved to break through the scheme of ambiguity; so far at least as to take into their own hands the collection as well as the disbursement of the revenues. In their letter to the President and Council of Fort William, dated the 28th of August, 1771, they declared their resolution, "To stand forth as Dewan," (so they were pleased to express it), "and by the agency of the Company's servants to take upon themselves the entire care and management of the revenues." The change was enormous, which it was the nature of this decree to produce. It was a revolution, much greater, probably, than any previous conjuncture—than even the change from Hindu to Mohammedan masters, had been able to create. The transition from Hindu to Mohammedan masters had only changed the hands by which the sword was wielded, and favours were dispensed; the machine of government, still more the texture of society, underwent feeble alterations; and the civil part of the administration was, from conveniency, left almost wholly in the hands of Hindus. A total change in the management of the revenues more deeply affected the condition, individually and collectively, of the people of India, than it is easy for the European reader to conceive. It was an innovation by which the whole property of the country, and along with it the administration of justice, were placed upon a new foundation.

Of the nature of this change, the Directors appear to have had no adequate conception. As if the measure which they proposed had been without consequences, they satisfied themselves with enjoining its execution; and consigned to their servants the task (of which, however, they did not much complain) of carrying *into effect* a change of government so momentous without one word of instruction.[2] Those servants, though more acquainted with the

[1] Fifth Report of the Select Committee, 1810, p. 5.

[2] The Committee of Circuit, in entering upon their task, remark a still more extraordinary failure in the sagacity of the Directors, who did not even foresee, that while their new resolution was totally inconsistent with their former regulations they gave no authority for abolishing them. "They have

BOOK V. CHAP. I. 1772.

practical difficulties which would be met in establishing the new system of finance, appear to have thought as little nearly as their honourable masters, of the great changes, with regard to the people, which it was calculated to produce. With great alacrity they betook themselves to the undertaking. Mr. Hastings succeeded to the chair on the 13th of April, 1772; and on the 16th the Council deemed themselves ripe for the following important resolution: that they would let the lands in farm, and for long leases; because it is the most simple mode, and best adapted to a government like that of the Company, which cannot enter into the minute details of the collections; because every mode of agency by which the rents could be received would be attended with perplexed and intricate accounts, with embezzlement of the revenue, and oppression of the people; and because any mode of collecting the revenues which would trench upon the time of the Governor and Council, would deprive them of a portion of what was already too little for the laborious duties which they had to perform.[1]

On the 14th of May the operations were planned. It was decreed, that the lands should be let for a period of five years: that a Committee of the Board, consisting of the President and four members, should perform the local operations, by circuit through the country; that the servants of the Company who superintended the business of the collection in the several districts, and who had hitherto been distinguished by the title of supervisors, should henceforth be denominated collectors;[2] that a native,

been pleased," say the Committee, "to direct a total change of system, and have left the *plan* and *execution* of it to the discretion of the Board, without any formal repeal of the regulations which they had before framed and adapted to another system—the abolition of which necessarily includes that of its subsidiary institutions, unless they shall be found to coincide with the new." Extract, Proceedings of the Committee of Circuit, dated Cossimbuzar, 28th July, 1772, inserted in the Sixth Report, Committee of Secrecy, 1773, p. 21.

[1] These reasons are assigned in the Consultation 14th May, Report, ut supra.

[2] The reasons they assign for this change of title is worth transcribing. "The term 'Supervisor' was properly suited to the original commission, which was to examine, inspect, and report. This office has been long since annulled; but we apprehend that the continuance of the name, and of many of the residents, in the same stations which they now fill as collectors, may have misled even our Honourable Masters, *who were never regularly advised of the change*, into the opinion that the first commission still subsisted." So much for the care of instructing, and the accurate information of the Honourable Directors.

under the title of dewan, should in each district be joined with the collector, both to inform and to check; that no banyan, or servant of a collector, should be permitted to farm any portion of the revenue: because with the servant of a collector no man would dare to become a competitor: and, as presents to the collectors from the Zemindars and other middlemen had been abolished, so all acceptance of presents, by such middlemen from the ryots, and all other modes of extortion, should be carefully prevented. Some precautions were taken against the accumulation of debt, which swelled at exorbitant interest, rarely less than three, often as much as fifteen per cent. per month, upon the ryots, as well as the different orders of middlemen. The collectors were forbidden to lend, or to permit their banyans or servants to lend, to the middlemen; and the middlemen or agents to lend to the ryots: but the Governor and Council express their regret, that loans and exorbitant interest were an evil which it was not in their power wholly to repress.[1]

The objects which in these regulations the servants of the Company professed to have in view, were, to simplify accounts; to render uniform the mode of exaction; and to establish fixed and accurate rules. The Committee of Circuit, with whom, though a Member, Mr. Hastings did not proceed, first began to receive proposals at Kishenagur. But the terms which were offered were in general so unsatisfactory both in form and amount, that the Committee deemed them inadmissible; and came speedily to the resolution of putting up the lands to public auction. It was necessary to ascertain with as much exactness as possible, the nature and amount of the different taxes which were to be offered to sale. For this purpose a new hustabood, or schedule of the taxes, was formed. The exactions consisted of two great parts; of which the first and principal was called *assal*, or the ground rents; the second *abwabs*, which consisted of a variety of additional, often arbitrary, and uncertain imposts, established at different times, by the government, the Zemindars, the farmers, and even the inferior collectors. Some of the most oppressive of these were abolished, and excluded from the present schedule. And new leases or titles were

[1] Consultation, 14th, May, ut supra.

BOOK V. CHAP. I. 1772.

granted to the ryots; which enumerated all the claims to which they were to be subject; and forbade, under penalties, every additional exaction. When the Zemindars, and other middlemen of ancient standing, offered for the lands which they had been accustomed to govern, terms which were deemed reasonable, they were preferred; when their offers were considered as inadequate, they were allowed a pension for their subsistence, and the lands were put up to sale.

While the settlement, in other words the taxation of the country, was carrying into execution upon this plan, the principal office of revenue, or *Khalsa*, underwent a total revolution. So long as the veil of the native government had been held up, this office had been stationed at Moorshedabad, and was ostensibly under the direction of the sort of minister of revenue, whom, with the title of *Naib Dewan*, the President and Council had set up. It was now resolved to transfer this great office from Moorshedabad to Calcutta; and to place it under the immediate superintendence of the government. The whole Council were constituted a Board of Revenue, to sit two days in the week, or if necessary, more. The Members of the Council were appointed to act as auditors of accounts, each for a week in rotation. The office of *Naib Dewan*, which had been held by Mohammed Reza Khan at Moorshedabad, and by Shitab Roy at Patna, was abolished; but a native functionary, or assistant dewan, under the title of *Roy royan*, was appointed to act in the Khalsa, as superintendent of the district dewans, to receive the accounts in the Bengal language, to answer interrogatories, and to make reports.[1]

The fundamental change in that great and leading branch of Indian administration which concerned the revenue, rendered indispensable a new provision for the administration of justice. The Zemindar, who was formerly the great fiscal officer of a district, commonly exercised both civil and criminal jurisdiction within the territory over which he was appointed to preside. In his Phoujdary, or criminal court, he inflicted all sorts of penalties;

[1] Extract of Proceedings, Sixth Report, ut supra. See also Sixth Report of the Select Committee of 1782, Appendix, No. I.; Colebrook's Supplement to Digest of Bengal Regulations, p. 174—190; and the Fifth Report from the Select Committee of the House of Commons, in 1810, p. 4, 5.

1772.

chiefly fines for his own benefit: even capital punishments, under no further restraint than that of reporting the case at Moorshedabad before execution. In his Adaulut, or civil court, he decided all questions relating to property; being entitled to a chout, or twenty-five per cent., upon the subject of litigation. His discretion was guided or restrained by no law, except the Koran, its commentaries, and the customs of the country, all in the highest degree loose and indeterminate. Though there was no formal and regular course of appeal from the Zemindary decisions, the government interfered in an arbitrary manner, as often as complaints were preferred, to which, from their own importance, or from the importance of those who advanced them, it conceived it proper to attend. To the mass of the people these courts afforded but little protection. The expense created by distance, excluded the greater number from so much as applying for justice; and every powerful oppressor treated a feeble tribunal with contempt. The judges were finally swayed by their hopes and their fears; by the inclinations of the men who could hurt or reward them. Their proceedings were not controlled by any written memorial or record. In cases relating to religion, the Cauzee and Brahmen were called to expound, the one the Moslem, the other the Brahmenical law; and their opinion was the standard of decision. Originally, questions of revenue as well as others belonged to the courts of the Zemindars; but a few years previous to the transfer of the revenues to the English, the decision of fiscal questions had been taken from the Zemindar, and given to an officer styled the Naib Dewan, or fiscal Deputy, in each province.

Beside the tribunals of the districts, the capital was provided with two criminal courts; in one of which, called Roy adaulut, the Nazim, as supreme magistrate, tried capital offences; in another, a magistrate called the Phoujdar tried offences of a less penal description, and reported his proceedings to the Nazim. At the capital was also found the principal dewanee or fiscal court: in which the Dewan tried causes relating to the revenue, including all questions of title to land. All other civil causes were tried at the capital in the court of the Darogah-i-adaulut-al-alea; except those of inheritance and

BOOK V. CHAP. I. succession, which were decided by the Cauzee and Muftee. An officer, with the title of Mohtesib, superintended the weights and measures, and other matters of police.

1772. Generally speaking, the courts of justice in India were instruments by which the powerful performed oppression, at their pleasure, on the weak.

Under the ancient government, the English, as well as other European settlers, instead of demanding payment from a reluctant debtor through the courts of law, seized his person and confined it, till satisfaction was obtained. Nor was this so inconsistent with the spirit of the government, as often to excite its displeasure. It was indeed a remedy to which they were not often obliged to recur; because the profit of dealing with them generally constituted a sufficient motive to punctuality. After the power of the English became predominant, the native courts ceased to exert any authority over Englishmen and their agents.[1]

The first attempt which had been made by the English to remedy, in their new dominions, any of the defects in the administration of justice, was the appointment in 1769 of superintending commissioners to the several districts, with directions to inquire into the proceedings of the courts of justice, to restrain iniquitous proceedings, to abolish the chout, and, where a total change should appear desirable, to apply to government for the requisite powers. In 1770, the Naib Dewan, and such of the servants of the Company as had their station of service at Moorshedabad, were formed into a Council of Control over the administration of justice. Its administration was still to conform to the ancient and established plan; but the Council of Control should interpose as they perceived occasion; every judicial proceeding which concerned the government should come under their review; the trials should be transmitted to them in all criminal cases, and execution suspended till their opinion was known; all causes relative to the revenue and to property in land should, in the first instance, be tried in the native courts, but the Council should revise the proceedings of these courts, and have the power of final determination.

[1] For this sketch of the state of the administration of justice in Bengal, see the Seventh Report of the Committee of Secresy in 1773.

For supplying the place of the native courts, in a great measure superseded by the new system of revenue, and for providing a more perfect judicial establishment, the following scheme was invented and pursued. Two courts, a civil and a penal, were appointed for each district. The criminal court, styled Phoujdary Adaulut, consisted of the collector, as superintendent, with the Cauzee and Muftee of the district, and two Moulavies, as interpreters of the law. The civil court, styled Mofussul Dewanee Adaulut, consisted of the collector, as President, assisted by the provincial dewan and the other officers of the native court. From the jurisdiction of this tribunal, no cases were excepted, beside those of succession to Zemindaries and Talookdaries, reserved to the President and Council.

At the seat of government were also established two supreme courts of appeal. That to which the civil branch of this appellate jurisdiction was consigned, received the name of Sudder Dewanee Adaulut; and was composed of the President with two Members of the Council, attended by the dewan of the Khalsa, and certain officers of the Cutchery, or native court of the city. That on which the penal branch was conferred, obtained the title of Nizamut Suddur Adaulut. It consisted of a chief judge, entitled Darogah-i-Adaulut, assisted by the chief Cauzee, the chief Muftee, and three Moulavies. This judge was nominated by the President and Council, who in this case acted in the capacity of Nazim. All capital cases were reported to his tribunal; and, after review, were ultimately referred to the Governor-general and Council. After a short experience, however, the superintendence of this court appeared to impose a labour, and to involve a responsibility, which the Governor and Council found it inconvenient to sustain; it was one of the first transactions, therefore, of the new government which succeeded in 1774, to restore this part of the Nizamut to the nominal Nabob, and to carry back the tribunal to Moorshedabad.[1]

[1] Fifth Report, Committee 1810, p. 6. It would appear, however, from Hastings' Minute, 21st November, 1775 (Fifth Report of Committee of Secresy in 1782, Appendix, No. clvii.) that Hastings was averse to the intrusting of a native with the uncontrolled administration of criminal justice, and that it was the act of the hostile majority of the council, by whom Mohammed Reza Khan was in 1775 raised to the office of Naib Nazim. It is necessary at the same time to state, that the gentlemen of the majority (see their letter of the same date, Ibid.) declare that previous to this measure of theirs, "the ad-

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For the district of Calcutta, two courts were established, on the plan of the other district courts; in each of which a Member of Council presided in rotation. In all these courts, it was ordained that records of proceedings should be made and preserved. The chout, or exaction of a fourth part of all litigated property, for the benefit of the judge, was abolished. A prohibition was issued against exorbitant fines. The discretionary power, exercised by a creditor over the person of his debtor, was no longer tolerated. And all disputes of property, not exceeding ten rupees, were referred to the head farmer of the pergunna or village precinct, to which the parties belonged.[1]

In the introduction of these measures, a specimen is exhibited of the regard which was paid to the feelings or honour of the natives, how great soever their rank or deservings. Under the anxious search of the Directors for the cause of their intense disappointment in the receipt of treasure from the revenues of Bengal, they, after venting the first portion of their chagrin upon their European, seem to have turned, with still greater want of consideration, upon their native agents. In a letter from the Secret Committee to Mr. Hastings, their President, dated 28th of August, 1771, they say, "By our general address you will be informed of the reasons we have to be dissatisfied with the administration of Mahomet Reza Cawn, and will perceive the expediency of our divesting him of the rank and influence he holds as Naib Dewan of the kingdom of Bengal."[2] Mr. Hastings is then directed "to

ministration of criminal justice throughout the country was at a stand."—It was at a stand, while under the superintendence of the English rulers: What was it likely to be, under a creature, without one atom of power, having the name of a Nabob?

[1] Seventh Report, at supra, General Regulations, dated 15th August, 1772; Colebrooke's Supplement, p. 1; Fifth Report from the Select Committee on Indian affairs, 1810, p. 6.

[2] By the manner in which the transaction is narrated, it would seem that Mohammed Reza Khan was put under arrest, because the Court of Directors were disappointed in their financial expectations. The letter of the court, however, specifies as the grounds of inquiry, charges of fraud and embezzlement, and principal instrumentality in the aggravation of the recent famine by a monopoly of rice and other necessaries of life. The charges were unfounded, and might have been somewhat hastily entertained, but as they had made an impression on the minds of the Directors, it was only their duty t direct investigation to be instituted. Hastings throughout acted under their positive orders, and as well stated by some of his contemporaries, inhabitants of Calcutta, petitioning against the Supreme Court, was excusably anxious

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issue his private orders for the securing the person of Mahomet Reza Cawn, together with his whole family, and his known partisans and adherents," and for bringing them prisoners to Calcutta. For this secrecy, precipitation, and severity, (arrest and imprisonment to a man of that rank in India is one of the most cruel of all punishments,) the reason assigned was, that otherwise he might "render all inquiry into his conduct ineffectual, and ill-consequences might result from his resentment and revenge." In the endeavour to discover delinquency, they say, "Your own judgment will direct you to all such means of information as may be likely to bring to light the most secret of his transactions. We cannot, however, forbear recommending to you, to avail yourself of the intelligence which Nundcomar may be able to give respecting the Naib's administration; and while the envy which Nundcomar is supposed to bear this minister may prompt him to a ready communication of all proceedings which have come to his knowledge, we are persuaded that no scrutable part of the Naib's conduct can have escaped the watchful eye of his jealous and penetrating rival." [1]

The opinion which the Directors entertained of the man of whom they desired to make such an instrument, had, on a former occasion, been thus expressed: "From the whole of your proceedings with respect to Nundcomar, there seems to be no doubt of his endeavouring, by forgery and false accusations, to ruin Ram Churn; that he has been guilty of carrying on correspondence with the country powers, hurtful to the Company's interests; and instrumental in conveying letters between the Shazada and the French Governor-general of Pondicherry. In short, it appears he is of that wicked and turbulent disposition, that no harmony can subsist in society where he has the opportunity of interfering. We therefore most readily concur with you, that Nundcomar is a person improper to be trusted with his liberty in our settlements;

to obey the orders of the Directors by whom he had been recently appointed to the high station he occupied in Bengal. See Instructions of the Court, &c., quoted in a letter to E. Burke, Esq., Lond., 1782. Accusations similar to those urged against Mohammed Reza Khan were preferred against Shitab Roy. Nuncomar, according to his own account, was the principal instigator of the proceedings against both. Min of Evidence, p. 1000.—W.

[1] See the Letter, Minutes of Evidence on the Trial of Warren Hastings, Esq., p. 993.

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and capable of doing mischief, if he is permitted to go out of the province, either to the northward, or to the Deccan. We shall therefore depend upon your keeping such a watch over all his actions, as may be means of preventing his disturbing the quiet of the public, or injuring individuals for the future." [1]

In a letter dated 1st September, 1772, Mr. Hastings gave the Directors a history of the operations already performed, and of the views from which they had sprung. "As your commands were peremptory, and addressed to myself alone, I carefully concealed them from every person except Mr. Middleton, whose assistance was necessary for their execution, until I was informed by him that Mahmud Rizza Cawn was actually in arrest, and on his way to Calcutta." Beside these alleged commands of the Directors, "I will confess," he says, "that there were other cogent reasons for this reserve;" and giving these reasons, he describes the importance of the office which was filled by Mohammed Reza Khan, and the susceptibility of corruption which marked the situation of his fellow-servants in India. "I was yet but a stranger to the character and disposition of the Members of your administration. I knew, that Mahmud Rizza Cawn had enjoyed *the sovereignty* of this province for seven years past, had possessed an annual stipend of nine lacks of rupees, the uncontrolled disposal of thirty-two lacks intrusted to him for the use of the Nabob, the absolute command of every branch of the Nizamut, and the chief authority in the Dewanee. To speak more plainly; he was, in everything but the name, the Nazim of the province, and in real authority more than the Nazim. I could not suppose him so inattentive to his own security, nor so ill-versed in the maxims of Eastern policy, as to have neglected the due means of establishing an interest with such of the Company's agents, as, by actual authority, or by representation to the Honourable Company, might be able to promote or obstruct his views." [2]

The office of Mohammed Reza Khan consisted of two parts; the one was the office of Naib Dewan, in which he represented the Company, as Dewan or Master of the Re-

[1] Company's Letter to their President and Council, dated 22nd February, 1764; Minutes, ut supra, p. 996.
[2] Committee of Secresy, 1781, Fifth Report, Appendix, No. iv.

venues; the other was the office of Naib Subah, as it was called by the President and Council, more properly the Naib Nazim, in which he represented the Nabob in his office of Nazim, that department of the Subahdaree, the name and ministerial functions of which were still reserved to the native Prince. The functions of the Naib Dewan were indeed supplied by the new scheme for levying the revenue.. But for those of the Naib Subah, as they called him, no provision as yet was made. The duties and importance of that office, are thus described by Mr. Hastings and committee; "The office of Naib Subah, according to its original constitution, comprehends the superintendence of the Nabob's education, the management of his household, the regulation of his expenses, the representation of his person, the chief administration of justice; the issuing of all orders, and direction of all measures which respect the government and police of the provinces; the conduct of all public negotiations, and execution of treaties; in a word, *every branch of executive government*."[1]

Nothing can afford a more vivid conception of what I may perhaps be allowed to call the *style* of government which then existed in Bengal, the temper with which the difference between some performance and no performance of the duties of government was regarded, than this; that the officer on whom "*every branch of the executive government*" depended, was arrested some days before the 28th of April; and that it was not till the 11th of July, that a proposition was brought forward to determine what should be done with the office he had filled.[2] A letter signed by the Company's principal servants at Moorshedabad, and received at Fort William on the 21st of May, declared; "We must also observe to you the necessity there is for speedily appointing a Naib to the Nizamut, as the business of that department, particularly the courts of justice, is suspended for want of a person properly authorized to confirm the decrees of the several courts of justice, and to pass sentence on criminals, besides various other matters of business, wherein the interposition of the Subah [*Subahdar*] is immediately necessary."[3] Why was not some

[1] Consultation, 11th July, 1772, Minutes of Evidence, ut supra, p. 972.
[2] Comp. Consultation, 28th April, 1772, Minutes, ut supra, p. 972; and Consultation, 11th July, 1772, Ibid, p. 978, 994.
[3] See the Letter, Minutes, ut supra, p. 974.

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arrangement taken; or rather, is it necessary to *ask*, why some arrangement was not taken to prevent the suspension of the judicial and every branch of the executive government, before the officer was arrested on whom all these great operations depended![1]

The Raja Shitab Roy held the same office at Patna, for the province of Bahar, as was held by Mohammed Reza Khan at Moorshedabad, for that of Bengal. Because Mohammed Reza Khan was arrested, and sent to Calcutta for his trial, and because, as holding the same office, it seemed proper that they should both share the same fate, Shitab Roy was in like fashion arrested, and sent to his trial.

Ahteram-al-dowlah was a surviving brother of Jaffier Ali Khan, the deceased Subahdar, the uncle of the young Nabob, the eldest existing male, and hence the natural guardian, of the family: on this ground he presented a petition to "the Gentlemen," praying that he might be appointed to the vacant office of Neabut Nizamut; in other words, be chosen Naib under the Nazim.

The Directors, though resolved not to be any longer Dewan under a cloak; were yet eager to preserve the supposed benefit of clandestinity, in the other department of the Subahdaree, the Nizamut.[2] The servants in India declared their full concurrence in the wisdom of that policy.[3] But they conceived that for this purpose such an officer as

[1] It is here forgotten that a plan for the collection of the revenue, and the administration of civil justice, and of criminal justice, in the first instance, had been devised, which rendered the interposition of the Naib no longer necessary; the Committee speak of the office as originally constituted, not as now, in a great degree superseded by the English regulations.—W.

[2] "Though we have not a doubt but that by the exertion of your abilities, and the care and assiduity of our servants in the superintendency of the revenues, the collections will be conducted with more advantage to the Company, and ease to the natives, than by means of a Naib Dewan; we are fully sensible of the expediency of supporting some ostensible minister in the Company's interest at the Nabob's court, to transact the political affairs of the Circar, and interpose between the Company and the subjects of any European power, in all cases wherein they may thwart our interest, or encroach on our authority." Letter from the Court of Directors to the President and Council at Fort William, 28th August, 1771: Minutes, ut supra, p. 973.

[3] "The Committee are fully sensible of the expediency remarked by the Honourable Court of Directors, of holding out the authority of the country government to the European powers, in all cases wherein their interests may interfere with those of the Company." Consultation, 14th July, 1772, Minutes, ut supra, p. 978. Mr. Hastings, in his letter, 24th March, 1774, seems to have questioned altogether the wisdom of clandestinity: "There can be but one government, and one power in this province. Even the pretensions of the Nabob may prove a source of great embarrassment, when he is of age to claim his release from the present state of pupillage which prevents his asserting them." Ibid. p. 999.

the Naib Subah (so they styled the Naib of the Nazim) was neither necessary nor desirable; first, on account of the expense, next, the delegation of power, which could never be without a portion of danger. They resolved, therefore, that the office of Naib Subah should be abolished.[1] That is to say, they resolved, that the main instrument of government, that on which the administration of justice, the whole business of police, and every branch of the executive government depended, should be taken away; and what did they substitute, for answering the same ends? The Courts of Review established at Calcutta might be expected to supply the place of the Naib of the Nazim, in respect to the administration of justice: with respect to all the other branches of government, answerable for the happiness of between twenty and thirty millions of human beings, no substitution whatsoever was made: so profound, for I acquit them on the score of intention, was the ignonce which then distinguished the English rulers of India, of what they owed to the people, over whom they ruled, and the fruit of whose labour, under the pretence of rendering to them the services of government, they took from them, and disposed of as they pleased! No doubt the duties of government, thus left without an organ, were in part, and irregularly, when they pressed upon them and could not be avoided, performed both by the President and Council, and by the servants distributed in the different parts of the country. But how imperfectly those services of government must have been rendered, for which no provision was made and which, as often as they were rendered, were rendered as works of supererogation by those who had other obligations to fulfil, it is unnecessary to observe.

Though so little was done for rendering to the people the services of government, there was another branch of the duties of the Naib Nazim, which met with a very different sort and style of attention. That was, in name, the superintendence of the education and household of the Nabob; in reality, the disbursement of the money, allotted for his state and support. This was a matter of prime importance; and was met with a proportional intensity of consideration and care. It would be unjust, however, to

[1] Ibid. p. 978.

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impute to the individuals the defect in point of virtue which this contrast seems to hold forth. The blame is due to their *education*, the sort of education which their country bestows. They had been taught to consider the disbursement of a very large sum of money, as a matter of prodigious importance; they had never been taught to consider the rendering of the services of government to the people, provided the people would be quiet, as a matter of any importance at all. They must, therefore, have been superior to ordinary men; they must have belonged to that small number who rise above the mental level which their country and its institutions are calculated to form, had they displayed a higher measure, than they did, of wisdom and virtue.

This high-prized department of the functions of the Naib Nazim was even divided into two portions: the latter subject to the control of the former. One portion was made to consist, in "the guardianship of the Nabob, and the care and rule of his family;" the other "in regulating and paying the salaries of the Nabob's servants, and keeping the account of his expenses, to be monthly transmitted to the Board, according to the orders of the Honourable Court of Directors."[1]

To execute the first of these portions (the pretensions of Ahteram-ul-Dowla, and if a woman was to be chosen, those of the mother of the Nabob the wife of Meer Jaffier being set aside) Munny Begum, a second wife, or rather concubine of Meer Jaffier, a person who had been originally a dancing girl, was preferred and appointed. The reasons are thus assigned by the majority of the council, in their minute of the 11th of July, 1772: "We know no person so fit for the trust of guardian to the Nabob, as the widow of the late Nabob Jaffier Ally Cawn, Munnee Begum; her rank may give her a claim to this pre-eminence, without hazard to our own policy: nor will it be found incompatible with the rules prescribed to her sex by the laws and manners of her country, as her authority will be confined to the walls of the Nabob's palace, and the Dewan" (meaning the person who should hold the secondary office, the paymaster, and accountant) "will act, of course, in all cases in which she cannot personally appear. Great abilities are not to be

[1] Consultation, 11th July, 1772, Minutes, ut supra, p. 978.

expected in a Zennana, but in these she is very far from being deficient, nor is any extraordinary reach of understanding requisite for so limited an employ. She is said to have acquired a great ascendant over the spirit of the Nabob, being the only person of whom he stands in any kind of awe; a circumstance highly necessary for fulfilling the chief part of her duty, in directing his education and conduct, which appear to have been hitherto much neglected."[1]

With regard to the second of the above-described portions, a minute, in the Consultation, 11th July, 1772, signed Warren Hastings, says, "The President proposes Raja Goordass, the son of Maha Rajah Nundcomar, for the office of Dewan to the Nabob's household. The inveterate and rooted enmity which has long subsisted between Mahomet Reza Cawn and Nundcomar, and the necessity of employing the vigilance and activity of so penetrating a rival to counteract the designs of Mahomet Reza Cawn, and to eradicate that influence which he still retains in the government of this province, and more especially in the

[1] Minutes, ut supra, p. 979. It is curious enough that Hastings, in his letter to the Nabob, calls her "The Rightful Head of his Family;" and tells him, that "She stands in the place of his deceased Father." Ib. 980. In a private account to the Secret Committee of Directors, Mr. Hastings states other reasons: the first was, that she was "the declared enemy of Mohammed Reza Khan," and that it was necessary, in order to obtain evidence of his guilt, to fill every department with the enemies of that prisoner, who was arrested without warning, and whose papers were secured." He adds, "the only *man*," he says nothing of a woman, "who could pretend to such a trust was the Nabob Yeteram O'Dowla, the brother of Meer Jaffier; a man indeed of no dangerous abilities, nor apparent ambition, but the father of a numerous family; who, by his being brought so nigh to the Musnud, would have acquired a right of inheritance to the Subahship; and if only one of his sons, who are all in the prime of life, should have raised his hopes to the succession, it would have been in his power at any time to remove the single obstacle which the Nabob's life opposed to advancement of the family. The guardian, at least, would have been the Nizam, while the minority lasted; and all the advantages which the Company may hope to derive from it, in the confirmation of their power, would have been lost, or could only have been maintained, by a contention hurtful to their rights, or by a violence yet more exceptionable. The case would be the same were any other man placed in that station. The truth is, that the affairs of the Company stand at present on a footing which can neither last as it is, nor be maintained on the rigid principles of private justice. You must establish your own power, or you must hold it dependent on a superior, which I deem to be impossible.

"The Begum, as a woman, is incapable of passing the bounds assigned her. Her ambition cannot aspire to higher dignity. She has no children to provide for, or mislead her fidelity. Her actual authority rests on the Nabob's life, and therefore cannot endanger it; it must cease with his minority, when she must depend absolutely on the Company for support against her ward and pupil, who will then become her master." Fifth Report, Committee of Secrecy, 1781, Appendix, No. iv.

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family of the Nabob, are the sole motives for his recommendation."[1]

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The revenue allowed to the use of the Nabob had hitherto been so great a sum as thirty-two lacks of rupees. Of this the Directors had already complained: and, agreeably to their directions, in January, 1772, on the allegation of the non-age of the Nabob, it was reduced to one half.

Mohammed Reza Khan and Shitab Roy were brought prisoners to Calcutta in the month of April. In his letter of the 1st of September, to the Court of Directors, Mr. Hastings says: "It may at first sight appear extraordinary, that Mahmud Rizza Cawn and Raja Shitab Roy have been so long detained in confinement without any proofs having been obtained of their guilt, or measures taken to bring them to a trial." Among the causes of this, he first specifies the great load of business with which the time of the counsel had been consumed. He then says, "Neither Mahmud Rizza Cawn nor Raja Shitab Roy complain of the delay as a hardship. Perhaps all parties, as is usual in most cases of a public concern, had their secret views, which, on this occasion, though opposite in their direction, fortunately concurred in the same points. These had conceived hopes of a relaxation of the Company's orders; Mahmud Rizza Cawn had even buoyed himself up with

[1] Minutes, ut supra, p. 994. The President goes on, "These reasons will justify the nomination of a man to supply the place of the late Naib Soobah, who is known to be his most violent opponent, and most capable of opposing him. It is not pretended that these ends are to be obtained merely from the abilities of Raja Goordass; his youth and inexperience render him, although unexceptionable in other respects, inadequate to the real purposes of his appointment; but his father hath all the abilities, perseverance, and temper, requisite for such ends, in a degree, perhaps, exceeding any man in Bengal. These talents, heretofore, made him obnoxious to government itself, and therefore it might be thought unsafe to trust him with an authority so near the Nabob; . . . . . it is therefore proposed to confer it upon his son, who is of himself incapable of making a very bad use of it, and to allow of his acting under the influence and instruction of his father, who, holding no office under the Nabob, and being a subject of our government, may be removed without éclat, or the least appearance of violence, whenever he shall be proved, or even suspected, to abuse his trust." Messrs. Dawes, Lawrel, and Graham, dissented from the President and the majority, and objected to the appointment of Raja Goordass, "Because," say they, "we esteem it, in effect, the appointment of Nundcomar, who, with respect to the various accusations against his political conduct, and the orders which have been in consequence received, stands in such a predicament as to preclude, in our opinion, an acquiescence in the President's proposition." Ib. 996. In his answer, the President vindicates the political conduct of Nundcomar, which he affirms to be without blemish, though he says he will "not take upon him to vindicate his moral character." Ib. 996, 997.

the hopes of a restoration to his former authority, by the interest of his friends and a change in the Direction. I pretend not to enter into the views of others; my own were these: Mahmud Rizza Cawn's influence still prevailed generally throughout the country; in the Nabob's household, and at the capital, it was scarce affected by his present disgrace; his favour was still courted, and his anger dreaded. Who, under such discouragements, would give information or evidence against him? His agents and creatures filled every office of the Nizamut and Dewannee; how was the truth of his conduct to be investigated by these? It would be superfluous to add other arguments to show the necessity of pressing the inquiry by breaking his influence, removing his dependants, and putting the direction of all the affairs which had been committed to his care, into the hands of the most powerful or active of his enemies. With this view, too, the institution of the new Dewannee obviously coincided. These were my real motives for postponing the inquiry."[1]

With respect to the further progress of that inquiry, for facilitating which such extraordinary proceedings had been described as necessary, proceedings sufficient to procure the destruction, when required, of the most innocent of men; it was, nevertheless, after two years' confinement,[2] degradation, and anxiety, judicially declared, that in Mohammed Reza Khan, and Raja Shitab Roy, no guilt had been proved. There is no proof that their destruction was at any time an object with Mr. Hastings; and their acquittal proves that certainly it was not so to the end. Of Mohammed Reza Khan, as connected with subsequent facts of great importance, we shall afterwards have to speak. But the mind of Shitab Roy, who was a man of a high spirit, was too deeply wounded for his health to escape; and he died of a broken heart, a short time after his return to Patna. As some compensation for the ill-usage of Shitab Roy, Mr. Hastings, on his visit to Patna, when travelling to meet the Vizir at Benares, in 1773, appointed his son Roy-royan, or chief native agent of finance, in the province

[1] There was no confinement nor personal restraint beyond an enforced residence in Calcutta, and this was no doubt considered by the parties themselves as an advantage, as it afforded them opportunities of personally defending both their character and their interests.—W.

[2] Committee of Secrecy, 1781, Fifth Report, Appendix, No. iv.

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of Bahar; "from an entire conviction," as he declared, "of the merits and faithful services, and in consideration of the late sufferings of his deceased father."[1]

During the time in which this great revolution was effecting in the Government of Bengal, the situation of the neighbouring powers was preparing another field of action for the ambition and enterprise of the Company's servants. The loss which the Mahrattas had sustained in their late contest with the Abdallees, and the dissensions which prevailed among their chiefs, had for several years preserved the northern provinces from their alarming incursions. Nujub-ad-dowla, the Rohilla, in whom, as imperial deputy, the chief power, at Delhi, had been vested, upon the departure of the Abdallee Shah, had, by his wisdom and vigour, preserved order and tranquillity in that part of Hindustan. The Emperor, Shah Aulum, who resided at Allahabad, in the enjoyment of the districts of Allahabad and Corah, allotted as his dominion in the treaty lately concluded with him by the English and Vizir, where his state was in some measure supported by the payment or expectation of the share which was due to him, and which the English rulers had bound themselves to pay, of the revenues of Bengal; had manifested great impatience, even before the conclusion of Mr. Verelst's government, to march to Delhi, and to mount the throne of his ancestors. Respect for the English, who laboured to repress this fond desire, and for the power of Nujub-ad-dowla, who might not willingly retire from his command, delayed the execution of the Emperor's designs. Nujub-ad-dowla died in the year 1770, about the very time when the ambition of Shah Aulum had stimulated him to the hazardous project of courting the Mahrattas to assist him in returning to Delhi.

[1] For the above scenes, besides the documents already quoted, see Scott's Hist. of Bengal, p. 453; and Seer Mutakhareen, ii. 418.—M.

The transactions regarding Shitab Roy are inaccurately detailed, and the cause of his death is a gratuitous supposition. In the first place, the term of his detention is exaggerated; it was little more than one year. He was sent to Calcutta in May 1772, and acquitted in July 1773. As noticed in the text, he made no complaint of the delay, and at the close of the investigation he was appointed Roy Royan of Behar, with the addition of the office of Naib Nazim: he quitted Calcutta in August, in a bad state of health, and died at Patna, in September. His son, Kullian Sing, was at once nominated his successor in both his fiscal and judicial functions. Letter from Bengal, 10th November, 1773.—W.

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With or without the concert of the Emperor, three powerful chiefs, Tookagee, Sindia, and Besajee, had taken a position to the northward of the river Chumbul, and hovered over the adjoining provinces with 300,000 horse.[1] The Emperor, in the beginning of the year 1771, had despatched his minister to Calcutta to obtain, if not the assistance, at least the approbation of the English, to his projected expedition; and was not restrained by their dissuasions. By the exertions of the Mogul nobles, and the assistance of the Vizir, who is said to have acted with more than his usual liberality,[2] he was enabled, in the month of May, 1771, to march from Allahabad at the head of an army of 16,000 men. At the town of Nubbee Gunge, about thirty miles beyond the city of Furuckabad, on the high road to Delhi, where he was constrained, by the commencement of the rains, to canton his army, a Mahratta vakeel, or ambassador, waited his arrival, and presented the demands of his masters. Whatever balance of chout was due from the time of Mohammed Shah, must be discharged; whatever plunder should be taken, must be divided equally between the Mogul and Mahratta troops; the Mahratta leaders must be confirmed in their jaghires; and five lacks of rupees,[3] toward the expense of the war, must be immediately advanced to the Mahrattas from the imperial treasury. With whatever indignation these imperious terms might be heard, no reluctance was to be shown. When the season for marching returned, the Mahratta chiefs and the nobles of Delhi joined the retinue of the Emperor; and on the 25th of December he made his entrance into the capital, with all the display which his circumstances placed within the compass of his power.

The Mahrattas afforded the Emperor but a few days to

[1] The Emperor had nothing to do with their position. Tukajee Holkar, Madhajee Sindhia, and Kishn Visajee, were officers of the Peishwa, by whom, in 1799, an army had been sent into Hindustan, to recover the influence lost at Paniput, and to exact revenge upon the Rohillas, for the aid they had given to the Abdali. It was for the easier accomplishment of these objects, that they undertook to replace Shah Alem on the throne of Delhi. Duff's Mahrattas, ii. 222.

[2] Francklin's Shah Aulum, p. 36. In the Seer Mutakhareen, the Vizir is said to have exerted himself to deter the Emperor. The truth is, he acted insidiously; in appearance dissuading the Emperor from the projected expedition, to keep faith with the English; secretly encouraging him to it, from the hopes of profiting, as he did, by this improvident adventure.

[3] Scott (Aurungzebe's Successors, p. 249) mentions ten lacks of rupees, without any other conditions or exactions.

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enjoy the dignity and pleasures of his capital; when they hurried him into the field. The country of the Rohillas was the object of cupidity to both; to the Emperor, as an increase of his limited territory; to the Mahrattas, as a field of plunder, if not a permanent possession. Seharunpore, the jaghire of the late minister Nujub-ad-dowla, the Rohilla chief, who had served the royal family with so much fidelity and talent, and, in the absence of the Emperor, had governed the city and province of Delhi for a number of years, lay most accessible. It was not, as the other possessions of the Rohillas, on the further side of the Ganges, but commenced under the Sewalic hills, at a distance of seventy miles from Delhi, and was terminated by the strong fortress of Ghose Ghur on the north, and by Sakertal on the east. The resumption of the government of Delhi, which had been possessed by Nujub-ad-dowla, transmitted to his son Zabita Khan, and the idea of the resentment which that chief must have conceived upon this retrenchment of his power, rendered him an object of apprehension to the Emperor, and recommended to his approbation the project of commencing operations with the reductions of Seharunpore. The Mogul forces, which the Emperor accompanied in person, were commanded by Mirza Nujuf Khan, a native of Persia, who accompanied to Delhi Mirza Mohsan, the brother of Suffder Jung, the Nabob of Oude, when he returned from the embassy on which he had been sent to Nadir Shah, after his invasion of Hindustan. Mirza Nujuf was of a family said to be related to the Sophi sovereigns of Persia, and was held in confinement by the jealousy of Nadir. He and his sister were released at the intercession of the Hindustan ambassador; when the sister became the wife of her deliverer; and the brother accompanied them on their departure to Hindustan. After the death of his benefactor, Mirza Nujuf adhered to the fortunes of his son, Mohammed Coollee Khan, Governor of Allahabad; and when that unfortunate Prince was treacherously put to death by his cousin Suja-ad-dowla, the son and successor of Suffder Jung, Nujuf Khan retired with a few followers into Bengal, and offered his services to Meer Casim. When that Nabob fled for protection to the Nabob of Oude, whom Nujuf Khan, as the friend of Mohammed Coollee Khan, was afraid to trust

he departed into Bundelcund, and was received into employment by one of the chiefs of that country. Upon the flight of Suja-ad-dowla, after the battle of Buxar, Mirza Nujuf offered his services to the English; advanced claims to the government of Allahabad; was favourably received; and put in possession of a part of the country. But when the transfer of that district to the Emperor came to be regarded as a politic arrangement, the pretensions of Nujuf Khan were set aside; and, in the way of compensation, he was allowed a pension of two lacks of rupees from the English revenues, and recommended warmly to the Emperor. His talents and address raised him to a high station in the service of that enfeebled Sovereign, whom he accompanied, as commander of the forces, on his ill-fated expedition to Delhi.

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The united power of the Emperor and Mahrattas, Zabita Khan, though he made a spirited defence, was unable to withstand. He was overcome in battle; and fled across the Ganges, in hopes to defend what territories he possessed on the opposite side. He stationed parties of troops at the different fords, but this weakened his main body; Nujuf Khan gallantly braved the stream, and was followed by the Mahrattas, when Zabita Khan, despairing of success, fled to Pattirgur, where he had deposited his women and treasures. The closeness with which he was pursued allowed not time sufficient to remove them, and they fell into the hands of the enemy; while Zabita Khan himself, with a few attendants, escaped to the camp of Suja-ad-dowla. His country, one of the most fertile districts in India, which had flourished under the vigorous and equitable administration of Nujub-ad-dowla, afforded a rich booty; which the Mahrattas wholly seized, and set at nought the outcries of the Emperor.

The Rohillas were now placed in the most alarming situation. We have already seen[1] that among those soldiers of fortune from the hardy regions of the North, who constantly composed the principal part of the Mogul armies, and, according to their talents and influence, procured themselves lands and governments in India, the Afghans had latterly occupied a conspicuous place; that a portion of this people, who took the name of Rohillas, had given

[1] Book iii. chap. iv.

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several chiefs, with large bands of followers, to the imperial armies; that these chiefs had in some instances been rewarded with jaghires in that fertile district of country which lies principally between the Ganges and the mountains, on the western boundary of the Subah of Oude; that amid the disturbances which attended the dissolution of the Mogul Government, those leaders had endeavoured to secure themselves in their possessions, which they had filled with great numbers of their countrymen. It is completely proved, that their territory was by far the best governed part of India; that the people were protected; that their industry was encouraged; and that the country flourished beyond all parallel. It was by these cares, and by cultivating diligently the arts of neutrality; that is, by pretending, according to the necessity of Indian customs, to favour all parties, not by conquering a larger territory from their neighbours, that the Rohilla chiefs had endeavoured to provide for their independence. After the death of Nujub-ad-dowla, no one among them was remarkably distinguished for talents.[1] Hafez Ruhmet Khan, whose territories lay nearest to those of Suja-ad-dowla, was looked upon as the chief of the tribe; but his character had in it more of caution than of enterprise, and his prudence had

[1] This chief had impressed, both on Indians and Europeans, the highest opinion of his character. Mr. Verelst, giving an account of the surrounding powers, at the conclusion of his government, thus describes him. "As a man and a prince, he is perhaps the only example in Hindostan of, at once, a great and good character. He raised himself from the command of fifty horse, to his present grandeur, entirely by his superior valour, integrity, and strength of genius; and has maintained himself in it with universal applause, by a spirited and well-grounded system of policy. Experience and abilities have supplied the want of letters and education; and the native nobleness and goodness of his heart have amply made amends for the defect of his birth and family. He is a strict lover of justice, a most faithful subject to his Emperor; and has long been the sole defence and support of the royal family at Delhi. His wisdom and conduct were no where more manifest than in his transactions last year with the Shah Abdalla. He found himself obliged to join him, or expose his country to an immediate invasion, and therefore complied with the necessity; but at the same time, so protracted their councils, and threw so many secret obstacles in the way of their designs, that, after several months, the Shah finding his troops mutinous for want of pay or plunder, himself harassed by the Seiks, the heats begun, and the rains approaching, was obliged to return home with disgrace, and rest contented with a sum of money infinitely inferior to what his expedition had promised. Another man in such a situation would probably have lost his life or liberty; but Nujub-ad-dowla, by his prudence, at once saved his dominions, and extricated himself. He is now about sixty years old, and his constitution much worn down by fatigue and sickness; so that it is probable he will soon be succeeded by his eldest son, Zabita Khan, aged nearly thirty-five, who, to all his father's virtues, joins the improvements of a liberal education." Verelst to the Court of Directors, March 28, 1768.

stamped upon him the reputation of avarice. The united force of all these leaders was estimated at 80,000 horse and foot. But though a sense of common danger might with difficulty combine them in operations of defence, they were too independent, and their minds too little capable of a steady pursuit of their own interests, to offer, through an aggressive confederacy, any prospect of danger to the surrounding powers.[1]

The Rohillas, on their part, however, stood exposed to alarming designs, on almost every quarter. Their nearest, and for a long time their most dangerous enemy, was the Subahdar of Oude, to whom, from its first acquisition, their territory had been a constant object of envy and desire. A predecessor of Suja-ad-dowla, nearly thirty years before, had invited the Mahrattas to assist him in wresting it from their hands; and had given the first temptation to that dangerous people to claim a settlement in that part of Hindustan. From the character of the present Subahdah of Oude, the danger of the Rohillas on that side was increased rather than diminished; and at the same time the superior power of the Mahrattas pressed upon them with alarming violence from the south. With their own strength, they were a match for neither party; and clearly saw, that their safety could only be found in obtaining protection against both. They temporized: and endeavoured to evade the hostile designs of each, by shielding themselves with the terror which one set of their enemies kept alive in the breasts of the other.

The Rohillas were vehemently roused by intelligence of the attack upon Zabita Khan, which they regarded as the first step of a general plan of aggression. They proposed an union of councils and of arms with the Subahdar of Oude, to whom the establishment of the Mahrattas upon his frontier was, they knew, an object equally of danger and alarm. He was thrown into great consternation and

[1] Of this, Mr. Vereist had left his decided conviction upon record. "There is something in the constitution of the Rohillas which must ever make them weak and inconsiderable as aggressors. Their government is divided into chiefships: but no one chief has singly troops or resources to enterprise a foreign war. When attacked, their national affection will unite, the common cause will animate them. A private contest will not rouse them; nor is it practicable to engage their voice on any other motive than the general safety." Vereist, Appendix, No. 28.

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embarrassment. Early in January, 1772, he pressed for an interview with the English General, Sir Robert Barker, who was then on his route to Allahabad, and met him on the 20th of the same month at Fyzabad. He remarked that "either, to prevent a total extirpation, the Rohillas would be necessitated to give up a part of their country, and to join their arms with the Mahrattas, when the whole confederacy would fall upon him; or that the Mahrattas, refusing all terms to the Rohillas, would establish themselves in the Rohilla country, and expose him to still greater danger." To extricate himself from these difficulties, the following is the plan which he had devised. He would march with his army to his own Rohilla frontier: he would there, partly by the terror of his arms, partly by desire of his aid, obtain from the Rohillas, first, the cession of a portion of their territory for the Emperor's support, leaving to them such a part as was best adapted to serve as a barrier to the province of Oude; and, secondly, a sum of money, with part of which he would purchase the departure of the Mahrattas, and part of which he would keep to his own use. He would thus effect an accommodation with both the Emperor and the Mahrattas, at the expense of the Rohillas; and put something in his own pocket besides. But for the accomplishment of these desirable ends, the presence of the English was absolutely necessary, without the guarantee of whom, he plainly declared that the Rohillas, who knew him, would yield him no trust. To the letter of the General, making known this proposal, the Presidency on the 3rd of February wrote in reply, approving highly of the project of Suja-ad-dowla, and authorizing the General to lend the support which was desired.

The proposals of the Subahdar, in regard especially to the division of their territory, were odious to the Rohillas; and time was spent in negotiation, while 30,000 Mahrattas ravaged the country beyond the Ganges, and their main body subdued the territory of Zabita Khan. The English General, Sir Robert Barker, strongly urged upon Suja-ad-dowla the necessity of protecting the Rohillas, the weakness of whom became the strength of the Mahrattas, and enabled them, if their departure were purchased, to return to the seizure of the country whenever they pleased. In

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the mean time the Subahdar was eager to conclude a treaty with the Mahrattas; the prospect of which alarmed the English General, and called forth his exertions to prevent so dangerous a confederacy. The Mahrattas, however, treated the overtures of the Subahdar with so little respect, that they varied their terms at every conference; and forced him at last to break off the negotiation. In their instructions to the General, on the 30th of April, the Select Committee declare: "We are confirmed in the opinion we have for some time past entertained, that the Mahrattas will not make any stay in the Rohilla country; but that they will be obliged to quit it even before the rains set in; and every day's intelligence renders the probability of this event the more apparent." Their opinion was grounded upon the knowledge which they possessed of the revolution which had taken place in the Mahratta government, and which could not, as they supposed, and as the event turned out, fail to recall their armies. The Committee add, "We therefore so far concur in opinion with you, that any concessions made to the Mahrattas to promote their departure would be superfluous and highly improper."

The defeat of the negotiation with the Mahrattas, and the knowledge with which the Subahdar was already furnished, of the events which summoned home the Mahrattas, brought about that alliance between him and the Rohillas, which Sir Robert had laboured so eagerly to effect. The Subahdar was very keen for an arrangement, from which he expected to derive money, now when he hoped by the voluntary departure of the Mahrattas to have nothing to do in return for it. The Rohillas, on the other hand, it is observable, entered into the engagement with the utmost reluctance; in compliance solely, as it would appear, with the importunities of the English. Sir Robert Barker had sent Captain Harper to the camp of the Rohillas to negotiate; and on the 25th of May, from the Nabob's camp at Shawabad, he writes to the Presidency, in the following remarkable terms: "Gentlemen, on the 21st instant, Captain Harper, returned from the Rohilla Sirdars [commanders] having *at length prevailed* on Hafez Ruhmet Khan to proceed with him to Shawabad the second day's march. The jealousy of Hindustanees

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has been very particularly evinced in this visit; for notwithstanding Hafez Ruhmet has been encamped within three coss since the 23rd of the month, until this morning, he could not prevail on himself to perform the meeting.—I hope, in a few days, to have the satisfaction of communicating to you the final conclusion of this agreement with the Rohilla Sirdars." [1]

It was not, however, before the 17th day of the following month, that all difficulties were borne down or removed, and a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, was signed by the respective parties. Of the articles, that which was attended with the most memorable consequences—that to which the Rohillas, it is probable, assented only from that rashness and negligence in forming pecuniary obligations which is universal in Indian governments, and which their universal practice of fulfilling none which they can violate or evade unavoidably engenders, was the promise to pay to the Vizir forty lacks of rupees, on condition that he should expel the Mahrattas from the Rohilla territories; ten of these lacks to be furnished on the performance of the service, the rest in the space of three years.[2]

[1] The particulars of the Rohilla war depend chiefly upon statements intended to prejudice Warren Hastings, or those of persons engaged in the transactions, but who, if impartial, were ill qualified by conversancy with the native languages and Indian politics to understand what was going on. At any rate they are, as recited in the text, very irreconcileable both in letter and spirit, with accounts derived from a source, the authenticity of which is unquestionable, and the tone of which cannot possibly be intended to be favourable to Shuja-ad-dowla. A life of Hafiz Rahmet Khan, written by his son Mustajab Khan, and translated by Mr. Elliot, has been published by the Oriental Translation Committee, and the circumstances there narrated are in constant contradiction to those recorded in the text. Thus, instead of any reluctance on the part of the Rohillas to apply to the Vizir for aid, the reluctance is there assigned to Shuja-ad-dowlah. The purport of Sir R. Barker's letter has been misunderstood. The difficulty there alluded to, was not that of inducing the Rohilla sirdars to ask for aid, but of persuading Hafiz to trust his person into the hands of the Nawab: they had long been political enemies, and Hafiz Rahmet Khan not unnaturally suspected, that if the Vizir could get hold of him, his detention would be followed by a renewed attempt upon the country: this is the reluctance spoken of: it was wholly personal, and was at variance with the wishes of the other chiefs. Life of Hafiz, 96.—W.

[2] For the preceding facts, see the Papers in the Appendix, No. 21, of the Fifth Report of the Committee of Secrecy in 1781.—M.

According to the authority last cited, the agreement was of a very different nature. The Mahrattas consented to retire on the promised payment of forty lacks of rupees by the Rohillas, but they demanded that Shuja-ad-dowla should be surety for the payment. "The Nawab declined entering into such an engagement, unless Hafiz gave him a bond for the money, adding, that he would not have acted as mediator, but from regard to Hafiz. The whole of the Afghan Sirdars entreated Hafiz to consent, promising to con-

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No effort whatsoever, in consequence of this agreement, was made by the Subahdar for the expulsion of the Mahrattas; in a little time he returned to his capital, and the Mahrattas, after ravaging the country, crossed the Ganges of their own accord, at the commencement of the rains. They encamped, however, between the Ganges and the Jumna, with too evident an intention of renewing their operations as soon as the favourable season should return. During the period of inaction, the Rohillas importuned the Vizir to make such arrangements with the Emperor and Mahrattas, as might prevent them crossing the Ganges any more. But no such arrangements were attempted. As soon as the termination of the rains approached, the Mahrattas drew near to the river, and, again threatening the Rohillas, demanded a sum of money, of which, after temporizing, a portion was, by Hafez Ruhmet, most reluctantly paid.

Upon the accomplishment of the enterprise against Zabita Khan, the Emperor returned to Delhi, disgusted with his new allies, and eagerly desirous of an opportunity to dissolve the connexion. The Mahrattas on their part, who disdained the restraint of obligation, whenever it might be violated with profit, had entered into correspondence with Zabita Khan, and had engaged for a sum of money to compel the Emperor not only to restore his territory, but to bestow upon him the office of Ameer-al-Omra, which his father had enjoyed. To these commands the Emperor could not prevail upon himself quietly to yield; and the Mahrattas thought proper to march towards Delhi, to enforce submission. The Emperor prepared himself for resistance; and, by the vigour and foresight of Nujuf Khan, was enabled to make a respectable defence. Incapable, however, of long supporting the weight of the Mahratta host, he opened the gates of Delhi on the 22nd of December, exactly one year, wanting three days, from the period of his inaugural entry. From this time, he

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tribute their quotas towards its discharge; on which the deed was executed, and Shooja-ad-dowla having made himself responsible to the Mahrattas, they quitted Kuther." p. 99. The sequel was characteristic of all parties: the Sirdars never paid their quotas: Hafiz paid the Nawab five lacks, and then demanded that his bond should be cancelled. Shuja-ad-dowla never paid the Mahrattas, and no doubt they never expected that he would. The Nawab, however, did good service to the Rohillas for the time.—W.

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was no better than an instrument in the hands of the Mahrattas. Of their power the first use was to extort from their prisoner a grant of the provinces of Corah and Allahabad, in which he had been established by the English. Having accomplished these events, they returned to the banks of the Ganges, which they made preparations to cross.

The Subahdar was now thrown into a state of the most violent alarm, and wrote repeated letters to the Bengal government to send a military force to his protection. He had neglected, or had been unable, to take any measures for placing the country of the Rohillas in a state of security. That people were now laid at the mercy of the Mahrattas, and would, he foresaw, be compelled to join them, to avoid destruction. Zabita Khan had already thrown nimself upon their mercy; and he violently feared that the other chiefs would speedily follow his example. The Mahrattas, indeed, made great offers to the Rohillas. They would remit the greater part of the sums of which they had extorted the promise. They engaged to pass through the country without committing any depredations or molesting the ryots, and to grant all sorts of advantages; provided the Rohillas would yield a free passage through their dominions into the territory of the Vizir.[1] The Subahdar of Oude exerted himself to prevent that union of the Mahrattas and Rohillas; the effects of which he contemplated with so much alarm. He moved with his army into that part of his country which was nearest to that of the Rohillas; and held out to them whatever inducements he conceived most likely to confirm their opposition to the Mahrattas. He engaged to make effectual provision both for their present and future security; and to remit, as Hafez Ruhmet affirms, the forty lacks of rupees. Difficult as was the choice, the Rohillas thought it still less dangerous to rely upon the faith of the Subahdar, than upon that of the Mahrattas; and gaining what they could, by temporizing with that formidable people, they, however, declined all engagements with

[1] This is distinctly asserted in a letter of Hafez Ruhmet himself, addressed to the Gov. General; and it is too conformable to the state of the circumstances to be liable to any reasonable doubt. Fifth Report, ut supra, App. No. 19.

them, and actually joined their troops to those of the English and Subahdar.[1]

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On the 7th of January, 1773, the Secret Committee at Calcutta entered into consultation on intelligence of these events; and thus recorded their sentiments: "Notwithstanding the alarms of the Vizir, expressed in the foregoing letters, it does not clearly appear that the Mahrattas have acquired any accession of power, since; whatever advantage they derived from the sanction of the King's name, when he was independent, must now be either lost, or very much diminished, by their late rupture with him, by their having violently possessed themselves of his person, and their usurpation of his dominions." On the subject of the Rohillas, whom the Vizir, to increase the ardour of the English to send an army to his support, represented as actually connected with the Mahrattas, though he only dreaded that event, they remark, that instead of joining with the Mahrattas in an invasion of the territories of the Vizir, "It is still more probable that the Rohilla chiefs, who have sought their present safety in a treacherous alliance, *to which necessity compelled them*, with the Mahrattas, will, from the same principle, abandon their cause, or employ the confidence reposed in them to re-establish their own independence, rather than contribute to the aggrandizement of a power, *which in the end must overwhelm them*." With regard to the unhappy Shah Aulum, the humiliated Emperor of the Moguls, they remark: "It is possible he may solicit our aid; and, in point of right, we should certainly be justified in affording it him, since no act of his could be deemed valid in his present situation, and while he continues a mere passive instrument in the hands of the Mahrattas: but whether it would be politic to interfere, or whether, at this time especially, it would be expedient, must continue a doubt with us."[2] It is remarkable, that with regard to the most important of his acts—the surrender of Corah and Allahabad—so little did any one regard it as binding, that his deputy in these provinces, instead of delivering them up to the Mahrattas, applied to the English for leave to place them under their protection, "as the King, his master,

[1] See Sir Robert Barker's Letter, 23rd March, 1773, Ibid. App. No. 18.
[2] Fifth Report, ut supra, App. No. 18.

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whilst a prisoner in the hands of the Mahrattas, had been compelled to grant sunnuds in their favour."[1] The English, in consequence, threw a garrison into Allahabad, and sent a member of council to take charge of the revenues.[2]

The obligation under which the English were placed to aid the Vizir in the defence of his own territory, and their opinion of the advantage of supporting him against the Mahrattas, induced them to send Sir Robert Barker, with a part of the army. The importance of preventing the Mahrattas from establishing themselves on the northern side of the Ganges, and the facility which they would possess of invading Oude if masters of Rohilcund, disposed the English to include that district also within the line of their defensive operations. But, though the combined forces of the English and Vizir passed into the territories of the Rohillas, and encamped near the river, opposite to the main army of the Mahrattas, which threatened at once the territories of Oude and the province of Corah, a large body of Mahrattas crossed the Ganges, overran a great part of Rohilcund, destroyed the cities of Moradabad and Sumbul, and continued to ravage the country till the end of March.

No operation of any importance ensued. The English General was restrained by peremptory orders from passing the river, to act on the offensive; the Mahrattas were afraid of crossing it in the face of so formidable an opponent. And in the month of May, the situation of their domestic affairs recalled that people wholly to their own country.

The departure of the Mahrattas opened a field to the ambition of the Subahdar, which he was eager to cultivate. A meeting was concerted between him and the Governor, which took place at Benares at the beginning of September. The terms are memorable in which the cause and object of this interview are mentioned by the English chief. In his Report to the Council at Calcutta, on the 4th of October, 1773, he says, "The Vizir was at first very desirous of the assistance of an English force to put him in possession of the Rohilla country, lying north of his dominions and east of the Ganges. This has long been a

[1] Fifth Report, ut supra, App. No. 18. [2] Ibid. App. No. 12.

favourite object of his wishes; and you will recollect that the first occasion of my last visit was furnished by a proposal of this kind."[1] The Governor-General was so far from revolting at this proposition, or hesitating to close with it, that he stimulated the Vizir to its execution.[2] *Money* was the motive to this eager passion for the ruin of the Rohillas. "As this had long," says the English ruler, "been a favourite object of the Vizir, the Board judged with me that it might afford a fair occasion to urge the improvement of our alliance, by obtaining his assent to a more equitable compensation for the expenses attending the aid which he occasionally received from our forces."[3] The situation of the Company, he says, urged it upon them, "as a measure necessary to its interest and safety. All our advices," he continues, "both public and private, represented the distresses of the Company at home, as extreme. The letters from the Court of Directors called upon us most loudly for ample remittances, and a reduction of our military expenses. At the same time, such was the state of affairs in this government, that for many years past the income of the year was found inadequate to its expense; to defray which, a heavy bond debt, amounting at one time to 125 lacks of rupees had accumulated."[4] It was accordingly stipulated that forty lacks of rupees, upon the accomplishment of the enterprise, should be advanced to the English by the Vizir, and a monthly allowance, equivalent to the computed expense, be provided for the troops engaged in that service. By this, says the Governor, "a saving of near one-third of our military expenses would be effected during the period of such a service; the stipulation of forty lacks would afford an ample supply to our treasury: the Vizir would be freed from a troublesome neighbourhood, and his dominions be much more defensible."

In all this, we may allow, there was enough for convenience and profit, both to the President and the Vizir.

[1] Fifth Report, ut supra, App. No. 19. See also his Minute, addressed to the New Government, Ibid. No. 45; and his Answer to the first of the Charges of Burke.

[2] "I found him," (says he, in his Appeal to the Directors, dated 3rd Dec., 1774, Fifth Report, ut supra, App. No. 45,) "still equally bent on the design of reducing the Rohillas, *which I encouraged*, as I had done before, by dwelling on the advantages which he would derive from its success."

[3] Appeal, ut supra.

[4] Appeal, ut supra.

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But to bring ruin upon a large body of our fellow-creatures for our own convenience and profit, unless where the most cogent reasons of justice and necessity impel, is to perform the part of the most atrocious oppressors. In this case, the pleas of justice and necessity are, to an extraordinary degree, defective and weak. The unhappy Rohillas, it seems, procrastinated, and evaded, with respect to the demand which was now violently made upon them for payment of the formerly stipulated price of defence; a payment which had not been earned, since they had never been defended; which they were not able to pay, since their country had been repeatedly ravaged and stript; of which the exaction was in reality a fraud, since the return for it was never intended to be made; which it was no wonder they were reluctant to pay to the man who was impatient to assail them, and whom the use of their money would only strengthen for their destruction. At the worst, a failure in a pecuniary obligation can never justify a war of extermination; it even authorized hostilities, as the Directors, when they condemned this employment of their forces, remarked, so far only, as might be necessary to compel the fulfilment of the contract. It was also alleged, that the Rohillas assisted the Mahrattas. But this is by no means true. They temporized with the Mahrattas, as it was highly natural they should do; but the whole power of the nation was exerted to keep and to drive the Mahrattas from their own side of the Ganges.[1] With regard to necessity for the extirpation of the Rohillas, there was not so much as prudence to justify the deed; Hastings himself confessing, "that the dependence of the Vizir upon the Company (in other words his weakness) would, by that extension of his possessions, be *increased*, as he himself was incapable of defending even his ancient possessions without the English support."[2]

[1] See the official letters of Sir Robert Barker, who commanded the British forces upon the spot, Fifth Report, ut supra, App. No. 18. He condemned the assistance given to the destruction of the Rohillas, but less on the score of justice, than expediency. See his Minute, ut supra, App. No. 23. The Rohillas, among other reasons, alleged with truth, that merely driving the Mahrattas across the river was no deliverance, as they would return the very next campaign. See Barker's Evidence, in Minutes of Evidence before the House of Commons, May 2nd, 1786. Sir Robert was asked; "Were the Mahrattas in fact prevented from invading the Rohillas, by any acts of Sujaad-dowla, or by his protection of that country?—No."

[2] Appeal, ut supra. This is a contradiction to his former assertion, that the acquisition of the Rohilla country made his territories more defensible.

Another object of great importance was to be settled between the Governor and Vizir. The provinces of Corah and Allahabad, of which a forced surrender had been obtained by the Mahrattas, but which the deputy of the Emperor, declaring the act involuntary, had, to save them for his master, placed under the protection of the English, were to be disposed of. At first, if no resolution was taken to restore them to the Emperor, it appears, at least, that none was adopted to take them from him. As soon as the idea was begotten of making money out of the present situation of affairs, the provinces of Corah and Allahabad naturally fell into the crucible. It had long been a decided principle in the Company's policy, not to retain those provinces under their own administration; because the expense of governing them, at so great a distance, would exceed the utmost revenue they could yield. The choice lay between preserving them for the Emperor and making them over to the Vizir. Generosity, had it any place in such arrangements, pleaded with almost unexampled strength in behalf of the forlorn Emperor, the nominal sovereign of so vast an empire, the representative of so illustrious a race, who now possessed hardly a roof to cover him. Justice, too, or something not easily distinguished from justice, spoke on the same side: considering that, in the first place, the Emperor had a right to the provinces, both by his quality of sovereign of India, and also by the peculiar concession and grant of the English Company, if not in express terms for, most certainly in consideration of, his not absolutely necessary but highly useful grant of the dewannee of the three great and opulent provinces of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa; and that, in the second place, he could not, by any fair construction, be deemed to have forfeited any right by the surrender of the provinces, an act which was in the highest degree involuntary, and therefore not his own. But these considerations were a feeble balance against the calls of want, and the heavy attractions of gold. To secure Allahabad and Corah against the posses-

True. But having a bad cause to defend, his apology is full of contradictions. There can be no doubt that the Rohillas, whose troops were among the best and bravest of Hindustan, were a barrier against the Mahrattas. But the desire of territory and plunder blinded the Vizir; that of money, the Governor.

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sion of so dangerous a power as the Mahrattas was the acknowledged policy of the British government; and it was alleged, that the Emperor was unable to protect them. But it is certainly true, that the Emperor was not less able at that time than he was at the time when they were first bestowed upon him; or than he was at any point of the time during which they had been left in his hands. It is equally true, that the inability of the Vizir to secure them was just as certain as that of the Emperor; since there is the confession of the Governor, that he was unable to protect even his own dominions, without the assistance of the English; and that every extension of his frontier rendered him more vulnerable and weak. There was, however, one difference; the Vizir could give money for them, the Emperor could not; and in this, it is probable, the whole advantage will be found to consist. That the English strengthened their barrier by giving to a crude native government a vast frontier to defend, instead of combining against the Mahrattas the forces of the Rohillas, the Emperor, and the Vizir, will hardly be affirmed by those who reflect how easily the balance among those powers might have been trimmed, or who know the consequences of the arrangement that was formed. For a sum of money, Corah and Allahabad were tendered to the Vizir. That he was delighted with the prospect of regaining a territory, for which, a few years before, we have seen him incurring the infamy and guilt of perfidy and murder, perpetrated against a near kinsman, we need not doubt. About terms there appears to have been no dispute. For the sum of fifty lacks of rupees, of which twenty lacks were to be paid in ready money, and the remainder in two years by payments of fifteen lacks at a time, the provinces in question were added to his dominions.

The acquisition of those provinces made an apparent change with regard to the Rohillas in the views of the Vizir. If we may believe the representation of the President; whose representations, however, upon this subject, are so full of management and ambiguity, that they are all to be received with caution; the Nabob represented himself unable to meet the pecuniary obligations under which the acquisition of both territories would lay him to the

English Company; and desired for that reason to suspend his attack upon the Rohillas. It was agreed, however, between him and the President, that whenever the time convenient for the extirpation of that people should arrive, the assistance of the English should not be wanting. The difficulty of fulfilling his pecuniary engagements with the Company, if they were ever alleged, did not detain him long.

From the meeting at Benares, the Vizir and President parted different ways; the former to the Dooab and Delhi, to reduce, during the absence of the Mahrattas, some forts and districts which were still held for that people; the latter to lay before his colleagues, and to transmit to his employers, such an account of the transactions at this interview, as was most likely to answer his ends.

In his report to the Council at Fort William, the President confined himself to the agreement respecting Corah and Allahabad, and the allowance for such troops as might hereafter be employed in the service of the Vizir. The agreement respecting the Rohillas, which it had been settled between the President and Vizir might be conveniently kept out of the ostensible treaty, was wholly suppressed. With a view to the future, it was politic however to explain, that the Vizir showed at first a desire to obtain English assistance for the seizure of the Rohilla country; it was politic also to state the pretexts by which the expediency of that assistance might best appear to be established. Adding, that for the present, however, the Vizir had laid aside this design, the President subjoined the following declaration: "I was pleased that he urged the scheme of this expedition no further, as it would have led our troops to a distance."[1] Yet we have it from his pen, that he "encouraged" the Vizir to the enterprize, as what promised to be of the greatest advantage to the Company.

In the letter of the President despatched from Benares to the Directors, announcing the result of his arrangements with the Vizir, all intelligence of the project for exterminating the Rohillas is suppressed.

Upon the return of Mr. Hastings to Calcutta, he effected an object, of which, from the important consequences

[1] Fifth Report, ut supra, App. No. 19.

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with which it was attended, it is necessary to give some account. The correspondence with the country powers had frequently been carried on through the military officers upon the spot. The power thus conveyed to the military, Mr. Hastings had represented as inconvenient, if not dangerous; and one object of his policy had been to render the head of the civil government the exclusive organ of communication with foreign powers. He now stated to the Council the concurrence in opinion of the Vizir and himself, that an agent, permanently residing with the Vizir for the communication and adjustment of many affairs to which the intercourse of letters could not conveniently apply, would be attended with important advantages: and he urged the propriety of granting to himself the sole nomination of such an agent, the sole power of removing him, and the power of receiving and answering his letters, without communication either to the Committee or Council. To all these conditions the Council gave their assent[1]; and Mr. Nathaniel Middleton, with an extra salary, was sent as private agent to attend the residence of the Vizir, and to communicate secretly with Mr. Hastings.[2]

The Vizir, in the meantime, had made himself master of several places in the Dooab. He advanced towards Delhi with a show of great friendship to the Emperor; assisted him with money; sent a force to assist his army in wresting Agra from the Jaats; and, having thus laid a foundation for confidence, began to intrigue for his sanction to the intended attack upon Rohilcund. A treaty was negotiated, and at last solemnly concluded and signed, by which it was agreed that the Emperor should assist with his forces in the reduction of the Rohillas, and in return should receive a share of the plunder, and one-half of the conquered country.[3]

On the 18th of November, about two months after their interview, the Vizir wrote to the President, demanding the promised assistance of the English for the destruction of the Rohillas. Mr. Hastings appears to have been thrown

[1] Hastings' Report, App. No. 19, ut supra; Letter of 17th June, 1774, App. No. 25.

[2] Francklin's Shah Aulum, p. 54. Letter of Col. Champion; Fifth Report, ut supra, App. No. 45; and the treaty itself, App. No. 27. Scott's Aurungzebe's Successors, p. 259, 260.

into some embarrassment. The suddenness and confidence of the call corresponded but indifferently with the terms on which he had given his colleagues to understand that the communication on this subject rested between him and the Vizir. His abilities in making out a case, though singularly great, were unable to produce unanimity; and it was not till after a long debate, that a decision in favour of the expedition was obtained. The assistance was promised on the very terms concerted and settled between him and the Vizir; and yet this President had the art to persuade his colleagues, and joined with them in a declaration to their common masters, that these terms were so favourable to the English, and so burdensome to the Vizir, as to render his acceptance of them improbable, and therefore to leave but little chance of their involving the English Government in a measure which the principal conductors of that government were desirous to avoid.[1]

In the month of January, 1774, the second of the three brigades into which the Company's army in Bengal was divided, received orders to join the Vizir; and Colonel Champion, now Commander-in-Chief, proceeded about the middle of February to assume the command. On the 24th of February the brigade arrived within the territory of the Vizir; and, on the 17th of April, the united forces entered the Rohilla dominions. On the 19th, Colonel Champion wrote to the Presidency, that the Rohilla leader, "had by letter expressed earnest inclinations to come to an accommodation with the Vizir; but that the Nabob claimed no less than *two crores* of rupees." After this extravagant demand, the Rohillas posted themselves on the side of Babul Nulla, with a resolution of standing their ground to the last extremity. And early on the morning of the 23rd, the English advanced to the attack. "Hafez," says the English General, with a generous esteem, "and his army, consisting of about 40,000 men, showed great bravery and resolution, annoying us with their artillery and rockets. They made repeated attempts to charge, but our guns, being so much better served than theirs, kept so constant and galling a fire, that they could not advance; and where they were closest, was the greatest slaughter. They gave

[1] Fifth Report, ut supra, App. Nos. 22, 23, 24, 25.

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proof of a good share of military knowledge, by showing inclinations to force both our flanks at the same time, and endeavouring to call off our attentions by a brisk fire on our centre. It is impossible to describe a more obstinate firmness of resolution than the enemy displayed. Numerous were their gallant men who advanced, and often pitched their colours between both armies, in order to encourage their men to follow them; and it was not till they saw our whole army advancing briskly to charge them, after a severe cannonade of two hours and twenty minutes, and a smart fire of musketry for some minutes on both flanks, that they fairly turned their backs. Of the enemy above 2000 fell in the field, and amongst them many Sirdars. But what renders the victory most decisive is the death of Hafez Ruhmet, who was killed whilst bravely rallying his people to battle. One of his sons was also killed, one taken prisoner, and a third returned from flight to-day, and is in the hands of Suja-ad-dowla."

In passing to another character, the General changes his strain. "I wish," says he, "I could pay the Vizir any compliment on this occasion, or that I were not under the indispensable necessity of expressing my highest indignation at his shameful pusillanimity; indispensably, I say, because it is necessary that administration should clearly know how little to be depended on is this their ally. The night before the battle, I applied to him for some particular pieces of cannon, which I thought might prove of great service in the action; but he declined giving the use of them. He promised solemnly to support me with all his force, and particularly engaged to be near at hand with a large body of cavalry, to be used as I should direct. But, instead of being nigh me, he remained beyond the Gurrah, on the ground which I had left in the morning, surrounded by his cavalry and a large train of artillery, and did not move thence till the news of the enemy's defeat reached him." Then, however, his troops began to be active, and effectually plundered the camp; "while the Company's troops, in regular order in their ranks, most justly" (says their commander) "observed, *We have the honour of the day, and these banditti the profit.*"[1]

[1] Letter of Col. Champion, to the Hon. Warren Hastings, &c., 24th April, 1774; Fifth Report, ut supra, App. No. 26.

This action, in reality, terminated the war. Though Fyzoolla Khan, with his treasures and the remains of the army, had made good his flight toward the mountains, the whole country, without opposition, lay at the mercy of the Vizir; and never, probably, were the rights of conquest more savagely abused. Not only was the ferocity of Indian depredation let loose upon the wretched inhabitants, but as his intention, according to what he had previously and repeatedly declared to the English Government, was to exterminate the Rohillas, every one who bore the name of Rohilla was either butchered, or found his safety in flight and in exile.[1]

[1] "The inhumanity and dishonour," says Col. Champion, in his letter of June 12, 1774, "with which the late proprietors of this country and their families have been used, is known all over these parts; a relation of them would swell this letter to an immense size. I could not help compassionating such unparalleled misery; and my requests to the Vizir to show lenity, were frequent, but as fruitless as even those advices which I almost hourly gave him, regarding the destruction of the villages, with respect to which I am now constrained to declare, that though he always promised as fairly as I could wish, yet he did not observe one of his promises, nor cease to overspread the country with flames, till three days after the fate of Hafez Rhamot was decided."—In another letter he says, "Above a lack of people have deserted their abodes in consequence of the defeat of Hafez." Ibid. App. No. 27. In another, "The whole army were witnesses of scenes that cannot be described." That the President was perfectly aware of the designs of the Vizir, before his engagement to assist in them, sufficiently appears from his own letter to that chief, dated the 22nd of April, 1773. "I have received," says he, "your Excellency's letter, mentioning.....that if, should the Rohillas be guilty of a breach of their agreement [viz., about the forty lacs], we will *thoroughly exterminate* them, and settle your Excellency in the country; you will in that case pay the Company fifty lacs of rupees, and exempt them from the King's tribute." Ibid. App. No. 21. In the Nabob's own letter to the President, of the 18th November, 1773, he says, "During our interview at Benares, it was agreed that I should pay, &c.....and that I should, with the assistance of the English forces, endeavour to punish and *exterminate the Rohillas out of their country*." Ibid. App. No. 22. Mr. Hastings only admits the atrocities in part, and then defends them in a curious manner; that is to say, not only by the example of Indian barbarity in general, but by the example of British barbarity, on the subjects of the Vizir. "I believe it to be a truth," says he, "that he [the Vizir] began by sending detachments to plunder. This I pronounce to have been both barbarous and impolitic. But too much justified by the practice of war established among all nations of the East; and I am sorry to add by our own; in an instance (which the Vizir has a right to quote in vindication of the charge against him), of a detachment employed in the war in which we were engaged with him in the year 1764, to burn and ravage his country." He then quotes a letter from Major Champion, who commanded the detachment, which says, "Two separate parties have been sent into the enemy's country, the one of which was as high up as Buxar, and (according to the directions given me) there are destroyed upwards of a thousand villages. Had not the rains, &c., prevented, we should have done very considerably more damage." Minute of the Governor-General, dated 10th Jan., 1775, in the Fifth Report, ut supra, App. No. 45.—M. The words 'extermination,' 'extirpation,' and the like, although found in the correspondence, are here put forward so as to convey erroneous impressions. The only extirpation proposed, was, that of the power of one or two Rohilla chiefs. It was not a war against the people, but against a few military adventurers, who had gained their possessions by the

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Shortly after this decisive affair, the army marched to the city of Bissouly, which was near the centre of the Rohilla country, with the intention of passing in quarters the season of the rains. At this place had arrived before them Nujuf Khan, with the army of the Emperor. In obedience to the treaty between the Emperor and Vizir, they had marched from Delhi to assist in the reduction of the Rohillas; but, before they reached the scene of action, the rapidity and vigour of the English had terminated the war. Nujuf Khan demanded partition of the country, and of the plunder, according to the conditions on which the countenance and co-operation of the Emperor had been procured. The Vizir did not dispute the treaty, a copy of which the Emperor had sent to Colonel Champion; he alleged, however, that the counterpart, which was in his own possession, expressed a condition that his Majesty should take the field in person; and that the breach of that article annulled the contract. "But when the counterpart," says Colonel Champion, "which he put into the hands of my interpreter, came to be examined, it appeared there was no such stipulation, nor did it ever exist even verbally."[1] The decision of the English Government is the next incident in the scene. Instructing on this subject the commander of their troops, when he had as yet sent them only a surmise, and the treaty had not been produced,

sword, who were constantly at war with their neighbours and with each other, and whose forcible suppression was the legitimate object of the King of Delhi, or the Nawab of Oude. So far was the contest from being national, that the mass of the population of Rohilcund consisted of Hindus, hostile both in religion and policy to their Afghan rules, to whom the name Rohillas is somewhat incorrectly confined. Even amongst the Afghans, however, there was but a partial combination, and several of the Sirdars joined the Vizir. One of the many pamphlets put forth by the virulent enemies of Hastings (Origin and authentic narrative of the present Mahratta and late Rohilla War. Lond. 1781,) unblushingly affirms that 500,000 families of husbandmen and artists had been driven across the Jumna, and that the Rohilla provinces were a barren and uninhabited waste. An equally false representation is cited from the Parliamentary Register, 1781, by Hamilton, according to whom, the numbers expelled were about 17,000 or 18,000 men with their families, none being included in the spirit of the treaty, *excepting such as were actually found in arms.* The Hindu inhabitants, consisting of about 700,000, were no otherwise affected by it than experiencing a change of masters, to which they had been frequently accustomed. Hamilton, History of the Rohilla Afghans, 268. These statements all proceeded from personal hostility to Hastings, and had no foundation in genuine humanity. It is evident that the son of Hafiz, although the most grievous consequence of hostilities was his father's death, entertains no suspicion that there was anything atrocious in the transaction, and he expresses no personal resentment towards the chief actors in the revolution.—W.

[1] App. No. 45, sup.

"our engagements (they say) with the Vizir are to aid him in the conquest of the Rohilla country; and if he is opposed by Nujuf Khan, or the King himself, you are to pay no regard to either. We cannot (they add) entertain so bad an opinion of the Vizir as to suppose him capable of acting in avowed breach of a treaty; but if any plea of that kind should be made for contesting our right to occupy any part of the Rohilla country yet unconquered, it will be proper to put to him the question, whether such treaty does exist or not? If he should acknowledge such a treaty, you must undoubtedly abstain from further hostilities in abetment of his breach of faith." Yet, after they were fully satisfied of the existence of such a treaty; and not only of the capability, but the resolution of the Vizir to act in avowed breach of it, they laid their commands upon the English general, to abet and support him, because "it is our intention" (say they) "to persevere in pursuit of the object which originally engaged us in the present enterprise, and to adhere strictly to our engagements with the Vizir, without suffering our attention to be diverted by foreign incidents or occurrences,"[1] that is, by solemn treaties, or the breach of them.

From Fyzoolla Khan an early application arrived, offering to come to the camp upon the faith of the English, and to hold the district which had belonged to his family as a dependant or renter of the Vizir. His offers, variously modified, were frequently repeated, with great earnestness. But the Vizir persisted in his declaration, that he would allow no Rohilla chief to remain on the further side of the Ganges; and only offered him one of the districts in the Dooab which had been recently conquered from the Mahrattas. Fyzoolla Khan, with justice, observed, that this the Mahrattas would take from him the first time they returned to the country.

Towards the end of July, the united forces of the English and Vizir marched towards Fyzoolla Khan, who occupied a strong post on the skirts of the mountains, near Pattir Gur. At the beginning of September they came near the enemy, and, as the Vizir began to exhibit a strong desire of an accommodation with the Rohillas, an active intercourse of letters and messengers ensued.

[1] Letter of 23rd May, and 14th July, App. ut supra, No. 27.

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Whether his mind was operated upon by the approaching arrival of the new councillors at Calcutta, or the dread which he pretended of assistance to Fyzoolla Khan from the Mahrattas and Afghans, he now made offer of terms to which a little before he would not so much as listen. He proposed to make Fyzoolla collector of the revenues, or Zemindar, of the whole territory of Rohilcund, allowing six lacks of rupees per annum for his own expenses. But this offer, and even that of a jaghire of ten lacks of rupees, in the Rohilcund country, were rejected. The Rohillas were so advantageously posted, with works thrown up in their front, that it was necessary to advance by regular approaches, and the army were so discontented, on account of hardship, arrears of pay, and ill-usage, either real or supposed, that the general was doubtful of their steadiness and order. After several days, in which the approaches were carried on, and the scouting parties of both armies were frequently engaged, it was at last agreed, that Fyzoolla Khan should receive a jaghire of fourteen lacks and seventy-five thousand rupees, in the Rohilcund territory, and should surrender one-half of all his effects to the Vizir. Thus terminated the first Rohilla war.[1]

Before closing the account of the events to which the visit of Mr. Hastings to Benares gave birth, it is necessary to mention its effects with regard to the deserted Emperor. Upon receiving from him the grant of the dewannee, or the receipt and management of the revenues of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, it was agreed that, as the royal share of those revenues, twenty-six lacks of rupees should be annually paid to him by the Company. His having accepted of the assistance of the Mahrattas, to place him on the throne of his ancestors, was now made use of as a reason for telling him, that the tribute of these provinces should be paid to him no more. Of the honour or the discredit, however, of this transaction, the principal share belongs not to the Governor, but to the Directors themselves; who, in their letter to Bengal of the 11th of November, 1768, had said, "If the Emperor flings himself into the hands of the Mah-

[1] See the correspondence, Fifth Report, ut supra, App. No. 27, and Col. Champion's long defensive letter, Ibid. App. No. 45. See also No. 28 of the Bengal Treaties, in the Collection of Treaties, &c., with the native princes, printed in 1812. *Rampore*, and some dependent districts, formed the territory bestowed upon Fyzoolla Khan.

rattas, or any other power, we are disengaged from him and it may open a fair opportunity of withholding the twenty-six lacks we now pay him."[1] Upon the whole, indeed, of the measure dealt out to this unhappy sovereign, depriving him of the territories of Corah and Allahabad, depriving him of the tribute which was due to him from those provinces of his which they possessed, the Directors bestowed unqualified approbation. And though they condemned the use which had been made of their troops in subduing the country of the Rohillas; they declare frankly, "We, upon the maturest deliberation, confirm the treaty of Benares."[2]

The circumstance upon which, in summing up the account of his administration to his honourable masters, Hastings advanced the strongest claim to applause, was the alleviation of the pecuniary difficulties of the Indian government, and the improvement of the revenues. In the letters from the Bengal administration to the Court of Directors, under date 22nd August, and 17th October, 1774, after presenting the most flattering picture of the financial situation to which the government was happily exalted, they advance a confident prediction, that in the course of the ensuing season, the whole of the bond debt would be discharged.[3] And in that representation of the state of Bengal, which was published by Mr. Hastings in 1786, he declares, "When I took charge of the government of Bengal in April 1772, I found it loaded with a debt at interest of nearly the same amount as the present; and in less than two years I saw that debt completely discharged, and a sum in ready cash of the same amount actually accumulated in store in the public treasuries."[4] This boasting exhibits some remarkable features, when the facts are sufficiently ascertained. No improvement had been made in the productive powers of the country, which is the only permanent and satisfactory source of an improved revenue. The gross revenues of the year ending in April 1772, 3,13,63,894 current rupees; the gross revenues of that ending in April 1774 were only 2,76,10,556. Hardly had any improvement been made in the net

[1] Fifth Report, ut supra, App. No. 12.
[2] Company's Letter to Bengal, 3rd March, 1775, Ibid. App. No. 46.
[3] Fifth Report, ut supra, p. 37, and App. No. 43.
[4] Memoirs relative to the state of India, by Warren Hastings, Esq., p. 21.

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receipt. That for the year ending in April 1772, was 2,16,88,538 rupees, equal to 2,373,650*l.*; that for the year ending 1774, was 2,20,56,919 rupees, or 2,481,404*l.*[1] In the next great department of financial administration, the expense of the civil and military services, instead of any retrenchment there had been an increase. In the year ending in 1772, the civil service is stated at 154,620*l.*, the marine at 52,161*l.*, the military at 1,164,348*l.*, and the total expense, exclusive of buildings and fortifications, at 1,371,129*l.*[2] In the year ending in 1774, the civil service is stated at 159,537*l.*, the marine at 53,700*l.*, the military at 1,304,883*l.*, and the total at 1,518,120*l.*[3] In the year 1772, the proportion of the military expense, defrayed by the Nabob of Oude, was 20,766*l.*[4] In the year 1774, the proportion defrayed by him was 131,430*l.*[5] In the following year, that ending in April 1775, there was a slight improvement in the collections, which may in part be ascribed to the measures of the preceding administration; and there was a total cessation of war which produced a reduction of the military expenditure, remarkable only for its minuteness. The gross collections amounted to 2,87,20,760 rupees, the net receipt to 2,51,02,090, or 2,823,964*l.*; the civil service to 231,722*l.*, the marine to 36,510*l.*, and the military to 1,080,304*l.*; total, 1,349,836*l.*: and the proportion this year borne by the Nabob of Oude was 240,750*l.*[6] It thus abundantly appears, that nothing so important as to deserve the name of improvement had arisen in the financial administration of the Company. A pecuniary relief had indeed been procured, but from sources of a temporary and very doubtful description; partly from the produce of the bills drawn in such profusion upon the Company, by the predecessor of Hastings; partly from the reduction of the allowance to the Nabob of Bengal, from thirty-two to sixteen lacks; but chiefly from the plunder of the unhappy Emperor of the Moguls, whose tribute of twenty-six lacks per annum for the dewannee of Bengal was withheld, and whose two provinces Corah and Allahabad were sold for fifty lacks to the Vizir; from the sale of the Rohillas, the extirpation of whom was purchased at

[1] Fifth Report, ut supra, p. 7 and 35.
[2] Ibid. p. 8.
[3] Ibid. p. 35.
[4] Ibid. p. 8.
[5] Ibid. p. 35.
[6] Ibid. p. 41.

forty of the same eagerly coveted lacks; and from the pay and maintenance of a third part of the troops, which were employed in the wars and dominions of the Vizir. With regard even to the payment of the debt, an inspection of the accounts exhibits other results than those presented by the declarations of the President.

Year ending in April.	Balances in the Treasuries.	Debts at interest.	Other debts.
1772 ...	C.R.65,09,041	... 1,07,84,520	... 52,48,480.
1774 ...	21,62,994	... 1,17,71,486	... 95,41,795.
1775 ...	1,23,95,598	... 90,68,584	... 87,05,871.[1]

Upon this statement, if we compare the year in which Mr. Hastings began his administration, with that in which it ended, we see a prodigious deterioration. If we compare it even with that which follows, the total amount of debt in 1772 was 1,60,30,000 rupees; in 1775 it was 1,77,68,584, which is an increase of 17,41,455. The only improvement appears in the balance of cash, which in 1775 exceeded the balance in 1772 by 58,86,557 rupees. Deducting from this a sum equal to the increase of debt, there remains 41,45,102 rupees, by which alone the state of the exchequer, after all the calamity which had been produced to supply it, was better in 1775 than it had been in 1772.

CHAPTER II.

Commencement of the New Government—Supreme Council divided into two Parties, of which that of the Governor-General in the Minority—Presidency of Bombay espouse the Cause of Ragoba, an ejected Peshwa—Supreme council condemn this Policy, and make Peace with his Opponents—Situation of the Powers in the Upper Country, Nabob of Oude, Emperor, and Nujuf Khan—Pecuniary Corruption, in which Governor-General seemed to be implicated, in the cases of the Ranee or Burdwan, Phousdar of Hoogley, and Munny Begum—Governor-General resists Inquiry—Nuncomar the great Accuser—He is prosecuted by the

[1] Fifth Report, ut supra, p. 8, 36, 42.

BOOK V. CHAP. II. 1774.

Governor-General—Accused of Forgery, found guilty, and hanged—Mohammed Reza Khan, and the office of Naib Subah restored.

THE operation of the new constitution framed by the Parliament of England, was ordained to commence in India after the 1st of August, 1774. The new councillors, however, General Clavering, Mr. Monson, and Mr. Francis, who, along with Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell, were elected to compose the board of administration, did not arrive at Calcutta until the 19th of October. On the following day the existing government was dissolved by proclamation, and the new council took possession of its powers. On the proposal of the Governor-general, who stated the necessity of a few days, to prepare for the council a view of the existing state of affairs, and to enable Mr. Barwell, who was then absent, to arrive; the meeting of the Board was suspended until the 25th. On the very day on which its deliberations began, some of the discord made its appearance, which so long and so deeply embarrassed and disgraced the government of India. The party who had arrived from England, and the party in India, with whom they were conjoined, met not, it should seem, with minds in the happiest frame for conjunct operations. Mr. Hastings, upon the first appearance of his colleagues, behaved, or was suspected of behaving, coldly. And with jealous feelings this coldness was construed into studied and humiliating neglect. In the representation which the Governor-general presented of the political state of the country, the war against the Rohillas necessarily attracted the principal attention of the new councillors; and, unhappily for the Governor-general, presented too many appearances of a doubtful complexion not to excite the desire of elucidation in the minds of the most candid judges. An obvious objection was, its direct opposition to the frequent and urgent commands of the Court of Directors, not to engage in offensive wars of any description, and to confine the line of defensive operations to the territorial limits of themselves and allies. The reasons, too, upon which the war was grounded; a dispute about the payment of an inconsiderable sum of money, and the benefit of conquest, to which that dispute afforded the only pretext; might well

appear a suspicious foundation. When the new government began the exercise of its authority, the intelligence had not arrived of the treaty with Fyzoolla Khan; and an existing war appeared to demand its earliest determinations. To throw light upon the field of deliberation, the new Councillors required that the correspondence should be laid before them, which had passed between the Governor-general (such is the title by which the President was now distinguished), and the two functionaries, the commander of the troops, and the agent residing with the Vizir. And when they were informed that a part indeed of this correspondence should be submitted to their inspection, but that a part of it would also be withheld, their surprise and dissatisfaction were loudly testified, their indignation and suspicions but little concealed.

As reasons for suppressing a part of the letters, Mr. Hastings alleged, that they did not relate to public business, that they were private confidential communications, and not fit to become public.

It is plain that this declaration could satisfy none but men who had the most unbounded confidence in the probity and wisdom of Mr. Hastings; and as the new Councillors neither had that confidence, nor had been in circumstances in which they could possibly have acquired it on satisfactory grounds, they were not only justified in demanding, but their duty called upon them to demand a full disclosure. The pretension erected by Mr. Hastings, if extended into a general rule, would destroy one great source of the evidence by which the guilt of public men can be proved: and it was calculated to rouse a suspicion of his improbity in any breast not fortified against it by the strongest evidence of his habitual virtue.[1] Nothing could be more unfortunate for Mr. Hastings than his war

[1] The Directors not only condemned the retention of the correspondence, and sent repeated orders for its disclosure, which were never obeyed; but arraigned the very principle of a private agent. "The conduct of our late Council," say they, "in empowering the President to prepare instructions for Mr. Middleton as agent at the court of Suja-ad-dowla, without ordering them to be submitted to the Board for their inspection and approbation, was very improper. And it is our express direction, that no such independent or separate authority be ever delegated, to any Governor, or Member of Council, or to any other person whatsoever; but that all instructions to public agents be laid before the Council, and signed by a majority of the Members, before they be carried into execution." Letter to Bengal, 15th December, 1775, Fifth Report, ut supra, Appendix, No. 46.

BOOK V. CHAP. II. 1774.

against the Rohillas, and the suppression of his correspondence with Mr. Middleton. The first branded his administration with a mark, which its many virtues were never able to obliterate, of cruel and unprincipled aggression; and the second stained him with a natural suspicion of personal impurity. Both together gave his rivals those advantages over him which rendered his subsequent administration a source of contention and misery, and involved him in so great a storm of difficulties and dangers at its close.

Of the Council, now composed of five Members, the three who had recently come from England joined together in opposing the Governor-General, who was supported by Mr. Barwell alone. This party constituted, therefore, a majority of the Council, and the powers of government passed in consequence into their hands. The precipitation of their measures called for, and justified, the animadversions of their opponents. Having protested against the suppression of any part of Middleton's correspondence, they were not contented with commanding that, as at least a temporary expedient, his letters should be wholly addressed to themselves: they voted his immediate recall; though Hastings declared that such a measure would dangerously proclaim to the natives the distractions of the government, and confound the imagination of the Vizir, who had no conception of power except in the head of the government, and who would consider the annihilation of that power as a revolution in the state. The governing party, notwithstanding their persuasion of the injustice and cruelty of the Rohilla war, and notwithstanding their ignorance whether or not it was brought to a close, directed the Commander-in-Chief, in the first place, immediately upon receipt of their letter, to demand payment from the Vizir of the forty lacks of rupees promised for the extirpation of the Rohillas,[1] and of all other sums which might

[1] On the supposition of the injustice of the Rohilla war, these forty lacks ought to have been paid, not to the Company, but to the sufferers: Suja-addowla ought to have been compelled to restore the unhappy refugees to their homes, and to make compensation. But neither the party, who now possessed all the powers of government, though they reprobated the Rohilla war, nor the Court of Directors, though they solemnly condemned it, ever uttered a wish for the restoration of the expatriated and plundered Rohillas; for a farthing of compensation for their loss, or alleviation to their miseries, either out of their own revenues, or those of the Vizir. The cry about justice, therefore, was a cheap virtue to them; and they were so much the less excusable

be due upon his other engagements. Provided a real inability was apparent, he might accept not less than twenty lacks, in partial payment, and securities for the remainder, in twelve months. And they directed him in the second place, to conduct the troops within fourteen days out of the Rohilla country, into the ancient territory of Oude; and in case the Vizir should refuse compliance with the prescribed demands, to withdraw the troops entirely from his service, and retire within the limits of the Company's dominions. Before the despatch of these instructions, intelligence arrived of the treaty with Fyzoolla Khan; of the payment of fifteen lacks by the Vizir, from the share of Fyzoolla Khan's effects; of his return to his capital, for the declared purpose of expediting payment to the Company of the sums which he owed; and of the intention of the English army to march back to Ramgaut, a Rohilla town near the borders of Oude. In consideration of these events the Governor-General proposed to suspend the peremptory demands of money, and the order for the recall of the troops; and to proceed with more leisure and forbearance. But every motion from that quarter in favour of the Vizir was exposed to the suspicion of corrupt and interested motives; and the proposal was rejected. The directions to the Commander were no further modified, than by desiring him to wait upon the Vizir at his capital, and to count the fourteen days from the date of his interview. The Governor-General condemned the precipitation of the pecuniary demand as harsh, impolitic, and contrary to those rules of delicacy, which were prescribed by the directors for their transactions with the native princes, and which prudence and right feeling prescribed in all transactions; and he arraigned the sudden recall of the troops as a breach of treaty, a violation of the Company's faith, tantamount to a declaration that all engagements with the Vizir were annulled, and affording to him a motive and pretence for eluding payment of the debts, which if his alliance with the Company continued, it would be his interest to discharge. Both parties wrote

than the Vizir and Mr. Hastings, that these actors in the scene denied its injustice, and were consistent; the Directors, and the condemning party, were inconsistent; if conscious of that inconsistence, hypocritical: if not conscious, blind.

BOOK V. CHAP. II. 1774.

the strongest representations of their separate views of these circumstances to the Directors; and the observations of one party called forth replies from the other, to a mischievous consumption of the time and attention, both in England and in India, of those on whose undivided exertions the right conducting of the government depended.[1]

Shortly after his return from the expedition against the Rohillas, Suja-ad-dowla, the Vizir, whose health was already broken, began to show symptoms of a rapid decay, and expired in the beginning of 1775, when his only legitimate son, who assumed the title of Asoff-ul-dowla, succeeded without opposition to the Subahdaree of Oude. Mr. Middleton had already returned, and Mr. Bristow was now sent to supply his place at the residence of the new Nabob. The majority in Council resolved to obtain from the son, with all possible despatch, the sums of money due by the father, but to consider all engagements by which they were bound to the late Nabob as dissolved by his death, and to make any assistance, which they might hereafter afford his successor, the result of new purchases and payments. A treaty was at last arranged on the 21st of May, by which it was agreed, that the Company should guarantee to Asoff-ul-dowla, the provinces of Corah and Allahabad, which had been sold to his father; but that the Nabob in return should cede to the Company the territory of the Raja Cheyte Sing, Zemindar of Benares, yielding a revenue of 22,10,000 rupees; that he should raise the allowance for the service of the Company's brigade to 2,60,000 rupees per month; and should pay, as they fell due, the pecuniary balances upon the engagements of the late Vizir. Mr. Hastings refused his sanction to the imposition of these terms, as inconsistent with any equitable construction of the treaty with the late Vizir, extorted from the mere necessities of the young Nabob, and beyond his power to fulfil. The conduct of the Directors was peculiar. In their letter of the 15th December, 1775, remarking, upon the resolution of the

[1] See the Documents in the Appendix, Nos. 44, 45, and 46 of the Fifth Report, ut supra. They are also to be found in the Minutes of Evidence, exhibited to the House of Commons on the Oude charge; and once more in the Minutes of the Evidence exhibited on the trial of Mr. Hastings in Westminster Hall.

Council to disregard the treaties concluded with the late Nabob of Oude, they say, "Although the death of Suja-ad-dowla may render it necessary to make new arrangements with his successor, we cannot agree with our Council, that our treaties with the State of Oude expired with the death of that Nabob." When they were made acquainted however with the new grant of revenue, and the new allowance on account of the troops, they say, in their letter of the 24th of December, 1776, "It is with singular satisfaction we observe at any time the attention paid by our servants to the great interests of their employers; and it is with particular pleasure we here signify our entire approbation of the late treaty concluded with Asoff-ul-dowla, successor of Suja-ad-dowla, by which such terms are procured as seem to promise us solid and permanent advantages."[1]

The new Board of Administration had early announced to the distant Presidencies, that it had assumed the reins of government, and was vested with controlling power over all the British authorities in India. It had also required from each of the Presidencies a representation of its political, financial, and commercial situation; and found a scene opened at Bombay, which it requires a notice of some preceding circumstances rightly to unfold.

The Mahratta sovereigns, or Rajas, were assisted, according to the Hindu institution, by a council of eight Brahmens, who shared among them the principal offices of the state.[2] The official name of the chief of this council was Peshwa, upon whom the most important parts of the business of government devolved. According as the pleasures, the indolence, or the incapacity of the sovereign withdrew him from the management of affairs, the importance of this principal servant was increased; and a proportionable share of the dignity and power of the sovereign passed into his hands. In a rude state of society, it appears not to be difficult for the influence and dignity of the servant to outgrow that of the master, who becomes too weak to resume the power which he has imprudently

[1] Fifth Report, ut supra, with Appendix, Nos. 44 and 45.

[2] These ministers were not in all instances Brahmans, nor were their offices part of the Hindu system; they were instituted by Sivajee. See Duff's Mahrattas, i. 235.—W.

BOOK V. CHAP. II. 1775.

devolved. The minister leaves his office and ascendancy to his son; the son makes it hereditary; and the sovereign, divested of all but the name of king, sinks into an empty pageant. Such was the course of events in the case of the mayor of the palace in France, in that of the *Chu-vua* in Tunquin,[1] and such it was, besides other cases, in that of the Peshwa, among the Mahrattas. In the reign of the Raja Sahoo, who was but third in succession from Sivajee, Viswanath Balajee had raised himself from a low situation in life to the rank of Peshwa. Sahoo was a prince devoted to ease and to pleasure; and the supreme powers were wielded, with little check or limitation, by Viswanath Balajee. He assumed the name of Rao Pundit, that is, chief of the Pundits, or learned Brahmens, and made the Raja invest him with a *sirpáh*, or robe of office,[2] a ceremony which ever since has marked the succession of the Peshwas, and appeared to confer the title. Viswanath was able to leave his office and power to his son Bajerao who still further diminished the power of the sovereign; and finally allowed him not so much as liberty. The Raja was confined to Satarah, a species of state prisoner; while the Peshwa established his own residence at Poona, which henceforth became the seat of government. The brother of Bajerao, Jumnajee Anna, though a Brahmen, led the forces of the state; he attacked the Portuguese settlements in the neighbourhood of Bombay; and added Salsette and Bassein to the conquests of the Mahrattas. The family of the Peshwa prided themselves in these acquisitions; affected to consider them as their own, rather than the property of the state; and showed a violent attachment to them, as often as, either by force or negotiation, the alienation of them was attempted. The vicinity of these territories to the British settlements at Bombay brought the interests of the Company in contact with those of the Mahrattas; and the terms of a commercial and maritime intercourse were somewhat inaccurately framed. Bajerao left a son, named Bao, who was slain in the battle of Paniput; and Jumnajee Anna, his brother, left two sons, Nanah,

[1] See the Exposé Statistique du Tunkin, published in London, in 1811, from the papers of M. de la Bissachère, a French missionary, who had spent twenty-six years in the country.

[2] The Sirpa is an honorary dress, not particularly a robe of office.—W.

called also Bajee Rao, and Ragonaut Rao, with the former of whom, as Peshwa, the Presidency of Bombay, in 1756, concluded a treaty. The Mahrattas agreed to exclude the Dutch from all intercourse with their dominions, and to give up Fort Vittoria, Hematgur, and Bancote, in exchange for Gheriah, which the English had taken from Angria the pirate. In 1761, Bajee Rao, or Nanah, died, of grief, it is said, for the death of Bao, and left two sons, the eldest Madhoo Rao, the other Narrain Rao, both minors. The hereditary succession of the Peshwas had now so firm an establishment that the title of Madhoo was not disputed; and the burden of government, during the minority of his nephew, devolved upon Ragonaut Rao, more commonly known by the name of Ragoba.[1]

1775.

It had fared with the Mahratta government, as it commonly fares with extended dominion under the rude policy of the East. The government of the provinces was confided to the chief military leaders, and the more distant and powerful of them, as the vigour of the central government relaxed, acquired independence. Of these independencies, the most important by far was that of the Bhonslas, which, together with Cuttuck, a part of Orissa, included the whole of the vast province, or region of

[1] This short account in the text of the rise of the power of the Peshwa and of his descendants, is a series of inaccuracies. The usurpation of all real power by the Peshwa did not take place till the death of Shao Raja, and was not the work of Viswanath. He was not succeeded, as a matter of course, by his son, Bajirao, who was not appointed Peshwa until seven months after his father's death, and his son, a second Bajirao, by whom the ascendancy was obtained, succeeded to the office of Peshwa only after some opposition. His aggrandizement was materially owing to Shao's having fallen into a state of mental imbecility some time before his death, and to his having left no successor. Raja Ram, who was placed upon the throne, and was a grandson of Sivaji, had been kept concealed throughout Shao's reign; and some doubts of his right to the succession were entertained. The Peshwa's agency in his accession necessarily gave additional power to the minister. With respect to the descendants of the first Bajirao the whole is erroneous.

Bajirao left no son named Bao, nor were the sons of his brother, whose proper name is Chimnaji Appa, named Bajirao and Ragonath. They were in fact not Chimnaji's sons, but Bajirao's; the second Bajirao being distinguished from his father by the term Balajee. The term Bao, or more correctly Bhao, is no name, but an epithet meaning literally 'brother,' but applicable to any near relative, and it was the familiar appellation of Sewdasheo Chimnaji, the son of Chimnaji Appa, as the cousin of the Peshwa Balaji Bajirao. The Bhao commanded at the fatal battle of Paniput, and Balaji Bajirao died of grief, not merely for his cousin's death, but the disgrace and danger in which the Mahratta state was plunged. It is true, that on all points connected with Mahratta History, we now have in Captain Duff's excellent work a better guide than was in the author's reach when he wrote, but the materials to which he had access, were capable of furnishing him with a more accurate knowledge both of persons and events.—W.

BOOK V. CHAP. II. 1775.

Berar. The next in point of magnitude, of the separate Mahratta kingdoms, was the province of Guzerat, which had been wrested from the Mogul empire by Pillajee Guicawar, or the herdsman, and its government rendered hereditary in his family. Besides these independent princes, two chiefs, Holkar and Sindia, possessed extensive dominions in the province of Malwa, and in the regions bordering on the territories of the Raja of Berar and the Nabob-vizir. And there were inferior adventurers, who in other parts had acquired a sort of independence, among whom the most remarkable was Morari Rao,[1] who had acted a considerable part in the long struggle between the French and English in the Carnatic, and possessed the fort of Gooti with a considerable district on the frontier of the Nizam. All these powers acknowledged a nominal dependence upon the government founded by Sivaji; and a sort of national feeling was apt to unite them against a foreign enemy. But their connexion was voluntary, and they scrupled not to draw their swords against one another, and even against the Peshwa, upon any provocation or prospect that would have engaged them in hostilities with a different foe.

The Brahmen council of eight, known also by the name of Mutseddies, or ministers, had been reduced to a low station in the government, during the vigour of the preceding Peshwas. The weak and divided councils of a minority and regency offered a tempting opportunity to endeavour the recovery of the influence which they had lost. By intriguing with Gopicaboy, the mother of Madhoo, they succeeded in creating jealousies between the nephew and the uncle; and in the end the uncle was stripped of his power. The Mutseddies and Gopicaboy ascribed to Ragonaut Rao a design to elevate himself to the office of Peshwa, and treacherously to deprive his nephews of their dignity or their lives. The Regent described his opponents as an ambitious confederacy, leagued with a dissolute intriguing woman for the purpose of grasping the powers of the state. The account of the transaction which the ministers themselves drew up for

[1] He was of a family highly distinguished in Mahratta history, and was hereditary Senapati, or Commander-in-Chief, but relinquished his claim for a territorial grant from the Raja.—W.

1775.

the English government[1] is marked with strong improbabilities. Hitherto, moreover, the members of the Peshwa family, instead of supplanting, had acted with the greatest harmony in supporting their head. And if Ragonaut Rao had aimed at the supremacy, of which no other token appears than the accusation of his enemies, prudence would have taught him, either to usurp the authority from the beginning; or to leave but little time for his nephew to gather strength. After the fall of Ragoba, the power of Mutseddies, during the nonage of Madhoo, was without control; and they employed it, after the manner of Hindus, for the acquisition of enormous riches. As the years however, of the Peshwa increased, he displayed some vigour of mind, and began to restrict the power of this cabal; but died at an early age in 1772.[2] At his death he bore a testimony to the fidelity of Ragoba, or his distrust of the ministerial confederacy, by releasing that relation from confinement; giving him the guardianship of Narrain Roa; and vesting him with the regency during the nonage of that prince. A short time elapsed before the intrigues of the Mutseddies with Gopicaboy, and the influence of Gopicaboy with her son, stripped Ragoba a second time of his power and his liberty. Dissensions, however, arose among the Mutseddies themselves. Siccaram Baboo, who had been raised by Ragoba from a menial service in his household, to the office of Dewan, or financial minister of the state, had taken the lead in all the preceding intrigues

[1] See Fifth Report, ut supra, Appendix, No. 35.

[2] We now possess better authority for these transactions, than that which has misled the text into an imperfect and incorrect relation of them. From Duff's Mahratta History, and Col. Briggs' Secret Correspondence of the Court of the Peshwa, from 1761 to 1772, (Tr. R. As. Society, vol. ii. p. 109), consisting chiefly of Madhu Rao's letters, we learn to appreciate the character of Madhu Rao, as an intelligent and amiable prince, who considerably outlived the period of his 'nonage,' dying at the age of twenty-eight, and distinguishing himself by great abilities, both in the cabinet and the field. His uncle, Ragoba, was a restless ambitious prince, perpetually endeavouring to usurp the supremacy, and occasionally effecting his purpose, by his nephew's anxiety not to expose the state to danger from without, by intestine dissensions. The Peshwa finally established his authority, and compelled his uncle to submit, but never failed to treat him with consideration, and, as mentioned in the text, was reconciled to him at his death. The eight 'Brahmans' to whom all the civil discord is ascribed, had very little to do with it, for Madhu Rao placed his whole confidence in Nana Furnavees, and the 'eight' ministers (they were not all Brahmans) of the old Mahratta constitution had ceased to exist. "The usurpation of the Raja's authority had superseded that of the eight Purdhans." Mahr. Hist. ii. 230; and again, "these ministers (seven of whom are named) were distinct from the Purdhans of Sivaji and Shao." Ib. 258.—W.

BOOK V. CHAP. II. 1775.

against his former master, and had acted as chief of the ministerial combination.[1] Another of the ministers, however, Nanah Furnavese, now attained the foremost place in the favour of Gopicaboy and her son; and the principal share of the power appeared ready to fall from the hands of Siccaram Baboo. In these circumstances a conspiracy was formed against the life of the young Peshwa, who is said to have rendered himself odious by his follies and cruelty. The commander of the guards was gained; who forced his way into the palace with a body of men, and cut down the prince in the apartment of Ragoba, to whom he had fled for protection. It was believed in Poona, at the time, according to the report of Mr. Mostyn, the English resident, who was upon the spot; that a party of the ministers were engaged in this transaction; and that Siccaram Baboo was at their head. It is to them that Ragoba himself ascribed both the conception and execution of the plot. But when the party of Siccaram Baboo regained the ascendancy, and chased Ragoba from the throne, they accused him of having alone been the author of his nephew's murder, and repelled or shifted the accusation from themselves.[2]

Upon the death of Narrain Rao, Ragoba was immediately acknowledged Peshwa; received the sirpah, or robe of office, from the pageant Raja; and was complimented by the ministers of foreign states, among others by the English resident, in the same form as was usually observed on the

[1] Sukaram Bapoo who had been nominated by Madhu Rao, as his brother's prime minister, was of a respectable Mahratta descent, and was chosen especially, because he was more favourably disposed towards Ragonath than the other ministers, having acted under him, not in a menial capacity, but as his Karkoon and Dewan, confidential manager of his affairs, and commander of his forces. Duff, ii. 242.

[2] From the information collected by Capt. Duff, there is little doubt that Narain Rao was murdered in consequence of a plot which originated with Ragonath, to release himself from detention, and make his nephew captive in his stead. Such he states was the moderate and general opinion amongst the Mahrattas. That the project ended fatally for Narain Rao, is attributed to the interference of a person not named in the text, but who was more implicated in the dissensions between the uncle and his nephews, than any other person; this was Anundee Bye, the wife of Ragonath, who had a violent personal animosity towards Gopika Bye, the mother of Madhu Rao and Narain Rao. She is said to have altered the paper sent by Ragonath, to the leaders in the disturbance, authorizing them to seize Narain Rao, into an order for killing him. Of Narain Rao's character, Capt. Duff observes, he was murdered in the 18th year of his age. His follies were those of a boy, but the feelings and interests of a party blackened them into crimes. He was affectionate to his relations, kind to his domestics, and all but his enemies loved him. Duff, ii. 250.—W.

accession of a Peshwa. From the beginning of his administration, the new Peshwa acted with a visible distrust of the Mutseddies. He forbore appointing Siccaram Baboo to the office of Dewan, and performed the duties of it himself. This conduct ensured him the hatred of the ministers. An army seemed the best security against their ambition and malice; and under the pretext of avenging the encroachments which the Subahdar of the Deccan, the Nizam, according to the English phrase, had made upon the Mahratta territories during the confusions of the government, he levied an army against that neighbouring prince. A union however was formed between the two hostile parties of the Mutseddies; his principal officers were debauched from their allegiance; and through their treachery, he sustained, in an engagement with the Subahdar, a total defeat.[1] To supply his pecuniary necessities, which were extremely urgent, he marched towards the south, to exact a long arrear of Chout from Hyder, and from the Nabob of Arcot. With Hyder he had compromised his claim, by accepting twenty-five lacs of rupees, and ceding to him in return the three provinces of Mudgewarry, Hanscootah, and Chunderdroog. But he was recalled from prosecuting his design against Mohammed Ali, by intelligence, that the ministerial confederacy had raised an army; that they were joined by the forces of the Subahdar; that they had proclaimed the widow of Narrain Roa to be with child; and under pretence of securing her offspring, had carried her to the fort of Poorunder. Ragoba met, and, by a well-concerted stratagem, gained a decisive victory over his foes. But after he was within a few miles of Poona, he was struck with a panic, upon intelligence, that the two chiefs, Holkar and Sindia, were gained by the ministerial party; and quitting his army in secret with a small body of men, he fled to Guzerat, where Govind Rao Guicawar engaged to support him. His army dispersed; Holkar and Sindia, whether previously engaged, or now led to the determination, joined the Brahmen cabal; the widow of Narrain Rao was said to have been delivered of

[1] There was no defeat, for there was no action: there was a very quiet, and on Ragonath's part, a very improvident reconcillation with the Nizam. Capt. Duff has pointed out the source of this error in a dispatch from the British Resident, founded on false information. Duff, ii. 256.—W.

BOOK V. CHAP. II. a son; and the confederacy agreed to support the pretensions of the infant.

1775. The fact of the birth was immediately disputed; and it is evident that the affirmation of the ministers ought to have been for ever disregarded; because, whether or not a child was born of the widow, and whether a male or female, their conduct and pretences would have still been the same. By withdrawing the pretended mother from the perception or disinterested witnesses; and by shutting up with her, as was generally affirmed and believed, a number of pregnant women in the same fort, they rendered it impossible that evidence of the reality of the pretended birth could ever be obtained; and for that reason it ought never to have been believed.[1]

At the time when Ragoba fled to Guzerat, the country was distracted by the rival pretentions of the two brothers Futty Sing Guicawar, and Govind Rao Guicawar. In the time of the Peshwa, Madhoo Rao, Futty Sing, by means it was said of bribes, to the ministerial junto, obtained, through the authority of the Peshwa, succession to the Musnud of Guzerat, in prejudice of his elder brother

[1] This is a very extraordinary argument: it is admitted that the birth of a child was probable, and yet it is asserted, that the fact ought never to have been believed, because it was impossible to prove its occurrence by actual testimony. Even if this were true, it would not be a reasonable ground of disbelief; but it was not true, for there was abundant evidence; and although an interest in making out a case may be a reason for receiving such testimony with caution, it is not a valid plea for its utter rejection. Such fastidiousness would render almost every doubtful matter incapable of proof. The present case, however, is wholly mis-stated. There was not only evidence, but unimpeachable evidence. From information furnished by General Briggs, it appears that Ragoba had two Vukeels at Purandhar immediately after the young Peshwa's birth, and his own daughrer, Durga Bye, the wife of Pandurang Raji Bhattikar, was in the room at the moment of the infant's birth. She and her husband, with several other persons, had been brought to Purandhar, and were detained there by Nana Furnavese, that there might be no doubt about the birth. Capt. Duff remarks, that the only circumstance which shed any suspicion upon the event, was, the assemblage of several pregnant women in the fortress, with the intention, as it was sometimes reported, that if Gunga Bye should be delivered of a girl, a male child might be substituted for it. An equally plausible report, however, states, that these women were assembled that a wet-nurse might be selected from among them. Whatever was the cause of this arrangement, General Briggs affirms, that neither Ragonath nor his party ever disputed the authenticity of the young Peshwa's birth; and Capt. Duff also states, that no doubt prevails amongst the Mahrattas that the infant was the child of Narain Rao. The parentage is also confirmed, it is said, by his striking resemblance to his cousin, the Ex-Peshwa Baji Rao. The doubts regarding his birth originated with the imperfect information and credulity of the English authorities at Bombay, and are readily adopted in the text, apparently for no other reason, than the mistaken notion that the ministers were Brahmans.—W.

1775.

Govind Rao.[1] When the office of Peshwa, however, devolved upon Ragoba, he acknowledged the title of Govind Rao. Govind Rao proceeded to levy war upon his brother; had gained over him various successes in the field; and was actually besieging him in his capital city of Broderah, when Ragoba came to claim his protection.[2]

It so happened that a similar contention at the same moment divided the kingdom of Berar, and ranged one of the rivals on the side of Ragoba, the other on that of his adversaries. Jannajee, the late Raja, died without issue. He had two brothers, Shabajee the elder, Moodajee the younger. Jannajee, before his demise adopted the son of Moodajee, then a minor, and named him his successor Shabajee and Moodajee disputed to whom the guardianship of the minor, and the regency of the kingdom, should belong. Shabajee claimed as the elder brother; Moodajee, as the parent of the Raja. And to determine their pretentions they involved the country in a violent and destructive war.[3]

In looking therefore to the neighbouring powers, there was none from which Ragoba could expect so much support as from the English at Bombay. To them, accordingly, he offered terms of alliance. And there existed circumstances, in the state of that Presidency, which induced the members of the government to lend a favourable ear to his proposals. Salsette and Bassein, with their dependencies, had been strongly coveted for some years. In the letter to the President and Council of Bombay, dated the 18th of March, 1768, the Directors said, "We recommend to you, in the strongest manner to use your endeavours, upon every occasion that may offer, to obtain these places, which we should esteem a valuable acquisition. We cannot directly point out the mode of doing it, but rather wish they could be obtained by purchase than war."[4] In the following year they expressed high approbation of

[1] The circumstances of the dispute are very differently told by Duff, ii. 281.—W.

[2] To the documents adduced in the Fifth Report, ut supra, add the anecdotes related by a man who had access to the conversation of the best informed of his countrymen, Mr. James Forbes, in his Oriental Memoirs, the fifteenth and two subsequent chapters.

[3] It was not of long duration, Sabajee was killed in action early in 1775. Mahr. Hist. ii. 310.—W.

[4] Fifth Report, Appendix, No. 47.

an attempt to obtain them by negotiation; and add, "Salsette and Bassein, with their dependencies, and the Mahrattas' proportion of the Surat provinces, were all that we seek for on that side of India. These are the objects you are to have in view, in all your treaties, negotiations, and military operations,—and that you must be ever watchful to obtain."[1] In more earnest prosecution of the same design, Mr. Mostyn arrived from England, in 1772, with instructions from the Court of Directors, that he should be sent immediately to negotiate with Madhoo Rao, the Peshwa, for certain advantages to the settlements on the coast of Malabar, and above all for the cession of the island and peninsula of Salsette and Bassein, which added so much to the security and value of Bombay. The result of this negotiation tended only to show that, pacifically at least, the coveted spots were very unlikely to be obtained.

In the mean time the Presidency had engaged themselves in a dispute with the Nabob of Baroach, upon whom they advanced a demand for the phoorza, a species of tribute, formerly yielded by Baroach to the government of Surat;[2] and for indemnification of an overcharge in the customs, which for the six preceding years had been levied on the merchants trading under the Company's protection. The more effectually to enforce the demand, a body of troops was sent to invade the Nabob's territory; but after proceeding so far as to attack his capital, they were obliged to abandon the enterprise, and return to Surat. This expedition the Directors condemned in the severest terms; as involving the Presidency in expense, when it was under the greatest pecuniary difficulties; as unskilfully conducted; as disgracing the Company's arms; and, even if successful, promising no proportional advantage. The supreme authority, weakened by its distance, prevented not the subordinate from raising a new expedition out of the first. The Nabob of Baroach, despairing of his power to resist the arms of the Company, repaired to Bombay, and represented his inability to comply with their heavy demand, amounting to thirty-three lacks of rupees. Among

[1] Fifth Report, p. 60. Extract of a general letter, dated 31st March, 1769.
[2] Surat was still governed nominally by a Mogul Nabob, who was, however, now, in a great measure, dependent upon the Company.

the various expedients to which he had recourse for conciliating the favour of the Bombay administration, and obtaining a mitigation of their claims, he recommended with great assiduity the conquest of Guzerat; which he represented as easy, and promised to assist them with all his resources. The presidency lent him a very favourable ear. After great discussion, an arrangement was concluded at the end of November, 1771. A species of military alliance; a sum of four lacks of rupees to be paid by instalments; the privilege of levying all duties on those who traded under the protection of the Company in the territory of Baroach; the erection of an English factory; and exclusion of all other Europeans excepting the Dutch, who had a previous establishment; were the advantages which the treaty promised to the English. Before the lapse of a year the Presidency began to accuse the Nabob of an intention to elude his agreement. After the question was left undetermined in the Committee, it was decided in the Council, with the censure of the Court of Directors on the former expedition lying before them, to send an armament to chastise the Nabob, and wipe off the former disgrace of their arms. Now indeed the enterprise succeeded; the Nabob was ruined; and the Presidency settled the division of the revenues with Futty Sing on the same terms on which they had formerly been shared between the government of Guzerat and the Nabob.

The assassination of Narrain Rao, and the succession of Ragoba, announcing a weak and distracted government, appeared to the Council to present a favourable opportunity for accomplishing an object which their honourable masters had so much at heart, the possession of Salsette and Bassein. In their select consultations, on the 17th of September, 1773, they agreed to instruct Mr. Mostyn, their resident at Poonah, to improve diligently every circumstance favourable to the accomplishment of that event; and on no account whatever to leave the Mahratta capital. Baroach, and several of the recent acquisitions, as Fort Vittoria, and Rajapore, were offered in exchange. But in their letter to the Directors, of the 12th of January, 1774, the Council declare the disappointment of all their endeavours; and their opinion that no inducements would prevail upon the Mahrattas willingly to part with those fa-

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vourite possessions, so justly the object of the Company's desire. They next represent the violent distractions of the Mahratta government; and the opinion, which they had received from Mr. Mostyn, that Ragoba would be either assassinated, or deposed. With this event, say they, "our treaties with the present government may be deemed at an end." The violent competitions for the throne, and consequent weakness of the state, might afford them, released as they would be from all engagements, an opportunity of acquiring those important possessions by what appeared to be the only means of acquiring them, force of arms; and they signify to the Court of Directors their determination not to let the occasion be lost, provided their pecuniary situation would permit, and the circumstances of Ragoba, which some recent intelligence represented as not yet desperate, should be found to be such as the Resident described.

After the despatch of this letter, Ragoba had returned upon his enemies; gained the victory, already mentioned,[1] over their forces in the field; fled from his army to Guzerat; and opened a negotiation with the Presidency; when towards the end of November, 1774, intelligence was received at Bombay, from the Company's resident at Goa, that great preparations were making by the Portuguese for the recovery of their lost possessions; and, in particular, of Salsette and Bassein. The accomplishment of this project appeared to the Presidency not only to cut off all chance of making this favourite acquisition for the Company, but to give to the Portuguese the command of the passes into the interior country, and the power of harassing, by what imposts and restrictions they pleased, the trade of the English. They came, therefore, to the resolution preventing, at all events, the fall of Salsette and Bassein into the hands of the Portuguese; and, for that purpose, regarded no expedient so good as of taking possession themselves. It was agreed to signify to Ragoba, with whom they were treating, that it was a measure purely of precaution, and in no respect intended to interfere with his rights. To avoid an immediate rupture with the Mutseddies, the Resident was instructed to make to them a similar declaration; and to renounce all intention

[1] Vide supra, p. 604.

of holding Salsette and Bassein in opposition to the will of the existing government at Poona. On the 12th of December a considerable force set out from Bombay; it carried by assault the principal fort in Salsette on the 28th; and, without further opposition, took possession of the island.[1]

The negotiation was not interrupted with Ragoba. The Presidency regarded him as the rightful Peshwa. They expected, and with good reason, that their assistance would place him, without much difficulty, on his throne; and though he adhered with obstinacy to the possession of Salsette and Bassein, he offered territorial dominion and revenue to a large amount in the neighbourhood of Surat. Amid these proceedings, arrived, on the 7th of December, the letter from the Supreme Council in Bengal, announcing the accession of the new government, and requiring an account of the state of the Presidency of Bombay. It was answered on the 31st, when accounts were rendered of the acquisition of Salsette and Bassein, of the negotiation with Ragoba, the intention of the President and Council to grant him their assistance, and the reasons which guided them in these acts and determinations. In the interval between the adjustment and execution of the treaty with the Ragoba, he was brought to an action by the army of the Ministers; deserted in the battle by a body of Arabs, on whom he depended, and obliged to fly from the field with a small body of horse. This disaster the majority of the Bombay Council deemed it an easy matter to retrieve; as Ragoba still had powerful adherents; as the Ministers were neither united nor strong; and the union of the English troops with his army would render him more than a match for his opponents. They resolved, therefore, "not to give up the great advantages which they were to reap by the treaty, when so fair an opportunity occurred." Ragoba made his way to Surat, and a treaty was concluded on the 6th of March, 1775, by which he now yielded up Salsette and Bassein, with the Mahratta share of the revenues of Baroach and other places in the district of Surat, to the amount, upon the whole, of a revenue of twenty-two and a half lacks of rupees. His army, with that of Govind Rao, made good

[1] Fifth Report, ut supra, p. 69.

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their retreat to the fort of Copperwange, about fifty coss from Cambay, and were joined by the English, under the command of Colonel Keating, on the 19th of April. The detachment consisted of eighty European artillery, and 160 artillery Lascars, 500 European infantry, and 1400 Sepoys, with a field-train of twelve pieces, besides two mortars and several howitzers. The whole amounted to about 25,000 men in arms.[1]

The army of the Mutseddies had been deserted by Sindia, with 12,000 of the best horse; Shabbajee Bonsla, who favoured their cause in Berar, had been cut off by his brother, who befriended Ragoba; the fidelity of Holkar was held in doubt; and the Nizam, though he received their concessions, and promised assistance, always evaded performance; but they were still superior in numbers to Ragoba and his allies.

As soon after conjunction as possible, the English commander proposed to advance towards the enemy, who were encamped on the banks of the Sabermatty. After a few indecisive rencounters, finding they could not bring the enemy to a general action, the English, in concert with their allies, resolved to march toward the south, and, penetrating to the Deccan, arrive at Poona before the setting in of the rains. The enemy, as soon as they discovered their intention, laid waste the country in front, and destroyed the wells. At last, on the 18th of May, having reached the plain of Arras, on which they had given Ragoba his recent defeat, they advanced, and commenced a cannonade upon the rear of the English and their ally. The enemy were received with great gallantry; but an officer of Ragoba, having treacherously introduced as partisans a body of hostile cavalry,[2] between the advanced party of the British army and the line, some confusion ensued, and the first company of European grenadiers, by a mistake of the officer commanding them, began to retreat, and were followed in a panic by the rest of the party. Considerable execution was then performed by the enemy's horse; but so destructive a fire of grape and

[1] Forbes, Oriental Memoirs, ii. 32.

[2] Some confusion is said to have arisen from the irregular interposition of Ragoba's horse, but it is not ascribed to treachery by Col. Keating himself. Hist. of Mahrattas, ii. 299.—W.

shells was immediately poured upon them from the British line, as compelled them to seek their safety by quitting the field. The loss of Europeans, seven officers and eighty men, mostly grenadiers, beside 200 Sepoys, rendered this an expensive victory; while the want of horse, and the backwardness occasioned or excused by the want of pay of the troops of Ragoba, made it impossible, by an active pursuit, to derive from it the advantages it might otherwise have given. The rear of the enemy was attacked in crossing the Nerbuddah, on the 11th of June, where they lost many lives, and were obliged to sink a part of their guns. After this rencounter, they hasted out of the province of Guzerat. And as Ragoba's troops refused to cross the Nerbuddah till they obtained satisfaction in regard to their long arrears, it was resolved, as the season of the rains was at hand, to suspend the progress of the expedition. Dhuboy, a fortified city, about fifty miles from Baroach, convenient for receiving reinforcements and supplies, was selected for quartering the English; while Ragoba encamped with his army at Bellapoor, a pass on the river Dahder, at ten miles distance. The favourable complexion of Ragoba's affairs produced, among other consequences, the alliance of Futty Sing. His overtures were made through the English; and, Govind Rao being previously satisfied by the promises of Ragoba, the terms of a treaty were agreed upon in the month of July. To the English he consented to confirm all the grants within the Guicawar dominions, which had been yielded by Ragoba; and to make further concessions in perpetuity to the annual amount of about one million seventy-eight thousand rupees.[1] To Ragoba he engaged himself for the usual tribute and aid to the Poona durbar; and, what was of unspeakable importance on the present emergency, for the sum of twenty-six lacks of rupees, to be paid in sixty days. The English and Ragoba had thus a prospect of marching to Poona in the next campaign, with a great augmentation of resources, and a friendly country in the rear.[2]

[1] There is a strange exaggeration: the cessions to the Company were the Gaekwar's share of the revenues of Baroach, and three villages estimated at 2,13,000 rupees.—Hist. of Mah. ii. 303. W.

[2] Mr. Forbes, who was private secretary to the commanding officer of the British detachment, gives us, though less of the campaign than of other objects, our best particulars, in the chapters xvi. to xx. of his Oriental Memoirs.

BOOK V. CHAP. II. 1775.

We have seen that the Presidency of Bombay informed the Directors by letter, on the 12th of January, 1774, that the Mahratta government was in a peculiar crisis, and that such an opportunity now occurred of acquiring Salsette and Bassein, as they had very little intention of letting escape. The Directors, as if anxious to allow time for the conquest, replied not till the 12th of April, 1775, when their answer could not be received at Bombay in much less than two years from the time when the measure was announced as on the verge of execution. Nearly six months after the place was reduced by their arms, and governed by their authority, they sat down to say, "It is with much concern we learn from your records, that we are not likely to obtain Salsette from the Mahrattas by negotiations. We, however, disapprove your resolution to take possession of the island by force, in case of the death or deposition of Ragoba; and hereby positively prohibit you from attempting that measure, under any circumstances whatever, without our permission first obtained for that purpose."[1]

The letter containing the account of the capture of Salsette, and the negotiation with Ragoba, written by the Bombay Presidency to the Supreme Council, on the 31st of December, was not received at Calcutta till the beginning of March. Before that time, however, intelligence from various quarters had reached them of the fate of Salsette; and they had written letters to Bombay, reprehending the Council, in severe terms, for delaying to send more complete information. Vested with a control over the other presidencies, not well defined, and, by consequence, ill-understood, the Supreme Council were jealous of every appearance of an attempt to originate important measures independently of their authority. This jealousy, and a desire to carry their own importance high, distinguished the party in the new Council, which now, by force of numbers, engrossed the powers of the government. They looked, therefore, with a very evil eye upon the audacity which, in a subordinate Presidency, so near the time when the Supreme Council were to assume the reins of government, ventured upon so great a mea-

[1] Fifth Report, App. No. 54. They, notwithstanding, failed not to approve of the acquisition when made. See p. 437, below.

sure as the conquest of Salsette, without waiting to be authorized by their sanction, or deterred by their prohibition. The letter from Bombay was answered on the 8th of March, with a dry remark, that all observations on the capture of Salsette were rendered useless by the tardiness of the information. The Council, however, declared their express disapprobation of the connexion with Ragoba; and two days after the treaty with that chieftain was signed, commanded that all negotiation with him should be suspended till further instructions were received. On the 31st of May, arrived from the President and Council of Bombay a letter dated the 31st of March, with information of the conclusion of the treaty with Ragoba, and the departure of the troops for his support. On this occasion, the Governor-General took the lead in the condemnation of the President and Council of Bombay; denouncing their procedure as "unseasonable, impolitic, unjust, and unauthorized;" and he proposed, that they should be peremptorily enjoined to cancel the treaty, and to withdraw the troops immediately from assisting Ragoba, except in the three following cases:—"1. That they should have obtained any decisive advantages over the enemy; 2. That they should be in such a situation as might render it dangerous to retreat; 3. That a negotiation should have taken place between Ragoba and his opponents." The Governor-General afterwards professed that he had gone beyond his real sentiments in these terms of condemnation, in hopes to moderate by that means the violence of the opposite party. In this expectation, if ever formed, he found himself deceived. The majority passed two resolutions, which form as singular a combination as the history of practical politics presents. They voted the condemnation of the treaty with Ragoba, and the immediate recall of the troops, subject to no consideration whatever but that of their safety. And they voted that a negotiation should be immediately opened with the Mutseddies, to arrange a treaty of peace, and obtain confirmation of Salsette and Bassein. They condemned the President and Council of Bombay, for taking part in the quarrels of the Mahrattas, and for declaring for one party in opposition to another. They themselves performed what they themselves condemned, and were most effectu-

BOOK V. CHAP. II. 1775.

ally and irresistibly declaring in favour of the ministers against Ragoba. Other negotiators proceed to discussion with as fair a colour on their pretensions as they can, and as much power in their hands as they are able to retain: not that honourable men will aim at advantages which are unreasonable and unjust; but that they may be secure from the necessity of submitting to any thing which is unreasonable and unjust. The English rulers began with declaring themselves to be in the wrong, and stripping their hands of power; as preliminaries to a negotiation with a people uniformly insolent and rapacious in proportion to their strength; who never heard the proposal of a concession but as an avowal of weakness; and could not conceive that any government ever yielded any thing which it was able to retain. Of all the courses which it was in the power of the Supreme Council to pursue, they made choice of that which was decidedly the worst. By fulfilling the treaty with Ragoba, they would have easily established his authority, and obtained the important concessions to which he had agreed. If they resolved, as they did, to countenance the ministers, they might, at any rate, have made their terms before they exalted their pretensions by the annihilation of the power which would have made them compliant. And if they had inclined to act the part of really useful and pacific neighbours, they might have arbitrated between the parties with decisive and happy effect.

The Supreme Council resolved to treat with the ministers at Poona by an agent of their own, without the intervention of the Presidency of Bombay, in whose department the Mahratta country was situated, and who were best acquainted with the character and circumstances of the people.[1] Colonel Upton, who was selected for the service, departed on the 17th of July, with letters to Siccaram Baboo, as head of the ministerial party; and with instructions to insist upon Salsette and Bassein, as indispensable conditions in the agreement which was proposed. It is worthy of remark, that he was furnished also with a letter to Ragoba, which was to be presented to that

[1] The ignorance respecting the Mahrattas, of the Supreme Council, at this time, even of Mr. Hastings, not to speak of Mr. Francis and his party, is very conspicuous in the Minutes of their Consultations.

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Prince, in case of his success; and then to form an introduction to a negotiation.

A letter from the Governor and Council of Bombay, dated the 22nd of August, reached the Supreme Council in the beginning of October. These rulers complained severely of the disgrace which was thrown upon their Presidency, by compelling them to violate a solemn treaty, and depriving them of the power of negotiating with the neighbouring states. Such a loss of dignity in a great branch of the government could not fail, they said, to affect injuriously the interests of the Company. They denied that they had been guilty of any wilful disrespect to the Supreme Council. The nature of the circumstances required that they should act without delay; the possession of Salsette and Bassein, required that they should declare in favour of one of the Mahratta parties; and many considerations induced them to give the preference to Ragoba. They pointed out the unhappy effects, even upon the negotiation with the ministers, which would result from the recall of the troops, and the ruin of Ragoba; and stated that they had deputed to Calcutta a member of their Board, upon whose representations they still hoped, that their treaty would be executed, and that the great advantages of the connexion with Ragoba would not be thrown away. Their deputy displayed both zeal and ability, in his endeavours to make an impression upon the Council. But the majority adhered to their first determinations. Colonel Upton was, however, instructed to make some stipulations in favour of Ragoba: and the Presidency at Bombay was authorized to afford a sanctuary, in case of personal danger, to himself, his family and attendants. That Presidency was also directed, notwithstanding the breach of the treaty with Ragoba, to retain possession of the districts which had been yielded by Futty Sing, till the conclusion of a definitive treaty of peace.

The Council had for some time been waiting with impatience for the account of the arrival of their negotiator at Poona. In the beginning of January, 1776, they received letters from the ministers, which contained a commentary on the policy of annihilating Ragoba, at the moment of commencing a negotiation with his enemies.

BOOK V. CHAP. II. 1776.

These letters displayed a high tone of complaint, and even of menace. They expressed a disinclination, on the part of the ministers, to submit their pretensions to discussion; and threatened a renewal of hostilities, unless the places which had been taken were immediately restored.

Letters, dated the 5th of January, received from Colonel Upton on the 12th of February, announced his arrival at Poona, and a favourable reception. Other letters received on the 6th of March, and dated on the 2nd of February, brought information of difficulties impeding the negotiation. "The ministers imagine," says Colonel Upton, "that I must treat with them at any rate:—And that I have vastly exceeded my instructions, by asking a surrender of Salsette and Bassein." "They ask me," says he, "a thousand times, Why we make such professions of honour? How disapprove the war entered into by the Bombay government; when we are so desirous of availing ourselves of the advantages of it?" Despairing of compliance with all his demands, the Colonel proposed to relax in the affair of Bassein, and to ask for something else in its stead.[1]

On the 7th of March, a letter dated the 7th of February arrived; and announced that the negotiation was broken off. The ministers insisted upon an immediate renunciation of Salsette, and would not allow so much as time for consulting the government. "In five or six days more," says the Colonel, "I am to leave Poona Dhur, and they will then fix the time for the expiration of the cessation of arms. I told them, I expected time to advise all our settlements before the renewal of the war; but I suspect them of taking every advantage." He added, which confirmed the representations made in defence of the connexion with Ragoba, "If three or four companies of Europeans, a small detachment from the corps of artillery, and two or three battalions of Sepoys, were embarked from Bengal to join the army from Bombay, we might soon command peace on our own terms. For the chiefs of this country are quite at a loss which side to take; and are waiting to see what the English do.[2]

[1] Fifth Report, ut supra, App. No. 102.
[2] Ibid. 105.

Upon this intelligence, the Council hastened to prepare for war on the largest scale. They resolved, "to support the cause of Ragoba with the utmost vigour; and with a general exertion of the whole power of the English arms in India; to act in all quarters at once; and, by the decision and rapidity of their proceedings, to bring the war, if possible, to a speedy conclusion:" And all this, (namely, a war with the ministers, and alliance with Ragoba, the very measure for which they condemned the Presidency at Bombay,) rather than restore Salsette, the capture of which, and the alliance for its support, they had denounced as both impolitic and unjust!

At the conclusion, however, of the month, another letter from Colonel Upton was received. This letter brought intelligence of the final compliance of the ministers on the subject of Salsette. Warlike preparations were then suspended, and a treaty was at last arranged. The English renounced Bassein, and agreed to renounce the cessions in Guzerat, provided it appeared, as the ministers maintained, that Futty Sing was not entitled to make them. The Mahrattas yielded Salsette, and the small adjacent islands, of 3,500,000 rupees revenues;[1] the Mahratta chout, or share of the revenues of Baroach, amounting to an equal sum; and a country of three lacs in the neighbourhood of Baroach. The members of the Bombay government compared these with the terms which *they* had obtained from Ragoba; and proclaimed their disapprobation. The concession with respect to Baroach, they said, was pretended and delusive, as the Mahrattas had no right to any share of its revenues. The ceded territory, not being jaghire, or free from Mahratta burdens, would be a source of continual disturbance. The relinquishment of the cessions in Guzerat was weakly made upon an unfounded pretence, which actually gave the Guicawar an interest to disclaim the right in dispute: and, upon the whole, the treaty was highly injurious to the reputation, honour, and interests of the Company. The majority in the Supreme Council grounded the defence of their mea-

[1] This is not quite correct, and the sum, if not a misprint, a gross exaggeration. Salsette was to be retained or restored at the pleasure of the Governor-General and Council; if restored, the Peshwa was to cede territory to an equal value of three lacks of rupees.—W.

BOOK V. CHAP. II. 1776.

sures upon the utility of peace; and the frequent commands of the Directors to abstain from aggressive war.[1]

It had been stipulated that Ragoba should disband his army within one month; receive an establishment of 1000 horse, to be paid and relieved at the pleasure of government, and, of course, to act as his gaolers and guards; enjoy a pension of three lacks of rupees per annum, and reside at an appointed place of abode. With these terms, which he represented as placing him in the hands of his enemies, Ragoba declared his resolution not to comply; and having requested an asylum in one of the Company's settlements, he was promised, under the license formerly granted, a sanctuary for himself and his attendants, by the Governor and Council of Bombay. The Mutseddies complained of this act of protection to Ragoba; and alarmed the ruling party in the Supreme Council with menaces that they would renounce the treaty, and betake themselves to war. After violent debates in the Supreme Council, and great diversity of opinion, it was decided by the majority, to condemn the offer made by the President and Council of Bombay of their protection to Ragoba; and to forbid them to receive that chieftain at any of the settlements within the limits of their government. The apprehensions of his enemies were soon after allayed by the defection of his troops. And he retired to Surat with only 200 attendants.

After considerable delay, and a variety of mutual complaints on the part of the Bombay Presidency and the ministers at Poona, the treaty was signed, and transmitted by Colonel Upton to Calcutta, on the 3rd of June, 1776. It is peculiarly worthy of notice and remembrance, that intelligence of the conclusion of this affair had not reached the Supreme Council, when letters arrived from the Court of Directors, applauding the treaty which the Presidency of Bombay had formed with Ragoba; and commanding their government of Bengal to co-operate for its fulfilment and confirmation. "We approve," they say, "under every circumstance, of the keeping of all the territories and possessions ceded to the Company by the treaty concluded with Ragoba; and direct that you forthwith adopt such

[1] See Fifth Report, ut supra, p. 24—29, and 60—88, with the corresponding articles in the Appendix.

measures as may be necessary for their preservation and defence."[1]

During these transactions, the attention of the Supreme Council was not attracted by any great event, towards the powers on the north-western frontier of the Company's empire. In Oude, Asoff ud Dowla, the new Nabob, had entered upon his government with an exhausted treasury. He was oppressed by the debts due to the Company, and by their importunate demands of payment; his troops were mutinous for want of pay; his inability to maintain them had produced a reduction of his army; he had dismissed the ministers of his father, and surrounded himself with favourites; distraction prevailed in his family and his government; his character was vicious and weak; and every commotion on his frontier alarmed the Supreme Council for the safety of his dominions. Flying parties of the Mahrattas harassed the neighbouring countries; and reports of more formidable enterprises excited the apprehensions of both the Nabob and his English friends. During the summer of 1776, it was rumoured that a league had been formed by the Emperor, the Mahrattas, the Seiks, and the Rohillas, to invade the dominions of Asoff ud Dowla. And the Governor-general urged the expediency of forming an alliance with Nujuf Khan, to lessen the danger of such an association. After the expedition against Zabita Khan, and the admission of the Mahrattas into Delhi, this leader, through the artifice of a favourite, had fallen into disgrace with his master, and been reduced to the brink of ruin. The necessity of the Emperor's affairs, and even the recommendation of Suja-ad-dowla and the English, again restored him to favour; and, in 1773, he engaged in a war with the Jaats, under an understanding that he should retain one-half of the territory he should conquer, and resign the other to the Emperor. He had prevailed over the Jaats in the field, and recovered the fort and city of Agra, at the time when the agreement was made, between the Emperor, and Vizir, to join in the war against the Rohillas. After his return from Rohilcund, he prosecuted his war with the Jaats; and having driven them, though he was exceedingly distressed for pecuniary means, from the open country, he was besieging the strong

[1] Fifth Report, ut supra, App. No. 137. Compare p. 430, above.

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fortress of Deig; which, after an obstinate resistance, yielded to his arms, at the time when the situation of the neighbouring powers recommended a connexion with him to the English rulers. The discharge, however, of Sumroo, and a few Frenchmen, from his service, was made an indispensable preliminary; and as he alleged the danger at that moment of sending them to increase the power of his enemies, though he professed the strongest desire to comply with the wishes of the Company, the alliance was for the present obstructed and postponed. The anxiety of Asoff ud Dowla to receive from the Emperor, what still, it seems, was a source of illustration and an object of ambition, the office, though now only nominal, of Vizir, was kept on the rack by various interruptions; by competitors strongly supported, particularly the Nizam, and by the disinclination of the imperial mind. The peshcush, however, or appropriate offering, with five thousand men and some artillery, which the Nabob sent to attend the Emperor, arrived at a critical moment, when Zabita Khan had not only evaded payment of the revenue for the country which he possessed, but had taken up arms to support his disobedience; had gained a victory over the Emperor's forces, and was upon the point of becoming master of Delhi, and of the fate of its lord. The troops of Asoff ad Dowla appeared in time to save this catastrophe, and an imperial representation, in requital of this service, was soon after despatched, to invest the Nabob with the Kelât. By interference, however, of the commander of the Nabob's detachment, whom Zabita Khan had duly bribed, the helpless Emperor was obliged to confirm that disobedient chief in the territory which he held, and even to remit those arrears of tribute which formed the subject of dispute.[1]

During the period of those transactions, affairs of a different description had deeply engaged the attention of the Supreme Council, and excited the most violent dissensions. So early as the month of December, 1774, a petition had been presented by the Ranee of Burdwan. This was the title of the widow of Tillook Chund, lately deceased, who, under the title of Raja, had enjoyed the Zemindary of the

[1] Report, ut supra, p. 97, 98, and App. No. 158 to 168. Also Scott's Aurungzebe's Successors, p. 249—267.

district, and whose ancestors, as the representatives of its ancient Rajas, had enjoyed it in succession through the whole period of Mohammedan sway. Her son, a minor of only nine years of age, had been nominated to the office upon the death of his father; and a considerable share of the power had at first passed into her hands. Afterwards, by the authority of the English Government, the young Raja was withdrawn from the guardianship of the Ranee, and the affairs of the Zemindary were intrusted to administrators of English appointment. She now complained of corrupt administration on the part of the Dewan, or chief agent of the Zemindary, and accused the English Resident of supporting him in his iniquity, for the sake of the bribes with which the Dewan took care to engage him. The more numerous party in the Council decreed that the Dewan should be compelled to render an account of his administration; that the Ranee, agreeably to her petition, should be allowed to repair to Calcutta with her son; and, as no inquiry into the conduct of the Dewan could be successfully performed while he retained power over the persons and papers of his office, that a temporary substitute should occupy his place. These resolutions, the Governor-General, accompanied by Mr. Barwell, opposed. The Governor-General said, that the presence of the Ranee at Calcutta, whom he described as a troublesome, violent woman, would be not only unnecessary, but inconvenient; that the removal of the Dewan from his office before any guilt was proved, would be a violation of justice;[1] and the appointment to that office of persons whose qualifications had not been tried, a total departure from policy and prudence. On the 6th of January, 1775, a letter was received from the Resident, against whom the accusations of the Ranee were directed. It was drawn up in a very lofty style; the writer celebrated his own virtues; ascribed a bad character to the Ranee; and expressed the highest indignation

[1] Wherein lay the difference between this case, and that of Mohammed Reza Khan, and the Raja Shitabroy?—M.

There is a material difference as far as Hastings is concerned; the arrest of Mohammed Reza Khan was ordered by the Court of Directors, and that of Shitab Roy followed as a consequence of the same instructions. Hastings was new in the Government, and had little time to form his own opinion on the case. All he had to do was to institute the inquiry as commanded; with more opportunities of acquiring an acquaintance with the merits of the case, or uncontrolled by positive instructions, he might have followed a course more consonant to his own notions of justice.—W.

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that she had the audacity to prefer an accusation against him. He professed his readiness to submit his conduct to examination; but required, that security should first be demanded of the Ranee to pay an equivalent penalty, in case she failed in the proof of her charges. The pretext for this condition was, its alleged conformity to the laws of the country. To stifle complaint, and to screen misrule, were its natural effect; and, upon this consideration, the majority of the Council refused to impose it.[1] A variety of accounts were presented to the Board, in which were entered several sums of considerable amounts, as paid by the Dewan to the servants of the Company and their dependants, not only upon the appointment of the young Raja, but also upon that of his Dewan. Not less than 3,20,975 rupees were charged to the account of the Resident, his banyan, and cash-keeper. Mr. Hastings, himself, was accused of receiving 15,000 rupees,[2] and his banyan, or native secretary, 4,500; and the whole of the sums represented as thus distributed among the Company's servants, since the death of the deceased Raja, amounted to 9,36,497 rupees.[3] The authenticity of these accounts was called in question by the parties whom they affected; and everything is doubtful which rests upon the authority of Indian witnesses, under strong temptations to depart from truth. Enough does not appear to condemn any individual. Enough appears to render it not doubtful that money was upon this occasion received by the Company's servants; and enough does not appear to exculpate any individual against whom the charge was advanced. Mr. Hastings now

[1] The execution of such a deed was not unusual, and the object was to put some check upon false and calumnious charges. It should have been noticed, in justice to Mr. Graham, the Resident at Burdwan, that he not only wrote the indignant denial, so slightingly adverted to, but he subsequently furnished a categorical reply to the Rani's petition, which, if it was not a most enormous falsehood, demonstrated the utter impossibility of the truth of her allegations, as affecting him. He could have had very little time to interfere with the affairs of the Zemindaree, as he was transferred to Hoogly within three months after the Raja's death, and had quitted Burdwan within six weeks of that event. On the other hand, the Rani antedates the Raja's death three years, in order to make it appear that the Resident had had ample opportunities of extorting money from her. Mr. Graham's change of appointment must have been too generally known for him to have misstated it, and the inaccuracy of the petition is too glaring to have been accidental. It furnishes an undeniable proof of the spirit of the petition. Eleventh Report, App. 740.—W.

[2] The very smallness of the sum exonerates Hastings from all credible imputation of having received it, and no proof whatever was attempted to establish the charge.—W.

[3] Ninth Report of the Select Committee, App. 111.

lost his tone of calmness and forbearance. He accused the party in the Council, by whom he was opposed, of a design to supersede him in his authority, and to drive him from his office. He pronounced them to be his accusers, parties to the cause against him, and therefore disqualified to sit as judges upon his conduct. He declared that he would not summon or hold councils for "a triumph over himself." He proposed that whatever inquisition they might choose to make into his conduct, they should make it in a Committee;[1] where his absence would save his station and character from degradation and insult; and he declared it to be his resolution to dissolve the Council, as often as they should enter upon any criminating inquiry against himself. An occasion soon presented itself for putting his threat in execution. The resolution to compliment the Ranee with the usual insignia of office, he pronounced an insult to himself: declared the Council dissolved, and quitted the chair. The majority resolved that a vote of adjournment could, as all other votes, be passed only by a plurality of the voices present; that if this was not the law, the Governor-general was despotic; and that the right which he claimed was a right of impunity. They voted the first member of the Council into the chair, and continued their proceedings.

On the 30th of March, 1775, another accusation occupied the attention of the Board. In a representation received from one of the natives, it was set forth, that the Phoujdar of Hoogly was paid by the Company 72,000 ru-

[1] It is important to notice this proposition. Hastings never objected to inquiry; all he maintained, and judiciously maintained, even if he could have relied upon the impartial judgment of the majority of the Council, was the inconsistency and indignity of permitting the head of the Government to be accused in person, during a sitting of the Council over which he presided, by every individual who chose to charge him, truly or falsely, with acts unworthy of his place and power. He objected, rationally and soundly, to the degradation which could not fail to attend the Governor-General's either silently listening to the objurgations of a private person, or entering into an altercation with him. It was certain of bringing himself and his office into contempt. For the purposes of truth and justice, it was wholly unnecessary. It was easy and efficacious for the Council to resolve themselves into a committee, as Hastings recommended, to receive information, and carry on inquiry to any extent they pleased; and had the result established the guilt of the Governor, the Supreme Court of Judicature, or the Court of Directors, were the authorities empowered to inflict punishment. In their resistance to this decorous and effective course, they showed that they sought truth less than the disgrace and mortification of their opponent. The unyielding firmness and calm resolution with which Hastings baffled their unworthy attempts, are amongst the most remarkable circumstances in his history.—W.

pees as the annual salary of his office; that out of this sum, however, he paid annually to Mr. Hastings 36,000 rupees, together with 4,000 to Mr. Hastings' native secretary, reserving only 32,000 rupees to himself; and that the author of this representation would undertake the duties of the office for this reduced allowance, producing an annual saving to the Company of 40,000 rupees, now corruptly received by Mr. Hastings and his banyan. The first debate which rose upon this information regarded the competence of the Board to entertain such complaints. Mr. Hastings' party, consisting of Mr. Barwell and himself, opposed the reception of any accusations against any individual of the Board; and referred to the courts of justice. The major party deemed it an important article of the duty of the Supreme Council to control abuses, and not least in the hands of those who had the greatest power to commit them. It is no sufficient check, upon those who are intrusted with power, to be amenable for legal crimes in a court of justice. The analogies of the most vulgar trust shed light upon the highest. Who would endure a servant, pretending that his conduct ought not to be challenged but in a court of justice; his trust modified, or withdrawn, till after the judicial proof of a legal crime?[1] When this plea was overruled, and the Council were about to enter upon the investigation, Mr. Hastings declared that "he would not sit to be confronted with such accusers, nor to *suffer* a judicial inquiry into his conduct, at the Board of which he is President." As formerly, he pronounced the Council dissolved; and the majority continued their proceedings in his absence. Two letters of the Phoujdar in question were produced in evidence; and two witnesses were examined. The Phoujdar himself was summoned to answer. At first he alleged excuses for delay. When he did appear, he declined examination upon oath, on the pretence that to persons of his rank it was a degradation to confirm their testimony by that religious ceremony. In this scrupulosity, he was strongly supported by Mr. Hastings; but the majority construed it into a contempt of the Board, and dismissed the Phouj-

[1] The analogy does not hold. What servant would endure that his fellow and inferior servants should erect themselves into a tribunal over him, to the exclusion of an authority superior to both?—W.

dar from his office, which they conferred, not upon the accusing petitioner, but another individual, at one-half of the preceding salary, 36,000 rupees.[1] The majority of the Council esteemed the evidence of the charge complete. The party of the Governor-general, representing the testimony of the natives of India when they have any motive to falsify, as little worthy of trust, and the known disposition of the leading party in the Council as holding forth inducement to accuse, affirmed that the evidence had no title to regard. The eagerness of the Governor-general to stifle, and his exertions to obstruct inquiry, on all occasions where his conduct came under complaint, constituted in itself an article of proof, which added materially to the weight of whatever came against him from any other source.[2]

Another ground of charge presented itself in the following manner. On the 2nd of May, 1775, Mr. Grant, accountant to the provincial council of Moorshedabad, produced to the board a set of accounts, relating to the affairs of the Nabob; and stated that he had received them from a native, now in his own service, who had till lately been a clerk in the treasury office of the Nabob. From these accounts it appeared that Munny Begum, since her appointment to the superintendence of the Nabob's person and affairs, had received 9,67,693 rupees, over and above what she appeared to have disbursed or had accounted for. Upon examination of Mr. Grant, and of the clerk from whom the accounts were received, the majority of the council were induced to regard them as authentic. Among

[1] Nothing can be weaker than the whole of this case, nothing more strikingly illustrative of the unfitness of the majority of the Council to assume judicial powers. The accusation came from a person of no repute or station, who sought to obtain the appointment for himself. The letters calling for payment for purposes not avowed, contain no allusion to Hastings whatever. Of the two persons to whom the letter was addressed, only one was examined, a discarded servant of the Foujdar, who did not understand the language (Persian) of the letter, and who gave no testimony as to the fact of the money having been given. The Foujdar, when before the Council, did not refuse to answer, although he objected to being sworn, from a feeling well known to be common amongst natives of respectability,—no proof of the money having been ever offered, given, or accepted, was attempted, but the Foujdar was dismissed from his appointment abruptly, solely on the ground of his objection to an oath. See the whole of the proceedings in the Appendix to the Eleventh Report. K.—W.

[2] As already pointed out, he did not obstruct inquiry; he only resisted the indecorous mode in which, for factious purposes, its institution was attempted.—W.

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other circumstances, it was stated by the clerk that the head eunuch of the Begum, the person who stood highest in her confidence, had endeavoured, upon hearing of such accounts in the hands of the clerk, to prevail upon him, by the prospect of rewards and advantages, to restore the papers, and return to the service of the Begum; and Mr. Grant was ready to state upon his oath that similar attempts had been made upon himself. The party opposed to the Governor-General thought the circumstances sufficiently strong to render inquiry necessary, and to authorize the steps which inquiry demanded. They proposed, that a servant of the Company should immediately be sent to Moorshedabad, invested with a proper commission and powers; and that the Begum, for the investigation of whose conduct no satisfactory evidence could be procured, while she retained authority over the officers and servants of the Nabob, should be divested of her power. The Governor-General, on the other hand, questioned the authority of the papers, resisted the proposal to inquire into the accounts of the Begum, and protested against removing her from her office, while no proof of her misconduct was adduced.[1] By decision, however, of the majority, Mr. Goring was despatched for the investigation; the power of the Begum was withdrawn; and Raja Gourdass, the son of Nuncomar, Dewan, or principal Minister of the Begum, received the temporary charge of the Nabob's affairs. Inquiry seemed to establish the authenticity of the papers. The Begum, when pressed to account for the balance with which she was charged, stated, among other circumstances, that 1,50,000 rupees had been given to Mr. Hastings, under the name of entertainment-money, when he went to Moorshedabad in 1772, and placed her at the head of the Nabob's establishment. She also represented, that, on the same occasion, 1,50,000 rupees had been given by her as a present to Mr. Middleton. Of the sum thus delivered to Mr. Middleton (for the receipt of it was never denied), no account was ever rendered, and no defence was ever set up. Mr. Hastings justified the receipt of what was bestowed upon himself, on the several pleas, that the act of parliament which prohibited presents was not then passed, that such allowances were the common custom of the country,

[1] Another contrast to the case of Mohammed Reza Khan.

that a Nabob of Bengal received on the same account 1000 rupees a day as often as he visited the Governor in Calcutta, that he added nothing to his fortune by this allowance, and must have charged to the Company a sum as large, if this had not been received.[1] Upon part of this it is necessary to remark, that custom, the custom of a country, where almost every thing was corrupt, affords but a sorry defence; that if a visit to the Nabob was a thing of so much expense it ought not to have been made without an adequate cause; that no adequate cause, if the receipt of the present be excluded, can any where be found; that for the necessity of a great expense on such a visit, or indeed of any extraordinary expense at all, we have barely the assertion of the Governor-General, which being the assertion of a party making out a case in his own defence, and an assertion opposed to probability, possesses but *little* of the force of proof. Besides, the amount is enormous; 2000 rupees per day; 7,30,000 rupees, or 73,000*l.* per annum. What should have made living at Moorshedabad cost the Governor-General at the rate of 73,000*l.* per annum? And why should the Nabob, whose allowance was understood to be cut down to the lowest point, have been oppressed by so enormous a burden? Another consideration of importance is, that when Mr. Hastings received the sum of one lack and half of rupees for entertainment-money, he at the same time charged to the Company a large sum, 30,000 rupees and upwards, as travelling charges, and a great additional amount for his colleagues and attendants.[2] The complaints of severe usage to the Begum, advanced both by herself and by Hastings, appear to have had no other foundation than the loss of her office; an office which the majority considered her sex as disqualifying her to fill; and to which they treated her appointment as one of the errors or crimes of the preceding administration.[3]

[1] See defence of Mr. Hastings at the Bar of the Lords.

[2] Minutes of Evidence on the Trial, p. 1048.—M. The charges were for twelve months, and in general they are not immoderate with reference to Indian customs and modes of travelling: at most they involve only the charge of want of economy, and an inefficient control over the disbursements of servants and dependants.—W.

[3] The sum for expenses, whether too much or not, was acknowledged and carried to account. The further sums asserted to have been given, were never proved. With that said to have been given to Mr. Middleton, Hastings had no concern. Of the spirit in which these charges were made, the proceedings are sufficient evidence. Upon the production of the accounts fur-

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Of the different charges, however, brought against the Governor-General, those which were produced by the Raja Nuncomar were attended with the most remarkable circumstances. From this personage, whom we have seen Phoujdar of Hoogly, minister of the Nabob Jaffier Khan, the agent of Mr. Hastings in the prosecution of Mohammed Reza Chan, and whose son was appointed Dewan of the household to the Nabob, which son it was regulated and ordained that he should guide, a paper was delivered on the 11th of March, which, besides accusing the Governor-General of overlooking the proof of vast embezzlements committed by Mohammed Reza Khan and Shitabroy, and acquitting them in consideration of large sums of money by which he was bribed, exhibited the particulars of a sum amounting to 3,54,105 rupees, which, it affirmed, the Governor-General accepted, for the appointment of Munny Begum, and Goordass, to their respective dignities and powers. In prosecution of the opinion of the majority, that it was the duty of the Supreme Council to inquire into the charges which were brought against the members of the government, and to control the conduct even of the highest officers of state, it was on the 13th proposed, that Nuncomar should be summoned to appear before them and called upon to produce the grounds of his accusation

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nished by Mr. Grant, it was at once determined to dispossess the Begum of her authority, and to call upon her for the whole of the public and private accounts for the preceding eight years. Mr. Goring was sent merely to enforce the delivery of those accounts, and he was directed to hand them over to the Provincial Council, Messrs. Maxwell, Anderson, and Grant, who were at the same time instructed to examine them minutely. It would have been but decent to have awaited the result of this examination, and a scrutiny so conducted, although involving a little delay, would have been most favourable to the ascertainment of the truth. Mr. Goring, however, paid little attention to his instructions. He did not leave Calcutta until after the 10th of May, and went to Nadiya by water—a voyage of five or six days at least; a few hours by dawk carried him to Moorshedabad, but he could not have arrived there much before the 20th: on the 22nd, he despatches to Calcutta memorandums of disbursements to English gentlemen, to Mr. Hastings for an entertainment, rupees 1,50,000; to Mr. Middleton on account of an agreement with Baboo Begum, a similar sum. It was very reasonable for Hastings to remark, as the commission given to Mr. Goring was to receive from the Begum all the accounts of the Nizamut for eight years past, and to deliver them into the hands of gentlemen appointed to examine and report their contents to the Board—"I desire that Mr. Goring be asked in what manner he came by the account he has now sent, and on what account this partial selection was made by him." The answer may easily be supplied: the narrative of his proceedings shows that he came by the account by intimidation, —and that the object of the selection was the inculpation of Hastings. Eleventh Report, App. E.—W.

Mr. Hastings, instead of choosing to confront his accuser, and to avail himself of the advantage of innocence, in hearing and challenging the pretences of a false accusation, resisted inquiry. "Before the question is put," says his Minute, "I declare that I will not suffer Nuncomar to appear before the Board as my accuser. I know what belongs to the dignity and character of the first member of this administration. I will not sit at this Board in the character of a criminal. Nor do I acknowledge the members of this Board to be my judges. I am reduced, on this occasion, to make the declaration that I regard General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis, as my accusers." The Governor-General, with Mr. Barwell, again recommended prosecution at law, not inquiry before the Council, as the mode of investigating his conduct. Again he pronounced the Council dissolved, and, together with Mr. Barwell, quitted the Board. Again the majority voted this form of dissolution void, and continued the inquiry. Nuncomar made positive declaration as to the sums which he himself had paid to the Governor; gave in the names of several persons who were privy to the transactions; and presented a letter, in purport from Munny Begum to himself, of which the seal, upon comparison, by the Persian translator and his moonshee, was declared to be authentic; and in which a gift was stated of two lacks to the Governor from herself. Upon this evidence, the Governor was called upon to refund to the Company the money which he had thus illegally received. But he refused to acknowledge the majority as a council, and returned no answer.

Nothing surely can be more inadmissible than the pretences of the Governor-General for stifling inquiry. What he alleged was, the dignity of the accused, and the baseness of the accuser. If the dignity in the accused be a sufficient objection to inquiry, the responsibility of the leading members of every government is immediately destroyed; all limitation of their power is ended; and all restraint upon misconduct is renounced. If the character of the accuser is bad, so much the greater is the advantage of the accused; because so much the more easy it is to counterbalance the evidence of his testimony. So great may be the improbability of a charge, and so little the

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value of an accuser's testimony, that the first may outweigh the latter, and preclude the propriety of any further research. But where the case is in any degree different from this, the character of the informer is not a sufficient objection to inquiry. It is often from men of the worst character that the most important intelligence is most likely to be received; and it is only necessary, in receiving it, to make those abatements of belief which the character of the informant may appear to require. Perpetual reference to the courts of law, as the only place where inquiry into the conduct of an officer of government could fitly be made, merits the highest condemnation; because the conduct of a member of government may be evil to almost any degree, may involve his country in ruin, and yet may be incapable of being touched by courts of law, constituted and conducted as those of England. It is another species of superintendence and control which must ensure good conduct in those who are vested with great public trusts. In disclaiming the majority for his judges, the Governor availed himself of an ambiguity in the word. They did not undertake the office of judgment. They only held it their duty to inquire, for the benefit of those who might afterwards judge.[1]

In this case, the Governor-general was not satisfied with crying out against inquiry. He took the extraordinary resolution of prosecuting, with all the weight of his autho-

[1] The question is not fairly stated. The comparative rank of the accused and the accuser was not alleged as an objection to the hearing of the accusation—it was the incompatibility of choosing a meeting of the Council as the scene of such a procedure—the necessary consequence of which was the privation of the head of the state of all respect and authority. A still stronger objection, however, lies to the tribunal. Whatever might be professed, the members of the Council were necessarily converted into judges the moment an accusation was pleaded before them on one side, and defended on the other. Hastings must either have admitted the charge in silence, or replied to it,—in either case the other members of the Council would have come to a resolution on the proceedings, they would to all intents and purposes have pronounced judgment. They would have assumed a power which they did not possess, and to the exercise of which it was right therefore at once to object. The general principle is incontrovertible, but in the present instance it is evident that such a course was most unlikely to promote the cause of truth. Had the governor acknowledged his colleagues as his judges, what measure of justice was he to expect at their hands. Had they been calm, prudent, dispassionate men, Hastings might have conceded the abstract principle, but with such daily proofs of their personal animosity, the cause of truth and justice, as well as his own safety, demanded that he should resist their usurpation. He did not dispute, he did not obstruct their right to inquire. He pointed out to them the legitimate mode of making inquiry; and their refusing to adopt it is sufficient proof that they did not seek to inquire, but were eager to condemn.—W.

rity, the man by whom he was accused. An indictment, at the instance of the Governor-general, of Mr. Barwell, of Mr. Vansittart, of Mr. Hastings' Banyan, and of the Roy Royan or head native agent of finance, was preferred against Nuncomar, together with Messrs. Joseph and Francis Fowke, for a conspiracy to force a man named Commaul-ad-din Khan, to write a petition against the parties to the prosecution. After an examination before the judges, Mr. Francis Fowke was discharged; and Mr. Barwell, the Roy Royan, and the Governor's Banyan, withdrew their names from the prosecution. The Governor and Mr. Vansittart persevered; and Nuncomar and Mr. Joseph Fowke were held to bail at their instance. "The truth is, as we" says the minute of Clavering, Monson, and Francis, on the 16th of May, "have reason to believe, that there never existed such a paper as has been sworn to; and that every particular said to be contained in it, is an imposition invented by Commaul-ad-Din." A few days after this suspicious, but ineffectual proceeding, a new prosecution was instituted against Nuncomar. At the suit of a native, he was taken up on a charge of forgery, and committed to the common gaol. He was tried before the Supreme Court, by a jury of Englishmen, convicted, and hanged. No transaction, perhaps, of this whole administration more deeply tainted the reputation of Hastings, than the tragedy of Nuncomar. At the moment when he stood forth as the accuser of the Governor-general, he was charged with a crime, alleged to have been committed five years before; tried, and executed; a proceeding which could not fail to generate the suspicion of guilt, and of an inability to encounter the weight of his testimony, in the man whose power to have prevented, or to have stopped (if he did not cause) the prosecution, it is not easy to deny. As Hastings, aware of the sinister interpretations to which the destruction of an accuser, in circumstances so extraordinary, would assuredly expose him, chose rather to sustain the weight of those suspicions, than to meet the charges by preventing or suspending the fate of the accuser; it is a fair inference, though mere resentment and spite might hurry some men to as great an indiscretion, that from the accusations he dreaded something worse than those suspicions. Mr.

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Francis, in his examination before the House of Commons, on the 16th of April, 1788, declared that the effect of this transaction upon the inquiries carried on by the Board into the accusations against the Governor, was, "to defeat them; that it impressed a general terror on the natives with respect to preferring accusations against men in great power; and that he and his coadjutors were unwilling to expose them to what appeared to him and these coadjutors, as well as themselves, a manifest danger."

The severest censures were very generally passed upon this trial and execution; and it was afterwards exhibited as matter of impeachment against both Mr. Hastings, and the Judge, who presided in the tribunal. The crime for which Nuncomar was made to suffer, was not a capital offence, by the laws of Hindustan, either Moslem or Hindu; and it was represented as a procedure full of cruelty and injustice, to render a people amenable to the most grievous severities of a law with which they were unacquainted, and from which, by their habits and associations, their minds were totally estranged. It was affirmed; that this atrocious condemnation and execution were upon an *ex-post-facto* law, as the statute which created the Supreme Court and its powers was not published till 1774, and the date of the supposed forgery was in 1770: that the law which rendered forgery capital did not extend to India, as no English statute included the colonies, unless where it was expressly stated in the law: that Nuncomar, as a native Indian, for a crime committed against another Indian, not an Englishman, or even a European, was amenable to the native, not the English tribunals: that the evidence adduced was not sufficient to warrant condemnation: and that although the situation in which the prisoner was placed with regard to a man of so much power as the Governor-general, should have suggested to the Judge peculiar circumspection and tenderness, there was every appearance of precipitation, and of a predetermination to find him guilty, and to cut him off. In the defence which was set up by Sir Elijah Impey, the Chief Judge, in his answer at the bar of the House of Commons on the 12th of December, 1787, he admitted that a native inhabitant of the provinces at large was not amenable to the

English laws, or to the English tribunals; and it was not as such, he affirmed, that Nuncomar was tried. But he maintained that a native inhabitant of the English town of Calcutta, which was English property, which had long been governed by Englishmen and English laws, was amenable to the English tribunals, and justly, because he made it his voluntary choice to live under their protection; and that it was in this capacity, namely, that of an inhabitant of Calcutta, that Nuncomar suffered the penalties of the English laws. If the competency of the jurisdiction was admitted, the question of evidence, where evidence was complicated and contradictory, could not admit of any very clear and certain decision; and the judge opposed the affirmation of its insufficiency by that of the contrary. He denied the doctrine that an English penal statute extended to the colonies, only when that extension was expressed. The allegation of precipitation and unfairness, still further of corruption, in the treatment of the accused, he not only denied with strong expressions of abhorrence, but by a specification of circumstances endeavoured to disprove. It was, however, affirmed, that Nuncomar was not an inhabitant of Calcutta at the time when the offence was said to have been committed; but a prisoner brought and detained there by constraint. The Chief Justice, on the other hand, maintained that not only was no evidence to this fact exhibited on the trial, but evidence to the contrary, and that not opposed. It does indeed, appear, that an omission, contrary to the intent of the framers, in the Charter of Justice granted the Company in 1753, had afforded a pretext for that extension of jurisdiction over the inhabitants of Calcutta, under which Impey sheltered himself. In establishing the *civil* court for the administration of the English laws, this charter expressly excepted "such suits as shall be between Indian natives, which shall be determined among themselves, unless both parties consent." In establishing the *penal* court, the reservation of the natives, having once been expressed, was not repeated; and of this opening the servants of the Company had availed themselves, whenever they chose, to extend over the natives the penalties of English law. That the intention of the charter was contrary, appeared by its sanctioning a separate court, called the Phoujdary, for the

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trial of all offences of the native inhabitants; a court which, under the intention of rendering natives, as well as English, amenable to the English criminal laws, would have been totally without a purpose.[1] Of the evidence it may fairly be observed, that though the forgery was completely proved by the oaths of the witnesses to the prosecution, it was as completely disproved by the oaths of the witnesses to the defence; that there was no such difference in the character of the parties or their witnesses as to throw the balance greatly to either of the sides; and that the preponderance, if any, was too weak, to support an act of so much importance and delicacy, as the condemnation of Nuncomar. Even after the judgment, the case was not without a remedy; the execution might have been stayed till the pleasure of the King was known, and a pardon might have been obtained. This too the Court absolutely refused; and proceeded with unrelenting determination to the execution of Nuncomar; who, on the 5th of August, with a tranquillity and firmness that never were surpassed, submitted to his fate, not only amid the tears and lamentations, but the cries and shrieks of an extraordinary assemblage of his countrymen.[2]

[1] Accordingly, this jurisdiction had hitherto been exercised with great timidity; and the consent of the government was always asked before the sentence was executed. In one case, and but one, there had been a conviction for forgery, but the prisoner was not executed—he received a pardon. See the Seventh Report of the Committee of Secrecy, in 1773, p. 17.

[2] It is true, that no circumstance in the administration of Hastings, has been so injurious to his reputation as the execution of Nundcomar—whether rightfully so is a different question. From the moment that Nundcomar became the object of judicial investigation, it would have ill become the governor to have interfered—it was not for him to interpose his personal or official influence to arrest the course of the law, nor would it have availed. The Supreme Court was new to its position, strongly impressed with a notion of its dignity, and sensitively jealous of its power. The judges would have at once indignantly resisted any attempt to bias their decision. For the fate of Nundcomar, they are alone responsible. It is presently admitted that they decided according to law, and the attempt to impeach the Chief Justice, Sir Elijah Impey, on this ground subsequently failed. It is therefore to be concluded, that the sentence was strictly according to law, and there can be no doubt that the crime was proved. The infliction of the sentence, however, upon a native of India, for an offence of which his countrymen knew not the penalty, and which had been committed before the full introduction of those laws which made it a capital crime, was the assertion of law at the expense of reason and humanity—with this Hastings has nothing to do—the fault, and a grievous one it was, rests with the judges. The question, as it concerns the Governor, regards only the share he had in the prosecution. Did he in any way instigate or encourage it? The prosecutor was a party concerned, a native, unconnected with the Governor. He may have thought he was doing a not unacceptable act in prosecuting a personal antagonist of Hastings, but that was his feeling. There is no necessity to suppose that he was urged on by Hastings: he had wrongs of his own to avenge, and needed no other instigation. There is no positive

There was, perhaps, enough to save the authors of this transaction, on the rigid interpretation of naked law. But that all regard to decorum, to the character of the English Government, to substantial justice, to the prevention of misrule, and the detection of ministerial crimes, was sacrificed to personal interest and personal passions, the impartial inquirer cannot hesitate to pronounce.[1]

Among the regulations of the financial system, formed and adopted in 1772, under the authority of Mr. Hastings, the seventeenth article was expressed in the following words: "That no Peshcar, Banyan, or other servant, of whatever denomination, of the collector, or relation or dependant of any such servant, be allowed to farm lands, nor directly nor indirectly to hold a concern in any farm, nor to be security for any farmer; and, if it shall appear that the collector shall have countenanced, approved, or connived at a breach of this regulation, he shall stand *ipso*

proof that he acted in concert with Hastings: we are therefore left to circumstantial proof, and the only circumstance upon which the participation of Hastings in the persecution of Nundcomar, is, its following hard upon the latter's charges against him. These were preferred on the 11th March, 1775. On the 6th of May following, Nundcomar was arrested under a warrant of the Court at the suit of Mohun Persand. Here is certainly a suspicious coincidence—but is there no other way of accounting for it than by imputations fatal to the character of W. Hastings? In truth, it seems capable of such explanation as acquits Hastings of having exercised any influence over it. Proceedings in the same cause did not then commence. They had been instituted before in the Dewanny Adaulut, and Nundcomar had been confined by the judge, but released by order of Hastings. The suit had therefore been suspended, but it had not been discontinued. The Supreme Court sat for the first time at the end of October, 1774. The forged instrument had been deposited in the Mayor's Court, and could not be recovered until all the papers had been transferred to the Supreme Court, and without it no suit could be proceeded with. At the very first opportunity afterwards, or in the commencement of 1775, at the first effective court of Oyer and Terminer and gaol delivery, held by the Supreme Court, the indictment was preferred and tried. It is not necessary to suspect Hastings of having from vindictive motives suggested, or accelerated the prosecution. It had previously been brought into another court, where it was asserted the influence of the Governor-General had screened the criminal, and it was again brought into an independent court at the first possible moment when it could be instituted. The coincidence was unfortunate, but it seems to have been unavoidable; and in the absence of all possible proof, the conjectural evidence is not unexceptionable enough to justify the imputation so recklessly advanced by Burke, and seemingly implied in the observations of the text, that Hastings had murdered Nundcomar by the hands of Sir E. Impey.—W.

[1] For the preceding charges against Mr. Hastings, and the proceedings of the Council, see the Eleventh Report of the Select Committee, in 1781, with its Appendix; Burke's Charges against Hastings, No. 8, and Hastings' Answer to the Eighth Charge, with the Minutes of Evidence on the Trial, p. 953—1001; and the Charges against Sir Elijah Impey, exhibited to the House of Commons by Sir Gilbert Elliot, in 1787, with the Speech of Impey in Reply to the first charge, printed, with an Appendix, by Stockdale, in 1788. For the execution and behaviour of Nuncomar, see a very interesting account, written by the sheriff who superintended, and printed in Dodsley's Annual Register for 1788, Historical part, p. 157.

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facto dismissed from his collectorship." These regulations had the advantage of being accompanied with a running commentary, in a corresponding column of the very page which contained the text of the law; the commentary proceeding from the same authority as the law, and exhibiting the reasons on which it was founded. The commentary on the article in question, stated, that, "If the collector, or any persons who partake of his authority, are permitted to be farmers of the country, no other persons will dare to be their competitors. Of course they will obtain the farms on their own terms. It is not fit that the servants of the Company should be dealers with their masters. The collectors are checks on the farmers. If they, themselves, turn farmers, what checks can be found for them? What security will the Company have for their property? Or, where are the ryots to look for protection?"[1] Notwithstanding this law, it appeared that Mr. Hastings' own Banyan had, in the year 1773, possessed, or was concerned in the farm of no less than nineteen pergunnahs, or districts, in different parts of Bengal, the united rent-roll of which was 13,33,664 rupees; that in 1774, the rent-roll of the territory so farmed was 13,46,152 rupees; in 1775, 13,67,796 rupees; that in 1776, it was 13,88,346 rupees; and in 1777, the last year of the existing or quinquennial settlement, it was 14,11,885 rupees. It also appeared that, at the end of the second year, he was allowed to relinquish three of the farms, on which there was an increasing rent. This proceeding was severely condemned by the Directors, and Mr. Hastings himself, beyond affirming that he had no share in the profits, and that little or none were made, alleged but little in its defence.[2]

[1] Sixth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, in 1773; Bengal Consultations, 14th May, 1772, p. 18.

[2] Extract of Bengal Revenue Consultations, 17th March, 1775; Parliamentary Papers, printed in 1787; see also the Fifteenth of the Charges exhibited to Parliament against Warren Hastings, Esq., and his Answer to the same.—M.

There was nothing to defend. The regulation applied to the native agent of a collector, being intended to obviate local influence and interests. The Banyan of the Governor-General residing in Calcutta, renting farms or being security for others so doing in different and distant parts of the country, and having so done before he became the servant of Mr. Hastings, did not come under the regulation. It was of importance that he should be a man of rank and wealth, and whence could either be derived more creditably than from landed possessions. That Cauntoo Baboo may have turned his connexion with the Governor to profit, is very possible, but that was inevitable, whoever might have filled the office. In the situation of Hastings, and of all the Company's servants, at that time, native agency was indispensable, and in the absence of efficient

For the affairs of the Nabob, and that part of the business of government, still transacted in his name, a substitute to Munny Begum, and to the plan superseded by her removal, was urgently required. In their letter of the 3rd of March, 1775, the Directors had declared Mohammed Reza Khan to be so honourably cleared of the suspicions and charges with which he had been clouded, and Nuncomar to be so disgraced by his attempts to destroy him, that they directed his son, who was no more than the tool of the father, to be removed from his office; and Mohammed Reza Khan to be appointed in his stead. It is remarkable, that the Directors were so ignorant of the government of India, which it belonged to them to conduct, that they mistook the name of the office of Gourdass, who was the agent for paying the Nabob's servants, and the substitute for Munny Begum, when any of the affairs were to be transacted to which the fiction of the Nabob's authority was still applied, for that of the officer who was no more than the head of the native clerks in the office of revenue at Calcutta. When they directed Gourdass to be replaced by Mohammed Reza, they distinguished him by the title of Roy Royan, and thence enlarged the ground of cavil and dispute between the contending parties in the Council. Clavering, Francis, and Monson, decided for uniting, in the hands of Mohammed Reza Khan, the functions which had been divided between Munny Begum and Raja Gourdass; and as Raja Gourdass, notwithstanding the prejudices against his father, was recommended by the Directors to some inferior office, the same party proposed to make him Roy Royan, and to remove Raja Bullub, the son of Dooloob Ram, by whom that office had hitherto been held.

As the penal department of justice was ill-administered in the present Foujdary courts (that branch of the late arrangements had totally failed), and as the superintendence

check from a knowledge of the languages and of the country, was very liable to be abused. Many of the charges of corruption and collusion had their origin from this source. The principals suffered not only for their own acts, but those of their dependants. That the European functionaries were all without exception immaculate, is not to be believed, considering how recent was the general prevalence of corruption, but their servants signed no covenants, and were no doubt accessible to bribes, and the masters were supposed to share in the illicit gains. No charge of corruption against Hastings himself, however, is unequivocally made out, and although he seems to have been careless and extravagant, and little scrupulous in raising means for public emergencies, he may be acquitted of all intention of enriching himself by the violation of principles or of covenants.—W.

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of criminal justice, intrusted to the Governor-general, as head of the Nizamut Adaulut, or Supreme Penal Court of Calcutta, loaded him with a weight of business, and of responsibility, from which he sought to be relieved, the majority agreed to restore to Mohammed Reza Khan, the superintendence of penal justice, and of the native penal courts throughout the country; and, for that purpose, to remove the seat of the Nizamut Adaulut from Calcutta, back to Moorshedabad. The Governor-general agreed that the orders of the Directors required the removal of Gourdass from the office which he held under Munny Begum, and the appointment to that office of Mohammed Reza Khan; but he dissented from all the other parts of the proposed arrangement; and treated the renewal of the title of Naib Subah, and the affectation of still recognising the Nabob's government, as idle grimace. "All the arts of policy cannot," he said, "conceal the power by which these provinces are ruled, nor can all the arts of sophistry avail to transfer the responsibility to the Nabob: when it is as visible as the light of the sun, that every act originates from our own government, that the Nabob is a mere pageant without the shadow of authority, and even his most consequential agents receive their express nomination from the servants of the Company."[1] The opposing party, however, thought it would be still politic, to uphold the pretext of "a country government," for managing all discussions with foreign factories. And, if ultimately it should, they say, "be necessary to maintain the authority of the country government by force, the Nabob will call upon us for that assistance, which we are bound by treaty to afford him, and which may be effectually employed in his name." That party possessed the majority of votes, and their schemes, of course, were carried into execution.[2]

[1] How strange a language this from the pen of the man who, but a few months before, had represented the power of the shadow of this shadow, the Naib Subah, as too great to exist with safety to the Company in the hands of any man!

[2] Fifth Report of the Select Committee in 1781; and the Bengal Consultations in the Appendix, No. 6.

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IN TEN VOLUMES.

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BY HORACE HAYMAN WILSON, M.A., F.R.S.

MEMBER OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY, OF THE ASIATIC SOCIETIES OF PARIS, BOSTON AND CALCUTTA, AND OF THE ORIENTAL SOCIETY OF GERMANY; OF THE IMPERIAL INSTITUTE OF FRANCE, AND THE IMPERIAL ACADEMIES OF VIENNA AND ST. PETERSBURGH; OF THE ROYAL ACADEMIES OF BERLIN AND MUNICH, ETC., ETC.; AND BODEN PROFESSOR OF SANSCRIT IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD.

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THE state of the regulations for collecting the revenue had for some time pressed upon the attention of the government. The lease of five years, on which the revenues had been farmed in 1772, was drawing to a close, and

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it was necessary to determine what course should then be pursued. To remedy evils, which delayed not to make themselves perceived, in the regulations of 1772, a considerable change had been introduced in 1773. The superintendence of the collectors was abolished. The provinces (Chittagong and Tipperah remaining under the original sort of management, that of a chief) were formed into six grand divisions, Calcutta, Burdwan, Moorshedabad, Dinagepore, Dacca, and Patna. In each of these divisions (Calcutta excepted, for which two members of the council and three superior servants, under the name of a committee of revenue, were appointed) a council was formed, consisting of a chief, and four senior servants, to whom powers were confided, the same, in general, with those formerly enjoyed by the collectors. They exercised a command over all the officers and affairs of revenue within the division. The members superintended in rotation the civil courts of justice, called Sudder Adaulut. The councils appointed deputies, or *naibs*, to the subordinate districts of the division. These naibs, who were natives, and called also aumils, both superintended the work of realizing the revenue, and held courts of fiscal judicature, called courts of Dewannee Adaulut. The decisions of these courts were subject by appeal to the review of the provincial courts of Sudder Adaulut; which decided in the last resort to the value of 1000 rupees, but under appeal to the court of Sudder Dewannee Adaulut at Calcutta in all cases which exceeded that amount. Even this scheme was declared to be only immediate, and preparatory to an ultimate measure, according to which, while the local management, except in those districts which might be let entire to the Zemindars or responsible farmers, should be performed by a dewan, or aumil, a committee of revenue, sitting at the Presidency, should form a grand revenue office, and superintend the whole collections of the country.[1] Such were the alterations adopted in 1773.

At an early period, under the five years' settlement, it was perceived, that the farmers of the revenue had contracted for more than they were able to pay. The collections fell short of the engagements even for the first year; and the farms had been let upon a progressive rent. The

[1] Sixth Report of the Select Committee, 1781, Appendix, No. 1.

Governor-General was now accused by his colleagues of having deceived his honourable masters by holding up to their hopes a revenue which could not be obtained. He defended himself by a plea which had, it cannot be denied, considerable weight. It was natural to suppose, that the natives were acquainted with the value of the lands, and other sources of the revenue; and that a regard to their own interests would prevent them from engaging for more than those sources would afford. It was contended with no less justice on the other side, that there was a class of persons who had nothing to lose; to whom the handling of the revenues, and power over those who paid them, though for a single year, was an object of desire; and whom, as they had no intention to pay what they promised, the extent of the promise could not restrain.

The failure of exaggerated hopes was not the only evil whereof the farm by auction was accused. The Zemindars, through whose agency the revenues of the district had formerly been realized, and whose office and authority had generally grown into hereditary possessions, comprising both an estate and a magistracy, or even a species of sovereignty, when the territory and jurisdiction were large; were either thrown out of their possessions; or from an ambition to hold the situation which had given opulence and rank to their families, perhaps for generations, they bid for the taxes more than the taxes could enable them to pay; and reduced themselves by the bargain to poverty and ruin. When the revenues were farmed to the Zemindars, these contractors were induced to turn upon the ryots, and others from whom their collections were levied, the same rack which was applied to themselves. When they were farmed to the new adventurer, who looked only to a temporary profit, and who had no interest in the permanent prosperity of a people with whom he had no permanent connexion, every species of exaction to which no punishment was attached, or of which the punishment could by artifice be evaded, was to him a fountain of gain.

After several acrimonious debates, the Governor-General proposed that the separate opinions of the Members of the Council, on the most eligible plan for levying the taxes of the country, should be sent to the Court of Directors.

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And on the 28th of March, 1775, a draught signed by him and Mr. Barwell was prepared for transmission. The leading principle of this project was, that the several districts should be farmed on leases for life, or for two joint lives; allowing a preference to the Zemindar as often as his offer was not greatly inferior to that of other candidates, or the real value of the taxes to be let. The plan of the other members of the Council was not yet prepared. They contented themselves with some severe reflections upon the imperfections of the existing system, an exaggerated representation of the evils which it was calculated to produce,[1] and an expression of the greatest astonishment at the inconsistency of the Governor-General, in praising and defending that system, while he yet recommended another, by which it would be wholly suppressed.

On the 22nd of January, 1776, Mr. Francis entered a voluminous minute, in which he took occasion to record at length his opinions respecting the ancient government of the country, and the means of ensuring its future prosperity. Of the measures which he recommended, a plan for realizing the revenue constituted the greatest and most remarkable portion. Without much concern about the production of proof, he assumed as a basis two things; first, that the opinion was erroneous, which ascribed to the Sovereign the property of the land; and secondly, that the property in question belonged to the Zemindars. Upon the Zemindars, as proprietors, he accordingly proposed that a certain land-tax should be levied; that it should be fixed once for all; and held as perpetual and invariable.

This was the principle and essence of his plan; and the reasonings by which he supported it, were the common reasonings which prove the benefit of certainty in levying contributions for the use of the state. But Mr. Francis misapplied a common term. By certainty, in matters of taxation, is not meant security for ever against increase of taxation. Taxes may be in the highest degree certain, and yet liable to be increased at the will of the legislature.

[1] "In the course of three years more, we think it much to be apprehended, that the continued operation of *this* system will have reduced the country in general to such a state of ruin and decay, as no future alteration will be sufficient to retrieve." Extract of a Minute from General Clavering, Col. Monson, and Mr. Francis, March 21, 1775.

For certainty it is enough, that under any existing enactment of the legislature, the sum which every man has to pay should depend upon definite, cognoscible circumstances. The window-tax, for example, is a certain tax; though it may be increased or diminished, not only at the pleasure of the legislature, but by altering the number of his windows at the pleasure of the individual who pays it. By the common reasonings to prove the advantages of certainty in taxes, M. Francis, therefore, proved nothing at all against the power of increasing them. The sacred duty of keeping taxation in general within the narrowest possible limits, rests upon equally strong but very different grounds.

Into the subordinate arrangements of the scheme, it belongs not to the present purpose to enter. It is only necessary to state, that Mr. Francis proposed to protect the ryots from the arbitrary exactions of the Zemindars, by prescribed forms of leases, in India known by the name of pottahs; that he condemned the provincial councils, and recommended local supervisors, to superintend, for a time, the executive as well as judicial business of the collections; a business, which, by the arrangements made with the Zemindars and the ryots, he trusted would in a great measure soon perform itself. On opium and salt, of which the monopoly had generally been disposed of by contract, he proposed that government should content itself with a duty; and terminate a large amount of existing oppressions by giving freedom to the trade.[1]

That the regulations which had been adopted for the administration of justice among the natives were extremely defective, all parties admitted and complained. That robbery and other crimes so greatly prevailed, was owing, in the opinion of Mr. Francis, to the reduction of the authority of the Zemindars. These officers had formerly exercised a penal control, which Mr. Francis maintained was fully judicial; which had reference, as Mr. Hastings affirmed, to nothing but police. As a cure for the exist-

[1] Report, ut supra, and Appendix, Nos. 14 and 15. See also a publication, entitled Original Minutes of the Governor-General and Council of Fort William, by Philip Francis, Esq. For the meaning of the terms Zemindar and Ryot, see i. 271; and for the interest which the Zemindar had in the land, see the considerations adduced on the introduction of the zemindary system during the administration of Lord Cornwallis.

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ing disorders, Mr. Francis recommended the restoration of their ancient powers to the Zemindars, who, in the case of robbery and theft, were obliged, under the ancient government, to make compensation to the party wronged; and in the case of murders and riots, were liable to severe mulcts at the hand of government. Mr. Hastings, who judged more wisely what effects zemindary jurisdiction had produced, or was likely to produce, treated this as a remedy which was far from adequate to the disease. In conjunction with Sir Elijah Impey, he formed the draught of a bill for an act of parliament, on the subject of the civil judicature of Bengal. It was communicated to the Council on the 29th of May. In this plan of the Chief Governor and Chief Judge, it was proposed, that in each of the seven divisions, into which, including Chittagong, the country had been already distributed, two courts of record should be established; that one should be denominated "The Court of Provincial Council;" that it should in each instance consist of a president and three Councillors, chosen by the Governor-General and Council, among the senior servants of the Company; and have summary jurisdiction in all pecuniary suits which regarded the Company, either directly, or through the medium of any person indebted to them or employed in their service; that the other of these courts should be called the Adaulut Dewanny Zillajaut; should consist of one judge, chosen, for his knowledge in the language and constitutions of the country, by the Governor and Council, from among the senior servants of the Company; and should have jurisdiction in cases of trespass or damage, rents, debts, and in general of all pleas real, personal, or mixed, belonging to parties different from those included in the jurisdiction of the Courts of Provincial Council. In this draught no provision was made for the criminal branch of judicature among the natives, which had been remitted to the nominal government of the Nabob, and exercised under the superintendence of Mohammed Reza Khan.[1]

Early in November, 1776, Colonel Monson died; and as there remained in the Council after that event, only the Governor-General and Mr. Barwell on the one part, with

[1] See Francis's Minute, ut supra, and the Draught of Hastings's Bill; Report, ut supra, Appendix, No. 13.

General Clavering and Mr. Francis on the other, the casting vote of the Governor-General turned the balance on his side, and restored to him the direction of government.

In the consultation of the 1st of November he had entered a minute, in which he proposed, as a foundation for new-modelling the plan of collection, that an investigation should be instituted for ascertaining the actual state of the sources of revenue, particularly of that great and principal source, the lands. As the mode of letting by auction, which had produced inconvenience, was meant to be discontinued, and the mode of letting by valuation to be adopted in its stead, the Governor-General was of opinion, that as accurate a knowledge as possible of the subject of valuation ought first to be obtained. He proposed that this inquiry should be assigned as an exclusive duty to particular agents; that two covenanted servants of the Company should be chosen, with an adequate appointment of native officers; and that their business should be to collect the accounts of the Zemindars, the farmers, and ryots; to obtain such information as the Provincial Councils could impart; to depute, when expedient, native officers into the districts for the purpose of inquiry; and to arrange and digest the accumulated materials. The use of this knowledge would be to assess the lands in proportion to their value, and to protect the ryots, by equitable agreements, or pottahs, imposed upon the Zemindars. The Governor-General finally proposed, for the sake, as he said, of despatch, that all orders issued from the office, in execution of such measures as had received the sanction of the Board, should be written in his name; and that the control of the office should be confided to his care.

As every proposal made by the Governor-General was an object of attack to the opposite side of the Board, this measure introduced, as usual, a long train of debate and altercation. Mr. Francis objected, 1. That the inquiry proposed was altogether useless; as a rate of impost, extracting from the lands their utmost value, would be cruel to the people, and ruinous to the state; while, under a moderate assessment, disproportion between the rate and the value was worthy of little regard; 2. That if an accu-

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rate valuation were useful, it ought to have been obtained through the Committee of Circuit, by whom the lands were let at auction, for the professed purpose of ascertaining their highest value; 3. That the inquiry would be unavailing, because the Zemindars, farmers, and ryots, would not give true accounts; 4. That if real accounts were capable of being obtained, they would be so voluminous, intricate, and defective, as to preclude the possibility of drawing from them any accurate conclusion; 5. That a valuation of land, if accurately obtained, is only true for one particular year, not for any future one; and 6. That with regard to the ryots, while the proposed pottahs were ill-calculated to afford them protection, the interest of the Zemindars, if their lands were restored under a moderate and invariable tax, would yield the best security to the husbandman, from whose exertions the value of the land arose. A furious minute was entered by General Clavering, in which he arraigned the measure as an attempt to wrest from the Council "the ordering, management, and government of the territorial acquisitions," and as an illegal usurpation of the powers that were vested exclusively in the Board. This accusation was founded upon the proposal about the letters and the control of the office. And it is remarkable that, knowing the jealousy with which any proposal of a new power to himself would be viewed by the hostile party, and the imputations to which it would give birth, the Governor-General should have embarrassed his scheme with a condition, invidious, and not essential to its execution. That the objections were frivolous or invalid, it is easy to perceive. Though the inequalities of some taxes redress themselves in time, it is a mischievous notion that inequality in the imposing of taxes is not an evil. Every inequality in the case of a *new* imposition, is an act of oppression and injustice. And Hastings showed that in the case of India, where the land-holder paid nine-tenths of the produce of the land to government, inequality might produce the most cruel oppression. If the Committee of Circuit had fallen short of procuring an accurate knowledge of the sources of the revenue, that could be no reason why better information should not be obtained. Though it was acknowledged that inquiry would be difficult, and its results defective, it is

never to be admitted that, where perfect knowledge cannot be obtained, knowledge, though imperfect, is of no advantage. If it were allowed, as it was not, that the interest of the Zemindars would have been such, upon the plan of Mr. Francis, as Mr. Francis supposed, it is not true that men will be governed by their real interests, where it is certain that they are incapable of understanding those interests; where those interests are distant and speak only to the judgment, while they are opposed by others that operate immediately upon the passions and the senses. As the Governor-General had not proposed that letters from the office issued in his name should relate to any thing but services which had received the sanction of the Council, he insisted that they no more implied a usurpation of the powers of the Council, than the letters written in his own name, in the discharge of his function, by any officer who was vested with a trust. The pernicious purposes to which it was in vague and general terms affirmed that such a power might be converted, it is not easy to understand. And the odium which it was attempted to cast upon the inquiry, by representing it as a preparation for exacting the utmost possible revenue from the lands, and dispossessing the Zemindars, Hastings answered, and sufficiently, by a solemn declaration, that no such intention was entertained.

By the ascendancy now restored to the Governor-General, the office was established. Orders were transmitted to the Provincial Councils; and native officers, called aumeens, were sent to collect accounts and to obtain information in the districts. The first incidents which occurred were complaints against those aumeens for injurious treatment of the inhabitants; and the opposing party were careful to place these accusations in the strongest possible light. From the aumeens, on the other hand, accounts arrived of frequent refusal on the part of the Zemindarry agents, and others, to afford information, or even to show their accounts.

The five years' leases expired in April, 1777; and the month of July of that year had arrived before any plan for the current and future years had yet been determined. By acknowledgment of all parties, the country had been so grievously over-taxed, as to have been altogether unable

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to carry up its payments to the level of the taxation. According to the statement of the Accountant-General, dated the 12th of July, 1777, the remissions upon the five-years' leases amounted to 118 lacs 79,576 rupees; and the balances, of which the greater part were wholly irrecoverable, amounted to 129 lacs 26,910 rupees. In his minute, on the office of inquiry, Mr. Barwell expressly declared that the "impoverished state of the country loudly pleaded for a reduction of the revenue as absolutely requisite for its future welfare."[1] In the meantime despatches arrived, by which it was declared, that the Court of Directors, after considering the plans, both that of the Governor-General for letting the lands on leases for lives, and that of Mr. Francis for establishing a fixed, invariable rent, "did, for many weighty reasons, think it not then advisable to adopt either of those modes," but directed that the lands should be let for one year, on the most advantageous terms; that the way of auction, however, should no more be used; that a preference should always be given to natives resident on the spot; and that no European, or the banyan of any European, should have any share in farming the revenues. On the 15th of July, it was determined that the following plan should be adopted for the year; that the lands should be offered to the old Zemindars on the rent-roll or assessment of the last year, or upon a new estimate formed by the provincial Council; that for such lands as should not in this manner find a renter, the Provincial Councils should receive sealed proposals by advertisement; that the salt farms should be let upon sealed proposals, a preference being given to the Zemindar or farmer of the lands on which the salt was made; that security should not be asked of the Zemindars, but a part of their lands be sold to discharge their balances. Mr. Francis objected to the rent-roll of last year as too high; and Mr. Hastings admitted the justice of the observation with regard to a part of the lands, where abatement would be required; but thought it good, in the first instance, to try in how many cases the high

[1] Mr. Shore (Lord Teignmouth) said, in his valuable Minute on the Revenues of Bengal, dated June, 1789, printed in the Appendix, No. I, to the Fifth Report of the Committee on India Affairs, in 1810, that "the settlement of 1772, before the expiration of the leases, existed, he believed, nowhere, upon its original terms."

rent, for which persons were found to engage, would be regarded as not more than the taxes would enable them to pay. Instead of sealed proposals, which he justly denominated a virtual auction, Mr. Francis recommended a settlement by the Provincial Councils. And he wished the manufacture of salt to be left to the holder or renter of the lands where it was made; the government requiring nothing but a duty. With these proposals the Governor-General signified no disposition to comply; but, after fresh commands from England, the average of the collections of the three preceding years was made the basis of the new engagements.

In their letter of the 4th of July, 1777, the Directors made the following severe reflections on the institution of the office of inquiry, and the separate authority which the Governor-General had taken to himself. "Our surprise and concern were great, on finding by our Governor-General's minute of 1st November, 1776, that after more than seven year's investigation, information is still so incomplete as to render another innovation, still more extraordinary than any of the former, absolutely necessary in order to the formation of a new settlement. In 1769, supervisors were appointed professedly to investigate the subject: in 1770, controlling councils of revenue were instituted: in 1772, the office of Naib Dewan was abolished, natives were discarded, and a Committee of Circuit formed, who, we were told, precisely and distinctly ascertained what was necessary to be known: and now, in 1777, two junior servants, with the assistance of a few natives, are employed to collect and digest materials, which have already undergone the collection, inspection, and revision of so many of our servants of all denominations.—We should have hoped, that when you knew our sentiments respecting the conduct of our late administration, in delegating separate powers to their President, it would have been sufficient to prevent us further trouble on such occasions; but to our concern, we find that no sooner was our Council reduced, by the death of Colonel Monson, to a number which rendered the President's casting vote of consequence to him, than he exercised it to invest himself with an improper degree of power in the

BOOK V. CHAP. III. business of the revenue, which he could never have expected from other authority."[1]

1777. The same mode of settlement was renewed from year to year, till 1781, when a plan destined for permanence was adopted and employed.[2]

When Mr. Hastings was in the deepest depression, under the ascendency of his opponents, a gentleman, of the name of Maclean, departed for England, and was intrusted with a variety of confidential affairs, as the private agent of the Governor-General. For the measures adopted against the Rohillas, Hastings had been censured by the Courts of both Directors and Proprietors:[3] and the Court of Directors had resolved to address the King for his removal. Upon this severe procedure, a Court of Proprietors was again convened; a majority of whom appeared averse to carry the condemnation to so great an extent, and voted, that the resolution of the Directors should be reconsidered. The business remained in suspense for some months, when Mr. Maclean informed the Court of Directors that he was empowered to tender the resignation of Mr. Hastings. If he resigned, a mere majority of the Proprietors, who appeared to be on his side, could restore him to the service. If he was dismissed, a mere majority would not be sufficient. In the letters by which the authority of Mr. Maclean was conveyed, confidential communications upon other subjects were con-

[1] Sixth Report, ut supra, Appendix, Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16. Minutes of the Governor-General and Council of Fort William, by Philip Francis, Esq.

[2] Fifth Report of the Committee of Indian Affairs, 1812, p. 8.

[3] This is not correctly stated: the Court of Directors passed resolutions condemnatory of the principles of the Rohilla war, and they were confirmed by a Court of Proprietors, but with a very important amendment, namely,—that "the Court had the highest opinion of the services and integrity of Warren Hastings, Esq., and could not admit a suspicion of corrupt motives operating on his conduct, without proof." Proceedings of a General Court, 6th December, 1775. The resolution to address the King, for the Recall of the Governor, arose out of the charges preferred by the other members of the Council against Hastings and Barwell, for having taken bribes, or exacted sums of money from natives illicitly. This Resolution passed the Court of Directors on the 8th of May, 1776; but, at a General Court, held on the 17th May, it was voted by 377 to 271, that the Court of Directors should reconsider their resolution. In the course of the following July, after several stormy discussions, the resolution was rescinded, and all questions of Hastings' removal ceased for the time. MSS. Records. The account of this transaction, and of that which follows, in the text, is taken from the Ninth Report of the Select Committee; not, as it should have been, from the documents to the Appendix, which do not, in very many instances, authorise the statements of the Report, influenced as they evidently are, by a spirit unfriendly to Warren Hastings.—W.

tained. On this account he represented the impossibility of his imparting them openly to the Court; but proposed, if they would appoint a confidential Committee of Directors, to communicate to them what was necessary for their satisfaction. The Chairman, Deputy-Chairman, and another Director were named. They reported, that they had seen Mr. Hastings's instructions in his own handwriting; and that the authority of Mr. Maclean for the proposed proceeding was clear and sufficient. Mr. Vansittart, and Mr. Stewart, both in the intimate friendship and confidence of Mr. Hastings, gave evidence that directions, perfectly correspondent to this written authority, had been given in their presence.[1] The two Chairmen alone concurred in the report. The third Director regarded not the authority as sufficiently proved. The

[1] The detail of the Report is unfair, and in this instance the Appendix does not furnish the means of correcting it. On reference to the original MS. documents, it is evident that Colonel Macleane's authority would have satisfied none but minds ready to catch at any plea for the removal of an opponent. The Chairman, Deputy Chairman, and Mr. Becher, report, that having conferred with Mr. Macleane, they find, that from the purport of Mr. Hastings' instructions, contained in a paper in his own handwriting, he declares "he will not continue in the government of Bengal, unless certain conditions therein specified can be obtained," of 'which,' they add, 'there is no probability.' This is a very different thing from a resignation: no conditions had been discussed; none had been proposed: their refusal should necessarily have preceded their consequences, and it was not for the Court of Directors to act upon their notion of a probable contingency. Again, it was only an intention that was talked of; and a mere intention, communicated to a friend, could not, by any just reasoning, be converted into an official announcement of a final determination. Even this intention, however, is not explicitly stated, but is gathered from the 'purport' of the instructions. On the other hand, the Court had before them, Hastings' reiterated intimations that he would *not* resign, until the Court had passed sentence upon the disputes between him and his adversaries. Letter to the Court, 15th August, 1777, App. No. 113. Macleane's conduct in this business it is not easy to comprehend. The Select Committee, in their usual spirit, find that motive for it which is assigned in the text; but there were no proceedings in contemplation at the time of his application to the Court, and it would have been quite early enough to have had recourse to the manœuvre for which credit is given him, when the recall of his principal had been again proposed. It seems not impossible, however, that he was influenced by views of his own. He had come home as the unauthorised agent of the Nabob of Arcot, and in February, 1776, addressed the Court, explaining his reasons for having resigned their service for that object. His account is not very explicit; but it is clear that he considered himself aggrieved by the Governor and Council of Bengal, and had some important points to carry with the Court, declaring that 'he is, and must continue to be, a great sufferer, unless the Court should be pleased to take his case into consideration, and grant him relief.' This is dated the 13th February, 1776. On the 10th of October, in the same year, he writes to the Court to announce his being authorised to proffer Hastings' resignation as above mentioned. During the whole interval, he had not relinquished his claims upon the Court; for not until the 31st of March in the next year, does he break with them finally. The whole of his proceedings display an intriguing spirit, which was very likely to have made him outstrip his instructions, in the hope of conciliating the ruling party of the Court. MSS. Records: also, Ninth Report, 356.—W.

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Directors proceeded upon the report: the resignation was formally accepted: and a successor to Mr. Hastings was chosen. Mr. Wheler was named; presented to the King for his approbation, and accepted. General Clavering, as senior Member of the Council, was empowered to occupy the chair till Mr. Wheler should arrive. And on the 19th of June, 1777, intelligence of these proceedings was received in Bengal.

A scene of confusion, well calculated to produce the most fatal consequences, ensued. Mr. Hastings, who now possessed the power of the Council, refused to acknowledge the authority of his agent; and declared his resolution not to resign. General Clavering claimed the attributes of supremacy; and summoned the Members of Council to assemble under his auspices. Mr. Barwell attended upon the summons of the one, and Mr. Francis upon that of the other; and two parties, each claiming the supreme authority, were now seen in action one against the other. An appeal to arms appeared, in these circumstances, the only medium of decision; and Mr. Hastings showed his resolution to stand the result. The other party, it is probable, felt their influence inferior to his. At any rate they declined the desperate extremity of a civil war; and finally offered to abide the award of the Supreme Court. The judges decided that Mr. Hastings had not vacated his office. This transaction was afterwards made the subject of a charge against him by those who moved for his impeachment; but he accused the Directors of rashness and injustice, in taking such important steps upon evidence which he affirmed would have been held, in a court of justice, insufficient to maintain a decision for the transference of an article of property of the smallest amount.[1]

The power recovered by the Governor-General, and thus strenuously retained, was exhibited in other triumphs, of slender importance. One of the first mortifications to which he had been subjected upon the arrival of the hostile councillors, was the recall of his agent, Mr. Middleton, from the office of resident with the Nabob of Oude. It

[1] Ninth Report, Select Committee, 1783, and Appendix, Nos. 107, 108, 109, 112, 113, 114, 116. See also the charges, No. 9, and the answer of Mr. Hastings.

was now his time to retort the humiliation: and on the 2nd of December, 1776, he moved in Council, "that Mr. Bristow should be recalled from the court of the Nabob of Oude, and that Mr. Middleton be restored to the office of resident." So far from imputing any blame to Mr. Bristow, the Governor-General acknowledged that he had commanded his esteem. As the ground of his proceeding, he stated, that Mr. Middleton had been removed from his office without allegation of fault; that he had a greater confidence in Mr. Middleton than in Mr. Bristow, and as the responsibility was laid upon him, it was but just that his agents should be chosen by himself. The measure was vehemently opposed by General Clavering and Mr. Francis; the usual violence of altercation ensued; Mr. Middleton was appointed, and Mr. Bristow recalled.

The part taken by Mr. Joseph Fowke in bringing forward the facts, whence imputations had been drawn upon the Governor-General himself, had excited a resentment, which, having formerly appeared only in bitter and contemptuous expressions, was now made manifest in acts. The son of that gentleman, Mr. Francis Fowke, had, on the 16th of August, 1775, been appointed by the Council, against the voice of the Governor-General, to proceed on a species of embassy to the new dependant of the Company, the Raja of Benares. On the same day on which the Governor-General moved for the recall of Mr. Bristow, he moved for that of Mr. Francis Fowke, which also, after strong opposition, was carried by his own casting vote. Mr. Fowke was recalled, and his commission annulled, on the express declaration, that "the purposes thereof had been accomplished." On the 22nd of the same month, a letter of the Governor-General and Council was written to the Court of Directors, in which the recall of Mr. Fowke was reported, and in which it was stated that the commission with which he had been invested was annulled, because the purposes for which it had been created were "fully accomplished;" on the very day after the date of this despatch, the Governor-General moved in Council, and whatever he moved was sure of acceptance, that a civil servant of the Company, with an assistant, should be appointed to reside at Benares!

Upon both of these transactions, the Directors pro-

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nounced condemnation. In their general letter to Bengal, of the 4th of July, 1777, they say, "Upon the most careful perusal of your proceedings of the 2nd of December, 1776, relative to the recall of Mr. Bristow from the court of the Nabob of Oude, and the appointment of Mr. Nathaniel Middleton to that station, we must declare our strongest disapprobation of the whole of that transaction. And therefore direct, that Mr. Bristow do forthwith return to his station of resident at Oude, from which he has been so improperly removed." And in their letter of the 30th of January, 1778, "You inform us," they said, "in your secret letter of December, 1776, that the purposes for which Mr. Francis Fowke was appointed to proceed to Benares, being fully accomplished, you had annulled his commission, and ordered him to the Presidency. But it appears by your letter of the 6th of January, 1777, that in less than twenty days you thought proper to appoint Mr. Thomas Graham to reside at Benares, and Mr. Daniel Octavius Barwell to be his assistant. If it were possible to suppose that a saving to the Company had been your motive for annulling Mr. Fowke's commission, we should have approved your proceedings. But when we find two persons appointed immediately afterwards, with two salaries, to execute an office which had been filled with reputation by Mr. Fowke alone, we must be of opinion that Mr. Fowke was removed without just cause; and therefore direct that Mr. Francis Fowke be immediately reinstated in his office of resident and post-master at Benares."

On the 20th of July, 1778, the commands of the Court of Directors, with regard to Mr. Fowke, came under the deliberation of the Governor and Council, when Mr Hastings moved that the execution of these commands should be suspended. A compliance with them, he said, "would be adequate" (meaning equivalent) "to his own resignation of the service, because it would inflict such a wound on his authority, as it could not survive." He also alleged that intelligence might daily be expected from England of resolutions which would decide upon his situation in the service; and, notwithstanding the opposition of one-half of the Council, he decided, by his casting vote, that Mr. Fowke, in spite of the command of the Directors, should not be replaced.

On the 27th of May, 1779, the Court of Directors write, "We have read with astonishment your formal resolution to suspend the execution of our orders relative to Mr. Francis Fowke. Your proceedings at large are now before us. We shall take such measures as appear necessary for preserving the authority of the Court of Directors, and for preventing such instances of direct and wilful disobedience in our servants in time to come. At present we repeat the commands contained in the sixty-seventh paragraph of our letter of the 30th January, 1778, and direct that they be carried into immediate execution."[1]

The place rendered vacant in the Council, by the death of Colonel Monson, had been supplied, by the appointment of Wheler, who commonly voted with Francis; but as General Clavering died in the end of the month of August, 1777, the decisions of the Council were still, by his own casting vote, at the command of the Governor-General.

Another of the transactions, which, during the ascendency of his opponents, had most deeply offended the Governor-General, was the subversion of his regulations respecting the government and household of the Nabob. As this, however, had obtained the sanction of the Court of Directors, and the appointment of Mohammed Reza Khan in particular had met with their specific approbation, some colour for reversing these measures was very much to be desired. The period, at which the Nabob would come of age, was approaching. In the secret consultations on the 23rd of July, 1778, the Governor-General desired that a letter from the Nabob Mubarek-al-Dowla should be read. In this letter the Nabob stated that he had now, by the favour of God, arrived at that stage of life, his twentieth year, when the laws of his country assigned to him the management of his own affairs; he complained of the severity with which he had been treated by Mohammed Reza Khan; and prayed that he might be relieved from this state of degrading tutelage, and allowed to assume the administration of his own government and affairs.

Mr. Wheler and Mr. Francis maintained, that it was

[1] The original documents respecting these transactions, may be found in the Appendix to the Fifth Report of the Select Committee, 1781; and in the Minutes of Evidence on the trial of Mr. Hastings.

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not competent for the delegated government of India to subvert a regulation of so much importance, which had been directly confirmed by the Court of Directors; and that the requisition of the Nabob should be transmitted to England for the determination of the superior power. Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell insisted that justice admitted of no delay. It is remarkable, how these contending parties in India could reverse their pleas, as often as their interests required that different aspects of the same circumstances should be held up to view. In 1775, when the party in opposition to the Governor-General meant to alter the regulations which he had formed, they represented it as their object "to recover the country government from the state of feebleness and insignificance, to which it was Mr. Hastings's avowed policy to reduce it." The Governor-General, in opposition to these pretences, declared, that "all the arts of policy cannot conceal the power by which these provinces are ruled; nor can all the arts of sophistry avail to transfer the responsibility of them to the Nabob, when it is as visible as the light of the sun, that they originate from our own government; that the Nabob is a mere pageant, without the shadow of authority, and even his most consequential agents receive their appointment from the recommendation of the company, and the express nomination of their servants."[1] Notwithstanding these recorded sentiments, the Governor-General could now declare; "The Nabob's demands are grounded on positive rights, which will not admit of discussion. He has an incontestable right to the management of his own household. He has an incontestable right to the Nizamut; it is his by inheritance; the dependants of the Nizamut Adaulut, and of the Fouzdary, have been repeatedly declared by the Company, and by this government, to appertain to the Nizamut. For these reasons I am of opinion, that the requisitions contained in the Nabob's letter ought to be complied with."[2] In the eagerness of his passions, the Governor-General, by asserting the incontestable right of the Nabob to all the powers

[1] Minute of the Governor-General on the 7th December, 1775, Fifth Report, ut supra, p. 24, and App. No. 6.

[2] Secret Consultations, 5th March, 1778. Fifth Report, p. 29, App. No. 6. (N.)

of the Nizamut, transferred a great part of the government. Under the Mogul constitution, the government of the provinces consisted of two parts; the Dewannee, or collection of the revenues, and the administration of the principal branches of the civil department of justice; and the Nizamut, or the military branch of the government, with the superintendence of the criminal department of judicature: and of these the Dewannee was subordinate to the Nizamut. In this exalted capacity, it was never meant to recognise the Nabob; and the language exhibits a useful specimen of the sort of arguments, to serve a purpose, which vague and imperfect notions of Indian policy have enabled those who were interested always to employ.[1]

[1] At the time when Nuncomar accused Mr. Hastings, an indictment for a conspiracy was brought against him, Roy Radachurn, and others. Roy Radachurn was the Vakeel of the Bengal Nabob, and claimed the privilege of an ambassador. To bring him under the power of the Court, it was thought necessary to prove that his master was in no respect a Prince. For this purpose, Mr. Hastings made an affidavit, that he and his council, in 1772, had appointed Munny Begum, and all her subordinates; that they had appointed courts of law, both civil and criminal, by their own authority, and without consulting the Nabob; that "the civil courts were made solely dependent on the Presidency at Calcutta; and that the said criminal courts were put under the inspection and control of the Company's servants, although *ostensibly* under the name of the Nazim; and that the revenues were exclusively in the hands of the Company." The inference was, that not a particle of sovereign power belonged to the Nabob. Affidavits to the same purpose, were made by Mr. George Vansittart, and Mr. Lane. Upon this and other evidence, the judges formed their decision; that the Nabob was not a sovereign in any sense, nor his Vakeel an ambassador. The words of some of them are remarkable. The Chief Justice said, that if the Nabob was a Prince, "the exercise of their power must be an usurpation in the India Company;" but this he affirmed was not the case, for the Nabob's treaty with the Company "was a surrender, by him, of all power into their hands." After a long argument, to show that there was in the Nabob nothing but a "shadow of majesty," he concludes: "I should not have thought that I had done my duty, if I had not given a full and determinate opinion upon this question. I should have been sorry if I had left it doubtful, whether the *empty name* of a Nabob could be thrust between a delinquent and the laws." The language of Mr. Justice Le Maistre was stronger still. "With regard to this phantom," said he, "this man of straw, Mobarek ul Dowla, it is an insult on the understanding of the Court, to have made a question of his sovereignty." "By the treaty which has been read," said Mr. Justice Hyde, "it appears that Mobarek ul Dowla deprives himself of the great ensign of sovereignty — the right to protect his own subjects. He declares *that* shall be done by the Company." When this opinion was received, Mr. Francis moved at the Board, that as it would preclude them from the use of the Nabob's name in their transactions with foreign states, the Directors might be requested, "if it should be determined by them that the Subah's government was annihilated, to instruct the Board in what form the government of the provinces should be administered for the future." Mr. Hastings objected to the motion, as the declaration of the judges told nothing but what, he said, was known and acted upon before. They had used the Nabob's *name*, it was true, in deference to the commands of the Directors; "but I do not," said he, "remember any instance, and I hope none will be found, of our having been so disingenuous as to disclaim our own power, or to affirm that the Nabob was the real sovereign of these provinces." He next proceeds to condemn the fiction of the Nabob's government. "In

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Letters were also brought from the Nabob, which the known wish of the Governor-General could not fail to obtain, requesting that his step-mother Munny Begum, of whom he had formerly complained, "should take on herself the management of the Nizamut, without the interference of any person whatsoever."[1] Mohammed Reza Khan was accordingly removed; Munny Begum was replaced in her ancient office: subordinate to her, Gourdass was re-instated in that of comptroller of the household; and a person called Sudder-al-Hok was appointed to the superintendence of the judicial department. To these several offices, which were all included in the trust of Mohammed Reza Khan, salaries were appropriated amounting to 18,000 rupees beyond what he had received. The incapacity of Munny Begum, when compared with Mohammed Reza, could admit of no dispute; and the pernicious influence of the eunuchs who governed her delayed not to

effect," he says, "I do not hesitate to say, that I look upon this state of indecision to have been productive of all the embarrassments which we have experienced with the foreign settlements..... It has been productive of great inconveniences; it has prevented us from acting with vigour in our disputes with the Dutch and French..... Instead of regretting, with Mr. Francis, the occasion which deprives us of so useless and hurtful a disguise, I should rather rejoice were it really the case, and consider it as a crisis which freed the constitution of our government from one of its greatest defects. And if the commands of our honourable employers, which are expected by the ships of the season, shall leave us uninstructed on this subject, which has been so pointedly referred to them in the letters of the late administration, I now declare that I shall construe the omission as a tacit and discretional reference of the subject to the judgment and determination of this Board; and will propose that we do stand forth, in the name of the Company, as the actual government of these provinces: and assume the exercise of it, in every instance, without any concealment or participation." Minutes of Evidence on the Trial of Mr. Hastings, p. 1071—1079. When all these facts are known, the vehement zeal which Mr. Hastings, because it now suited his purpose, displayed for the fictitious authority of the Nabob, has a name which every reader will supply.—M.

The right of the Nabob to control his own household, was quite compatible with the absence of political power; and as long as his administration of the Nizamut was permitted, he had a right to appoint his officers. The point in dispute involves no question of political power, but of individual patronage. It was a very unnecessary exercise of control, to withhold from a man of twenty, all voice in the nomination of his servants and dependants.—W.

[1] Of the mode in which such a letter was procured, nobody who knows the relative situation of the parties, can entertain a doubt. The judges of the Supreme Court, upon a letter of the same Nabob, in July, 1755, unanimously gave the following opinion: "The Nabob's *age*, his *situation* is such, that there is no man, either in England or India, will believe he would be induced to write such a letter, was it not dictated to him by the agents of those who rule this settlement: or unless he was perfectly convinced it would be agreeable to, and coincide with their sentiments. We always have, and always shall consider, a letter of business from that Nabob, the same as a letter from the Governor-General and Council." Minutes of Evidence on the trial, p. 1079, and Appendix, p. 547. According to this rule, the letter on which Mr. Hastings laid his superstructure, was a letter from himself to himself.

give Hastings uneasiness. On the 10th of October of the same year (1778), he was obliged to write to the Nabob "That the affairs both of the Phouzdary and Adaulut were in the greatest confusion imaginable, and that daily robberies and murders were perpetrated throughout the country;—that his dependants and people, actuated by selfish and avaricious views, had by their interference so impeded the business of justice, as to throw the whole country into a state of confusion."

Meanwhile the report of this transaction was received in England; and the Court of Directors, in their letter of the 4th of February, transmit their sentiments upon it in the following terms: "We by no means approve your late proceedings on the application of the Nabob Mubarek ul Dowla for the removal of the Naib Subahdar. In regard to the Nabob's desire to take charge of his own affairs, we find it declared by one of your own members, and not contradicted, that the Nabob is, in his own person, utterly incapable of executing any of those offices which were deemed of essential importance to the welfare of the country. The Nabob's letters leave us no doubt of the true design of this extraordinary business being, to bring forward Munny Begum, and again to invest her with improper power and influence, notwithstanding our former declaration, that so great a part of the Nabob's allowance had been embezzled, or misapplied under her superintendence. You have requested the inexperienced young man, to permit all the present judges and officers of the Nizamut and Phousdary Adauluts, or courts of criminal justice, and also all the Phousdars or officers appointed to guard the peace of the country, to continue in office until *he the Nabob shall have formed a plan for a new arrangement of those offices:* and it is with equal surprise and concern, that we observe this request introduced, and the Nabob's ostensible rights so solemnly asserted at *this period* by our Governor-General; because, on a late occasion, to serve a very different purpose, he has not scrupled to declare it as visible as the light of the sun, that the Nabob is a mere pageant, and without even the shadow of authority. No circumstance has happened, since that declaration was made, to render the Nabob more independent, nor to give him any additional degree of power or consequence; you must

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therefore have been well apprized that your late concessions to Mubarek-ul-dowla were unnecessary, and as such unwarrantable. As we deem it for the welfare of the country, that the office of Naib Subahdar be for the present continued, and that this high office should be filled by a person of wisdom, experience, and approved fidelity to the Company; and as we have no reason to alter our opinion of Mohammed Reza Khan, we positively direct, that you forthwith signify to the Nabob Mubarek-al-dowla our pleasure, that Mohammed Reza Khan be immediately restored to the office of Naib Subahdar."[1]

The state of the relations between the Company's government and the Mahratta powers had for some time pressed with considerable weight upon the attention of the Council. The treaty which had been concluded by Colonel Upton, commonly distinguished by the title of the treaty of Poorunder, had left the minds of the governing party at Poonah, and those of the Bombay Presidency, in a state of mutual jealousy and dissatisfaction. The occupation of Salsette, and the other concessions which had been extorted, but above all the countenance and protection still afforded to Ragoba, rankled in the minds of the Poonah ministry; while the Bombay rulers, condemned and frustrated by the Supreme Council, but encouraged by the approbation of the Court of Directors, stood upon the watch for any plausible opportunity of evading or infringing the treaty. Colonel Upton, though he remained at Poonah till the commencement of the year 1777, departed before any of the material stipulations had been carried into effect. Futty Sing, as by the treaty it had been rendered his interest, disavowed his right to alienate

[1] Fifth Report, ut supra, p. 24—32, and App. No. 6; also the charges against Mr. Hastings, No. 17, with Mr. Hastings' answer. See also the evidence both for the Prosecution and the Defence, in Minutes of Evidence, ut supra.—M.

No comment is made upon the inconsistency of the Court, in their insisting on the continuance in office of Mohammed Reza Khan, a person whom they had formerly accused of corruption, and sentenced to imprisonment. In all these conflicting orders and opinions, the real state of things should be kept in view. The majority of the Court of Directors were friendly to the opponents of Hastings: the majority of the Court of Proprietors were his friends. In reliance on their support, the governor held his post and his purposes, in defiance of what he not unfoundedly regarded as the party spirit of the Director; but their opposition, and that of his council, forced him to devise arguments and assign motives intended to meet the exigency of the moment, and, therefore, sometimes as much at variance with themselves, as were the arguments of those by whom he was so vehemently and invariably opposed.—W.

in favour of the Company any portion of the Guicawar dominions; and the Poonah Council made use of the favour shown to Ragoba, as a pretext for delaying or evading the concessions they had made.

A new feature was soon added to these disputes, by the arrival of a French ship in one of the Mahratta ports, and the reception given at Poonah to some gentlemen whom she landed, as on a mission from the king of France. This circumstance strongly excited the English jealousy and fears. The object at which the French were supposed to aim, was the establishment of a factory at Poonah; and the acquisition of a sea-port on the coast of Malabar. These advantages would enable them, it was apprehended, to sustain, a competition with the English in matters of trade, and to annoy them seriously in a period of war. The asserverations of the Mahratta goverment, that nothing was in view prejudicial to the interests of the Company, gave little satisfaction. Colonel Upton, whose partiality was engaged to the treaty which he had concluded, and the party whom he served, accused the Bombay Presidency, and answered for the sincerity and pacific designs of the Mahrattas. Mr. Hastings leaned to the suspicious side; his opponents urged the propriety of yielding contentment to the Mahrattas, especially by the abandonment of Ragoba. The probability of a rupture between France and England was already contemplated in India; and, as it was to be expected that the French would aim at the recovery of their influence in India, so Mr. Hastings, at least, thought that the western coast was the place where they had the best prospect of success; and the support of the Mahrattas was the means most likely to be adopted for the accomplishment of their ends.

The progress of inquiry respecting the agent from France discovered, that his name was St. Lubin; that he was a mere adventurer, who had opened to the French Minister of Marine a project, supported by exaggerated and false representations, for acquiring an influence in the Mahratta councils, and an establishment in the Mahratta country; and that he had been intrusted with a sort of clandestine commission as an experiment, for ascertaining if any footing or advantage might be gained. The presidency of Bombay represented to the Supreme Council, that St. Lubin

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received the most alarming countenance from the Poonah ministers; that nothing could be more dangerous to the Company, than a combined attack from the Mahrattas and French. And they urged the policy of anticipating the designs of their enemies, by espousing the cause of Ragoba; and putting an end to the power of men, who waited only till their schemes were ripe for execution, to begin an attack upon the Company. The Bombay Presidency were more emboldened in their importunity, by a letter from the Court of Directors, containing their observations on the conduct of the Supreme Council in taking the negociation with the Mahrattas out of the hand of the Bombay government, and on the treaty which the Supreme Council had concluded with the Poonah rulers. "We approved," said the Directors, "under every circumstance, of keeping all territories and possessions ceded to the Company by Ragoba; and gave directions to the Presidencies of Bengal and Fort St. George to adopt such measures as might be necessary for their preservation and defence. But we are extremely concerned to find, from the terms of the treaty concluded by Colonel Upton at Poonah, that so great a sacrifice has been improvidently made; and especially, that the important cession of Bassein to the Company by Ragoba has been rendered of no effect. We cannot but disapprove of the mode of interference of the Governor-General and Council, by sending an ambassador to Poonah without first consulting you, and of their determination to disavow and invalidate the treaty formerly entered into by an agent from your Presidency, and solemnly ratified under the seal of the Company. We are convinced that Bassein, which is so great an object with us, might have been obtained if they had authorized you to treat either with Ragoba, or with the ministers at Poonah; reserving the final approval and ratification of the treaty to themselves. This is the precise line we wish to have drawn; and which we have directed our Governors-general and Council in future to pursue. We are of opinion, that an alliance originally with Ragoba would have been more for the honour and advantage of the Company, and more likely to be lasting, than that concluded at Poonah. His pretensions to the supreme authority appear to us better founded than those of his competitors; and

therefore, if the conditions of the treaty of Poonah have not been strictly fulfilled on the part of the Mahrattas, and if, from any circumstance, our Governor-General and Council shall deem it expedient, we have no objection to an alliance with Ragoba, on the terms agreed upon between him and you."

While these circumstances were under the consideration of the Supreme Council at Calcutta, intelligence arrived, that the rivalship of Siccaram Baboo and Nana Furnavese had produced a division in the Council at Poonah; that a part of the ministers, with Siccaram Baboo at their head, had resolved to declare for Ragoba; that they had applied for the assistance of the English to place in his hands the powers of government; and that the Presidency of Bombay had resolved to co-operate with them in his favour. This subject produced the usual train of debate and contention in the supreme Council; where Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler condemned the resolution of the president and Council of Bombay, first, as illegal, because not taken with the approbation of the supreme authority; next, as unjust, by infringing the treaty; and finally, impolitic, by incurring the dangers and burdens of war. The Governor-General and Mr. Barwell approved it, as authorized by the suddenness and greatness of the emergency, and the declared sentiments of the Court of Directors; as not unjust, since the principal party with whom the treaty was formed now applied for the interference of the Company; and as not impolitic, because it anticipated the evil designs of a hostile party, and gave to the Company an accession of territorial revenue, while it promised them a permanent influence in the Mahratta councils. It was resolved, in consequence, that a supply of money and a reinforcement of troops should be sent to the Presidency of Bombay. The Governor-General proposed that a force should be assembled at Calpee, and should march by the most practicable route to Bombay. This also gave rise to a warm debate, both on the policy of the plan, and the danger of sending a detachment of the Company's army to traverse India through the dominions of princes, whose disposition had not been previously ascertained. It was finally determined, that the force should consist of six battalions of Sepoys, one com-

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pany of native artillery, and a corps of cavalry; that it should be commanded by Colonel Leslie; and anticipate, by its expedition, the obstruction of the rains. That commander was instructed to take his route through the province of Berar, of which the rulers were friendly; to obtain, where possible, the consent of the princes or chiefs, through whose territories he might have occasion to pass; but even when refused, to pursue his march; to be careful in preventing injury to the country or inhabitants; to allow his course to be retarded by the pursuit of no extraneous object; and to consider himself under the command of the Bombay presidency from the commencement of his march. That Presidency were at the same time instructed to use their utmost endeavours to defeat the machinations of the French; to insist upon the execution of the treaty; to take advantage of every change of circumstances for obtaining beneficial concessions to the Company; and, if they observed any violation of the treaty, or any refusal to fulfil its terms, to form a new alliance with Ragoba, and concert with him the best expedients for retrieving his affairs.

In the mean time another change had taken place in the fluctuating administration at Poonah. The party of Siccaram Baboo had prevailed over that of Nana Furnavese without the co-operation of Ragoba; and it was immediately apprehended at Bombay, that they would no longer desire to admit as an associate, a party who would supersede themselves. The arguments, urged, upon this change, by Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler, did not succeed in stopping the march of the troops; because the unsettled state of the government of Poonah, and the machinations of the French, rendered it highly expedient, in the opinion of the Governor-General, that the Presidency of Bombay should be furnished with sufficient power, both to guard against dangerous, and to take advantage of favourable, circumstances and events.

The detachment experienced some slight obstruction at the commencement of its march, from some of the petty Mahratta chiefs; upon which, as indicating danger if it proceeded any further, Mr. Francis renewed his importunities for his recall. Mr. Hastings opposed his arguments, on the ground, that after a few days' march the troops

would arrive in Bundelcund, which was independent of the Mahrattas; would thence pass into the territories of the Raja of Berar, in which they would be received with friendship; that, on quitting the territories of the Raja, more than two-thirds of the march would be completed; that the consent of the Peshwa had been obtained; and that the Mahratta chiefs, whatever their inclinations, were too much engaged in watching the designs of one another, to be able to oppose the detachment.

Various were the orders by which its movements were affected. The Presidency at Bombay, having taken up hopes that the presiding party at Poonah would favour the views of the English, and dismiss the agents of the French, wrote a first letter to the detachment, requiring them to halt, and wait till subsequent directions; and presently thereafter another letter, desiring them to prosecute the march. In the meantime, intelligence had reached Calcutta, that war was declared between the English and the French. Upon this, instructions were despatched to Colonel Leslie by the Supreme Council, not to advance, till further orders, beyond the limits of Berar.

According to the Governor-General, the Company had nothing to dread from the efforts of the French, at either Calcutta or Madras: it was the western coast on which, both from the weakness of Bombay, and the inclinations of the Mahratta government, those enemies of the English had any prospect of success; and where it most behoved the servants of the Company to provide against their attempts. He recommended a connexion with some of the leading powers of the country; pointed out the Raja of Berar as the prince with whom it was most desirable to combine; and mentioned two services by which the co-operation of that Prince might be ensured. One of these services was to assist him in the recovery of the dominions which had been wrested from him by Nizam Ali. The other was to support him in a pretension to the Mahratta Rajaship. The legitimate, but impotent King of the Mahrattas, had recently died in his captivity at Sattarah, without leaving issue: and the Raja of Berar, as a branch of the house of Sivajee, might urge a claim to the succession. In pursuance of these objects, an embassy to the court of Berar was voted by the majority,

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and despatched. In the meantime another revolution had ensued in the government at Poonah. The party of Siccaram Baboo was again overthrown; and that of Nana Furnavese exalted by the powerful co-operation of Madajee Sindia. The party of Nana still appeared to favour the French. The defeated party, now led by a chief named Moraba, as the age of Siccaram Baboo in a great measure disqualified him for business, were eager to combine with the English in raising Ragoba; and the Presidency of Bombay had no lack of inclination to second their designs. A resolution to this effect was passed on the 21st of July, 1778; but it was not till the beginning of November that any step was taken for its execution. The activity of the Presidency had been repressed by news of the confinement of the leading members of the party at Poonah, from whom they expected assistance, and by instructions from the Supreme Council not to pursue any measures which might interfere with the object of the embassy to Moodajee Bonsla, the Regent of Berar. Early however, in November, a plan of operations was concerted; a treaty was concluded with Ragoba; a loan to a considerable amount was advanced to him; and, upon intelligence that the ruling party at Poonah had penetrated their designs, and were making preparations to defeat them, it was determined to send forward one division of the army immediately, and the rest with all possible despatch.

The force which was sent upon this enterprise amounted in all to nearly 4500 men. A committee, consisting of Colonel Egerton, Mr. Carnac, a member of the Select Committee, and Mr. Mostyn, formerly agent of the Presidency at Poonah, were appointed a Committee for superintending the expedition, and settling the government at Poonah. The army set out about the beginning of December; on the 23rd completed the ascent of the mountains, and arrived at Condola. The enemy now, for the first time, appeared. From the head of the Ghaut, or pass, which they secured by a fortified post, the English, on the 4th of January, began their march toward Poonah, with a stock of provisions for twenty-five days. They were opposed by a body of troops, who retired as they advanced, but cut off their supplies, and seized every opportunity to harass and impede them. They were not joined, as

they had encouraged themselves to expect, by any chief of importance, or numbers to any considerable amount. And it was in vain, as they were informed by Ragoba, to hope, that his friends and adherents would declare themselves, till the English, by some important operations and success, held out to them a prospect of safety. The army continued to advance till the 9th of January, when, at the distance of about sixteen miles from Poonah, and eighteen from the summit of the pass, they found an army assembled to oppose them. The Committee,[1] to whom, by a strange policy, the command of a military expedition was consigned, began to despair; and, on learning from the commissary in chief, that only eighteen days' provisions were in store, and from the officer commanding the forces, that he could not protect the baggage, without a body of horse, they made up their minds to a retreat. It commenced on the night of the 11th. But secrecy had not been preserved; and they were attacked by the enemy before daybreak; when they lost a part of their baggage, and above three hundred men. It was not until four o'clock in the afternoon that the enemy desisted from the pursuit, when the English had effected their retreat as far as Wargaun. Hope now deserted not only the Committee, but the Commander of the troops; who declared it impossible to carry back the army to Bombay.[2] An embassy was sent to the Mahratta camp to try upon what terms they could have leave to return. The surrender of Ragoba was demanded as a preliminary article. That unfortunate chief was so impressed with the danger of waiting another attack, that he had declared his intention of surrendering himself to Sindia, and had been in cor-

[1] Mr. Mostyn was soon taken ill, and returned to Bombay, where he died. On arriving at Tullygaum, Colonel Egerton was obliged to relinquish the command to Colonel Cockburn, but continued to act as a Member of the Committee. In either capacity, he may be considered as principally answerable for the failure of the expedition. After crossing the Ghaut, the movements of the army were so slow, that it had advanced but eight miles in eleven days, without any excuse for such deliberate procedure: and when it became a question what was to be done, Colonel Cockburn expressed no doubt of making good his march to Poona, and other well-informed officers were of opinion, that at least they should maintain their ground whilst the negotiations were carried on. History of Mahrattas, ii. 366.—W.

[2] Captain Hartley, who had distinguished himself in command of the rear-guard during the retreat, proposed a plan by which it might be ensured. The commanding officer, however, despaired of its accomplishment. Hist. of Mahrattas, ii. 375.—W.

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respondence with that chieftain for several days; the Committee were less scrupulous, therefore, in bartering his safety for their own. When this compliance was announced, and the English expected a corresponding facility on the part of the Mahrattas, the leaders of that people informed them, that the surrender of Ragoba was a matter of the utmost indifference; that the treaty, which had been concluded with Colonel Upton, had been shamefully violated; the territory of the Mahrattas invaded; and that unless a new treaty were formed upon the spot, the army must remain where it was, and abide the consequences. The declaration of the Committee, that they possessed not powers to conclude a treaty, was disregarded. The commanding officer declared, that the attempt to force a retreat could lead to nothing but the total destruction of the army. It was, therefore, agreed to submit to such conditions as the Mahrattas might impose; and a treaty was signed, by which all the acquisitions were relinquished, which had been made in those parts by the English, since the treaty with Madhoo Rao in 1756; Baroach was given up to Sindia;[1] Ragoba placed in his hands; the detachment from Bengal was ordered to return; and two Englishmen of distinction were left as hostages for the due fulfilment of the terms.

No approbation could be more complete than that which was bestowed by the Court of Directors on the object of this expedition. In a letter from the Committee of Secrecy, dated the 31st of August, 1778, "The necessity," they say, "of counteracting the views of the French at Poonah appears to us so very striking, that we not only direct you to frustrate their designs of obtaining a grant of the port of Choul, but also to oppose by force of arms, if necessary, their forming a settlement at that or any other place which may render them dangerous neighbours to Bombay. As the restoration of Ragoba to the Peshwaship is a measure upon which we are determined; and as the evasions of the Mahratta chiefs, respecting the treaty of Poonah, justify any departure therefrom on our

[1] It was the policy of the Committee to appeal to Sindia, which, as Captain Grant observes, flattered him exceedingly, and accorded with his plans of policy: he, nevertheless, availed himself of the opportunity to take every advantage of the English, as far as was consistent with the control he wished to preserve over Nana Furnavees. Mahratta History, ii. 337.—W.

part, we, therefore, direct, that if, on the receipt of this letter, you shall be able to obtain assistance from the friends of Ragoba, and with such assistance find yourselves in force sufficient to effect his restoration without dangerously weakening your garrison, you forthwith undertake the same." In proportion to the satisfaction which would have been expressed upon a fortunate termination of this enterprise, was the displeasure manifested upon its failure. "The first object which strikes us," say the Directors, "is the slow progress of the army. This we deem an irreparable injury to the service; and in this respect the conduct of the Commander-in-Chief appears extremely defective. The consequence was obvious; the enemy had full opportunity to collect their strength; the friends of Ragoba, instead of being encouraged by the spirited exertion of our force, to join his standard, must, as we conceive, have been deterred from declaring in his favour, by the languor of our military proceedings." They condemn the first resolution to retreat, when "the army was so far advanced, the troops full of spirits and intrepidity, and eighteen days' provision in store." And the utmost measure of their indignation and resentment is poured on the humiliating submission which was at last preferred to the resolution of a daring, though hazardous retreat; preferred, on the pretext that the troops would not again resist the enemy, though they had behaved with the utmost intrepidity on the former attack; and though Captain Hartley declared that he could depend upon his men, urged every argument in favour of resolute measures, and even formed and presented to the commanding officer a disposition for conducting the retreat. The two military officers who had shared in the conduct of the expedition, the Directors dismissed from their service; and the only remaining member of the Field Committee, who had been selected from the civil branch of the service, for one had died during the march, they degraded from his office, as a member of the Council and Select Committee of Bombay.

The detachment which was proceeding from Bengal had wasted much time on its march, having advanced as far as Chatterpore, a principal city of Bundelcund, early in June, it halted till the middle of August. During this

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season, when the rains, according to Colonel Leslie, interrupted; according to the Governor-General, favoured the march; the commander of the troops engaged himself in negotiations and transactions with the local chiefs; measures severely condemned by his superiors, and very open to the suspicion of selfish and dishonourable motives. The President and Council of Bombay, on the receipt of intelligence of a rupture with France, had earnestly exhorted him by letter to accelerate his motions. They renewed their solicitations on the 21st of July, when they came to the resolution of supporting Ragoba. And they urged the delay of this detachment, and the uncertainty of its arrival, as a reason for having undertaken the expedition to Poonah, without waiting for that addition of strength which its union and co-operation would have bestowed. Dissatisfied with the long inactivity of the detachment at Chatterpore, the Supreme Council wrote to the commanding officer on the 31st of August, desiring him to explain the reasons of his conduct, and to pursue the march. He had put himself in motion about the middle of the month, and was at Rajegur on the 17th, where a party of Mahrattas disputed the passage of the river Kane. On the 17th of September he despatched a letter to the Supreme Council from Rajegur, where he still remained, stating, that the retardation of the detachment had been occasioned by the weather; that he had concluded friendly engagements with Gomân Sing and Komân Sing, two Rajas of Bundelcund; and had received satisfactory assurances from Moodajee Bonsla, the Regent of Berar, to whom the proposition of an embassy from the English rulers appeared to have yielded peculiar gratification.[1]

The person[2] who had been chosen to conduct this em-

[1] The sentiments of the Court of Directors were unfavourable to this attempted alliance. In their letter of the 14th of May, 1779, to the Governor-General and Council, they say: "The undertaking appears to us contrary to the Company's former policy, to our engagements with Ragoba and Nizam Ali, and doubtful respecting any reasonable prospect of advantage." And in another letter, dated on the 27th of the same month, to the President and Select Committee of Bombay, they say: "We earnestly hope, that upon your negotiation and treaty with Ragoba being communicated to our Governor-General and Council, they would concur with you in giving full effect thereto, and desist from entering into any new connexions which may set aside or counteract your recent agreements with Ragoba." Sixth Report, Committee of Secrecy, 1781, p. 84.

[2] Mr. Elliot; he died on the 12th September.—W.

bassy, died upon the journey, before he reached the capital of Berar. After some fluctuation of opinion, it was determined not to continue the negotiation by appointing a successor; but rather to wait in expectation of some advances from the Regent.

The party of Mr. Francis now urgently pressed for a distinct declaration of the design with which the detachment on its way to the western Presidency, was directed to continue its march. There was not only a complication, they affirmed, but a contrariety of objects; the alliance for raising Moodajee Bonsla to the throne of Sivajee, being inconsistent with the scheme for establishing Ragoba in the office of Peshwa. The Governor-General, without any definite explanation, alleged that the re-instatement of Ragoba had never been pursued as an end, but only as a means; that his hopes and expectations were placed on Moodajee; that the detachment, whether its services should be required for the restoration of Ragoba, or in prosecution of engagements with Moodajee, or in opposing the French, ought equally to continue its march. The opposite party once more urged in vain their reasons for its recall. But all parties agreed in condemning Colonel Leslie for the delay which he had incurred, and the engagements which he had formed; in pronouncing him unfit to be any longer intrusted with the command which he held; and in transmitting orders that he should resign it to Colonel Goddard, the officer next in command. Leslie, however, survived not to receive the intelligence of his disgrace; nor to produce, it ought to be remembered, what he might have urged in vindication of his conduct. He was an officer of experience and reputation. It is known, that he held a high language, that he complained of the Governor-General, to whom, by his special directions, he had communicated a private journal of his transactions, and to whom he had trusted for the explanation of his proceedings. But no inference can safely be founded on the allegation that the Governor-General, who had previously defended his conduct, was informed of the deadly nature of his disease, and the hopelessness of his recovery, at the time when he condemned him and voted for his recall.

By the death of Leslie, the command devolved on

BOOK V. CHAP. III. 1779.

Colonel Goddard on the 3rd of October. On the 22nd he wrote a private letter to the Governor-General, informing him of the progress which the detachment had made towards the Nerbudda, or the boundary of Berar. At the same time with the letter from Colonel Goddard, arrived despatches from Moodajee, expressing his lamentation upon the death of the late ambassador, and his hopes that such an event would not frustrate the plan of friendship which it had been the object of that embassy to establish. Upon the receipt of these letters, the Governor-General moved, that the negotiation with Moodajee Bonsla should be resumed; and that powers to treat with him should be communicated to Colonel Goddard. The opposite party contended, that an alliance with the Regent of Berar would be equivalent to a declaration of war against Nizam Ali, and involve the Carnatic in misfortune; that neither did Colonel Goddard possess the qualifications of a negotiator, nor did the duties of his command enable him to devote his mind to the business which a negotiator was required to perform; and that the Presidency of Bombay, under whose orders the detachment had been placed, might take measures in favour of Ragoba, with which the instructions which might be given in regard to Moodajee would not be reconcilable.

On the 7th of December, after intelligence had arrived of the second revolution at Poonah, which the Governor-General regarded as defeating the original design upon which the assistance of the detachment had been sent to Bombay, he proposed that it should no longer act under the orders of that Presidency, lest the designs of those rulers should defeat the negotiation with Moodajee, intrusted to Colonel Goddard. While this proposition was under debate, a despatch was received from the resident at Poonah, stating his expectation of being immediately re-called, as the Select Committee at Bombay had determined to proceed against the governing party at Poonah. After this intelligence, the proposition of the Governor-General, for retaining the detachment of Colonel Goddard under the immediate authority of the Supreme Council, received the sanction of the Board. In the meantime Moodajee Bonsla, for whose alliance so much anxiety was expressed, had written an evasive letter to Colonel God-

dard, dated the 23rd of November; manifesting pretty clearly a wish to embroil himself as little as possible either with the English or with the Poonah confederacy. Goddard crossed the Nerbuddah on the 1st of December; and sent an agent to Nagpore, to ascertain how far he might depend upon Moodajee. In conclusion, he inferred, that no engagement could be formed between that chieftain and the English; but that a friendly conduct might be expected toward the detachment, while it remained in his dominions.

By this time the army of Bombay was on its march to Poonah. But though Colonel Goddard had transmitted regular intelligence of his movements to Bombay, he had received no communications from that quarter; and remained in total ignorance of their designs, except from some intimations communicated by Moodajee, that an expedition against Poonah was in preparation. Uncertain as was the ground upon which he had to proceed, he had come to the determination, that the balance of probabilities required his proceeding to Poonah; when he received despatches from the Council at Bombay, unfolding what they had done, and what they were intending to do; and pressing it upon him to march to Poonah, with the smallest possible delay. To the question why the Presidency at Bombay had not sooner made Colonel Goddard acquainted with the design of the expedition, and taken the precautionary steps for securing co-operation between his detachment and their own, the answer must be, either that they exercised not the degree of reflection necessary for that moderate display of wisdom; or that they wished to have to themselves the glory of setting up a Mahratta government; or that, to avoid the expense of the detachment, they wished it not to arrive. Moodajee, who was afraid to embroil himself with the Poonah government, if he gave a passage to the troops of Goddard, and with the English government if he refused it, was very earnest with him to wait till he received satisfactory letters from Calcutta. But, notwithstanding his solicitations, Goddard, on the 16th of January, began his march from the banks of the Nerbudda.

He took the great road to Boorhanpoor and Poonah and arrived at Charwah on the 22nd, where he received

BOOK V. CHAP. III. 1779.

intelligence that the army from Bombay had advanced as far as the Bora ghaut, a place fifty miles distant from Poonah.

On the 24th, he received a letter dated the 11th, from the Field Committee, who conducted the Bombay expedition, representing, that in consequence of an alteration which had taken place in the state of affairs, it was not expedient he should advance; that he should either proceed to Surat, if he found himself in a condition to make his way in spite of the Mahratta horse, by whom his march would be annoyed; or remain in the territories of the Raja of Berar, till further instructions. This letter placed him in a state of perfect uncertainty, whether the Bombay army had sustained a disaster which cut off their hopes, or had so flattering a prospect of success, that all additional force was accounted unnecessary. On the next day a letter arrived from the Council at Bombay, apparently written without a knowledge of the circumstances which dictated the letter of the Field Committee, and urging him to proceed. Under the perplexity which this lack of information, and discrepancy of injunctions, inspired, he resolved to proceed to Boorhanpoor, in hopes of obtaining intelligence, and arrived at that ancient capital on the 30th.

There, on the 2nd of February, he received another letter from the Field Committee, dated on the 19th of January, more mysterious than any which had yet arrived. It shortly cautioned him against obeying the order in their letter of the 16th, which on better consideration they deemed themselves incompetent to give. Goddard could ill conjecture the meaning of this warning, as he had not received the letter of the 16th; but he believed that it indicated evil rather than good; and saw well the dangers which surrounded him in the heart of the Mahratta country, if any serious disaster, which might produce a change in the mind of Moodajee himself, had befallen the army from Bombay. He waited at Boorhanpoor till the 5th, in hopes of receiving more certain information, when he was made acquainted with the nature of the disaster pretty exactly by Moodajee. He resolved to retreat to Surat, and marched on the 6th. On the 9th a vakeel arrived from the Poonah government, bearing the letter written

by the Field Committee on the 16th of January. It was the letter in which, under the dictation of the Mahrattas, they had commanded his immediate return to Bengal. This injunction it was the business of the vakeel to enforce. But Goddard replied, that he was marching to Bombay in obedience to the orders of the Supreme Council, and with the most friendly intentions toward the Mahratta state. The march was conducted with great expedition. The troops were kept in such exact discipline, that the people having nothing to fear remained in their houses, and supplied the army by sale with many conveniences for the march. They arrived at Surat on the 30th; a distance of nearly three hundred miles, in nineteen days.[1]

In consequence of these events, it was resolved at the Supreme Board, to vest Colonel Goddard with full powers for treating with the Poonah government; to disavow the convention concluded with the Bombay committee; but to express a desire for accommodation on the basis of the treaty of Poorunder, if the Mahrattas, on their part, would afford encouragement by relinquishing all claims founded on that convention, and by a promise of forming no connexion, either commercial or political, with the French. If they should reject these proposals, Colonel Goddard, whom the Supreme Council now promoted to the rank of general, was empowered to renew the war, and if possible to form connections with the head of the Guicawar family, and the government of Berar.

Goddard had commenced his correspondence with the Poonah ministry, when Ragoba made his escape, and repaired to Surat, where he received an asylum. Discordance prevailed among the Mahratta chiefs, and much uncertainty hung over their proceedings. Dissension broke out between Nana and Sindia, by whose united power Siccaram and Moraba had been subdued. With profession

[1] It is worthy of remark, that Gazee ad din Khan, formerly Vizir of the empire, and grandson of the great Nizam-al-Mulk, was at this time found at Surat, in the disguise of a pilgrim, and confined, till the Supreme Council being consulted, disapproved of all acts of violence, but forbade his appearing within the territories of the Company. See the Letter from Governor-General to Directors, dated 14th January, 1780. Sixth Report to the Secret Committee, Appendix, No. 246.—M. It is still more worthy of remark, that by the expedition of their march, the detachment avoided a body of 20,000 horse, sent from Poonah to intercept them.—W.

BOOK V. CHAP. III. 1780.

of a desire for peace, they kept aloof from definite terms; reports were received of their preparations for war; and negotiation lingered till the 20th of October, when Goddard sent his declaration, that if a satisfactory answer to his proposals was not returned, in fifteen days, he should consider the delay as a declaration of war. A reply arrived on the 28th. Without the surrender of Ragoba, and the restoration of Salsette, it was declared that the Mahratta powers would make no agreement. The General upon this broke off the negotiation, and repaired to Bombay, to concert with that Council the plan of hostilities.

The President and Council of Bombay had received, with considerable indignation, the intelligence of the power, independent of themselves, with which General Goddard had been invested at the Superior Board. They regarded it as an encroachment upon the rights conveyed to them, both by the act of parliament, and the commands of the Directors; and they had declared that they would sustain no responsibility for any of his acts. At first they alleged the great exhaustion of their resources, as a reason against taking any considerable part in the war; but when the General held up, as the first object of his operations, the acquisition, on which they had long fixed their affections, of a territorial revenue adequate to all the demands of the Presidency, they agreed to supply as great a portion of their troops, as the security of Bombay would allow; and furnished him with powers and instructions to treat with Futty Sing Guicawar, whose assistance, as placing a friendly country in the rear, it was of the greatest importance to obtain. With regard to Ragoba it was proposed to feed him with such hopes, as should ensure the advantage of his name; but to engage themselves as short a way as possible for a share in the advantages of the undertaking, to the success of which it was so little in his power to contribute.

On the 2nd of January, 1780, General Goddard had crossed the Tapti, with a view both to stimulate the good inclinations of Futty Sing, and to reduce the fortress of Dubhoy. On the 19th the army appeared before the place. On the next day it was evacuated by the enemy, when the whole district, yielding by estimate a revenue of two lacks of rupees, was taken possession of in the name

of the Company. On the 26th, Futty Sing was at last, with some difficulty, brought to trust so far in the power of the Company, as to accede to the terms proposed; and it was agreed that the Guzerat country should be divided between the Company and himself, the Company obtaining that proportion which had formerly accrued to the Mahrattas; and the remainder being rendered independent of the Poonah government, and freed from every exterior claim. Being joined by the cavalry of this chief, the General marched towards Ahmedabad, the capital of the province, before which he arrived on the 10th of February, and in five days carried it by storm, with inconsiderable loss. The united armies of Sindia and Holkar, amounting to 40,000 men, were in the mean time advancing towards Surat. The English General, by rapid marches, arrived in the neighbourhood of their encampment, near Brodera, on the 8th of March, and intended to attack them in the night, but was prevented by a letter from one of the gentlemen, left as hostages with Sindia, signifying that professions were made by the Mahratta chiefs of a desire to establish amity with the English government. Of this desire, Sindia afforded a favourable indication the following day, by sending back the hostages, and along with them a vakeel, or commissioner, who acknowledged the hatred borne by his master to Nana Furnavese, and his desire of a separate arrangement with the English. Upon further explanation it appeared, that he was anxious to get into his hands Ragoba and his son, as an instrument for aggrandizing himself in the Mahratta state; a proposition to which General Goddard would by no means accede. Sindia, at the same time, was offering terms to Govind Row, the brother and opponent of Futty Sing, and had actually received him in his camp. Not convinced of his sincerity, and suspecting his design to waste the season, till the commencement of the rains, when he would return home to the business of his government, and to his intrigues, General Goddard was desirous of forcing him to a battle, which he constantly avoided, by retreating, as the English army advanced. To defeat this stratagem, the General, on the 3rd of April, marched silently from his camp, about two o'clock in the morning, with four battalions of Sepoy grenadiers, four companies of European

BOOK V. CHAP. III. 1780.

infantry, and twelve pieces of field artillery. The distance was about seven miles to the camp of the enemy, which he entered at dawn. He reached the very centre of the encampment before he was perceived. The enemy were thrown into their usual confusion; and, though some troops were collected, and made a show of resistance, they soon abandoned their camp, and occupied a neighbouring ground. The English made no delay in proceeding to charge them, when the Mahrattas dispersed, and left them masters not only of the field, but of the country in which it was contained. A detachment from Bombay took possession also of Parsek, Bellapore, Panwel, and Callian, and extended the territory of the Presidency along the coast and towards the passes of the hills in the way to Poonah. On the 6th of April the General was joined by six companies of European infantry, and a company of artillery, which had been sent to his assistance from Madras; and about the same time five companies of Sepoys arrived for him at Surat. As the rainy season had now commenced, Sindia and Holkar withdrew into their own countries; and the General, after sending back the Bombay detachment, put his troops into cantonments, and prepared for the succeeding campaign.

Sir Eyre Coote, who had been appointed to succeed General Clavering, both as Commander-in-Chief, and as a member of the Supreme Council, had arrived at Calcutta in the beginning of April, 1779; and without showing an unvarying deference to the opinions of the Governor-General, commonly supported his measures. Early in November of that year, in consequence of an application from the Raja of Gohud, commonly known by the name of the Rana, a Hindu chieftain or prince, who governed a hilly district of considerable extent, lying on the Jumna, between the territories of Sindia and the Nabob of Oude; the Governor-General proposed a treaty, by which the Rana might be empowered to call for the assistance of the English against the Mahrattas, of whom he stood in constant danger, and should agree to assist the English with his forces, when they should undertake any enterprise against the contiguous powers. The Governor-General, who contemplated the continuance of the war with the Mahrattas, proposed this alliance, both as a barrier against

an invasion, in that direction, of the territory of the Company or their allies; and as an advantage for invading the territory of the Mahrattas, and operating a diversion in favour of the enterprises which might be undertaken on the side of Bombay. The measure was opposed by the opposite side of the Board, both on the ordinary and general ground of the importance of abstaining from war, and also in consideration of the weakness of the Rana, who had few troops, and not revenue to pay even them; whose aid, in consequence, would be of little avail, and his protection a serious burden. In the objections of the opposing party the General concurred; and even transmitted his protest against the terms of the connexion. But, as he was absent, the casting vote of the Governor-General gave his opinion the superiority, and the treaty was formed.

In the meantime intelligence arrived by a letter from General Coote, dated the 20th of November, of an invasion of the territory of the Rana, by a body of Mahrattas, whom his want of resources made it impossible for him to resist. Instructions were dispatched to afford him such assistance as the exigency of the case might require, and the state of the English forces permit. A detachment of the company's army had been prepared in that quarter, under the command of Captain Popham, for the purpose of augmenting the forces of Goddard; but from the consideration, partly that they could not arrive in time on the Bombay coast, partly that they might contribute to the success of his operations by an attack upon the part which was nearest of the Mahratta frontier, they had not been commanded to proceed; and in the beginning of February, 1780, they were sent to the assistance of the Rana of Gohud. Captain Popham found means in this service of distinguishing his enterprise and talents. With a small force, and little assistance from the Rana, he expelled the Mahrattas from Gohud; crossed the Sind, into their own territory; laid siege to the fortress of Lahâr, the capital of the district of Cuchwagar; and having effected an imperfect breach, which the want of heavy cannon enabled him not to complete, he, on the 21st of April, successfully assaulted and took possession of the fort.

It had, however, been importunately urged, both by

BOOK V. CHAP. III. 1780.

Coote and Goddard, and was acknowledged by the Governor-General, that the force employed on the Mahratta frontier under Captain Popham, was far from adequate to any such important operations as could materially affect the result of the war. After some fluctuations of plans, and great debate and opposition at the Superior Board, in which Mr. Francis in particular vehemently opposed the extension of military efforts, it was determined that a detachment of three battalions, stationed at Cawnpore, under Major Camac, with a battalion of light infantry, under Captain Browne, should threaten or invade the territories of Sindia and Holkar. In the meantime Captain Popham, with the true spirit of military ardour, after securing with great activity the conquest of the district of Cuchwagar, turned his attention to the celebrated fortress of Gualior, situated within the territory of the Rana of Gohud, but wrested from his father, and now garrisoned by the Mahrattas. This fortress was situated on the summit, three coss in extent, of a stupendous rock, scarped almost entirely round, and defended by a thousand men. By the princes of Hindustan it had always been regarded as impregnable. And Sir Eyre Coote himself, in his letter to the Supreme Council, dated the 21st of April, had pronounced it "totally repugnant to his military ideas, and even absolute madness," to attack it with so feeble a detachment, and without a covering army to keep off the Mahrattas in the field, and preserve the line of communication. Captain Popham moved to the village of Ripore about five coss distant from Gualior, and employed his spies in continually searching if a spot fit for escalading could be found. After many and dangerous experiments, they at last brought him advice that one part only afforded any appearance of practicability. At this place the height of the scarp was about sixteen feet, from the scarp to the wall was a steep ascent of about forty yards, and the wall itself, was thirty feet high. "I took the resolution," says Captain Popham, "immediately. The object was glorious; and I made a disposition to prevent, as much as in my power, the chance of tarnishing the honour of the attempt, by the loss we might sustain in case of a repulse." At break of day, on the 3rd of August, the van of the storming party arrived at the foot of the rock. Wooden ladders

were applied to the scarp, and the troops ascended to the foot of the wall. The spies climbed up, and fixed the rope ladders, when the Sepoys mounted with amazing activity. The guards assembled within, but were quickly repulsed by the fire of the assailants. The detachment entered with rapidity, and pushed on to the main body of the place. In the meantime, the greater part of the garrison escaped by another quarter, and left the English masters of one of the greatest and most celebrated strongholds in that quarter of the globe. This brilliant achievement, for which Captain Popham was rewarded with the rank of Major, struck the Mahrattas with so much consternation, that they abandoned the circumjacent country, and conveyed the alarm to Sindia in his capital.[1]

The opposition which was made by Francis to these proceedings, for pushing the war on the Jumna, brought to a crisis the animosities which the struggle between him and the Governor-General had so long maintained. On the 20th of July, 1780, Mr. Hastings, in answering a minute of Mr. Francis, declared, "I do not trust to his promise of candour, convinced that he is incapable of it. I judge of his public conduct by my experience of his private, which I have found to be devoid of truth and honour." The ground of these severe expressions, the Governor-General stated to be a solemn agreement formed between him and Mr. Francis, which Mr. Francis had broken. Of this transaction, the following appear to have been the material circumstances. When the parliamentary appointment, during five years, of the Governor-General and Council, expired in 1778, the expectation of a change in the Indian administration was suspended, by the re-appointment, upon the motion of the king's chief minister, of Mr. Hastings for a single year. Upon the arrival of this intelligence in India, an attempt was made by some mutual friends of Mr. Hastings and Mr. Francis, to deliver the

[1] For the transactions relative to the Mahratta war, the materials are found in the Sixth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, in 1781, and the vast mass of documents printed in its Appendix; the twentieth article of the Parliamentary Charges against Hastings, and his answer; the Papers printed for the use of the House of Commons on the Impeachment; and the Minutes of Evidence on the Trial of Mr. Hastings. The publications of the day, which on this, and other parts of the history of Mr. Hastings' Administration, have been consulted, some with more, some with less, advantage, are far too numerous to mention.

BOOK V. CHAP. III. 1780.

government, at a period of difficulty and danger, from the effects of their discordance. Both parties acknowledged the demand which the present exigency presented for a vigorous and united administration; and both professed a desire to make any sacrifice of personal feelings, and personal interests, for the attainment of so important an object. On the part of Mr. Francis, it was stipulated that Mohammed Reza Khan, Mr. Bristow, and Mr. Fowke, should be reinstated in conformity to the Company's orders; and on the part of Mr. Hastings, that the Mahratta war, the responsibility of which Mr. Francis had disclaimed, and thrown personally on the Governor-General, should be conducted in conformity with his conceptions and plans. It was this part of the agreement which Mr. Hastings accused his opponent of violating; and of depriving him, by a treacherous promise of co-operation, which induced Mr. Barwell to depart for Europe, of that authority which the vote of Mr. Barwell ensured. Mr. Francis, on the other hand, solemnly declared, that he "never was party to the engagement stated by Mr. Hastings, or had a thought of being bound by it." His agreement with regard to the Mahratta war, he explained as extending only to the operations then commenced on the Malabar coast, but not to fresh operations on another part of the Mahratta dominions. Mr. Hastings produced a paper, containing the following words: "Mr. Francis will not oppose any measures which the Governor-General shall recommend for the prosecution of the war in which we are supposed to be engaged with the Mahrattas, or for the general support of the present political system of his government." To the terms of this agreement, presented to Mr. Francis in writing, he affirmed that Mr. Francis gave his full and deliberate consent. The reply of Mr. Francis was in the following words: "In one of our conversations in February last, Mr. Hastings desired me to read a paper of memorandums, among which I presume this article was inserted. I returned it to him the moment I had read it, with a declaration that I did not agree to it, or hold myself bound by the contents of it, or to that effect." Mr. Francis added some reasonings, drawn from the natural presumptions of the case. But these reasonings and presumptions had little tendency to

strengthen the evidence of his personal assertion — the ground, between him and his antagonist, on which this question seems finally to rest.[1] With the utmost earnestness, Mr. Hastings repeated the affirmation of the terms on which Mr. Francis declared his assent; and at this point, the verbal controversy between them closed. Soon after, a duel ensued between Mr. Hastings and Mr. Francis, in which the latter was wounded; and on the 9th December, that gentlemen quitted India, and returned to Europe.[2]

CHAPTER IV.

In the Carnatic, Relations between the English and Nabob —Plenipotentiary, with independent Powers from the King —English courted by Hyder Ali and the Mahrattas, and in danger from both—Nabob and Plenipotentiary desire Alliance with the Mahrattas—Presidency adhere to Neutrality—Relations with the King of Tanjore—After hesitation, War is made upon him—War upon the Marawars —A second War upon Tanjore—Condemned by the Directors—Pigot sent out to restore the Raja—Opposition in the Madras Council—Pigot imprisoned—Sentiments and Measures adopted in England—Committee of Circuit—Suspended by Governor Rumbold, who summons the Zemindars to Madras—Transactions with Nizam Ali respecting Guntoor—Censured by the Supreme Council—Governor Rumbold, and other Members of the Government, condemned and punished by the Court of Directors.

WHILE the principal station of the Company's power in India was giving birth to so many important transactions, their Presidency on the Coromandel coast

[1] It is a strong corroboration of Hastings's belief in such a promise having been received from Francis, that he suffered (if he could have prevented it) Barwell's leaving India. That event he knew would leave him in a minority; and nothing but the expectation that Francis would wave his opposition, in consideration of the concession made to him, could have reconciled Hastings to the loss of his friend. The decision of the question therefore turns upon the circumstances under which Barwell quitted Bengal.—W.

[2] Sixth Report of the Committee of Secresy, 1781, p. 98, and Appendix, No. 288; also Fifth Report of the Select Committee, 1781, pp. 14, 18, 30; Memoirs of the late war in Asia, i. 301, etc.

BOOK V. CHAP. IV. 1770.

was not barren of incidents entitled to a great share of our regard.

The relation, in which the Company professed to stand to the country, was different in the Carnatic, and in Bengal. By the avowed possession of the Dewannee, they entered in Bengal into the direct discharge of the principal functions of internal government. In the Carnatic, during the contest with the French, they had held up Mohammed Ali; upon the termination of it, they had acknowledged him as the undoubted sovereign of the country. He was established, therefore, in the possession of both branches of power, both that of Nazim, or the military power, and that of Dewan, or the financial power; and the Company held the station of dependants, possessing their privileges through his sufferance, and owing obedience to his throne. They possessed a district of land surrounding Madras, which had been granted in 1750, and in 1762 was confirmed, by the Nabob of the Carnatic or Arcot, in recompense of the services rendered by the Company to him and his family. This was a sort of estate in land, under what is called a jaghire tenure, enabling the owner to draw the revenue, which would otherwise accrue to government; and to exercise all those powers which in India were usually connected with the power of raising the taxes. This Presidency also possessed, and that independent of their Nabob, the maritime district, known under the title of the four Northern Circars, which they had obtained by grant from the Mogul in 1765, and enjoyed under an agreement of peshcush, entered into the succeeding year with the Nizam or Subahdar.

Partly from characteristic imbecility, partly from the state of the country, not only exhausted, but disorganised by the preceding struggle, the Nabob remained altogether unequal to the protection of the dominions, of which he was now the declared sovereign. Instead of trusting to the insignificant rabble of an army which he would employ, the Presidency beheld the necessity of providing by a British force for the security of the province. For this reason, and also for the sake of that absolute power[1]

[1] The resolution of maintaining this absolute power, is thus clearly expressed in the letter of the Court of Directors to the Presidency of Madras, dated 24th December, 1765. "The Nabob has hitherto desired, at least acquiesced

which they desired to maintain, the English were under the necessity of urging, and, if need were, constraining the Nabob to transfer to them the military defence of the country, and to allow out of his revenues a sum proportional to the expense. The Nabob, having transferred the military power of the country, was placed in absolute dependence upon the Company; they being able to do what they pleased, he to do nothing but what they permitted. In a short time it was perceived, that his revenue was by no means equal to the demands which were made upon it. The country was oppressed by the severity of his exactions, and instead of being repaired, after the tedious sufferings of war, it was scourged by all the evils of a government at once insatiable and neglectful. When his revenues failed, he had recourse to loans. Money was advanced to him, at exorbitant interest, frequently by Englishmen, and the servants of the Company. He generally paid them by a species of assignments, called in India *tuncaus*, which entitled the holders of them to the revenue of some portion of the territory, and to draw it immediately from the collectors. While his embarrassments were by these means increased, the exactors were encouraged to greater severities.

In this situation, the Nabob and the Presidency were both dissatisfied, and both uneasy. Finding his power annihilated, and his revenues absorbed, after feasting his imagination with the prospect of the unlimited indulgences of an Eastern prince, he regarded the conduct of the Presidency as the highest injustice. The gentlemen entrusted at once with the care of their own fortunes and

with seeming approbation, that garrisons of our troops should be placed in his forts: it is not improbable that, after a time, he may wish to have his protectors removed. Should such an event happen, it may require some address to avoid giving him disgust, and, at the same time, a degree of firmness to persist in your present plan; but persist you must; for we establish it as a fundamental point, that the Company's influence and real power in the province, cannot be any way so effectually maintained, as by keeping the principal forts in our hands." See First Report of the Committee of Secresy, 1781, Appendix, No. 23. "By being in possession of most of his strong places, the troops being officered by the Company, and the garrisons perfectly under their orders, the Company have it in their power to give law to the Carnatic. Without the concurrence of the Presidency, he can do nothing; they are arbiters of peace and war; and even if one of his own tributaries refuse the pescush, the payment of which they had guaranteed, without them he cannot call them to an account," Letter from Sir John Lindsay to the President and Council of Madras, 22nd June, 1771; Rous' Appendix, p. 368.

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the interests of the Company, for both of which they imagined that the revenues of the Carnatic would copiously and delightfully provide, were chagrined to find them inadequate even to the exigencies of the government; and accused the Nabob, either of concealing the amount of the sums which he obtained, or of impairing the produce of the country by the vices of his government.

Upon the termination of the disputes in London, toward the end of the year 1769, between the Ministers of the Crown and the East India Company, respecting the supervisors, and respecting the power of the King's naval officer to negotiate and to form arrangements with the Indian powers;[1] a marine force, consisting of some frigates of war, was commissioned, under the command of Sir John Lindsay, to proceed to the East Indies: "to give countenance and protection to the Company's settlements and affairs." In conformity with the terms to which the Company had yielded, they vested Sir John Lindsay with a commission to take the command of all their vessels of war in the Indian seas; and also, on their behalf, "to treat and settle matters in the Persian Gulph."

So far, there was mutual understanding, clearness, and concert. But in addition to this, Sir John Lindsay was appointed, by commission under the great seal, his Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary, with powers to negotiate and conclude arrangements with the Indian sovereigns in general. This measure was not only contrary to what the Company had claimed as their right, against which the Minister appeared to have ceased, for the time, to contend; but it was a measure taken without their knowledge: and Sir John Lindsay appeared, in India, claiming the field for the exercise of his powers, before they or their servants had the smallest intimation that any such powers were in existence.

If there was a danger which must strike every considerate mind, in sending two independent authorities, to act and clash together in the delicate and troubled scene of Indian affairs, a danger inevitable, even if the circumstances had been arranged between the Ministers and the Company with the greatest harmony and the greatest wisdom; all the principles of mischief were naturally

[1] See the account of these disputes, supra, vol. iii., book iv., chap. ix.

multiplied, and each strengthened to the utmost, by the present stroke of ministerial politics.

The ground upon which this disputed and imprudent exercise of power appears to have been placed, was the eleventh article of the treaty of Paris, concluded in 1763. With a view to maintain peace in India, and to close the disputes between the English and the French, who, according to their own professions, appeared to have nothing else in view but to determine who was the just and rightful Nabob of the Carnatic, and who was the just and rightful Subahdar of the Deccan; it was there decided and agreed that the two nations should acknowledge Mohammed Ali as the one, and Salabut Jung as the other. It occurred to the ingenuity of practical statesmen, that the King of Great Britain, having become party to an article of treaty, had a right, without asking leave of the Company, to look after the execution of that article; and hence to send a deputy duly qualified for that purpose. If this conferred a right of bestowing upon Sir John Lindsay the powers of an ambassador; it also conferred the right of avoiding altercation with the East India Company, by taking the step without their knowledge.[1]

The power of looking after the due execution of the eleventh article of the treaty of Paris was not a trifling power.

It included in the first place, the power of taking a part in all the disputes between the Nabob and the Company's servants; as Mohammed Ali was in that article placed upon the footing of an ally to the King of Great Britain, and hence entitled to all that protection which is due to an ally. The servants of the Company had been at some pains to keep from the knowledge of the Nabob the full import of the new relation in which he was placed to the British throne; as calculated most imprudently to inflame that spirit of ambition and love of independence, with which it was so difficult already to deal, and with the gratification of which the existence in the Carnatic, either of his power or of that of the Company, was altogether

[1] It was impossible to prevent the measure from becoming known to the Company, and very improbable that they would not resist it. Altercation was delayed — therefore not avoided; and it would have better become the ministers to have apprised the Company at once, of their determination to send out an agent of the crown.—W.

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incompatible. The band of Englishmen, and others, who surrounded the Nabob, for the purpose of preying upon him, wished of course to see all power in his hands, that they might prey the more abundantly. They filled every place with their outcries against every restraint which was placed upon him: and in particular had endeavoured, and with great success, to disseminate an opinion in England, that he was an oppressed and ill-treated prince, while the servants of the Company were his plunderers and tyrants.

Nor was this all. As the grand intent of the eleventh article of the treaty of Paris was to preserve peace between the English and other powers of India, and as there is nothing in the relations of one state to another which the care of peace may not be said to embrace, the whole international policy of the British government in India was, by the new ministerial expedient, deposited in the hands of the King's Minister Plenipotentiary.

On the 26th of July, 1770, Sir John Lindsay, after having remained some months at Bombay, arrived at Madras; and at once surprised and alarmed the servants of the Company by the declaration of his powers. In one of their first communications with Sir John, they say, "when you now inform us, you are invested with great and separate powers, and when we consider that those powers, in their operation, may greatly affect the rights of the Company, we cannot but be very much alarmed."[1] To their employers, the Court of Directors, they expound themselves more fully. "To give you a clear representation of the dangerous embarrassments through which we have been struggling, since the arrival of his Majesty's powers in this country, is a task far beyond our abilities. They grow daily more and more oppressive to us; and we must sink under the burthen, unless his Majesty, from a just representation of their effect, will be graciously pleased to recall powers, which, in dividing the national interest, will inevitably destroy its prosperity in India. Such is the danger; and yet we are repeatedly told, that it is to support that interest, by giving the sanction of his Majesty's name to our measures, that these powers were

[1] Letter to Sir John Lindsay, dated 16th August, 1770, Rous' Appendix, p. 254.

granted, and for that alone to be exerted. It has always been our opinion, that with your authority, we had that of our Sovereign, and of our nation delegated to us. If this opinion be forfeited, your servants can neither act with spirit nor success: for under the control of a superior commission, they dare not, they cannot exert the powers with which they alone are entrusted. Their weakness and disgrace become conspicuous; and they are held in derision by your enemies." [1]

The first of the requisitions which Sir John Lindsay made upon the President and Council was to appear in his train, when he went in state to deliver to the Nabob his Majesty's letter and presents. They conceived, that, as the servants of the Company had heretofore been the medium through which all communications to the princes of India had been made, and they had been considered in India the immediate representatives of the British monarch, and the highest instrument of his government, they could not appear in the train of Sir John Lindsay without degradation in the eyes of the natives, and a forfeiture of the dignity and influence of the Company which; as they had no instructions upon the subject, they did not think themselves at liberty to resign. With the assignment of these reasons, they respectfully signified to Sir John Lindsay the inability under which they found themselves to comply with his request. This brought on an interchange of letters, which soon degenerated into bitterness and animosity on both sides.[2]

Among the reasons which the President and Council assigned for declining to appear in the train of Sir John Lindsay, they had stated, that any suspicion, disseminated in the country, of the annihilation or diminution of the Company's power "might, at this crisis particularly,

[1] Letter to the Court of Proprietors, dated July 20th, 1771, Rous' Appendix, p. 400.

[2] Rous' Appendix, p. 245—253. In the commencement of the correspondence, the tone of Sir J. Lindsay was that of affronting condescension: it soon became that of contemptuous sarcasm. The Government of Madras were evidently alarmed, and treated him with unnecessary deference. Their more prudent course would have been to have refrained from all discussion with him, until they had received instructions from England; as they could not be expected to recognise powers utterly incompatible with those which the Court of Directors had apprised them, had been conferred upon the commander of the king's ships in India, and His Majesty's representative in the Gulph of Persia only.—W.

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prove fatal to the existence of the Company, and the interests of the nation in India: because they were on the brink of a war with the most formidable power in India, which it would require all their efforts to avoid, while they feared that all their efforts would be insufficient."[1] This apprehension was a good deal exaggerated, to serve the present purpose; and the exaggeration yielded an advantage to Sir John Lindsay, of which he immediately availed himself. He was very sorry, he said, to find them on the brink of a dreadful war, which was all but inevitable. He pressed upon them the consideration of the importance of peace to a commercial body. And as he was sent out to watch over the execution of the eleventh article, of which peace was the main object, he begged they would lay before him such documents and explanations, as "would make him acquainted with the real state of the Company's affairs."[2] He also informed them, that he was commanded by his Majesty to apply to them for a full and succinct account of all their transactions with the Nabob of Arcot since the late treaty of Paris; and inquire with the utmost care into the causes of the late war with the Subah of the Deckan and Hyder Ali, and the reasons of its unfortunate consequences."[3] To this point the reply of the President and Council was in the following terms: duplicates of our records, and very minute and circumstantial details of all our transactions, have already been transmitted to the Court of Directors of the East India Company, our constituents. We have heard, that when an inquiry at home into the state of the Company's affairs was thought necessary, it was signified by his Majesty's ministry to the Court of Directors, that they would be called upon by parliament to produce their records; that they were accordingly called upon by parliament, and did produce them. This, we believe, was a constitutional course; but we have never heard that the Company's papers and records were demanded by, or surrendered to, the ministry alone; for that we believe would be unconstitutional. The Company hold their rights by act of parliament, their papers and their records are their rights; we are entrusted with them here; we are under oath of fidelity, and under covenants not to part

[1] Rous' Appendix, p. 248. [2] Ibid. p. 250. [3] Ibid. p. 253.

with them; nevertheless all conditions are subservient to the laws; and when we shall be called upon in a legal and constitutional way, we shall readily and cheerfully submit ourselves, our lives, and fortunes, to the laws of our country. To break our oath and our covenants would be to break those laws. But we hold them sacred and inestimable, for they secure the rights and liberties of the people."[1]

Corresponding to the jealousy and dislike with which Sir John Lindsay was received by the president and Council, were the cordiality and pleasure with which he was received by the Nabob and those who surrounded him. To the Nabob he explained, that he was come to recognize him as a fellow sovereign with the King of Great Britain, and to afford him the protection of that great King against all his enemies. The Nabob, who had a keen Oriental eye for the detection of personal feelings, was not long a stranger to the sentiments with which his Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary, and the Company's President and Council, regarded each other. He described the President and Council as his greatest enemies; for they withdrew the greater part of his revenue and power. Sir John, who was already prejudiced, and ignorant of the scene in which he was appointed to act, fell at once into all the views of the Nabob, and the crowd by whom he was beset. The Nabob laid out his complaints, and Sir John listened with a credulous ear. The Nabob described the policy which had been pursued with respect to the native powers by the servants of the Company; and easily made it assume an appearance which gave it to the eye of Sir John a character of folly, or corruption, or both. He drew the line of policy which at the present moment it would have gratified his own wishes to get the Company to pursue; and he painted it in such engaging colours, that Sir John Lindsay believed it to be recommended equally by the sense of justice, and the dictates of wisdom. The King's Commissioner, measuring his own consequence by that of the master whom he served, and treating the Company and their servants as not worthy of much regard, on the score either of wisdom or of virtue, widened the difference between the partnership sovereigns of the Carnatic. The

[1] Rous' Appendix, p. 257.

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royal functionary assumed the character of protector of the Nabob; and appeared to interpose the royal authority, between an ally of the crown, and the oppression of the Company. The contempt which the Nabob saw bestowed upon the authority to which he had been accustomed to bend, and the dignity to which he appeared to be exalted as an ally of the British King, augmented his opinion of the injustice under which he appeared to himself to groan; and the letters of the Commissioner to the ministers in England were filled with accounts of the oppression exercised by the insolent and rapacious servants of a counting-house, over an independent and sovereign prince. The feeble discernment which has generally scanned the proceedings of the East India Company, and which has often lavished upon them applause where their conduct has been neither virtuous nor wise, has almost uniformly arraigned them for not accomplishing impossibilities, and uniting contrary effects; for not rendering themselves powerful and independent, without trenching upon the power and independence of princes, who would suffer their power and independence, only in proportion as they were deprived of those attributes themselves. Beside this fundamental consideration, it was not to be disputed, that, left to himself Mohammed Ali could not maintain his possession of the province for even a few years; and that nothing but the power of the English could prevent it from falling a prey to the neighbouring powers, or even to its own disorganization. Though it is not disputed that the rapacity of individuals, who preyed upon the Nabob may have added to the disorder of his affairs; it is true that the poverty of the Carnatic, and the wretched administration of the Nabob, enabled it not to fulfil the golden hopes of the English, or even to provide for its own necessities.[1]

When the President and Council described themselves as on the brink of a war, the circumstances to which they alluded were these. In the second article of the treaty, which was concluded with Hyder Ali, in 1769, it was agreed: "That in case either of the contracting parties shall be attacked, they shall, from their respective countries, mutually assist each other to drive the enemy out;" and the party in aid of whom the troops were employed,

[1] See Ross' Appendix, No. 17, passim.

was to afford them maintenance at a rate which was mutually determined. This was a condition so highly esteemed by Hyder, that all hopes of an accommodation with him, on any other terms, were, at the time of the treaty, regarded as vain.

Within a few weeks, Hyder endeavoured to persuade the English of the great advantage which he and they would derive, from uniting Janojee Bonsla with them, in triple league. He also informed them of his intention to recover from Madhoo Row, the Peshwa, certain possessions which that invader had wrested from him two years before; and requested that they would send him a certain number of troops, no matter how small, merely to show to the world the friendship which now happily subsisted between the English and him. The Presidency, pointing out in what manner this, to which the treaty did not bind them, would be an act of unmerited hostility against the Mahrattas, declined compliance with his request.

Early in 1770, the Mahrattas invaded his country; and again he solicited assistance, if it were but a few troops, for the sake of the manifestation on account of which he had requested them before. If a more substantial aid was afforded, he professed his readiness to pay three lacks of rupees. It was not very easy for the English now to find a pretext. They evaded, procrastinated, and withheld, rather than refused compliance with his desire.

The Mahrattas reduced Hyder to great difficulties, nay dangers; and seemed resolved to annex his dominions to their spreading conquests. During this period of his distress, in which he was obliged to abandon the open country, and to depend upon his forts, he endeavoured to persuade the English that their own interest was deeply concerned in combining with him against the Mahrattas, who would touch upon their frontier, and present them a formidable neighbourhood, if the barrier which he interposed were broken down.

The Mahrattas, too, very earnestly pressed for the assistance of the English. They had, indeed, by weight of superior numbers, driven Hyder from the open country; but the protection of his strong holds enabled him still to hold out, and they saw the time rapidly approaching, when the exhausted state of the country would compel

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them to retire for want of the means to support their army. The skill, therefore, which enabled the English to subdue the strongest places with a rapidity which to them appeared like magic, rather than natural means, they regarded as a most desirable acquisition. To attain this object, they endeavoured to work upon the fears of the Nabob; and in their communication with him, threatened to invade the Carnatic, unless the English complied with their desires.

The difficulties on the part of the President and Council were uncommonly great. They state their view of them in their consultations, on the 30th of April, 1770. Their assistance would enable the Mahrattas indeed to prevail over Hyder, but of all events that was, probably, the most alarming; the Mahrattas would in that case immediately adjoin the Carnatic, with such an accumulated power, as would enable them to conquer it whenever they pleased; and what, when they had power to conquer, the Mahrattas would please nobody acquainted with India entertained any doubt. If they assisted Hyder; that was immediate war with the Mahrattas, accompanied with all its burdens and dangers. It was not clear, that both united could prevail over the Mahrattas; and if they did, the power of Hyder would bring along with it a large share of the dangers to which they would be exposed from the Mahrattas, if sovereigns of Mysore. If they stood neuter, and thereby offended both parties, either Hyder or the Mahrattas, most probably the latter, would prevail; and in that case the victor, whoever he was, would wreak his vengeance on the rulers of the Carnatic. Amid these difficulties, they conceived it their wisest policy after all to remain neuter; to gain time; and take up arms, only when the extremity could no longer be shunned.

The views and wishes of the Nabob were exceedingly different. He was bent upon forming an alliance with the Mahrattas. In the first place, he had a personal antipathy to Hyder Ali, which in a mind like his was capable of weighing down more respectable motives, and made him express extreme reluctance to join, or see the English concur, in any thing favourable to Hyder. In the next place, the Mahrattas were successful in working upon the short-sighted ambition of the Nabob, with the promise of splen-

did gifts of territory, which, if they had the power of giving, they would also have the power of resuming at pleasure. But in the third place, he expected, according to the opinion of the President and Council, to place the English government, by means of the alliance with the Mahrattas, in a state of dependance upon himself; and that was what he valued above all other things. "Once engaged in the war," said they, "we are at the Nabob's mercy, for we have no certain means of our own. Enter, we are told, into an engagement with the Mahrattas; engage to assist them in the conquest of the Mysore country, and they will cede to the Nabob the Ghauts, and all the countries dependant on Mysore on this side the Ghauts. If we enter into such a measure, utterly repugnant to every order and every idea that has been suggested to us by our employers, we cannot see any end to the consequences, but utter ruin; we must thenceforth follow the schemes of the Mahrattas and the Nabob, wheresoever they shall please to drag us, be it to place the Nabob on the musnud of the Deccan, or to subjugate the whole peninsula."

Sir John Lindsay adopted completely the views of the Nabob, with regard to the Mahratta alliance: nor was there any reproach, or exhortation, or threat, which he spared, to entice or to drive the Presidency into that measure.

The ministry, it would appear, became in some degree alarmed at the accounts which they received of the contentions which prevailed between the King's Minister Plenipotentiary, and the servants of the Company in India; and they thought of an expedient; which was, to change the person, and leave the authority. Sir John Lindsay was recalled, and Sir Robert Harland with an addition to the marine force, was sent to exercise the same powers in his stead.

Sir Robert arrived at Madras on the 2nd of September, 1771. Sir Robert took up the same ideas, and the same passions exactly, which had guided the mind of Sir John Lindsay; and the only difference was, that he was rather more intemperate than his predecessor; and in consequence created rather more animosity in his opponents.

The progress of the Mahrattas had become still more

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alarming. In the month of November, they were in the possession of the whole of Mysore, excepting the principal forts. They had advanced to the borders of the Carnatic: and some straggling parties had made plundering incursions. They openly threatened invasion; and it was expected that about the beginning of January, when the crops would be ready, they would enter the country. The Nabob was, or affected to be, in the utmost alarm; and Sir Robert Harland urged the Presidency to accept the terms of the Mahrattas, who bid high for assistance on the one hand, and threatened fire and sword on the other. In this trying situation, the Presidency vented the most bitter complaints, at being left by the Court of Directors, totally without instructions.[1] Nevertheless, "although we have not yet," say they, "had any answer from our constituents, to the repeated representations of the embarrassments we labour under for want of their clear and precise instructions with respect to our conduct in the present critical situation of affairs; yet it is evident from the whole spirit of their orders for some years past, that they look upon the growing power of the Mahrattas with jealousy and apprehension." From this, from an adoption of the same sentiments, from a regard to the treaty with Hyder, which rather required them to assist than allowed them to join in destroying that sovereign, and from a regard to the opinion of the other Presidencies, they determined not to comply with exhortations or commands of Sir Robert. They would have thought it advisable on the other hand to support Hyder as a barrier against the Mahrattas, had not the opposition of the Nabob, supported as he was by the minister of the King, placed it, for want of resources, out of their power. They determined, therefore, to remain neutral; and only to collect a body of troops in some central position, where they might best protect the country in case of attack, and distress the enemy by cutting off their supplies.

[1] "It is with infinite concern the Committee observe that, notwithstanding their repeated and earnest representations to the Court of Directors, of the very critical situation of affairs with respect to the Mahrattas and Hyder Ally, which were so fully and clearly explained, in order to enable them to give us their sentiments and orders with respect to the conduct they would wish us to observe in so important and interesting a matter, we still find ourselves not only without orders, but without the least intimation of their opinion thereon." Select Consultations, 29th November, 1771; First Report, Committee of Secrecy in 1781, Appendix, No. 21.

The Mahrattas, notwithstanding their threats, had not, it would appear, any serious intention of invading the Carnatic; for in the month of January, 1772, the Nabob, and Sir Robert, finding the Presidency inflexible against their project of alliance, found the means of prevailing upon them to promise a cessation of hostilities till the pleasure of the British King should be known.[1] The Mahrattas were afraid of provoking the English to join Hyder Ali; and they began now to feel their situation abundantly uneasy. The activity and capacity of that great leader were still able to give them incessant annoyance; and the country was so excessively ravaged and exhausted, that the means of subsisting an army could no longer be found. They became, therefore, desirous of an accommodation; and in the beginning of July consented to a peace, for which, however, they made Hyder pay very dearly, both in territorial and pecuniary sacrifices.[2]

If a judgment may be formed from this instance, the chance for good government in India, if the ministers of the crown were to become, and the East India Company cease to be its organ, would undergo an unfavourable change. The course into which the ministers of the crown would have plunged the nation bears upon it every mark of ignorance and folly; that which was pursued by the East India Company and their servants is eminently characterized by prudence and firmness.

Amid the pecuniary wants of the Nabob and the Presidency, both had often looked with a covetous eye to the supposed riches of the King of Tanjore. They considered the natural fertility of his country, and his general exemption from the ravages of the war which had desolated the rest of the province; but they did not consider that the temporizing policy by which he had laboured to save himself from the resentment of all parties, had often cost him considerable sums; that the wars which raged around and perpetually threatened himself, had imposed upon him the maintenance of an army, as great as he could possibly support; that the country which he governed, though fertile, was small; that the expense of a

[1] That they gave money, and gave largely, appears plainly from a letter in Rous' Appendix, p. 952.

[2] See First Report, ut supra, p. 28, and Appendix, Nos. 20, 21, 22, 23; and the Papers published by the Directors, in Rous' Appendix, Nos. 17 and 28.

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court aims to be as grand in a small, as in an extensive country; that the expense of protecting a small country is comparatively heavy; that hardly any government has ever yet been so good, as not to expend as much as it could possibly drain from its subjects; and that the government of Tanjore was a true specimen of the ignorance and rudeness of the Hindus.

In the war with Hyder, the Raja of Tanjore had not only contributed less, both in troops and treasure, to the maintenance of the war than was expected of him, but was known to have held a correspondence with Hyder; and if he did not afford, at any rate promised, assistance. Without making any allowance for the current policy of the feeble princes in India, who aim at contributing as little as possible to the wars of the greater powers, from which they see not that they have any thing to gain, and by professions of friendship for both parties, to avert the dangers of their resentment, the Company and the Nabob were sufficiently disposed to have treated the Raja as a faithless ally. In the treaty, however, which they concluded with Hyder in 1769, they insisted upon including the Mahratta chieftain, Morari Rao, whose territories would have formed a convenient conquest for Hyder; and he refused to accept the condition unless the Raja of Tanjore was admitted to the same protection. That the Raja might not appear to owe his safety to the interposition of Hyder, the English pretended to regard him as their partisan, and included him in the treaty as their own ally.

In their letter to the Select Committee at Fort St. George, dated 17th March, 1769, the Court of Directors said, "It appears most unreasonable to us that the Raja of Tanjore should hold possession of the most fruitful part of the country, which can alone supply our armies with subsistence, and not contribute to the defence of the Carnatic. We observe the Nabob makes very earnest representations to you on this subject, wherein he takes notice that the Zemindars of the Carnatic have been supported, and their countries preserved to them by the operations of our forces employed in his cause; and that nothing was more notorious, than that three former princes of the Carnatic had received from the Tanjore Raja seventy, eighty, nay even one hundred lacks of

rupees at a time. We therefore enjoin you to give the Nabob such support in his pretensions as may be effectual? and if the Raja refuses to contribute a just proportion to the expense of the war, you are then to pursue such measures as the Nabob may think consistent with the justice and dignity of his government. Whatever sums may, in consequence of the above orders, be obtained from the Raja of Tanjore, we expect shall be applied to the discharge of the Nabob's debt to the Company; and if more than sufficient for that purpose, to the discharge of his debts to individuals."[1]

Upon this injunction of the Court of Directors, the Select Committee deliberated on the 13th of September, 1769. "With regard," they say, "to the demand recommended to be made on the King of Tanjore, our situation at this time is such, for want of money, that, if there were no other obstacles, that alone would put it utterly out of our power to undertake an expedition against him. The treaty of 1762 being before the Hon. Court, considering also, on the other hand, the late conduct of the King of Tanjore, we certainly should not postpone an undertaking so warmly recommended, if it were in our power now to attempt it consistently with good policy and the safety of the Carnatic. But as the case is, were the difficulty of money out of the question, it would become a point of serious consideration, whether an attempt upon Tanjore might not again involve us in a war with Hyder Ally, as the Raja is expressly included in the treaty lately made with Hyder Ally Khan. However unreasonable it may be, that he should enjoy the benefits derived from the government of the Carnatic without contributing his proportion of its expense; and however impolitic, and contrary to the natural rights of government, to suffer such a power to remain independent in the heart of the province, we must submit to necessity, and the circumstances of the times. He has, indeed, lately made some objections by his letters to the payment of his annual peshcush, alleging in excuse the great expense of the troops sent to join our army; although, as the Nabob inform us, it be contrary to the custom of the country for tributary princes to make any demands for the charges of troops furnished to the power

[1] Official Papers in Rous' Appendix, pp. 525, 526.

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to whom they are tributary, while employed within the districts dependant on such power. Should he persist in requiring an abatement in the peshcush due on account of his late charges, it might furnish us with a just pretext to accuse him of a breach of his engagements, and to take our measures accordingly when our situation will admit of it. But as the case now is with us; under difficulties to provide the money necessary even for our current expenses; doubtful of the intentions of the Mahrattas; suspicious of the designs of the Subah: and apprehensive of the King of Tanjore's calling upon Hyder for aid, and thus raising a fresh flame, the Committee are clearly of opinion, that at this juncture the undertaking would be impolitic and unwarrantable." [1]

The Raja had urged, that, instead of having any money, the late expenses, which was the fact, had involved him deeply in debt; and he prayed, if a remission could not be granted, at any rate for a delay in the payment of the exacted tribute; an indulgence to which the expense incurred by him in sending troops to assist in the wars of the Nabob afforded, he thought, a reasonable claim.[2]

Early in the month of February, 1771, the Presidency received intelligence that the Raja of Tanjore was setting out upon the expedition against one of his neighbours the Polygar of Sanputty, one of the Marawars.[3] On the 14th of February, the President wrote to the Raja, that as Marawar belonged to the Nabob, as a dependency of the Carnatic, it was contrary to the treaty between the Raja and him, to make war upon that country, and that, as the English were guarantees of that treaty, it was their duty to request he would relinquish his design.[4]

The Raja represented that Hanamantagoody was a district of country which did belong to the King of Tanjore, and was actually in his possession at the time of the conclusion of the treaty of 1762; that it had been unjustly seized by the Marawar chief, while the armies of Tanjore

[1] Papers, ut supra, p. 631. [2] Ibid. pp. 563, 564.

[3] There was no such person as the Polygar of Sanputty. The author has mistaken, apparently, the title of the Polygar of Ramnad, for the name of his province. The word occurs in the proceedings of the Madras Government Satputty, and is correctly used, as the "The Rajah of Tanjore sent a force against the Satputty's country." "Tonderawee is ready to assist the Satputty," etc. The proper title is Setu-pati, chief of the "Seta," or bridge, the rocks extending from the continent to Ramiseram.—W.

[4] Papers, ut supra, p. 574.

were engaged in the service of the Nabob; that the King of Tanjore, at the time when the Nabob was setting out upon his expedition to Madura, had represented the necessity of wresting back this territory from the Marawar, but the Nabob professed to have undertaken the expedition against Madura only upon the strength of the assistance which he expected from his dependants, and therefore requested the execution of his design might be delayed, till that expedition was accomplished; that he had represented the necessity of recovering the territory in question to the President himself, who had offered no objections. "For these reasons," said he, "I was in hopes to this day, that the Nabob and your honour would give strict orders to Marawar to restore our country. I also wrote to my vakeel on that head. But you and the Nabob did not get the country restored to me. Besides which, when the elephants relating to my present from Negapatnam were coming, Nalcooty,[1] pretending that the vessel was driven on shore by a storm in his seaports, seized the said elephants, and detained them; concerning which I sent him word, as well as to your honour; but he did not return them to me. If I suffer Marawar to take possession of my country, Nalcooty to seize my elephants, and Tondiman to injure my country, it will be a very great dishonour to me among my people, to see such compulsions used by the Polygars. You are a protector of my government. Notwithstanding, you have not settled even a single affair belonging to me.

"If I stay quiet, I shall greatly hurt my dignity. Wherefore, I marched myself. If you now advise me to desist, what answer can I give? In the treaty, it was not forbidden to clear the country possessed by Marawar, or to undertake any expedition against the Polygars, who may use compulsions. Since it is so, it cannot be deemed contrary to the treaty."[2]

The Presidency urged, that, whatever was the truth with regard to the facts set forward by the Raja, he knew that they were disputed by the Nabob; and for that reason, was guilty, because he had taken upon himself to be judge and executioner in his own cause, when he ought to have reserved the decision to the English government. In his defence, the Raja observed: "You were pleased to write,

[1] The Little Marawar. [2] Papers, ut supra, pp. 608, 614.

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that if I desist in my present expedition, you will then settle the affairs in a reasonable manner. I continued to speak to you for this long time concerning this affair; but you have not settled it. Notwithstanding, if you now write that I did not acquaint you before I began it, what answer can I make to it? I did not undertake to do any thing contrary to the hereditary custom observed." [1]

The Nabob called upon the Presidency, with unusual force and boldness of importunity, to make war upon the Raja; as the honour of his government was concerned in chastising a refractory dependant; and the honour of the Company's government was concerned in supporting a faithful ally. Sir John Lindsay vehemently urged the same conclusions, not without reproaches, that the Presidency were betraying the Nabob, and violating their duty, by even deferring the assistance which he required.[2]

On both hands, the Presidency were assailed by the greatest difficulties. There was imminent danger that the views of Sir John Lindsay, who was the creature of the ministry, would prevail at home; and that the Council, should they refuse to join with the Nabob, would be condemned, punished, and disgraced. They were restrained, on the other hand, by the consideration of the want of money; of the improbability of receiving sufficient funds from the Nabob; of the danger, while the troops were engaged in a distant quarter, of an attack upon the Circars by the Nizam; and of a war with the Mahrattas, with whom the king of Tanjore was allied, and who already hung over the Carnatic with alarming menaces. They believed that, beside the Nabob's old passion for the conquest of Tanjore, he was at present stimulated by the desire of that part of the Mysore country which lay on the Carnatic side of the passes, and which he had been promised by the Mahrattas, as the price of the assistance which they wished to receive; that he now despaired of being able to persuade the English to give that assistance; but expected, if he could inveigle them into a war with the King of Tanjore, that they would then be glad to form an alliance with the Mahrattas, in order to escape the calamity of their arms. In these circumstances, the Governor and Council bitterly complained, that they were

[1] Papers, ut supra, pp. 645, 609. [2] Ibid. pp. 579, 283.

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left by their honourable masters, with instructions and orders which might be construed all manner of ways; and that, whatever course they took, they were sure of condemnation if they failed; could expect approbation, only as a consequence of success.[1] They resolved to collect as much of the army and of the military stores at Trichinopoly, as could be done without appearing to prepare for war; and to abstain from hostilities unless unavoidably involved in them.

Inquiring into the supposed dependence of the Marawar country, the Presidency found, that both Tanjore and Trichinopoly had alternately made use of their power to set up and put down the chiefs of Marawar. But in conclusion, "it appears," they said, "to us, that the only right over them is power, and that constitutionally they are independent of both; though Trichinopoly, since it has been added to the government of the Carnatic, having been more powerful than Tanjore, hath probably received more submission from them." Between states in India, "power," they remark generally, "is the only arbitrator of right; established usages or titles cannot exempt one state from a dependence on another, when superior force prevails; neither can they enforce dependence where power is wanting."[2]

These reasonings and conclusions, with regard to Tan-

[1] See these considerations balanced, and this severe condemnation passed upon their employers. Papers, ut supra, pp. 662, 663, 666, 679.

[2] Ibid. pp. 682, 682*. According to this account, there is no constitution in India but the law of the strongest. The fact is important; and has often (I should not much err if I said always) been mistaken by the inaccurate minds which hitherto have contemplated Indian affairs.—M.

This can scarcely be called the constitution of India, although it was the political condition of the country, growing out of the anarchy consequent upon the Mohammedan invasion, particularly in the South of India. The operations of the Moguls in the Dekhin, although they broke to pieces the consistency of both the Mohammedan and Hindu principalities, substituted no paramount authority in their place, and furnished an opportunity and example to adventurers of all classes, to scramble for power, annihilating all right except that of the sword. When the fact is remembered, therefore, its history should not be forgotten the circumstances under which it was true, shew it to be an accident, not a principle. In the present instance, nothing could be weaker than the claims of the Nawab upon Tanjore, except those of Trichinopoly and Tanjore upon Marawa. During the vigour of the Pandyan kingdom of Madura, Ramnad and Marawa were subject to it; but, upon its subversion, the chief of Ramnad became independent. Family dissensions divided the country into separate principalities, which were occasionally terrified into the payment of tribute to the Rajahs of Madura and Tanjore, but which were never really subject to either. Neither could the Rajah of Tanjore be considered as at any time the subject of the Nawab of the Carnatic, although occasional precedents existed for the levy of a peshcush from his fears.—W.

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jore, bare date in the records of the Presidency from the beginning of February to the end of March. On the 12th of June, when Trichinopoly was sufficiently supplied with stores for defence, and the question was to be determined whether more should be sent, the Nabob dissuaded from any further preparations; alleging that the Mahrattas would never give the necessary respite for undertaking an expedition against Tanjore, and that to him every article of expense, however small, was an object of importance. Upon this, the Presidency express themselves in the following terms: "When we consider the earnest and repeated solicitations urged by the Nabob to engage us in an expedition against Tanjore; when we consider the taunts and reflections cast on us by Sir John Lindsay for refusing to comply with the Nabob's requisition of proceeding immediately against Tanjore at a time when we were unprepared; when we consider that our apprehensions from the Mahrattas are not nearly so great, since most of the grain is now collected in the different forts, which would render it difficult for an army of Mahrattas to subsist; all these circumstances considered, it appears strange that the Nabob should so suddenly alter his opinion, and should now decline entering on the expedition, which he so lately and so earnestly urged us to undertake." They conjectured, that, as his grand motive for urging the expedition at first, was to force them into an alliance with the Mahrattas, so now, despairing of that event, he wished not to give the Mahrattas a pretext for overrunning his dominions.[1]

On the 24th of July, the Committee resolved, first, that an expedition against the Raja would, in itself, be advisable, but being contrary to the inclination of the Nabob, ought not to be undertaken; secondly, that negotiation should be used instead of war, and that the negotiation, in which the Nabob wished the English not to appear, should be left to be conducted by that ostensible prince.[2]

No sooner was conference attempted than the Raja declared, that he had already "referred all differences between him and the Nabob to the Company, and that he wished the Company would mediate between them; that he was ready and willing to settle terms of accommoda-

[1] Papers, ut supra, pp. 684, 685. [2] Ibid. p. 696.

tion under the guarantee of the English, on whose faith and promise he would rely; but that he would never trust the Nabob without the security of the English; as he well knew the Nabob's intentions were to accommodate matters for the present, but that he had had intentions whenever opportunity should offer in future."[1]

On the 29th of July, the demands of the Nabob were presented to the Raja's vakeel at Madras; but as he required fifteen or twenty days to receive the instructions of his master, and as the distance of Madras would aid the Raja in spinning out the time till the commencement of the rains, the Nabob proposed to send his two sons to Trichinopoly; the eldest, Omdut ul Omrah, to conduct the negotiations; and the younger, Mader ul Mulk, to manage the supply of the army; while the negotiation, he thought, should be supported, by the show of inevitable war, if the Raja declined implicit submission.[2]

Now was required a decision on the question, what, if the war should issue in a conquest, was to be done with Tanjore. The Presidency knew, that the grand cause of the reluctance which the Nabob had latterly shown to the war, was a fear lest the Company should conquer Tanjore for themselves; and, that there was no accommodation, how unfavourable soever, which he would not make with the Raja, rather than incur the hazard of so hateful a result. The Nabob offered to give the Company ten lacs of pagodas, if, after conquering, they delivered Tanjore, in full dominion, to him. The Presidency wished to reserve the question for the proper authorities in England, but the Nabob would not consent. The Presidency imagined, that as they had now convinced the Raja of the hostile designs both of themselves and the Nabob, it was highly dangerous to leave him possessed of power, which he would have an interest in lending to the French, or any other enemy; and as they could not proceed to war, except with the consent of the Nabob, it was therefore best to comply with his terms.[3]

Early in September, the young Nabob, (such was the name by which the English generally spoke of Omdut ul Omrah) who had repaired to Trichinopoly, to conduct the negotiation, reported to General Smith, the commander

[1] Papers, ut supr, p. 717. [2] Ibid. pp. 718, 720. [3] Ibid. p. 726—731.

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of the English troops, that nothing but compulsion would bring the Raja to the submission required. The army was ready to march on the 12th of September; but the department of supplying the army had been entrusted wholly to the Nabob's second son; and it was found upon inquiry that there was not rice in the camp for the consumption of a single day.[1]

The greatest exertions were made by the general to enable the army to move; and on the 16th it arrived before Vellum, a fortress of considerable strength, and one of the great bulwarks of Tanjore. The battery, having been constructed first in a wrong place, was not ready till the morning of the 20th; and the breach could not have been made practicable till about three o'clock the next afternoon, but towards evening the garrison stole out of the fort.[2]

On the 23rd the army again marched, and encamped before Tanjore. They broke ground late on the evening of the 29th, and by that time began to be distressed for want of provisions. On the 1st of October, the enemy made a strong sally, which threatened to have considerable effects: but Major Vaughan, the officer against whose post it was directed, acted with firmness and judgment, and the attack was repelled without much loss. The operations proceeded but slowly. The 27th of October had arrived, when the engineers reported that the breach would be practicable the next morning. On that day the young Nabob signed a peace with the Raja, and hostilities ceased.[3]

The Raja engaged to pay eight lacs of rupees for arrears of peshcush; 30,50,000 for the expense of the expedition; to restore whatever he had taken from the Marawars; and to aid with his troops in all the wars of the Nabob. Vellum was the principal difficulty. It was finally agreed, that it should be restored to the Raja, but demolished if the Nabob chose.

Before this event, a dispute had arisen about the plunder. Omdut ul Omrah was informed, that, by the usage of war, the plunder of all places, taken by storm, belonged to the captors. Omdut ul Omrah, unwilling to lose the

[1] General Smith's Letter, Ibid. 742. [2] Papers, ut supra, p. 744–750.
[3] Ibid. p. 755—790.

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plunder of Tanjore, offered a sum of money in lieu of it to the troops. His offer was not satisfactory; and a disagreeable and acrimonious correspondence had taken place. By concluding a peace, before the reduction of the fort, any allowance to the army was a matter of gratuity, not of right.[1]

The Presidency were struck, as they say, with "alarm," when, expecting every hour to hear of the fall of Tanjore, they were accosted with the news of the conclusion of a peace. They expressed the greatest dissatisfaction with the terms, which ought, in their opinion, to have been nothing less than the surrender of the fort at discretion. The terms were not only inadequate; but no security, they said, was provided for the execution of them such as they were. On this account, they held it necessary to keep themselves prepared as for immediate war. Orders were sent out to give up Vellum without further instructions. The expectation was entertained, that the Raja would not be exact to a day in the delivery of the money and jewels he had agreed to resign. This happened. The want of punctuality was pronounced a breach of the treaty; the guns had not yet been drawn out of the batteries; and the troops were under the walls of Tanjore: the fort of Vellum, and the districts of Coiladdy and Elangad, were demanded: a renewal of hostilities was threatened as the only alternative: the helpless Raja could do nothing but comply.[2]

In averting from themselves the effects of this disapprobation, the General stated, that he communicated to Omdut ul Omrah the progress of the siege, and the great probability of success: that he had no control over the negotiation, and was bound by his instructions to desist from hostilities the moment the Nabob desired: on the other hand, Omdut ul Omrah affirmed, that he took not a step without consulting the General; that the troops were under the greatest apprehension on account of the rains which had begun; that when the breach was partly made, he stated the terms to which the Raja had yielded declaring that he would not accept them, if the fall of the place were assured; that the General replied, he could not say he *would* take the place, but he would endeavour to

[1] Papers, ut supra, p. 827.

[2] Ibid. pp. 930, 931.

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take it; that being asked his opinion, whether the Raja would give such terms as he now offered, if the siege were unsuccessful, the General said, "My opinion is, that in that case he will give you nothing, but if he does he is a great fool;" that when asked if he would guarantee equivalent terms in case the enterprise miscarried, he repelled the proposal; that when peace was then held up to his view, as what in that case appeared the most politic choice, he replied, "It was well; it was at the Nabob's option."[1]

Before all things were settled with Tanjore, the Nabob made application for the Company's forces to reduce the two Marawar Polygars. The Governor and Council, in their letter upon this to the Court of Directors, make the following pertinent remarks; "It is well worthy of observation that Marawar and Nalcooty are the two Polygars whom the Raja of Tanjore attacked in the beginning of the year, asserting their dependence on his government; while the Nabob claimed the right of protecting them, as tributaries to the government of Trichinopoly. It was in this cause that the late Plenipotentiary[2] took the field of controversy; asserted the Nabob's pretensions to us, who did not deny them; exaggerated the outrage of the Raja of Tanjore in taking arms against them: and extolled their obedience and submission to the Nabob's government: and he will say, he *compelled* us to vindicate the Nabob's dignity. What honours are due to the minister's zeal for his *friend's* cause! Mark now the reasoning of that *friend:* the Raja humbled! Marawar and Nalcooty, from obedient dependants, become immediately dangerous and ungovernable delinquents; and there can be no safety to the Nabob's government unless they are reduced."[3]

Notwithstanding the contradiction which the Presidency thus remarked in the pretexts of the Nabob, they consented, without any difficulty in this case, to undertake the expedition. The season of the rains of necessity delayed their operations; but in the meantime inquiries were made; terms were settled with the Nabob; and the army was kept ready at Trichinopoly, the nearest of the stations to the place of attack.

The Nabob imputed no other crime to the Marawars,

[1] Papers, ut supra, pp. 803, 857. [2] Sir John Lindsay.
[3] Tanjore Papers, ut supra, p. 1082.

except their not sending troops to the late war upon Tanjore, and not paying the money which he exacted of them. And the Presidency acknowledged that he had no right over them whatsoever, but that right of oppression, which is claimed by the strong man over the weak. The reason for concurring with the Nabob in his desire to attack them, was, that the Nabob, by his ill-usage, had made them his enemies. They concurred, they said, "not to gratify the Nabob's revenge on those Polygars; but because, if they were not originally and naturally, he has made them his enemies; and therefore it is necessary they should be reduced. It is necessary; or it is good policy they should. We do not say it is altogether just; for justice and good policy are not often related." [1]

The objects, however, of the Nabob and of the Company were somewhat different. The ardent passion of the Nabob was to destroy every creature who bore any rule in the country, and place the whole under his own immediate authority. The intention of the Company was by no means to proceed to "the total extirpation of the Polygars; but only to reduce them to such a state of dependence, by seizing their forts and strong-holds, as might prevent their being troublesome in future." [2]

The Nabob's application for reduction of the Marawars was made at the beginning of November, 1771; at the beginning of December, when the concurrence and views of the Presidency were understood, he recommended, if not a dereliction, at any rate a suspension of the design, for fear of the Mahrattas; and at the beginning of March, 1772, he renewed his application for undertaking the expedition. On the 12th of May, a force consisting of 120 artillery-men, 400 European infantry, three battalions of sepoys, six battering cannon, a body of the Nabob's cavalry, and two of his battalions of sepoys, marched from Trichinopoly, accompanied by Omdut ul Omrah, who was deputed by his father to conduct all operations, not military, connected with the expedition. They arrived, having met with no opposition, at Ramnadaporam, the capital of the greater Marawar, on the 28th. The batteries were opened in the morning of the 2nd of April, and a practicable

[1] Tanjore Papers, ut supra, p. 969, combined with p. 1085, par. 54.
[2] Ibid. p. 1081.

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breach was effected before the evening. This time a bargain had been made with the Nabob, that he should not forestall the wishes of his allies, by the precipitate conclusion of a peace. Terms were, however, offered both by Omdut ul Omrah and the General, which, notwithstanding their inadequate means of resistance, the people of the Polygar refused. The fort was assaulted the same evening, and carried with the loss of only one European and two sepoys killed. The Polygar, a minor of only twelve years of age, with his mother, and the Dewan, were taken in the place; and soon reduced to a situation which extorted the compassion of Englishmen. The Nabob bargained for the plunder by a sum of money to the troops.[1]

The Nabob's troops, before the 15th of June, were put in possession of all the forts in great Marawar; and on the 16th, the army began its march toward the other principality of that name. The Polygar had betaken himself to a strong-hold, named Kala-Koil, or Carracoil, surrounded by thick woods, which they approached on the morning of the 23rd. An English officer, with a detachment of the army, was sent to approach by a road on the opposite side, with a hope, either of drawing off some of the enemy's attention, or of finding an opportunity to enter by surprise. In the meantime submissive offers arrived from the Polygar. To guard against any stratagem to amuse, the advance of the troops was not interrupted till the morning of the 25th, when Omdut ul Omrah gave the General notice that peace was concluded, and requested that orders might be sent to stop the detachment. The orders, it seems, were intrusted to the Polygar's vakeels; the Polygar's vakeels, it is said, used not the requisite diligence; at any rate the sending of the orders was unhappily if not criminally mismanaged; the detachment advanced; found the Polygar reposing upon the security of the treaty, and totally off his guard; with scarcely any resistance it entered the place, and the Polygar was killed while endeavouring to escape at one of the gates. The Nabob, here too, gave a sum of money in redemption of the plunder. And these sums became the subject of immediate animosities and disputes, among

[1] Papers, ut supra, p. 1081—1083, and 998.

the parties by whom pretensions to a share of them were advanced.[1]

The settlement of the territory was rendered difficult, by excess of misgovernment. The people of the country, who had facilitated the conquest by remaining at their ploughs, and who expected equal indulgence under one despot as another, were turned out of their lands, and took arms all over the country. "I must represent to you," said the English officer, who was left to support Omdut ul Omrah, (these are the words of a letter addressed to the Council,) "that the settling this country in the manner expected by the Nabob, requires extremities of a shocking nature. When we are marching, we find all over the country most villages abandoned by the men, there remaining in them only women and children, who, probably if the Nabob persists in this undertaking, must, with other poor innocents, become a sacrifice to this conquest. For, if any of our baggage remain behind, it is usually taken; our parties and stragglers are attacked. This is done by the inhabitants of some village or other. Those villages being pointed out to me, I cannot pass the outrage without punishment; and not finding the objects on which my vengeance should fall, I can only determine it by reprisals; which will oblige me to plunder and burn those villages; kill every man in them; and take prisoners the women and children. Those are actions which the nature of this war will require: for, having no enemy to encounter, it is only by severe examples of that kind, that we may expect to terminate it, so as to answer the end proposed."[2]

Complaining, that they were left without any specific instructions by the Court of Directors, that they were commanded generally to support the Nabob in all his pretensions, that they were blamed as not having given him a sufficient support, that they were bullied by the Plenipotentiaries to support him more than they could believe was either expedient or safe, the Governor and Council alleged that they were led on by that friend and ally from one step to another, without knowing where to stop, and without being able to make those reservations in favour of the Company which the interests of the Company ap-

[1] Papers, ut supra, pp. 1083—1085, 1006, 1037. [2] Ibid. p. 1058.

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peared to require. In this manner had Tanjore been humbled and fleeced: in this manner the two Marawars had been conquered, and delivered up as a dominion to the Nabob. It must be allowed, that except for a little time when he first demanded the attack on Tanjore, the Presidency had shown themselves abundantly forward to second, or rather to excite the Nabob's ardour for conquest of the minor states. The Nabob had only one scruple, the fear of their conquering for themselves. The declarations, however, of the Presidency, of the Directors, and of the King's minister plenipotentiary, the interpretations of the treaty of Paris, and especially the recent example in the surrender of the Marawars, raised up a hope in his Highness that the time was at last arrived when the long-desired possession of Tanjore might be fully acquired.

In a conference with the President about the middle of June, 1773, the Nabob brought complaint, that there was now due from Tanjore about ten lacs of rupees, that the Raja had applied to the Mahrattas and to Hyder for a body of troops, and had encouraged the Colleries to ravage part of the Carnatic territory: and intimated his intention of subduing him; all which he desired the President to consider of.[1]

After a few days, at another conference, "the Nabob expressed his earnest desire that the expedition should be undertaken; spoke much of his friendship to the Company; and to show his regard for them, was willing, in case of success, to give them ten lacs of pagodas."[2]

As the question immediately occurred, what, in case the expedition was undertaken, was to be expected from, or done with, their neighbours, Hyder, and the Mahrattas; a curious change appeared in the sentiments of the Nabob. A friendship, he said, must be established between him and Hyder; for notwithstanding all that he had done to procure for the Mahrattas the benefit of English assistance, "yet he found they were not fair and open towards him at Poonah;[3] and that whether he reduced Tanjore or

[1] Papers, ut supra, p. 1107.
[2] President's Report to the Select Committee, Papers, ut supra, p. 1108.
[3] His not getting them the assistance from the English, he represented as the cause of their want of friendship, since they believed (of course he had told them) that, "he had got the entire control of the whole English nation, and could make them do as he pleased." Ibid.

did not reduce it, they would still come against him when it suited their affairs; that by God's blessing, however, if he and Hyder were joined, they would, with the assistance of the English, keep the Mahrattas effectually on the other side of the Kistnah."[1]

On the 22nd of June, the question underwent deliberation in the Select Committee. As to the complaint about the moneys unpaid, the Committee pass it over as a matter of slight importance. And as to the other complaint, that the Raja was looking to the neighbouring powers for support against the Nabob, of which they had before them no satisfactory proof, they were constrained to confess, that, if it were true, he would not be to blame. "That the Nabob," they say, "has constantly had in view the design of conquering Tanjore, will not admit of a doubt. We are firmly persuaded, that his chief motive for concluding peace with the Raja, at a time when our troops were upon the point of getting possession of the place, arose from his jealousy lest the Company purposed at a convenient opportunity to take the country from him. By that expedition, however, he obtained what he earnestly wished for, namely, the removal of that restraint which he thought himself under, by the Company's guarantee of 1762."

The Committee next record a solemn declaration, that the treaty, which was then concluded, left the Raja at the mercy of the Nabob, and bound, by a sense of self-preservation, to seek for protection against him in every quarter. "We then expressed our firm opinion, that the peace, concluded *without the intervention of the Company*, would not be considered by the Raja as any security to him; and that he would avail himself of the first opportunity of freeing himself from *his apprehensions of the Nabob*. The intelligence communicated to us by the Nabob, of the Raja's application to the Mahrattas and Hyder Ali for assistance, is, in some measure, confirmed by the advices transmitted to us by Mr. Mostyn from Poonah:[2] Neither is the conduct of the Raja, in this in-

[1] President's Report to the Select Committee, Papers, ut supra, p. 1108.

[2] The author of the Defence of Lord Pigot (Introd. p. 63) says, that by the Nabob, people were employed to personate the Raja's vakeels at Poonah; that letters were fabricated; and all sorts of artifice employed to mislead the Company's servants. The Presidency are often complaining that the Nabob's

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stance, to be wondered at. The apprehensions he before had, have been increased by the publication of the Nabob's intention of reducing him; which has gained credit all over the country. He knows that, in our present situation, we cannot interfere in the disputes between him and the Nabob; that the Nabob did not even allow his vakeel to visit the late President. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising, that the Raja should endeavour to strengthen himself, by every means in his power, to enable him to withstand any attempts of the Nabob against him."[1]

That the Presidency had reason to pass over in silence, or at least with neglect, the complaints of the Nabob, respecting the payment of the Raja's debt, sufficiently appears from the statement of the facts. Of fifty lacks, exacted as the compensation for peace, twelve lacks and a half were paid down. By mortgaging jewels and land, to the Dutch at Negapatnam, and the Danes at Tranquebar, he had contrived to pay the remainder, together with eight lacks for the peshcush of two years, leaving a balance of only ten lacks upon the whole.[2]

Notwithstanding the absence of criminality on the part of the Raja, the Presidency resolved that they ought to destroy him. "It is evident," they say, "that in the present system,[3] it is dangerous to have such a power in the heart of the province: for, as the Honourable Court have been repeatedly advised unless the Company can engage the Raja to their interest, by a firm promise of support in all his just rights, we look upon it as certain, that, should any troubles arise in the Carnatic, whether from the French or a country enemy, and present a favourable opportunity of freeing himself from his apprehensions of the Nabob, he would take part against him, and at such a time might be a dangerous enemy in the south. The propriety and expediency, therefore, of embracing the present

letters of intelligence state always a set of facts exactly calculated to support the point, whatever it is, at which the Nabob is at that moment driving,

[1] Papers, ut supra, p. 1117.

[2] See the Letter from the Dutch to the Nabob (Ibid. 1273; Defence of Lord Pigot, Introd. 64.

[3] By "present system," they mean the orders from England to support the Nabob, as absolute sovereign, in all his pretensions; which held their hands from interfering to protect the Raja.

opportunity of reducing him entirely, before such an event takes place, are evident."[1]

Never, I suppose, was the resolution taken to make war upon a lawful sovereign, with the view of "reducing him entirely," that is, stripping him of his dominions, and either putting him and his family to death, or making them prisoners for life, upon a more accommodating principle. We have done the Raja great injury. We have no intention to do him right. This constitutes a full and sufficient reason for going on to his destruction. Such is the doctrine; the practical improvement is obvious. Do you wish a good reason for effecting any body's destruction? First do him an injury sufficiently great, and then if you destroy him, you have, in the law of self-defence, an ample justification?[1] 1773.

In the opinion of the Presidency, no danger attended the operations required for the destruction of the Raja. As to Hyder, he had too much business on his hands, and knew his own interest too well, to make the English just now his enemies on account of the Raja. With regard to the Mahrattas, they were sure to invade the Carnatic, whenever they could expect to do so with any success; and that would happen neither sooner nor later on account of the reduction of Tanjore.[2]

The next point to consider was, the conditions upon which the Nabob should be accommodated with the destruction of the Raja, and the transfer of his dominions. The first condition was, that the Nabob should advance cash, or good bills, sufficient for the expense of the expedition. The second was, that all sorts of necessaries, excepting military stores, should be amply provided by the Nabob. The third was, that instead of paying for 7,000 sepoys, he should henceforth pay for 10,000. The condition, which the Presidency endeavoured before the first war to obtain, but which they afterwards gave up, that of reserving the disposal of Tanjore to the Court of Directors; and the maxim laid down by the Directors, and recognised by the Presidency, in the case of the Marawars, viz. that it was for the interest of the Company to leave the minor chiefs in the Carnatic totally defenceless, as likely to aid the Nabob in those schemes of independence which he

[1] Papers, ut supra, p. 1117.

[2] Ibid. p. 1117.

BOOK V. CHAP. IV. incessantly cherished; were on this occasion totally neglected.

1778. The Nabob, in these cases, was accustomed to press his project eagerly, as long as he found the Presidency reluctant or undetermined; as soon as he found them engaged, and warm in the project, to manifest something of indifference or aversion. So it happened, on the present occasion. The Nabob, after several conferences, told the President, "he would not be too pressing upon the expedition's being undertaken, without it suited the Company's affairs." The Presidency, however, were in a very different disposition; they were determined, and impatient, to begin the operations immediately.[1]

The Nabob, without much difficulty, accepted the conditions, on which the Presidency were eager to make for him the conquest of Tanjore; and it was agreed, that no peace should be concluded with the Raja, unless it should be found to be absolutely impossible to effect his destruction. The general was furnished with his instructions on the 5th of July. The Nabob bargained with the troops, by a sum of money, for the plunder of Tanjore, if the place should be taken by storm. And on the 3rd of August the army marched from Trichinopoly.

They encamped, after a skirmish, within a short distance of Tanjore, on the 6th of August. On the 13th, the following letter was received from the Raja. "The friendship and support offered by the English to this country is a matter of universal celebration and report among all the Mahratta and Rajapoot nations, as well as others. We have quietly submitted to the hard terms imposed on us by the Nabob; and have given him all that, by these means, he required. Some deficiency happened in the re-

[1] Papers, ut supra, p. 1122, 1125. There is a secret history in many of the proceedings of the Company's servants, which it is not possible to bring forward with such evidence as history admits, and which, except in a very general manner, it is not within the province of history to trace. Such articles of evidence as present themselves may be submitted for consideration. The Author of the History and management of the East India Company, than whom no man was better acquainted with the secrets of Madras, and who, though he is a prejudiced and unfair, is not a mendacious writer, says, (p. 219) that the crime of the Raja was his sending to borrow money of the Dutch; and had he pursued the plan of borrowing at Madras "with more constancy, and to a much larger extent, the GREAT FOLKS at Madras might have had an interest in overlooking, for some time longer, his designs. But Tulja-ji, though not more faithless, was less prudent than his father, Pretaupa Sing, who had always an expert agent at Madras to negotiate a loan, when he wished to obtain a favour."

venues of the mortgaged lands; for the payment of the sums so deficient, as well as the last year's peshcush (though the latter had not yet become due) I borrowed of the Soucars; and having engaged with them also for an additional sum, to discharge what was due to the young Nabob and other lesser accounts, I took bills for the whole amount, and sent them to the Nabob; who, having protested my bills,[1] has set on foot an expedition against me. Considering that no deviation of conduct can by any means be laid to my charge, and that I have fulfilled my engagements in respect of the payments I agreed to, I am confident you can never consent to this measure. Some offence should surely be proved upon me, before an expedition be undertaken against me; without any show of equity, to wage an unjust war against me, is not consistent with reason. This charitable country is the support of multitudes of people; if you, Sir, will preserve it from destruction, you will be the most great, glorious, and honoured of mankind. I am full of confidence, that you will neither do injustice yourself, nor listen to the tale of the oppressor. I only desire a continuance of that sup-

[1] This transaction is explained in the following manner, by the Author of the "Defence of Lord Pigot." (Introd. p. 64.) "It happened that one Comera, a dubash of the virtuous Mr. Benfield, was at Tanjore, when the Nabob threatened a second visit. This Comera, servant of Mr. Benfield, was employed in lending money on mortgages. To him the Raja addressed himself; through him, he mortgaged to Mr. Benfield some districts which had been formerly mortgaged to the Nabob; and obtained from Comera bills on his master, Mr. Benfield, payable at Madras, for the twelve lacks which, by the treaty of 1771, were still to be paid. But it was not the intention of the Nabob to receive this last instalment. His confidence in the servants of the Company was increased. And he now determined at all events to get possession of Tanjore. He therefore sent for the dubash, and, by proper application, prevailed on him to deny that he gave the draughts: by proper applications he raised unexpected scruples in the breast of the delicate Mr. Benfield. Though he now avows that he has mortgages to a considerable amount in the Tanjore country; yet then, in a more enlightened moment, he discovered that it was his duty, as a servant obedient to the orders of the Company, to reject any proposal of lending money on mortgages. He does not, indeed, deny that the bills were drawn on him: he allows them to have been drawn, and actually sent to the Nabob: so far he contradicts his agent. But he seems not to know who it was that drew them. His own servant, Comera, dwindles, in his account, into an undescribable creature without a name; a black man to the southward, with whom the virtuous Mr. Benfield had, indeed, some mercantile concerns. In this statement, the facts of the drawing of the bills, and of their not being accepted by Mr. Benfield, are established. For the remaining points we have only the authority of the writer, and the mode of gaining a delicate point at Madras; the writer is, it is to be remembered, a partizan; but the mode of gaining points at Madras, are notorious, habitual, and altogether concordant with the assertion.

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port which this country has formerly experienced from the English, and you will reap the fame so good an action deserves." [1]

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Ground was broken before Tanjore, late on the evening of the 20th of August; and a party was advanced to a commanding spot within 500 yards of the walls. On the 23rd, the engineers had run their parallels to the destined extent, but had not time to erect a redoubt which was intended to secure their left. On the morning of the 24th the enemy sallied in a considerable party, and attacked the trenches with musketry. They retired upon the brisk advance of the grenadiers; but not without some loss to the English assailants. On the 27th, in the morning, the batteries were opened. About the same time the Presidency received from Mr. Mostyn, at Poonah, a letter, to say, that a dispute between the Peshwa's government, and that of Berar, afforded present occupation to the Mahrattas, and removed the danger of interruption to the expedition against Tanjore. The approaches were made, and the breaching-batteries opened, early in the morning of the 14th of September. On the 16th, a passage of twelve feet wide was completed across the wet ditch which surrounded the walls; and the breach was so considerable, that the enemy expected the assault by day-light the next morning, when 20,000 fighting men were prepared to defend the breach. This hour being permitted to pass, they expected no further attempt till the evening; but when the sun was in the meridian, and intensely hot, and the garrison had mostly retired to obtain a little refreshment and repose, the English troops were drawn out, without noise, to the assault. The success of the stratagem was complete. The troops entered with scarcely any resistance, or any loss. And the Raja and his family were taken prisoners in the fort.[2]

The Dutch had received the seaport town of Nagore

[1] Papers, ut supra, p. 1177. The tone of the Raja's letter is indisputable; his assertions with regard to matters of fact are as much, or rather as little valuable, as those of the Nabob.

[2] Papers, ut supra, p. 1197.—1218. In giving an account, the next day, of the capture of the place, the English General writes to the Presidency: "The situation of the Raja is truly pitiable, and likewise Monajee's (the Generalissimo); I do therefore hope, as the place has fallen by the English arms, that the Honourable Board will exert their influence with his highness, that those prisoners may be treated agreeably to the rank they once held in this country." Ibid. p. 1218.

and its dependencies, in assignment for the money which they had lent to the Raja of Tanjore. It was the wish, neither of the English, nor of the Nabob, that they should enjoy the advantage of retaining these possessions. The first protence made use of was, that assistance had been lent to the Raja against the late expedition. Before the troops withdrew from Tanjore, a letter was written by the Nabob to the Presidency, recording the complaint, and demanding assistance to punish the offenders. It was also necessary to send information of the charge to the Dutch. They utterly denied the facts; and, as there appears to have been nothing to prove them, the charge was permitted to drop. Another resource remained. The Dutch had purchased Nagore. Upon this the Presidency gravely and solemnly declare: "As the Raja of Tanjore held his lands of the Nabob in fee, he could not, agreeably to the feudal system, which prevails all over India, alienate any part of this country to any other power, without the consent of his liege lord, the ruler of the Carnatic Payen Ghaut."[1] Upon this foundation, they felt no scruple in joining with the Nabob to make war upon the Dutch. Yet it is abundantly certain, that such an idea as that of "land held in fee" could hardly enter into the mind of a native Indian, even in the way of imagination and conception. Such a thing as a feudal system or a liege lord, never had a moment's existence in India, nor was ever supposed to have, except by a few pedantic, and half-lettered Englishmen, who knew little more of the feudal system than the name. If this doctrine were true, the English had originally no just title, either to Calcutta or Madras. When they obtained the one from the Subahdar of Bengal, he was the vassal of the Mogul; when they obtained the other from the Nabob of the Carnatic, he was the vassal of Nizam al Mulk, the Subahdar of the Deccan. Besides, the Presidency themselves had, only two years before, declared that no such thing as feudality existed in India; that the only right of one state over another was power; that the stronger uniformly exacted tribute of the weaker;

[1] Consultation of the Governor and Council, 23rd Sept., 1773; Papers, ut supra, p, 1226.—M. This part of the argument seems to have been suggested by the ministerial representative, Sir Robert Harland.—Papers, 1225.—W.

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but that legal dependence there was certainly none.[1] The troops advanced. The Dutch made a solemn protest against the injustice; but they were not in a condition to make effectual resistance; and they prudently retired. The Nabob complained of the cold-heartedness and supineness of his English friends, because they would not support him in attacking the ancient possessions of the Dutch. At length it was arranged, that the Dutch should be re-imbursed by the Nabob the money which they had advanced to the Raja; and that they should give up to the Nabob the lands and jewels which they had received in payment or in pledge.[2]

When the former war with Tanjore was projected, the Nabob, though he would not consent that the English should garrison Tanjore, if taken, yet proposed that he himself should place in it a garrison of Europeans. This time he would not consent to even so much, but insisted upon it, that Tanjore should be garrisoned with his own troops.[3] The Presidency so far attended to humanity, and the suggestion of their own general, as to express their wishes to the Nabob for humane treatment of the Raja and his family. But they were satisfied with very slight evidence of the gratification of those desires. The wretched Raja and his mother addressed a letter, each of them, to the Nabob; telling him that they were remarkably well treated. These letters were shown to the Presidency; and the Presidency tell the Directors, "We have much satisfaction to learn, by letters from the Raja and his mother to the Nabob, communicated to us, that they are treated with much attention and humanity in their confinement."[4] The Nabob could never be at a loss, upon such admirable terms as these, for a proof of anything which he could possibly desire.

Intelligence of the dethronement of the Raja, and of the transfer of his dominions to the Nabob, was not delayed by the Company's servants. It was received in London, with all the documents and details, on the 26th of March, 1774. Three weeks elapsed before the departure of the last ships of the season: but the Directors made no remarks

[1] Vide supra, p. 65.
[2] Papers ut supra, p. 1226, 1273, 1276, 1281, 1290, 1333, 1361.
[3] Ibid. p. 1236.
[4] Ibid p. 1336.

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upon the revolution in Tanjore. Upon so great a change effected in the state of their dominions, without advice or authority, the sovereign body, as if they had no opinion to express, that is, were incapable for the moment of executing the functions of government, maintained absolute silence. In the course of the summer, various despatches arrived, describing the subsequent measures to which the transfer of the Tanjore kingdom had given rise. No observations were elicited from the Court of Directors.[1] During the winter of 1774, and more than two months of 1775, the same silence was observed; and, if acquiescence might be taken for approbation, the actors in India had reason to congratulate themselves upon a favourable construction of their conduct.

The secret history at that time of the East India House, that is, the history of the interests of the individuals by whom it was governed, even if it could be given upon such evidence as history confides in, which secret history seldom can be, would not, on the present occasion, be of any importance. The only point which deserves our attention, is the general result; that the East India Company is a governing body so constituted, no matter by what secret

[1] An explanation is offered of the non-interposition of the Court in the Tract published under their authority, "The Restoration of the King of Tanjore considered," in reply to the "Statement of Facts," and which contains the view of the case derived from the documents repeatedly referred to. It is admitted, that the situation of affairs in England lessened the attention of the Directors to political concerns in India. In 1769, occurred the necessity of the renewal of their engagements with the Government of Great Britain, in the midst of great pecuniary difficulties. In 1771, it became necessary to reduce the rate of dividend, and the court was engaged in ascertaining the cause of the distress, and investigating the conduct of those to whom it was imputed. New regulations were the perpetual subject of discussion by General Courts and Committees of Proprietors. The succeeding winter produced other inquiries. Two Committees of the House of Commons sat at the same time, and their proceeding gave full employment to the attention of the Court. In June, 1773, the Constitution and Government of the Company, both in England and in Bengal, were greatly altered; and the considerations consequent upon the change were numerous and important, so that the instructions to the gentlemen appointed by parliament, were not delivered to them before March, 1774. In that month arrived the news of the second expedition and capture of Tanjore; but the consultations required to explain the measures of the Council, were not received till August, when the Court lost no time in preparing papers necessary for an attentive investigation. Silence, therefore, was not observed through the winter of 1774, for those papers were submitted to His Majesty's Ministers in January, 1775. On the 27th of March, the intended paragraphs of a letter to Madras were laid before the Secretary of State, returned with his concurrence on the 7th of April, and signed on the 12th of the same month. Although, therefore, the efficiency of the system to conduct, at the same period, great interests both in England and in India, may be called in question; yet there is no reason whatever to insinuate that the Court of Directors disregarded or acquiesced in the transactions in Tanjore.—W.

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agency in the minds of individuals, as to be incapable of giving, or capable of withholding to give, for nearly twelve months, an opinion on one of the most important transactions to which their authority and power could be applied.

There was no little division, at that time, in the councils of the East India House. Early in the year 1775, the question was agitated of a successor to the Governor of Fort St. George. The Court of Directors, by a small majority, declared for Mr. Rumbold. A Court of Proprietors, called soon after to deliberate upon the subject, reversed their decision, by a small majority, and made choice of Lord Pigot.

This ancient Governor had returned to England about the end of the year 1763; and had been successively raised to the dignities of a baronet, and of an Irish peer.[1] By the weight of his fortune, by his connexion with individuals, and the reputation of his services, he enjoyed a great influence in the Company; and, after a residence of twelve years in England, discovered an inclination, or a wish, to resume the burden of the Presidentship at Madras, and to rival the glory of Clive, by introducing the same reforms under the Presidency of Madras, as that illustrious Governor had introduced in Bengal. The decision in the Court of Proprietors gave the ascendancy to his party in the Court of Directors, and the gratification of his ambition was no longer delayed.

Respecting the revolution in Tanjore there was no indecision in the mind of Pigot; and no sooner was the ascendancy of his party determined, than it also disappeared in the East India House. The treaty of 1762, which gave the Raja security for his throne, was the act, and a favourite act, of Governor Pigot. The subversion of it became the subject of severe condemnation in the Company's Courts There was in the transaction, it is not to be doubted, enough to interest the feelings of any man who looked upon it with partial, or even impartial eyes; and to account for the zeal of Lord Pigot upon the most honourable motives. That his favourite dubash, Moodoo Kistna,

[1] He had gone out a writer to Madras in 1736, and succeeded Mr. Saunders as Governor in 1754, in which appointment he continued until the end of 1763.—W.

with whom he maintained a correspondence in England, had rented lands to a great extent from the Tanjore Raja; that he was offended with the Nabob, who, after appointing him his agent in England, had failed in those remittances which made the place of agent desirable; and that an auction between two princes for the favour of the powerful servants of the Company promised a golden harvest to the relatives and connexions of the Directors, were allegations thrown out by the enemies of the new resolutions;[1] allegations which, if they had general surmise, and even general presumptions in their favour, were unsupported by particular facts.[2]

On the 12th of April, the very day on which the Court of Proprietors met to choose new Directors, the Court of Directors proceeded at last to declare their decision on the business of Tanjore, and to prescribe the rules of future operation.[3]

Notwithstanding their ambiguous language, and still more ambiguous conduct, they declared that they had been perfectly uniform in two things; in commanding that no addition should be made to the possessions either of themselves or the Nabob; and in condemning the policy of placing Tanjore under the dominion of that ruler; "more especially," they add, "as they on the spot were of opinion, that, on account of oppressions exercised by the Nabob in his own dominions, and of his inveterate hatred to the King of Tanjore, the Tanjoreans would submit to any power whatever, rather than to the Nabob." First they condemn, though after solemn thanks formerly given to the Governor who had carried it on, the war of 1771; declaring that though it would have been right to call the Raja to account for arrears of tribute, and to interpose between him and the Marawars, it was wholly unjustifiable to make war upon him when he offered to submit to the arbitration of the Company; and still more "on any account or pretence, or under any circumstances, to put the Nabob

[1] Hist. and Management of the E. I. C. chap. viii.

[2] Why, then, should these allegations be recorded? There was quite enough in the nature of the occurrences to warrant their condemnation upon disinterested principles.—W.

[3] As mentioned in a preceding note, upon the authority of the official narrative, the despatch containing the decision of the Court had been finally prepared on the 27th March. The decision did not, therefore, come in with the new Directors.—W.

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in possession of that Kingdom."[1] They complain, upon this subject, of their servants, as sending them disingenuously incomplete information, and then taking their measures without authority.[2]

With regard to the second expedition, that in 1773 intended for the complete destruction of the Raja, they declare that it was founded upon pretences which were totally false; 1. as the Raja was not proved to have committed any offence; and, 2. as the destruction of him, instead of adding to the security of the Company, had only increased its dangers. They decree, therefore, that Mr. Wynch, their President, shall be removed from his office; that the members of their council shall be severely reprimanded; and, "unless their zeal for the interest of their employers shall manifest a proper sense of their lenity, that they shall certainly experience more rigorous marks of their resentment."[3]

After this retrospect of the past, the Directors immediately pen their regulations for the guidance of the future. They regarded two subjects; 1st, the restoration of the Raja of Tanjore; and, 2ndly, the management of the Company's own possessions, on the coast of Coromandel; that is, the Northern Circars, and the jaghire lands in the neighbourhood of Madras. "We are convinced," said the Directors, addressing the Council of Madras, "that success must, in a great measure, depend upon the wisdom of your councils, the integrity and firmness of your conduct, and in no small degree, upon the seasonable exertion of those peculiar abilities for which your Right Honourable President is so justly and eminently distinguished."

With regard to the King of Tanjore, the Presidency were first to provide security, by a proper guard, for the persons of him and his family; and next, but under certain conditions, to restore him to his dominions, as they existed in 1762. The conditions were, that he should receive a garrison of the Company's troops into the fort of Tanjore; assign lands for their maintenance; pay to the Nabob the peshcush of 1762: assist him with such troops alone as the Presidency shall join in requiring; form no treaty with

[1] General Letter to Fort St. George, 12th April, 1775; papers, ut supra, p. 145.
[2] Ibid. p. 146—149.
[3] Ibid. p. 150, 151.

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foreign powers, except in concurrence with the English rulers; and neither directly nor indirectly furnish any assistance to their enemies.

For the better management of the Company's possessions, the Council were directed, "when affairs respecting Tanjore shall have been accommodated and finally adjusted," to form a committee, consisting of five members of the Council, who should make the circuit of the Northern Circars, and collect information of all those circumstances in the state of the country which government is chiefly interested in knowing; and after this information should be gained, to take the proper steps for letting the lands during a term of years, on principles similar to those on which the lands had been let in Bengal. Respecting the jaghire, which the Nabob hitherto had rented under the allegation, that the appearance, presented to the people of the country, of the exemption of any part of his dominions from his immediate jurisdiction, would be injurious to his authority; the Directors declared their dissatisfaction with the present arrangement, their determination to take the lands under their own control, unless the Nabob should submit to their conditions; and they directed their servants in the meantime to let them to him, only from year to year.[1]

Lord Pigot resumed the office of Governor of Fort St. George on the 11th of December, 1775. "Upon my arrival," says his Lordship, "I found a general reform was necessary in the settlement, to preserve the Company from ruin."[2] A "general reform" has many enemies; and those, for the most part, very powerful ones. The injunctions of the Directors were to proceed immediately to the restoration of the Raja of Tanjore. It was, however, agreed that the communication should be made with all delicacy to the Nabob, to whom it was known that it would be unpleasing in the highest possible degree. There was no expedient to which Oriental artifice could have recourse, which the Nabob left untried to ward off the blow. He endeavoured to make it appear that he had an undoubted right to the possession of Tanjore; he magnified

[1] General Letter to Fort St. George, 18th April, 1775; papers, ut supra, p. 153—159.

[2] Lord Pigot's Narrative, &c.; Defence of Lord Pigot, p. 83.

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the merit of his services and attachment to the Company; he enlarged upon the disaffection of the Raja; he claimed the support which the letter of the King of England, brought by Sir John Lindsay, had promised him; he deprecated the policy adopted by the Company, of doing one thing by their servants in India, and the very reverse by their Directors in England, and declared that he was unable to understand them in this double capacity. He tried the tone of humility; he tried that of audacity. He sought to affect their sympathy by reminding them of the many Englishmen to whom he was indebted, and whom, if stripped of Tanjore, he would be less able to pay: and of that confidence in their honour with which he had placed his residence, and that of his family, under the guns of Fort St. George. He offered to place an English garrison in the fort of Tanjore; and only entreated, that the country might not be taken out of his hands, till the Company, who had proceeded upon partial information, should decide upon what he had to suggest.

The Council availed themselves of his offer to admit an English garrison into the fort of Tanjore; because it enabled them at once to set the Raja at liberty, and guard his person. But they showed the Nabob that the commands of the Directors were peremptory in regard to the time of the restoration, and left them no liberty to grant the delay for which he applied. It seems to have been the expectation of the principal military officer belonging to the Presidency, Sir Robert Fletcher, that he should be the person by whom the immediate business of restoring the Raja should be performed. But when the President signified his intention of proceeding for that purpose to Tanjore in person, the Council voted unanimously, that the business should be placed in his hands; and as the crop was on the ground, and the harvest approaching, that no time should be lost in giving possession of the country to the Raja.

Sir Robert Fletcher, however, though he had joined in the vote for sending the President, proposed another for sending along with him two other members, under express and particular instructions of the Board; declaring that without this condition he would not have assented to the vote in favour of the President; that the Board were not

justified in the delegation of undefined and unlimited powers, except in a case of extreme necessity: and that, if this measure were drawn into a precedent, the effect would be, to serve the corrupt interests of individuals at the expense of the public. The proposal was rejected by a majority of the Council; but the President took with him by choice two members of the Council, and one of them a person who had voted for the deputation.

Lord Pigot set out on the 30th of March, and arrived at Tanjore on the 8th of April. On the 11th the restoration of the Raja was proclaimed. Instead of employing the troops of the Company to do nothing more than garrison the fort of Tanjore, the President got the Raja to request that they might be employed for the protection of the whole country. And instead of assigning revenue barely to defray their expenses, to save the trouble and dispute which accounts are apt to produce, he offered to give a neat sum to cover all expenses; namely, four lacs of pagodas a year. On the 5th of May, Lord Pigot returned to Madras, and having laid before the Council a copious diary of his proceedings, with all the documents which belonged to them, received a vote of approbation, which, with regard to the general measures, was unanimous.

Mr. Paul Benfield was a servant of the Company in the civil department, and as yet in one of the lowest situations. He had betaken himself to more lucrative functions than the duties of his office; and had become not only a favourite of the Nabob, but the principal agent, in what was at that time one of the first concerns in the settlement, the lending of money.

It appears that Mr. Benfield gave to Lord Pigot a general intimation of certain interests which he held in Tanjore, before the departure of that Lord for the restoration of the Raja, and received from him a general disavowal of any intention to injure his rights. Immediately after the restoration of the Raja was proclaimed, a letter from Mr. Benfield was delivered to Lord Pigot at Tanjore, in which he stated, that for money lent to the Nabob he had assignments upon the revenues of Tanjore, to the amount of 405,000 pagodas, equal to 162,000*l.*; and for money lent to individuals in Tanjore, assignments upon the present

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crop to the amount of 180,000 pagodas, equal to 72,000*l.*; making together the immense sum of 234,000*l.* lent by a junior servant of the Company, with a salary of a few hundred pounds a-year, and who was conspicuous, among other things, for keeping the finest carriages and horses at Madras.

Lord Pigot replied, that, in a case like this, he could do nothing more than lay the circumstances before the Board. Mr. Benfield expressed dissatisfaction that the powers of government were not immediately exerted to procure him all that he desired; and he wrote to the Council, expressing his confidence that they would afford him "assistance to recover his property, while the Right Honourable President, under their commission, remained in authority over those countries." Certain Members of the Board were for proceeding immediately to consider the claims of Mr. Benfield. The majority, however, decided, that the consideration should be postponed till Lord Pigot's return.

A few days after the return of Lord Pigot to the Board, the application of Mr. Benfield was appointed for the subject of deliberation. Mr. Benfield was called upon for particulars and vouchers; but vouchers Mr. Benfield was unable to produce. The transactions, he said, were registered in the books of the Cutcherry; and the Nabob would acknowledge them. As for the books of the Cutcherry, they were never produced; and as for the acknowledgment of the Nabob, there were two questions; one, whether the assignments of the Nabob, if the debts were real, gave any right to the revenues of Tanjore, now restored to the Raja; another, whether the whole, demand and acknowledgment, taken together, were not a collusion between the Nabob and Benfield; a studied fraud upon the Company and the Raja. For the debts, said to be due from individuals, which, in the specification had dwindled down to 30,000 pagodas, there was nothing to give but the word of Mr. Benfield himself. After due consideration, a majority of the Board came to the following decision: "That the Raja of Tanjore, being put in full possession and management of his country by the Company's express orders, it is the opinion of the Board that it is not in their power to comply with Mr. Benfield's request in any re-

spect, those claims on individuals, which bear the appearance of having no connexion with government, not being sufficiently explained to enable the Board to form an opinion thereon, and the assignments of the Nabob not being admissible."

This resolution was passed on the 29th of May. On the 3rd of June Mr. Brooke, one of the majority who had thrown out the claims of Mr. Benfield, entered a minute, in which he stated, that supposing Mr. Benfield to have *demanded* the assistance of the Council, he had voted against him; if he had then, as now, understood that he only *requested* their assistance, he would have voted for him; he, therefore, moved, that the Board should reconsider their vote on the claims of Mr. Benfield; and gave his opinion, that the crop on the ground, at the time of the restoration of the Raja, was by the Company meant to belong to the Nabob. The vote for reconsideration was supported by the majority. On the 13th of June, the subject being resumed, a motion was made by Lord Pigot, that the vote of the 29th of May should be confirmed; it was negatived by a majority of seven to five. On the following day Lord Pigot was proceeding to move that "all the claims of Mr. Benfield were *private* and not *public* concerns," when a member of the Council claimed a right to priority. The claim of the member was founded upon the notice which he had given the preceding day of his intention to put certain motions. The claim of Lord Pigot was founded upon the custom of the Presidency, corroborated by convenience, that the President should possess the initiation of business. The claims were put to the vote, when the question was decided in favour of the member; and he moved, that the crop sown during the time of the Nabob's possession be declared the Nabob's property, his assignments on it, therefore, good; and that the Raja should be instructed to respect and to restore, if they had been disturbed, the pledges in corn which were held by Mr. Benfield. When all this was voted, the question of the President, whether the claims of Mr. Benfield were private or public, was finally considered. The majority thought them, "so far as they regard Mr. Benfield, private claims; so far as they regard the Nabob's assignments to Mr. Benfield, public."

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The following point was agitated next. On the 28th of June, the President opened a proposal for establishing a factory at Tanjore. A motion to this effect was rejected by the majority on the 8th of July. As he could not obtain a factory, the President supposed that a resident would be useful. He moved that Mr. Russel, a member of the Council, and a closely connected friend of his own, should be appointed resident at Tanjore; and this was carried without much opposition.

Velore was the principal military station in the Carnatic, as a frontier fortress, in the line of invasion both to Hyder and the Mahrattas; it was, therefore, provided with the greatest number of troops, and regularly, as the post of honour, assigned to the officer second in command. Colonel Stuart, the officer second in command, thought proper to consider Tanjore, where a small number only of troops were required, as at this time the military station of principal importance in the province; he, therefore, claimed it as his right, and that claim the majority sustained.

Though liberty had been restored to the Raja, and his rights proclaimed, much was yet to be done to put the administration of the country fully in his hands. The struggle between the President and the majority in the Council now was, whether Colonel Stuart, who would manage the business agreeably to the views of the majority, or Mr. Russel, who would manage it agreeably to the views of the President, should have the opportunity of placing the administration in the hands of the Raja.

Mr. Russell was one of the gentlemen named by the Court of Directors to form one of the Committee of Circuit to explore the Circars; and this Committee was directed to proceed upon its mission, as soon as the final settlement of affairs in Tanjore should be effected. The majority laid hold of this circumstance; and voted, as well for the immediate departure of the Committee to the northern Circars, as that of Colonel Stuart to his command in Tanjore. The President insisted, that neither was there any necessity for precipitating the departure of the Committee, nor was the business of Tanjore settled; that the Raja, who believed that the interests which had dethroned him were now triumphant, and those which

restored him overthrown, was in a state of apprehension bordering upon despair. He proposed that, for the termination of this unfortunate struggle, two members of the Board, who were stationed at the out-settlements, and were not involved in the disputes, should be summoned to attend. This proposition was rejected. The President offered to be satisfied, if Mr. Russel was allowed to go to Tanjore for only a few days, to preserve the appearance of consistency in the proceedings of the Council, and to quiet the alarms of the Raja. This too was rejected.

Hitherto the proceedings of both parties, whatever name they may deserve in point of wisdom or virtue, were regular in point of form. Only one alternative now remained for Lord Pigot; the majority was either to be obeyed, or their authority was to be resisted. Lord Pigot resolved to resist, and the method which he pursued was as follows:

He assumed that the President was an integrant part of the Council; that it was not competent to perform any acts of government without him; and that he had a right to withhold his concurrence from any propositions which the majority might urge. This was pretty nearly the same doctrine which had suggested itself to Mr. Hastings in Bengal; but the practical application was somewhat different.

On the 19th of August, it was moved that a copy of instructions for Colonel Stuart, prepared by the commanding officer, should be taken into consideration. The President declared that he would not put the question. The obstruction presented a question of importance; and the majority resolved to adjourn. The following day, the Council assembled, and the same motion was made. The President declared that he would not allow the question to be agitated at the Board. The majority, nevertheless, approved of the instructions, and prepared the draught of a letter to the officer at Tanjore, directing him to deliver over the command of the garrison to Colonel Stuart. The President declared that he would sign neither; affirmed that without his signature they could have no authority, and warned his opponents to desist. The minds of the majority were yet embarrassed, and they adjourned the Council for two days. On the 22nd of August, the day

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on which they first assembled, the majority produced a minute, in which they deny that the concurrence of the President is necessary to constitute an act of government; affirm that the vote of the majority constitutes an act of government; and that it tends to subvert the constitution, for the President to refuse either to put a question, or to carry into execution the decisions of the majority. The President proposed, that questions of so much importance should be left to the decision of their honourable masters; and that here, till their pleasure should be known, both parties should allow the matter to rest.

This, too, was not agreeable to the wishes of the majority. They came to a resolution, that, as the President would not sign the instructions to Colonel Stuart, and the letter to the officer at Tanjore, a letter should be written to the Secretary, directing him to sign them in the name of the Council, and transmit them as authoritative instruments of government to the parties addressed.

The letter was written, and approved by all the gentlemen of the majority. They began to sign it in order, and two of them had already written their names, when Lord Pigot took, or snatched it out of the hand of the man who held it. He then took a paper out of his pocket, and said he had a charge to present against two members of the Board, and named the two who had just signed the letter which he had snatched.[1] The accusation was, that by signing orders to the Secretary to give instructions to Colonel Stuart, they had been guilty of an act subversive of the authority of government, and tending to introduce anarchy. By the standing orders of the Company, any member of the Council, against whom a charge was preferred, was not allowed to deliberate or vote on any of the questions relating to the charge. When the two accused members were excluded, the President had a majority by his own casting vote. It was therefore voted to suspend the members in question, and then the President had a permanent majority. After the vote of suspension, the Council

[1] It would appear from this account, that Lord Pigot had come prepared with the charge, in anticipation of what would happen; but a particular narrative of the transaction, written by Mr. Floyer, one of the majority, to Mr. Orme, mentions, that whilst the letter was being written, the President retired from the Council to his own apartment, and after a short interval returned. It was in this interval that he prepared his charge. Orme Papers, No. 171.—W.

adjourned to the following day which was the 23rd. The gentlemen of the former majority forbore to attend; but they sent by a public notary a protest, in which, beside denouncing the principal act of the following day, they, as the majority of the Board, declare themselves the governing body, and claim the obedience of the settlement. This protest was sent by the same agency to the commanders of his Majesty's troops, and to all persons holding any authority at Madras. In consequence of what he deemed so great an outrage, Lord Pigot summoned the Council again to meet at four o'clock, when they passed a vote, suspending the whole of the members who had signed the protest, and ordered Sir Robert Fletcher, the commanding officer, to be put under arrest, and tried by a Court martial.

The opponents were not behind in violence. They speedily assembled, declared themselves a Council vested with all the powers of government, and resolved to arrest the person of Lord Pigot, and confer the command of the army, Sir Robert Fletcher being ill, on Colonel Stuart.[1] The task of performing the arrest of Lord Pigot was devolved on the Colonel, who, by acquiescence, had accepted from him the command of the army. The greater part of the next day, the 24th, the Colonel passed in company, or in business, with his Lordship; breakfasted with him as well as dined; and having accepted an invitation to sup at his house, and made his arrangement to arrest him by the way, was in the carriage of Lord Pigot along with him, when it was surrounded and stopped by the troops.

As the point, for which all this confusion was created, was the extremely minute one, whether Mr. Russel should or should not go for a few days to Tanjore, it is not easy to believe, that something of importance did not remain at the bottom, which it was not the interest of the parties to disclose. One thing is certain, that the parties, and they had the best means of information, cast the most odious imputations upon one another, and charged the most cor-

[1] In examining afterwards the conduct of the parties, a question was raised about the time of this resolution to arrest Lord Pigot. It appeared to have been taken before the violence of Lord Pigot, in suspending the whole of the majority, and ordering the arrest of Sir Robert Fletcher. But the affidavits of the parties, who were prosecuted in England for the imprisonment of Lord Pigot, and which affidavits were not contradicted, affirmed, that the figure 8, indistinctly written and mistaken for 3, had been the source of the error; and that 8 o'clock, and not 3 p.m. was the time at which the resolution of the majority was taken.

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rupt and dishonourable motives.[1] They were accused of desiring to have an opportunity of enriching themselves, the one party by sharing in the revenues of the Raja, the other by sharing in those of the Nabob.[2] The party who espoused the views of the Nabob seem to have been afraid, after the extremities on which they had ventured, to carry their own resolutions into effect. They had voted that the crop which was on the ground at the time of the restoration belonged to the Nabob, and ought to follow the assignments he had made; yet the Raja was not disturbed in the possession of it;[3] and the debts, real or fictitious, to Benfield, remained at the end of their administration still undischarged.[4]

[1] The real character of the contest is not difficult to comprehend. It lay between the Raja of Tanjore and the Nawab, the latter never relinquishing his pretensions to the supremacy over the former, or his desire to get possession of the Revenues of Tanjore; the former maintaining his claim to independence. Compelled by the orders of the Court to abstain from the open assertion of his pretensions, the Nawab did all that he could to embarrass the proceedings of those intrusted with powers favourable to the cause of the Raja; and he found a strong party to adopt his sentiments with even more violence than himself. On the other hand, Lord Pigot and his adherents were equally intemperate in their support of the Raja; and, not content with effecting his restoration, treated the Nabob with indignity, threatening to remove him to Arcot, or place a guard upon his palace, and interdicting all communication between him and his friends in the service of the Company. These feelings of partisanship were no doubt exacerbated by interested motives: many of the Nawab's supporters and friends were his creditors to a very large amount—to that of nearly a million and a half sterling, and they could not be expected to view with indifference the loss of the revenues of Tanjore, upon which they had calculated for a considerable proportion of their security; that a few of them had corrupt inducements in advocating the Nawab's cause is very possible; and it is difficult to believe that Lord Pigot's personal visit to Tanjore, or the struggle for the office of Resident at that Court, was free from all wish to benefit by substantial proofs of the Raja's gratitude. In proportion as the dispute continued, it included a greater number of persons, until it comprehended most of the settlements of Madras; and the parties principally engaged in it were urged to extremities by the passions of their adherents as well as their own. That the insubordinate members of the Council intended the death of Lord Pigot was an absurd accusation, which, although resting on the verdict of a Coroner's inquest in Madras, was wholly untenable and unproven. The catastrophe, however, contributed, with the orders of the Court, to terrify all parties into temperance, as at an early period after the receipt of these orders, the Committee report that dissension had ceased. General Letter from Madras, 5th Feb. 1777.—W.

[2] Admiral Pigot declared, in the House of Commons, that his brother had been offered ten lacks of pagodas, and afterwards fifteen, a bribe, amounting to about £600,000 of English money, only to defer, and that for a short and specified time, the reinstatement of the Raja. See Parliamentary History for the 16th of April, 1779, and Dodsley's Annual Register, xxii.

[3] The claim was not abandoned, however, and in the beginning of 1777, a sort of compromise was effected with the Raja, who, although he refused to acknowledge any demand upon this account, assented to deposit in the Company's Treasury four lacs of Pagodas — £160,000, to await the Court's disposal. Only one fourth of this was realized at a date considerably subsequent to the agreement. MS. Records.—W.

[4] See their affidavit, Howell's State Trials, xxi. 1236.

They proceeded to the further violence of suspending all those members of the Council, who had voted with the President; but it does not appear that any harshness attended his confinement, or that he was not indulged with every freedom, consistent with the means necessary to prevent his resuming his place in the government.

When intelligence was brought to England of the violent act of the Council of Madras, it excited among the members of the Company, and still more in the nation at large, both surprise and indignation. In the Court of Directors, the party who defended, or at any rate attempted to apologize for the authors of the late revolution, were nearly equal to the party by whom they were condemned. But in a Court of Proprietors held on the 26th of March, 1777, a resolution was passed by a majority of 382 to 140, in which it was recommended to the Court of Directors to take the most effectual measures for restoring Lord Pigot to the full exercise of his authority, and for inquiring into the conduct of the principal actors in his imprisonment. In consequence of this proceeding, it was, on the 11th of April, carried by a casting vote in the Court of Directors, that Lord Pigot and his friends should be restored to the situations from which they had been improperly removed; that seven members of the Council, including the Commander in Chief, who were declared to have subverted the government by a military force, should be suspended from the service, and not restored without the immediate act of the Directors. But a vote of censure was at the same time passed on Lord Pigot, whose conduct in several instances was pronounced worthy of blame. The means were not yet exhausted of defeating this turn of affairs. Not only were impediments accumulated, and placed in the way; but a fresh set of resolutions were brought forward, importing the recall of both parties, as the only mode of accomplishing that fundamental investigation which the importance of the occasion required. These propositions, in favour of which the ministers were supposed to have exerted all their influence, were voted by a majority of 414 to 317, in a General Court on the 9th of May. The attention of Parliament was also attracted. Governor Johnstone, who was distinguished for the part which he had taken in discussions relative to Indian

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affairs, moved, on the 22nd of the same month, a series of resolutions, highly approving the conduct of Pigot, and the measures which had been pursued for his restoration, while they condemned the proceedings of his enemies, and the motion for his recall. Almost all the questions of the English policy, relating to the affairs of the Carnatic, underwent discussion in a long and animated debate; which was closed by a vote of no more, notwithstanding ministerial influence, than ninety to sixty-seven, against the resolutions.

After these proceedings, a commission was prepared under the Company's seal, bearing date the 10 of June 1777, by which Lord Pigot was restored to his office; but he was at the same time directed, within one week after the despatch of the first ship, which, subsequent to the date of his restoration, should proceed from Madras, to deliver over the government to his successor; and either by that ship, or the first that should follow, to take his passage to England. The members of the Council who had concurred in displacing Lord Pigot were recalled; and the military officers, who had been chiefly instrumental in executing the arrest and confinement, were ordered to be tried by courts martial on the spot. Till inquiry should be made into the conduct of both parties in the recent scenes, when it would be seen which of the actors might deserve, and which might not deserve to be removed from the service, the Directors thought proper to form a temporary government; in which Sir Thomas Rumbold, after the departure of Lord Pigot, was to succeed to the chair John Whitehill to be second in council; and Major General Hector Munro, Commander of the Forces, to be third, without the power of any further advancement.[1]

[1] Nothing was ever made of the inquiry. In October, 1789, the Government of Madras informed the Court that they found insuperable difficulties in obtaining information on which dependence could be placed. An advertisement had been published, inviting persons to depose on oath what they knew of the corruption of the parties: none had come forward. Application to the Raja and the Nawab was considered inexpedient, as they were not likely to state any thing to the discredit of their friends. Trial of the officers by Court Martial was held to be illegal, as no military offence had been committed; they had all acted under the orders of the superior authorities. The chief civil servants concerned in the affair returned to England and remained there; the others crept back again into the service. Colonel Stuart afterwards commanded the army, and the military were employed at the siege of Pondicherry. Amidst the public events that soon ensued, all minor irregularities were forgotten.—W.

Before these orders were received in India, Lord Pigot had passed beyond the reach of honour or disgrace. His constitution, worn out by age, and the operation of a hostile climate, sunk under the inactivity of his situation, and the painful feelings which preyed upon his mind, after a confinement of somewhat more than eight months. Mr. Whitehill reached Madras on the 31st of August, 1777, and being the senior in council, acted as President and Governor till the 8th of February following, when Sir Thomas Rumbold arrived.[1]

Once more the subject was taken up by the House of Commons. On the 16th of April, 1779, Admiral Pigot, the brother of the deceased Governor, began the discussion with a history of the transactions which had led to the deposition of Lord Pigot, and with the heaviest charges against the actors in that scene. After which he moved a series of resolutions, affirming the principal facts; affirming also that orders had been given to hold courts-martial for the trial of the principal military officers engaged in the crime, and directing an address to his Majesty for the prosecution, by the Attorney-General, of four of the members of the Council, who had returned to England. The resolutions gave rise to considerable debate; but were finally adopted. Proceedings in the courts of law were immediately commenced; and on the 20th of December the four members were tried for a misdemeanour, before a special jury; and found guilty. When brought up for judgment, a fine of 1000*l.* was imposed upon each. To men of their fortunes, this was a punishment hardly to be felt. Such is the difference, in the minds of English judges, between the crime of deposing the head of a government abroad, and that of writing a censure upon one of the instruments of government at home.[2]

[1] Second Report of the Committee of Secrecy, 1781; and Parliamentary History, 1777, 1779, 1780; State of Facts relative to Tanjore, printed for Cadell, 1777; Tanjore Papers, printed for Cadell, 1777; Lord Pigot's Narrative, with Notes of Mr. Dalrymple, &c.; Defence of Lord Pigot, drawn up by Mr. Lind; Case of the President and Council, fairly stated, &c. Almon, 1777; Proceedings against George Stratton and others (in Howell's State Trials, vol xxi.); Hist. and Management of the East India Company; Considerations on the Conquest of Tanjore, and the Restoration of the Raja. The two last, both by the agents of the Nabob, were published by Cadell, in 1777. Genuine Memoirs of Asiaticus, in a series of letters to a friend, during five years' residence in different parts of India, three of which were spent in the service of the Nabob of Arcot. By Philip Dormer Stanhope, Esq., p. 123—142.

[2] Parliamentary History, vol. xx.; Howell's State Trials, vol. xxi.

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When the Northern Circars were first delivered into the hands of the Company, it was judged expedient to govern the country for a time in the manner which was already established. The Circars of Rajamundry, Ellore, and Condapilly, were consigned, under a lease of three years, to a native named Hussun Ali Khan, who had previously governed them under the Nizam, with the state and authority of a viceroy. The remaining Circar of Circacole was placed under a similar administration, but in the hands of a separate deputy.

A change was introduced in 1760. Administration by the agency of natives was discontinued; and the Circars were placed under the charge of Provincial Chiefs and Councils, a title and form which at that period the commercial factories were made to assume. Under the Chief and Council, formerly the Factory, of Masulipatam, were placed the districts of Condapilly, Rajamundry, and Ellore. The Chief and Council of Vizagapatam received in charge the southern parts of Cicacole; and at Ganjam, where the factory had been discontinued, a new establishment was made of a chief and council for those affairs of the country which could be most conveniently ruled from that as a centre. To these provincial boards, the financial, judicial, and, in short, the whole civil and political administration of the country, was consigned.

The disappointment in their expectations of pecuniary supply from the Northern Circars, as from their other dominions, and the sense which they entertained of the defects of the existing administration, had recommended to the Court of Directors the formation of the Committee of Circuit. This Committee were directed, by personal inspection, and inquiry upon the spot, to ascertain with all possible exactness, the produce, the population, and manufactures of the country; the extent and sources of the revenue; the mode and expense of its collection; the state of administration of justice; how far the financial and judicial regulations which had been introduced in Bengal were applicable in the Circars; what was the condition of the forts; and the circumstances of the Zemindars or Rajas; what the military force of each; the expenses both of his army and household; and the means which he possessed of defraying them. The Directors

declared it to be their intention to let the lands, after the expiration of the present leases, for a term of years, as in Bengal; not, however, to deprive the hereditary Zemindars of their income; but leave them an option, either to take the lands which had belonged to them, under an equitable valuation, or to retire upon a pension. They avowed, at the same time, the design of taking the military power into their own hands, and of preventing the Zemindars from maintaining those bodies of troops, with which they were perpetually enabled to endanger the peace and security of the state.

Within a few days after the deposition of Lord Pigot, the new Governor and Council drew up the instructions of the Committee, and sent them to the discharge of their duties. They had made some progress in their inquiries; when Sir Thomas Rumbold took the reins of government at Madras, in February, 1778.[1]

In Council, on the 24th of March, the Governor represented, that on account of the diminution in the number of members, it was now inconvenient, if not impossible, to spare a sufficient number from the Council to form the Committee; that the Committee was attended with very great expense; that all the ends which were proposed to be served by it might be still more effectually accomplished if the Zemindars were sent for, the desired information obtained from the Zemindars, and the jummabundy or schedule of rent, settled with them at the seat of government; that by this expedient the Zemindars would be made to feel more distinctly their dependence upon the government, both for punishment and protection; that intrigues, and the pursuit of private, at the expense of public interests, which might be expected in the Circars, would be prevented at Madras; and that an indefinite amount of time would be saved. For these reasons he moved, that the Committee of Circuit should be suspended, and that in future the annual rent of the districts should be settled at the Presidency, to which the Zemindars should, for that purpose, be ordered to repair. The Council acquiesced in his reasons, and without further deliberation the measure was decreed.

[1] Fifth Report of the Committee of the House of Commons, 1810; Second Report, Committee of Secrecy, 1781. App. No. 153.

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As soon as this intelligence reached the Zemindars, they were thrown into the greatest consternation. It was expressly urged by the provincial councils on the spot, that the Zemindars were in general poor, and hardly able to support their families with any appearance of dignity; that many of them were altogether unable to defray the expense of a distant journey, and of a residence for any considerable time at the seat of government; that the greater part of them were in debt, and in arrears to the Company; that they must borrow money, to enable them to undertake the journey, and still further incapacitate themselves for fulfilling their engagements; that their absence would greatly augment the confusion of the country, obstructing both the collection of the revenue, and the preparation of the investment; and that some of them laboured under the weight of so many years, and so many bodily infirmities, as to render the journey wholly impracticable.[1]

The President and Council persevered in their original design; and a considerable number of Zemindars were brought to Madras. Of the circumstances which followed, it is necessary that a few should be pointed out. In every case, the Governor alone negotiated with the Zemindars, and regulated their payments; in no case did he lay the grounds of his treaty before the Council; in every case the Council, without inquiry, acquiesced in his decrees. Of all the Zemindars in the Northern Circars, the most important was Vizeram Râz, the Raja of Vizianagaram whose territory had the extent of a considerable kingdom, and whose power had hitherto held the Company in awe. The character of the Raja was voluptuousness and sloth; but along with this he was mild and equitable. Sitteram Râz, his brother, was a man who possessed in a high degree the talents and vices of a Hindu. He was subtle, patient, full of application, intriguing, deceitful, stuck at

[1] Of thirty-one Zemindars summoned to Madras, thirteen did not obey the summons, nor was their presence enforced. On those who came no great hardship was inflicted; and the accounts of the alarm and distress which the order created, are no doubt much exaggerated, as the arrangement withdrew, in some degree, the Zemindars from the influence of the provincial authorities, and deprived them of the valuable Nuzzurs, or presents, which they admitted they were in the practice of receiving. The exactions at the Presidency were probably more moderate than those in the provinces. The settlements made with them were not unreasonable nor injudicious. Minutes of Evidence in the case of Sir J. Rumbold, p. 208, et seq.—W.

no atrocity in the pursuit of his ends, and was stained with the infamy of numerous crimes. Sitteram Râz had so encroached upon the facility and weakness of his brother as to have transferred to himself the principal power in the province. The yoke, however, which he had placed upon the neck of the Raja was galling, and sustained with great uneasiness. Jaggernaut Râz, a connexion of the family, united by marriage with the Raja, who had superintended the details of government, as Dewan, or financial minister, and was universally respected as a man of understanding and virtue, had been recently deprived of his office, through the machinations of Sitteram Râz.[1] The points which required adjustment between Vizeram Râz and the Company had suggested a use, or afforded a pretext, for calling him to the Presidency before Sir Thomas Rumbold arrived. Against this order he remonstrated, on the ground of his poverty, and of the detriment to his affairs which absence would induce. He offered to settle with the Council at Vizagapatam for any reasonable tribute or rent; and complained of his brother Sitteram Râz, whom he described as engaged in machinations for his ruin. Sitteram had obeyed the very first summons to repair to Madras, and had negotiated successfully for the farm of one principal division of the lands. He carried another point of still greater importance; which was to receive from the Presidency the appointment of Dewan to the Raja. To this regulation the Raja manifested the greatest aversion. The President addressed him in the following words: "We are convinced that it is a measure which your own welfare and the interest of the Company render indispensably necessary. But should you continue obstinately to withstand the pressing instances that have repeatedly been made to you by the Board, conjunctively as well as separately, we shall be under the necessity of taking such resolutions as will in all probability be extremely painful to you, but which, being once passed, can

[1] The characters given of both these persons are unwarranted by the evidence or correspondence adduced. Sitaram's atrocity and Jagannath's virtue, are both gratuitous. They were both men of ability, and equally so of intrigue; they were both competitors for the control of Vizeram, and the management of the Zemindari; and both equally unscrupulous in taking advantage of every favourable opportunity to provide for their own interests. If any preference might be claimed for either, it seems to have been due to Sitaram.—W.

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never be recalled." To this Vizeram Râz made the following answer: "I shall consider myself henceforward as divested of all power and consequence whatever, seeing that the Board urge me to do that which is contrary to my fixed determination, and that the result of it is to be the losing of my country." The reason which was urged by the President for this arbitrary proceeding was, the necessity of having a man of abilities to preserve the order of the country, and ensure the revenues. The Court of Directors, however, say, in their general letter to the Presidency of Madras, dated the 10th of January, 1781, "Our surprise and concern were great, on observing the very injurious treatment which the ancient Raja of Vizianagaram received at the Presidency; when, deaf to his representations and entreaties, you, in the most arbitrary and unwarrantable manner, appointed his ambitious and intriguing brother, Sitteram Râz, Dewan of the Circar, and thereby put him in possession of the revenues of his elder brother, who had just informed you that he sought his ruin: for however necessary it might be to adopt measures for securing payment of the Company's tribute, no circumstance, except actual and avowed resistance of the Company's authority, could warrant such treatment of the Raja."[1] And in one of the resolutions which was moved in the House of Commons by Mr. Dundas, afterwards Lord Melville, on the 25th of April, 1782, it was declared, "That the Governor and majority of the Council of Fort St. George did, by menaces and harsh treatment, compel Vizeram Râz, the Raja of Vizianagaram, to employ Sitteram Râz as the Dewan or Manager of his Zemindary, in the room of Jaggernaut, a man of probity and good character; that the compulsive menaces made use of towards the Raja. and the gross ill-treatment which he received at the Presidency, were humiliating, unjust, and cruel in themselves, and highly derogatory to the interests of the East India Company, and to the honour of the British nation."

Nor was this the only particular in which the Presidency and Council contributed to promote the interest and gratify the ambition of Sitteram Râz. They not only prevailed upon the Raja to be reconciled to his brother; they

[1] Second Report, Committee of Secrecy, 1781; Appendix, No. 153.

confirmed his adoption of that brother's son; and "agreed," say the Secret Committee of the House of Commons, "that all under-leases should for the future be made in the adopted Raja's name; that his name should be used in all acts of government; and that Sitteram Râz, his father, who was in reality to enjoy the power, should be accepted of by the Board as a security for this young man."[1]

In the opinion of the Directors, even this was not all. They accused the Presidency of underselling the lands by a corrupt connivance with Sitteram Râz. "The Report," they said, "of the Committee of Circuit, and the positive evidence of Sitteram Râz, warrant us in asserting that more than double the amount of the tribute for which you have agreed, might and ought to have been obtained for the Company. We are in possession," they add, "of one fact, which, so far as it extends, seems to convey an idea, that the Zemindars have been abused, and their money misapplied at the Presidency."[2]

The Directors alluded to the following fact; that Mr. Redhead, private Secretary to Sir Thomas Rumbold, the Governor, had actually received from Sitteram Râz a bond for one lac of rupees, on condition of his services in procuring for the donor the Dewanship of the Zemindary, a reconciliation with his brother, a confirmation of his son's adoption, the Zemindary of Ancapilly, and the fort of Vizianagaram; advantages, the whole of which, Sitteram Râz obtained; and corruption, of which though made known to the President and Council by the proceedings of a court of justice, they afforded to the Court of Directors no information.[3]

Another fact was: that to the same Mr. Redhead, as

[1] Second Report, Committee of Secrecy, 1781; p. 16.—M. As Vizeram was childless, his adoption of his nephew was in strict conformity to Hindu law; the Council of Madras could not choose but concur in it. That the reconciliation between the brothers, however enforced, was permanent, and productive of good effects, was satisfactorily shown by its results. It was effected in July, 1778. The Chief of Vizagapatam, Mr. Casamajor, from June, 1780, to March, 1782, deposes, that during that period, the brothers lived in perfect harmony, Sitaram being Dewan; that the revenues had improved and were regularly paid; and that they could not have been collected at all if the brothers had been at variance. Whatever, therefore, the inducements may have been, this transaction did not deserve the censure cast upon it.—W.

[2] See Letter of 10th January, 1781, quoted above.

[3] Third Report, Committee of Secrecy, 1781, p. 13, 14. Twelfth Resolution of Mr. Dundas, moved in the House of Commons, 25th April, 1782.

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appeared by a codicil to his will, Ameer ul Omra, son of the Nabob, had an order from his father to pay a lac of rupees.

Another fact was: that two lacs and one thousand rupees had been transmitted to Sitteram Râz, while at Madras; of which money, though he was greatly in arrear, no part was paid to the Company.

It further appeared: that according to one of the checks devised by the Company upon the corruption of their servants, if Sir Thomas Rumbold possessed in India any money on loan, or merchandise on hand, at the time of entering upon his office, he was by his covenant bound, before he proceeded to recover the money, or dispose of the goods, to deliver to the Board a particular account of such property upon oath: that upon an accurate examination of the records of the Council during the whole of Sir Thomas Rumbold's administration, no proceedings to that effect could be found: that Sir Thomas Rumbold, nevertheless, had remitted to Europe, between the 8th of February, the day of his arrival at Madras, and the beginning of August in the same year, the sum of 45,000*l.*, and, during the two subsequent years, a further sum of 119,000*l.*, the whole amounting to 164,000*l.*; although the annual amount of his salary and emoluments did not exceed 20,000*l.*

Sir Thomas opposed the evidence of corruption which these transactions imported, by asserting, that he had property in India at the time of his return, sufficient to account for the remittances which he afterwards made. The evidence which he produced consisted in certain papers and books of account, which exhibited, upon the face of them, sums to a great amount. And one of the witnesses, examined before the Secret Committee of the House of Commons, stated his having heard in conversation from Sir Thomas Rumbold, that he had in Bengal, at the time of his last arrival in India, about 90,000*l.*; part in Company's cash, part in bonds, and mortgages at interest, on some of which three or four years' interest was due.[1]

[1] Second Report, ut supra, p. 21, 22.—M. These particulars are loosely and inaccurately stated. It was proved by the evidence and accounts of Mr. Price, Sir T. Rumbold's Attorney in Bengal, that at the time when Sir Thomas quitted Bengal in 1772, the property belonging to him was 9,92,201 rupees, exclusive of interest, valued at 111000*l.* and bearing interest at 8 to 10 per cent.;

The lands or taxes in the Circars were let, some for ten years, some for five.[1] The jaghire about Madras was re-let to the Nabob, not for one, but for three years. And in no case was any satisfactory inquiry performed.

The Directors, complaining that their orders, and the interests of the Company, had been equally disregarded, and that while the dignity and feelings of the Zemindars were violated, the rights of the immediate cultivators were left without protection, pronounced upon the whole of these proceedings their strongest condemnation.

In the agreements formed with the Subahdar, or Nizam, respecting the five Northern Circars, in 1767 and 1768, it was arranged, that Guntoor, which was one of them, should be granted in jaghire to Bazalut Jung, his brother; to be enjoyed by that Prince during his life, or so long as the Subahdar should be satisfied with his conduct;[2] and upon expiration of the interest of Bazalut Jung, to revert to the Company. About the latter end of the year 1774, the Governor and Council were informed by letters from the chief of Masulipatam, that a body of French troops, under the command of M. Lally, were retained in the service of Bazalut Jung, and received reinforcements and stores by the port of Mootapilly. The mention of a French force in the service of a native prince was sure to kindle the jealousy of the English. The Presidency of Madras held the affair of sufficient importance to communicate with the Supreme Council of Bengal on the propriety of using

which balance was handed over to other attorneys in the beginning of 1773, at which time the amount of interest raised the sum to 121,000*l*. There was also other property at the same date in Bengal. The evidence as to what became of this sum in the interval between 1773 and 1777 is defective: but it is proved that no addition to Sir Thomas Rumbold's fortune had been made in England between that time and 1779, and therefore it is inferred no remittances had been effected. That some property had been left in Bengal is also proved by account, but it may be observed that in March, 1778, the balance of his account current with his agents is but 1,12,000 rupees: to this is to be added about three lacs paid on account of monies lent, making a total of something more than 40,000*l*. It is also in evidence that he received as salary 49,000*l*. There still remains a considerable sum to be accounted for, to explain the large amount of his remittances to England. Minutes of Evidence. 518, et seq.—W.

[1] They were let for five years. The only case in which a lease of ten years was granted was to Sitaram Râz, for the Haveli, or demesne lands; and this was granted by the Madras Government some time prior to Sir Thomas Rumbold's arrival.—W.

[2] Not so long as the Subahdar should be satisfied, but until he broke friendship with the Company. See the treaty in Minutes of Evidence, p. 72.—W.

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measures to procure the removal of the French from the territories of Bazalut Jung: and received the authority of that Board, not only to insist, with Bazalut Jung, upon their immediate dismissal; but to prepare a body of troops for marching to his frontiers, and to threaten him, that "they would take possession of his country, and negotiate with the Nizam, even by an entire renunciation of the revenue, for the cession of it to the Company." It was deemed advisable to treat with the Nizam, as principal in the treaty of 1768, and a party to every agreement between the Company and Bazalut Jung: and they desired his co-operation for compelling his brother, either first to dismiss the Europeans from his service, and trust to the English the defence of Guntoor, which was their own; or, secondly, to let that Circar to them at a rent determined by amicable valuation. The Nizam replied in friendly terms; declaring that he had sent a person of distinction to procure the removal of the French from the service of his brother; and that "every article of the treaty should remain fixed to a hair's breadth." From the date of these transactions, which extended to the beginning of the year 1776, though several representations had been received of the continuance of the French in the territory of Bazalut Jung, no ulterior measures were adopted by the Board until the 10th of July, 1778, when the President and Select Committee entered a minute, expressing a conviction of danger from the presence, in such a situation, of such a body of men. A negotiation, through the medium of the Nabob, without the intervention of the Nizam, was commenced with Bazalut Jung. That prince was now alarmed with the prospect presented by the probable designs of Hyder Ali, and well disposed to quiet his apprehensions by the benefit of English protection. On the 30th of November, the President presented to the Board a proposal, tendered by Bazalut Jung, in which that Prince agreed to cede the Guntoor district for a certain annual payment, to dismiss the French from his service, and to accept the engagement of the English to afford him troops for the defence of his country. On the 27th of January, 1779, when the treaty was concluded with Bazalut Jung, it was thought expedient to send to the court of the Nizam a resident; who should ascertain as far as possible the

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views of that Prince, and his connexions with the Indian powers or the French; obviate any unfavourable impressions which he might have received; and transact any business to which the relations of the two states might give birth. And on the 19th of April a force, under General Harpur, was ordered to proceed to the protection of the territory of Bazalut Jung.

In the contest with the Mahrattas, in which, at the Presidencies of Bengal and Bombay, the English were engaged, the Nizam had expressed a desire to remain neutral, though he had frankly declared his hatred of Ragoba, and his connexion by treaty with Pundit Purdaun, the infant Peshwa, that is, with the prevailing party of the Poona Council; and though an alliance with the Berar government had been attempted by the Supreme Council, on the condition of recovering for that government some countries which had been wrested from it by the Subahdar of the Deccan.* When Mr. Hollond, who was sent as resident by the Presidency of Madras, arrived at Hyderabad, the capital of the Nizam, on the 6th of April, he was received with every mark of respect, and with the strongest assurances of a desire to cultivate the friendship of the English. But when, at his audience, the resident proceeded to explain the transactions, which, without the participation of the Nizam, had taken place between the Company and his brother, the painful emotions of his Highness were visible; he read over the articles of the treaty of 1768; affirmed that it was violated by the conduct of the Presidency; disavowed the right of the English to interfere in the concerns of his family; declared that, if the treaty was to be regarded, the troops which, without his leave, were about to march into the country, possessed by Bazalut Jung, a dependant of the Subah, ought to be stopped; if the treaty was not to be regarded, he should be constrained to oppose them. To the apology urged by Mr. Hollond, that the probability of an immediate attack by Hyder Ali left not sufficient time for consulting him; the Nizam replied that Hyder had no immediate intention to molest his brother, but was meditating a speedy attack upon the Carnatic, to be conducted, like the former invasion of that province, by plundering and burning, while he avoided a battle. The Nizam was jealous of the presence of a British

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force with Bazalut Jung, who, with such assistance, he doubted not, would soon aspire at independence. The French troops he had taken into his service, immediately after they were dismissed by his brother; but he assured the British resident that he had adopted this expedient solely to prevent them from passing into the service of Hyder or the Mahrattas; and described them as of little value, the wreck of the army of Bussy, augmented by persons of all nations. This was a contingency, which, in their eagerness to see the French discharged by Bazalut Jung, the Presidency had somewhat overlooked. It was, no doubt, true, as they alleged, that had the Nizam consulted the friendship of the English, he would have ordered the French troops to the coast, whence, with other prisoners, they might have been sent on their passage to Europe.

In the Select Committee, on the 5th of June, it was proposed by the Governor, and agreed, that the *Peshcush*, or tribute, of five lacs of rupees, which the Company were bound by their treaty to pay, in compromise, for possession of the Northern Circars, the Nizam should be solicited to remit. The payment of it had already been suspended for two years, partly on the pretence that the French troops were not dismissed, partly on account of the exhausted state of their finances. When this proposal was announced by Mr. Hollond to the Nizam, he became highly agitated; and declared his conviction that the English no longer meant to observe the treaty, for which reason he also must prepare for war.

Mr. Hollond, who had received instructions to communicate with the Supreme Council, conveyed intelligence of these transactions to Bengal, by sending, on the 3rd of September, copies of the letters which had passed between him and the Presidency of Madras. On the 25th of October, the subject was taken into consideration at Calcutta, when the proceedings of the Madras Presidency, in forming a treaty with Bazalut Jung, without the interposition of his immediate sovereign, the Company's ally, and in withholding the payment, and proposing the abolition of the peshcush, underwent the most severe condemnation, as tending to impeach the character of the English for justice and faith, and to raise them up a for-

midable enemy, when they were already exposed to unusual difficulties and dangers. It was agreed, that the case demanded the interference of the Superior Board; and a letter was written on the 1st of November, 1779, to assure the Nizam that the intentions of the English government were truly pacific, notwithstanding the interpretation which he put upon the proceedings of the Council at Madras. Mr. Hollond was directed to suspend his negotiations till he should receive further instructions from his own Presidency. Letters were also written to that Presidency, acquainting them, in terms studiously inoffensive and mild, with the aberrations which it appeared to the Supreme Council that they had made from the line of propriety and prudence. The Nizam declared the highest satisfaction with the friendly assurances which the Supreme Council had expressed. But their interference excited the highest indignation and resentment in the Council of Madras. On the 30th of December a minute was entered by Sir Thomas Rumbold, the President, in which he treats the censure which had been passed on their conduct as undeserved, and its language unbecoming; denies the right of the Supreme Council thus to interfere in the transactions of another Presidency, and argues that their controlling power extended to the conclusion alone of a treaty, not to the intermediate negotiation; he turns the attack upon the Bengal Presidency, enters into a severe investigation of the policy and conduct of the Mahratta war, which in every particular he condemns; this it was which had alienated the mind of the Subahdar, not the regulation with his brother, or the proposed remission of the peshcush; the retention of a peshcush offended not the conscience of the Bengal Presidency, when themselves were the gainers, the unfortunate Emperor of India the sufferer, and when it was a peshcush stipulated and secured by treaty for the most important grants. In terms of nearly the same import the letter was couched, in which the Presidency of Madras returned an answer to that of Bengal, along with which they transmitted the minute of their President.

The Presidency of Madras had not only taken Guntoor on lease from Bazalut Jung, they had also transferred it, on a lease of ten years, to the Nabob of Arcot, though

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well aware how little the Directors were pleased with his mode of exaction, either in their jaghire or in his own dominions.

The measure of their offences, in the eyes of the Directors, was now sufficiently full. In their letter of the 10th of January, 1781, after passing the severest censure upon the abolition of the Committee of Circuit, and the proceedings with the Zemindars of the four Northern Circars, on the treaty with Bazalut Jung, the transactions with the Nizam, and the lease of Guntoor to the Nabob, they dismiss from their service Sir Thomas Rumbold, President, John Hill and Peter Perring, Esquires, Members of their Council of Fort St. George; deprive of their seat in council Mr. Smith and Mr. Johnson; and express their strongest displeasure against the commander of their forces, Sir Hector Munro.[1]

CHAPTER V.

War with the French—Pondicherry taken—War with Hyder Ali—Presidency unprepared—Colonel Baillie's Detachment cut off—Supreme Council suspend the Governor of Fort St. George, and send Sir Eyre Coote to Madras—Hyder takes Arcot, and overruns the greater Part of the Country—Lord Macartney, Governor of Fort St. George—Negapatnam and Trincomalee taken from the Dutch—Treaty between the Nabob of Arcot and Supreme Council—Assignment of the Nabob's Revenues—Tellicherry invested—Great Armaments sent from both England and France—Disaster of Colonel Brathwaite's Detachment in Tanjore—Madras reduced to a State of Famine—Death of Hyder Ali—Tippoo withdraws the Mysorean Army from the Carnatic—Operations and Fate of General Matthews on the Coast of Malabar—Siege of Mangalore—The General at Madras, refusing to obey the Civil Authority, is arrested and sent to Europe—French and English sus-

[1] These transactions are minutely detailed in the Second and Third Reports of the Committee of Secrecy, 1781; in the Appendices to which the official documents are to be found.—M.

The author does not appear to have been in possession of the Minutes of the Evidence, which was produced in justification of the Bill of Pains and Penalties, introduced by Mr. Dundas.—W.

pend Hostilities in consequence of Intelligence of the Peace in Europe—Operations of Colonel Fullarton in Coimbetore—Peace with Tippoo—Behaviour of Supreme Council to Presidency of Madras.

WAR with the French, instead of being, as formerly, the most alarming to the English of all sources of danger in India, now held a very inferior station among the great objects which occupied their attention. In the beginning of July, 1778, intelligence was received in Bengal, which, though somewhat premature, was acted upon as certain, that war had commenced between England and France. Without waiting for a formal notification of this event, which might be only delayed till the French had made themselves strong, it was resolved by a stroke, decisive in their present defenceless situation, to take possession of the whole of the French settlements in India. With regard to minor places the attempt was easy; and Chandernagore, with the factories at Masulipatam and Carical, surrendered without resistance. Pondicherry was the object of importance, and it was resolved to lose no time in taking measures for its reduction. Instructions were sent to Madras, and reached it with unusual expedition. Major-General Sir Hector Munro, who commanded the Madras army, took post on an elevated ground, called the Red Hills, distant about a league from Pondicherry, on the 8th of August, and on the 9th summoned the place to surrender. But his preparations were still so backward, that it was the 21st of August before he took possession of the bound-hedge, within cannon-shot of the town, and ground was not broken till the 6th of September. It was broken in two places, with a view to carry on attacks upon both sides of the town at once.

The British squadron, consisting of one ship of sixty guns, one of twenty-eight, one of twenty, a sloop of war, and an East Indiaman, sailed from Madras, toward the end of July, under the command of Sir Edward Vernon, with a view to block up Pondicherry by sea. This squadron reached the scene of action about the time when Sir Hector Munro encamped on the Red Hills and summoned the fort. The French squadron, under M. Tronjolly, consisting of one ship of sixty-four guns, one of thirty-six,

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one of thirty-two, and two East Indiamen armed for war, sailed, immediately, and prepared for action. The two squadrons met and engaged on the 10th of August. The battle raged with great fury for the space of seventy-four minutes, when the three minor ships of the French squadron quitted the action, and in fifteen minutes after were followed by the rest. The English ships, which, as usually happened in engagements with the French, had suffered chiefly in their rigging, were unable to pursue the French, which had suffered chiefly in their hulls. The French squadron reached Pondicherry the same night. Sailing badly, and opposed by the winds and the current, it was the 20th before the English recovered their station. Early on the morning of the 21st, the French squadron was perceived under easy sail, standing out of Pondicherry road. During the day the alternate failure and opposition of the winds prevented the squadrons from closing; and towards night the English commander stood in for Pondicherry road, and cast anchor, expecting that the enemy, to whom it was an object of so much importance to keep open the communication of Pondicherry by sea, would proceed in the same direction, and commence the action on the following morning. M. Tronjolly availed himself of the night. His squadron was out of sight before the morning, and was no more heard of upon the coast.

The garrison of Pondicherry was commanded by M. Bellecombe, a man whom this abandonment was not sufficient to dismay. Notwithstanding the total destruction which the works of Pondicherry had sustained in the former war, its fortifications had been restored with great diligence, and it was defended by a garrison who availed themselves of all its advantages. The English opened their batteries on the 18th of September, with the fire of twenty-eight cannon and twenty-seven mortars, and carried on their approaches with unremitting vigour; but the vigilance, activity, and enterprise of the garrison, compelled them to caution, and, together with the rains, which fell in torrents, retarded their operations. Towards the middle of October, having pushed a gallery on the south side into the ditch of the fort, having made a breach in one of the bastions, destroyed the faces of the two that were adjacent, and prepared a bridge of boats for

passing the ditch,; having also destroyed the face of the bastion on the opposite side of the town, and constructed a float for passing the ditch, they resolved to make the assault in three places at once, on the south side, on the north side, and towards the sea, where the enemy had run out a stockade into the water. All the marines, and 200 seamen, were landed from the ships. On the day first appointed for the assault, so much rain unexpectedly fell, as to swell the water in the ditch, blow up the gallery on the southern side, and damage the boats belonging to the bridge. The loss was diligently and speedily repaired. But M. Bellecombe, who had accomplished all that an able governor could perform, to retard the fall of the place, resolved not to throw away the lives of the gallant men who had seconded his endeavours, and the day before the intended assault proposed a capitulation. The English, by the generosity of their terms, and the liberality of their whole procedure, showed their high sense of the honour and gallantry of the enemy whom they had subdued. The garrison were allowed to march out with all the honours of war; and, at the request of M. Bellecombe, the regiment of Pondicherry was complimented with its colours. After a delay of some months the fortifications were destroyed.

The French now retained in India nothing but Mahé, a a small fort and settlement on the coast of Malabar. On the 27th of November, the question of its reduction was agitated in the Council, when the pride of driving the French entirely out of India enhanced the apparent advantage of the conquest. The difficulties were not inconsiderable: the march of the troops over land, from one side of India to the other, was long and hazardous: the disposition of the native chiefs, through the territory of whom it would be necessary to pass, was not in all cases ascertained to be friendly: the constitution of Europeans would be apt to fail, under the difficulties of the march: there was not shipping sufficient to convey the expedition by sea: it was at the same time apprehended that Hyder Ali would view the enterprise with jealousy and dissatisfaction, and not regarded as impossible that he would directly oppose it. The importance, however, of having no such talents as those of Frenchmen to cope with in

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India, and of not leaving to them a place to which either troops or stores could be sent, though both Hyder and the Mahrattas had very convenient places with which they would have gladly accommodated them, appeared of sufficient magnitude to induce the Presidency to brave all dangers in undertaking an expedition against Mahé. Towards the end of December, it was planned, that the European portion of the expedition should be conveyed by sea; that the Sepoys should march over land; that they should rendezvous at Anjengo, and Colonel Brathwaite receive the command. On the 4th of February intelligence was received at Madras, of the disaster sustained by the army of Bombay, on its march to Poona. The danger to which this event might expose the expedition, now on its way to Mahé, underwent deliberation in the Council; but the confession of weakness, which would be implied in the recall of the troops, and the supposed importance of accomplishing the object in view, decided the question in favour of perseverance. 'Intelligence of the resolution of Hyder to resent the attack produced a hesitation;[1] and the importance was discussed of gaining the friendship of that powerful chief by renouncing the enterprise; but after a short suspension, the design was resumed, and Colonel Brathwaite was instructed to anticipate resistance by velocity of completion. The expedition encountered far less difficulty than there was reason to expect: no opposition was made to the march: the fleet and the troops arrived safely at the place of rendezvous: and Mahé, which was strongly situated, but totally destitute of supplies, surrendered on the 19th of March before a cannon was fired. It was occupied by the English till the 29th of November, when, Colonel Brathwaite's detachment being ordered to Surat, to reinforce General Goddard, the fort was blown up.[2]

Before Colonel Brathwaite was enabled to comply with his orders, and embark for Surat, he received a requisition from the chief and factory at Tellicherry for the assist-

[1] A formal communication was made by his Vakeel to the Madras Government, that he would oppose an attack upon Mahé, or would retaliate by sending troops into the Carnatic. First Report Committee of Secrecy, p. 21.—W.

[2] First and Second Reports of the Committee of Secrecy; also the Annua Register for 1779 and 1782.

ance of the whole detachment. That settlement had drawn upon itself the resentment of Hyder by protecting a Nair chief who had incurred his displeasure. By the influence of Hyder, a number of the surrounding chiefs were incited to attack the settlement, which was closely pressed, at the time of the evacuation of Mahé. Not conceiving that he could be justified in leaving Tellicherry in its perilous situation, Colonel Brathwaite moved with his detachment to its support. In consequence of the detention of those troops, the Council at Madras resolved to send another detachment to the assistance of Goddard, which was embarked in the months of January and February, 1780.[1] 1780.

In 1774, the division among the Mahratta chiefs afforded to Hyder an opportunity, which he dexterously and vigorously improved, of turning the tide in his affairs. He recovered speedily the territory which he had lost. He diligently employed the interval of repose which succeeded, in restoring order to his country, improving his revenues, augmenting the number, and improving the discipline of his troops. His power soon appeared to be rapidly on the increase; and afforded alarm to the English, who, by their evasion of the treaty of 1769, were conscious of the hatred they had inspired, and were now jealous of a connexion between him and the French. He continued to extend his dominions, and increase his power, with little interruption, till the latter end of the year 1777, when the Mahrattas and Nizam Ali combined to chastise him. The Mahrattas, under Hurry Pundit and Purseram, penetrated into the Balaghât country, with an army of 50,000 men; but upon the approach of Hyder, who hastened to oppose them, they retreated into the district of Adoni, where they came to an engagement on the 5th of January, 1778, and sustained a defeat.

Though Hyder was deeply exasperated against the Presidency of Madras for their continued evasion of treaty, and refusal of assistance, he was induced by the state of affairs to make a fresh proposal in 1778. Harassed, by the hostilities of the Poonah government, he had been well pleased to support a pretender in the person of Ragoba: the English were now involved not only in disputes with

[1] First Report, ut supra, p. 56.

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the Poonah ministers, but in actual operations for the reinstatement of that ejected chief; and in the beginning of July, 1778, Hyder, through his resident at Madras, made a new overture towards an alliance with the English, offering his assistance to establish Ragonaut Rao in the office of Peshwa; and requiring only a supply of arms and military stores for which he would pay, and a body of troops whose expenses he would defray. The opinion of the Presidency appears to have been, that such an arrangement might be useful, more particularly to prevent the formation of a connexion between Hyder and the French: they even acknowledged their belief, that had not the treaty of 1769 been evaded, Hyder never would have sought other allies than themselves. The Supreme Council, to whom reference was made, approved in general of an alliance with Hyder; but being at that time zealous to form a connexion with the Raja of Berar, they directed a modification of the terms in regard to Ragoba, whose cause, they said, was supported, not as an end, but a means now deemed subordinate to the successful issue of the negotiation with Moodajee.

A friendly intercourse subsisted between Hyder and the French. He had been supplied by them with arms and military stores. A number of adventurers of that nation commanded and disciplined his troops; and they were united by a common hatred of the English power. A desire to save appearances, however, constrained Hyder to congratulate the English upon the reduction of Pondicherry; but, anticipating the design of attacking Mahé he gave early intimation of the resentment with which he would regard any such attempt. Mahé was situated in the territory of a petty prince on the western coast, who with the other petty princes, his neighbours, were rendered tributary to Hyder, and ranked among his dependants. The merchants of various nations, it was declared by Hyder, had settlements, and performed traffic in his dominions; and all of them, as if they were subjects of his own, he would resolutely defend. To soften his animosity and prevent a rupture, which the dread of his power, and, above all, his apprehended union with the French, clothed in considerable terrors, there was sent to his presence, in January, 1779, a person, who, though empowered to declare

the resolution of attacking Mahé, should assure Hyder of the desire which the Presidency felt to study his inclinations, and to cultivate his friendship. The messenger was received with but little respect, and the invasion of the Carnatic was threatened as the retaliation for interfering with Mahé.[1] At that particular moment, Hyder was engaged in the conquests of Gooti, of Carnaul, and Cudapah; the former belonging to the Mahratta chieftain Morari Rao, the two last to their respective Nabobs, dependants of the Subahdar, and thence was hindered from taking effectual measures to defeat the expedition against Mahé. But the Presidency were now convinced of his decided aversion; and were informed of his intention to make peace with the Mahrattas, for enabling him the more completely to carry into execution his designs against the English. Their thoughts were called to the necessity of preparation; and they saw nothing but dangers and difficulties in their path. The Nabob, as he informed them, and as they knew well without his information, was destitute of money: and as destitute of troops, on whom, either for numbers or quality, any reliance could be placed. Their own treasury was impoverished; and if the cavalry of Hyder should enter the country, neither could the revenues be collected, nor provisions be procured. More alive than they to the sense of danger, the Nabob urged the necessity of making peace with Hyder, by stopping the expedition to Mahé; or, on the other hand, of making terms with the Mahrattas and the Subahdar. So far from attempting to conciliate either Hyder or the Subahdar, the Presidency formed with Bazalut Jung the arrangement

[1] Some confusion has here been made, probably between the written and personal communications that took place between the two Governors. In January, 1779, no person was sent to Hyder. A letter was addressed to him by the President, proposing to send a Resident to his court, and announcing the intention of attacking Mahé. No Resident was sent. Something later in the year, Sir Thomas Rumbold, without communicating with the Committee, engaged the celebrated Missionary, Schwartz, to go privately to Hyder, and ascertain his real sentiments, the Governor distrusting the representation of them from Hyder's own Vakeel, or from the officers of the Nabob. Schwartz set off on his mission in July, 1779, arrived in Seringapatam in August, was treated by Hyder with kindness, and made the bearer of a letter from him to the government, which he delivered some time in October, as, on the 23rd of that month, the proceeding was first communicated to the Committee. In February, 1780, a second mission was sent to Hyder, in the person of Mr. Gray, renewing offers of alliance with the English, which were disdainfully rejected. Both the missions furnished sufficient evidence of the disposition and purposes of Hyder. First Report of Select Committee, 25. Wilks's South of India, ii. 242. Life of Schwartz, i. 341.—W.

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which has been already described, respecting the Guntoor Circar and military assistance, and which, in the highest degree, alarmed and exasperated both. The detachment which under Colonel Harpur was sent to the assistance of Bazalut Jung, attempted to proceed to Adoni, through a part of Cudapah, which Hyder had lately subdued. His troops barricaded the passes; and the detachment, afraid of being surrounded, was obliged to march back and wait for subsequent orders. Hyder not only assured Bazalut Jung, by writing, that he would not permit the English whom he described as the most faithless and usurping of all mankind, to establish themselves in a place so contiguous to his country, and so important as Guntoor; but in the month of November he sent a body of troops into the territory of that Prince, took possession of the open country, and joined with Nizam Ali his brother in threatening him with instant ruin, unless he broke off all correspondence with the English. In this emergency, Bazalut Jung was constrained to forbid the march of the English detachment; and to request the restoration of Guntoor, as the only means of pacifying his brother and Hyder, and averting his fate. The question respecting the Circar came under deliberation of the Council on the 30th of December, when the decree was passed that it should not be restored. Though its importance was considerable, because situated as it was between the territories of the Nabob, or, more properly speaking, of the English, in the Carnatic, and the four Northern Circars, it completed the communication between their northern and southern possessions, and, by placing in their hands the port of Mootapilly, deprived Nizam Ali of all connexion with the sea, reduced him to the condition of a merely inland power, and in particular closed the channel by which French supplies could easily reach him; yet the embarrassments created in the Council, by the bargain they had concluded with the Nabob, for a ten years' lease of that Circar, contributed not less, it would appear, than all other inducements, to the resolution which they formed.

Under the apprehensions which the resentment and preparations of Hyder inspired, the Presidency, at the end of October, had presented to the Supreme Council the prospect of a rupture with that chieftain, the dangerous mag-

nitude of his power, and their want of resources; had pressed upon them the necessity of forming a peace with the Mahrattas, as in that event Hyder would be restrained by his fears; they had also written in similar terms to General Goddard at Bombay. Soon after, when they were informed of the probability that hostilities would be renewed with the Mahrattas, they reiterated the statement of their apprehensions; and concluded that, destitute as they were of resources for all active operations, they could only collect their troops as much as possible, and wait to see what the resolutions of the Supreme Board would enable them to undertake.

Before the end of November, the Nabob, whose intelligence respecting the proceedings of the Indian powers was in general uncommonly good, informed the Governor, that a treaty had been formed between Hyder and the Mahrattas, to which Nizam Ali had acceded, for a system of combined hostilities against the English. Though, in his answer to the Nabob, the Governor appeared to discredit the intelligence, it was not long before he was satisfied of its truth; and, in the letter, which, on the 31st of December, the Select Committee addressed to the Supreme Board, they represented the treaty between Hyder and the Mahrattas, as an undoubted fact. Still they were not so much impressed with a sense of imminent danger, as to be deterred from sending a body of troops to the assistance of Goddard, in lieu of those which were detained at Tellicherry; being in daily expectation of a regiment from Europe; conceiving themselves sufficiently strong to cover the principal garrisons; and deeming it vain, without cavalry, to attempt to protect the open country against the invasion of a vast body of horse. In the month of January, 1780, the President wrote to the Court of Directors, that, notwithstanding the alarms in which they had been held by the hostile appearances of Hyder and the Nizam, and notwithstanding the provocation which the support of Ragoba had given both to the Mahrattas and the Nizam, there was still a prospect of tranquillity; and in the following month, he repeated, in still stronger terms, a similar assurance.[1] Till the month of June, no

[1] The President, in the early part of 1780, was Sir Thomas Rumbold; he quitted Madras, on the score of ill health, in April, and with anticipations,

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measures were pursued which had a reference to the war; and even then it was only commanded that Colonel Harpur's detachment, which had been transferred to the command of Colonel Baillie, should cross the Kistna, to be more in readiness, "in case of any disturbance in the Carnatic." On the 19th of June intelligence was received from the officer at Velore, that Hyder had begun his march from Seringapatam, and that a great army was already collected at Bangalore. On the 28th of the same month, the Select Committee of Fort St. George declared, by letter to the Supreme Board, that Hyder had received from the French islands a great quantity of military stores; that his army, which he had been rapidly increasing for two years past, was now equipped for immediate service; that a part of it was already advanced to the borders of the Carnatic; and that intelligence had been received of his being actually employed in clearing the road to one of the principal passes.

While the affairs of the Presidency were approaching to their present situation, a division had existed not only in the Council, but in the Select Committee itself. The President, however, and the General had combined; and they retained a majority in both. In contemplation of the resentment of Hyder, and the progress of his power, the party, the views of which were apt to discord with those of the leading members of the government, had strongly urged upon them, at various times, the necessity of making preparations against the invasion with which they were threatened by Hyder, and of which they had received intimation from various quarters. If the resources of the Nabob and the presidency combined were unequal to the

which, after the information he had received, and after the strong provocation to hostilities of which he had been the author, were unaccountably delusive. His farewell minute begins, "It affords me a particular satisfaction that the whole of the Carnatic and the Company's northern possessions are at present undisturbed, and in perfect tranquillity, notwithstanding the unsettled state of affairs with respect to the Mahrattas, and the connexions occasioned by the march of the Bengal troops across the country to Surat. However well inclined Hyder Ali may be to give disturbance, neither he nor the Nizam have as yet thought proper to put any of their threats into execution; and from the arrival of the fleet with the King's troops, I think there is the greatest prospect that this part of India will remain quiet, especially if the Government here cautiously avoid taking any measures that may be likely to bring on troubles." Minutes of Evidence, p. 500. And this, after he had excited Hyder's resentment by the occupation of Guntoor, the violation of his territory by the unpermitted march through it of Colonel Harpur's detachment, and the capture of Mahé in defiance of his menaces.—W.

maintenance of an army sufficient for the protection of the open country, it behoved them at least to assemble the troops; which, scattered as they were in petty garrisons over a great extent of country, could not, in case of an emergency, be collected without a lapse of time; and of which the junction would become hazardous, and perhaps impracticable, if the country were pervaded by Hyder's horse. The majority, indeed, had expressed their opinion of the necessity of having the troops collected in a body, and ready to act, previously to invasion. But they had not yet become persuaded that the danger was sufficiently imminent to render it necessary that preparation should begin.[1]

On the 21st of July, information was brought from the commander at Amboor, that Hyder and his two sons, with the principal part of his army, had come through the pass, and that his artillery was drawn up in the road to Changama. This intelligence, though it was confirmed from several quarters, was treated with slight regard by the party in power: and on the 23rd, when Lord Macleod represented to the Governor, "That perhaps the report of Hyder's invasion might be true, and that he thought at all events they ought to take measures to oppose him; the Governor answered, What can we do? We have no money. But added, We mean however, to assemble an army, and you are to command it."[2] The next day brought undoubted intelligence, that Porto Novo, on the coast, and Conjeveram, not fifty miles from the capital had been plundered by the enemy.

The army, with which Hyder had arrived, was not less

[1] On the 19th June, two of the Select Committee, Messrs. Johnson and Smith, submitted a minute, urging the imminence of the danger, and the necessity of active preparation; and a similar minute was presented on the 17th July. On both occasions, Mr. Whitehill and Sir Hector Munro, forming, by the casting vote of the former as President, the majority, moved that the apprehensions expressed in these minutes were groundless, and that there was no danger of an immediate invasion. Four days after the latter occasion, Hyder was in the Carnatic. The history of British India affords no similar instance of such utter want of foresight or such imbecility of purpose. See Minutes of Evidence, p. 509; and First Report, p. 28. Even then, says the Report of the Select Committee, the advice that Hyder Ali had invaded the Carnatic with a powerful army, was treated by the people in power with inattention and contempt. It was not till Conjeveram, not fifty miles from the capital, was plundered by the enemy, that they could no longer close their eyes to the dangers of their situation.—W.

[2] Lord Macleod was the commanding officer of the European regiment which had lately arrived. See the extract of his Letter to the Secretary of State, quoted in the First Report of the Secret Committee, p. 44 and 51.

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than 100,000 strong: of his infantry, 20,000 were formed into regular battalions, and mostly commanded by Europeans. His cavalry amounted to 30,000, of which 2,000 were Abyssinian horse, and constantly attended upon his person; 10,000 were Carnatic cavalry, well disciplined, of which one half had belonged to the Nabob, and after having been trained by English officers, had either deserted or been disbanded for want of ability to pay them. He had 100 pieces of cannon managed by Europeans, and natives who had been trained by the English for the Nabob. And Monsieur Lally, who had left the service of the Subahdar for that of Hyder, was present with his corps of Frenchmen or other Europeans, to the amount of about 400 men; and had a principal share in planning and conducting the operations of the army.

The arrival of Hyder, and the rapidity with which his cavalry overran the country, and spread ruin and desolation in a circle of many miles round Madras, filled the Carnatic immediately with terror and dismay. The people fled from the open country to the woods, and the mountains; their houses were set on fire; the fields were left uncultivated, or the crops destroyed. Alarm succeeded alarm. Intelligence poured in from all quarters, that one place after another was assailed; till every part of the Carnatic frontier appeared to be entered, and even the Northern Circars exposed to a similar fate.

On the 24th of July, the Select Committee assembled in deliberation. The object of greatest urgency was, to call the troops together, and form an army in the field. The European regiment at Poonamallee, that of Velore, the battalion of Europeans, and the four battalions of sepoys cantoned at Pondicherry, the battalion of sepoys, and the grenadiers of the European Battalion at Madras, the battalion at Trichinopoly, and the artillery at the mount, received orders to be in readiness to march. Absent officers were summoned to join their corps; and all things necessary for an army in the field were ordered to be immediately prepared. Letters were sent to the other Presidencies and settlements. The Governor-General and Council were importuned for money; and informed, that, if the Presidency were assured of pecuniary means, and not embarrassed by their ignorance of the state of affairs

between the Bengal government and the Mahrattas, they would produce an attack on the possessions of Hyder on the western coast, by assistance sent to the detachment at Tellicherry, and the co-operation of his Majesty's fleet.

Colonel Baillie, who commanded the detachment in Guntoor, consisting of about 150 Europeans, infantry and artillery, and upwards of 2000 sepoys, was instructed to operate a diversion, by attacking Cudapah, or some of the other possessions of Hyder. This step was vehemently opposed in council by the antagonizing party; as sure, they said, to fail in detaching from his principal object any part of the attention or forces of Hyder; and sure to enfeeble their defence at home, by the absence of so important a part of their forces, which ought to be directed to march without a moment's delay by the safest route to Madras. As an additional reason for persisting in their original orders, the Governor and his majority alleged their doubts of being able to procure provisions for a greater number of troops than the marching orders already embraced. But on the 31st of July, when a letter was received from Colonel Baillie, representing the difficulties he experienced in finding subsistence for his troops, or in detaining the bullocks absolutely necessary for his march, they altered their instructions, and directed him to proceed towards the Presidency, taking such a route as might offer a chance of intercepting some of the enemy's convoys.

By the majority, in which both the Governor and the General were comprised, it was resolved, that the troops should assemble, and the army should be formed at a place near Conjeveram; where they would be nearer to the stores of provisions laid up by the Nabob in the forts, and prepared to yield a readier support to the garrisons which the enemy might assault. To constitute the majority of the Governor, it so happened, that the voice of the General was requisite; and if he departed to take the command of the army, that majority would be lost. On the ground that his councils at the Presidency were of more importance at this moment, than his presence with the army, it was moved and voted that he should not depart; and that the command of the army should be intrusted to

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Lord Macleod. When the plan of operations, however, and in particular that part of it which consisted in assembling the army at Conjeveram, was communicated to that officer, he represented the danger with which, now that the country was invaded, the separate detachments would march to a place so distant and exposed; preferred the security of forming a junction in the neighbourhood of Madras, and of not taking the field till an army should be assembled sufficient at least to cope with the principal bodies of the enemy's horse; and declared his aversion to adopt a responsibility in the execution of plans of which his judgment did not approve. These observations appear to have piqued the General, who insisted upon the advantage of assembling close to the scene of action, for the purpose of protecting the forts; and instead of acknowledging the difficulty of uniting the forces near Conjeveram, he ventured to pledge himself to the Committee for carrying that measure into effect. Upon this, it became a matter of necessity, that he should leave his seat in the Select Committee; but to preserve its majority to the party to which he belonged, a new expedient was devised. On the allegation, that his plans had no chance of support, and that his reputation, neither as an officer nor a man, was safe, if the managing power were to pass into the hands of the opposite party, it was, previous to his departure, proposed, and what was thus proposed, the majority which he helped to constitute had pre-ordained to decree, that a person whom he named should be appointed as an acting member of the Committee till his return. It naturally followed, that such procedings should be severely criticized by the opposite party; and one member of the Council excited so much resentment by the asperity of his remarks, that the majority, first replied to him with greater intemperance than that which they condemned; then suspended him from his seat at the Board; and lastly the General wrote him a challenge.

On the 2nd of August, while preparations were making, and the army was not yet assembled, a project was adopted for sending a strong detachment towards the passes, with a view to intercept the enemy's convoys. Colonel Cosby was the officer chosen to command the expedition; and a force was provided for him, out of the troops stationed at Tri-

chinopoly and Tanjore, strengthened by two regiments of the Nabob's cavalry from Tinivelly, which joined the detachment at Trichinopoly on the 27th of August. Several causes of retardation operated on the expedition; but the grand impediment arose from the disaffection of the inhabitants. The sort of partnership sovereignty, which the Nabob and the Company had established in the Carnatic, had hitherto been extremely oppressive to the people, and had completely succeeded in alienating their minds. Though Hyder was carrying devastation over the country, he was less detested as a destroyer, than hailed as a deliverer. While Colonel Cosby found himself in the greatest distress for intelligence, which by no exertion he was able to procure; every motion of his own was promptly communicated to Hyder by the people of the country:[1] He was disappointed and betrayed, even by the district officers of the Nabob. As he advanced, his march became so much infested by parties of the enemy's horse, that all hope of any successful operation against the convoys was wholly cut off; and the danger which surrounded the detachment made it necessary to think of nothing but the means of re-uniting it with the army. A total want of intelligence reduced Colonel Cosby to mere conjecture in choosing his route; and he fell in with the army by accident, as it was retreating before Hyder, on the 12th of September near Chingliput.

Not only every day brought fresh intelligence of the conquest and devastation effected by Hyder; Madras itself, on the 10th of August, was thrown into alarm. A party of the enemy's horse committed ravages as near as St. Thomas's Mount; and the inhabitants of the open town began to take flight.

On the 14th of August, the General was obliged to report, that the place of rendezvous, which he had persisted

[1] Captain Cosby, in his official letter, dated Gingee, 5th September, 1780, says, "There is no doubt but that Hyder has, by some means, greatly attached the inhabitants to him, insomuch that my hircarrahs (spies) tell me, the news of my marching from Tiliagar was communicated from village to village, all the way to Trinomalee, from whence expresses were sent to Hyder: and in my march yesterday from Tricaloor, the country being extremely woody, the line was several times fired upon by match-lock fellows, collected together, I suppose, from different villages, by Hyder's Amuldars. Some of them, till my approach, were issuing orders six miles from this." First Report, ut supra, Appendix, No. 3.

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in recommending, was unfit; the want of bullocks to carry provisions rendering the march impracticable. On his recommendation, it was therefore agreed, that the troops should meet at St. Thomas's Mount; and there wait till eight days' provisions, and bullocks to carry it, could be procured.

Colonel Brathwaite, after sending away from Pondicherry all the French officers capable of service, and taking an oath of fidelity from the principal Frenchmen who remained, commenced his march. He arrived at Carangoly on the 12th of August, and found it garrisoned by only a petty officer of the Nabob, and twenty sepoys. They would have surrendered it, he was well assured, on the very first summons; and had it not by a singular oversight, as it commanded the only road by which Brathwaite could proceed, been neglected by the enemy, who had a large body of horse in its neighbourhood, the most serious consequences might have ensued. The country through which he passed after leaving Carangoly would have rendered it so difficult for him to escape, if attacked by the enemy, that he formed a very contemptible opinion either of Hyder's military skill, or his means of offence, when he allowed so favourable an opportunity to be lost. On the 18th. after a hazardous and fatiguing march, Colonel Brathwaite arrived at Chingliput, when he received orders to join the army at the Mount.

After various speculations and reports respecting the plan of hostilities which Hyder would pursue, uncertainty was at last removed, by his marching towards Arcot, and taking ground before it on the 21st of August. The danger of that place excited no little interest and alarm. It was not only the capital of the province, but contained the principal portion of the very defective stores which the Nabob had provided; and afforded to Hyder a situation, highly convenient, both for the accommodation of his troops, and for spreading his operations over the province. From every quarter alarming intelligence arrived. The troops of Hyder were expected in the Circar of Guntoor, which had neither forts nor soldiers sufficient to oppose them, and where the Zemindars were disaffected to the Company and in correspondence with the enemy. An army of Mahrattas from Berar had marched into

Cuttack, and brought into imminent danger the defenceless state of the Northern Circars. A body of Hyder's troops had united with the Nairs, and having driven the Company's troops from the Island of Durampatnam, threatened Tellicherry, with all the British possessions on the coast of Malabar. The enemy had appeared on the frontier of Madura, and the admiral of the fleet communicated to the President and Select Committee, intelligence which he had received from Europe, and on which he relied, that a French naval and military force might soon be expected in India.

While pressed by dangers thus extraordinary both in number and degree, the Presidency found their treasury empty; they had endeavoured to borrow money upon the Company's bonds with little effect, the loans of the Nabob bearing a better interest; they made urgent applications to the Nabob for pecuniary and other supplies, and received from him a deplorable picture of his own poverty and necessities, of the wretched and unproductive condition of the whole country, and the oppressive load of his debts, principally, he said, produced, by the money which he had expended and lost in the conquest of Tanjore. To a similar application made to the Raja of Tanjore, the Raja replied, with a truth not liable to dispute, that from the total exhaustion of his country by the recent conquest, and by the oppressive administration of the Nabob for several years, he was wholly incapable of furnishing any considerable supplies. By desertion for want of pay, or disbanding for want of ability to pay, the Nabob's army was greatly reduced. Even that reduced army was mutinous from the length of its arrears, and a source of apprehension rather than of hope.

On the 25th of August, the General left the Presidency, and joined the army which was encamped at St. Thomas's Mount. Of cavalry, there was one regiment, belonging to the Nabob, but commanded by English officers, and it refused to march unless it received its arrears. The men were deprived of their ammunition and arms; and about fifty-six of them only consented to serve. The rest of the army consisted of the King's 73rd regiment, one battalion of the Company's European troops, with the grenadiers of

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another, five battalions of sepoys, a company of marksmen, two troops of cavalry, and a large train of artillery, amounting, officers included, to 5209.[1] With the utmost difficulty, as much rice had been provided as would serve the troops for eight days; the sepoys were obliged to be loaded with four days' supply; and the utmost efforts barely sufficed to procure bullocks to carry the remainder. The General, notwithstanding, insisted upon loading his march with a number of heavy cannon; of which, as he had no fortifications to attack, the use did not appear to be very remarkable. On the 26th, the army left the Mount, and, after a march of four days, reached the camp near Conjeveram. During the two last days, the rain had fallen with great violence, had broken the roads, and rendered the march, especially with heavy artillery, slow and fatiguing. The enemy's cavalry had pressed upon them in great numbers, and wounded and taken some of the men. The agent of the Nabôb, who accompanied the army, and on whom the General depended to procure both provisions and intelligence, informed him, that he had no power for procuring either the one or the other; and his only remaining resource was in the paddy in the fields about Conjeveram.

It had been concerted, that the detachment of Colonel Baillie should reach Conjeveram on the day after the arrival of General Munro and the army.[2] But on the 31st, a letter from Baillie gave information that he had been stopped about five miles north from Tripassore by a small river which the rains had swelled. On the same day, it was reported by some deserters that Hyder had left Arcot, was crossing the river Palar, and marching with his whole army towards Conjeveram. On the 3rd of September, the same day on which Baillie crossed the river by which he had been impeded, the enemy encamped at five miles' distance in front of the army near Conjeveram. The continuance of the rains, and the necessity of collecting the rice in the fields, and beating it for themselves out of the husk, greatly incommoded and harassed the troops. On the

[1] 1481 European infantry, 294 artillery, 3434 sepoys, thirty-two field-pieces four heavy cannon, and five mortars.

[2] The junction might have been effected at Madras, without difficulty or danger, on the 25th or 26th; and it is clear that the main army should not have advanced until the junction had been effected. Wilks, ii. 267.—W.

6th, the enemy moved his camp to the north-east; upon which the English advanced to a high ground about two miles upon the road towards Ballee and Tripassore, having the enemy at a distance of about two miles upon their left. While this movement was performing, Hyder had sent forward his son Tippoo Saib with a large body of the flower of his army to cut off the English detachment with Colonel Baillie, who had now advanced to Perambaucum, distant from the main army about fifteen miles. Baillie made a disposition to resist a prodigious superiority of force; sustained a severe conflict of several hours; and at last repelled the assailants. By a letter on the 8th, he informed Munro, that upon a review after the battle he found the movement, requisite for joining him, beyond the powers of his detachment; and intimated the necessity, that the General should push forward with the main body of the army. The General now found himself pressed by dangers, to whatever quarter he turned. All his provisions consisted in a small quantity of paddy which he had been able to collect in a pagoda. If he moved, the enemy would occupy his ground, and cut him off from the means of subsistence. With the concurrence of his principal officers, he adopted an expedient, of which the danger was scarcely, perhaps, less formidable; that of still further dividing his little army, by sending a strong detachment, which, joining Baillie, might enable him to proceed. About nine o'clock in the evening of the 8th, Colonel Fletcher marched with the flank companies of the 73rd regiment, two companies of European grenadiers, one company of sepoy marksmen, and ten companies of sepoy grenadiers. The field-pieces, which the General proposed to send with the detachment, Colonel Fletcher declined, as calculated to impede his march. The men left even their knapsacks, and marched with only two days' provisions. Being joined by this detachment, Baillie was instructed to move in the evening of the 9th, and march the whole of the night. On that night the tents of the main army were struck, and the men lay on their arms. About 12 o'clock some cannon and musketry were heard; but they presently ceased, and all was still. A little before daybreak, a heavy firing of cannon and musketry was heard at a distance. It was soon perceived that the enemy's army had moved. The General gave orders to march by the right in the

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direction of the firing. After proceeding about four miles, he ordered guns to be fired, as a signal of his approach; and after a mile and a half, he repeated the signal. A great smoke was suddenly perceived, and the firing ceased. Supposing that Baillie had repulsed the enemy, the General led the army back into the road, in hopes to meet him. After marching about two miles, he met a wounded sepoy, who had escaped from the fight, and told him that Colonel Baillie was entirely defeated. The General concluded that the saftey of the army depended upon its returning to Conjeveram; where it arrived about six in the evening, and where the arrival of more wounded sepoys confirmed the report of the disaster.

While the English General was placed in so complete an ignorance of the proceedings of the enemy, Hyder had intelligence of every transaction of the English camp: he was correctly informed of the route of Colonel Fletcher, the number and quality of his troops, the time of their march, and even the circumstance of leaving their cannon behind. He sent a strong detachment to intercept them. But the sagacity of Fletcher suggesting suspicion of his guides, he altered his route, and, by cover of night, evaded the danger. The junction of the two detachments, after the defeat by Baillie, of so large a portion of the enemy a few days before, struck alarm into the Mysorean camp. Even the European officers in the service of Hyder regarded the junction as a masterly stroke of generalship, intended for the immediate attack of his army both in front and rear. Lally himself repaired to Hyder, and entreated him to save his army from destruction by a timely retreat. The resolution of Hyder was shaken, till two of his spies arriving, assured him, not only that the English army at Conjeveram was not in motion, but that it was making no preparation to that effect. To his European officers this intelligence appeared so perfectly incredible, that they concluded the spies to be sold, and entreated Hyder not to incur his ruin by confiding in their report. Hyder immediately formed his plan. A difficult part of the road was enfiladed with concealed cannon; and large bodies of the best part of his infantry were placed in ambush on either side; a cloud of irregular cavalry were employed to engage the attention of the English main army in the direction of Conjeveram, while Hyder

with the main body of his army, lay in wait to watch the attack.

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Colonel Fletcher joined with his detachment at half-an-hour after six in the morning of the 9th. They reposed during the day; and after the parade in the evening, Colonel Baillie gave orders to be in readiness to march. Between eight and nine o'clock, the men moved off toward the left, by way of Subdeverim. The enemy began immediately to discharge their rockets; but, from the vigilance of the flanking parties, did little execution. A little after ten o'clock several guns opened on the rear. The detachment countermarched, and formed in line with the front toward Perambaucum. The enemy keeping up an incessant, though not very destructive fire, and discovering no inclination to advance, Colonel Baillie ordered his men to face to the right, and march into an avenue, which they had passed a few minutes before. The enemy's cannon began to do great execution; when Baillie detached a captain with five companies of Sepoys, to storm their guns. Though a water-course, which happened at that time to be unfordable, prevented this detachment from performing the service on which they were commanded, the intelligence of their march, which was immediately communicated to the enemy, threw their camp into alarm; their guns were heard drawing off towards the English front, and their noise and irregular firing resembled those of an army under a sudden and dangerous attack. A strong conviction of the necessity of preserving every portion of the little army, with which the mighty host of the enemy was to be withstood, suggested, in all probability, both to Colonel Baillie and to the General, a caution which otherwise they would not have observed. For what other reason Colonel Baillie forbore to try the effect of an attack during the apparent confusion of the enemy; or, for what reason, unless a hope of being supported by the General with an attack on the opposite side, he did not, when the firing ceased, endeavour to proceed, but remained in his position till morning, it is not easy to divine. During the night, Tippoo, who had commanded only a detachment of the army in the preceding attack, had an opportunity of drawing his cannon to a strong post on the road, by which the English were obliged to pass; and of sending to his

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father advice, on which he immediately acted, of the advantage of supporting the attack with the whole of his army. At five o'clock in the morning, Colonel Baillie's detachment began to advance. A few minutes after six, two guns opened on their rear; and large bodies of horse appeared on their flanks. Four guns, which began to do considerable execution on their flanks, were successfully stormed; and the Pagoda of Conjeveram, the object of their hopes, and the termination of their perils and labour, began to appear; when they were informed that the whole host of Hyder was approaching. "Very well," said Baillie, "we shall be prepared to receive them." And presently after, upwards of sixty pieces of cannon, with an immense quantity of rockets, began to play upon this little army. Great confusion was produced among the numerous followers of the camp, who were driven in upon the line; and Hyder's numerous cavalry, supported by his regular infantry, and his European corps, bore upon every point of attack. Nothing ever exceeded the steadiness and determination with which this handful of men sustained the fury of their enemies. No effort could break their order; while Sepoys, as well as Europeans, repeatedly presented and recovered arms, with as much coolness and regularity, as if they had been exhibiting on a parade. Every attack of the enemy was repulsed with vast slaughter. Their courage began to abate; and even Hyder himself was perplexed. A movement executed by Colonel Baillie to the right, apparently with a view to attack the enemy's guns, increased the terrors of Hyder; and he consulted Lally on the propriety of a retreat. Lally replied, that as the main army of the English was probably advancing upon his rear, no expedient remained but to break through the detachment. When the heroic bravery of this little band presented so fair a prospect of baffling the host of their assailants, two of their tumbrils blew up; which not only made a large opening in both lines, but at once deprived them of ammunition, and overturned and disabled their guns. Their fire was now in a great measure silenced, and their lines were no longer entire; yet so great was the awe which they inspired, that the enemy durst not immediately close. From half after seven, when the tumbrils blew up, they remained exposed to the fire of the cannon

and rockets, losing great numbers of officers and men, till nine o'clock, when Hyder, with his whole army, came round the right flank. The cavalry charged in separate columns, while bodies of infantry, interspersed between them, poured in volleys of musketry with dreadful effect. After the sepoys were almost all destroyed, Colonel Baillie, though severely wounded, rallied the Europeans who survived. Forming a square, and gaining a little eminence, without ammunition, and almost all wounded, the officers fighting with their swords, and the men with their bayonets, they resisted and repelled thirteen attacks, many of the men when desperately wounded disdaining to receive quarter, and raising themselves from the ground to receive the enemy on their bayonets. Though not more than 400 men, they still desired to be led on, and to cut their way through the enemy. But Baillie, despairing now of being relieved by Munro, and wishing, no doubt, to spare the lives of the brave men who surrounded him, deemed it better to hold up a flag of truce. The enemy at first treated this with contempt. After a few minutes, the men were ordered to lay down their arms; with intimation that quarter would be given. Yet they had no sooner surrendered, than the savages rushed upon them with unbridled fury; and, had it not been for the great exertions of Lally, Pimorin, and other French officers, who implored for mercy, not a man of them probably would have been spared. The gallant Fletcher was among those who lay on the field of battle. About 200 Europeans were taken prisoners, reserved to the horrors of a captivity more terrible than death. The inhuman treatment which they received was deplored and mitigated by the French officers in the service of Hyder, with a generosity which did honour to European education. "No pen," says an eye-witness, and a participator of their kindness,[1] "can *do* justice to the humanity of those gentlemen,

[1] See "A Narrative of the Captivity and Sufferings of the Officers, Soldiers, and Sepoys, who fell into the hands of Hyder Ali, after the Battle of Conjeveram, September 10, 1780, by an officer of Colonel Baillie's Detachment." It forms the second volume of the work entitled, "Memoirs of the late War in Asia," published by Murray, in 1788. N.B. Before reading the proof of this sheet, I have had the advantage of perusing the account of the same action in the second volume (not yet published) of "Historical Sketches, &c. by Colonel Wilks." The account in the text is taken from the journal of one eye-witness. Colonel Wilks gives an account from that of another, much less favourable to

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without whose assistance, many of our officers must have perished: but their merit will live for ever embalmed in the hearts of all who felt or witnessed their beneficence."

Hyder withdrew to Damul, a place about six miles from the scene of action, and the next day returned to his camp, where he had left the tents standing, and baggage unmoved, when he marched to the attack of the unfortunate Baillie. He had acted, during the whole of these operations, under the greatest apprehension of the march of Munro upon his rear. And had not that General been deterred, through his total want of intelligence, and his deficiency in the means of subsistence, from marching to the support of Baillie; had he fallen upon the rear of the enemy while the detachment was maintaining its heroic resistance in front, it is probable that the army of Hyder would have sustained a total defeat. On returning to Conjeveram, after intelligence of the fate of the detachment, the General found that the provisions, which he had been so unwilling to expose, amounted to barely one day's rice for the troops. Concluding that he should be immediately surrounded by Hyder's cavalry, and cut off from all means of providing any further supply, he began at three o'clock the next morning to retreat to Chingliput, after throwing into a tank the heavy guns and stores which he could not remove. Hyder, informed of all the motions of the English army, sent a body of not less than 6000 horse, who harrassed continually their flanks and rear, wounded some of the men, and cut off several vehicles of baggage. Through several difficulties, they reached,

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the detachment and its commander. According to the authority of Colonel Wilks, a series of military blunders, and not much of mental collectedness marked the conduct of the leader; and no little confusion and panic appeared among the men. Which account are we to believe? Why, this; that when proof is balanced, it is always more probable that men have acted like ordinary men, than that they have acted like heroes.—M. The accounts are less incompatible than the author thinks them. Colonel Wilks speaks of no panic amongst the men, nor of confusion, till after the explosion of the tumbrils: his description is equally favourable to their courage and conduct as that of the text. Both accounts agree as to one principal cause of the catastrophe, the unnecessary halts made by Baillie, his neglecting to advance after the first repulse of the enemy, and remaining in position until day-break. Had the time thus wasted been employed in pursuing the march, he must, by the morning, have been so close to the main body, that their co-operation could no longer have been prevented, and Hyder would have either suffered a defeat, or been compelled precipitately to retire. There was no want of courage, but a sad deficiency of military judgment and decision.—W.

about eleven at night, a river, within a mile and a half of Chingliput, so deep, that the rear of the army passed only at nine o'clock on the following morning. At this place the General expected to find a stock of provisions; but, with all his endeavours, could hardly procure paddy for a day. Fortunately for Colonel Cosby, as he was about to make a forced march to Conjeveram, he met with one of the fugitive sepoys from Colonel Baillie's camp, upon whose intelligence he proceeded to Chingliput, and, though considerably harrassed by the enemy on his march, joined the army in safety on the morning of the 12th. Leaving the sick, and part of the baggage, at Chingliput, the whole army, at six o'clock on the morning of the 13th, began their march for the Mount, at which they arrived in the afternoon of the following day. Nothing could exceed the consternation and alarm of the Presidency, which now trembled even for Madras; and destitute as it was not only of provisions, but supplies of every kind, if Hyder had followed the English with his usual impetuosity, and with his whole army assailed the place, it is hard to tell how nearly, if not completely, he might have involvod the Carnatic interests of the nation in ruin.[1]

On the 4th of September, the supreme Council in Bengal had deliberated upon the situation of the Presidency of Madras, and the propriety of adding to their pecuniary resources; but as the Supreme Council were still uncertain as to the reality of Hyder's invasion, or the success of the Presidency in raising money, it was agreed, that proceedings should be delayed till further intelligence.

The Supreme Council were highly dissatified with the Governor and Council of Fort St. George, who had not only passed the severest strictures on their policy, but, in the business with Nizam Ali, the Subahdar, had acted contrary to their declared inclinations, and even commands. The Madras Presidency, offended with the interference of the Supreme Council in their negotiation with the Subahdar, and with their own envoy, Mr. Hollond, as

[1] For the original documents relative to this irruption, see First Report, ut supra, with its Appendix. In "Memoirs of the late War in Asia," i. 134—168 besides the concomitant transactions, is a narrative of the transactons of Baillie's detachment, from the information of an officer who belonged to it. The Annual Register for 1782, contains a tolerable account, chiefly drawn from the Parliamentary Reports.

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an instrument in that interference, resolved that he should be recalled. The Supreme Council, being made acquainted with that resolution by Mr. Hollond, and apprehending a greater estrangement of the mind of the Nizam by so abrupt a conclusion of the correspondence with the Company, came to an opinion, on the 14th of February, 1780, that advantage would arise from appointing a person to represent themselves at the Nizam's court; and to obviate the appearance of disunion between the Presidencies, they made application to the Governor and Council of Madras, whose servant Mr. Hollond more immediately was, for their permission to vest that gentleman with the office; and in the meantime directed him to remain with the Nizam till the answer of the Presidency was obtained. The offended minds of the Presidency, not satisfied with the recall of Mr. Hollond, which had not produced an immediate effect, suspended him from their service. The Supreme Council, now freed from their delicacy in employing the servant of another Presidency, appointed Mr. Hollond immediately to represent them at the court of the Subahdar. They transmitted also their commands to the Governor and Council of Madras, under date the 12th of June, 1780, to make restitution of the Circar of Guntoor. No step, however, had as yet been taken in the execution of that measure by the government of Madras: and this the Governor-General represented, as a conduct which demanded the most serious consideration, and the decided interposition of the Sovereign Board.[1]

On the 25th, however, of the same month of September, when intelligence had arrived not only of the actual invasion of Hyder, but of the discomfiture of Baillie, and the retreat of the army to the vicinity of Madras, with the poverty and helplessness of the Presidency, and the general havoc of the province by a barbarous foe, the Governor-General, regarding only the means of recovering the blow, and meeting the exigency with a clear judgment and a resolute mind, proposed, that all the faculties of their government should be exerted, to re-establish the power of the Company on the coast. He moved that the sum of fifteen lacs of rupees, and a large detachment of European

[1] Second Report of the Committee of Secrecy.

infantry and artillery, should immediately be sent to the relief of Madras: he also moved that Sir Eyre Coote should be requested to take upon himself, as alone sufficient, the task of recovering the honour and authority of the British arms: and recommended that an offer of peace should be made without delay to the Mahratta state. Upon the joint consideration, first, of the indigence and dangers of the Bengal government; secondly, of the probability of mismanagement on the part of the government of Madras; and, lastly, of the resources which that government still possessed; Mr. Francis objected to the magnitude of the supply, and would have sent only-half of the money and none of the troops, while peace, he said, should be concluded with the Mahrattas on any terms which they would accept. It was agreed that Sir Eyre Coote, and not the government of Madras, in whom confidence could not be wisely reposed, should have the sole power over the money which was supplied; it was resolved, that the strong measure should be taken of suspending the Governor of Fort St. George, for his neglect of their commands in not restoring the Circar of Guntoor; and on the 13th of October, Sir Eyre Coote sailed from Calcutta, with a battalion of European infantry, consisting of 330 men; two companies of artillery, consisting of 200 men, with their complement of 630 Lascars, and between forty and fifty gentlemen volunteers. The prejudices of the Sepoys rendered it hazardous to attempt to send them by sea; and till the waters abated, which in the rainy season covered the low lands on the coast, it was not practicable for them to proceed by land. The intention, indeed, was entertained of sending by land four or five battalions in the course of the next or the ensuing month; but to that proceeding another difficulty was opposed. Moodajee Bonsla, the Regent of Berar, after showing a great readiness to meet the proposal of an alliance with the English, had afterwards temporized; and, though he afforded Colonel Goddard a safe passage through his dominions, declined all co-operation by means of his troops, and even evaded a renewal of the negotiation. When the disaffection of Nizam Ali towards the English was increased, that chieftain united his councils with the Poonah rulers, and with Hyder Ali, for the means of

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gratifying his resentments; and they joined in threatening the Regent of Berar, if he afforded assistance to the English. The Regent distrusted his means of resistance, and dared not to form the interdicted conjunction. The Nizam and the Poonah chiefs even insisted that he should send an army to invade and ravage Bengal, and he was afraid to resist the command; as he had no intention, however, to bring upon himself the resentment of the English, he communicated to the Governor-General intelligence of the constraint under which he acted; and, though he sent into Cuttack an army of 30,000 horse, under his son Chimnajee Bonsla, he promised to contrive, by means of delay, that it should not reach the borders of Bengal, till the season of action was over, and the rains begun. When it did arrive, which was early in June, 1780, it was in such distress for want of provisions, as to find a necessity of applying to the Bengal government for aid. The policy of preserving, if possible, the relations of amity with the state of Berar, as well as the motive of making a suitable return for the accommodations afforded to Colonel Goddard on his march, disposed the government to comply with its request. The army of Chimnajee Bonsla was in want of money no less than provisions; and on the 21st of September, an urgent request was tendered for a pecuniary accommodation, which the Governor-General privately, and without communication with his Council, in part supplied; at the same time intimating, that it depended upon the recall of that army from Cuttack, or its junction with the troops of the Company, to enable him to propose a public gratuity better proportioned to its wants. It might, in these circumstances, be presumed, that Chimnajee Bonsla would not hinder an English detachment to pass through Cuttack for Madras; but evil intentions on his part were still possible; on that of Nizam Ali something more than possible; the hazard of a march by the countries which they occupied was therefore proportionally great.[1]

Sir Eyre Coote, with a passage fortunately expeditious, landed at Madras on the 5th of November, and took his seat in Council on the 7th. He had been appointed bearer

[1] First Report, ut supra, and Appendix, No. 17; Sixth Report, ditto, p. 99, and Appendix, No. 294–305.

of the decree by which the Supreme Council suspended the Governor of Fort St. George; and this document he now produced. The Governor not only denied the competence of the Supreme Board to exercise the authority which they now assumed; but declared their decision precipitate and unjust, no contumacy appearing in his conduct to merit the punishment, which they arrogated to themselves unwarrantably the power to inflict. The majority of the Council, however, recognized the suspension; and the senior member of the Council succeeded to the chair.

During the interval between the retreat of Sir Hector Munro to the Mount, and the arrival of the Commander-in-Chief with the Bengal supplies, the Presidency at Madras had in vain importuned the Nabob for means which he had not to bestow. They appointed Colonel Brathwaite to the command in Tanjore; and recommended that a body of cavalry should be raised in that country, demanded the assistance of the Raja for that purpose, as well as for provisions to the troops. They made restitution at last of the Guntoor Circar; and at the same time sent a letter to the Nizam, in which they advertised him of the compliance they had yielded to his desires; made apology for delay in paying the peshcush, and promised regularity, when the removal of the present troubles should place it more in their power. Partly the poverty and weakness of this Prince, partly his jealousy of Hyder, and partly the assurances which he had received from the Superior Government in Bengal had as yet retained him inactive during the war which he had been eager to excite. The situation of the Northern Circars was calculated to tempt his ambition. The troops, with the exception of garrisons for the three principal places, were all recalled; but the Sepoys in the Guntoor Circuit refused to proceed by sea, and were obliged to be left at Ongole, while a mutiny was the effect of an attempt to embark those at Masulipatam and Vizagapatam. At the first of these places, order was restored by the address of the commanding officer. At Vizagapatam, however, they killed several of their officers, plundered the place, and went off, accompanied by five companies of the first Circar battalion. Apprehensions were entertained, that the

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Sepoys of the neighbouring Circar would follow their example; and that the Zemindars would deem the opportunity favourable to draw their necks out of the yoke. Sitteram Râz, who had been vested with so great a power by the favour of Governor Rumbold, stood aloof in a manner which had the appearance of design. But Vizeram Râz, his brother, who had just grounds of complaint, zealously exerted himself to suppress and intercept the mutineers, who at last laid down their arms, with part of their plunder, and dispersed.

Immediately after the battle of Conjeveram, Hyder marched to renew the siege of Arcot, defended by about 150 Europeans, and a garrison of the Nabob's troops. In the service of the Nabob, there was hardly found a man that was faithful to his trust. Discord prevailed between the officers of the Nabob and those of the Company, during the whole of the siege. The approaches of Hyder were carried on with a skill resembling that of the best engineers, and his artillery was so well served as to dismount repeatedly the English guns upon the batteries. After a siege of six weeks, the town which surrounded the fort was taken on the 31st of October, by assault; but the fort was strong, and still might have defended itself for a considerable time. The favour with which Hyder found his cause regarded by the people, he took care to improve, by the protection which he afforded to the inhabitants of Arcot, and the treatment of his prisoners: the applause of his generosity easily passed from the people without the fort to the people within: with the Nabob's officers he probably corresponded: the native troops almost all deserted; and the fort capitulated on the 3rd of November. The officer who commanded the fort, on the part of the Nabob, he took immediately into his service and confidence. Many other of the Nabob's garrisons had surrendered, with little or no resistance, generally upon the summons of Hyder's horse; and though an excuse was furnished, by the condition in which they found themselves with respect to the means of defence, nothing less than general treachery and disaffection seemed sufficient to account for the facility with which every place was given up. Hyder immediately supplied the forts with garrisons, repaired the works, and laid in

provisions and stores. He proceeded with great expedition to put Arcot into the best possible state of defence. Every avenue which led to it from Madras, and from Madras to the forts which the Nabob or the English still retained, was occupied by large detachments of his horse, and when need was, even by infantry, and fortified posts. By this means, the channel of communication, not only for supply, but even for intelligence, was almost wholly cut off.

Not deficient, either in the virtues which inspire affection, or in those which command respect, Sir Eyre Coote, as he was somewhat disposed to enlarge in praise of himself, so was somewhat apt to indulge in complaint of others. In the letters, which after his arrival in the Carnatic he addressed to the Directors and the Ministers of the King, he drew a picture in the darkest colours, not only of the weak and disastrous condition into which the country was brought, but of the negligence and incapacity, if not the corruption and guilt, of those servants of the Company, under whose management such misfortunes had arrived. It was, however, much more easy to point out what it was desirable should have been performed, than, with the defective revenue of the Presidency, to have performed it.[1] That Presidency had repeatedly represented both to the Supreme Council and to the Directors, their utter incapacity, through want of money, to make any military exertion: and by both had been left to struggle with their necessities. It was the poverty of the Carnatic, and the unwillingness of all parties to act as if they believed in that poverty, much more, it is probable, than the negligence or corruption of the government, which produced the danger by which all were now alarmed.[2]

[1] See the Fourth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, p. 6, where it appears to have been distinctly announced, by the Governor and Council, on the 19th January, 1779, that their resources were unequal, even to their peace establishment, much more to make any preparations for war.

[2] If the poverty of the Madras Presidency was the consequence of mismanagement and corruption, it only aggravated their culpability. The resources of the Carnatic were sufficient, if protected against the prodigality of the Nabob, the rapacity of his European adherents, and the ignorance or venality of the Company's servants, to have maintained the Presidency in a posture respectable, if not formidable, to its neighbours. At any rate, the knowledge of such inadequate resources, evinced in the complaints alluded to, should have deterred the Government from provoking hostilities, from a breach of their engagements with Hyder Ali, from disregarding his displeasure, and violating his territory, and from injuring and offending the

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According to the statement of the General, the whole army with which he had to take the field against the numerous host of Hyder, did not exceed 7000 men, of whom 1700 alone were Europeans.[1] Having put down in writing the view which he took of the situation of affairs, and the plan of hostilities which it appeared to him most advisable to pursue, he called a Council of War, consisting of the three general officers at the Presidency, Sir Hector Munro, Lord Macleod, and Brigadier-General Stuart; laid the paper before them, and desired that, after the most mature consideration, they would give their opinions upon it separately in writing. As four of the principal strongholds of the Carnatic, Velore, Wandewash, Permacoil, and Chingliput, represented by the Nabob as containing considerable stores, were invested by the enemy, the General proposed to begin with the operations necessary for their relief.[2] Not contented with the sanction of the general officers, he deemed it meet, with a condescension to which the pride of military knowledge can seldom submit, to communicate the proceedings of the Council of War to the Select Committee, and to desire their opinion. All agreed in approving the plans of the General, and reposing unbounded confidence in his discretion. As Wandewash was the place in most imminent danger, the first effort was directed in its favour. The probability that Hyder would not permit them, unopposed, to pass the river Palar, it was gallantly and generously observed by Munro, was a motive rather to stimulate than repel, as the troops under their present

Nizam. The timely interposition of the Bengal Government alone prevented the active enmity of this latter power, whose co-operation with Hyder, once before experienced, would have been decisive of the fate of Madras. In no part of the administration of Warren Hastings does he appear to more advantage than in the wisdom and vigour with which he rescued the Presidency of Fort St. George from the disastrous consequences of its misgovernment.—W.

[1] His force, therefore, did not exceed that of Munro and Baillie, had their junction been effected. According to Sir T. Munro, who was then a subaltern with the army, it was not so strong; consisting of but 1400 Europeans, with 5000 sepoys, and 800 native cavalry. Life of Munro, i. 32.—W.

[2] In his representation, the General stated it as a known fact, that they had not only Hyder, but the whole Carnatic, for enemies; and, therefore, not assistance, but obstruction, to expect in every part of the march: one of the Nabob's renters, having endeavoured to betray Vellore to the enemy, he had ordered him, he said, into irons; hoping, "that he might be instrumental to the discovery of those dark designs, which he had long suspected to exist in the court of a native power, living under the very walls of our garrison at Fort St. George."

leader he was confident would prevail, and nothing was, therefore, more desirable than to bring Hyder to a general action. On the 17th of January, 1781, the army, under the command of General Coote, marched from the encampment at the Mount. Hyder was struck with awe by the arrival of the new commander and the reinforcements from Bengal. So far from opposing the passage of the Palar, he abandoned Wandewash with precipitation, as soon as the army approached.[1] But this success was counterbalanced by the fall of the important fortress of Amboor, which commanded one of the passes into the Carnatic. From Wandewash the army was on its march towards Permacoil, when intelligence was received by express, that a French fleet had arrived. This was an event by which attention was roused. The direction of the march was immediately changed; and the army, after a few days, encamped on the Red hills of Pondicherry, with its front toward Arcot.

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After the reduction of Pondicherry, the inhabitants had been treated with uncommon forbearance and generosity. The fortifications alone were destroyed. The people were allowed to trade under the protection of the English; and the officers to remain on their parole. Even upon the invasion of Hyder, when it was entirely evacuated by the English troops, the officers alone were sent to Madras. The flattering prospect of being speedily reinforced by their countrymen, of seeing themselves change places with the English, and of contributing something to the recovery in India of the glory and power of their country, tempted the Frenchmen of Pondicherry to forget the favours which they had received. They applied coercion to the English resident; enlisted sepoys; and laid in provisions at Carangoly. Sir Eyre Coote made haste to disarm the inhabitants, to remove the provisions from Carangoly, and to destroy the boats. The French fleet, consisting of seven

[1] Wandewash was not besieged by Hyder at this time in person. The commander of the enemy was one of his generals, Mir Saheb; the fort was defended by Lieut. Flint, and a garrison of 300 Sepoys only. The extraordinary courage, presence of mind, and military talents of Lieut. Flint, are described with the most interesting minuteness, and with enthusiastic, but deserved commendation, by Col. Wilks, ii. 291. See also Life of Munro, i. 33. Hyder at this period was engaged in the siege of Vellore, which was defended with successful gallantry by Col. Lang; and the failure of an attempt to carry it by storm, on the 10th of January, as well as the movements of the English General, induced Hyder to raise the siege. Ibid. 35.—W.

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large ships, and four frigates, lay at anchor off Pondicherry. The English army was closely followed by large bodies of the enemy's horse; and on the 8th of February Hyder passed at the head of his army, within cannon-shot of the English camp: marching, as was supposed, directly to Cuddalore. The English drums beat to arms; and while the enemy proceeded on one of the two roads which lead towards Cuddalore, the English marched parallel with them on the other, and encamped on the 9th with their right towards the ruins of Fort St. David, and their left towards Cuddalore. So feeble were the resources of the English General, that he was already reduced to a few days' provisions; and eager for a battle, as the most probable means of obtaining relief. He moved the army on the 10th from the cover of the guns of Cuddalore, leaving the tents standing, and placed himself in order of battle. He informed the men, as he rode along the line, that the very day he wished for was arrived; and that they would be able in a few hours to reap the fruit of their labours. The English remained for three successive days offering battle to the enemy, which he was too cunning to accept; and on the fourth returned to their camp, with a great increase of their sick, their provisions almost exhausted, the cattle on which their movements depended dying for want of forage, Hyder in possession of the surrounding country, and an enemy's fleet upon the coast. The deepness of the gloom was a little dispelled by the sudden departure of that fleet, which, being greatly in want of water and other necessaries, and afraid of the English squadron which was shortly expected back from the opposite coast, set sail on the 15th of February, and proceeded to the Isle of France.

The inability, in the English army, to move, for want of provisions and equipments, and the policy of Hyder to avoid the hazards of a battle, prevented all operations of importance during several months. In the meantime Hyder reduced the fortress of Thiagar; his cavalry overran and plundered the open country of Tanjore; and Tippoo Saib, with a large division of his army, laid siege to Wandewash.

On the 14th of June the fleet returned with a reinforcement of troops from Bombay. While absent on the

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western coast, Sir Edward Hughes had attacked the ships of Hyder, in his own ports of Calicut and Mangalore; and destroyed the rudiments of that maritime power which it was one of the favourite objects of his ambition to erect.

The want of bullocks, which were the draught cattle of the army, rendered the movement even of the English artillery heavy and slow. In hopes of being now supplied with provisions by sea, while they remained upon the coast, the English proceeded to Porto Novo on the 19th of June, not only to put a stop to the ravages of the enemy in Tanjore and the neighbouring districts, but to yield protection to Trichinopoly, against which, it was evident, that Hyder was preparing to march. On the 18th, General Coote in person conducted a large detachment to the assault of the fortified Pagoda of Chillambram; where he was repulsed with very considerable loss. This event, which the English regarded as a heavy misfortune, produced the most favourable results. At a time when they could by no means venture to carry their operations from the vicinity of the sea; when their imbecility was becoming dangerously visible; and when they might have been soon cooped up within the walls of Madras, this disaster sufficiently elevated Hyder, whose army had increased with the progress of his arms, to hazard a battle for the sake of preventing the advance of the English towards Trichinopoly; which, as holding in check the southern countries, was regarded by him as an object of great importance, and against which he was proportionally desirous that his operations should not be disturbed. He was dissuaded, it is said, but in vain, from this rash design, by the prudence of his eldest son; and advancing on the only road by which the English could proceed to Cuddalore, he took up an advantageous position, which he fortified with redoubts, while the English were obtaining a few days' provisions landed laboriously through the surf. Early in the morning of the 1st of July, the English army broke up the camp at Porto Novo, and commenced their march with the sea at a little distance on their right. To the other difficulties under which the English General laboured, was added a want of intelligence, partly from deficient arrangements, but chiefly, it is probable, from the

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disaffection of the people of the country, and the diffusion of Hyder's horse, who seldom allowed a spy to return. After a march of about an hour, the opening of an extensive prospect discovered a large body of cavalry drawn up on the plain. It was necessary to detach from the English army, small as it was, a considerable body of troops for the protection, from the enemy's irregular horse, of the baggage and the multitudinous followers of an Indian camp. The General formed the army in two lines, and advanced in order of battle. A heavy cannonade was opened on the cavalry which occupied the road before them. This dispersed the cavalry, and exposed to view a line of redoubts, commanding the road, and the enemy behind that line, extending on the right and left to a greater distance on the plain than the eye could command. The troops were ordered to halt; and the principal officers were summoned to council. The difficulties were almost insurmountable: the sea enclosed them on the right: impracticable sand-banks on the left: to advance directly upon the fire of so many batteries exposed the army to a dreadful slaughter, if not extermination: and four days' provisions, which the men carried upon their backs, constituted the whole of their means of subsistence. While the Council deliberated, an officer, walking to a little distance, discovered a road cut through the sand-hills. It was afterwards found to have been made by Hyder the preceding night, with a view to enable him, when the English should be storming the batteries in front, to throw them into confusion by falling on their flank; when his horse would rush from behind the batteries and complete their destruction. The army filed off into the newly-discovered road, the sepoys unharnessing the wretched oxen, and drawing the artillery more quickly themselves. Hyder perceived the failure of his stratagem, evacuated his works, and moved exactly parallel with the English army: which, after passing the sand-banks, turned and faced the enemy. A pause ensued, during which the General seemed irresolute, and some officers counselled a retreat.[1] Several of the men fell under the fire of the

[1] Both Wilks and Munro ascribe this pause to no irresolution in the General, but to the necessity of waiting until his second line was in position. Munro's account is particularly valuable, as he was present. "The General rode along

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enemy's guns, which had been removed with great expedition from the batteries, and placed in the line. The second line of the English army was commanded to occupy some heights in the rear. Hyder, soon aware of the importance of this position, sent a division of his army to dislodge them. The first line of the English, led by Sir Hector Munro, now went forward to the attack; and at the same time another division of the enemy endeavoured to penetrate between the two lines, and attack the General in the rear. For six hours, during which the contest lasted, every part of the English army was engaged to the utmost limit of exertion. The second line upon the heights, skilfully and bravely commanded by General Stuart, not only repelled the several attacks which were made to force them from their advantageous ground, but successfully resisted the attempt which was made to penetrate between the lines, and rendered it impossible for the enemy to aim a stroke at the baggage towards the sea. The first line was thus left with undivided attention to maintain their arduous conflict with the main body of Hyder's army; where their admirable perseverance at last prevailed, and driving before them promiscuously, infantry, cavalry, artillery, they finally precipitated the enemy into a disorderly retreat. Had the English possessed cavalry, and other means of active pursuit, they might have deprived Hyder of his artillery and stores, and possibly reduced him to the necessity of evacuating the province. Their loss did not exceed 400 men; and not one officer of rank was either killed or wounded. The enemy's principal loss was sustained in the first attack upon the line on the heights, the strength of which they mistook, and advanced with too much confidence of success. In the rest of the battle, they fought chiefly at a distance, and with their artillery, which was skilfully served. The consequences of this victory were highly important. Hyder abandoned his designs upon the southern provinces. Tippoo raised the

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the front (of the first line) encouraging every one to patience, and to reserve their fire till they were ordered to part with it; he only waited for accounts from the second line. An aide-de-camp from General Stuart told him that he had taken possession of the sand-hills; he immediately gave orders to advance, and to open all the guns. The fire was so heavy that nothing could stand before it." Life of Munro, 43. See also a detailed account of the action, in Wilks, ii. 309.—W.

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siege of Wandewash; and both retired with the whole of their army to the neighbourhood of Arcot.

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The body of native troops, which it had been resolved by the government of Bengal to send by land to the assistance of Madras, was long detained by the negotiations, carried on as well with the Berar government, as with Chimnajee, the Commander of the army in Cuttack. The distress of that Commander for money to pay his troops, and the proposal of gratuity of thirteen, with a loan of ten, lacks of rupees, though distrust of the English power, now violently shaken, made his father shy, induced Chimnajee to engage for a safe passage to the troops. The detachment was placed under the command of Colonel Pearce; and about the end of March arrived at Ganjam, where it was long detained by the violence of an infectious disease. This, together with a great desertion among the sepoys, materially weakened the battalions; and their junction was not effected with Coote, who had returned to Madras, before the beginning of August.

The object which more immediately engrossed the desires of the English was the recovery of Arcot. As the want of provision was the grand impediment to that enterprise, and as the enemy were reported to have laid in great stores at Tripassore, the siege of that place was undertaken, in hopes to supply the army for the siege of Arcot. But Tripassore, though it surrendered after a few days' resistance, was found to contain a small supply of provisions; and the advanced parties of Hyder's army, who was in full march to its relief, appeared in sight, before the English troops had taken full possession of the works. Hyder fell back a few miles to what he reckoned a lucky spot, a strong position on the very ground where he had defeated Baillie. And the English General, eager for another battle, which might relieve him from his difficulties, came in sight of the enemy about eight o'clock on the morning of the 27th. The position of Hyder gave him great advantages, while his guns bore upon the approaching army, and the advance was rendered peculiarly difficult by a number of water-courses cutting the ground. The second line of the English army, consisting of two brigades, were directed to occupy a situation of some strength on the left, while the first line, consisting of three brigades,

formed in face of six or eight cannon, which they were commanded to storm. No sooner had they pushed through some intervening underwood, than they found the guns removed from the front, and beginning to fire upon both their flanks; while at the same instant a tremendous cannonade opened on the second line. Sir Hector Munro, who commanded the first line, was ordered to join the second, which could hardly maintain its ground. The two lines having closed, and presenting the same front, were commanded to advance on the enemy's artillery. The intervening ground was not only difficult but impracticable; where the army stood, some protection was derived from a long avenue of trees. This was observed by the whole line; and Sir Hector Munro pointed it out to the General. "You talk to me, Sir, when you should be doing your duty." The army accordingly advanced; the men began to drop very fast; and grew impatient. A tumbril blew up, the second in the course of the day. At an impassable difficulty, the army came to a stand, and impatiently waited for orders. None arrived. Sir Hector Munro, seated sullenly by the only tree that was in the plain, refused to issue a single command. The battalions, opening for the purpose of giving way to the enemy's shot, had fallen into clusters, and become noisy. The second line broke into great confusion. Two hours did the army remain in this perilous situation, in which, had they been vigorously charged by the enemy's cavalry, they could scarcely have avoided a total defeat. It is probable that Hyder's experience had rendered it difficult for him to conceive that the English were in a state of confusion. Night advancing, he ordered his guns to be drawn off, and the English returned to the strong ground which the second line originally occupied. A conference was held among the principal officers, when the impossibility of remaining, and the danger of advancing, being apparent to all, one gentleman, in expressing his sentiments, made use of the word *retreat*. The general immediately swore, he had never *retreated* in his life. He added, that he would permit the army to *fall back*. Spies came in with intelligence that Hyder was preparing to attack the English army between midnight and break of day. The troops in consequence were ordered to pass the night under arms

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in front of the camp. The report was false, artfully given out by Hyder, to cover his intention of removing in the night, to a place more secure from surprise. The next day the English buried their dead, and collected the wounded; when, being masters of the field of battle, they fired the guns in token of victory. They now marched back to Tripassore; when Hyder, calling the march a *retreat*, proclaimed a victory, with all the pomp of war, to the nations of India.[1]

The English suffered considerably more in this than in the previous action; and the enemy less. Of the privates not less than 600 were lost to the service.[2]. Several officers of distinction were wounded, and some were killed.

Affairs were now in great extremity. The moment seemed approaching when the army would be constrained to quit the field for want of provisions. Madras itself was threatened with famine. The fort of Velore was so exhausted of provisions, that it could not hold out beyond a short time longer; and the fate of the Carnatic in a great measure depended on the fort of Velore. The greatest exertions were made to enable the army to march to its relief. Madras was for that purpose actually exhausted of the means of subsistence. The enemy were encamped at the pass of Sholingur on the road to Velore; to which the English came up on the 27th of September. A strong body was detached, in order to occupy a rising

[1] The description of this action in the text, is taken evidently from authorities unfavourable to Sir Eyre Coote, and is at least unprecise. The account given by Colonel Wilks is much more distinct, and, for the military details, more worthy of credit. Munro's description is brief, but authentic. "The position of Hyder was such, that a stronger could not have been imagined. Besides three villages, which the enemy had occupied, the ground along their front, and on their flanks, was intersected in every direction by deep ditches and water-courses; their artillery fired from embrasures cut in mounds of earth, which had been formed from the hollowing of the ditches, and the main body of their army lay behind them. The cannonade became general about 10 o'clock, and continued with little intermission till sunset, for we found it almost impossible to advance upon the enemy, as the cannon could not be brought, without much time and labour, over the broken ground in front. The enemy retired as we advanced, and always found cover in the ditches and behind the banks. They were forced from them all before sunset, and after standing a short time a cannonade on open ground, they fled in great hurry and confusion towards Conjeveram." Life, i. 45. That his army was saved from a total rout by the difficulty of getting at it, was politically converted by Hyder into the credit of having fought a drawn battle. Such, according to Wilks, it is termed in the Mysorean accounts; not a victory, as in our text Wilks, ii. 326.—W.

[2] The English army lost no more than 421 killed, wounded, and missing, officers included. Wilks. Our loss was above 500. Munro.—W.

ground to the left of the enemy's encampment, while the main army advanced in a single line upon their front. Hyder, from his former experience, had concluded that Sir Eyre Coote would keep the whole of his troops together; and had only provided against a direct movement on his line. His good sense made him resolve not to change the disposition of his rude and unwieldy mass in the face of an enemy; and his only effort was to draw it out of the field. He endeavoured to alarm the detached portion of the English army with a feint; while, after a short firing, his guns were hurried off. His horse during these operations stood the fire of the English cannon, and suffered severely. Before he could extricate himself, and before night came to his aid, he had sustained a considerable loss, with the power of inflicting only a trifling injury in return.[1]

The English were in no condition to press upon the foe. In the minor operations which succeeded, as in the whole course of the war, one of the most remarkable circumstances was the extraordinary promptitude and correctness of Hyder's intelligence, who had notice of almost every attempt, even to surprise the smallest convoy, and in this important respect, the no less remarkable deficiency of the English. On the 26th of October, the General removed his camp to the neighbourhood of Palipett, where he obtained a quantity of rice. With this he afforded Velore a temporary supply; and was even encouraged to undertake the siege of Chittore. That place, not being provided for defence, capitulated in two days; while Hyder, obliged to humour his army, was unable to obstruct these operations. The month of November was now

[1] The accounts of Wilks and Munro are much more particular and clear than that of the text. Hyder was taken unprepared, and had not struck his tents when the head of the British line appeared before his encampment; and his only object in the action that followed, was to effect his escape without the loss of his guns. To accomplish this he sacrificed his cavalry. "He divided his best horse into three bodies, and sent them under three chosen leaders to attack as many parts of our army at the same time. They came down at full gallop till they arrived within reach of grape, when, being thrown into confusion, the greater part either halted or fled, and those that persevered in advancing, were dispersed by a discharge of musketry, except a few who thought it safer to push through the intervals between the battalions and their guns, than to ride back through the cross fire of the artillery; but most of these were killed by parties in the rear. This attack enabled Hyder to save his guns. Except the escort with the artillery, every man in the Mysorean army shifted for himself. The loss of the enemy was estimated at 5000, that of the English fell short of a hundred."—W.

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arrived, and every thing announced the falling of the monsoon floods, when the rising of the rivers, and the softening of the roads, would make the return of the English army extremely difficult; so far, too, from being supplied with subsistence, the army continued in a state of want; yet the General lingered where he was, apparently absorbed in his own chagrin. He was summoned from his reveries about the middle of the month, by intelligence of an attack upon Palipett and Tripassore.[1] The rains fell upon him during his march: in the space of a few days the roads became so deep, that one elephant, three camels, a great number of bullocks, carriages, and horses, were left inextricably entangled in the mud: and the Palar was just ferdable when he passed it on the 21st. On his approach, however, the enemy abandoned both Palipett and Tripassore: and after encamping a few days on the Coccalore plain, above Tripassore, he placed the troops in cantonments; having lost one-third of the force with which, after his junction with Colonel Pearce, he marched in August from the Mount.[2]

At the Presidency, changes of more than ordinary importance had taken place during this campaign. The state of affairs in the Carnatic having greatly alarmed the Com-

[1] There was no great delay in the movements of the British force. Chittoor was taken only on the 11th November, and on the 16th the army marched to raise the siege of Tripassore.—W.

[2] For the materials of this war with Hyder, up to the present date, the most important sources are the First, Second, Third, and Sixth Reports of the Committee of Secrecy, in 1781. Of the military transactions, narratives of considerable value are to be found in the Annual Register; Robson's Life of Hyder Ali; and the publication entitled, Memoirs of the late War in Asia. For part of this campaign, see also Barrow's Life of Lord Macartney. To the pages of Colonel Wilks, I can now only refer, not having had the opportunity of availing myself of his lights, till what I had written could not be conveniently altered. Where my facts stand upon the authority of public records, I conceive, in the few instances in which we differ, that I approximate to the truth more nearly than he. To my other authorities I should have preferred him; though it is a grievous defect, that he so rarely tells us the source from which he derives his information: and though I repose no great confidence in the vague censures, and still more vague eulogies, in which he has indulged.—M.

Colonel Wilks explains in his preface the authorities he employs, and the reasons why more precise reference is not given. He writes from native documents, and from the official records of the Madras government. To these a particular reference would have been of no use, as they are not generally accessible. Of the care and fidelity with which they are cited, we have every reason to entertain a favourable belief, and the censures and eulogies which offend our author, are apparently in all cases judiciously, although they may be warmly, bestowed. As a military history of a very important period of our transactions in India, Col. Wilks's South of India is a work of the highest possible authority.—W.

pany in England, misfortune pointed resentment against the men under whose superintendence it had arrived; and according to the usual process of shallow thought, a change of rulers, it was concluded, would produce a change of results. So much of misconduct having been imputed to the servants of the Company, a party appeared to be forming itself, even among the Directors and Proprietors, who called for an extension of the field of choice: and represented it as rather an advantage, that the chief governors in India should not be selected from the servants of the Company. It necessarily followed that a party arose who contended with equal zeal that by the Company's servants the stations of greatest power and trust in India ought exclusively to be filled. At a Court of Proprietors, held on the 30th of November, 1780, Mr. Lushington moved, "That it be recommended to the Court of Directors to appoint forthwith a Governor of Madras, and that it be earnestly recommended to them to appoint one of their own servants to fill that vacancy." It was on the other hand contended, that the *fittest* man, not a man of any particular class or order, ought always to be sought for the places on which the interests of the community principally depended; and that integrity, unshaken by the example of plunder and corruption, a character to lose, and consequently one to save, by shunning the offences of former governors, were to be considered as the fittest qualifications in their new Governor of Madras. The Court adjourned without proceeding to a ballot; but on the 23rd of the same month the question was renewed. Lord Macartney, who had recently gained reputation by negotiating a commercial treaty with Russia, was pointed out to the choice of the Company; the advantages of a liberal education, of political experience, acknowledged talents and honour, were placed in the strongest point of view by the one party; the benefits of local knowledge, and of the motives to zeal, to industry, fidelity, and the acquisition of knowledge afforded to the whole line of the Company's servants, by the high prizes of the principal stations in the government of India, were amply displayed by the opposite party: and, on a division, it was decided by a majority of seventy-nine to sixty, that new men should be eligible to the office of Governors in India. The

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Court of Directors were guided by similar views; and on the 14th of December, Lord Macartney was nominated Governor and President of Fort St. George. After a passage of four months, he landed at Madras on the 22nd of June, 1781, and then first obtained intelligence that the country was invaded.

He came to his office, when it, undoubtedly, was filled with difficulties of an extraordinary kind. The presence of a new Governor, and of a Governor of a new description, as change itself under pain, is counted a good, raised in some degree the spirits of the people. By advantage of the hopes which were thus inspired, he was enabled to borrow considerable sums of money. Having carried out intelligence of the war with the Dutch, and particular instructions to make acquisition of such of their settlements as were placed within his reach, he was eager to signalize his arrival by the performance of conquests, which acquired an air of importance, from the use, as seaports, of which they might prove to Hyder, or the French. Within a week of his arrival, Sadras was summoned and yielded without resistance. Pulicat was a place of greater strength, with a corps in its neighbourhood of Hyder's army. The garrison of Fort St. George was so extremely reduced, as to be ill prepared to afford a detachment. But Lord Macartney placed himself at the head of the militia; and Pulicat, on condition of security to private property, was induced to surrender.

Of the annunciation, which was usually made to the Princes of India, of the arrival of a new Governor, Lord Macartney conceived that advantage might be taken, aided by the recent battle of Porto Novo, and the expectation of troops from Europe, to obtain the attention of Hyder to an offer of peace. With the concurrence of the General and Admiral, an overture was transmitted, to which the following answer was returned, characteristic at once of the country and the man: "The Governors and Sirdars who enter into treaties, after one or two years, return to Europe, and their acts and deeds become of no effect; and fresh Governors and Sirdars introduce new conversations. Prior to your coming, when the Governor and Council of Madras had departed from their treaty of alliance and friendship, I sent my vakeel to confer with

them, and to ask the reason for such a breach of faith; the answer given was, that they who made these conditions were gone to Europe. You write that you have come with the sanction of the King and Company to settle all matters; which gives me great happiness. You, Sir, are a man of wisdom, and comprehend all things. Whatever you may judge proper and best, that you will do. You mention that troops have arrived, and are daily arriving, from Europe: of this I have not a doubt. I depend upon the favour of God for my succours." Nor was it with Hyder alone, that the new Governor interposed his good offices for the attainment of peace. A letter signed by him, by Sir Edward Hughes, and Sir Eyre Coote, the commanders of the sea and land forces, and by Mr. Macpherson, a Member of the Supreme Council, was addressed to the Mahrattas, in which they offered themselves as guarantees of any treaty of peace which might be contracted between them and the Governor-General and Council of Bengal: and declared their willingness to accede to the restoration of Guzerat, Salsette, and Bassein.

The principal settlement of the Dutch, on the Coromandel coast, was Negapatam, near the southern boundary of Tanjore. This, Lord Macartney was desirous of adding to the rest of the conquests from the Dutch, immediately after his arrival, but was overruled by the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, who represented the importance of recovering Arcot, in the first instance, and of marching afterwards to the attack of Negapatam. The President was eager to avail himself of the assistance of the fleet and marines, in his design against Negapatam — assistance, without which, the object could hardly be accomplished, and which could only be obtained while the season permitted shipping to remain upon the coast. Though the General had been disappointed in his hopes of being able to attempt the recovery of Arcot, he continued in the north-western part of the province, apparently disposed neither to march to the attack of Negapatam, nor to spare for that enterprise any portion of his troops. To Lord Macartney the attainment of the object did not appear to be hopeless without him. The intimation, however, of a design to make the attempt, brought

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back from the General an eager renunciation of all responsibility in the exploit, a pretty confident prediction of disappointment, and, from disappointment, of consequences deplorable and ruinous. The President declared that, convinced as he was of the propriety, and hence obligation of the enterprise, he would not shrink from the responsibility. To avoid interference with the General, not a man was taken from his army. Colonel Brathwaite, who commanded in Tanjore, and in whom the President complained that he found not all the alacrity which could have been desired, was directed, with his troops, to aid in the attack. The choice of a leader, too, was involved in difficulties. After the affront received by Sir Hector Munro, in the battle of the 27th of August, he retired as soon as possible from the army commanded by General Coote, under whom he served not again, and remained at the Presidency recruiting his health. It was to him that, in etiquette, the command of the expedition belonged; but Mr. Sadlier, with whom he had the violent dispute, was now a member of the Select Committee; and he refused to serve under orders or directions in which that gentleman should have any concern. The scruples of the General met a contrast in the liberality of the Committee, who readily consented that he should receive his instructions from the President alone; and the President, with the Admiral of the fleet, was empowered to form whatever arrangements the enterprise should require. On the 21st of October, the seamen and marines were landed from the ships; on the 30th, the lines and redoubts were attacked and carried; on the 3rd of November, ground was opened against the north face of the fort, and the approaches were pushed on with great rapidity; the Governor was summoned on the 6th, after a battery of ten eighteen-pounders was ready to open within three hundred paces of the walls; he refused to surrender; but, on the 12th, after making two desperate sallies, and after one of the bastions had suffered from a formidable breaching-battery, he offered to accept, and received, terms of honourable capitulation. The number of troops who surrendered was 6551—considerably greater than that of the besieging army. A large quantity of warlike stores, together with a double investment of goods—no ships having

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arrived from Holland for the investment of that or the preceding year—was found in the place. With Negapatam, the whole of the Dutch settlements on that coast fell into the hands of the English; and the troops of Hyder began immediately to evacuate the forts which they had occupied in the kingdom of Tanjore. A body of 500 men were put on board the fleet, which sailed from Negapatam on the 2nd of January, and proceeded to the attack of Trincomalee, a celebrated Dutch settlement on the island of Ceylon. It arrived before the place on the 4th, and on the 11th the best of the two forts which defended Trincomalee was taken by storm.[1]

The deplorable indigence of the Presidency; the feebleness of military operations unsupported by funds; the power of the enemy, and the diminished prospect of supplies from Bengal, presented to the eyes of Lord Macartney a scene of difficulties, from which it was hardly possible to discover any source of relief. Participating in the general aversion to believe that the Nabob was no less exhausted than the Company, and representing to that chief how great the interest which he, no less than the Company, had, in the expulsion of so dangerous a common foe, the President, at an early period of his administration, renewed the importunities of the government on the subject of a pecuniary supply. The Bengal government, by their letters, had already given a sanction to strong measures of coercion; declaring that, while every part of the Nabob's dominions, except the part retained by the English troops, was in the hands of a foreign power, and could only be wrested from it by their exertions, the Nabob could no longer be looked upon as the proprietor of the country; and that such a combination of circumstances not only justified, but required, the immediate assignment of all his revenues, to defray the expenses of the war.[2] The President, expressing his desire to avoid this extremity, offered to accept a few lacs of pagodas as a temporary supply. This pressure upon the inability of

[1] Some Account of the Public Life of the Earl of Macartney, by John Barrow, F.R.S. i. 67—109; Annual Register for 1782.—M. Some interesting particulars of the capture of Fort Ostenburg, are given in the Memoirs of a Field Officer (Colonel Price) on the Retired List of the East India Service, who was present as a subaltern.—W.

[2] Letter of Gov.-Gen. and Council, Feb. 26, 1781.

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the Nabob, drew from him language of asperity and recrimination; and when importunately urged, he at last declared, that his future contributions were defined, by a treaty which he had just concluded with the government of Bengal. The declaration, though it justly surprised the President and Council of Madras, was not at variance with the fact. The Nabob, who had tried the effect of an agency in England, both on the legislative and executive branches of the government, was advised to make trial of the same expedient on the controlling Board in India; and in March, 1781, he sent, on a commission to Calcutta, his dewan or treasurer, together with Mr. Joseph Sullivan, a servant of the Company, whom, without the consent of the Presidency, he had appointed his agent. The object of the Nabob was to obtain a clear recognition of his being the hereditary sovereign of the Carnatic, not subject to any interference on the part of the Company in the affairs of his government; a promise of exemption from all pecuniary demands, beyond the expense of ten battalions of troops, to be employed in his service; an admission of his right to name his successor, in pursuance of his wish to disinherit his eldest, in favour of his second son; a promise to add, by conquest, certain districts possessed by Hyder to his dominions, and to restore to him the kingdom of Tanjore; and, finally, the assistance of the Company, in forming a settlement with his European creditors.

To this embassy, the rulers of Bengal afforded a cordial reception. For the independence of the government of the Carnatic Prince, they undertook, in general terms: his requisition, respecting the ten battalions, and the limit of his pecuniary contributions, was approved: his right to appoint his successor they recognised as already admitted: the conquest of certain districts possessed by Hyder, they declared to be as desirable on account of the Company's as the Nabob's interest: the restoration of Tanjore, they informed him, was not placed within the limits of their authority: with regard to his European creditors, they proposed, that after the addition to the principal sum, of all interest due to the 21st of November, 1781; and after a deduction of one-fourth from all the debts which might have been transferred from the original

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creditors, by purchase or otherwise, Company's bonds, with the usual interest, should be granted, and paid, according to a proportion which might be fixed, out of the assigned revenues. And upon these conditions, it was proposed, but not without his own consent, that the Nabob should make over all the revenues of his country, during the war, to the Company; that his agents, in conjunction with persons appointed by the Presidency of Fort St. George, should perform the collections; and that as much only should be retained by the Nabob as was necessary for the disbursements of his family and government. Not only was this agreement transmitted to Madras, with instructions to consider it as possessing the validity of a treaty; but Mr. Sullivan returned with credentials, as minister from the Governor-General and Council of Bengal at the Court of the Nabob.

Nothing is more pregnant with mischief than ill-worded and indefinite laws; and the best legislators have, as yet, displayed but little of the art of rendering the language of their enactments unambiguous and certain. We have already contemplated the disputes with the Presidency of Bombay, occasioned by the loose and imperfect phraseology of the law which conferred the power of control upon the Presidency of Bengal. In that instance, the Supreme Council were even rebuked by their masters for carrying their pretensions beyond the intent of the Company, and that of the law; but on the present occasion they pushed their interference into the most immediate and important concerns of the Madras government; inveigled from their service and obedience the servants of that Presidency; and set up an agency of their own at Madras, which implied the suppression of the chief powers of the Governor and Council. Though the character of Lord Macartney was tinged with vanity as well as ambition, he possessed great temper and urbanity; and the Governor and Council of Madras, instead of treating this new assumption of power on the part of the Bengal government as an injury, expressed only their apprehensions that they were not free to divest themselves of powers, with which their employers had intrusted them, and for the exercise of which they would hold them responsible. They remarked, that they were therefore at liberty to consider the scheme of

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arrangements, which had been transmitted to them by the Supreme Board, as only materials to aid, not as commands to supersede their judgment. The words, they observed, in which the Supreme Council had appeared to sanction the independence of the Nabob, an independence which they had received the express and repeated commands of the employers to prevent, were so adroitly ambiguous, as, in fact, to evade the question, and were inconvenient only in so far as they tended to inflame the pretensions of that troublesome associate; but as, in the government of the country, there were certain departments in which it was assumed as necessary that the Company's government should take a share, and yet those departments and that share remained totally undefined, the vagueness and ambiguity of the words of the Supreme Board left the Madras Presidency, if bound to obey, without any rule to guide their proceedings. The article which regarded the ten battalions of troops appeared, they said, to them, to convey a power over their marches and operations, which the Court of Directors had ever been most anxious to withhold. The Nabob had requested the power of employing these troops in settling his country. The answer of the Presidency is worthy of record: "We wish to know what is meant by this article, before we form any judgment as to its propriety: we know not how troops can be properly said to contribute to the settlement of a country: if it be meant that he should have the Company's forces to enable him to punish or extirpate any of his tributaries, and if it be proper to lend our forces for such a purpose, should we not plainly say so, without reserve or ambiguity?" If the Nabob was to have the troops, in all cases, upon his simple requisition, "he might soon," they add, "require, what he has hitherto in vain solicited from the Court of Directors, —the means of attacking, contrary to their express commands, the principal tributary Rajas who claim and depend upon the protection both of the Crown and the Company." If he was only to be assisted in those cases which the President and Council should approve, the clause, though void of meaning, was not exempt from mischief, as it tended to raise "a claim, which, being undefined, would be measured only by the wishes of the claimant." The right of the Nabob to nominate a suc-

cessor, or to infringe the rule of primogeniture, they declined to discuss; but affirmed their total ignorance of any such admission of that right as the Governor-General and Council appeared to assume. That the mode which was proposed for collecting the revenues, by the agents of the Nabob and of the Company in conjunction, was calculated to produce altercations between the different parties, and to afford the agents of the Nabob a pretence for defalcations, alleging obstructions from the Company's servants, experience, they said, most fully evinced. Whether the defect proceeded from the want of intention on the part of the Nabob, or from his inability to ensure the obedience of his collectors, it had, through them, been found impossible to obtain the revenues. With regard to the arrangements in behalf of the creditors of the Nabob, they were unwilling to wear the appearance of opposing either the will of the superior Board, or the interest of the creditors; but they professed themselves ignorant, whether the creditors would regard the arrangement as advantageous, or the Directors would be pleased to find the Company pledged for bonds to so great an amount.

On the point, however, of the assignment, the situation of affairs, and the sanction of the Bengal government, appeared to the President and Council sufficient authority for urging the Nabob forcibly to concur with their views. With much negotiation it was at last arranged; that the revenues of all the dominions of the Nabob should be transferred to the Company for a period of five years at least; that of the proceeds one-sixth part should be reserved for the private expenses of himself and his family, the remainder being placed to his account; that the collectors should all be appointed by the President: and that the Nabob should not interfere. By this deed, which bore date the 2nd of December, 1781, the inconveniences of a double government, which by its very nature engendered discordance, negligence, rapacity, and profusion, were so far got rid of; though yet the misery and weakness to which they had contributed could not immediately be removed.[1]

[1] This is evidently the main object of the agreement projected, not executed, with the Nabob, by the government of Bengal. In the reply of Hastings to the objections of the government of Madras, he first apologizes for the inter-

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It was not one spring alone of dissension which distracted the government of Madras. The species of independent authority which had been conferred upon the General, produced many of the evils of a double government in the Presidency itself. The General had a susceptibility of temper, which, heightened by the infirmities of old age, by flattery, by the difficulties of his situation, and his want of success, made him take offence, with the levity and hastiness of a child. The civil authority, deprived, in a period of war, of all share in the military arrangements, found the business of government withdrawn from their hands, and themselves degraded into a capacity little superior to that of agents for supplying the wants of the army. The visible loss of authority, by weakening their influence, diminished their resources; and persons were even discouraged from relieving them by loans. A situation like this was ill calculated to please a man of Lord Macartney's rank and pretensions. Aware of the uneasiness which it was probable he would feel, it was natural for the General to view him with suspicion from the moment when he arrived. The mutual desire to save appearances, preserved an uninterrupted intercourse of civilities, till Lord Macartney discovered his design of attempting the conquest of Negapatam against the advice and without the co-operation of the General. From that moment the General gave way to his spirit of dissatisfaction and complaint; refused to attend the consultations of the Select Committee; quarrelled with every measure that was proposed; and even wrote to the Governor-General and Council that he suffered from interference with his authority, and, unless he were vested with power

ference by the character of Lord Macartney's predecessors. "Your Lordship," he says, "will not ask why we thought our intervention on this occasion necessary, and why we did not rather refer the accommodation to the Presidency of Fort St. George, which was the regular instrument of the Company's participation in the government of the Carnatic; but I will suppose the question. I might properly answer it by another. Why did the Company withdraw their confidence from the same ministry, to bestow it on your Lordship?" He also declares, that had he known of Lord Macartney's nomination, he should have referred the Nabob to his government. He urges the enforcement of the agreement as being the act of the government of Bengal, and having been done by them; but he lays stress only on the 8th, 10th, 11th, and 12th articles; the two first insisting upon the assignment of the revenues of the Carnatic and Tanjore, and their application to the purposes of the war; and the two last proposing the consolidation of the Nabob's debts, and arrangement with the creditors. The whole matter was, however, left finally to the decision of the Madras Presidency.—W.

totally independent, that he would resign the command. Beside the loss of their authority and the diminution of their power over even the sources of supply, the civil authorities lamented, that they possessed no control over the expenditure of the army, and that, from the total disregard of economy, in which, notwithstanding the ruinous poverty of the government, the General indulged, that expenditure was enormously great. It nevertheless appears, that Lord Macartney, aware of the importance not only of united efforts, but of the name and influence of Coote, entertained not an idea of withdrawing from him any portion of that authority with which he had been intrusted; and strove to preserve his good humour by studied forbearance and courtesy.[1]

The army had not been many days in cantonments, where they expected to repose during the remainder of the monsoon, when the fall of Chitore was announced at Madras, and intelligence was received, that for want of provisions Vellore would not be able to hold out beyond the 11th of January. No exertion was to be spared for the preservation of this important place. The treasury was drained to the last pagoda, to afford some pay to the army, which was deeply in arrear. But the exorbitant demands for equipment and conveyance were the principal source of difficulty and alarm. To carry the necessaries of thirty-five days for twelve or fourteen thousand fighting-men, the estimate of the Quarter-Master was 35,000 bullocks. Not to speak of the money wanted for the purchase, so great a number could not be procured; nor was it easy to conceive how protection could be afforded from Hyder's horse to a line of so many miles as the march of 35,000 bullocks would of necessity form. The number of bullocks now in store was 8000. With these and 3000 coolies, or porters, whom he could press, it appeared to the President that the army might convey what was absolutely neces-

[1] In a letter to a private friend, at the time, his Lordship says, "I never retort any sharp expression which may occur in his letters. In fact, I court him like a mistress, and humour him like a child; but with all this I have a most sincere regard for him, and honour him highly. But I am truly grieved at heart to see a man of his military reputation, at his time of life, made miserable by those who ought to make him happy, and from a great public character, worked into the little instrument of private malignity and disappointed avarice. All, however, has been, and shall be, good-humour and good-breeding on my part." Extract of a Letter to Mr. Macpherson, dated Fort St. George.

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sary; and the urgency of the case made the General disposed to waive his usual objections. Though with broken health, he joined the army on the 2nd of January; but on the 5th he suffered a violent apoplectic attack, and the army halted at Tripassore. On the following day, he was so far revived as to insist upon accompanying the army, which he ordered to march. They were within sight of Vellore on the 10th, and dragging their guns through a morass, which Hyder had suddenly formed by letting out the waters of a tank, when his army was seen advancing on the rear. Before the enemy arrived, the English had crossed the morass; when Hyder contented himself with a distant cannonade, and next day the supply was conducted safely to Vellore. As the army was returning, Hyder, on the 13th, again presented himself on the opposite side of the morass, but withdrew after a distant cannonade. On the evening of the 15th, the enemy's camp was seen at a distance; and a variety of movements took place on both sides on the following day: after mutual challenges, however, and a discharge of artillery, the contenders separated, and the English pursued their march to the Mount. The General expressed a desire of making a voyage to Bengal for the benefit of his health, but allowed himself to be persuaded to alter his design.[1]

After the capture of Mahé, the Madras detachment remained at Tellicherry, besieged by Hyder's tributary Nairs. Early in May, 1781, being urgently demanded for the defence of the Carnatic, the detachment was relieved by Major Abingdon, who arrived with a force from Bombay. One of Hyder's principal generals, with a detachment from his army which greatly outnumbered the garrison, now carried on a vigorous attack. The utmost efforts of the besieged were incessantly demanded to counteract the operations of the enemy; and the commander was under the necessity of applying to Bombay, both for provisions and troops. The answer declared the inability of the Presidency to make any further provision for the defence of Tellicherry, and the resolution to which they had been reluctantly brought of giving it up. His military notions of disgrace, and the still more important considerations of the cruel sacrifice

[1] Barrow's Life of Lord Macartney, i. 109—117; Wilks's Historical Sketches, ch. xxiii; Memoirs of the late War in Asia, i. 231—234.

which would thus be made of the lives and fortunes of the people in the place, as well as the doubtful possibility of withdrawing the troops, induced Major Abingdon to conceal the contents of the letter, and to remit a strong remonstrance against the orders which he had received. It produced the desired effect, and a packet was immediately despatched from Bombay to assure him of speedy support. The arrival of his reinforcements determined this enterprising officer no longer to confine himself to operations of defence. Every thing being prepared for a sally, upon the signal of the clock striking twelve, the troops got under arms, on the night of the 7th of January, and at one, in profound silence, began to march. After passing a deep morass, and escaping the notice of the enemy's picquets, they stormed an advanced battery at break of day, and forming the line, moved rapidly towards the camp, when the enemy fled in the utmost confusion, and their leader was wounded and taken. Master now of the surrounding country, Major Abingdon turned his thoughts to the re-establishment, in their respective districts, of the various chiefs whom Hyder had either rendered tributary or compelled to fly. Having, after this, demolished the enemy's works, and improved the defences of the settlement, he marched towards Calicut. On the 12th of February, he took post within two hundred yards of the walls, and the next day, a shell having fortunately blown up a part of the grand magazine, the garrison, exposed to an assault, immediately surrendered.

The hostilities of the French and English Governments, not contented with Europe and America as a field, at last invaded the two remaining quarters of the globe. A squadron of five ships of the line and some frigates, under the conduct of M. de Suffrein, together with a body of land forces, was prepared at Brest in the beginning of 1781; and sailed in company with the grand fleet bound to the West Indies, under Count de Grasse, at the latter end of March. At the same period, a secret expedition, with which for some time rumour had been busy, was prepared in England. The state of the Spanish colonies in South America, and the rich prizes which they appeared to contain, had pointed them out as the destined object to the public eye. But the war with Holland, and the

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importance of the conflict now raging in India, communicated a different direction to the views of ministers: and the acquisition of the Cape of Good Hope, with the effectual support of the war in India, became the ends, for the accomplishment of which the enterprise was planned. One ship of seventy-four guns, one of sixty-four, three of fifty, several frigates, a bomb-vessel, a fire-ship and some sloops of war composed the squadron; of which Commodore Johnstone, with a reputation for decision and boldness, received the command. A land force, consisting of three new regiments of 1000 men each, was placed under the conduct of General Meadows, who had purchased fame in the action at St. Lucia with d'Estaing. On the 13th of March, in company with the grand fleet destined for the relief of Gibraltar, the armament sailed from St. Helen's, and, including several outward-bound East Indiamen, with store-vessels and transports, amounted to upwards of forty sail. The secret, however, of this expedition had not been so vigilantly guarded as to escape the sagacity of the Dutch and the French. The armament under Suffrein was ultimately destined to reinforce the squadron now at the Isle of France; and to oppose the English fleet in the Indian seas. But the particular instructions of that officer were, in the first instance, to follow, and counteract the expedition of Johnstone, and above all, his design upon the Cape of Good Hope. For the sake of water and fresh provisions, the English squadron put into Prava Bay in St. Jago, one of the Cape de Verd Islands; and having no expectation of an enemy, cast their anchors as chance or convenience directed. A considerable proportion both of men and of officers, partly for business, partly for pleasure, were permitted to go on shore; and the decks were speedily crowded with water-casks, live stock, and other incumbrances. On the 16th of April, after nine o'clock in the morning, a strange fleet, suspected to be French, was seen coming round the eastern point of the harbour; and Suffrein, separating from the convoy with his five sail of the line, soon penetrated to the centre of the English fleet. The utmost despatch was employed in getting the men and officers on board, and preparing the ships for action. The French ship, the Hannibal, of seventy-four

guns, led the van, and coming as close to the English ships as she was able, dropped her anchors with a resolution which excited a burst of applause from the British tars. She was followed by the ship of Suffrein, of equal force. Another of sixty-four guns anchored at her stern. And the two other ships, of sixty-four guns each, ranged through the fleet, firing on either side as they proceeded along.[1] The ships being extremely near, and the guns being played with unusual fury, much destruction was effected in a little time. After the abatement of the first surprise, several of the Indiamen brought their guns to bear upon the enemy with good effect. Within an hour, the French ships at anchor had suffered so terribly, that the last of the three, having lost her captain, cut her cables and began to withdraw. Thus deserted astern, and despairing of success, Suffrein followed her example, and gave the signal to retreat; the Hannibal alone remained, a mark to every ship the guns of which could be made to bear upon her; and displayed a resolution, which may be compared with the noblest examples of naval heroism. She had lost her foremast and bowsprit; her cable was either cut or shot away; in the effort of hoisting more sail to get out of the fire, her main and mizen masts went overboard, and she remained, as it were, a hulk upon the water. Sustaining the weight of a dreadful fire, to which, enfeebled as she was, her returns were slow and ineffectual, she yet joined the rest of the ships at the mouth of the bay; and, being towed off, erected jury-masts, and proceeded with the fleet. An attempt on the part of the English to pursue was totally ineffectual. They sustained not any considerable loss, notwithstanding the closeness of the action, and the crowded situation of the ships. Their own steady and determined bravery counteracted the effects of surprise, and baffled the well-concerted scheme of the enemy. They remained to refit and provide till the 2nd of May, and on approaching the Cape ascertained that Suffrein had arrived before them. Though previous to the arrival of Suffrein, that settlement, then supposed of great importance, was not in a

[1] That Port Praya, belonging to the Portuguese, was a neutral harbour, but little affected the delicacy of the French, though the English observed the punctilio of reserving their fire till attacked.

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condition to have offered any considerable resistance to the land and naval force under Meadows and Johnstone it was now accounted vain to make on it any attempt. While the French fleet lay at anchor in False Bay, it appeared not to the Commodore impossible to make prize of a fleet of Dutch East Indiamen, in Saldanha Bay. Success depended on being able, by surprise and celerity, to prevent them from being run ashore and burnt. The end was pretty completely attained; as, out of five ships, four were secured. The Commodore in his own ship, with the prizes and most of the frigates, returned to Europe; the rest, together with the troops, proceeded to India. Suffrein, leaving a sufficient garrison for the protection of the Cape, sailed for the Island of Mauritius; where he augmented the French fleet to ten sail of the line, one fifty gun ship, and several frigates. The English, on the 2nd of September, stopped at the Island of Joanna, to land and recover the sick, who now amounted to a third part both of the seamen and soldiers. They left the island on the 24th of the same month; were becalmed from the 11th of October to the 5th of November; at 260 leagues distant from Bombay, they were carried, by the shifting of the monsoon, to the coast of Arabia Felix; on the 26th of November anchored in Morabat Bay; on the 6th of December, the principal ships of war, having on board General Meadows and Colonel Fullarton with the chief part of the troops, proceeded in quest of Admiral Hughes; the remaining, ships and transports with part of two regiments, under the command of Colonel Humberston Mackenzie, left Morabat on the 9th; and arrived at Bombay on the 22nd of January, 1782.

The Colonel remained only six days at Bombay, when he re-embarked the men, and set sail for Madras. On the 9th of February, at Anjengo, in the dominions of the King of Travancore, alarming intelligence reached him from the Coromandel coast, that Hyder Ali had overrun the whole of the Carnatic with an immense army; that he threatened Tanjore, Marawar, Madura, and Tinivelly with destruction; that he circumvented and cut off two British armies; that dissension, improvidence, and pusillanimity reigned at Madras; and that Fort St. George itself was insulted and endangered. To these statements was added

intelligence that the French fleet were at this time to assemble off Point de Galle; and that magazines for them had for some time been forming at Columbo and other ports in Ceylon. He called a Council of War; when he came to the determination, in consequence chiefly of the intelligence respecting the French fleet, rather to attempt a diversion on the Malabar side of Hyder's dominions, than to incur the chances of delay and danger attached to the voyage round to Madras. He landed his troops, amounting to scarcely a thousand men, at Calicut, on the 18th of February, where he joined Major Abingdon, and as senior officer assumed the command. He immediately took the field; proceeded into Hyder's territories; drove before him the army which was left for the protection of those parts; and took several forts; when, the monsoon approaching, he returned to Calicut, and placed his little army in cantonments in the month of May.

The French fleet, with a body of land forces, forming part of the armament which, under Bussy, was destined to restore the influence of the French in India, left the islands a considerable time after the English sailed for Joanna; and, the Admiral dying on his passage, the command devolved upon M. Suffrein, a man of great resource, of unwearied enterprise, and, in every respect, one of the best naval commanders whom France had ever produced. The English fleet, delayed and dispersed by the weather, incurred considerable danger of a very unseasonable rencounter; and the Hannibal, a fifty-gun ship, being separated from the rest in a haze, unexpectedly found herself surrounded by the enemy, where, after a fruitless though gallant resistance, she was taken. The French fleet arrived on the Coromandel coast in the month of January, and intercepted several vessels bound to Madras with grain. Sir Edward Hughes, after taking Trincomalee, was obliged on the last day of January to set sail for Madras, being in great want of stores and provisions, his ships much decayed, and his crew diminished and sick. On his arrival at Madras, on the 11th of February, he learned that he had fortunately escaped the French fleet already upon the coast; but still found himself exposed to their attack in an open road, with only six ships of the line, out of condition from long service, and almost destitute of sup-

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plies. By another fortunate chance (for had either squadron fallen in with the French, the most fatal consequences might have ensued), the ships which carried General Meadows and his army, consisting of one seventy-four, one sixty-four, and one fifty-gun ship, arrived the next day in the road; and within twenty-four hours, Suffrein, with ten ships of the line, two ships, including the captured Hannibal, of fifty guns, six frigates, eight transports, and six prizes, hove in sight, reconnoitred Madras, and anchored a few miles to windward of the English fleet, which, with the utmost diligence, was making the necessary preparations for action. Deceived in his probable expectation of finding Sir Edward Hughes with only six sail of the line, not re-inforced, and of signalizing his arrival by so decisive a blow as the destruction of the English fleet, he, on the 14th, passed Madras in line of battle to the southward. The English weighed anchor, and followed. On the 15th, in the evening, the fleets passed each other, so near, as to exchange some shots. On the 16th, the English Admiral found an opportunity of making a push at the French convoy separated from the fleet, when he retook five of the vessels which had been captured on the coast, and a large transport laden with provisions, ammunition, and troops. On the 17th, after a variety of movements, in which Suffrein still kept the weather-gage, the two fleets came to action late in the day; and separated after a short conflict, on the approach of night, when the French steered to windward, and the English to Trincomalee.

The French Admiral proceeded to Porto Novo, and landed 2000 men.[1] They were soon joined by a large detachment of Hyder's army, under the command of Tippoo his son, who had just been employed in inflicting upon the English one of the deepest wounds which they had sustained during the war. Colonel Brathwaite, with 100 Europeans, 1500 native troops, and 300 cavalry, stationed for the purpose of protecting Tanjore, lay encamped on the banks of the Coleroon, at a distance of forty miles from the capital of that name, exposed indeed on an open plain, but apparently secured by the intervention of

[1] The author of Histoire de la Dernière Guerre (p. 297) says about 3000; but, that was, including a regiment of Caffres.

several large and deep rivers, and the distance of the enemy. His position gave encouragement to Hyder. Tippoo, with 10,000 horse, an equal number of infantry, twenty pieces of cannon, and M. Lally, with his European troops 400 strong, surrounded Colonel Brathwaite before he had received even a suspicion of their march. His first endeavour was to reach Tanjore, or some other place of safety; but the superior force of the enemy rendered this impracticable. The next resolution was to make a brave defence; and seldom can the annals of war exhibit a parallel to the firmness and perseverance which he and his little army displayed. From the 16th to the 18th of February, surrounded on all sides by an enemy, who outnumbered them, twenty to one, did they withstand incessant attacks. They formed themselves into a hollow square, with the artillery interspersed in the faces, and the cavalry in the centre. Tippoo laboured, by the fire of his cannon, to produce a breach in some of the lines, and as often as he fancied that he had made an impression, urged on his cavalry, by his presence, by promises, by threats, by stripes, and the slaughter of fugitives with his own hand. Repeatedly they advanced to the charge; as often were they repelled by showers of grape-shot and musketry; when the English cavalry, issuing from the centre, at intervals suddenly made by disciplined troops, pursued their retreat with great execution. After twenty-six hours of incessant conflict, when great numbers of the English army had fallen, and the rest were worn out with wounds and fatigue, Lally, at the head of his 400 Europeans, supported by a large body of infantry, covered on his flanks by cavalry, advanced with fixed bayonets to the attack. At this tremendous appearance, the resolution of the sepoys failed, and they were thrown into confusion. The rage of barbarians was with difficulty restrained by the utmost efforts of a civilized commander. Lally is reported to have dyed his sword in the blood of several of the murderers, before he could draw them off from the carnage. It is remarkable, notwithstanding the dreadful circumstances of this engagement, that out of twenty officers, only one was killed, and eleven wounded. And it is but justice to add, that Tippoo treated his prisoners, especially the officers and wounded men, with real attention and humanity.

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The arrival of so important an aid as that of 2000 Frenchmen, augmented to an alarming degree the army of Tippoo. Cuddalore yielded to their united force on the 3rd of April, and afforded a convenient station both naval and military for the French. In the meantime Sir Edward Hughes left Trincomalee, having effected the most necessary repairs, and arrived at Madras on the 12th of March. Towards the end of that month, the French Admiral slipped from Porto Novo, hearing that a fleet of English Indiamen had arrived upon the coast. As soon as his departure was known at Madras, Sir Edward Hughes got under weigh; but had not lost sight of the flag-staff of the fort, when he fell in with the fleet, of which the French were in quest, consisting of seven Indiamen and two line-of-battle-ships, having a king's regiment on board. He ordered the men of war to join him, and proceeded to land a reinforcement and stores for the garrison of Trincomalee. His policy was to avoid an engagement till this service was performed. Suffrein, on the other hand, whose crews were sickly, and his provisions wearing low, was eager to fight. The two fleets came in sight on the 5th of April; but the English Admiral held on his course, and the French followed, during that and the three succeeding days, when, having made the coast of Ceylon, about fifteen leagues to windward of Trincomalee, the English bore away for it during the night. This appears to have been the opportunity for which Suffrein was in wait; for having gained the wind of the English squadron, he was seen on the morning of the 12th crowding all the sail which he could carry in pursuit, while the English were so alarmingly close upon a lee-shore, that one of the ships actually touched the ground. A severe conflict ensued, in which the intrepid resolution of the English again counterbalanced the disadvantages of their situation; and the fleets, after suffering in nearly an equal degree, were parted by the night. So much were both disabled, that they lay for seven days within random-shot, only to prepare themselves to sail; and retired, the English to Trincomalee, the French to the Dutch harbour of Battacalo, without on either side attempting to renew the engagement.

The English army, who had now been some months in cantonments, took the field on the 17th of April. The

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object first in contemplation was to relieve Parmacoil; but on arriving at Carangoly, the General found it already surrendered. On the 24th, the army encamped near Wandewash, on the very spot on which Sir Eyre Coote defeated the French General Lally in 1760. The general orders boasted of the victory, and a double batta was issued to the troops; but on the next day, on account of water, the position was shifted to the other side of the fort. Hyder and his French auxiliaries lay encamped on a strong post on the red hills near Parmacoil, from which, on the approach of the English, they removed to another in the neighbourhood of Kellinoor. As the magazines of Hyder were deposited in the strong fort of Arnee, Sir Eyre concluded that a march upon that place would draw the enemy to its assistance, and afford the opportunity of a battle. He encamped on the first of June within three miles of the place; and Hyder, passing over a space of forty-three miles in two days, took up his head-quarters at Chittapet, on the evening of the same day. Before the dawn of the following morning, the English army were in motion toward Arnee; but with the first of the light, a heavy cannonade was opened on their rear. The troops came twice to the right about, and the baggage was brought twice through the files, before it was possible to discover whence the fire proceeded. A Council, which was called, and deliberated in great uncertainty, agreed in opinion, that an attack was expected on the rear, and the army was immediately drawn up to receive it. The enemy's horse, in the meantime, occupied the circumjacent grounds, more elevated than the low spot which was occupied by the English, and considerably galled them; while Hyder, dexterously detaching a division of his army under Tippoo, carried off the treasure from Arnee, gave instructions to the commandant, and reinforced the garrison. Having accomplished his object, he retired as the English advanced; and one of his guns, and a tumbril which stuck in the bed of the river, were the only trophies of the day. Deeming it vain to attempt the reduction of Arnee, the English on the 7th were considerably advanced on their march back to Madras, when a regiment of European cavalry, which Sir Eyre Coote called his grand guard, were drawn into an ambuscade, and either killed or taken prisoners. After

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attempting without success to lead the enemy into a similar snare near Wandewash, on the 9th, the General proceeded on his march, and on the 20th arrived at Madras.

On the 29th of that month, by a letter from the Governor-General to Lord Macartney, the conclusion of peace with the Mahrattas was announced at Madras. Sir Eyre Coote, as solely invested with the power of war and peace, of his own authority, and without consulting the Governor and Council of Madras, proposed to Hyder, or rather summoned him, to accede to the treaty concluded between the English and the Mahrattas, to restore all the forts which he had taken, and within six months to evacuate the Carnatic; otherwise, the arms of the Mahrattas would be joined to those of the English, in order to chastise him. Lord Macartney, alarmed at so daring an assumption of the whole power of the Presidency, is accused of having diverted the mind of Hyder from peace, by teaching him to doubt the validity of any agreement with the General in which the Governor and Council had not a part.[1] But Hyder too well knew the politics of India to receive great addition to his apprehensions from the threats of the General; and was too well acquainted with the intrigues of Madras to receive new lights from the communication, even if it had been made, which was thus imputed to Lord Macartney. To retain the negotiation more completely independent of the civil authority, the General moved from Madras, on the 1st of July, and lessened his distance from Hyder. Sir Eyre was a most unequal match for the Mysorean in the arts of diplomacy, and allowed himself to be duped. Hyder amused him in the neighbourhood of Wandewash, till the army had wholly consumed not only their own rice, but also that of the garrison; and till he had completely arranged with the French Admiral a plan of combined operations for the reduction of Negapatam. He then demanded a little time for deliberation, and, suddenly withdrawing his vakeel, left the General in total darkness with regard to his designs.[2]

[1] Memoirs of the late War in Asia, i. 403, which, being an undistinguishing panegyric upon Hastings, takes part against Macartney.

[2] Colonel Wilks's account of this negotiation is somewhat different. According to him, it originated with Hyder. Some advances to negotiation being made by him through Colonel Brathwaite, a prisoner in Hyder's camp, these

Sir Eyre Coote was obliged to return to Madras; and good fortune alone defeated the train which was laid for the reduction of Negapatam. Suffrein, in sailing to Negapatam, was descried by the English fleet, and in spite of every attempt to gain the road without fighting, was by the skilful movements of the Admiral constrained to venture a battle. After refitting at Ceylon, both fleets had returned to the coast about the end of June; the French to the port of Cuddalore, the English to that of Negapatam. Weighing anchor about three in the afternoon on the 3rd of July, the English Admiral steered in a southward direction, in order to gain the wind of the enemy, and about 11 o'clock on the following day the action commenced. It was close, warm, and general. After an hour and a half, during which the fire had been equally well maintained on both sides, the French line appeared to be getting into disorder; and the English began to cheer themselves with the hopes of a speedy and glorious victory, when a sudden alteration of the wind disturbed their order of battle, affording an opportunity to Suffrein, of which he dexterously availed himself, to form a line with those ships which had suffered the least, for covering the disabled part of his fleet, and induced the English Admiral to collect the scattered ships. At the approach of evening he cast anchor between Negapatam and Nagore.[1] The French, having passed the night about three leagues to leeward, proceeded the next morning to Cuddalore; and the English fleet, though it saw them, was too much disabled to pursue. The English Admiral, after remaining a fortnight at Negapatam, arrived at Madras on the 20th, in order to refit. In the mean time Suffrein had proceeded with characteristic activity, a quality in which he was never surpassed, in preparing his fleet for sea at Cuddalore. He was a man, that, when the exigency required,

advances were followed by the mission of an envoy to the English camp, charged with no definite proposals, and instructed merely to feel the dispositions and probable demands of the English in the event of a peace being made. Sir Eyre Coote declined to satisfy the official inquiries of Lord Macartney with regard to the nature of these communications — conduct certainly uncordial and indecorous, but less glaringly so, than if the General had taken upon himself to propose terms of peace without the knowledge of the government.—W.

[1] It is said that two of the French line-of battle-ships struck during the action, but that Suffrein fired into them till they hoisted colours again; and in consequence were saved.

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would work for days, like a ship's carpenter, in his shirt He visited the houses and buildings at Cuddalore, and for want of other timber, had the beams which suited his purpose taken out. To some of his officers, who represented to him the shattered condition of his ships, the alarming deficiency of his stores, the impossibility of supplying his wants in a desolated part of India, and the necessity of repairing to the islands to refit; the whole value, he replied, of the ships was trivial, in comparison with the object which he was commissioned to attain; and the ocean should be his harbour, till he found a place in India to repair them. On the 5th of August, the Governor of Fort St. George was informed, that the French fleet was already not only prepared for sea, but had actually sailed to the southward on the 1st of the month; that the first division of the French reinforcements expected from Europe was actually arrived at Point de Galle; and that the second, with Bussy himself, was daily expected. Greatly alarmed for the fate of Trincomalee, and even of Negapatam, the President and Committee deemed it requisite to quicken the preparations of the Admiral, whose activity equalled not his courage and seamanship, by a letter in which they drew his attention to this intelligence, and to the danger which every day was incurred, while an enemy's fleet kept the sea, without a British to oppose it. The jealousy of the Admiral was acute; of the time for sailing, he replied, that he was the judge; that he was not responsible for his conduct to the government of Madras; and that he should proceed to sea with his Majesty's squadron under his command, as soon as it was fit for service.[1] He did not proceed to sea before the 20th of August, when he sailed to Trincomalee, and found it already in the hands of the enemy. Suffrein, after proceeding to Point de Galle, where he was joined by the reinforcements from Europe and two ships of the line, anchored in Trincomalee Bay on the 25th; landed the troops before day the next morning; opened the batteries on the 29th; silenced those of the garrison before night; and summoned the place before morning. Eager to anticipate the arrival of the English fleet, Suffrein offered the most honourable terms. The

[1] Barrow's Life of Lord Macartney, i. 122.

forts were surrendered on the last of the month, and Hughes arrived on the 2nd of September.

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Early on the following morning the French fleet proceeded to sea; when the English were eager to redeem by a victory the loss of Trincomalee. The French had twelve, the English eleven sail of the line; the French had four ships of fifty guns, the English only one. The battle began between two and three in the afternoon, and soon became general. After raging for three hours with great fury, in every part of the line, the darkness of the night at last terminated one of the best-fought actions then recorded in the annals of naval warfare. The exertions of Suffrein himself were remarkable, for he was ill seconded by his captains, of whom he broke no fewer than six, immediately after the engagement. Fortunately for the French fleet, they had the island of Trincomalee at hand, to receive them; but in crowding into it in the dark, one ship struck upon the rock, and was lost; and two others were so much disabled, that ten days elapsed before they were able to enter the harbour. Suffrein then described them as presents which he had received from the British Admiral; who, regarding the proximity of Trincomalee as a bar to all attempts, and finding his ammunition short, immediately after the battle proceeded to Madras.

Hyder, upon the disappointment of his plan against Negapatam, by the rencounter between the French and English fleets, returned upon his steps; and proceeded toward his magazine at Arnee. Upon the return of the English army to Madras, a plan had been concerted for the recovery of Cuddalore. The return, indeed, of Hyder, by alarming the General for the safety of Wandewash, made him wish to lessen rather than increase his distance from that fort; but after a day's march, having learned that Hyder had passed the river Arnee, he proceeded in the direction of Cuddalore, and on the 6th of September encamped on the Red Hills of Pondicherry. Intelligence, here received, of the fall of Trincomalee, of another action between the fleets, and of the intention of the British Admiral to return to Madras, induced the General, who had sustained a second paralytic attack, to return to the same place with the army.

The Presidency were thrown into the utmost agitation

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and alarm by an unexpected event; the refusal of the Admiral to co-operate in the enterprise against Cuddalore; and the declaration of his intention to proceed to Bombay, and leave the coast during the ensuing monsoon. If the coast were left unprotected by a British fleet, while the harbour of Trincomalee enabled the enemy to remain, and while Hyder was nearly undisputed master of the Carnatic, nothing less was threatened than the extirpation of the English from that quarter of India. Beside these important considerations, the Council pressed upon the mind of the Admiral the situation of the Presidency in regard to food; that their entire dependence rested upon the supplies which might arrive by sea; that the stock in the warehouses did not exceed 30,000 bags; that the quantity afloat in the roads amounted but to as much more, which the number of boats demanded for the daily service of his squadron had deprived them of the means of landing: that the monthly consumption was 50,000 bags at the least; and that, if the vessels on which they depended for their supply were intercepted, (such would be the certain consequence of a French fleet without an English upon the coast,) nothing less than famine was placed before their eyes. The Admiral was reminded that he had remained in safety upon the coast during the easterly monsoon of the former year, and might still undoubtedly find some harbour to afford him shelter. A letter too was received express from Bengal, stating that Mr. Ritchie, the marine surveyor, would undertake to conduct his Majesty's ships to a safe anchorage in the mouth of the Bengal river. And it was known that Sir Richard Bickerton, with a reinforcement of five sail of the line from England, had already touched at Bombay, and was on his way round for Madras.

The Admiral remained deaf to all expostulations. In the mean time intelligence was received that the enemy was preparing to attack Negapatam. The President had already prevailed upon Sir Eyre Coote, to send a detachment of 300 men under Colonel Fullarton, into the southern provinces, which, since the defeat of Colonel Brathwaite, had lain exposed to the ravages of Hyder, and were now visited with scarcity, and the prospect of famine. Within two days of the former intelligence, accounts were

received that seventeen sail of the enemy's fleet had arrived at Negapatam, and that the place was already attacked. The most earnest expostulations were still addressed to the Admiral in vain; and the morning of the 15th of October exhibiting the appearance of a storm, the fleet set sail and disappeared. The following morning presented a tremendous spectacle to the wretched inhabitants of Madras; several large vessels driven ashore, others foundered at their anchors, all the small craft, amounting to nearly 100 in number, either sunk or stranded, and the whole of the 30,000 bags of rice irretrievably gone. The ravages of Hyder had driven crowds of the inhabitants from all parts of the country to seek refuge at Madras, where multitudes were daily perishing of want. Famine now raged in all his horrors; and the multitude of the dead and the dying threatened to superadd the evils of pestilence. The bodies of those who expired in the streets or the houses without any one to inter them, were daily collected, and piled in carts, to be buried in large trenches made for the purpose out of the town, to the number, for several weeks, of not less, it is said, than twelve or fifteen hundred a-week. What was done to remove the suffering inhabitants to the less exhausted parts of the country, and to prevent unnecessary consumption, the Governor sending away his horses, and even his servants, could only mitigate, and that to a small degree, the evils which were endured.[1] On the fourth day after the departure of Sir Edward Hughes and his fleet, Sir Richard Bickerton arrived, with three regiments of 1000 each, Sir John Burgoyne's regiment of light horse, amounting to 340, and about 1000 recruits raised by the Company, chiefly in Ireland; but as soon as Sir Richard was apprized of the motions of Sir E. Hughes, he immediately put to sea, and proceeded after him to Bombay. Sir Eyre Coote also, no longer equal to the toils of com-

[1] The violence of the tendency there was to calumniate Lord Macartney, is witnessed by the absurd allegations which even found their way into publications in England; that he kept the grain on board the ships to make his profit out of its engrossment. See Memoirs of the late War in Asia, i. 413.—M. This is not asserted, nor insinuated, by the author of the work cited: he merely states that such suspicions were entertained, according to the manner of the people, originating in some restrictions laid upon the disposal of the cargoes, thought advisable by the government of Madras, on public principles, such as were common in those days, before political economy was understood.—W.

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mand, set sail for Bengal; and General Stuart remained at the head of the army, now encamped at Madras, with provisions for not many days, and its pay six months in arrear.

The exclusive power over the military operations, which had been intrusted to Coote, and which, though it greatly impeded the exertions of the President, motives of delicacy and prudence forbade him to withdraw, belonged, under no pretext, to General Stuart; and the Governor and Council proceeded to carry their own plans into execution, for checking the profuse expenditure of the army, and making the most advantageous disposition of the troops. A reinforcement of 400 Europeans was despatched to co-operate with the Bombay army in effecting a diversion on the western side of Hyder's dominions; 300 of the same troops were sent to the Northern Circars against an apprehended invasion of the French; and 500 to strengthen the garrison at Negapatam. Fortunately for the English, the French had no information or conception of the unprotected and starving condition in which Madras had been left. It remained unvisited, even by a few frigates to intercept the corn-ships: and from Bengal and the Circars considerable supplies were received. An event also arrived, of such magnitude, as to affect the views of almost every state in India, and suddenly to cheer the gloom which darkened the prospects of the English. Their great enemy, Hyder Ali, who began his career in one of the lowest situations of life; who, totally destitute of the benefits of education, raised himself to be the sovereign of a great empire, and displayed a talent for government and for war, of which they had met with no example in India, died at Chittore in the beginning of December, at an age not exactly ascertained, but certainly exceeding eighty; when his destined successor Tippoo was at a great distance; having been detached to the western coast, to oppose Colonel Humberstone's invasion.

That officer, after remaining at Calicut from the end of May till the beginning of September, proceeded to Palacotah, a strong fort, situated about a mile from Palacatcherry, and commanding the great southern pass between the coasts, with an army consisting of more than 900 British troops, and 2000 Bombay sepoys; beside 1200 sepoys

with European officers and serjeants, furnished by the King of Tanjore; and a proportional train of artillery, of which, however, they were obliged, for want of draught bullocks, to leave the whole of the heavy part, and one half of the remainder by the way. They remained before Ramgurree from the 20th of September to the 6th of October. Being deserted in the night, it was garrisoned with convalescents, and made the centre of a chain of communications. After taking another fort on the 14th they approached Palacatcherry; and on the 18th, without much difficulty, dispersed the enemy, who met them at about three miles' distance from the fort. To take Palacatcherry, without heavy artillery, was after three days' inspection, considered impossible; and the army were ordered to march at four o'clock on the morning of the 22nd, in order to occupy a camp at several miles' distance till the battering cannon should arrive. Unfortunately, the officer who conducted the retreat, instead of putting the line to the right about, ordered them to countermarch, which threw the baggage and stores to the rear. Apprized of all their motions, the enemy dexterously watched them in a narrow defile, till all except the rear guard and the baggage had passed, when the enemy suddenly made an attack, and the whole of the provisions, and almost all the the ammunition, fell into their hands. It now only remained for the English to make their retreat to the coast with the greatest expedition. They were attacked from every thicket; exceedingly harassed both on flanks and rear: during the two first days they hardly tasted food; and on the 18th of November, when they reached Ramgurree, the fortifications of which, as well as those of Mangaracotah, they blew up, they received intelligence that Tippoo Saheb, with 20,000 men, whom the weakness of the English in the Carnatic had enabled Hyder to detach for the protection of his western provinces, was advancing upon them with rapid marches, and already at hand. They had marched but a few miles on the following morning, when Tippoo's advanced parties opened a cannonade on their rear. Fighting every step of the march, they arrived towards dark at the river Paniani, which appeared impassable. After a painful search of two hours a ford was found, which though it reached up to the chin of

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an ordinary man, they resolved to attempt, and happily passed with the loss of but two black women, among the followers of the camp. The enemy, expecting to find them an easy prey in the morning, had totally neglected to watch them during the night. Next day they reached the town of Paniani, against which the operations of Tippoo were immediately commenced.[1] Before dawn on the 28th of November, the enemy, divided into four columns, including a portion of Lally's corps, with that officer himself at their head, made a strong assault upon the English lines, as yet incomplete. They had dislodged a body of sepoys, and were in possession of the guns, before the English troops got under arms; when the forty-second regiment, advancing with fixed bayonets, threw them into confusion. They made various attempts to rally, but with considerable slaughter were compelled to retreat.[2] Tippoo continued the blockade, and was understood to be meditating another attack, when he received the news of his father's decease. He departed immediately with a few horse, leaving orders for the army to follow.

No sooner was intelligence received of the death of Hyder, than Lord Macartney aware of the feeble cement of an Indian army, and justly estimating the chance of its dispersion, if, at the moment of consternation, it were vigorously attacked, expressed his eagerness for action. General Stuart, instead of seconding this ardour, either by having the troops in readiness, or putting them in motion, was employing his time and his talents in squabbles with the civil authority. Slight symptoms of military impatience, under the command of the Company's servants, had, at different times, already appeared. But it was under Coote, that it first assumed a formidable aspect. The independent authority which was yielded to that commander corrupted the views of the military officers; and General Stuart was well calculated to uphold a controversy on the subject of his own pretensions. From the moment of his elevation to the command of the troops, and to a voice in the deliberations which regulated their actions,

[1] The command had been assumed by Colonel Macleod, sent by Sir Eyre Coote for the purpose, and who arrived at Paniani on the 19th.—W.

[2] According to Wilks, the assault took place on the 29th; on the 30th, Sir E. Hughes with his squadron touched at Paniani, and reinforced the detachment with 450 Europeans.—W.

he is accused of having diligently objected to almost every proposal; and of having filled the records of the Company with teasing discussions on his own dignity, privileges, and emoluments. The King's officers, indeed, from an early period of their services in India, assumed an air, proportionate, as they imagined to the dignity of the master whom they served; and they now, under General Stuart, distinctly asserted the doctrine of being at liberty to obey, or not to obey the Company, as they themselves held fit. A doctrine which implied the extinction of the civil authority, and went to subvert the government of the Company, appeared to Lord Macartney to demand an explicit and decisive resistance. The Committee agreed with him in recording a declaration: that when the King lent his troops for the service of the Company, and when they passed from the pay of the King into the pay of the Company, their obedience to the Company, till the period of their recall, was a condition necessary and understood: that the king reserved to himself the regulation of their interior economy; but with regard to their operations, gave them not so much as instructions; which were left exclusively to the Authority, for the service of which they were employed. The General, having thought fit to deliver to the Committee what he called an answer to this declaration, and therein to assert a right of judging when he should obey, and when not, received by the unanimous resolution of the Committee, a positive order to send no commands or instructions, except on business of discipline or detail, to any of the King's or Company's officers without the approbation of the Committee. To these decisive measures, General Stuart abstained from any direct or declared resistance; and rather chose to thwart the views of the President and Council by placing obstacles in their way. Upon their earnest application, when the news arrived of the death of Hyder, that the army should march, the General affected to disbelieve the intelligence; and, if it was true, replied, that the army would be ready for action in the proper time. When the fact was ascertained, and the remonstrances were redoubled; when letters were daily received, describing the importance of the moment for striking a decisive blow; when the commanding officer at Tripassore sent express intelligence,

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that the whole of the enemy's camp was in consternation, that numbers had deserted, and that, in the opinion of the deserters, the whole army, if attacked before the arrival of Tippoo, would immediately disband and fly into their own country, the General declared the army deficient in equipments for marching at that season of the year; though for upwards of a month he had been receiving the strongest representations on the necessity of keeping it in readiness for action, with offers of the utmost exertions of the government to provide for that purpose whatever was required.

Tippoo, in the mean time, had admitted no delay. Having reached Colar, where he performed the accustomed ceremonies at the tomb of his father, he pursued his course to the main army, which he joined between Arnee and Vellore, about the end of December. The address and fidelity of the leading officers,[1] who concealed the fatal event, had been able to preserve some order and obedience among the troops till he arrived; when the immediate payment of their arrears, and a few popular regulations, firmly established Tippoo on his father's throne. Shortly after his arrival, he was joined by a French force from Cuddalore, consisting of 900 Europeans, 250 Caffres and Topasses, 2000 Sepoys, and twenty-two pieces of artillery; while at this time, the whole of the British force in the Carnatic, capable of taking the field, amounted to no more than 2,945 Europeans, and 11,545 natives.

On the 4th of January, the army at last took the field. On the 5th of February they marched. On the 8th, they arrived at Wandewash, where the enemy appeared. On the 13th, the General advanced and offered battle; when the enemy retired in haste and disorder towards the river. He withdrew the garrisons from Wandewash and Carangoly, which it was held impracticable to maintain, and blew up the fortifications of both.[2] He then marched towards Vellore, and at that place received intelligence

[1] The two principal ministers of Hyder were Hindus, both Brahmans Poornea and Kishen Rao. Wilks, ii. 413.—W.

[2] This was done in compliance, and in concurrence with, the views of the Madras government; but General Stuart afterwards expressed his regret at having precipitately adopted a measure of which the army soon felt the inconvenience. It also received the condemnation of the Supreme Government. Wilks, ii. 424, 426.—W.

that Tippoo Saib was retreating from the Carnatic, that he had ordered Arcot to be evacuated, and two sides of the fort to be destroyed.

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Tippoo was recalled, not only by the care of establishing his government, but of meeting a formidable invasion on the western coast, which had already approached the vitals of his kingdom. The English army, which had been left unobstructed on his departure from Paniani, about the beginning of December, proceeded, about the end of that month — the sepoys, by land, to Tellicherry, the European part, by sea, to Merjee, about three hundred miles north of Paniani. In January, General Matthews, with an army under his command, from Bombay, arrived at Merjee, and summoned to his standard the rest of the troops on that part of the coast. He took by storm the fort of Onore, and reduced some other places of smaller consequence; and about the middle of the month, with a force consisting of about 1200 Europeans, eight battalions of Sepoys, and a proportionate quantity of artillery and Lascars, moved toward the great pass which is known by the appellation of the Hussain Gurry Ghaut.[1] The ascent consisted of a winding road of about five miles in length, defended by batteries or redoubts at every turning. The army entered the pass on the morning of the 25th, and, chiefly with the bayonet, carried every thing before them, till they reached a strong redoubt at the top of the Ghaut; this appeared impregnable; but a party, clambering up the rocks, came round upon it behind, and the whole of the pass was placed in their power. The next day they advanced to Hyder-nagur, or Bednore, the rich capital of one of the most important of all the dependencies of Mysore. They were on their march with no more than six rounds of ammunition for each man, when an English prisoner arrived, with terms from the Governor, and a proposal to surrender, not only the city of Bednore, but the country and all its dependencies. With the capital, most of the minor forts made a ready submission; but Ananpore, Mangalore, and some others, held out. Ananpore, after violating two flags of truce, stood the storm,

[1] This movement, intended to advance upon Bednore, was in consequence of positive orders from the Bombay Government, and in opposition to the opinion of General Matthews. Wilks, ii. 448.

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and was carried on the 14th of February. In Mangalore, a breach being effected, the commander, unable to prevail upon his people to maintain the defence, was obliged to surrender. In these transactions, particularly in the reduction of Onore and Ananpore, the English army have been accused of a barbarity unusual at the hands of a civilized foe. It appears not, however, that quarter, when asked, was refused; but orders were given to shed the blood of every man who was taken under arms; and some of the officers were reprimanded for not seeing those orders rigidly executed.[1] After the acquisition of Mangalore, the General, with a portion of the army, returned to Bednore, where the flames of discord were kindled by pretensions to the spoil. A vast treasure, amounting to eighty-one lacs of pagodas, £801,000, besides a quantity of jewels, was understood to have been found in Bednore. Of this, though the army was in the greatest distress for want of money, having received no pay for twelve months, some of the troops for a longer time, the General positively refused to divide any part. The most vehement complaints and remonstrances ensued. Refractory proceedings were severely, if not arbitrarily, punished; and three of the leading officers, Colonel Macleod, Colonel Humberstone, and Major Shaw, left the army, and, proceeding to Bombay, laid their representations before the Governor and Council. So flagrant to the Governor and Council did the conduct of the General appear, that they superseded him; and appointed Colonel Macleod, the next in rank, to take the command in his stead. Suspicions of his rapacity blazed with violence; but it ought to be remembered, that he lived not to vindicate his own reputation; and that in circumstances such as those in which he was placed, suspicions of rapacity are easily raised.[2]

[1] See Annual Register for 1783; and "A Vindication of the English Forces employed in the late War, under the command of Brigadier-General Matthews, against the Nabob Tippoo Sultaun," by sundry Officers of the Bombay Establishment. Parliamentary Papers, ordered to be printed, 11th March, 1791. —M. Wilks states that the garrison of Ananpore was put to the sword in retaliation for what the English considered an act of treachery—their firing upon a party advancing under a promise of the peaceable surrender of the fort; which promise had, without any communication with the assailants, been revoked by a different authority. ii. 453.—W.

[2] As far as they originated with the disappointment of the army, they were unfounded. No such amount of treasure could have been collected in Bednore. The circumstances of the surrender of that place to the English, which General

Colonel Macleod, now Brigadier-General and Commander-in-chief, returning to the army with the two other officers, in the Ranger snow, fell in with a Mahratta fleet of five vessels off Geriah, on the 7th of April. This fleet was not, it appears, apprized of the peace; and Macleod, full of impatience, temerity, and presumption, instead of attempting an explanation, or submitting to be detained at Geriah for a few days, gave orders to resist. The Ranger was taken, after almost every man in the ship was either killed or wounded. Major Shaw was killed, and Macleod and Humberstone wounded; the latter mortally. He died in a few days at Geriah, in the twenty-eighth year of his age, and was lamented as an officer of the most exalted promise; a man, who nourished his spirit with the contemplation of ancient heroes, and devoted his hours to the study of the most abstruse sciences connected with his profession. 1783.

During this interval, the forty-second regiment was sent from Bednore to seize some forts below the Ghauts; the army was dispersed in detachments, to occupy almost every town and mud-fort in the country; nothing, it was said, was dreamt of but riches: intelligence, fortifications, and subsistence, were all equally neglected. In this state of supine insensibility, Tippoo suddenly appeared on the 9th of April, drove in a detachment stationed four miles

Matthews thought little less than providential, considering the defective state of his equipments, have been fully explained by Colonel Wilks, from original documents. Bednore was yielded without resistance, from the treason of the governor, Ayaz (Hyat) Khan, one of Hyder's military pupils or slaves, who had always been in disfavour with Tippoo, who apprehended disgrace or death upon that prince's accession; and who had intercepted orders for his destruction. He therefore at once ceded the province and capital to the English, and upon its investment by Tippoo, made his escape to Bombay. He probably stipulated for the preservation of what treasure there was in the fort, and he claimed compensation for what was lost, when the place was re-captured. His claim was but 1,40,000 pagodas, and the accounts of the Finance minister of Mysore state the embezzlement to have been upwards of one lack, not eighty-one, as particularized in the text. As usual, therefore, the English were deceived by their own unreasonable expectations, and as the negotiation between Ayaz and the General was kept a profound secret; — indeed Col. Wilks supposes it possible that General Matthews himself was not aware of the motives of the Governor, which is by no means probable; — they were at a loss to understand why they were deprived of even so much of their booty as was to be divided. The conduct of the General after the occupation of Bednore, when the withdrawal of the positive orders of the Bombay Government left him free to fall back on the coast, exhibits as great a want of military judgment, as his disputes with his officers manifested irritability of temper. Col. Wilks has given a very copious and interesting account of the whole of this calamitous transaction, vol. ii. 448, et seq.—W.

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distant, at Fattiput, seized the town of Bednore, with a considerable quantity of ammunition, neglectfully remaining without the magazine; laid siege to the fort; and sent detachments to occupy the Ghauts and surrounding country. The English in Bednore were then cut off from retreat; the fortifications ruinous, their ammunition expended, their provisions low, and their numbers diminishing by disease and fatigue, as well as the sword. Honourable terms being promised, they surrendered by capitulation, on the 30th of April; but, instead of being sent, according to agreement, to the coast, they were put in irons, and marched like felons to a dreadful imprisonment in the strong fortresses of Mysore. To apologize for this outrage upon the law of even barbarous nations, Tippoo charged the English with a violation of the articles of capitulation in robbing the public treasure; and the suspicions which were attached to the character of the General, have given currency to a story that he ordered the bamboo of his palanquin to be pierced and filled with pagodas.[1]

After this important success, Tippoo proceeded to Mangalore, in which the remains of the English army collected themselves, with such provisions as the suddenness of the emergency allowed them to procure. On the possession of Mangalore, the chief fortress and the best harbour of Canara, Tippoo, as well as his father, set an extraordinary value. On the 16th of May, a reconnoitring party of his horse appeared on a height near the town. On the 20th, the picquets; on the 23rd, the outposts of the garrison were driven in, and the investment of the place was rendered complete.

During the march of Tippoo from the Carnatic to the

[1] That the public treasure was divided amongst the English, is uniformly admitted. Annual Register, 1783. Wilks, ii. 462. Colonel Price, who was then serving with a detachment of General Matthews's army nearer the coast, observes, "The account of the captured treasure was at the time enormously exaggerated, but the imprudent and unwarrantable manner in which at the last extremity it was distributed, and that, after it had been determined to capitulate, furnished too plausible an apology for that breach of the capitulation of which the Sultan became immediately guilty." The same officer gives an account of an operation, the success of which might have had some effect upon a more favourable result. A sortie from the citadel took the French detachment so completely by surprise, that it might easily have been destroyed. One of the French officers, however, adroitly stepped forward, and requested a parley, as if preparatory to a surrender. The commandant of the detachment unwisely halted to receive his overtures, and during the pause the enemy armed and repulsed their assailants. Memoirs of a Field Officer, 101.

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western side of his kingdom, and the operations which preceded his arrival at Mangalore, the following occurrences took place at Madras. As soon as the General ascertained the departure of the enemy, he returned with the army, and on the 30th of February encamped near the Mount. The policy of supporting the English army in Bednore against the army of Tippoo, by strong incursions on the southern and eastern parts of his dominions, presented itself, in the strongest point of view, to the Governor and Council. The army stationed in Tanjore and the southern provinces received orders to march towards the west; and to General Stuart it was recommended, to march upon Tippoo's frontier in the direction of Vellore. Any such movement he declared to be impossible; and while the army remained inactive, Suffrein, whom the British fleet had not yet returned to oppose, found no difficulty in landing Bussy, with a reinforcement of French troops, at Cuddalore. It was an object of great importance to recover possession of that place, before the works should be strengthened, and the army of Tippoo, with the French troops which were with him, should be able to return. To all the expostulations of the Governor and Council, the General is accused of having replied, only by the statement of wants and difficulties, operating as grounds of delay. About fourteen days after the time fixed upon by himself, that is, on the 21st of April, in consequence of peremptory commands, he marched with the army towards Cuddalore. Contrary to his pledge, that he would not recall to his assistance the southern army, without the strongest necessity, of which he engaged to apprize the Committee, he secretly wrote to the Commanding Officer three days before his departure, to join him with the greatest part of the force under his command. By this abuse of their confidence, the Committee were induced to withdraw the discretionary power over the southern army, which they had granted at his request. The march from Madras to Cuddalore, about 100 miles, is usually performed in twelve days. General Stuart had no obstruction either to meet or to fear; he was, to a degree unusually perfect, supplied with all the requisites for his march; yet he spent forty days upon the road, that is, marched at the rate of less than three

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miles a-day, though the chance of success mainly depended upon despatch, and the Admiral, who was to co-operate with the expedition, declared that he could not, for want of water and provisions, remain before Cuddalore till the end of June. The fleet had returned to Madras on the 12th of April, augmented to seventeen sail of the line, four frigates, and some smaller vessels; and soon after, a fleet of ten Indiamen, and three store-ships, with 1000 recruits to the army, arrived under convoy of the Bristol man-of-war, after a narrow escape from the squadron of Suffrein.

The army arrived at Cuddalore on the 7th of June, where the enemy had already thrown up, and almost completed, considerable works. An attack was to be made on these works on the 13th, in three several places at once; and it was planned to give the signal by firing three guns from a hill. Amid the noise of firing, a signal of this description could not be heard; and the attacks were made at three several times. The English were repulsed; but the enemy quitting, in the pursuit, a part of their works, which were dexterously occupied by a division of the English army, were thrown into consternation, and withdrew. This attack had nearly incurred the ruin of the English army, and left sixty-two officers, and 920 men, almost all Europeans, either dead or mortally wounded, on the field. The English lay upon their arms during the night in expectation of an attack, which the troops, fatigued and unprotected, would have found it difficult to sustain. But the spirit of Bussy was chilled with age and infirmities; and he restrained the impetuosity of his officers, who confidently predicted the destruction of the British army.[1]

On the following day, Sir Edward Hughes, and Suffrein, who had followed him from Trincomalee, arrived with their

[1] No such cause of confusion as that indicated by the text, is noticed by Wilks, nor does it appear that three simultaneous movements were intended; the object was to gain possession of what was considered the key of the enemy's position. The first operation, which was merely preliminary, succeeded. The second failed, and rendered a third necessary, which succeeded but partially. Thirteen guns, and the key of the contested position remained in possession of the English army. The retirement of the French on the same night, within the walls of Cuddalore, evinced their sense of the operations of the day, but their being permitted during the night to draw off without molestation all their heavy guns, furnished equal evidence of the impression made upon the English by a victory so dearly purchased.—W.

respective fleets. The English remained at anchor till the 16th; on the 17th, and two succeeding days, the fleets performed a variety of movements for the purpose of gaining or keeping the wind; and about four o'clock on the 20th they engaged. The English consisted of eighteen sail, the French only of sixteen, and so leaky, that most of them it was necessary to pump during the battle: yet Suffrein, by dexterous management, contrived in several instances to place two of his vessels upon one of the English, of which five were but little engaged. The combatants were parted by night, and the next day the French were out of sight, but appeared at anchor in the road of Porto Novo on the morning of the 22nd. The British Admiral, deeming it inexpedient to attack them, only offered battle, and then made sail for Madras.[1] It has been both asserted and denied that Suffrein weighed, and stood after him; but it is certain that he arrived at Cuddalore on the following day. He immediately proceeded to land as many men as he could spare from the fleet: and measures were concerted between him and Bussy for the most vigorous operations. They made a sally on the 25th, which was repulsed;[2] but a grand effort was preparing for the 4th of July; and so much were the English reduced by the sword, by sickness, and fatigue, that the most fatal consequences were probable and feared. Sir Edward Hughes at Madras, and the British army exposed to Suffrein and Bussy at Cuddalore, presented a dismal prospect to the imaginations of the Governor and Council; when intelligence was received of the signature in Europe of a treaty of peace between the English and French. It was immediately resolved, though official intelligence had

[1] The English fleet was much crippled by the sickly state of the crews. Eleven hundred sick of the scurvy had been landed at Madras; and in the short space of a fortnight, seventeen hundred more had from the same cause become unfit for duty. On the other hand Suffrein had been reinforced by Bussy on the night of the 17th, with 1200 men, giving him the advantage at the lowest estimate of 3000 hands more than the strength of Sir Edward Hughes. After the action, not only were the men re-landed, but 2400 men were furnished from the fleet. Asiat. Reg. 1783. Wilks, ii. 440.—W.

[2] In this affair, Marshal Bernadotte afterwards Crown Prince of Sweden, served as a Serjeant in the French army, and was wounded and taken prisoner, as he acknowledged at a subsequent period to General Langenheim, who at Cuddalore was Commandant of the Hanoverian troops in the British service, and who had treated him with particular kindness. See the Anecdote in Wilks, ii. 442.—W.

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not yet arrived, to send a flag of truce to Bussy, recommending an immediate cessation of arms. To this proposal the French commander acceded, with less difficulty than might have been expected. Bussy even consented to invite Tippoo to a participation in the peace, and to send positive orders to the French troops to retire immediately from his service.

Upon the evacuation of the Carnatic by Tippoo, the occasion was not omitted of making to him an overture of peace by means of a Brahmen, in the confidence of the King of Tanjore. A favourable answer was remitted; but a point of etiquette, for which the Governor was a great stickler, leading to another on the part of Tippoo, broke off the negotiation. To the application from Bussy, however, an answer was returned in little more than a month, offering peace upon certain conditions, and expressing a desire to send two ambassadors to Madras. Upon the arrival of the vakeels it appeared that a peace, upon the basis of a mutual restitution of conquests, might easily be made; and for the acceleration of so desirable an event, especially on account of the prisoners, to whose feelings, and even lives, a few weeks were of importance, it was deemed expedient to send three commissioners along with Tippoo's vakeels, to expedite on the spot the business of negotiation.

Measures, in the meantime, were pursued for creating a diversion in favour of the detachment besieged in Mangalore. The two divisions of the army which were stationed for the protection, the one of the northern, the other of the southern provinces, were reinforced; and instructed to threaten or attack the enemy in that part of his dominions to which they approached. The division in the south was, in the opinion of Colonel Fullarton, by whom it was commanded, augmented sufficiently to penetrate into the very heart of Mysore, and possibly to attack the capital itself.

Amid these proceedings, the contentions which prevailed between the heads of the civil and military departments were hastening to a decision. Along with the flag of truce which was forwarded to the French, it was resolved in the Committee to send orders for the recall of General Stuart to the Presidency, as well because they could not depend

upon his obedience, as because they deemed it necessary to hear the account which he might render of his conduct. After a temporary neglect of the commands of the Committee, the General thought proper to leave the army and proceed to Madras; where, superseding mutual explanations, the customary disputes were renewed and inflamed. The Governor at last submitted to the Committee a motion, that General Stuart should be dismissed from the Company's service. In the minute by which this motion was introduced, the misconduct of the General in the expedition to Cuddalore, and the acts of disobedience, which were sufficient in number and magnitude to imply the transfer of all power into his hands, were stated as the principal grounds of the proposed proceeding; to which the votes of the Committee immediately imparted their unanimous sanction. Stuart, however, announced his determination to retain the command of the King's troops; and Sir John Burgoyne, on whom, as second in rank, the command would devolve, intimated his intention to obey the orders of General Stuart. Decisive acts were now inevitable. The Town Adjutant, accompanied by the Governor's Private Secretary, and a party of sepoys, proceeded to the villa of the General, and brought him quietly a prisoner to the fort; where he remained a few days, and was then embarked for England.

The original plan, to the execution of which the army in the south was destined, was, that it should penetrate on the one side, and the army under Colonel Humberstone at Paniani on the other, into the country of Coimbetore, forming a line of communications from the one coast to the other, through the middle of Tippoo's dominions. In this scheme, which was framed and suggested by Mr. Sullivan, the gentleman at the head of the civil department in the Trichinopoly district, was included a negotiation for raising disturbance against Tippoo in his own dominions, by setting up the pretensions of the deposed Raja of Mysore. In the months of April and May, 1783, the forts of Caroor, Aravarcouchy, and Dindigul, were reduced; but the exhausted state of the country, not more from the ravages of the enemy, than the disorganization of the government, cramped the operations of the army by scarcity of supplies. The first object of

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Colonel Fullarton, who took the command of the southern army, was to augment the field force by battalions from Tanjore, Trichinopoly, and Tinivelly; and, vigorously aided as he was by the chief civil servants of the Company, not only to procure supplies, but soothe the minds, and conciliate the favour, of the different classes of the people. It was not before the 25th of May, 1783, that he began to march from Dindigul towards Daraporam. The reduction of this place, which fell on the 2nd of June, afforded one incident, which, being a characteristic circumstance, deserves to be stated. It was impossible to approach so near the fort as to determine with precision the most advantageous point of attack. One spy explained the circumstances of the place to the commanding officer, and another to the Adjutant-General. Each of these officers drew a plan from the description which he himself had received; and they coincided so exactly both with one another, and with the facts, that a body of troops marched in a dark night, crossed a river, and occupied a strong position within 400 yards of the fort, where the batteries were constructed which effected the breach. The accuracy with which the Indian spies convey the idea of a fort even by verbal communication, and still more by models made of clay, is represented as not surprising only, but almost incredible. The orders which General Stuart, unknown to the Committee, dispatched to the southern army stopped them at this point in their career of conquest; and they were within three miles of the enemy's camp when they received intelligence that hostilities with the French had ceased, and that an armistice was concluded with Tippoo.[1] In the interval Colonel Fullarton had proceeded with great activity in restoring obedience and order in Madura and Tinivelly, in which, during the distress of the Madras government, almost all the Polygars had revolted. According to Fullarton, the management of the province by the Company's and the Nabob's servants had been corrupt and oppressive, and hence preg-

[1] Colonel Fullarton received, at the same time, orders from the General to advance; from the government to return to the South; of the relative judiciousness of these orders, he demonstrated his opinion by disobeying the latter. The strengthening of General Stuart's army was of much more importance than an ineffective attempt at diverting Tippoo from the siege of Bednore. Fullarton's View, p. 115.—W.

nant with disorder, in the extreme. One single exception he produces, Mahomed Issoof Khan. "While he ruled these provinces, his whole administration denoted vigour and effect: his justice was unquestioned, his word unalterable, his measures were happily combined and firmly executed, the guilty had no refuge from punishment. On comparing," says the English commander, "the state of that country with his conduct and remarks, I found that wisdom, vigour, and integrity, were never more conspicuous in any person of whatever climate or complexion."[2] In the month of August, when the reinforcements had joined him from the army of Cuddalore, and the Polygars were sufficiently reduced and humbled to be disposed to a general submission, this Commander moved towards the frontier of Mysore, under instructions to remain inactive while the result was uncertain of the negotiation with Tippoo. In the interval thus afforded, among other arrangements, Colonel Fullarton established a system of intelligence, under a defect of which the English had laboured during the whole of the war: and established it in such perfection, even into the heart of the enemy's country, that, "during many months," to use his own expressions, "of continued marching, through a country almost unexplored, he never once failed in his supplies, nor did any material incident escape his knowledge." On the 18th of October, when the supplies of the army were almost exhausted, intelligence arrived that Tippoo had recommenced hostilities against Mangalore. Colonel Fullarton had long meditated an enterprise against Seringapatam, but none of the forts, directly in the route, were sufficiently strong to be confided in as an intermediate magazine, or, in the event of failure, as a place of retreat. It was therefore determined to march upon Palacatcherry, which was one of the strongest places in India, commanded the pass between the coasts, and secured a communication with a great extent of fertile country. After a march of great difficulty, much impeded by woods and incessant rain, the army reached Palacatcherry on the 4th of November. They immediately commenced and carried on their operations with great vigour; but the strength of the place, and the active resistance of the garrison,

[1] Fullarton's View of the English Interests in India, p. 139.

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threatened them with a tedious siege. On the 13th, two batteries were opened, and before sun-set the defences of the enemy were so much impaired, that their fire was considerably abated. At night, Captain Maitland took advantage of a heavy rain to drive the enemy from the covered way, and to pursue them within the first gateway, to the second: here he was stopped, but gallantly defended himself, till additional troops arrived; when the enemy, alarmed by the idea of a general assault, called for quarter, and put the English in possession of the fort. The army then marched to Coimbetore, which they reached on the 26th of November, and which surrendered before they effected a breach. They had now the conquest of Seringapatam, and the entire subversion of the power of Tippoo full in their view. The brave garrison of Mangalore had long baffled his whole army, which had suffered severely by a perseverance in the siege during the whole of the rains. A chain of connected operations could now be carried on by the army of Colonel Macleod on the western coast, and that of Fullarton in the south. The army of the north was acting in Cudapah, in which, and the neighbouring provinces, the power of Tippoo was ill established All the petty princes on the western coast, were supposed ready to shake off their dependance. The co-operation was confidently expected of the Hindu inhabitants of Mysore, of whom the Brahmens were in correspondence with the English. Fullarton had provided his army with ten days' grain, repaired the carriages, and made every arrangement for pushing forward to Seringapatam, with nothing but victory sparkling in his eye; when he received, on the 28th of November, commands from the Commissioners, appointed to treat with Tippoo, to restore immediately all posts, forts, and countries, lately reduced, and to retire within the limits occupied on the 26th of July. He had made some progress in the execution of these commands, when he received on the 26th of January, directions to reassemble the army, and prepare for a renewal of the war.

The negotiators, whom the President and Council had dispatched to the presence of Tippoo, for the purpose of accelerating the conclusion of peace, had not attained their object without many difficulties and considerable delay. Scarcely had they entered the territory of the enemy,

when they were required, and almost commanded, to surrender Mangalore, which they regarded as the chief security for the lives and restoration of the English prisoners in the hands of Tippoo. On their approach to Seringapatam, they were made acquainted with the intention to conduct them to Mangalore. No communication was allowed between them and their unfortunate countrymen, when they passed Bangalore, and other places in which they were confined. Their letters, both to and fro, were intercepted. Upon complaining they were informed, that Colonel Fullarton, notwithstanding the commencement of their mission for peace, had taken and plundered the forts of Palacatcherry and Coimbetore. Not aware that the proceedings of Fullarton were justified by the intelligence which he had received of Tippoo's breach of faith to the garrison at Mangalore, they sent their commands to that officer to restore the places, which, since the date of their commission, had fallen into his hands. After a tedious and harassing journey, through a country almost impassable, in which some of their attendants and cattle actually perished, they joined Tippoo at Mangalore, where he had wasted almost a year, and a considerable portion of his army.

The force with which, in the month of May, in the preceding year, he invested Mangalore, is stated at 60,000 horse, 30,000 disciplined sepoys, 600 French infantry, under the command of Colonel Cossigny, Lally's corps of Europeans and natives, a French troop of dismounted cavalry, commanded by an officer of the King of France, irregular troops to the amount of many thousands, and nearly one hundred pieces of artillery. The British garrison consisted of 696 Europeans, including officers, and 2850 black troops, besides pioneers, and camp followers. The operations of the enemy proceeded with so much activity, that on the 27th of May they had completed eleven embrasures, which the English made an effort to destroy, but were repulsed. On the 29th, large stones, some of them weighing 150 pounds, began to be thrown by mortars into the town. As often as they lighted upon soft earth, they buried themselves without mischief: When they fell upon houses, they laid them open, where no materials could be had to repair them, to all the incle-

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mency of the monsoon: When they fell upon a substance harder than themselves they were dashed into a thousand pieces; and even the wounds and lacerations which were produced by the splinters proved peculiarly destructive, hardly any person surviving who received them.

From batteries erected on the north, the east, and the south, a heavy fire was constantly maintained; the feeble fortifications on the northern side were entirely dismantled on the 4th of June; on the 7th a practicable breach was effected in the wall; and the English, especially as a flag of truce had been rejected, looked for an immediate assault. In the mean time they repulsed with the bayonet repeated attacks on the batteries which they had erected without the fortress; repeatedly silenced the batteries of the enemy, and spiked their guns, which were as often expeditiously repaired. Masked batteries were opened and the approaches of the enemy brought so near, that they threw fascines on the covered way, and edge of the glacis. On the 4th of July, the assault was undertaken. A body of troops, armed with knives, of the shape of pruning hooks, two feet long, and with spears mounted on light bamboos of a prodigious length, rushed into a tower on the left of the eastern gate, while the line marched forward to support them. The enterprise did not succeed. The assaulting party were so warmly received, that they were soon disposed to retreat. On the 6th a general attack was made on the northern covered way, which, though very fierce and obstinate, was also repulsed. The garrison were now obliged to defend themselves from almost daily attempts to penetrate into the fort, while they severely suffered both from scarcity and disease. At last intelligence arrived of the peace between France and England, with the orders of Bussy to the French to co-operate no longer in the hostilities of Tippoo. The French envoy made some efforts to effect a pacification; but even during the suspensions of hostilities, which were frequently terminated, and frequently renewed, Tippoo continued his operations. A trait of Indian humanity ought not to be forgotten. During the progress of hostilities, and especially after the prospect of peace, the enemy's sentinels in many instances beckoned to the men to get under cover, and avoid their fire: a generosity which

the English were well disposed to return. At last, after a long and intricate correspondence, a cessation of hostilities, including the garrisons of Onore[1] and Carwar, was concluded on the 2nd of August. Of this agreement one important condition was, that the English garrison should three times a week be furnished with a plentiful market of provisions, at the rates of Tippoo's camp. This was evaded, and prices were daily, in such a manner, increased, that a fowl was sold at eight, and even twelve rupees; and other things in a like proportion. At last the market was wholly cut off; and horse-flesh, frogs, snakes, ravenous birds, kites, rats, and mice, were greedily consumed. Even jackals, devouring the bodies of the dead, were eagerly shot at for food. The garrison had suffered these evils with uncommon perseverance, when a squadron appeared on the 22nd of November, with a considerable army under General Macleod. Instead of landing, the General, by means of his secretary, carried on a tedious negotiation with Tippoo; and having stipulated that provisions for one month should be admitted into the fortress, set sail with the reinforcement on the 1st of December.[2] Even this supply was drawn from damaged stores bought of a navy agent, and of the beef and pork, not one in twenty pieces could be eaten, even by the dogs. Another visit, with a similar result, was made by General Macleod, on the 31st of December. The desertion of the sepoys, and the mutiny of the Europeans, were now daily apprehended: two-thirds of the garrison were sick, and the rest had scarcely strength to sustain their arms: the deaths amounted to twelve or fifteen every day; and at last, having endured these calamities till the 23rd of January, the gallant Campbell, by whom the garrison had been so nobly commanded, offered, on honourable terms, to withdraw the troops. The Sultan was too eager to put an end to a siege which by desertion and death had cost him

[1] For a very interesting detail of the defence of Onore, which was maintained with consummate ability and heroism, by Captain Torriano, till the conclusion of the treaty, see Forbes's Oriental Memoirs, iv. 111 to 175.

[2] The excuse was, that it would have been a violation of the armistice, which did not expire till the 2nd December, and the ships could not wait another day for want of water. The armistice had been repeatedly broken by Tippoo. Colonel Wilks states the reasons assigned for this neglect of the garrison, but they are anything but satisfactory. ii. 476.—W.

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nearly half his army, to brave the constancy of so firm a foe; and they marched to Tellicherry, with arms, accoutrements, and the honours of war.

The negotiating commissioners, whose journey had been purposely retarded, were now allowed to approach. The injuries which the English had sustained, since Tippoo had joined in the business of negotiation, were such, as in a prouder state of the English mind, would have appeared to call for signal retribution. But the debility and dejection to which their countrymen were now reduced, and their despair of resources to continue the war, impressed the negotiators with a very unusual admiration of the advantages of peace; and meeting the crafty and deceitful practices of Tippoo with temper and perseverance, they succeeded, on the 11th of March, 1784, in gaining his signature to a treaty, by which, on the general condition of a mutual restitution of conquests, peace was obtained.[1]

It is only necessary, further, to relate the manner in which the treaty was ratified by the Governor-General and Council; and to explain the mode in which, during these momentous transactions, the relations between the Supreme and Subordinate Presidency were maintained. Lord Macartney was not only of superior rank to the highest of the Company's servants in India, but in him was set one of the first examples of elevating a servant of the king to a high station in that country; and of intercepting the great prizes which animated the ambition of the individuals rising through the several stages of the Company's service. To these causes of jealousy were added, recommendations and injunctions, which had been pressed upon so many governors, and which had not failed to involve in odium and difficulties as many as had attempted to obey them; recommendations and injunctions of peculiar ur-

[1] For the narrative of the preceding events, have been explored, and confronted, Papers presented to the House of Commons, pursuant to their orders of the 9th of February, 1803, regarding the affairs of the Carnatic, vol. ii.; Barrow's Macartney, i. 109—232; Memoirs of the late War in Asia, i. 231—236, 252—286, and 403—512; A View of the English Interests in India, by William Fullarton, M.P., p. 68—195; Annual Register for 1782 and 1783; the Collection of Treaties and Engagements with the native princes of India: and the Sixth Report of the Committee of Secrecy of 1782. The recent narrative of Colonel Wilks, drawn up under the advantages of peculiar knowledge, affords me the satisfaction of perceiving, that there is no material fact which my former authorities had not enabled me to state and to comprehend.

gency, to correct abuses and effect retrenchments. Though the accomplishments and talents of Lord Macartney, which were not of an ordinary kind, and a considerable propensity to vain glory might have added to the flames of discord, the calmness of his temper, his moderation, and urbanity, were well calculated to allay them. He was aware of the sentiments to which, among the members of the superior government, his appearance in India was likely to give origin; and lost no time in endeavouring to avert the jealousy which might naturally arise. He not only assured the Governor-General of the sentiments of esteem, and even of admiration with which all that he knew of his administration inspired him, but openly disclaimed all designs upon the government of Bengal; and declared that the objects were not Indian to which his ambition was directed. Mr. Hastings met his professions with similar protestations, both of personal regard and of desire for co-operation. He also expressed his regret that the suddenness of the arrival of Lord Macartney had not allowed him the opportunity to furnish to that nobleman the explanation of certain acts, by which the Supreme Government might appear to him to have passed beyond the limits of its own province, and to have taken upon itself an authority which belonged to the Presidency of which he was now at the head.

Of the acts to which Mr. Hastings made allusion, one was, the treaty, into which, in the beginning of the year 1781, he had entered with the Dutch. The object of that measure was to obtain, through the Governors of Colombo and Cochin, a military force to assist in the expulsion of Hyder from the Carnatic; but as these Governors acted under the authority of the government of Batavia, for whose sanction there was no leisure to wait, a tempting advantage was represented as necessary to prevail upon them to incur so unusual a responsibility. The negotiation was carried on through the medium of the Director of the Dutch settlements in Bengal; and it was stipulated that for 1000 European infantry, 200 European artillery, and 1000 Malays, who should be paid and maintained by the Company, during the period of their service, the province of Tinivelly should be ceded to the Dutch, together with the liberty of making conquests in the neighbourhood of Cochin, and the exclusive right to the

pearl fishery on the whole of the coast south from Ramiscram. In name and ostent, the sovereignty of the Nabob Mahomed Ali was not to be infringed; and the treaty, framed and concluded for him, was not to be ratified by his signature. The small value of the cession, and the extreme danger of the Carnatic, were urged as the motives to induce compliance on the part both of the Nabob, and of the Presidency of Madras. The ideas, however, of the Nabob, and of the Presidency of Madras, differed very widely from those of the Governor-General, respecting the value both of what was to be given and what was to be received. They not only set a high estimate on Tinivelly, but treated the offer of a body of troops, when they were much less in want of troops than of money to pay and maintain those which they had, as a matter of doubtful utility. In consequence, they declined to forward the treaty, transmitting their reasons to the Court of Directors. And the accession of the Dutch to the enemies of England, of which Macartney carried out the intelligence, superseded, on that ground, all further proceedings.[1]

Of the transactions, which Mr. Hastings might expect to impress unfavourably the mind of the noble President, another was, that of which the history has already occurred; the engagement into which he and his Council had entered, for setting aside the intervention of the Government of Madras, and transacting directly with the Nabob of Arcot. Under the same predicament was placed the negotiation into which the Governor-General and Council of Bengal had entered with Nizam Ali, the Subahdar of the Deccan, for obtaining from that Prince the aid of a body of his horse, and for ceding to him in return the Northern Circars. Though a treaty to this effect had been fully arranged, yet as the orders for carrying it into execution had not been despatched when Lord Macartney arrived, Mr. Hastings paid him the compliment of submitting it for his opinion. On this occasion also, the Governor-General represented, as of vast importance, the aid which the Company was thus to receive; and ascribed but little value to the territory which they were about to surrender, both as it yielded a trifling revenue, and, being a narrow strip along the coast, was, by its extent of fron-

[1] Supplement to the First Report of the Committee of Secrecy, 1782, p. 8, 9; and the Sixth ditto, p. 118.

tier, difficult to defend. Here again the opinions of the Governor-General found themselves widely at variance with those of the Governor of Fort St. George. Lord Macartney stated the net revenue for that year of the four Northern Circars, not including Guntoor, at 612,000 pagodas; he affirmed that to the English the defence of territory was easy, not in proportion to its remoteness from the sea, but the contrary, as a communication with their ships enabled the troops to move in every direction; that as manufacturing districts, the Circars were of great importance to the Company's investment; that they would be important in a still higher point of view, as forming a line of communication between Bengal and the Carnatic, and giving to the English the whole of the eastern coast, when they should be augmented by Guntoor and Cuttack; and that the friendship of Nizam Ali was of no value, both as no dependence could be placed on his faith, and as the expense of his undisciplined and ungovernable horse would far outgo the utility of their service. On all these accounts Lord Macartney declared, that, without the special command of his employers, he could not reconcile it to his sense of duty to consent to the treaty which was proposed. Mr. Hastings gave way; but a diffidence so marked of his judgment, or his virtue, did not lessen the alienation towards the government of Madras, with temptations to which the situation of the Governor-General so largely supplied him.

The first occasion on which his measures gave uneasiness to the government of Madras, was furnished by the complaints of Coote, whom that government found it impossible to satisfy with power. Instead of interposing with their authority to allay the unreasonable dissatisfactions of the querulous General, and to strengthen the hands, at so perilous a moment, of the government of Madras, the Supreme Council encouraged his discontent, and laid their exhortations upon the Presidency of Madras, to place themselves in hardly any other capacity than that of Commissaries to supply his army, and while they continued responsible for the acts of the government, to retain with them hardly any other connexion, in no degree to possess over them any substantial control. As the coolness on the part of the Governor-General seemed

BOOK V. CHAP. V. 1784.

to Macartney to increase, and to threaten unfavourable consequences, which it was of the utmost importance to avert, he sent to Bengal, in the beginning of the year 1782, his confidential secretary, Mr. Staunton, in whose judgment and fidelity he placed the greatest reliance, to effect a complete mutual explanation, and, if possible, to secure harmony and co-operation. With this proceeding Mr. Hastings expressed the highest satisfaction, and declared his "anxious desire to co-operate with Lord Macartney firmly and liberally, for the security of the Carnatic, for the support of his authority, and for the honour of his administration." But, even at the time when he was making these cordial professions, and entertaining Mr. Staunton with the highest civilities in his house, he signed, as President of the Supreme Council, whose voice was his own, a letter to the President and Council of Madras, in which, with an intimation of a right to command, they say they "do most earnestly recommend, that Sir Eyre Coote's wishes in regard to power may be gratified to their fullest possible extent; and that he may be allowed an unparticipated command over all the forces acting under British authority in the Carnatic." Though Macartney announced his determination to act under this recommendation, as if it were a legal command, he yet displayed, first in a private letter to the Governor-General, to which no answer was ever returned, and also in a public communication, in the name of the Select Committee of the Council of Madras, his opinion, that the measure, as it regarded either the antecedent conduct of the Governor and Council of Madras, or the nature of the case, was destitute of all reasonable ground; calculated to involve the Madras government in difficulties; and liable to produce the most dangerous consequences. Of the rooted enmity of the Governor-General he regarded this proceeding as a decisive proof. And from this time but little between the Presidencies was preserved even of the appearance of concert.[1]

[1] The importance of the services of Coote, and the advantage of leaving to his experience and skill the control of all military operations, was fully evinced by the events that followed his retirement and death. Mismanaged as the war had been by General Stuart and the Government of Madras, it seems probable that but for the opportune occurrence of peace with France, the South of India would have been lost to the English. The annihilation of the army at Cuddalore would have been followed by the siege of Madras, and there was

Of the inconvenience to themselves of the transfer which the Supreme Council had ordered of the powers of the Presidency, one instance speedily occurred. Upon a requisition to send a detachment from Madras to Bombay, the President and Council were obliged to return for answer, that compliance no longer remained in their power, since all authority over the troops resided in the General. It is remarkable enough, that this incident, which, with others of the like description, might have been so easily foreseen, determined the Supreme Council to revoke the orders which they had formerly given, and, by explaining away the meaning of their former words, to substitute a new regulation for the degree of power with which the General was to be supplied. A great diminution, following close in succession upon a great enlargement of power, was not likely to produce a healing effect upon such a temper as that of Coote. He now insisted upon relinquishing the command of the army; and on the 28th of September, 1782, sailed for Bengal. Measures for giving him satisfaction were there concerted between him and the Supreme Council; and he departed from Bengal in the following spring to resume the command. It has been historically stated, and without contradiction, that nothing but an accident prevented the two Presidents, even at that trying moment, from plunging their countrymen in India into something of the nature of a civil war. That Coote was despatched with powers to resume the military command, exempt from dependence upon the Madras government; and that to this illegal subversion of the authority of the subordinate Presidency, Lord Macartney was determined not to submit.[1] The death of the General happily prevented the chance of a struggle. The ship, in which he was proceeding from the Ganges to the coast, was

little chance of defending it successfully against Tippoo and the French. Without denying that there was much to reprehend in the conduct of the military authorities, yet it is evident that there was a constant disposition in the civil authorities of Madras to appropriate the direction of military affairs, and to interfere beyond the strict necessity of interference, which exposed them, not without reason, to the disapprobation of the Bengal Government.—W.

[1] Memoirs of the late War in Asia, i. 429.—M.

This can scarcely be cited as history. An anonymous author quoting no proofs, can scarcely be considered as evidence of intentions not reduced to actions. It is unjust to Lord Macartney, to impute to him the purpose of engaging in something like civil war.—W.

BOOK V. CHAP. VI. 1784.

chased several days by some of the French cruisers, and at times in imminent danger; the extreme anxiety of this situation operating upon the irritable and enfeebled frame of the General, accelerated a third fit of apoplexy, and terminated his life on the 26th of April, only three days after landing at Madras. To such an extreme the distrust of the Supreme Government was now carried, that a sum of ten lacs of rupees from Bengal, which arrived a few days after, could not be received, because the person who brought it had orders to deliver it not to the civil government, but into the hands of Sir Eyre Coote. From this time the Governor-General and Council withheld from Macartney, not only the powers which were necessary for effecting, by negotiation, a division among the enemies of the English, but all instruction with respect to their views of peace or war; and, instead of those supplies which they had hitherto afforded in considerable quantity, they forbade the Carnatic Presidency to draw on the government of Bengal for a single rupee. Repeated applications were sent before any answer was received, for instructions in regard to the treaty which Tippoo had declared his willingness to form. It was not till after the commissioners had departed that any were received; and when they came, they were so equivocally worded, that whatever course the Carnatic Presidency might pursue, their conduct would equally stand open to blame.[1]

The treaty of peace with Tippoo was transmitted for ratification to Bengal. In the absence of Mr. Hastings, who was then at Lucknow, it was acknowledged and signed by the Supreme Council, who were vested with all the powers of government. It was returned in due form. It was then, with the requisite solemnity, transmitted to Tippoo. The receipt of it was acknowledged. And this great transaction was closed.

After a number of months had elapsed, a fresh copy of the treaty was received from Bengal, having the signature as before, of the Members of the Council at Calcutta, and the additional signature of the Governor-General at Lucknow. To this instrument was annexed a declaration, that the Nabob Wala Jah had a right to be included in the

[1] Papers presented to the House of Commons, ut supra; Barrow's Life of the Earl of Macartney, i. 180 and 233.

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treaty; and a command to the President and Council of Madras, "at their peril," to transmit the ratification of the treaty in its second form to Tippoo.

For understanding this transaction, it is necessary to recollect, that the Nabob, and, along with him, his mischievous agents, expressed their uneasiness at the unhappy state of his affairs, by imputing blame to the Governor, and obstructing the Government. The Supreme Council had taken part with the complaints, not only of the General, but also of the Nabob. To all practicable arrangements for peace, that dependent, ambitious, and insatiate chief, had shown aversion, and, in particular, a poignant abhorrence of Hyder Ali and his son. Important as the blessings of peace had now become, to the exhausted resources of him and the Company, he treated with unreserved disapprobation the terms of any treaty which, to the Presidency, it seemed practicable to obtain; and neither gave his consent, nor appeared to desire to become a party, to the arrangement which they endeavoured to effect. The treaty of 1769, in which the Nabob was not included as a party, nor his name mentioned, appeared to furnish a precedent to justify a treaty in which, though his participation was not expressed, his interests were secured. And as it was absolutely necessary, on behalf of the Company, that the Nabob should not have the power of breaking a treaty, essential to their interests, though by him violently condemned, it was held a great advantage to place it on a foundation independent of his will. Besides, previously to the negotiation, the Supreme Council were so far from holding up the Nabob, as a necessary and a principal party, that they did not even direct the communication to him of their instructions, or hint the propriety of taking his advice. The complaint, however, which on this account the Nabob had been instigated to raise, the Supreme Council treated now as a matter of infinite importance; and to Lord Macartney they appeared to be actuated by a wish to multiply the embarrassments of his administration. Considering the jealous temper of Tippoo, his distrust of the English, and his perpetual apprehension of treachery and deceit, Lord Macartney was convinced, that to present to him a second ratification of a treaty, after the first had been received as final and complete, could

BOOK V. CHAP. VI. 1780.

only serve to persuade him that either on the first or second of these occasions imposition was practised; and that hostility should anticipate the effect of hostile designs. The danger of such a result determined the President to brave the resentment of the superior government, and, exonerating his council from responsibility, he declared his readiness to submit to suspension as the consequence of his refusal to obey the orders of the governing Board. The situation of Mr. Hastings himself became, about this time too alarming, however, to leave him inclination for a stretch of his authority; and the disobedience of Lord Macartney was followed by no unpleasant esult.[1]

CHAPTER VI.

Financial Difficulties—Campaign of General Goddard on the Bombay Side of the Mahratta Country.—Attack on the Bengal Side.—Peace with Sindia.—Supreme Court of Judicature.—Efforts of the Supreme Court to extend its Jurisdiction.—Their Effects upon Individuals.—Upon the Collection of the Revenue.—Upon the Administration of Justice. — Interference of Parliament claimed.—Granted.—The Chief Justice placed at the Head of the Sudder Dewannee Adaulut.—Chief-Justice recalled.—Judicial and Police Regulations.—Provincial Councils abolished, and a new Board of Revenue set up.

WE return to the events which, during these great transactions in the south, had taken place in Bengal, and other parts of the British dominions in India.

Before the commencement of the war with Hyder, the finances of the Company in every part of India had become a source of distress. The scanty ressources of Bombay, which seldom equalled the expenditure of a peace-establishment, had not, even with the supplies which had been sent from Bengal, sufficed to save that Presidency from the necessity of draining the channels of loan, and from sinking in arrear so deeply, even with the pay of the

[1] Barrow's Life of Macartney, i. 232--238; Papers presented to the House of Commons, ut supra.

1780.

army, that the General, in the month of August, 1780, declared it was no longer fit to be depended upon.[1] Even Bengal itself, though it had enjoyed entire tranquillity, and had only contributed to the maintenance of Goddard's army, and to other feeble operations against the Mahrattas, was so completely exhausted, that, in August, 1780, the Supreme Council were again reduced to the expedient of contracting debt; and before the end of the year, when exertions in favour of the Carnatic were required, they were obliged to announce to the Directors the probability of a total suspension of the investment.[2]

In the important consultations of the 25th of September 1780, upon the intelligence of the fatal irruption of Hyder, it was resolved, that terms of peace should be offered to the Mahrattas, through the mediation of the Raja of Berar; and on the 2nd of October a draught of a treaty was prepared, according to which all conquests made by the English were to be surrendered, with the exception of the fort of Gualior, destined for the Rana of Gohud, and of that part of Guzerat which had been ceded to Futty Sing Guicowar. Should the fort of Bassein, however, be taken by the English forces, before the final agreement, it was proposed to cede, in its stead, all the territory and revenue which they had acquired by the treaty of Poorunder. Of this draught, a copy with power of mediation, was sent to the Raja of Berar; and at the same time letters were written to Nizam Ali, to the Peshwa, to Sindia, and to the Poonah ministers, apprizing them of the terms on which the English government was ready and desirous to conclude a treaty of peace.

On the 16th of October, General Goddard, reinforced by

[1] See Goddard's Letter to the Select Committee of Bombay, dated 24th August, 1780, Sixth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, ut supra. p. 111 and 112. See also p. 89 and 90, with the Appendix, No. 256, for details, of the extreme poverty and necessities of the Presidency, "necessities," they say, "now pressing to a degree never before experienced."

[2] Sixth Report, ut supra, p. 101, 102, 103. In a letter to General Goddard, under date 20th April, 1780, the Supreme Council wrote, "Our resources are no longer equal to the payment of your army." In another, dated 15th May, they warned the Bombay Presidency against any reliance on continued supply from Bengal, "as neither their resources, nor the currency of the provinces, would endure a continuance of the vast drains," &c. In a minute of the Governor-General on the 28th of August, he said, "Our expenses have been increasing; our means declining. And it is now a painful duty imposed upon me, to propose, that we should again have recourse to the means of supplying our growing wants, by taking up money at interest. The sum I do not propose, because I think it should not be limited."

BOOK V. CHAP. VI. 1780.

a body of Europeans from Madras, and relieved from apprehension of Holkar and Sindia by intelligence that an attack would be made upon their dominions from the upper provinces of Bengal, put the army in motion from Surat. The roads were still so deep, and the rivers so full, that they were unable to reach their ground before Bassein till the 13th of November. From the strength of the place and the number of the garrison, the General deemed it necessary to carry on his operations with regularity and caution. A battery of six guns and six mortars, within nine hundred yards of the fort, was completed on the morning of the 28th. Under cover of its fire, approaches were carried on to a spot within 500 yards of the wall, where a battery of nine heavy guns was opened on the morning of the 9th of December, while a battery of twenty mortars began to play upon one of the parapets. On the morning of the 10th, when a practicable breach was nearly effected, the fort made an offer of surrender, but in consequence of some demur the fire was renewed, and the next morning the enemy yielded at discretion.[1]

After the reduction of Bassein, the General repaired to Bombay for the purpose of settling with the Committee the further operations of the army, and there received intelligence of the irruption of Hyder into the Carnatic, and the destruction of Colonel Baillie's detachment. An attack, which might operate as a diversion, on the western side of Hyder's dominions, was pressed upon the Presidency of Bombay by that of Madras; and at the same time arrived from the Supreme Council intelligence of their designs respecting peace with the Mahrattas, and a copy of the treaty which it was intended to offer. Though directed immediately to obey a requisition in writing from the Peshwa to suspend hostilities, General Goddard and the Committee of Bombay were exhorted to prosecute the war

[1] No notice is taken in the text of the important and brilliant operations of a division of the Bombay army, under Colonel Hartley, in the Concan, the objects of which were to secure the revenues of the country for the British authority, and then to cover the siege of Bassein. The first object was partially, the latter completely, effected. Colonel Hartley defeated, in the beginning of October, a considerable Mahratta force at Mullunghur, and then driving the enemy's parties out of the Concan, took up a position not far from the Bhore Ghaut. From hence he fell back to Doogaur, nine miles East of Bassein, upon the advance of an overpowering force intended to raise the siege; and there, on the 10th and 11th December repulsed every attack of the Mahratta army, 20,000 strong, with the loss of their general. Duff, ii. 261.—W.

with vigour, till such time as that application should arrive. After several fluctuations of opinion, it was determined not to evacuate Tellicherry; as a place which, though burdensome to defend, might ultimately be of importance for commencing an attack upon the dominions of Hyder. And, notwithstanding the desire of the Committee to secure the Concan, or the country below the Ghauts, it was resolved, upon the recommendation of the General, to occupy the passes of the mountains, and to threaten the enemy's capital, advancing into the country as far as might appear consistent with the safe return of the army. The terror which might thus be inspired was expected to operate as the most effectual inducement to peace; and that terror would be the more powerful, as the two leading chiefs, Sindia and Holkar, were understood to be occupied in the defence of their own dominions against the attack carried on from Bengal.

The army marched from Bassein about the middle of January. The Mahratta force in the Concan was computed at 20,000 horse and foot, with about fifteen guns. It was commanded by Hurry Punt Furkea, and posted on the road to the Bhore Ghaut,[1] by which, as the easiest of the passes, and that leading most directly to the Mahratta capital, it was expected that the English would endeavour to ascend. Notwithstanding the numerical superiority of the enemy, they offered little resistance in the level of the country, and with only a few slight skirmishes, the English reached the foot of the pass on the 8th of February. The enemy had ascended; and from intelligence, it appeared that they had assembled in great force to dispute the passage. Holkar, whom the attack from Bengal had been too feeble to retain on the opposite side of the Mahratta country, and who had left Sindia as sufficient to cope with the force by which he was assailed, had lately joined the Poonah army, of which the whole was encamped near the top of the Ghaut. The General, who saw the advantage of audacity and despatch, resolved to storm the pass the very night of his arrival. The storming party, which consisted of the grenadiers,

[1] It was the same army which had been repulsed by Colonel Hartley, and had been obliged to fall back into an attitude of defence.—W.

BOOK V. CHAP. VI. 1781.

headed by Captain Parker, entered about midnight, and with consummate gallantry, forcing the enemy from every battery and post which they occupied, reached the summit at five o'clock in the morning.

At the top of the Ghaut, the English army were not distant more than forty-five miles from the Mahratta capital. On the 12th, a person arrived, commissioned, as he said, by Nana Furnavese, the Poonah minister. His object was, to declare the earnest desire of the minister to obtain the friendship of the English; but he brought with him no credentials to authenticate his mission. For this, he apologized, by the doubts which Nana felt of the disposition towards him entertained by the English. Goddard was not willing that a mere adherence to forms should obstruct the acquisition of peace. He instructed him to assure the minister of the readiness with which the English would second his views for a termination of the existing contests, and the formation of an alliance against their respective enemies. Among other circumstances, the Mahratta agent affirmed that the copy of the treaty which had been sent for transmission to the Regent of Berar, the Regent, who had not approved of it, had declined to forward. The General, therefore, transmitted to the minister a copy, together with information of his being vested with full powers to treat; and agreed to wait eight days for an answer. The answer arrived within the time prescribed, containing a simple and explicit rejection of the terms. Fully acquainted with the progress of Hyder in the Carnatic, and regarding the eagerness of the English for peace, as a declaration of inability for war, the Mahrattas, at this juncture, expected greater advantages from continuing, than terminating hostilities.[1] To the application of the Supreme Council to Moodajee, that he would employ his mediation between them and the Poonah government, an answer was not received till the 9th of January, 1781; and when it did arrive, it contained so many objections to the treaty, and even advanced so many pretensions on the part of Moodajee himself, that it not only convinced them of the

[1] Negotiations were also on foot for an alliance between all the Mahratta states, except the Gaekwar, with Hyder and the Nizam against the English.—W.

little prospect of peace, but brought into doubt the sincerity of the former professions of that person himself.

Notwithstanding this disappointment in the hopes of peace, and the approach of the English army to the capital of the enemy, Goddard, convinced that possession of the capital, which the enemy had determined to burn, would by no means ensure the attainment of his object, declined any further progress into the interior of the country; and recommended a system of defensive warfare,[1] permitting the return of the Madras troops to the coast of Coromandel, both for assistance against Hyder, and to lessen the pressure upon the Bombay finances.

After maintaining their post with little disturbance at the head of the Ghauts till the 17th of April, the English descended secretly during the night.[2] The difficulty of supplying the troops with provisions, while the enemy, it was found, could descend by other passes, and intercept their convoys; together with the expense of fortifying the post at the top of the Ghauts, appeared to surpass the advantage of maintaining it. The enemy descended in pursuit the following day. The route from the bottom of the hills to the coast was about twenty-four miles, through a country full of bushes, thickets, and narrow defiles. This was highly favorable to the irregular and unexpected assaults of the Mahrattas, who greatly harassed the English during the three days of the march: but though several lives were lost, and among the rest that of Colonel Parker, the second in command, no material impression was made, nor any loss sustained of the baggage and stores. The Mahratta army re-ascended the Ghauts; and the English, left in possession of the Concan, prepared, with the Madras detachment, which the reduced state of the battalions now rendered it desirable to retain, to remain at Callian through the approaching moonsoon.[3]

[1] The recommendation came from the Bombay Government, and now only obtained Colonel Goddard's acquiescence upon his finding the impossibility of maintaining an advanced position in the Mahratta country, against such powerful forces as they could bring against him. Duff, ii. 439.—W.

[2] Although not attacked in their post, the English had suffered much from well-concerted operations upon their communications; the country below the Ghaut being overrun by Purseram Bhow, with 1200 horse. Duff, ii. 437.—W.

[3] Sixth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, 1782, p. 100—113, with the official documents, in its voluminous Appendix.

BOOK V. CHAP. VI. 1781.

On the Bengal side of the Mahratta country, it was determined, notwithstanding the eminent services of Major Popham, to supersede that officer in the command, and relieve his corps by that of Colonel Camac,[1] who, having already advanced into the territory of the Rana of Gohud, was, about the beginning of the year 1781, commanded to penetrate, at the head of five battalions of sepoys, towards Oogein, the capital of Sindia. The force employed in this service, as it was too small to prevent Holkar from returning to assist in turning the balance against Goddard, so it was too feeble to intimidate even Sindia alone, and seems to have been saved from destruction, or at any rate from flight, by nothing but a fortunate exploit. Having reached Seronge, in the month of February, it was surrounded by a powerful enemy; its supplies were cut off; it was harassed on all sides; the princes, expected to join it, stood aloof; it was reduced to distress for want of provisions: and the commanding officer was obliged to apply by letter for the troops stationed at Futtyghur, under Colohel Muir, to enable him to retreat into the country of the Rana. Colonel Muir arrived at Gohud on the 29th of March. But before this time, Colonel Camac was reduced to such extremity, that on the 23rd of the same month he had summoned a council of war, in which Captain Bruce, the officer who commanded the storming party at the taking of Gualior, recommended, as the only possible means of preserving the army, to make that very night an attack upon the camp of Sindia. After some debate and hesitation, the resolution was adopted. At sunset on the 24th, the army moved from their ground, and after a march of thirteen hours arrived at the camp.[2] The surprise was, happily, complete; and all the terror and confusion ensued, which usually result from a nocturnal assault unexpectedly falling upon a barbarian army. The enemy dispersed, and fled in disorder, leaving several guns and elephants, with a quantity of ammunition, as prize to the victor.

[1] A typographical error pervades all the previous editions, and instead of Camac, this officer is termed Carnac, a very different person.—W.

[2] It is very unlikely that a march of 'thirteen hours' should have preluded a surprise, especially a nocturnal surprise, as the interval must have brought daylight on the assailants. Duff states that it was Sindia's custom to encamp every night at the distance of five or six miles, ii. 647; and Colonel Camac, in his official report, says, "the enemy encamped within three coss," a distance of five or six miles. Sixth Report, Append. 1072.—W.

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Colonel Muir was so retarded by want of cattle for the conveyance of provisions, and by other difficulties,[1] that he arrived not at Antry till the 4th of April; and, as senior officer, upon joining Camac, he assumed the command. In order to overcome the backwardness of the Rana of Gohud, whom the apparent feebleness of the English led to temporize, and even to intrigue with Sindia, directions were given to place him in possession of the fort of Gualior, which had been professedly taken only for him. Though the English were now enabled to remain within the territory of Sindia, they were too feeble to undertake any active operations; and spent several months in vain endeavours to induce the Rana of Gohud, and the neighbouring chieftains, to yield them any efficient support. In the meantime, the army of Sindia lay close to that of the English, which remained at Sissai, a place within the Mahratta dominions, several days' march beyond the frontiers of Gohud. The Mahratta horse daily harassed the camp, and cut off the supplies. And the troops were reduced to great distress, both by sickness and want of provisions.[2] Happily the resources of Sindia, too, were not difficult to exhaust; and he began seriously to desire an end of the contest. About the beginning of August, an overture was made, through the Rana of Gohud, which the English commander encouraged; and on the 16th of that month, an envoy from Sindia, with powers to treat, arrived in the English camp. Similar powers were transmitted to Colonel Muir. Negotiation commenced; and on the 13th of October a treaty was concluded. All the territory which the English had conquered on the further side of the Jumna was to be restored to Sindia: on the other part, Sindia was not to molest the chiefs who had assisted the English, or to claim any portion of the territory which the English had annexed to the dominions of the Rana Gohud: it was also agreed, that Sindia should use his endeavours to effect a peace between the English and their enemies, Hyder Ali, and the Peshwa.[3]

[1] "Difficulties beyond conception," they are called by Mr. Hastings. See his "Answer to the Fourteenth Charge."

[2] Mr. Hastings' Answer, before the House of Commons, on the Fourteenth Charge.

[3] Hastings' Answer, ut supra; A retrospective View, and Consideration of Indian Affairs; particularly of the Transactions of the Mahratta War, from its commencement to the month of October, 1782, p. 72. The author of this

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During these proceedings the Governor-General and Council were involved in other affairs of no ordinary importance.

When the wisdom of parliament embraced the subject of the government of India, and by its grand legislative effort, in 1773, undertook to provide, as far as it was competent to provide, a remedy both for the evils which existed, and for those which might be foreseen, a Court of Judicature was created, to which the title of Supreme was annexed, and of which the powers, as well as the nomination of the judges, did not emanate from the Company, but immediately from the King. It was framed of a Chief Justice and three Puisné Judges; and was empowered to administer in India all the departments of English law. It was a court of common law, and a court of equity; a court of oyer and terminer, and gaol delivery; an ecclesiastical court, and a court of admiralty. In civil cases, its jurisdiction extended to all claims against the Company, and against British subjects, and to all such claims of British subjects against the natives, as the party in the contract under dispute had agreed, in case of dispute, to submit to its decision. In affairs of penal law, its powers extended to British subjects, and to another class of persons, who were described, as all persons directly or indirectly in the service of the Company, or of any British subject, at the time of the offence.

In the establishment of this tribunal, the British legislature performed one important act of legislative wisdom. They recognised, and by adopting, they sanctioned, the principle, that to leave any part of the emoluments of judges, as so great a portion of them in England is left, to be made out of fees extracted from the suitors in their own courts, is an abuse; an infallible cause of the perversion of judicature. They enacted that a sufficient salary should be fixed for the judges; that no additional emolument, in the shape of fees, or in any other, should accrue

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short narrative has evidently enjoyed the advantage of access to the records of the Bombay government. Some particulars have been gleaned in the "Memoirs of the late War in Asia." See also the copy of the Treaty with Sindia, in the Collection of Treaties with the Princes of Asia, printed by the E. I. C. in 1812, p. 97.—M.

To these authorities, the superior one of Duff's Mahratta History may be added.—W.

from their judicial functions. A sure temptation to exert, for the multiplication of suits and of their expenses, the great power of judges, was so far, accordingly, taken away; and that oppression which is inflicted upon the public by the unnecessary delay, vexation and expense of judicial proceedings, was in part deprived of its fundamental and most operative cause.[1]

On the principal ground, however, the parliament, as usual, trode nearly blindfold. They saw not that they were establishing two independent and rival powers in India, that of the Supreme Council, and that of the Supreme Court; they drew no line to mark the boundary between them: and they foresaw not the consequences which followed, a series of encroachments and disputes which unnerved the powers of government, and threatened their destruction.[2]

The judges had not been long in the exercise of their functions when the effects of their pretensions began to appear. The writs of the Supreme Court were issued at the suit of individuals against the Zemindars of the country, in ordinary actions of debt; the Zemindars were ordered to Calcutta to make appearance, taken into custody for contempt if they neglected the writ, or hurried from any distance to Calcutta, and, if unable to find bail, were buried in a loathsome dungeon.[3] In a minute of General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis, dated the 11th of April, 1775, they declare that process of this description had been issued into every part of the provinces. "Zemindars," they add, "farmers, and other proprietors of the lands, have been seized upon their estates, and forcibly brought up to the Presidency, at the suit or

[1] They created fee-fed offices, and had the patronage of them; this class of impure motives was not therefore destroyed.

[2] Mr. George Ross, Counsel to the East India Company, in the report which he made to the Directors upon the documents relative to this business submitted to him in 1780, says: "It is remarkable, that the judges on the one hand, and the Council on the other, were perfectly unanimous, in every measure taken throughout this unhappy contention. This fact will lead a candid mind to look for the source of this contention, not in the temper of individuals, but in the peculiarity of their situation. In no country of which I have read, did two powers, like these, ever subsist distinct and independent of each other." See Report of the Committee of the House of Commons in 1781, on the petitions relative to the administration of justice in India, of Touchet and others, of Hastings, and the other members of the Supreme Council, and of the East India Company, General Appendix, No. 39.

[3] See the description of the horrid gaol of Calcutta, in the First Report of the Select Committee in 1782; see also vol. iii. p. 166.

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complaint of other natives, and detained there, or obliged to give bail, according to the nature of the case." By these proceedings, the minds of the natives were thrown into the utmost consternation and alarm. They saw themselves surrounded with dangers of a terrible nature, from a new and mysterious source, the operations of which they were altogether unable to comprehend. The principles of English law were not only different, in many important respects, from those to which they had hitherto been indebted for the protection of every thing which they held dear; but opposite and shocking to some of their strongest opinions and feelings. The language of that law; its studied intricacies and obscurities, which render it unintelligible to all Englishmen, who have not devoted a great part of their lives to the study of it; rendered it to the eye of the affrighted Indian, a black and portentous cloud, from which every terrific and destructive form might at each moment be expected to descend upon him. Whoever is qualified to estimate the facility and violence with which alarms are excited among a simple and ignorant people, and the utter confusion with which life to them appears to be overspread, when the series of customs and rules by which it was governed is threatened with subversion, may form an estimate of the terrors which agitated the natives of India, when the process of the Supreme Court began to operate extensively among them.

The evils, not of apprehension merely, but of actual suffering to which it exposed them, were deplorable. They were dragged from their families and affairs, with the frequent certainty of leaving them to disorder and ruin, any distance, even as great as 500 miles, either to give bail at Calcutta, a thing which, if they were strangers, and the sum more than trifling, it was next to impossible they should have in their power; or to be consigned to prison for all the many months which the delays of English judicature might interpose, between this calamitous stage and the final termination of the suit. Upon the affidavit, into the truth of which no inquiry whatsoever was made, upon the unquestioned affidavit of any person whatsoever, a person of credibility, or directly the reverse; it made no difference, whether the individual prosecuted, was within the jurisdiction of the court, the natives were seized, carried

to Calcutta, and consigned to prison, where, even if it was afterwards determined that they were not within the jurisdiction of the court, and of course that they had been unjustly prosecuted, they were liable to lie for several months, and whence they were dismissed totally without compensation. Instances occurred, in which defendants were brought from a distance to the Presidency, and when they declared their intention of pleading, that is, objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, the prosecution was dropped; in which the prosecution was again renewed, the defendant again brought down to Calcutta; and again, upon his offering to plead, the prosecution was dropped. The very fact of being seized was, in India, a circumstance of the deepest disgrace, and so degraded a man of any rank, that, under the Mohammedan government, it was never attempted, except in cases of the greatest delinquency.[1]

Not only the alarm which these proceedings diffused throughout the country, but the effects with which they threatened to strike the collection of the revenue, strongly excited the attention of the Company's servants and the members of their government. To draw from the ryots the duties or contributions which they owe, is well known to be a business of great detail and difficulty, requiring the strictest vigilance, and most minute and persevering applications. Anything which strikes at the credit of the Zemindar, farmer, or other functionary, by whom this duty is performed, immediately increases the difficulty, by encouraging the ryot in the hope of defeating the demand by evasion, cunning, obstinacy, or delay. The total absence of the functionary, called away to attend the proceedings of the Supreme Court, his forcible removal, or the ignominious seizure of his person, went far to suspend the collections within his district, and to cut off the source of those payments for which he was engaged to the Company.

It had been the immemorial practice in India, for that great branch of the government intrusted with the collection of the revenue, to exercise the department of jurisdiction which regarded the revenue, to decide in that field all matters of dispute, and to apply the coercive

[1] See the evidence of Mr. Ewan Law, Report of the Committee on Touchet's Petition, &c., p. 19.

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process which was usual for enforcing demands. These powers were now exercised by the Provincial Councils, and the courts established, by the name of Dewannee Adaulut, under their authority. The mode of decision was summary, that is, expeditious, and unexpensive; and the mode of coercion wsa simple, and adapted to the habits and feelings of the people. One or more peons, a species of undisciplined soldiery, employed in the collections, was set over the defaulter, that is, repaired to the house, and there watched and restrained him, till the sum in demand was discharged. In a short time the Supreme Court began to interfere with these proceedings. The defaulters were made to understand by the attorneys, who had spread themselves pretty generally through the country, that if they would throw themselves upon the Supreme Court, they would obtain redress and protection. They were taught, as often as any coercive process was employed by the judges of revenue, to sue out a writ of Habeas Corpus in the Supreme Court; where it was held competent, and was in practice customary, for the judges to set them at liberty upon bail. This excited still more violently the apprehensions of the members of government, in regard to the collection of the revenue. As the disposition to withhold the payment is universal and unremitting in India, and never fails to lay hold of every occasion which affords any chance either of delay, or evasion; they apprehended that such a resource, held up to the people, would breed a general tendency; and they concluded, with justice, that if, in the innumerable cases in which compulsion was necessary, it could only be exercised through the tedious, laborious, and expensive forms of English law, the realizing of a revenue in India was a thing altogether impossible.

While the Company exercised the office of Dewan, in other words, that department of government which regarded the collection of the revenue, and in civil cases the administration of justice, they had been careful to keep up the appearance of the Nizamut, or remaining branch of the ancient government, in the person of the Nabob; and to him, the penal department of judicature, under the superintendence of the Naib Dewan, or deputy Nabob, appointed by the Company, had in particular been

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intrusted. To this government of the Nabob, which, though totally dependent upon the servants of the Company, and subservient to their will, was yet the instrument of a great portion of all that security for order and protection which existed in the country, the Supreme Court declared, that they would pay no regard. In their representation, under date of the 15th of January, 1776, the Governor and Council complain to the Court of Directors, that Mr. Justice Hyde had declared publicly on the bench, "The Act of Parliament does not consider Mubaruck al Dowla as a sovereign prince. The jurisdiction of this court extends over all his dominions." That Mr. Justice Le Maistre had said, "With regard to this phantom, this man of straw, Mubaruck al Dowla, it is an insult on the understanding of the Court, to have made the question of his sovereignty: but it comes from the Governor-General and Council; I have too much respect for that body to treat it ludicrously, and I confess I cannot consider it seriously:" and that the Chief Justice had treated the Nabob "as a mere empty name, without any legal right, or the exercise of any power whatsoever."

By these pretensions, the whole of that half of the powers of government which were exercised in the name of the Nabob, was taken away and abolished. By another set of pretensions, the same abolition was effected of the other half, which, in the character of Dewan, were exercised in the name of the Company.

In the same address, the Governor-General and Council add the following statement: "Mr. Le Maistre, in his late charge to the grand Jury, declares that a very erroneous opinion has been formed by the Governor-General and Council, distinguishing the situation of the East India Company, as Dewan, from the common condition of a trading company; he makes no scruple of avowing a decided opinion, that no true distinction, in reason, in law, or justice, can or ought to be made, between the East India Company as a trading Company, and the East India Company as Dewan of these provinces. With respect to the management of the territorial revenue, he is pleased to declare, that the only true interpretation of the Act of Parliament is, that our management and government is not exclusive, but subject to the jurisdiction of the King's

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Court; and that it will be equally penal for the Company, or for those acting under them, to disobey the orders and mandatory process of the King's Court, in matters which merely concern the revenues, as in any other matter or thing whatsoever." The Governor and Council declare: "By the several acts and declarations of the judges, it is plain that the Company's office of Dewan is annihilated; that the country government is subverted; and that any attempt on our part to exercise or support the powers of either, may involve us and our officers in the guilt and penalty of high treason; which Mr. Justice Le Maistre, in his charge, expressly holds out, *in terrorem*, to all the Company's servants and others, acting under our authority."

It would be difficult, in any age or country, to discover a parallel to the conduct which this set of judges exhibited on the present occasion. Their own powers, as it was impossible for them not distinctly to see, were totally inadequate to the government of the country; yet they proceeded, contrary to the declared, though badly expressed, intention of the legislature, to avail themselves of the hooks and handles,[1] which the ensnaring system of law, administered by them, afforded in such abundance, to draw within their pale the whole transactions of the country; not those of individuals only, but those also of the government. That this was to transfer the government into their hands is too obvious to require illustration. When a government is transferred from one to another set of hands, by a simple act of despotism, every branch of authority is directly supplied; the machine of government remains entire; and the mischief may be small, or the advantage great. But when the wheels of government were threatened to be stopped by the technical forms of a court of English law, and when nothing but those forms, and a set of men who could ostensibly perform nothing, but through the medium of those forms,

[1] The following is an amusing instance. The Provincial Council of Dacca, the grand administrative and judicative organ of government, for a great province, is thus treated: "Who are the Provincial Chief and Council of Dacca? .... They are no *Corporation* in the eye of the law.... The Chief and Provincial Council of Dacca is an ideal body.... A man might as well say that he was commanded by the King of the Fairies, as by the Provincial Council of Dacca; because the law knows no such body." Argument and Judgment of Mr. Justice Le Maistre, on the return to Seroopchund's Habeas Corpus. Report, ut supra, General Appendix, No. 9. See for another specimen, equally beautiful, a few pages onwards, the maxim *Delegatus non potest delegare*.

and the pretence of administering justice, was provided to supply the place of the government which was destroyed, a total dissolution of the social order was the impending consequence. The system of English law was so incompatible with the habits, sentiments, and circumstances of the people, that, if attempted to be forced, even upon that part of the field of government which belonged to the administration of law, it would have sufficed to throw the country into the utmost disorder; would have subverted almost every existing right; would have filled the nation with terror and misery; and being, in such a situation, incapable of answering the purposes of law, would have left the country in a state hardly different from that, in which it would have been, under a total absence of law. But when the judges proceeded to apply these forms to the acts of government, the powers of administration were suspended; and nothing was provided to supply their place. Either with a blind ignorance of these consequences, which is almost incredible, unless from our experience of the narrowness which the mind contracts by habitual application to the practice of English law, and by habitual indulgence of the fancy that it is the perfection of reason; or, with a disregard of these consequences, for which nothing but a love of power, too profligate to be stayed by any considerations of human happiness or misery, is sufficient to account,—the judges proceeded, with the apparent resolution of extending the jurisdiction of their court, and leaving as little as possible of the business of the country exempt from the exercise of their power.

To palliate the invasions which they made upon the field of government, they made use of this as an argument: That the great end of their institution was to protect the natives against the injustice and oppression of the Company's servants; and that, without the powers which they assumed, it was impossible for them to render to humanity this eminent service. But to force upon the natives the miseries of English law, and to dissolve the bands of government, was to inflict upon the people far greater evils than those from which they pretended to relieve them. If the end proposed by the legislature was really to protect the natives from the injustice of

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Englishmen, they made a very unskilful choice of the means.

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The representations upon this subject, which the Governor-General and Council transmitted to England, induced the Court of Directors, in the month of November, 1777, to lay a statement of the case before the Ministers of the Crown. The supposed dignity of a *King's Court*, as it inflated the pretensions of the Judges, who delighted in styling themselves King's Judges—contrasting the source of their own power with the inferior source from which the power of the Governor-General and Council was derived—so it imposed awe and irresolution upon the Court of Directors. They ventured not to originate any measure for staying the unwarranted proceedings of the Supreme Court; and could think of no better expedient, than that of praying the ministry to perform this important service in their behalf.

The Directors represented to the ministry, that the Zemindars, farmers, and other occupiers of land, against whom, writs, at the suit of natives, had been issued into all parts of the provinces, it was not the intention of the legislature to submit to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; that the proceedings, by which they were hurried to a great distance from their homes, their persons arrested, and a long confinement in the common gaol inflicted upon them, appeared to be replete with irregularity and injustice; that the parties are "sure to suffer every distress and oppression with which the attorneys of the court can easily contrive to harass and intimidate them," before the question whether they are subject or not to the jurisdiction of the court can be so much as broached; that after pleading to the jurisdiction, they are sure of an adverse decision, "unless they are able to prove a negative; that is, unless a native of Bengal is able, from an act of parliament, which the Governor-General and Council have declared liable to different constructions, to prove himself not subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court;" that the consequences were in the highest degree alarming, as almost all the Zemindars in the country, standing in the same predicament, felt themselves exposed to the same dangers; as the disgust and hatred of the natives were excited by the violation of their customs and laws;

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and the collection of the revenue was impeded, and even threatened with suspension.

They represented also, that the Supreme Court, beside extending its jurisdiction to such *persons*, had extended it also to such *things*, as it was clearly the intention of the legislature to exempt from it: that these were "the ordering, management, and government of the territorial revenues," including the powers which that ordering and government required: that over this department the whole Bench of Judges had declared their resolution to exercise a power, superior to that of the Company: that, accordingly, the process of the ordinary Revenue Courts was opposed; persons whom they had confined being released by the Supreme Court; suits which were cognizable in none but the Revenue Courts being instituted and entertained in the Supreme Court; prosecutions being carried on by the Supreme Court against the Judges of the Revenue Courts, for acts done in the regular performance of the business of the Court; farmers of the revenue, who had fallen into arrear, refusing to obey the process of the Revenue Courts, and threatening the Judges with prosecution in the Supreme Court, if any coercive proceedings were employed: that in consequence of these acts, in some instances, the operation of the Dewannee Courts was suspended; in others, the very existence of them destroyed: and that the Governor-General and Council, in their capacity of a Court of Appeal, or Sudder Dewannee Adaulut, were discouraged from the exercise of this important jurisdiction, under the apprehension that their powers might be disputed, and their decrees annulled.[1]

Under the third head of complaint, the Directors represented that the Supreme Court had, on the pretext of requiring evidence, demanded the production in Court of papers liable to contain the most secret transactions of the

[1] See vol. iii. p. 529, for the rank which was assigned to this, in the Catalogue of Provisions for giving to the people of India the benefits of law. From the first arrival of the Judges of the Supreme Court, the Court of Sudder Dewannee Adawlut never acted; and for all that number of years, which intervened till a new regulation, nothing was provided to supply its place. A correspondence on the subject between the Council and the Supreme Court took place in the year 1775. The Court said that the Council had a right to receive appeals in all cases in which the Provincial Councils had a *legal* jurisdiction. This the Council treated as a denial of any right at all: as the Court, by not telling what they meant by "legal," and reserving to themselves a right of deciding, without rule, on each case which occurred, had the power of deciding just as they pleased.

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government; that the Secretary of the Council was served with the writ called the *sub pœna duces tecum*, and attending the Court without the papers, was informed that he had brought upon himself all the damages of the suit; that upon his representing the impossibility of his producing in Court the records of the Council which the Council had forbidden to be so produced, he was ordered to declare which of the Members of the Council voted for the refusal of the papers, and which (if any) for the production; and that upon his demurring to such a question a positive answer was demanded, and every Member of the Council who had concurred in the refusal was declared liable for an action; that the Council agreed to send such extracts as had a reference to the matter in dispute, but persisted in the refusal to exhibit their records; that of this species of demand various instances occurred; and that it was manifestly impossible for the Board to deliberate and act as a Council of State, and as the administrative organ of government, if publication of their minutes might at any time be called for, and if every Member was answerable, in an action of damages, for any measure in which he concurred, to as many persons as might think themselves aggrieved by it.

In the fourth place, the Directors represented, That the penal law of England was utterly repugnant to those laws and customs by which the people of India had been hitherto governed; that, nevertheless, Maha Raja Nuncomar, a native of high rank in Bengal, was indicted, tried, convicted, and executed, for an offence, which was not capital by the laws of the country where the offence was committed; that if the court was unable to mitigate the punishment, it might have deemed it prudent to use its power of respiting the prisoner until the pleasure of the King was known; that this the Directors "conceived to be a matter of the most serious importance, and big with consequences the most alarming to the natives of India; that the Judges seemed to have laid it down as a general principle, in their proceedings against Nuncomar, that all the criminal law of England is in force and binding, upon all the inhabitants within the circle of their jurisdiction in Bengal." The Directors, therefore, adjure the Minister to consider what will be the conse-

quences, if this principle, and the example grounded upon it, were followed up with consistency. "Can it be just," they say, "or prudent, to introduce all the different species of felony created by what is called the *Black Act?* or to involve, as what is called the *Coventry Act* involves, offences of different degrees in one common punishment? — or to introduce the endless and almost inexplicable distinctions by which certain acts are or are not burglary?" They ask whether Indian offenders, of a certain description, were to be transported to his Majesty's colonies in America, or sent to work upon the river Thames? And whether every man convicted for the first time of bigamy, "which is allowed, protected, nay almost commanded by their law, should be burnt in the hand if he can read, and hanged if he cannot read?" "These," they add, are only some of the consequences which we conceive must follow, if the criminal law of England be suffered to remain in force upon the natives of Bengal. If it were legal to try, to convict, and execute Nuncomar for *forgery*, on the Statute of George II., it must, as we conceive, be equally legal, to try, convict and to punish the Subahdar of Bengal, and all his court, for *bigamy*, upon the statute of James I."

On the 2nd of January, 1777, a suit was instituted before the Provincial Council at Patna, which afforded occasion to the Supreme Court of carrying the exertion of their powers to a height more extraordinary than they had before attempted. A person of some distinction and property, a native Mohammedan, died, leaving a widow, and a nephew, who for some time had lived with him, in the apparent capacity of his heir, and adopted son. The widow claimed the whole of the property, on the strength of a will, which she affirmed the husband had made in her favour. The nephew, who disputed the will, both on the suspicion of forgery, and on the fact of the mental imbecility of his uncle for some time previous to his death, claimed in like manner the whole of the estate as adopted son and heir of the deceased.

For investigation of the causes, the decision of which depended upon the principles of the Mussulman law, the Provincial Councils were assisted by native lawyers, by whose opinion in matters of law it was their duty to

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be guided. In the present instance, the Council of Patna deputed a Cauzee and two Muftees, by a precept or perwannah, in the Persian language, directing them to take an account of the estate and effects of the deceased, and secure them against embezzlement; to inquire into the claims of the parties; to follow strictly the rules of Mohammedan Law; and report to the Council their proceedings. In all this, nothing appeared which was not according to the approved and established mode of procedure.

On the 20th of January, the Cauzee and Muftees, having finished the inquiry, delivered their report; in which, after a statement of the evidence adduced, they declare their opinion, that neither the widow, nor the nephew, had established their claims, and that the inheritance should be divided according to the principles provided by the Mohammedan law for those cases in which a man dies without children and without a will; in other words, that it should be divided into four shares; of which one should be given to the widow, and three to the brother of the deceased, who was next of kin, and father of the nephew who claimed as adopted son. Upon a review of the proceedings of the native Judges, and a hearing of the parties, the Provincial Council confirmed the decree, and ordered the division of the inheritance to be carried into effect. They did more: as it appeared from the evidence, that part of the effects of the deceased had been secreted by the widow, before they could be secured by the Judges, and that both the will, and another deed which she produced, were forged, they put her five principal agents under confinement, till they should account for the goods; and directed that they should be afterwards delivered to the Phousdary, to take their trial for forgery.

It is to be observed, that the widow had opposed all these proceedings from the beginning, not by course of law, but such irregular and violent acts, as suggested themselves to an angry and ignorant mind. When called upon by the Cauzee to appoint, in the usual manner, a vakeel, or representative, to act in her behalf, she positively refused; and when the Cauzee recommended to her a relative who had lived in the house, was much in her confidence, and acted as her principal agent, she persisted

in her refusal, but sent her seal, with a message that the Judges might appoint him if they pleased. Upon the arrival of the Cauzee and Muftees to carry the decree of the Council into execution, the widow resisted. The Cauzee and Muftees proceeded to enforce the orders under which they acted. The widow, contrary to their request and remonstrances, left the house, and betook herself to an asylum of Fakeers, which was in the neighbourhood, carrying along with her certain title-deeds and the female slaves. The Cauzee and Muftees divided the remaining effects, upon the valuation of appraisers mutually chosen by the parties, into four shares, of which the vakeel of the widow chose one for her, and the rest were set apart for the brother of the deceased. The widow refused to submit to the decision, or to accept of her share. She also refused to give up the title-deeds, which she had carried away, or the female slaves. In consequence of this proceeding, a petition was presented to the Council, by the nephew, representing that she had not complied with the decree, but by absconding, reflected, according to the Mohammedan ideas, disgrace upon the family, and praying that she might be compelled to deliver up the papers and slaves, and to return to the house, under his protection as representative of the heir. An order was directed by the Council to comply with this request. After some time, another petition was presented by the nephew, complaining that the Cauzee and Muftees had not yet complied with the injunctions of the Board. Upon this, the Council agreed, that the Cauzee should be reprimanded for his delay, and directed to proceed immediately in the execution of his orders. The Cauzee represented by memorial, that he had not only made frequent demands upon the widow, but had placed hircarrahs to watch her, and that, in his opinion, that species of constraint which was authorized by the Mussulman law, and customary in the country, namely, restriction from all intercourse by a guard of soldiers, was necessary to be applied. The guard was ordered, and continued for a space of six weeks. The widow still refused compliance, and at that time the guard was withdrawn.

The widow was advised to bring an action in the Supreme Court, against the nephew, the Cauzee, and Muftees,

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on the ground of their preceedings in the cause, and laid her damages at 600,000 sicca rupees, about 66,000*l*. The objection taken, on the part of the nephew, to the jurisdiction of the court, the judges overruled, on the pretence that every renter was a servant of the Company.[1] The justification set up for the Cauzee and Muftees was, that they had acted regularly, in their judicial capacity, in obedience to the lawful orders of their legal superiors; that the Provincial Councils were vested with a power of determining suits between the natives, with the advice and assistance of the native lawyers; that the established mode in which the Provincial Councils availed themselves of that advice and assistance was, by directing them to hear the parties, to collect the evidence, and to deliver in a report of the whole, comprehending the opinion of the decision which ought to be pronounced; which decision the Council, upon a review of the whole, or with the addition of such other inquiries as they might think the case required, affirmed, or altered, subject only to an appeal to the Governor and Council; and that a judge acting in his judicial capacity could not be responsible in damages to those who might suffer by the execution of his decrees.

This defence, which to the eye of reason appears appropriate and irrefragable, the Court treated with the utmost contempt; and upon a ground which rouses surprise and indignation. A form of words, among the numerous loose expressions, which fall from the lips and pens of English lawyers, without any binding authority, or any defined and consistent application, occurred to the judges. This was the phrase, *Delegatus non potest delegare*, "he who is delegated cannot delegate." And upon this, and no other reason, so much as alleged, they decreed, that the Cauzee and Muftees, for acting regularly, acting as they were obliged to act, and had in fact been accustomed to act ever since the jurisdiction of the country had passed under English control, were liable to actions of damages at the suit of every person whom their proceedings displeased,

[1] This decision greatly increased the alarm among the farmers and other landowners. In the province of Bahar they joined in a petition to the Governor and Council, praying for protection against the process of the Supreme Court, or if that could not be granted, for leave to relinquish their farms, that they might retire into another country. Report, ut supra, p. 8, Patna Appendix, No. 14.

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that is, one at least of the parties in almost every cause. It would be absurd to attempt, by illustration, to render more apparent the deformities of this proceeding. To quote a maxim of English law, though ever so high in authority, and invariable in its force, as a ground for committing in India a flagrant violation of natural equity amongst persons who knew not the English law, nor owned its authority, was an act of chicane, which the history of judicial encroachments, rich as it is in examples of injustice, cannot frequently surpass. It is, however, a maxim, of which, even where admissible, the authority is so little determined, that, like many more, with which the appetite of judges for power is in England so quietly gratified, it has just as little weight or as much, as, in each particular instance, the judge may happen to please. And in a variety of remarkable cases, the established course of English law goes directly against it.[1]

Deciding, upon the strength of this assemblage of words, that the provincial council could not delegate any authority to the native magistrates, even as their agents; and hence that every thing which these assistant magistrates had performed was without authority, the Supreme Court thought proper to enter minutely and laboriously into the whole of the case, and, after voluminous proceedings, gave judgment against the defendants, damages 300,000 rupees, and costs 9,208, amounting to the sum of about 35,000*l.*[2]

At the commencement of the suit, a capias was granted with a bailable clause. A bailiff proceeded from Calcutta, and arrested at Patna the nephew, and also the Cauzee, as he was returning from his duty in one of the courts of

[1] In Chancery for example; when cases are referred by the Chancellor to the Master; when commissions are issued to examine witnesses, &c., in the common law courts, when cases are sent to arbitration, &c.

[2] In the judicial investigation, all the chicanery which two of its fruitful sources, the formalities about notice, and the rules of evidence, could supply, was played off, with decisive effect, upon the defendants. Mr. Rous, in his Report, quoted above, says, "When they attempted to mitigate the damages, by showing the circumstances, they were embarrassed by the *defects of their notice:* afterwards by the rules of evidence. Particularly they were not able to prove the personal delegation of an authority to act for her, by a woman of rank, who could not appear without disgrace; the public acts of her nearest relations in the house being rejected as no legal evidence of her consent. With this defect fell the whole of the exculpation. Lesser difficulties arose from *some* papers not being translated: *others* being fair copies, when the foul draughts were the originals." Patna App. No. 39. The Patna Appendix is a rich mine of information respecting the beauties of English law.

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justice. The bail demanded was 400,000 rupees, or about 44,000*l.* The Council of Patna, struck with consternation, at the probable effects of so extraordinary a procedure, upon the minds of the people, upon the authority of government, upon the collection of the revenue, and upon the administration of justice, which it threatened to stop, by deterring the native lawyers and judges from yielding their services, resolved, as the best expedient which the nature of the case afforded, to offer bail for the prisoners, who, after a confinement of some time, in boats upon the river, were enlarged. The Governor-General and Council, as soon as they were informed of these proceedings, resolved, "That as the defendants are prosecuted for a regular and legal act of government in the execution of a judicial decree (except one of them,[1] the plaintiff in the suit before Dewannee Adaulut at Patna, whose arrest is not for any apparent cause) they be supported and indemnified by government from all consequences from which they can be legally indemnified."[2] Judgment being given, the defendants were put under a guard of Sepoys, that they might be conveyed to Calcutta, to be surrendered. The Cauzee, an old man, who had been chief Cauzee of the province for many years, was unable to endure the vexation and fatigue; and he expired by the way. The rest were carried to Calcutta, and lodged in the common gaol, where they remained till relieved by the interference of the British parliament in 1781. By that authority, a pecuniary compensation was awarded to them for their losses and hardships; and the Muftees were ordered to be not only reinstated in their former situation and condition, but to be elevated to the office of Mohammedan counsellors to the court and council of Patna.

The Supreme Court and the widow were not satisfied with these proceedings against the native magistrates: an action was also brought against Mr. Law, and two other members of the provincial council at Patna. And this prosecution was instituted for official acts performed in

[1] i. e. the nephew.

[2] The Governor-General, though, in his opinion, the examination of witnesses was a part of the procedure which the Council should not have delegated, not only affirmed the power of delegation, but his conviction of the justice of the decision to which, in this case, the Council had come. See his letter to Mr. Law, Patna App. No. 7.

the Company's service, the Governor-General and Council thought it fit that the Company should bear the burden of their defence. Here too the Court decided in favour of the party who brought it jurisdiction: and awarded damages to the amount of 15,000 rupees, which money was paid from the Company's treasury.

It was in this manner, that a thirst for jurisdiction incited the English judges to interfere with the administration of justice in the native *civil* courts. The following is the manner in which it induced them to interfere with the jurisdiction of the native *criminal* courts. From a former statement it will be recollected, that the system of criminal judicature among the natives had been left by the Company nearly upon the footing, on which they found it, and on which it had long been established in the country. It was a branch of authority which was reserved to the Nabob in his character of Nazim. The judges of the courts (they were known by the name of Phoujdary Courts) were appointed by the Naib Subah, or Nabob's deputy, by whom their proceedings were reviewed and controlled. They were entirely independent of all other authority; and it does appear that, considered as Indian, justice was administered in them without any peculiar strain of abuse. About the middle of the year 1777, an attorney of the Supreme Court took up his residence at Dacca. In the month of September of that year, this attorney proceeded to execute a process of arrest, issued by one of the judges of the Supreme Court, against the Dewan, or principal public officer of the Phoujdary Court at Dacca. The process was issued at the suit of a man of the low rank of a *pyke*, or messenger, who had been prosecuted in the Phoujdary Court for a misdemeanour, convicted, and confined till he made restitution. The action was brought against the principal officer of the court, for trespass and false imprisonment, in the execution of this decree. A native, employed by the attorney as a bailiff, who proceeded to the house of the Phoujdar, or chief criminal judge, entered the hall of audience in which the Phoujdar was sitting with several of his friends, and the principal officers of his court: and attempted, in a violent and disrespectful manner, to seize the person of his Dewan, or principal agent. It is to be observed, that in India, a

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man considers an indignity offered to his servants, as in reality offered to himself. No writ or warrant, it was affirmed, was produced by the bailiff; and he was not allowed to perform the arrest. Upon this the attorney proceeded to the house of the Phoujdar, in person, accompanied by a crowd of attendants: and entered it in a forcible manner, by breaking down the gate. To see violated the sanctuary of his house, the mysterious repository of his wives, is a disgrace to a Mussulman more dreadful than death. The reserve of Eastern manners, and the respect bestowed upon the very walls which contain the sacred deposit of the master, render the forcible entrance of a house an event which occurs only in the exercise of the most violent hostility. It is one of the last outrages which may be expected at the hands of an implacable foe. When the Phoujdar of Dacca, therefore, beheld his gate broken down, and an irregular crowd of men bursting into his house, the greatest calamity which could befall him rushed naturally upon his apprehension; and he proceeded to repel a danger, which every honourable Mussulman would resist at the expense of his life. An affray arose in the court of the house. The father of the Phoujdar received a wound in the head, from a sword by an attendant of the attorney; and the brother-in-law, of the Phoujdar was dangerously wounded in the body with a pistol-shot, by the attorney himself.

Mr. Justice Hyde, one of the judges of the Supreme Court, wrote, after hearing of these facts, to the military officer upon the spot, instructing him to afford assistance to the attorney; and adds, "I beg the favour of you, for fear my letters to him should not be suffered to come safe, to tell him, that I highly approve his conduct, and doubt not that he will receive proper support from the court whose officer he is."[1]

It is unnecessary in this case any further to pursue the proceedings of the attorney or his court. The Provincial Council gave bail for the Dewan; transmitted to the Governor-General and Council an account of the facts; and they concluded their letter in the following words: "It is fitting we should point out to your notice, that all criminal justice is at a stand, and seems not likely to be resumed,

[1] Report, ut supra, p. 24.

until the decisive consequences of the present disputes shall be publicly declared and known. It touches the very existence of government throughout the province, that the jurisdiction of the Phoujdar, and his superior, the Naib Subah, be admitted; free from all doubt or ambiguity. How, otherwise, can it be supposed, a Phoujdar will perform any function of his office? How presume to execute a criminal convicted, and sentenced to death by the established laws of the government and his religion, if he is liable himself to stand to actions of damages, or to answer to a criminal accusation, according to the laws of England, for any punishment he may inflict? Paint to yourselves, gentlemen, the anarchy and distraction which may arise, if the present uncertainties are not effectually removed!"

In England, one of the notions which judges, and other lawyers, are in most particular manner eager to stamp upon the public mind is, That the administration of justice is to a most astonishing degree sensitive and delicate. That the acts and character of judges should be treated with exquisite, indeed a religious, respect. That they can hardly bear to be exposed to criticism, or blame in the slightest degree. And that, if the criticism is to any considerable degree searching and severe, it ought to be repressed and punished, however just, with terrifying penalties. This doctrine, which is so very palatable to the judges in England, and so very favourable to all the abuses of their power, we see in what respect they themselves retain, when their power may be enlarged, by trampling upon it in the dust, by annihilating the power and the dignity of the whole order of judges by whom law was administered to a great people.

These are specimens of the manner in which the Supreme Court in India attempted to carry their pretensions into effect. And specimens are all which here it is possible to adduce. A summary of the principal instances in one department, I am happy to be able to present in the words of Mr. Rous, the great law-officer of the Company themselves. "Persons confined by the courts of Dewannee Adaulut are collusively arrested by process from Calcutta, or removed by *Habeas Corpus*, where the language is as unknown as the power of the court. The process is abused to terrify the people; frequent arrests made for the same

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cause; and there is an instance of the purchaser of a Zemindary near Dacca, who was ruined by suits commenced by paupers, suits derived from claims prior to his purchase, and who was at last condemned in considerable damages for an ordinary act of authority in his station. Hence the natives of all ranks become fearful to act in the collection of the revenues. The renters, and even hereditary Zemindars, are driven away, or arrested at the time of the collections, and the crops embezzled. If a farm is sold, on default of payment, the new farmer is sued, ruined, and disgraced. Ejectments are brought, for land decreed in the Dewannee Adaulut. A Talookdar is ruined by the expense of pleading to the jurisdiction, though he prevails. And, in an action, where 400 rupees were recovered, the costs exceeded 1,600 rupees. When to these abuses, incident to the institution of the court itself, and derived from distance, and the invincible ignorance of the natives respecting the laws and practice of the court, we add the disgrace brought on the higher orders, it will not, perhaps, be rash to affirm, that confusion in the provinces, and a prodigious loss of revenue, must be the inevitable consequence of upholding this jurisdiction. The Zemindar of Duckensavagepore, upon pretence that he had been arrested, and afterwards rescued, has his house broke open, and even the apartments of his women rudely violated. Another Zemindar surrenders himself to prison, to avoid the like disgrace to his family."

"We have seen with astonishment," say the Governor-General and Council, "process of contempt ordered in one instance, and civil process issue in another, against the Naib Nazim of these provinces residing at Moorshedabad, a party not owing allegiance to the King, nor obedience to his laws; deriving no benefit or security whatever, in life or member, in fame, liberty, or fortune, from the administration of justice under the authority of these laws; a party, it is worth attention, who is the chief magistrate of criminal jurisdiction throughout the provinces, and in whose jurisdiction in matters of criminal cognizance the judges have not only at all times acquiesced, but in a particular instance have actually resorted to it, in aid and exoneration of themselves." [1]

[1] See a very important Letter from the Governor-General and Council to the Court of Directors, dated Fort William, 25th January, 1780, Report, ut supra, General Appendix, No. 13.

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At length a case arose, in which the disputes between the executive and judicial powers reached a crisis. Upon the 13th of August, 1779, a suit was commenced in the Supreme Court, against the Raja of Cossijurah, by Cossinaut Baboo, his agent at Calcutta. Upon the affidavit of Cossinaut, a capias was ordered to issue, in which bail to the amount of £35,000 was allowed to be taken. The Raja absconded, to avoid the execution of the writ, and was unable to fulfil his duty, as Zemindar, in the government of the country, and the collection of its revenues. The writ of capias having been returned as unexecuted, on account of the concealment of the Zemindar, another writ was issued to sequester his land and effects. For the execution of this writ, the Sheriff despatched to Cossijurah an armed force, consisting of sixty men, headed by a serjeant of the court. It was represented by the Raja, that they entered the house, and endeavoured to pass into the Zenana, or women's apartment; that of the servants of the Raja, who attempted to prevent the dishonour of their master, several were beaten and wounded; that the party then broke open and forcibly entered his Zenana, and plundered his effects; that they committed outrages upon his place of religious worship, and stript it of its ornaments; and that a stop was put to the collections, and the farmers prohibited from paying him their rents.

Upon the first intimation of this procedure, the Governor-General and Council, by the advice of the Advocate-General, had come to the resolution of instructing the Raja not to recognise the authority of the court, or to pay obedience to its process; and orders were sent to the officer commanding the troops at Midnapore, to intercept the party of the Sheriff, and detain them in his custody till further orders. The orders arrived too late to prevent the outrage committed upon the house of the Raja; but afterwards the whole of the party were seized.[1]

Affairs having come to this extremity, the Governor-General and Council issued a notification, to all Zemindars, Choudries, and Talookdars, in the three provinces, that, except in the two cases of being British servants, or bound

[1] The substance of this is not denied by the Chief Justice. He only dwells upon the resistance which was offered. See his Letter to Lord Weymouth, Cossijurah Appendix, No. 26.

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by their own agreement, they were not to consider themselves as subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, or to obey its process; and the provincial chiefs were forbidden to lend a military force to aid the Court in carrying its mandates into effect.

A rule was granted by the Supreme Court to show cause why an attachment should not issue against the Company's attorney, and the officers who were immediately instrumental in seizing the Sheriff's officers and their attendants at Çossijurah. The officers were instructed, by the Governor-General and Council, to resist the execution of any writ, which had a reference to acts done in obedience to their orders in seizing the persons in question. But the attorney was committed to the common gaol of Calcutta for contempt, and a criminal prosecution carried on against him. Upon this, even Mr. Rous remarks,[1] "I am sorry to observe, that the judges, at this period, seemed to have lost all temper, particularly in the severe and unexampled manner of confining Mr. Nayler, attorney to the Company, who merely procured information from the office of the number of men employed by the Sheriff, and once gave directions to the vakeel of the Zemindar to withhold his warrant of attorney;—both, acts done in obedience to the Governor-General and Council."

The Governor-General and Council themselves were at last individually served with a summons from the Supreme Court of Judicature, to answer to Cossinaut Baboo, in a plea of trespass; but finding that the suit was brought against them for acts done in their collective capacity, as the governing organ of the country, they delivered, by the Company's counsel, a declaration that they would submit to no proceeding of the Court, in any prosecution against them as individuals, for acts done by them as Governor-General and Council; acts to which the jurisdiction of the Court did not extend.

These proceedings were not brought to this stage, before the middle of March, 1780; and in the meantime a petition to parliament had been prepared and signed, by the principal British inhabitants in Bengal, against the exercise which the Supreme Court of Judicature made of their power: and this, together with a petition from the Governor-General, and members of the Supreme Council, and

[1] Report of Mr. Rous, ut supra.

also a petition from the Company itself, was presented in 1780, and referred to the Select Committee, which afterwards reported at such length on Indian affairs. In defence of the Supreme Court, the only matter which appears, with the exception of the speeches of the Judges in Court, which refer only to the grounds of their proceedings in special cases, is contained in three letters of the Chief Justice, addressed to Lord Viscount Weymouth, Secretary of State; one dated the 25th of March, 1779, and the other two dated the 2nd and 12th of March, 1780. In vindication of the attempt to force the jurisdiction of the Court upon the Zemindars, it is affirmed that although, as Zemindars, they are not subject to that jurisdiction, yet, as renters and collectors of the revenue, they are included in the description of servants of the Company. And it cannot be denied that the vague and inaccurate phraseology of the act, a species of phraseology which forms so remarkable a characteristic of the language of the English law, and is the source of so many evils, did leave open a door to the dispute, and to all the mischief which it produced, and which it threatened to produce; though it is clear as day, from the general import of the act, that no such jurisdiction was *intended* to be given. To the allegation of the mischievous consequences which would ensue, and which were proved to be so extensive and alarming, the Chief Justice offers no reply. If there is a verbal, or technical reason, to justify the exercise of his power, the consequences, in regard to the happiness or misery of others, are what, from his habits, must to an English Judge appear, in general, as in the present case, very much a matter of indifference. To the accusation of interfering with the administration of criminal justice in the native courts, over which the Supreme Court had undeniably no control, the only defence which is offered by the Chief Justice is, that in those tribunals justice was administered very ill. It is, however, abundantly certain, that totally to destroy those tribunals by prosecuting the Judges in the Supreme Court, when, having destroyed them, it was impossible for that Court to substitute any thing in their room, was not the way to improve the daministration of justice. If those native Courts were susceptible of reform, as most assuredly they were, though,

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considering the state of society and the former experience of the people, there was at this particular period some ground for praise as well as for blame, it would have been a fit and noble exercise for the mind of the Chief Justice and his brethren, to have formed an excellent plan for the administration of justice among the natives, and to have recommended it with all the weight of their authority to parliament and the Company.

The motive in this case, which guided to so desperate a line of conduct, cannot be mistaken, and ought not with hypocrisy to be disguised. It was not any conception of good; it was not ignorance of the evil; for it was too obvious to be misunderstood. It was the appetite for power, and the appetite for profit. The power sufficiently visible and extraordinary; the profit more concealed.[1] Nor can the pleasure of exercising unbounded sway, through the forms of administering law, be justly regarded as a feeble inducement. We see what, in this instance, it was capable of producing. And a faithful history of the law of England would exhibit no less wonderful proofs, in the misery which it has brought, and still obstinately binds, upon the people of England. Of this important inlet of evil, with which the British legislature ought to have been well acquainted, they appear, in framing the act for the administration of justice in India, to have had no remembrance or regard. And even when they set that important example of cutting off the direct profit of the Judges in the plunder of the suitors, by depriving them of all *direct* share in the fees; they did not cut off an indirect profit of no trifling importance, by allowing them to create offices, with emoluments derived from fees;

[1] Although these motives may have unconsciously influenced the conduct of the judges, yet it were more charitable to refer their unreasonable pretensions to the novelty of their position, and their consequent ignorance of their relative and absolute duties. They were English lawyers, had been sent out to administer English law; they had been educated in a belief of its comprehensiveness and perfection. They knew nothing of India, had never heard of Hindu or Mohammedan law, and would have despised it if they had: they had been accustomed to know that gross abuses of law and justice prevailed in India, and they imagined it to be their first of duties to show that they would resolutely exert the powers which they thought that they possessed, for the extension of the principles of the only law which they conceived to be capable of protecting the interests of society. That they entertained a mistaken opinion of their own dignity, and an equally unfounded contempt for the Company's functionaries, originated in the same cause, and to ignorance may be referred the origin of their indiscretion and intemperance.—W.

offices of which they enjoyed the patronage, itself a valuable power, and of which they could not fail to discover various ways of disposing for their own advantage. They still, therefore, retained an interest, and a very distinct and operative interest, in the amount of the fees which might be gathered in the Court; and the candour is amusing with which the Chief Justice bewails the decline of those profits, as one of the principal evils, if not the only evil, for he scarcely specifies another, which sprang from the measures taken to circumscribe the jurisdiction of the Court. "But one term," he says, "has intervened, and the business of the Court, as I estimate, has fallen off near one-third, and in a term or two, when the causes already commenced are got rid of, I expect it will be reduced to the trial of a few causes arising in Calcutta. The advocates, attorneys, and officers of the court, who have not already succeeded, will be reduced to a most deplorable condition. The attorneys have petitioned us, that on account of the difficulty of their procuring subsistence in the present state of things, their numbers may not be increased by new admissions. Though persons may come from England so qualified and recommended, that we may not be able to comply with this requisition, yet I really apprehend we shall do them little service by admitting them; for, it seems to me, it will be only to give them the privilege of starving in company with the present attorneys."[1] That there might be great abundance of advocates and attorneys, and that they, and the officers, in regard to whom the Court possessed the patronage, might be richly rewarded, appeared to the Chief Justice a sufficient reason why his court should retain a jurisdiction ruinous to the country. One of the surest effects of an excellent administration of justice, the diminution of the number of law-suits, that is, the diminution of the business of the Courts; an effect which, if produced by the proper cause, is so highly to be desired, is here set down by the judge as one of the greatest of evils. It is no wonder. It was an effect directly contrary to his profit and power. And it may with assurance be expected, that judges who enjoy the profits of a defective and vicious

[1] Report, ut supra, Letter from Sir Elijah Impey to Lord Weymouth, 2nd March, 1780.

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system of law, will regard as an evil whatever has any tendency to lessen those profits; that is, any tendency to purify the law of its profitable defects.[1]

At this stage of the discussions, respecting the administration of justice, a considerable alteration in the constitution of the tribunals in the civil department of the native law, was brought forward by the Governor-General, and adopted by the Council. According to the regulations of 1773, this department was wholly administered by the Provincial Councils, sitting as Dewannee Adaulut, or Court of Civil Judicature. It was now, on the 11th of April, 1780, arranged, that the business of these Courts should be divided into two parts; that which peculiarly concerned the revenue, and that which peculiarly concerned individuals. A separate Court, styled Dewannee Adaulut, was established for the cognizance of such disputes as arose between individuals: all such disputes as respected the revenue continued subject exclusively to the jurisdiction of the Provincial Councils. The new tribunals were severally composed of one covenanted servant of the Company, who was not a member of the Provincial Council, nor dependent upon it; and denominated superintendent of the Dewannee Adaulut. The reason adduced for this alteration was, to exonerate the Provincial Councils from part of their burden, and afford them more time for attending to the important business of the revenue.

About the same time, an expedient, of which the foregoing alteration was probably contrived as a subsidiary portion, suggested itself to the mind of the Governor-General, for neutralizing the animosities which prevailed between the Sovereign Council and the Supreme Court;

[1] Some opinion may be formed of the sort of faith with which the defence of the Judge was drawn up, by the misrepresentation which he made of facts. He thus describes the circumstances of the Patna case. "A widow of an Omrah of the empire, to whom her husband had, by deeds executed in his life-time, given personal effects to the value of some lacs of rupees, and a considerable landed property, was, under pretence that the deeds had been forged, though proof was made to the contrary, plundered and stript of the whole estate, turned out without bed or covering into the public streets, compelled to take refuge in a monument inhabited by fakeers, and to depend upon their charity for subsistence, &c.....This action was likewise brought against *Black Agents*, whom the Council at Patna had, contrary to their original institution, empowered to hear and determine a petition." &c. Ibid. Letter from Sir E. Impey to Lord Weymouth, 26th March, 1779. "*Black Agents*"—this is the *appropriate* name he bestows on the Magistrates and Judges of the highest respectability in the country. "*Hear and determine*;"—this is what he affirms, though he knew that they only collected evidence and reported.

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and thereby for terminating their disputes. He devised the plan of creating a Court for the Chief Justice, with a large allowance both of power and emolument, dependent on the pleasure of the executive power. The scheme was conducted in the following manner. Along with the establishment of the Provincial Dewannee Adauluts in 1773, had been appointed a Sudder Dewannee Adaulut at the Presidency, the object of which was to receive appeals from the Provincial Adauluts. The Sudder Dewannee Adaulut was to consist of the Governor-General and Council in person; but up to this time they had not so much as entered upon the discharge of the functions of this Court; although the Governor-General declared, and the declaration ought not to pass without remark, that, if one-half of the time of the Council were devoted to this Court, its important duties could not be adequately discharged.[1] 'If a judicial function of the highest importance, for which there was so extensive a demand, was left for seven years totally undischarged, what an opinion is it proper we should form of the situation of justice during all that time? And what opinion are we to form of a Governor-General and Council, who let justice remain in that situation? If they had time for the duties of the office (and few of the duties of government could be more important), they were inexcusable for not applying it; if they had not time, they were inexcusable for not devising and executing another plan.

In consultation on the 22nd of September, 1780, the Governor-General introduced a minute, in which he stated, that the arrangement, established a few months before, respecting the Courts of civil law, had produced not the most desirable effects, but a great deal of inconvenience. "The institution," he said, "of the new Courts of Dewannee Adaulut, has already given occasion to very troublesome and alarming competition between them and the Provincial Councils, and too much waste of time at this Board." He represented it as the business of the Sudder Dewannee Adaulut, not only to receive appeals from these Courts, but to superintend their conduct, revise their proceedings, remedy their defects; and, generally, to form

[1] Governor-General's Minute in consultation, 29th September, 1780. See First Report of the Select Committee, 1782, Appendix, No. 3.

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such new regulations and checks, as experience shall prove to be necessary to the purpose of their institution. He affirmed, that it was impossible for the Council of Government to spare time from its other functions for this important duty; and thus made two declarations; one, that respecting the disorders of the Dewannee Adauluts; another, this respecting the Court of Appeal: and both expressive of the miserable foresight, which attended his own attempts at legislation. He therefore proposed, That the constitution of the Sudder Dewannee Adaulut should be totally changed. That it should not consist of the Governor-General and Council: but that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Judicature should be vested with all its powers. A large salary was intended to be annexed to the office; but that, for politic reasons, was not as yet proposed. And it was expressly regulated, that the Chief Justice should enjoy the office and the salary, during the pleasure of the Governor-General and Council. The happy effects which the Governor-General represented as about to flow from this arrangement, were these; that when the Chief Justice possessed the superintendence of the Dewannee Adauluts, that is, obtained the choice portion of their power, the Supreme Court would no longer interfere in their jurisdiction; that when the Chief Justice obtained this addition of power, with the large salary which would attend it, and held them both at the pleasure of the Council, it "would prove an instrument of conciliation between the Council and the Court," and prevent "those dangerous consequences to the peace and resources of the government, which every member of the Board," he said, "foreboded from the contest in which they had been unfortunately engaged with the Court." The imputation which was essentially involved in this proposition, and which the Governor-General cast upon the Chief Justice, was the most dishonourable, that ever was thrown upon the character of the most infamous of men. The Chief Justice, in extending so vehemently the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, had affirmed, That it was an imperious sense of duty which thus restrained him to act; That by the King whose servant he was, and the Act of Parliament which constituted the Court over which he was placed, the

boundaries of his jurisdiction, that is, of his sacred duties, were assigned and marked out; that from these duties it was not optional for him to recede; that the Judges of the Supreme Court of Judicature were strictly bound to occupy every portion of the field allotted to them; and could not abandon any part of it, either from respect for the Governor-General and Council, or on account of any contingent effects which the discharge of their imperative duties might be supposed to produce. Yet, what did the proposition of the Governor-General to the Council infer? That if they gave to the Chief Justice a sufficient quantity of power, and of money, dependent upon their will, the Chief Justice would confine the pretensions of the Supreme Court within any limits which they might wish to impose. It might naturally have been objected, that to such a proposition the Chief Justice would never consent. But Mr. Hastings, it would appear, was better acquainted with the circumstances of the case; for the Chief Justice immediately discovered, that infinite advantage would arise from the plan. The proposition was, indeed, opposed, with strong arguments, by Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler. They insisted, that if the Dewannee Adauluts were defective institutions, this was not the proper course for their amendment; that, if the authority of the Governor General and Council, under which they acted, was doubtful, resting, as Mr. Hastings, to recommend his measure, had asserted, on the disputed construction of an Act of Parliament, the authority of the Council to make the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Judge of the Sudder Dewannee Adaulut could not be less than equally doubtful, and the Chief Justice, by accepting the office, would acknowledge their authority, and disclaim the construction which hitherto he had put upon the Act; that to accept a new office, with new emoluments, and those dependent upon the pleasure of the Company, seemed inconsistent with the Act which had expressly assigned him a large salary, in lieu of all other emoluments; that the duties of the one office were inconsistent with those of the other; especially if the doctrine of the Chief Justice himself were sound, that the Judges of the Adauluts might be sued for damages; because he might thus have to answer, in his own Court,

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for the acts which he had performed as Judge of Sudder Adaulut; that if the jurisdiction of the Sudder Adaulut would occupy one-half of the time of the Council, so it would that of the Chief Justice, whose time was already so much engrossed, that he could not join with his colleagues in performing the important office of a Justice of the Peace for the city and district of Calcutta; that the present exhausted state of the Company's finances did not justify them in creating a new office to which large appointments were annexed; that the power which would thus be wielded by the Chief Justice would "too much hide the government from the eyes of the natives;" and that, if the attorneys and forms of the Supreme Court were in any degree introduced into the business of the Dewannee, "a new and a wide door of litigation would be opened." When these two opponents of the measure advanced as objections, that the new powers allotted to the Chief Justice would endanger the rights of the Council or of the Company as Dewan, and still might not terminate the endeavours of the Chief Justice to encroach on their department, they estimated far less correctly, than Mr. Hastings, the powers of the instrument which he proposed to employ. They did not consider, that, by rendering the Chief Justice dependent upon themselves for a large portion of money and power, they lost no part of that power which they lent to him, but gained the command even of that which he derived from another source.

It was on the 24th of October resolved, by a majority of the Council, that the Chief Justice should be requested to accept of the office of judge of the Sudder Dewannee Adaulut; and at the same time proposed, that, 60,000 sicca rupees per annum, nearly seven thousand pounds, should be annexed to the office, under the title of salary, and 7,200 sicca rupees, upwards of eight hundred pounds, under the denomination of rent for an office. The assent of the Chief Justice, and his appointment to the office, immediately ensued.

When intelligence of the reconciliation between the governing Council and the Supreme Court, effected by the appointment of Sir Elijah Impey, with a large salary, to the station of Judge of Appeal from the Dewannee

Adauluts, was brought to the Court of Directors, the case appeared to them of so much importance, as to require the highest legal advice; and it was laid before the Attorney and Solicitor General, Mr. Dunning, and their own counsel, Mr. Rous. It is a fact, more full of meaning perhaps, when applied to the character of the profession than of the individuals, that an opinion in the following words—"The appointment of the Chief Justice to the office of Judge of the Sudder Dewannee Adaulut, and giving him a salary for the latter office, besides what he is entitled to as Chief Justice, does not appear to us to be illegal, either as being contrary to the 13 Geo. III. or *incompatible with his duty as Chief-Justice;* nor do we see anything in the late act, 21 Geo. III., which affects the question"—was signed by the names, J. Dunning, Jas. Wallace, J. Mansfield. The opinion of Mr. Rous, the Counsel of the Company, was different, as had been that of their Advocate-General in India; and Mansfield, a few days afterwards, stated, in a short note to the Directors, that doubt had arisen in his mind, whether the acceptance of a salary, to be held at the pleasure of the Company or their servants, was not forbidden by the spirit of the act, or at any rate the reason of the case. He concluded in these words, "I have not been able to get the better of these doubts, although I have been very desirous of doing it, from the great respect I have for the opinions of those gentlemen with whom I lately concurred, and whose judgment ought to have much more weight and authority than mine."

The question was taken under consideration of the Select Committee of the House of Commons; who treated it, under the guidance of other feelings and other ideas. In their report, the power conferred upon Sir Elijah Impey in his new capacity was represented as exorbitant and dangerous; and so much the more so, that no regular definition of it was anywhere to be found; no distinct rule of law was anywhere pointed out; but he was to be guided by his own will: he was to be moderated by no check; he was to be restrained by no appeal; and he was to decide upon the fortunes of all the natives of Bengal. He was provided not only with judicial but legislative powers, being authorized to make rules and

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regulations, that is to lay down laws, for governing the civil jurisdiction of the country. And all this power was conferred upon a man, who, in the opinion of Mr. Hastings at least, had been distinguished by no disposition to make a moderate use of his power. The grounds of expediency and policy, on which, ostensibly, the measure was put, were treated as having been already proved to be frivolous and weak, by the arguments of Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler, to which no answer had ever been made. "The idea," it was affirmed, "of establishing peace upon the ground of adverse claims still unrelaxed, and which nothing even appears to reconcile but the lucrative office given to the Chief Justice, can be maintained but upon suppositions highly dishonourable to the public justice, and to the executive administation of Bengal." One of the most important features of the case was then held up to view: Mr. Hastings, it was remarked, assumed, and he was well acquainted with the circumstances of the case, in the whole course of his reasoning, that in substance and effect the Chief Justice was the whole of the Supreme Court: by selling his independence to the Governor-General and Council, the Chief Justice, therefore, sold the administration of justice, over every class of the inhabitants of Bengal. "By the independence of one tribunal," says the report, "both are rendered dependent; both are vitiated, so far as a place of great power, influence, and patronage, with near eight thousand pounds a-year of emoluments, held at the pleasure of the giver, can be supposed to operate on gratitude, interest, and fear. The power of the Governor-General over the whole royal and municipal justice in Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, is as absolute and uncontrollable, as both those branches of justice are over the whole kingdom of Bengal."

An observation of the Committee is subjoined, to which the highest degree of importance belongs. It is founded upon the grand fundamental truth, that nothing is more favourable to the augmentation and corruption of the executive power, than the faculty of doing, through the medium of the courts of law, things which would awaken suspicion or hatred, if done by the executive itself.

In the situation in which the dependence of the Chief Justice has placed Mr. Hastings, "he is enabled," say the

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Committee, "to do things, under the name and appearance of a legal court, which he would not presume to do in his own person. The refractory to his will may appear as victims to the law; and favoured delinquency may not appear, as protected by the hand of power, but cleared by the decision of a competent judge." When a nation is habituated, even as much as our own is habituated, to pay a blind and undistinguishing respect to the character and acts of judges; the subservience of the courts of law is an instrument of power, of portentous magnitude.

The consequence of the discussion which these transactions underwent, and of the sensations which they produced in the nation, was an act of parliament to regulate anew the Supreme Court of Judicature, and deprive it of the powers which had been found destructive: and, upon a change of ministry, an address to the King was voted by the House of Commons, on the 3rd of May, 1782, for the recall of Sir Elijah Impey, to answer to the charge of having "accepted an office not agreeable to the true intent and meaning of the act 13 Geo. III."[1]

Soon after his appointment to the office of Judge of Sudder Dewannee Adaulut, thirteen articles of regulation for the practice of that Court and of the subordinate tribunals were recommended by the Judge, approved by the government, and adopted. With these were incorporated various additions and amendments, which were afterwards published in a revised code, comprising ninety-five articles. The number of provincial Dewannee Adauluts was, in April, 1781, increased from six to eighteen, in consequence of the inconvenience experienced from the extent of their jurisdiction.

As the establishment of the police magistrates, called foujdars and tannadars, introduced in 1774, followed the

[1] For these important proceedings, the Report of the Committee of the House of Commons, to which the petitions respecting the administration of justice in Bengal were referred; and the First Report of the Select Committee of 1781, with the ample documents contained in their voluminous appendices, have been laboriously consulted. See also the Speech of Sir Elijah Impey, delivered at the bar of the House of Commons on the 4th day of February, 1788, with the documents printed in the Appendix; though this defence refers almost solely to the conduct of the Chief Justice in the trial and execution of Nuncomar. See also Colebrooke's Supplement, p. 14, 23, 128; and the Fifth Report from the Select Committee on India affairs, in 1810, p. 8 and 9.

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example of so many of the contrivances adopted in the government of India; that is, did not answer the end for which it was designed; the judges of Dewannee Adaulut were vested with power of apprehending depredators and delinquents, within the bounds of their jurisdiction, but not of trying or punishing them; a power which was still reserved to the Nizamut Adauluts, acting in the name of the Nabob. The Governor-General and Council also reserved a power of authorizing, in cases in which they might deem it expedient, the Zemindars to exercise such part of the police-jurisdiction as they had formerly exercised under the Mogul administration. And in order to afford the government some oversight and control over the penal jurisdiction of the country, a new office was established at the Presidency, under the immediate superintendence of the Governor-General. To this office, reports of proceedings, with lists of commitments and convictions, were to be transmitted every month; and an officer, under the Governor-General, with the title of *Remembrancer of the Criminal Courts*, was appointed for the transaction of its affairs. In November, 1782, in consequence of commands from the Court of Directors, the jurisdiction of the Sudder Dewannee Adaulut was resumed by the Governor-General and Council.[1]

Upon these changes in the judicial, followed close another change in the revenue, system. In 1773, the plan had been adopted of performing the collection of the revenues by means of provincial Councils; but under the declared intention of its being only temporary, and preparatory to another plan; namely, that of a Board of Revenue at the Presidency, by whom, with local officers, the whole business of realizing the revenue might be performed. Afterwards, when disputes with Mr. Francis, and other opposing members of the Council, arose, Mr. Hastings had maintained, that the expedient of provincial Councils was the most excellent which it was possible for him to devise. On the 20th of February, 1781, however, a very short time after the departure of Mr. Francis, he recurred to the plan which was projected in 1773, and decreed as follows: that a Committee of Revenue should

[1] Fifth Report of the Select Committee in 1810; Second Report of the Select Committee in 1781.

be established at the Presidency, consisting of four covenanted servants of the Company; that the provincial Councils should be abolished, and all the powers with which they were vested transferred to the Committee; that the Committee should transact, with full authority, all the current business of revenue, and lay a monthly report of their proceedings before the Council; that the majority of votes in the Committee should determine all those points on which there should be a difference of opinion; that the record, however, of each dissentient opinion was not expected; that, even upon a reference to the Council, the execution of what the majority had determined should not be stayed, unless to the majority themselves the suspension appeared to be requisite; and that a commission of two per cent. on all sums paid monthly into the treasury at Calcutta, and one per cent. on all sums paid monthly into the treasuries which remained under charge of the collectors, should be granted as the remuneration, according to certain proportions, of the members and their principal assistants. Against this arrangement, it was afterwards urged, that it was an addition to those incessant changes, which were attended with great trouble, uncertainty, and vexation to the people; that it was a wanton innovation, if the praises bestowed by Mr. Hastings on the provincial Councils were deserved; that it divested the Supreme Council of that power over the business of revenue, with which they were solely intrusted by the legislature, to lodge it in the hands of Mr. Hastings, as the members of the Committee were under his appointment, and the Council were deprived of the means of forming an accurate judgment on all disputed points—hearing the reasons of the majority alone, while those of the minority were suppressed. To these objections, Mr. Hastings replied, that the inconveniences of change were no argument against any measure, provided the advantages of the measure surpassed them; that he was not bound by his declarations respecting the fitness of the provincial Councils, when the factious disputes which divided them, and the decline of the revenues, proved that they were ill adapted to their purpose; that the business of the revenue was necessarily transferred from the Supreme Council, because the time of the Council was inadequate to its demands; that the Committee of Revenue were not

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vested with the powers of the Council, in any other sense than the provincial Councils, or any other delegates; but, on the contrary, acted under its immediate control.

It was intrusted to the Committee to form a plan for the future assessment and collection of the revenues. And the following are the expedients of which they made choice: to form an estimate of the abilities of the several districts, from antecedent accounts, without recurring to local inspection and research: to lease the revenues, without intermediate agents, to the Zemindars, where the Zemindary was of considerable extent: and, that they might save government the trouble of detail, in those places where the revenues were in the hands of a number of petty renters, to let them altogether, upon annual contracts.[1]

CHAPTER VII.

Journey of the Governor-General to the Upper Provinces.—History of the Company's Connexions with the Raja of Benares.—Requisitions upon the Raja.—Resolution to relieve the Company's Necessities by forcible Exaction on the Raja.—The Governor-General arrives at Benares.—The Raja put under Arrest.—A Tumultuous Assemblage of the People.—An Affray between them and the Soldiers.—The Raja Escapes.—War made upon him, and the Country subdued.—Condemnation of Mr. Hastings by the Directors.—Double Negotiation with the Mahrattas of Poonah.—Treaty of Peace.

IT was immediately subsequent to these great changes in the financial and judicial departments of the government, that the celebrated journey of the Governor-General to the Upper Provinces took place. Important as was the business, which at that time pressed upon the attention of the government, when war raged in the Carnatic, when the contest with the Mahrattas was carried on in two

[1] The official documents are found in the Appendix, Sixth Report of the Select Committee, 1782: and in the papers printed for the House of Commons, on the question of the impeachment. See too the Fifteenth article of Charge against Hastings, and the answer.

places at once, and when the Supreme Council was so greatly reduced in numbers, that, upon the departure of the Governor-General, one member alone, Mr. Wheler, was left to conduct the machine of government, it was to be concluded, that matters of great concernment had withdrawn the Governor-General from the principal scene of intelligence, of deliberation, and of action. The transactions which he had in view were chiefly those proceedings which he meditated with regard to the Raja of Benares, and the Nabob of Oude. The government was distressed for money, and the intention was avowed, of making those tributary Princes subservient to its supply. The Governor-General departed from Calcutta on the 7th of July, 1781, and arrived at Benares on the 14th of August. To understand the events which ensued, it is necessary to trace from its origin, the connexion which subsisted between the English and the Raja.

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After the shock, which the empire of the Great Mogul sustained by the invasion of Nadir Shah, when the Subahdars and other governors, freed from the restraint of a powerful master, added to the territory placed under their command, as much as they were able of the adjacent country, the city and district of Benares were reduced under subjection to the Nabob of Oude. This city, which was the principal seat of Brahmenical religion and learning, and to the native inhabitants an object of prodigious veneration and resort, appears, during the previous period of Mohammedan sway, to have remained under the immediate government of a Hindu. Whether, till the time at which it became an appanage to the Subah of Oude, it had ever been governed through the medium of any of the neighbouring viceroys, or had always paid its revenue immediately to the imperial treasury, does not certainly appear. With the exception of coining money in his own name; a prerogative of majesty, which, as long as the throne retained its vigour, was not enfeebled by communication; and that of the administration of criminal justice, which the Nabob had withdrawn, the Raja of Benares had always, it is probable, enjoyed and exercised all the powers of government, within his own dominions.[1] In 1764, when

[1] This is an adoption of one of those errors upon which the charge against Mr. Hastings, in regard to his relations with Cheit Sing, was founded, and

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the war broke out between the English and the Subahdar of Oude, Bulwant Sing was Raja of Benares, and, excepting the payment of an annual tribute, was almost independent of that grasping chief, who meditated the reduction of Benares to the same species of dominion which he exercised over the province of Oude. The Raja would gladly have seen the authority of the English substituted in Oude

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which commences with the Second Report of the Select Committee, who talk of "the expulsion of a Raja of the highest rank from his dominions." In point of fact, however, no Raja had enjoyed and exercised the powers of government in the province of Benares, since the middle of the eleventh century, at the latest. At the period of the Mohammedan conquest, it was part of the kingdom of Kanoj. It was annexed to Delhi by the arms of Kutteb, early in the 13th century, and in the 14th was included in the Mohammedan kingdom of Jonpur. In the reign of Akbar, it was comprised in the Subah of Allahabad, and in that of Aurungzeb it was comprehended in that of Oude. In all this time no mention is made of a Raja of Benares. The title originated in the beginning of the eighteenth century, or A.D. 1730, when Mansa Ram, Zemindar of Gangapoor, having, in the distracted state of affairs, added largely to his authority, obtained a Sunnud of Raja, from Mohammed Shah of Delhi—a mere honorary title, conferred then, as it is now by the British Government, without any suspicion of its implying princely power or territorial dominion. Mansa Ram procured the title for his son, Bulwunt Sing, who succeeded him in 1740; so that even the title was only forty years old at the time of Cheit Sing's removal. It had never conferred independence, for the Raja had still remained a Zemindar, holding under the Subahdar of Oude. It is true, that the minutes of Council of various dates speak of the Raja as a sort of king; tributary, but reigning in his own right, and by the position of his supposed kingdom, calculated to be a valuable feudatory or ally of the British Government. Some of this was merely vagueness of expression, some of it ignorance. The word Raja seems to have imposed even upon Hastings; certainly it did upon Clavering and his party; and language was used in allusion to Cheit Sing, which exposed Hastings to the charge of contradiction and inconsistency. There is no vagueness or inconsistency, however, in the document upon which Cheit Sing's whole power and right depended. The Sunnud of 1776, granted to the Raja by the Governor and Council, and which, it is to be observed, "causes all former Sunnuds to become null and void;" confers no royalties, acknowledges no hereditary rights, fixes no perpetual limit to the demands of the Supreme Government; but appoints him Zemindar, Aumeen, and Foujdar of Benares, and other districts. All these terms imply delegated and subordinate offices, and recognise in him nothing more than receiver of the rents, and civil and commercial Judge. In the Kabooleat, or assent to this Sunnud, Cheit Sing acknowledges the sovereignty of the Company, and promises to pay them a certain sum, the estimated net revenue, and to preserve peace and order. Whatever, therefore, may be the fluctuating and contradictory language of the minutes of Council, there is not the slightest pretext for treating the Zemindar of Benares as a sovereign, however subordinate or tributary, to be drawn from the official paper acknowledged by himself to be the tenure by which he held whatever power he enjoyed. It is true, that the genuineness of this document was disputed by the prosecutors; and they affirmed that the Sunnud was altered in compliance with the representation of Cheit Sing, who objected to the insertion of the term, "Muchulka," and the clause annulling all former Sunnuds. They could not prove, however, that any other Sunnud was ever executed; and whatever might at one time have been the disposition of the Council to accede to the Raja's wishes, it does not appear that any actual measure ensued. Even, however, if the omissions had been made, of which there is no proof, it is not pretended that any clause, exempting the Raja for ever from all further demands, was inserted; and this was the only material point at issue. Minutes of Evidence, p. 60.—W.

for that of the Vizir, whom he had so much occasion to dread. He offered to assist them with his forces; and, to anticipate all jealousy, from the idea of his aiming at independence, expressed his willingness to hold the country, subject to the same obligations under them, as it had sustained in the case of the Nabob; and so highly important was the service which he rendered to the Company, that the Directors expressed their sense of it in the strongest terms.[1] When peace was concluded, the Raja was secured from the effects of the Nabob's resentment and revenge, by an express article in the treaty, upon which the English insisted, and the guarantee of which they solemnly undertook. Upon the death of Bulwant Sing in the year 1770, the disposition of the Vizir to dispossess the family, and take the province into his own hands, was strongly displayed, but the English again interfered, and compelled the Vizir to confirm the succession to Cheyte Sing, the son of the late Raja, and his posterity for ever, on the same terms, excepting a small rise in the annual payment, as those on which the country had been held by his father.[2] In the year 1773, when Mr. Hastings paid his first visit to the Nabob of Oude, the preceding agreement was renewed and confirmed. "The Nabob," said Mr. Hastings, "pressed me, in very earnest terms, for my consent, that he should dispossess the Raja of the forts of Leteefgur and Bidgegur, and take from him ten lacs of rupees over and above the stipulated rents: and he seemed greatly dissatisfied at my refusal."[3] Mr. Hastings, however, insisted that all the advantages which had been secured to Bulwant Sing, and confirmed by the Nabob's own deed to Cheyte Sing, should be preserved; and he expressed, in the same letter, his opinion both of the faith of the Vizir, and the independence of the Raja, in the following words:

"I am well convinced that the Raja's inheritance, and perhaps his life, are no longer safe than while he enjoys the Company's protection; which is his due, by the ties of justice, and the obligations of public faith; and which

[1] In their Bengal Letter, 26th May, 1768.

[2] This stipulation ceased to be in force under the subsequent Sunnud of 1776.—W.

[3] The Vizir had urged no more than he had a right to do, and the opposition of the Governor-General established a claim to the gratitude of the Benares family.—W.

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policy enjoins us to afford him ever most effectually: his country is a strong barrier to ours, without subjecting us to any expense; and we may depend upon him as a sure ally, whenever we may stand in need of his services." It was established accordingly, that "no increase of revenue should ever thereafter be demanded."[1]

When the Company's new government, established in 1774, resolved upon forming a new arrangement with the son and successor of the Vizir, lately deceased; the interest, whatever it was, which was possessed by the Vizir in the territory of the Raja Cheyte Sing, was transferred from that chief to the Company. Upon this occasion it was resolved, not only that no infringement should take place of the previous rights and privileges of the Raja, but that other advantages should be annexed. Mr. Hastings took the lead in this determination; and earnestly maintained the policy of rendering the Raja totally independent in his government of Benares, under no condition but the payment of a fixed and invariable tribute. To this, with only a nominal modification, the Council agreed. It was a primary object, professed by all, that the Raja should be completely secured from all future encroachments, either upon his revenue, or his power; and a unanimous resolution was passed, that so long as he discharged his engagements, "no more demands should be made upon him, by the Honourable Company, of any kind; nor, on any pretence whatsoever, should any person be allowed to interfere with his authority." To preclude all ground for such interference, the right of coining money, and of administering penal justice, was transferred to him. Mr. Hastings proposed that the Raja should pay his tribute, not at his own capital of Benares, but at Patna, which was the nearest station for the business of government, within the territory of the Company. And the reason which he suggested is worthy of record: "If a resident was appointed to receive the money, as it became due, at Benares; such a resident would unavoidably acquire an influence over the

[1] Secret Consultations, Fort William, 4th Oct. 1773; Extract of the Governor-General's Report; Second Report of the Select Committee, 1781, p. 12.—M.

Here is no acknowledgement of independence, unless the word "ally" be so construed; but in the voluminous correspondence of the Indian Governments, it is impossible that words should not be used sometimes in their general sense, without intending a rigid interpretation.—W.

Raja, and over his country; which would, in effect, render him master of both. This consequence might not, perhaps, be brought completely to pass, without a struggle; and many appeals to the Council, which, in a government constituted like this, cannot fail to terminate against the Raja: and, by the construction, to which his opposition to the agent would be liable, might eventually draw on him severe restrictions: and end in reducing him to the mean and depraved state of a mere Zemindar."[1] The chain of acknowledgements is instructive and memorable: 1st, that a resident of the Company, at the court of a native Prince, though for ever so confined and simple a purpose, no more than that of receiving periodical payment of a definite sum of money, would engross the power of the Prince, and become, in effect, the master of the country: 2ndly, That in any disputes which might arise with the agent, in the resistance offered by the Prince to these encroachments, the Prince is sure of injustice from the Company's government, sure that all appeals to it will terminate against him, and that even his attempts to oppose the encroachments of the agent will be liable to such constructions, as may induce the Company's servants to plunge him into the lowest state of oppression and degradation: and, 3rdly, That this state of "meanness and depravity" is the ordinary state of a Zemindar.[2]

[1] Minute in Council of the Governor-General on the 12th of June, 1775.

[2] Mr. Barwell even went so far, as to record it in his minute as his opinion and desire, that the Raja should be exempt even from tribute, and rendered in all respects an independent Sovereign. His words are these: "The independence of Gauzeepore (the Raja's country) on Oude, is a great political object, and ought to be insisted on; and whatever may be resolved respecting the revenue paid by the Raja of that country, the English government ought not to stand in the same relation to it as the late Vizir, because the country of Benares and Gauzeepore is a natural barrier to these provinces; and the Raja should have the strongest tie of interest to support our government, in case of any future rupture with the Subah of Oude.—To make this his interest, *he must not be tributary* to the English government; for, from the instant he becomes its tributary, from that moment we may expect him to side against us, and by taking advantage of the troubles and commotions that may arise, attempt to disburden himself of his pecuniary obligations." Bengal Consultations, 13th Feb. 1775. As a specimen of the changes to which the sentiments of these rulers were liable, compare the words of the Minute of the same Mr. Barwell, not three years and five months afterwards, viz., in his Minutes in Council, 9th of July, 1779; "I have *long* regarded the military establishment of Benares, under the Raja's native officers, as a defect; I therefore most heartily agree to the present proposal for three disciplined battalions to be kept up and paid by the Raja, and sincerely hope the Company will direct that the whole force of Benares and Gauzeepore, under the Zemindar, be placed upon the same footing as the regular military force of the Presidency." It is to be observed, that the three battalions were a mere pretence. The Raja was only required to give money; and the battalions were never raised.

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It was in the end arranged, that the payment of the tribute should be made at Calcutta, a commission being allowed for the additional expense: and Mr. Francis was anxious that the independence of the Raja should be modified no further than by an acknowledgment of the supremacy of the English; a condition not practically affecting his government, and conducive no less to his security than to the dignity of those to whom the compliment was paid.[1]

Upon these terms the settlement was concluded; and the Raja continued to pay his tribute with an exactness rarely exhibited in the history of the tributary princes of Hindustan. Unhappily for him, he was not an indifferent spectator of the disputes which agitated the Supreme Council. "It is a fact," says the Governor-General, "that when the unhappy divisions of our government had proceeded to an extremity bordering on civil violence, by the attempt to wrest from me my authority, in the month of June, 1777,[2] he had deputed a man named Sumboonaut, with an express commission to my opponent; and the man had proceeded as far as Moorshedabad, when hearing of the change of affairs, he stopped, and the Raja recalled him."[3] It is somewhat wonderful that a circumstance, no greater than this, should have made so deep an impression upon the mind of the Governor-General, as to be enume-

[1] The third paragraph of his Minute in Council, on the 13th of February, 1775, was in these words: "The present Raja of Benares to be confirmed in the Zemindary, which may be perpetuated in the family under a fixed annual tribute, and a fixed fine at each future investiture; the Raja's authority in his own country to be left full and uncontrolled." And this he further explained in a Minute, dated the 4th of March, in the following words: "In agreeing to the proposed independence of the Raja of Benares, my meaning was, to adhere strictly to the third paragraph of my Minute of the 13th of February, that the Zemindary may be perpetuated in his family on fixed and unalterable conditions. It is highly for his own advantage, to be considered as a vassal of the Sovereign of these kingdoms, holding a great hereditary fief by a fixed tenure, and acknowledging the Sovereign of Bengal and Bahar to be his lord paramount. Speaking my sentiments without reserve, I must declare, that in settling this article, I look forward to the assertion or acceptance of the sovereignty of these provinces, *pleno jure*, on the part of his most Gracious Majesty, the King of Great Britain."

[2] What he calls the attempt to wrest from him his authority, was his own refusal to obey the appointment of the Company, when Sir John Clavering was nominated to the place of Governor-General, upon the resignation which Mr. Hastings disowned.—M.

Having disowned it, he had not resigned, and the conditional appointment, therefore, fell to the ground. The attempt to enforce it without the condition, was an attempt at usurpation.—W.

[3] The Governor-General's Narrative of the Transactions at Benares, App. No. 1; Second Report of the Select Committee, 1781.

rated, after the lapse of years, in a laboured apology among the causes which justified the prosecution of the Raja to his ruin.[1]

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In the year 1778, the Governor-General proposed, that a requisition should be made upon the Raja Cheyte Sing, for the maintenance of three battalions of sepoys, estimated at five lacs of rupees per annum, during the continuance of the war. In settling the terms of the connexion of the Raja with the Company, in 1775, it had been proposed, for *consideration*, by the Governor-General, whether the Raja should not engage to keep a body of 2000 cavalry constantly on foot, which should be consigned to the service of the Company, receiving an additional pay or gratuity, as often as the public interest should require. But this proposition was rejected by the rest of the Council, even by Mr. Barwell, on the score of its being a mere enhancement of the tribute of the Raja, under a different name. And the Governor-General then declared, that "it was far from his intention to propose this, or any other article, to be imposed on the Raja by compulsion; he only proposed it as an article of speculation." Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler, in 1778, consented that an aid, to the amount which the Governor-General proposed, should be requested of the Raja, but demurred as to the right of enforcing any demand beyond that of the stipulated tribute: and Mr. Hastings agreed to reserve the question of right to their superiors.[2] Professing a strong desire to show his friendship to the Company, the Raja, as was to be expected, endeavoured to obtain an abatement of the sum; and when he gave his consent to the whole, expressly declared that it was only for a single year. In resentment of these endeavours to limit the amount of the contribution, the Governor-General proposed, that no time should be allowed for the convenience of payment; but the whole should be exacted immediately. "I acquiesce," were the

[1] The manner in which this circumstance is described is uncandid. There is no reason to infer from the notice taken of the conduct of Cheit Sing, that Hastings alludes to it from any cherished feeling of resentment. He alludes to the Raja's alacrity in fomenting the divisions of the Council, as one proof among others of his being on the watch for opportunities to throw off subjection to the English government, and establish his own independence.—W.

[2] The expressions in his Minute of Council (9th July, 1778) are these.... "wishing to avoid the question of right"...."I wish to leave the decision of future right to our superiors."

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words of Mr. Francis's Minute; "though, in my own opinion, it would answer as well to us, and be less distressing to the Raja, if the subsidy were added in equal proportions to the monthly receipts of the tribute."

The Raja pleaded poverty, and praying for indulgence in point of time, engaged to make good the total payment in six or seven months. The Governor-General treated the very request as a high offence, and added the following very explanatory words, "I will not conceal from the Board, that I have expected this evasive conduct in the Raja, having been some time past well informed that he had been advised in this manner to procrastinate the payment of the five lacs, to afford time for the arrival of dispatches from England, which were to bring orders for a total change in this government; and this he was given to expect would produce a repeal of the demand made upon him by the present government." A delay, founded upon the hope that the Governor-General would be stript of power, might sting the mind of the Governor-General, if it was a mind of a particular description; but a delay founded upon the hope of remission (even if it had been ascertained to be the fact) would not by any body, unless he were in the situation of the Governor-General, be regarded as much of a crime. Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler were over-ruled, and the resident at Benares was commanded immediately to repair to the Raja, to demand, that in five days the whole of the money should be paid, to denounce to him that a failure in this respect would be treated as equivalent to an absolute refusal, and to abstain from all intercourse with him till further instructions, if the requisition was not obeyed.

In the following year, the demand was renewed. The Raja now more earnestly represented the narrowness of his circumstances; the hardship which was imposed upon him by so heavy an exaction; his exemption, by the terms of his treaty,[1] from all demands, beyond the amount of his tribute, which was most regularly paid; and his express stipulation, annexed to his former payment, that it was

[1] There was no treaty; a Sunnud is not a treaty, but a grant or patent from a superior to an inferior. No exemption was specified; and although a specific sum was named, there was no pledge that it should never be altered. —W.

not to be for more than a year. The Governor-General replied in terms more imperious and harsh than before, threatening him with military execution unless he paid immediate and unconditional obedience to the command. The Raja repeated his remonstrance, in the most earnest, but the most submissive, and even suppliant terms. The troops were ordered to march. He was compelled to pay not only the original demand, but 2000*l.* as a fine for delay, under the title of expence of the troops employed to coerce him.[1]

In the third year, that is, in 1780, the exaction was renewed; but several new circumstances were, in this year, annexed to the transaction. The Raja sent his confidential minister to Calcutta, to mollify the Governor-General, by the most submissive expressions of regret for having incurred his displeasure, even by confessions of error and of fault, and by the strongest protestations of a desire to make every possible exertion for the recovery of his favour. This however included not the payment of the five lacks, of which the agent was instructed to use his utmost endeavours to obtain a remission. For the better accomplishment of this object, he was furnished with a secret compliment to the Governor-General, of the amount of two lacs of rupees. At first, as we are told by Mr. Hastings, he absolutely refused the present, and assured the agent of the Raja that the contribution must be paid. Afterwards, however, he accepted the present; with a view, as he himself informs us, to apply the money to a peculiar exigency of the public service. Be it so. The money of the Raja however was tendered, for a purpose which it was impossible to mistake; and that money, with all the obligation which the receipt of it imported, was in fact received.[2] The contribution, nevertheless, was ex-

[1] The questions at issue were the ability and disposition of Cheit Sing to render effective assistance to the state in a period of real emergency. Had the latter been evinced, had not a contrary disposition been cherished, more leniency would have been deserved, and would no doubt have been manifested, in enforcing the demands of the government.—W.

[2] For the circumstances of this present, see Hastings' Answer to Burke's Eighth Charge; the Eleventh Report of the Select Committee, 1781; and the Minutes of the Evidence taken at the trial of Warren Hastings. These circumstances are remarkable and characteristic. At first, perfect concealment of the transaction; such measures, however, taken, as may, if afterwards necessary, appear to imply a design of future disclosure; when concealment becomes difficult and hazardous, then disclosure made. The Governor-General, on the 29th of June, offered to apply 23,000*l.*, which, as he described it, *ap-*

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acted. The remonstrances of the Raja, and his renewed endeavours to gain a little time, were treated as renewed delinquency; and for these endeavours the Governor-General imposed upon him a mulct or fine of 10,000*l.*;[1] and the troops were ordered to march into the Raja's country, on the same errand, and on the same terms, as in the preceding year.

The Raja again submitted, and the money was again discharged. But these submissions and payments were no longer regarded as enough. An additional burthen was now to be imposed. A resolution was passed in the Supreme Council, that the Raja, besides his tribute, and the annual contribution of five lacs of rupees, should be required to furnish to the Bengal Government such part of the cavalry entertained in his service, as he could spare: and the resident was instructed by the Governor-General to make a peremptory demand of 2000. The Raja represented that he had only 1300 cavalry in his service, and that they were all employed in guarding the country, or in collecting the revenues. The Governor-General reduced

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peared to be, though not asserted to be, money of his own, to the support of the detachment under Colonel Camac, destined to act in the country of Scindia. Whether the accommodation was meant to be a loan or a gift, did not appear. Of the receipt of this money as a present, no intimation was made to the Court of Directors before the 29th of November following; when he only alludes to it, but expressly withholds explanation; stating the reason of mentioning the matter at all, to be a desire of "obviating the false conclusions or purposed misrepresentations" which might be made of his offer to defray the expense of Camac's detachment, as if that offer were "either an artifice of ostentation, or the effect of corrupt influence," he tells them, "that the money, by whatever means it came into his possession, was not his own; that he had himself no right to it, nor would or could have received it, but for the occasion which prompted him to avail himself of the accidental means which were at that instant afforded him, of accepting and converting it to the property and use of the Company." Even here, he represents his converting it to the use of the Company, as a voluntary favour he conferred upon the Company, when the money was in reality the money of the Company, and when every thing received in presents was theirs. He had given no further explanation up to the end of 1783; and the first knowledge obtained in England of the source whence the money was derived, was drawn from Major Scott by the interrogatories of the Select Committee. See Eleventh Report, p. 7.—M.

The transaction, however exceptionable in many respects, is not open to one very important part of the charges here preferred. There was not "perfect concealment." It appeared in evidence that Hastings communicated all the circumstances relating to this present, to the Accountant-General, who received the money, and transferred it to the Company's Treasury, from whence it was issued in payments on public account. It is undeniable, therefore, that Hastings never intended to appropriate this money to his own use. Min. of Evid. 1155, 2747.—W.

[1] The payment of this mulct is stated as doubtful, in Burke's Charges; but as it is passed without mention in the Answer, the silence must, in this, as in other cases, be taken for confession.

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his demand, first to 1500, and at last to 1000. The Raja collected 500 horse, as he himself, and without contradiction, affirmed, and 500 matchlock men as a substitute for the remainder.[1] He sent word to the Governor-General that this force was ready to receive his commands; but never obtained any answer.

The Governor-General had other views. He wanted money, and he was resolved that the plunder of the unhappy Raja, whom he disliked, should be the source from which it was to flow. "I was resolved," says the Governor-General, "to draw from his guilt the means of relief to the Company's distresses. In a word, I had determined to make him pay largely for his pardon, or to exact a severe vengeance for his past delinquency."[2] The confession has the merit of frankness, be the other virtues belonging to it such as they may. The guilt as it is called, consisted, exclusively, in a reluctance to submit to the imposition of a very heavy burthen, from which the Raja considered that he ought to be free.[3]

The Raja was informed of the hostile designs which were entertained against him, and in order to mitigate the fury of the storm, sent an offer to the Governor-General of twenty lacs of rupees for the public service. The offer was scornfully rejected. A sum of not less than fifty lacs was the peremptory demand. From the Governor-General's information we learn, that he was at this time offered a large sum of money for the dominions of the Raja, by the Nabob of Oude; that he was resolved to extort the obedience of the Raja; otherwise to reduce his forts, and seize the treasure which they were supposed to contain; or to conclude a bargain for his dominions with the Nabob Vizir.

It is necessary to be remarked, that Mr. Fowke, who had been replaced in the office of resident at Benares by the express command of the Court of Directors, the Governor-General removed about six months before his

[1] A return given by one of his principal officers, stated his established forces to be above 7000 horse and foot. After his flight from Benares, he readily assembled above 20,000. Narrative, 43.—W.

[2] Governor-General's Narrative, K., supra.

[3] This was not "exclusively" the guilt of the Raja. His main offence was disaffection to the Company's Government, and the purpose of freeing himself from it whenever opportunities offered.—W.

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journey to Benares, on the sole pretence that "he thought the resident there should be a man of his own nomination and confidence;" though the Court of Directors had decreed the contrary, and issued to that effect their most peremptory commands. It is also requisite to be stated, that though the Governor-General departed for Benares with the intention of inflicting a severe vengeance on the Raja, a design which he communicated in trust to some of his confidential friends,[1] he entered no intimation of this design in the consultations, or records of the Deliberative Council, but on the contrary a minute importing nothing beyond an amicable and ordinary adjustment, and desiring powers for nothing but to make such arrangements, and perform such acts, for the improvement of the Zemindary "as he should think fit and consonant to the mutual engagements subsisting between the Company and the Raja." The aptness of the expression consisted in its having sufficient laxity to stretch around all that the actor had in view, while its more obvious signification led not the mind of the hearer to any but ordinary transactions.

Upon the approach of the Governor-General to the boundary of the Raja's dominions, that Prince went out to meet him, and, to render the compliment still more respectful, with a retinue unusually great. Not contented with a mere interview of form, the Raja pressed for a more confidential conversation. "He professed," says Mr. Hastings, "much concern to hear that I was displeased with him, and contrition for having given cause for it assuring me that his Zemindary, and all that he possessed, were at my devotion; and he accompanied his words by an action, either strongly expressive of the agitation of his mind, or his desire to impress on mine a conviction of his sincerity—by laying his turban on my lap." Mr. Hastings, according to his own account, treated the declarations of the Raja as unworthy of his regard, and dismissed him.

Mr. Hastings arrived in the capital of the Raja on the 14th of August; earlier by some hours than the Raja himself. The Raja communicated his intention of wait-

[1] He communicated it to the only other member of Council, Mr. Wheler, as that gentleman publicly acknowledges. Narrative 13, Note.—W.

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ing upon him in the evening. But the Governor-General sent his prohibition; and at the same time directed him to forbear his visits, till permission should be received. The resident was next morning sent to the Raja with a paper of complaints and demands. The Raja in reply transmitted, in the course of the day, a paper in which he endeavoured to make it appear that his conduct was not liable to so much blame as the Governor-General imputed; nor deserved the severity of treatment which was bestowed. The Governor-General, without any further communication, put him under arrest the following morning; and imprisoned him in his own house with a military guard.

This is the point at which the reader should pause, to examine, by the rules of justice, the conduct of the parties; since to this time their actions were the offspring of choice; afterwards, they became more the result of necessity on both sides.

Suppose the justice of the demand to have been ever so clear and certain; suppose that the Raja had procrastinated, and endeavoured to evade the payment of his defined and established tribute, which on the contrary he always paid with singular exactness; suppose that importunity on each occasion had been requisite, and the delay of a few months incurred even in this case, where blame, if inability hindered not, might without dispute have been due, it will be acknowledged, that the behaviour of the Governor-General would have been harsh, precipitate, and cruel. Even the fines, and the soldiers would have been too hastily and vindictively applied to an offence, so common in India, and to which any consequences of importance are so little attached. The arrest, which to a man of rank is the deepest disgrace and injury, would have been an excess of punishment to a very considerable degree beyond the line of justice and humanity. If so, how much must be supposed to be added to that excess, when it is considered that the demand itself was extraordinary, irregular, and liable to the imputation of injustice; that some even of Mr. Hastings' colleagues disputed the right of the Company to enforce any such demand; and that Mr. Hastings, though he declared that his opinion was in favour of the right, dared not to decide upon

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it, but in express terms left the question doubtful, and reserved the decision for his superiors?

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Mr. Hastings imposes a heavy burden upon a native Prince. His right, in point of law or justice is a matter of doubt. The Prince shows reluctance to submit to what he very naturally regards as oppression: and by some little and ordinary artifices he endeavours to elude the demand. To this reluctance and these little artifices, Mr. Hastings attaches the name of guilt. Having sufficiently attached to them the name of guilt, he holds it requisite that guilt should meet with punishment: and as it is the dignity of the state against which the offence has been committed; the dignity of the state, which is infinite, requires that punishment should be adequately severe. If this be justice, a way may be found for inflicting any punishment justly at any time, upon any human being.

There are considerations, on the opposite side, which must not be forgotten. Mr. Hastings, in his present exigency, might naturally expect assistance from the Raja. It was common for the tributary Princes of the country to be compelled to assist their superiors in war. And it is probable that Mr. Hastings counted upon that assistance, when, in 1775, the agreement with the Raja was formed. It is, however, not a matter of doubt, that by the terms of that solemn compact, the Governor-General and his colleagues, whether they so intended or not, did surrender and renounce all right to make any demand upon the Raja of such assistance, or of any emolument or service whatsoever beyond the amount of his annual tribute.[1]

Mr. Hastings, in contest with his accusers, endeavoured to lay the burthen of his defence upon the duties which in India a dependent ruler owes to the authority on which he depends. But if these duties, whatever they may be, are solemnly remitted by him to whom they are due, and the right to exact them is formally given up, the obligation is destroyed, and becomes as if it never had existed. That the words of the grant of the Rajah Cheyte Sing barred every demand beyond that of his tribute, and by consequence that which was now made, Hastings no

[1] This, as mentioned above, was cancelled by the Sunnud of 1776. See p. 262 note.—W.

where directly controverts.[1] He meets not the argument, because it could not be answered; he endeavours to defeat it by other means; by hiding it from observation, while he sedulously directs the attention to different points.[2]

[1] The form of the words was affirmative and negative; the first clause defining that which he was to pay; the latter clause excluding by express declaration whatever was not defined and specified in the former. Ambiguity could not more effectually be excluded. The first clause included his tribute, and nothing else; the latter negatived whatever was not in the first clause, that is, whatever was not his tribute. The words to which reference is always made, are the words of the resolution of the Council. It is true, that the words of the Sunnud, which was afterwards actually granted, and which ought to have been exactly correspondent to the words of the resolution, were too indefinite to fix any thing whatsoever in favour of the Raja. But this is one of the injuries which the Raja sustained; and cannot be employed to justify the oppression which was grounded upon it; it is on the contrary, a heinous fraud, for which the authors were justly accountable. And the words of the resolution ought to be the explanation, and the standard of what is left undefined in the Sunnud. It is remarkable, that there was a great deal of irregularity, and some suspicious circumstances, in the mode of making out the deeds, and performing the investment. The Raja objected to the first forms. They were altered. Other forms were adopted. And in the charges against Mr. Hastings, voted by the House of Commons, it is stated, that neither the first set of deeds, nor the second set of deeds, were entered in the records, or transmitted to the Court of Directors. In fact, there is so much of the appearance of improper design in these proceedings, that Mr. Burke scruples not to say, they "give, by that complicated, artificial, and fraudulent management, as well as by his (Mr. Hastings) omitting to record that material document, strong reason to presume that he did even then meditate to make some evil use of the deeds which he thus withheld from the Company, and which he did afterwards in reality make, when he found means and opportunity to effect his evil purpose." The design was, however, probably, no worse than to leave himself a latitude of power with regard to the Raja. But the indefiniteness of the Sunnud very ill agreed with the solicitude expressed in Council by the Governor-General, in 1775, to exempt the Raja from dependence, and all chance of encroachment on his power. It is also necessary to state, that Mr. Hastings avers he had no concern in making out the Sunnuds, or omitting to record them; that these practical operations belonged to the Secretary of the Board, under the superintendence of the majority, of which at this time he was not a part; and that if there was any misconduct, that majority are to answer for it. See his Defence on the Third Charge.

[2] The argument in the text and that in the note, repeated after Burke, rests upon either an erroneous or a wilful confounding of very different things. There are no such words in the grant as are here asserted. The grant contains no clause excluding, by express declaration, all demands beyond the specified sum; there is but one grant, one Sunnud, that which was duly executed by the government, and accepted by Cheit Sing. Where then are the conditions to be found which the adversaries of Hastings choose to consider as conceded? Either in a Sunnud, granted by the Vizir in 1773, or in the resolutions of the Council. The former is declared to be cancelled by the Sunnud of 1776: the latter were not final, and the public would have known nothing of them had they not been dragged into observation: and the worst that can be said of them is, that they were inconsistent with the measure finally adopted. They afforded to Cheit Sing no ground of complaint. They had not been communicated to him to raise hopes which were disappointed. He knew of nothing but the terms to which he acceded—for him there were no others, and none could therefore have been violated. Hastings may be blamed for evading opposition, by acquiescing in purposed stipulations which he did not carry into effect, but it is not true that any breach of compact was committed. The Sunnud, the only authority that can be appealed to, remits no duties, relinquishes no rights, and annihilates no obligations.—W.

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We must also be allowed to examine the rights which the custom of India gave to the Prince who received, over the Prince who afforded, the tribute. Far were they, indeed, from being of such a nature, as Mr. Hastings, for the benefit of his own exculpation, affirmed. By whose construction? By the habitual construction, by the public acts, of Mr. Hastings himself. The East India Company were the dependants of the Shah Aulum, and paid him a tribute. Did the East India Company hold themselves bound to obey every demand which the Emperor might choose to make upon them for assistance in his wars? Did they not treat him as a person to whose commands, or most urgent supplications, not the smallest attention was necessary? Did they not even treat him as a person toward whom they had no occasion to fulfil even the most solemn engagements? Did they not, as soon as they pleased, refuse to pay him even his tribute for that part of his dominions which they continued to hold in his name? Did not their ally, the Nabob of Oude, in like manner depend upon the Emperor, and owe him tribute, which he never paid? Was he not even his Vizir; in other words, his chief minister and servant, and therefore bound by a double duty to obey, to aid, and to protect him? Did he, on these accounts, perform towards him the smallest act of service, or obedience? No one, than Mr. Hastings, better knew, that in India the obligation of the person who pays tribute to the person who receives it is deemed so very slight, as scarcely to be felt or regarded; and no man was more ready to act upon that principle, when it suited his purposes, than Mr. Hastings. The law of the strongest, indeed, was in perfect force; and whenever any party had the power to enforce obedience, it had no limit but that of his will.[1]

[1] This argument is a complete vindication of Hastings' proceedings. No doubt the subordinate authorities of the Mohammedan kingdom of Delhi, in its declining condition, were well enough disposed to withhold from the state it just dues, whenever they thought themselves strong enough to do so with impunity; but what does the admission of this fact amount to?—Not to a justification of the subordinate, but the condemnation of the principal; to evidence of extreme impolicy or helpless weakness, which relaxed irrecoverably the reins of authority, and prostrated the sovereign at the feet of his subjects. Was it for the Governor of Bengal to imitate the imbecility and folly of the Mogul, and allow refractory or rebellious dependants to grow into disproportionate and dangerous importance? What consequences could have been expected from such a policy, but those of which the empire of Delhi furnished so striking an illustration—the utter subversion of the state?—W.

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The relation in which the Company stood to the Raja, the one as sovereign, the other as subject, Mr. Hastings represented as conferring "an inherent right to impose such assessments as the Company thought expedient." But, in that case, the compact into which the Company entered with the Raja,[1] that on no pretence whatsoever should any demand whatsoever be made upon him, beyond the amount of his tribute, were a form of words totally destitute of meaning, or rather a solemn mockery, by which the Company gave security and assurance to the mind of the Raja, that they would take from him nothing beyond his tribute, excepting just as much, and just as often, as they pleased.[2]

Mr. Hastings, in his own justification, and after the time when his conduct had produced the most alarming events, alleged the previous existence of designs, and even preparations, on the part of the Raja, traitorous and hostile to the Company. For the evidence of these designs, Mr. Hastings presents his own naked assertion. But to that, in such circumstances, little value is to be attached. The assertion was also contradicted; and by the man who best knew on what grounds it was made; by Mr. Hastings himself. It was contradicted, by his own actions, a better testimony than his words. So far from repairing to the capital of the Raja, as to a place where any danger was to be apprehended, he repaired to it as a place where he might commit the greatest outrage upon its sovereign without the smallest dread of opposition or revenge.[3]

[1] There was no such compact.—W.

[2] Mr. Francis at the time remarked; "I did, from the first, express a doubt, whether we had strictly a right to increase our demands upon the Raja beyond the terms which we originally agreed to give him; which he consented to; and which, as I have constantly understood it, were made the fundamental tenure by which he held his Zemindary. If such demands can be increased upon him at the discretion of the superior power, he *has no rights*; he has no property; or at least he has no security for either. Instead of five lacks, let us demand fifty; whether he refuses, or is unable to pay the money, the forfeiture of his Zemindary may be the immediate consequence of it, unless he can find means to redeem *himself* by a *new* treaty." Minute in Council, 28th September, 1778; Second Report, ut supra, p. 30.

[3] The affidavits, appended to Mr. Hastings' Narrative, instead of proving that any design of rebellion was on foot, prove the contrary; by showing the total want of a foundation for the pretended suspicions. Much testimony was given in defence to this point on the trial. It amounted, however, to nothing but a statement of *rumours*, or of *equivocal appearances*, or of the *opinions* of witnesses who believed that which they wished. (See printed Minutes of Evidence on the Benares Charge, p. 1601 to 1616 and 1664—1788.) Lieu-

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By Mr. Hastings the Raja was represented as having vast riches, which he ungratefully desired to withhold from the Company in their greatest distress. If the fact had corresponded with the assertion, it is not very allowable, for a mere debt of gratitude, to prosecute a man to his ruin. Of the riches of the Raja, however, we look in vain for the proof; and the fancy of those riches was, in all probability nothing more than a part of that vain imagination of the unbounded opulence of India, which the experience of our countrymen might at a very early period have extinguished in their minds, but which their cupidity has, in spite of their experience, kept alive, to hurry them into many of the weakest and most exceptionable of their acts. Of the Princes of India, there has not been one whom, after experience, they have not found to be poor; scarcely has there been any whom, before experience, they have not believed to be rich.

Mr. Hastings endeavoured to strengthen his justification by chicaning about the quality of the Raja, or his

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tenant-Colonel Crabb, on the subject of the reports respecting the disaffection of the Raja—(after the treatment which he had received, the known existence of a cause for disaffection was very likely to be confounded with the supposed existence of disaffection itself)—was asked by the Select Committee (Second Report, Appendix, No. 11),—"Whether there were any circumstances in the Company's situation at that time to consider those reports probable? He said, Not that he knew of; reports were circulated one half-hour, and contradicted the next; and no one can trace the origin." Among the alleged proofs, was given, a recent augmentation of his troops; of cavalry, to the amount of 5000; (see the Evidence of Major Fairfax, Report, ut supra, Appendix No. 15); yet all the horse in his service, when he was obliged to take the field, amounted only to about 2000; see Hastings' Narrative, ut supra, Dd. The same sort of suspicions, and the same sort of reports, existed against the Nabob of Oude; and with more probability, and with more danger, because he had greater power. The Governor-General himself says, "I had received several intimations, imputing evil designs to the Nabob, and warning me to guard myself against them, and especially be careful that I did not expose myself to the effects of concealed treachery, by visiting him without a strong guard. Many circumstances favoured this suspicion. No sooner had the rebellion of this Zemindary (Benares) manifested itself, than its contagion instantly flew to Fyzabad—and the extensive territory lying on the north of the river Dewa, and known by the names of Goorucpoor and Bareech. In the city of Fyzabad, the mother and grandmother of the Nabob openly espoused the party of Cheyte Sing, encouraging and inviting people to enlist for his service, and their servants took up arms against the English. Two battalions of regular sepoys in the Vizir's service, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hannay, who had been intrusted with the charge of that district, were attacked and surrounded in various places, many of them cut to pieces, and Colonel Hannay himself, encompassed by multitudes, narrowly escaped the same fate. The Nabob Vizir was charged with being privy to the intrigues which had produced and *fomented* those disturbances; and the little account that he seemed to make of them served to countenance the suspicion." (Narrative, ut supra, Cc.)

dignity and rank. Mr. Hastings denied that he was a sovereign prince: he was only a Zemindar. Did this, however, change the nature of the compact, by which the Company had bound themselves to exact from this man, whether Prince or Zemindar, no more than his annual tribute? Would Mr. Hastings have asserted, that, being a Zemindar, the Company had any better right to plunder him, than if he was a dependent Prince? Had he been a subject, in the most unlimited sense of the word, would it have been anything else than plunder, not to have taxed him along with the rest of his fellow-subjects, but to have gone to him personally, and singly, and have taken from him by compulsion, whatever it was the pleasure of the exactor to take? Would Mr. Hastings have undertaken to point out where the line of distinction between a Zemindar, and a dependant Prince was to be found? Was not every Zemindar that had a large extent of territory and power, a dependent Prince; and was not every Prince of a small extent of territory and power, a mere Zemindar? What could constitute any man a sovereign Prince, if all the powers of government secured, without participation, to him and his heirs for ever, over a country surpassing the extent of considerable kingdoms, did not constitute the Raja of Benares a Prince? But the father of the Raja, Bulwunt Sing, said Mr. Hastings, rose from the condition of a petty Zemindar. What had this to do with the question? Did any one, better than Mr. Hastings, know, that those who acquired the station of dependant Princes in India almost uniformly ascended from the lowest origin? Did the birth of Aliverdi Khan prevent him from being the Subahdar of Bengal, and leaving his heir in the state of a tributary Prince?[1]

[1] What was the condition of the Zemindars of the province of Benares, whose obedience as subjects was due to Cheyte Sing? The fact is, that nothing was so indefinite as the title of Zemindar. Mr. Hastings himself says, "The expulsion of Cheyte Sing was indisputably a *revolution*. I have always called it so." A revolution, consisting in the mere change of a land-renter, removeable at pleasure! It is curious to contrast the words of Mr. Hastings' own agent, Major Scott, who had occasion to exalt the situation of the Raja: "Mr. Fowke, as resident at Benares, appears to him, and certainly is, as an ambassador at a foreign though dependent court. From that Raja, the Company receive 300,000*l.* sterling a-year. Benares is a seat of politics; vackeels, or ambassadors, from every power in India reside constantly there." Evidence of Major Scott, in the fifth redort (p. 7) of the Select Coumittee,

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Another of the allegations, upon which the defence was attempted, of the demands which Mr. Hastings made upon the Raja, and of the arrest of him for evasions of payment, was, that the police of the Raja's dominions was very defective. It would have been difficult for his accuser to show in what part of India it was good. Three instances are adduced, on the complaint of Major Eaton, the English officer commanding at Buxar, in which the people of the country had behaved without respect to the English authority, and, in one instance, with violence to English sepoys, and even English officers. Upon this, remonstrance had been made to the Raja, and, though it is not alleged that he abetted his officers or people, yet he had not made redress, to the satisfaction of the offended party. On the 14th of December, 1780, the Supreme Council wrote, commanding the Raja to make inquiry into one of the cases; which, as there is no complaint to the contrary, except that an answer had not been received on the 17th of next month, it would appear that he did. And just seven months after the date of this letter, Mr. Hastings set out on the journey to inflict that punishment on the Raja which led to his ruin.[1]

Another extraordinary declaration of Mr. Hastings remains to be considered. "I will suppose," says he, "for a moment, that I have erred—that I have acted with an unwarranted rigour towards Cheyte Sing, and even with injustice: let my motive be consulted." Then follows the account of this motive, in the following words: "I left Calcutta, impressed with the belief that extraordinary means, and those exerted with a strong hand, were necessary to preserve the Company's interests from sinking under the accumulated weight which oppressed them. I saw a political necessity for curbing the overgrown power of a great member of their dominion, and to make it contribute to the relief of their pressing exigencies. If I erred, my error was prompted by an excess of zeal for their interests, operating with too strong a bias on my

1781. Yet no small portion of the evidence adduced for the defence on Mr. Hastings' trial went to prove that the Raja wws a mere Zemindar. Vide Minutes of Evidence, ut supra.—M.

See preceding note. p. 361.—W.

[1] Vide Minutes of Evidence on the Trial, p. 1601.

judgment."[1] Here some portion of the truth comes forth. The Company were in want of money. The Raja was supposed to possess it. And since he would not give what was demanded willingly, the resolution was formed to take it from him by force. The pretence, however, that his power was overgrown — that is, from its magnitude an object of danger, was utterly groundless. In what respect had that power increased, during the short period of five years, from the time when Mr. Hastings and his colleagues confirmed and established his power, and when Mr. Hastings was so far from dreading it, that he wished to make it still more independent than it was really made? By a small body of troops, hastily collected together, and wretchedly provided both with provisions and pay, the whole power of the Raja was, in a few days, and with but little bloodshed, completely subdued. And the military officers declared, that, even if the country had deliberately rebelled, a single brigade of the Company's army would have sufficed for its reduction.[2]

Nor was the Governor-General so perfectly disinterested as he was desirous to make it appear. The whole power and emoluments of his office, over which he watched with so much jealousy and desire, were the powerful interests by which he was stimulated. He knew, under the sentiments which prevailed at home, by what a slender and precarious tenour he enjoyed his place. He knew well that success or adversity would determine the question. He knew, that with those whom he served, plenty of money[3] was success; want of that useful article, adversity.

[1] Governor-General's Narrative, ut supra, O, No. 1.

[2] See the Evidence of Lieutenant-Colonel Crabb, Second Report, ut supra, Appendix, No. 11. Observe the words of Mr. Hastings himself. "The treachery of Raja Cheyte Sing has compelled me to retreat to this place, where I wait to reduce this Zemindary; *a work I trust of no great difficulty or time*.... Troops are assembling daily, *to which he can afford no opposition*." Governor-General's Letter to Colonel Muir, dated Chunargur, 29th August, 1781, ut supra, No 4. Evidence was adduced on the trial, however, to prove this point with the rest. Vide Minutes, ut supra, on the Benares charge.

[3] It is not candid to ascribe the motives of the Governor to a wish to conciliate support at home by possession of money. He knew that the very existence of the British authority in India was at stake—Hyder triumphant in the Carnatic; war with the French and Dutch; the Mahrattas formidable in the Concan; Madras and Bombay destitute of resources, and depending wholly upon Bengal for means of keeping an army on foot. Bengal labouring under financial difficulties, and all the Governor-General's views obstructed by a factious opposition; it was not a time to reject legitimate means of saving the empire, because they were informal, or because they were harsh.

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He found himself in extreme want of it. The treasure to which he looked, was the fancied treasure of the Raja; and he was determined to make it his own. If, under such circumstances as these, a zeal for the government which he served could sanctify his actions, then may Jefferies be regarded as a virtuous judge.[1]

On the very evening of the first day after the arrival of the Governor-General in the capital of the Raja, he gave his commands to Mr. Markham, the Resident; who proceeded the next morning, with a few of his orderlies, to the palace of the Raja; and he thus reported to his employer the result of his mission: "The Raja submitted quietly to the arrest, and assured me, that whatever were your orders, he was ready implicitly to obey: he hoped that you would allow him a subsistence; but as for his Zemindary, his forts, and his treasure, he was ready to lay them at your feet, and his life if required. He expressed himself much hurt at the ignominy which he affirmed must be the consequence of his confinement, and entreated me to return to you with the foregoing submission, hoping that you would make allowance for his youth

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Whether more candour and leniency would have effected the same objects may be matter of doubt; but the object was of a magnitude amply sufficient to justify the means by which it was accomplished.—W.

[1] Mr. Hastings represented his animosity as inflamed by the danger, to which the detachment of Colonel Camac in Sindia's country was exposed. The money expected from the Raja was, according to the statement of Mr. Hastings, destined to that service. But in the first place, Mr. Hastings was inexcusable, if he left the subsistence of an army, in a dangerous situation, to depend upon a supply which he knew to be precarious. Besides, it is, by the Select Committee, in their Second Report, shown, from the comparison of the dates, that the distress of the army was not an effect of delay in the payments of the Raja. And it is still further shown by the Committee in their Eleventh Report, that the present of two lacs of rupees (23,000*l.* sterling), which the Governor-General took from the Raja, he actually proposed to the Council on the 26th of June, 1780, to employ (not representing it as money not his own) in supporting the detachment under Camac. The following are a few of the words of the Committee. "If the cause of Colonel Camac's failure had been true, as to the sum which was the object of the public demand, the failure could not be attributed to the Raja, when he had on the instant privately furnished at least 23,000*l.* to Mr. Hastings; that is, furnished the identical money which he tells us (but carefully concealing the name of the giver) he had from the beginning destined, as he afterwards publicly offered, for this very expedition of Colonel Camac's. The complication of fraud and cruelty in this transaction admits of few parallels. Mr. Hastings, at the Council Board of Bengal, displays himself as a zealous servant of the Company, bountifully giving from his own fortune; and in his letter to the Directors (as he says himself), as going out of the ordinary roads for their advantage; and all this on the credit of supplies, derived from the gift of a man, whom he treats with the utmost severity, and whom he accuses, in this particular, of disaffection to the Company's cause and interests." Ibid. p. 7.

and inexperience, and, in consideration of his father's name, release him from his confinement as soon as he should prove the sincerity of his offers, and himself deserving of your compassion and forgiveness."

This conversation had only been a few minutes ended, when a guard of two companies of sepoys arrived: the servants of the Raja were disarmed; and he was left in charge of the officers. The sensation which this event produced in the minds of the people, was immediately seen. The government of the Raja, and of his father, Bulwant Sing, had for many years afforded the people an uncommon portion of justice and protection; and they had prospered under its beneficent care. Captain Harper, an officer of the Company, who had performed a great deal of service in that part of Hindustan, was asked in evidence, by the Select Committee, "How the provinces of Benares and Gazeepore were cultivated, compared with those parts of Bahar which adjoin, and are only separated by the river Caramnassa? He said, The provinces of Benares and Gazeepore were more highly cultivated than any he ever passed through; and far superior to the adjoining one of Bahar; and that he attributed this comparative prosperity of those provinces to the industry of the inhabitants, and to the secure and lenient government they lived under."[1] In consequence, the family of the Raja was naturally beloved;[2] and it sufficiently appears, from the affidavits[3] adduced by the Governor-General, that the English were, by the natives in those parts, in a peculiar manner detested. The confinement of their Prince was an act, which, under the ignominious light in which imprisonment is regarded by the Indians, they viewed as an outrage of the most atrocious description. The passions of the people were inflamed; and they flocked in crowds to the spot where their sovereign was confined. So little had any conception of resistance been

[1] Report on the petition of Touchet, &c., p. 56. And the Governor-General himself, in his Minute in Council, 12th of June, 1775, declared that the Zemindary of the Raja consisted of "as rich and well cultivated a territory as any district, perhaps, of the same extent in India."

[2] There is no evidence to this effect, and the fact is doubtful: it is certain that no particular respect is felt by the people of Benares for their memory: the editor has frequently heard Cheit Sing and his father spoken of by the natives as robbers and oppressors. W.

[3] Appended to his narrative.

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entertained, that the two companies of sepoys, who were placed on guard, had come without ammunition. As the intercourse of people increased, two additional companies, with a supply of ammunition, were ordered to their support. But before they arrived at the palace, all the avenues were blocked up; and a tumult arose, which soon led to bloodshed, and, at last, to a furious engagement between the people and the troops. The unfortunate consequence was, that the sepoys and their officers were almost all destroyed. On which side the acts of provocation and violence began, does not sufficiently appear.[1] The Rajah, during this confusion, escaped by a wicket which opened to the river, and, letting himself down the bank, which was very steep, by turbans tied together, he escaped to the other side. The multitude immediately followed him across the river, and left the palace to be occupied by the English troops.

That this assemblage of the people, and the attack which they made upon the guard, was the fortuitous result of the indignation with which they were inspired, by the indignity offered to their prince, and that it was in no degree owing to premeditation and contrivance, was amply proved by the events. The Raja knew that Mr. Hastings was unattended by any military force; and, if he had acted upon a previous design, would not have lost a moment in securing his person. The Governor-General himself declares; "If Cheyte Sing's people, after they had effected his rescue, had proceeded to my quarters, instead of crowding after him in a tumultuous manner, as they did, in his passage over the river, it is probable that my blood, and that of about thirty English gentlemen of my party, would have been added to the recent carnage: for they were about two thousand, furious and daring from the easy success of their last attempt: nor could I assemble more than fifty regular and armed sepoys for my whole defence."[2] Nothing was

[1] The Raja asserted, and Mr. Hastings has nowhere contradicted, that the provocation was given by the violence and insolence of the English and their agents. But his assertion, unless supported by circumstances, should not in such a case go far towards proof.—M. How little credit the Raja's account deserves, is easily estimated. He asserts, in a letter to the Governor-General, that the tumult began by the Sepoys firing on the people. "The people of the Sirkar first fired balls from their guns, and discharged their muskets." No one has ever disputed the fact that the Sepoys were first sent without ammunition Narrative, App. 106.—W.

[2] Narrative, ut supra.

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it possible to have said, more decisive of the character of a casual mob, led by the mere contingency of the moment, without foresight, and without an end.

It was by no means worthy of a man of prudence and experience to have proceeded deliberately to a measure so likely to make a violent impression upon the minds of the people, without having made any provision whatsoever for preventing the unhappy effects which it tended to produce. Mr. Hastings at first was able to assemble for his defence only six companies of Major Popham's regiment, about sixty sepoys which he had brought with him from Buxar as a guard to his boats, and a few recruits, newly enlisted for the Resident's guard; in all about four hundred and fifty men; and without provisions even for a single day.

Ramnagur, was a fortified palace of the Raja, on the opposite side of the river, close to Benares. It was not expected that it could for any length of time resist the effect of artillery; and the resolution was taken of reducing it with all possible dispatch. The remaining four companies of Major Popham's regiment of sepoys, with one company of artillery, and the company of French rangers, lay at Mirzapoor; and were ordered to march to Ramnagur. Major Popham was destined to assume the command, as soon as all the troops intended for the service had arrived. But the officer, who in the mean time commanded the troops, was stimulated with an ambition of signalizing himself; and, without waiting for the effects of a cannonade, marched to the attack of the palace through the narrow streets of the town by which it was surrounded. In this situation the troops were exposed to a great variety of assaults, and after a fruitless opposition were compelled to retreat. The commanding officer was killed; a considerable loss was sustained; and an unfavourable impression was made at the commencement of the struggle, which would have been a serious evil in a less trifling affair.

The Governor-General now regarded himself as placed in imminent danger. Letter upon letter was written to the commanding officers at all the military stations from which it was possible that timely assistance could be received. Few of these letters reached their destination;

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for all the channels of communication were interrupted; and so greatly were the people of the country animated against the English, that it was extremely difficult for any agent of theirs to pass without discovery and prevention. The contagion of revolt and hostility flew with unusual rapidity and strength. Not only did the whole of the district which owed the sway of the Raja fly to arms, the very fields being deserted by the husbandmen, who voluntarily flocked to his standards and multiplied his ranks: but one half of the province of Oude is by the Governor-General affirmed to have been in a state of as complete rebellion as Benares. Even the British dominions themselves afforded cause of alarm; many of the Zemindars of Bahar had exhibited symptoms of disaffection: and the Governor-General received reports of actual levies, in that province, for the service of Cheyte Sing. The danger was exceedingly augmented from another source. The Governor-General was entirely destitute of money; and affirms, that the whole extent of both his treasure and his credit exceeded not three thousand rupees; while the troops were all four months, and some of them five months, in arrear.[1]

He was alarmed with the prospect of an attack from Ramnagur, which report described as about to take place in the night. His situation at Benares was regarded, by himself, and by his military officers, as not defensible; and he resolved to make his escape to the strong fortress of Chunar. He secretly quitted the city, after it became dark, leaving the wounded sepoys behind; and arrived in safety at the place of his retreat.

Though the letters of the Governor-General reached not Colonel Morgan who commanded at Cawnpore, yet some intelligence travelled to him of the disorder which had arisen; and with promptitude and decision he ordered the principal part of the force which he commanded to march. The requisition both for money and for troops, which had been despatched to Lucknow, was happily received: and was promptly obeyed. About the middle of September, one lack and a half of rupees had been received, and a force was now collected deemed sufficient for the accomplishment of the enterprise.

[1] See his letter to Mr. Wheler, Appendix to his Narrative, No. 127.

The Raja had endeavoured to make his peace from the moment of his escape. He had written letters, in which he declared his sorrow for the attack which had been made upon the soldiers of the guard, and for the blood which had been spilt; protested his own innocence with regard to the effects which had taken place, and which he affirmed to have arisen solely from the casual violence of the multitude, inflamed by the insolence of an English agent; and professed his readiness to submit with implicit obedience to whatever conditions the Governor-General might think fit to impose. Not contented with repeating his letters, he made application through every person on whose influence with the English ruler he thought he might depend; through one of the gentlemen of his party; through Cantoo Baboo, his confidential secretary; and through Hyder Beg Khan, one of the ministers of the Nabob Vizir. All his applications Mr. Hastings treated as unsatisfactory and insincere; and deigned not to make to them so much as a reply. The Raja collected his forces, and appealed by a manifesto to the princes of Hindustan. He was reported, truly or falsely, to be also venting the most extravagant boasts of the ruin which he meant to bring down upon the English; though he totally abstained from all operations not purely defensive, and in his letters to the Governor-General appealed to his forbearance, as a proof of his desire to retain his obedience. In the mean time he sustained several partial attacks. On the 29th of August a considerable body of his troops, who occupied a post at Seeker, a small fort and town within sight of Chunar, were defeated, and a seasonable booty in grain was procured. On the 3rd of September a detachment was formed to surprise the camp at Pateeta, about seven miles distant from Chunar. But the enemy were on their guard, and received the party in good order, at the distance of a mile beyond their camp. They fought with a steadiness and ardour which disconcerted the sepoys and were beginning to produce disorder, when an attack, made with great gallantry upon their guns, by the two companies of grenadiers, induced hem to leave the field with four of their cannon to the victors.

Pateeta was a large town surrounded by a rampart of earth, which extended a considerable way beyond the

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town, to the adjoining hills. It had also a small square fort, built of stone, fortified with four round towers, a high rampart, and a great ditch. The principal force of the enemy was collected at this place, and at Lutteefpoor, a large stone fort, surrounded with hills and a wood, at the distance of about fourteen miles from Chunar. The strength of both consisted mostly in the difficulty with which they were approached. According to the plan of operations, which the English had arranged, Ramnagur was first to be assailed, both as it was the place where their arms had met with a disgrace, and because reduction of it would restore possession of the capital, and redeem their credit with the public. Several days were spent, in conveying battering cannon and mortars, with other preparations for a siege, to the camp of Major Popham, which was placed before the town. In the mean time one of the natives represented that it would be extremely dangerous to allow time to the enemy to strengthen themselves at Pateeta and Lutteefpoor; that the approaches to both were strongly guarded; and that those to Lutteefpoor, in particular, could not be forced but with a serious loss; that even if Lutteefpoor were reduced, the object would not be attained, because the enemy could immediately gain the pass of Sukroot, which was behind, and there maintain themselves against any force which could assail them. He, therefore, recommended an attempt to gain possession of the pass by surprise, to which he undertook to conduct a part of the army by an unknown road; and the more to distract the enemy, he advised that an attack should at one and the same time be conducted against Pateeta. His representation was favourably received; Major Popham, with the quick discernment and decision, on which so much of military success depends, immediately acknowledging the excellence of the plan. The army was divided into two parts, of which that which was destined for Sukroot began their march, under command of Major Crabb, about an hour before midnight, on the 15th of the month; and that for Pateeta, conducted by the commanding officer, Major Popham, about three o'clock on the following morning.

He found the works of Pateeta strong, and the approach more hazardous than he had anticipated. He had marched

without his battering cannon or mortars. They were sent for, but made little impression. Apprehensive lest further delay should frustrate the attempt at Sukroot, he resolved to make an assault on the morning of the 20th. On that very morning the other division of the army arrived, through ways nearly impracticable, at a village about two miles from the pass. Major Roberts led the storming party at Pateeta, which hardly met with any resistance. After a slight stand at the outer entrenchment, the enemy fled through the fort, and the English sol iers followed without opposition. The pass at Sukroot was guarded by a body of men with three guns, who made a stout defence, but after a considerable loss, fled through the pass, in which the English encamped for the remainder of the day. The intelligence of the loss of Pateeta, and of the pass, was carried at nearly the same time, to Lutteefpoor, to the Raja. He now, it is probable, began to despair. About four o'clock on the same day he fled from Lutteefpoor, and proceeded with a few followers to the fort of Bidgegur, which was his last resource. His army disbanded themselves; and "in a few hours, the allegiance of the country," says the Governor-General, "was restored as completely, from a state of universal revolt, to its proper channel, as if it had never departed from it."

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The Governor-General made haste to return to Benares, where the formation of a new government solicited his attention. To quiet the minds of the people, a proclamation was issued, offering pardon to all, with the exception of Cheyte Sing and his brother. A grandson of the Raja Bulwant Sing, by a daughter, was selected as the future Raja; and as his years, nineteen, or his capacity, appeared to disqualify him for the duties, his father, under the title of Naib, was appointed to perform them in his name. Two important changes, however, were produced in the condition of the Rajah. His annual tribute was raised to forty lacs of rupees; and the police, with the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the city of Benares, and the criminal jurisdiction of the whole country, was taken out of his hands. It was alleged that they had been wretchedly administered under his predecessor: and it was either not expected, or not desired, that he should be the author of an improvement. A separate establishment

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was erected for each, and the whole was placed under the superintendence of a native officer, who was denominated the Chief Magistrate of Benares, and made responsible to the Governor-General and Council. The power of the mint was also withdrawn from the Raja, and intrusted to the resident at his court.

After possession was taken of Lutteefpoor, the army lost no time in marching to Bijygur. The Raja did not wait for their arrival, but fled for protection to one of the Rajas of Bundelcund, "leaving," says Mr. Hastings, "his wife, a woman of an amiable character, his mother, all the other women of his family, and the survivors of the family of his father Bulwant Sing, in the fort." Mr. Hastings cuts very short his narrative of the transactions at Bijygur, and only remarks, that it yielded by capitulation on the 9th of November. These transactions were not omitted by him, because they were devoid of importance. The Ranee, that is, the widow of the deceased Raja, Bulwant Sing, endeavoured, before she opened the gates of the fort, which had been her own peculiar residence, to stipulate for some advantages, and among them for the safety of her own pecuniary and other effects; representing her son, as having carried along with him whatever belonged to himself.[1] Mr. Hastings mani-

[1] The allegation, though it was possible that it might not be true, was at any rate highly probable. What he took away, Mr. Hastings describes in the following pompous terms; "As much treasure as his elephants and camels could carry, which is reported to me to have consisted of one lack of mohrs, and fifteen or sixteen of silver, besides jewels to an unknown amount." There could be no reason for his leaving behind any part of what belonged to him. "If he took as much as his elephants and camels could carry;" and if it amounted only to what the Governor-General is pleased to represent, the Raja must have been badly provided with beasts of burden, as the value of his jewels was "unknown," that is to say, no estimate was put upon them by rumour, it was probably known to be small; since rumour seldom fails to give a name to the amount of any portion of wealth, which, from his magnitude, it is led to admire. Besides, it has never been found, when the exaggerations of the fancy were suppressed, by the real discovery of the facts; that the value of the jewels of these eastern princes was very great. And, moreover, the Raja of Benares was but a petty Prince; according to Mr. Hastings, a mere middleman, for collecting the Company's rents; no prince at all; and, therefore, could have had no great superfluity of wealth to bestow upon jewels. Over and above all which, his family had enjoyed their state only for some years of his father's life, and five or six of his own. But any great accumulation of jewels in any family was seldom the purchase of a few years, but the collection of several generations. And still further, it is to be considered, that neither the Raja nor his father had ever enjoyed the whole of their revenues; but had always paid a large tribute, either of the Nabob of Oude, or to the English; and were subject moreover to the drain, both of wars and of exactions. It ought likewise to be taken into the account, that they had contented themselves with moderate imposts upon the people, who were rich;

fested a desire to have her despoiled. What is more remarkable, in his letters to the commanding officer, he employed expressions which implied that the plunder of those women was the due reward of the soldiers; expressions which suggested one of the most dreadful outrages, to which in the conception of the country, a human being could be exposed. The very words of the letter ought to be produced, that no inference may be drawn from it beyond what they evidently support. "I am this instant favoured with yours of yesterday. Mine of the same date has before this time acquainted you with my resolutions and sentiments respecting the Ranee. I think every demand she has made to you, except that of safety and respect for her person, is unreasonable. If the reports brought to me are true; your rejecting her offers, or any negociation with her, would soon obtain your possession of the fort, upon your own terms. I apprehend that she will contrive to defraud the captors of a considerable part of the booty, by being suffered to retire *without examination.* But this is your consideration, and not mine. I should be be very sorry that your officers and soldiers lost any part of the reward to which they are so well entitled; but I cannot make any objection, as you must be the best judge of the expediency of the promised indulgence to the Ranee. What you have engaged for, I will certainly ratify; but as to permitting the Ranee to hold the pergunnah of Hurlak, or any other, without being subject to the authority of the Zemindar, or any lands whatever, or indeed making any condition with her for a provision I will never consent to it."[1] It was finally arranged that the Ranee should give up the fort, with all the treasure and effects contained in it, on the express condition, along with

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that is, had never been oppressed by rents severely screwed up. It is further evident, that if the Raja had carried much wealth away with him, it must have somewhere afterwards appeared.—M.

That some was taken away is certain. From 250,000*l.* to 300,000*l.* was found in the fort. This is enough to invalidate the Raja's pleas of poverty when called upon for a contribution of 50,000*l.*—W.

[1] It is remarkable, that of the inferences which are drawn from this letter, by Mr. Burke, is in his Third Article of charge, no notice whatsoever is taken by Mr. Hastings, in his Answer to that Charge or indeed of any thing relative to the surrender of Bijygur, and the fate of the prize-money.—M.

It did not deserve a reply. Any examination which could have been intended, was of course of a public nature only, applying to the baggage and effects of the Ranee, not to her person.—W.

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terms of safety, that the persons of herself and the other females of her family should be safe from the dishonour of search. The idea, however, which was suggested in the letter of Mr. Hastings, "that she would contrive to defraud the captors of a considerable part of the booty, by being suffered to retire without examination," diffused itself but too perfectly among the soldiery; and when the Princesses, with their relatives and attendants, to the number of three hundred women, besides children, withdrew from the castle, the capitulation was shamefully violated; they were plundered of their effects; and their persons otherwise rudely and disgracefully treated by the licentious people and followers of the camp.[1] One is delighted for the honour of distinguished gallantry, that in no part of this opprobrious business the commanding officer had any share. He leaned to generosity, and the protection of the Princesses, from the beginning. His utmost endeavours were exerted to restrain the outrages of the camp; and he represented them with feeling to Mr. Hastings, who expressed his "great concern;" hoped the offenders would be discovered, obliged to make restitution, and punished; and directed that recompense should be made to the sufferer, "by a scrupulous attention to enforce the performance of the remaining stipulations in her favour."[2]

The whole of the treasure found in the castle, of which the greater part did probably belong to the Ranee, and not to the Raja, amounted to 23,27,813 current rupees. The whole, therefore, of the treasure which the exiled Prince appears to have had in hand, not only to defray the current expenses of his government, but also to advance regularly the Company's tribute, was so far from answering to the hyperbolical conceptions or representations of the Governor-General, that it exceeded not the provision

The authority referred to, sanctions no such exaggerated statement as that of the text. Hastings writes, "It gives me great concern that the licentiousness of any persons under your command should have given cause to complain of the infringement of the smallest article of the capitulation in favour of the mother of Cheyte Sing and her dependants." No other authority for the disgraceful treatment of the princesses by the licentious followers of the camp has been found. That they or rather their attendants were subjected to personal search, is possible, and this may have been the subject of complaint—the searchers were females. "Resolved:—that ten gold mohurs be given to each of the four female searchers." Proceedings of a Committee of Officers, Tenth Report, 532.—W.

[2] See his Letter, Tenth Report, Select Committee, Appendix, No. 3.

which a prudent Prince would have thought it always necessary to possess.

The army proceeded upon the obvious import of the words of the Governor-General in the letter, in which he seemed to desire, that they should not allow the female relations of the Raja to leave the fort, without the examination of their persons. They concluded, that the whole of the booty was "the reward to which they were so well entitled," and divided it among themselves.[1] Among the practical conclusions deducible from his letter, it appears that this, at least, the Governor-General did not wish to receive its effect. He endeavoured to retract the permission which the army had inferred; and, by explaining away the terms which he had used, to recover the spoil for the exigencies of his government. The soldiers, however, both officers and men, refused to surrender what they had, upon the faith of the Governor-General, appropriated. Failing in this attempt, he endeavoured to prevail upon the army, in the way of loan, to aid the Company with the money, in its urgent distress. Even to this solicitation they remained obdurate. When Major Fairfax, in his examination before the Select Committee of the House of Commons, was asked, "whether the officers assigned any reason for refusing to obey the requisition of Mr. Hastings? he said, he heard it was, because the Rohilla prize-money had never been paid."[2] Mr. Hastings was therefore, not only frustrated as to every portion of that pecuniary relief which he expected from the supposed treasures of the Raja Cheyte Sing; he added to the burden, under which the Company was ready to sink, the expense which was incurred in subduing the revolt.

It is but justice to the Court of Directors to record the

[1] In a letter to the commanding officer, without date, but supposed by the Select Committee to have been written early in November (vide Tenth Report, App. No. 3) the Governor-General's words were still more precise, with regard to the booty. "If she (the Begum) complies, as I expect she will, it will be your part to secure the fort, and the property it contains, for the benefit of yourself and detachment."

[2] Second Report, ut supra, Appendix, No. 15. "Being asked, whether this was the sole reason? he said, it was. Being asked, whether he did not hear it alleged; that a promise was claimed by the officers from Mr. Hastings, that the prize-money, in the Rohilla war, when taken, should be the property of the captors? he said, he never heard of a promise previous to the capture; but he has heard that Mr. Hastings, after the prize-money was divided, promised, that if they would deliver it up, government would distribute it, in the manner they should think most proper."

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resolutions, in which they expressed their opinion of the conduct pursued by their principal servant in India, towards the unfortunate Raja of Benares:

"That it appears to this Court, that on the death of Suja-ad-dowla, 1775, a treaty was made with his successor, by which the zemindary of Benares, with its dependencies, was ceded in perpetuity to the East India Company:

"That it appears to this Court, that Raja Cheyte Sing was confirmed by the Governor-General and Council of Bengal, in the management of the said zemindary (subject to the sovereignty of the Company) on his paying a certain tribute, which was settled at sicca rupees 22,66,180; and that the Bengal government pledged itself that the free and uncontrolled possession of the zemindary of Benares, and its dependencies, should be confirmed and guaranteed to the Raja and his heirs for ever, subject to such tribute, and that no other demand should be made upon him, nor any kind of authority or jurisdiction exercised within the dominions assigned to him, so long as he adhered to the terms of his engagements:

"That it appears to this Court, that the Governor-General and Council did, on the 5th of July, 1775, recommend to Raja Cheyte Sing, to keep a body of 2000 horse; but at the same time declared there should be no obligation upon him to do it:

"That it appears to this Court, that Raja Cheyte Sing performed his engagements with the Company, in the regular payment of his tribute of sicca rupees 22,66,180:

"That it appears to this Court. that the conduct of the Governor-General towards the Raja, while he was at Benares, was improper; and that the imprisonment of his person, thereby disgracing him in the eyes of his subjects, and others, was unwarrantable, and highly impolitic, and may tend to weaken the confidence which the native princes of India ought to have in the justice and moderation of the Company's government."

That the conception, thus expressed by the Court of Directors, of the several facts which constituted the great circumstances of the case, was correct, the considerations adduced in the preceding pages appear to place beyond the reach of dispute. The sensibility which, in his answer,

Mr. Hastings shows to the inferences which they present, is expressed in the following words: "I must crave leave to say, that the terms, improper, unwarrantable, and highly impolitic, are much too gentle, as deductions from such premises." History, if concealment were not one of the acts by which truth is betrayed, would, out of tenderness to Mr. Hastings, suppress the material part of that which follows, and which he gave in his defence:

"I deny, that the Bengal government pledged itself, that the free and uncontrolled possession of the zemindary of Benares, and its dependencies, should be confirmed and guaranteed to the Raja and his heirs for ever:

"I deny, that the Bengal government pledged itself that no other demand should be made upon him, nor any kind of authority or jurisdiction, within the dominions assigned him, so long as he adhered to the terms of his engagement:

"I deny that I ever required him to keep up a body of 2000 horse, contrary to the declaration made to him by the Governor-General and Council, on the 5th of July, 1775, that there should be no obligation to him to do it;

"My demand (that is, the demand of the Board) was not that he should maintain any specific number of horse, but that the number which he did maintain should be employed for the defence of the general state:

"I deny, that Raja Cheyte Sing was bound by no other engagements to the Company, than for the payment of his tribute of sicca rupees 22,66,180:

"He was bound by the engagements of fealty and absolute obedience to every order of the government which he served.

"I deny that the Raja Cheyte Sing was a native Prince of India."[1]

[1] On equal grounds might the denial have been set up, that the Company held the dignity of a prince of India. They were not only the subjects of Shah Aulum, but the subjects of the Nabob of Bengal; and according to the doctrine of Mr. Hastings, "bound by the engagements of fealty, and absolute obedience to every order of the government which they served." Hear what the Governor-General and Council themselves declare respecting their subordinate relations to that Nabob, in their secret letter (Second Report, ut supra, p. 22), 3rd August, 1775. "In the treaties entered into with the late Vizir, in the years 1765, 1770, the Company's representatives acted as plenipotentiaries from the Nabob Nujum ul Dowlah, and his successor Syef ul Dowlah." Hastings's plan of defence was this: To avail himself of the indefiniteness and uncertainty which surrounded every right, and every condition in India; and out of that to manufacture to himself a right of unbounded

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Mr. Hastings says, "I forbear to detail the proofs of these denials;" and as the pleas involved in them coincide with those allegations of his which have been examined above, it is only necessary to refer to what has there been adduced.[1] The Court of Directors, notwithstanding their condemnation of the treatment which the Raja had received, and notwithstanding the manner in which, by a train of unhappy circumstances, the trial of arms was forced upon him, thought proper to declare, that his dethronement and proscription were justified by the war.[2]

It was shortly after his retreat to Chunar, that the Governor-General received from Colonel Muir the intelligence, that Mahdajee Sindia had offered terms of peace. This was an event, calculated to afford him peculiar satisfaction. One of the ostensible objects of his journey was,

despotism. There is one remark, however, to which he is, in justice, entitled; that this indefiniteness, and the latitude of authority, the exercise of which was, in the practice of the country, never bounded by anything but power, constituted a snare into which it was very difficult not to fall. It is also to be remembered, that it is one thing to act under the casual and imperfect information of the moment of action, agitated by the passions which the circumstances themselves produce; and a very different thing to sit in judgment upon those acts, at a future period, when all the evidence is fully before us, illustrated by the events which followed, and when we are entirely free from the disturbance of the passions which the scenes themselves excite. It is the business of history, to exhibit actions as they really are; but the candid and just will make all the allowance for the actors, of which the case will admit. With regard to Mr. Hastings, it ought to be allowed, that the difficulties under which he acted were very great; and might be expected to betray any but a very extraordinary man into expedients for relief which would not always bear examination. Mr. Hastings deserves no hypocritical tenderness with regard to the instances in which he violated the rules of justice or of policy; but he deserves credit, in considerable, and perhaps a large degree, for having, in his situation, violated them so rarely.—M. The case which is here under review, was one in which there was no violation of justice or policy. Justice and policy both demanded the punishment of a disaffected dependant, and it was matter of urgent policy to draw forth all the resources of the state, when the state, as is universally admitted, was in imminent peril. Cheit Sing was quite able to afford the most important services to his Government, and he withheld them. He deserved no lenity. For his expulsion, he had to thank either his own treachery, or the indiscreet zeal of his followers. A few professions of regret for the past, and the proffer of a few lacs of rupees, would no doubt have preserved his Zemindary and prevented an act of atrocity that left him without the slightest claim on the forbearance of the Government. It is possible that Hastings acted with unnecessary rigour in his first communications with the Raja at Benares, but this was an error of judgment not deserving of impeachment.—W.

[1] Vide Supra, p. 233—40.

[2] The official documents relative to this passage of the history of India are found, in a most voluminous state, in those parts of the Minutes of Evidence on Mr. Hastings' trial, which relate to the Benares Charge; in the Second Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons, (1781) and its Appendix; in the Third of the Articles of Charge, and Answer to it, with the Papers called for by the House of Commons to elucidate that part of the accusation.

to confer with the Minister of the Raja of Berar, who was expected to meet him at Benares; and, through the influence of the government of that country, to accelerate the conclusion of a peace. That Minister, however, died, before the arrival of Hastings; and the loss of his intervention rendered the pacific intentions of Sindia more peculiarly gratifying. So far back as February, 1779, the Presidency of Bombay had recommended the mediation of Sindia, as that which alone was likely to render any service. The Colonel immediately received his instructions for a treaty, on the terms either of mutual alliance, or of neutrality; and either including the Peshwa, or with Sindia individually. If it included the Peshwa, the Colonel was authorized to cede every acquisition, made during the war, except the territory of Futteh Sing Guicowar, Lahar, and the fortress of Gualior; and to renounce (but without the surrender of his person) the support of Ragonaut Rao. He was instructed to retain Bassein, if it were possible, even with the surrender, in its stead, of all the territory (Salsette with its adjacent island and the moiety of Baroach excepted,) ceded by the treaty of Colonel Upton; but not to allow Bassein itself to be any obstruction to the conclusion of peace.

When the separate treaty was concluded with Sindia, who undertook to mediate with the Mahratta powers, the Governor-General, who had not yet departed from Benares, sent Mr. Anderson and Mr. Chapman; the former to the court of Sindia, with full powers to negotiate and conclude a peace with the Poonah government; the latter to the court of the Raja of Berar, to perform what was in his power towards the accomplishment of the same object.

The business was not very speedily, nor very easily concluded. The Poonah ministers, solicited for peace by the three English Presidencies at once,[1] though they were somewhat shaken in their opposition, by the defection of Sindia from the war, by the steadiness with which the

[1] About the same time that the proposals for a peace were sent from Bombay and Bengal, a letter was addressed to the Peshwa, in the joint names of Lord Macartney, Sir Eyre Coote, Sir Edward Hughes, and Mr. Macpherson, through the Vakeel of Mohammed Ali, at Poonah, expressing their wish for peace, the moderation of the Company, and the desire of the nation to conclude a firm and lasting treaty: a proceeding wholly unauthorized, contrary to the existing constitution of the Government of India, and only calculated to obstruct the negotiation. Duff, ii. 455.—W.

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English sustained themselves against Hyder, by the facility with which they had subdued the Raja of Benares, and the vigour with which they carried the war almost to the gates of Poonah, were yet encouraged by the pressure which the English sustained, and still more, perhaps, by the eagerness which they manifested for peace.

Colonel Goddard, not yet informed of the steps which had been taken by Mr. Hastings for urging the business of peace with the Poonah ministers, deemed it necessary in pursuance of the powers for treating and concluding, with which he was invested, to commence a formal negotiation. And he gave the requisite commission to Mr. Watherstone, who arrived at Poonah on the 14th of January, 1782.

The cunning of the Poonah Ministers taught them the advantage of negotiation with two ambassadors, acting under separate commissions; who, by the desire of attaining the object for which they were sent, might be expected to bid against one another, and give to the Mahrattas the benefit of an auction in adjusting the terms of peace. They pretended, therefore, to be puzzled with two sets of powers: though they laboured to retain Col. Watherstone, after he was recalled.[1] They put on the forms of distance; and stood upon elevated terms. Sindia, too, who meant to sell his services to the English very dear, was displeased at the commission sent to solicit the interference of the government of Berar. The extensive sacrifices, however, which the English consented to make, the unsteadfast basis on which the power of the leaders of Poonah was placed, and the exhausted state of the country, from the long continuance of its internal struggles, as well as the drain produced by the English war, triumphed over all difficulties; a cessation of hostilities was effected early in March; and a treaty was concluded on the 17th of May.

Not only the other territories which the English had acquired during the war, but Bassein itself, the city also of Ahmedabad, and all the country in Guzerat which had been gained for Futty Sing, were given up; and the two

[1] Their wish to retain this officer was, however, part of a policy not appreciated by the author: the ministers of the Peshwa would have willingly concluded a peace without Sindia's mediation. Duff, ii. 456.—W.

brothers, the Guicowars, were placed in the same situation, both with respect to one another, and with respect to the Peshwa, as they stood in previous to the war. Even of the territory, which had been confirmed to them by the treaty of Colonel Upton, the English agreed to surrender their pretensions to a part (yielding annually three lacs of rupees), which had not yet come into their possession when the war was renewed. And all their rights in the city and territory of Baroach, valued at 200,000*l.* a year, were resigned, by a separate agreement, to Sindia and his heirs for ever. To Sindia was also given up, by the liberty of seizing it, the territory, including the fort of Gualior, of the Rana of Gohud; who had joined the English, but, as usual in India with the petty princes, who choose their side from the hope of protection on the one hand, and the dread of plunder on the other, had been neither very able nor very willing, to lend great assistance. Having given offence by his defect of service, and created suspicions by his endeavours to effect a separate reconciliation with Sindia, he was, in adjusting the terms of the treaty with Sindia, left to his fate. The amity of Sindia was purchased, by still further sacrifices, which evince but little foresight. The project of Sindia for invading the territories of the Mogul Emperor, those of Nujuf Khan, and those of other chiefs in the province of Delhi and the adjoining regions, was known and avowed. And it was, intentionally, provided, that no obstruction, by the treaty with the English, should be offered to the execution of those designs.[1]

All that was stipulated in behalf of Ragonaut Rao was, a period of four months, in which he might choose a place

[1] The letter of instructions of the Governor-General to Colonel Muir says, We are under no engagements to protect the present dominions of the King, or those of Nudjiff Khan, and the Raja of Jaynagur; and if peace is settled betwixt Madajee Sindia and us, I do not desire that he should be restrained in carrying into execution any plans which he may have formed against them; at the same time, I think it necessary to caution you against inserting any thing in the treaty, which may expressly mark either our knowledge of his views or concurrence in them. It will be sufficient for us (and Sindia ought to be satisfied with the latitude implied in it) if he is only restricted in the treaty from making encroachments on our own territory and those of our allies." Second Report, ut supra, App. No. 1. By the way, we may here remark, how enormous a difference exists, between the obligations of fealty which Mr. Hastings imposed upon himself (as representative of the Company) towards his undoubted Sovereign the Mogul; and the obligations which, as supposed sovereign of Cheyte Sing, he exacted (on the same ground) from that unfortunate chief. Vide supra, p. 252.

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for his residence. After that period the English agreed to afford him neither pecuniary nor any other support. The Peshwa engaged, on the dangerous condition of his residing within the dominions of Sindia, where he was *promised* security, to allow him a pension of 25,000 rupees per month.

An article was inserted respecting Hyder Ali, to which we have scarcely information to enable us to attach any definite ideas. The Mahrattas engaged, that within six months after the ratification of the treaty, he should be compelled to relinquish to the English, and their allies, all the places which he had taken from them during the war. But neither did the Mahrattas perform, nor did the English call upon them to perform, any one act toward fulfilment of this condition. The English, on their part, engaged that they would never make war upon Hyder till he made war upon them; an engagement to which they as little expected that the Mahrattas would call upon them to adhere.[1]

[1] In the twentieth article of chargo, we have Mr. Burke's view of the case. He says, that Mr. Hastings did wish to engage with the Mahrattas in a plan for the conquest and partition of Mysore; that in order to carry this point, he exposed the negotiation to many difficulties and delays; that the Mahrattas, who were bound by an engagement with Hyder to make no peace with the English in which he was not included, pleaded this sacred obligation; but Hastings undertook to instruct even the Mahrattas in the arts of crooked faith, by showing how they might adhere to the forms of their engagement, while they violated the substance; and what is most heinous of all, that Hastings, having effected the assent of the Mahrattas to the article which is inserted in the treaty, and led by his desire of conquest, opposed obstructions to the conclusion of a peace with the son and successor of Hyder Ali; that it was for this reason he endeavoured to bind the hands of the Presidency of Fort St. George, by withholding his authority from the negotiation; and that it was not till after a long experience of the total absence of any intention on the part of the Mahrattas, to engage with him in his schemes upon Mysore, and till he was assured of the fact by his agent at the court of Sindia, that his late and reluctant assent to the negotiation was obtained; and that, after the peace was concluded, and ratified by the Supreme Council, from which, he was absent, and of which, by reason of his absence, he formed not a part, he endeavoured to break it, or at least exposed it wantonly to the greatest danger of being broken, by insisting that its formal conclusion and ratification should be of none effect, and that it should be opened again for the purpose of inserting the useless, if not mischievous, formality of an article, admitting as a party the Nabob of Arcot. These imputations receive all the confirmation conveyed by an answer, which, passing them over in silence, appears to admit them.—M.

All these imputations had no foundation whatever but in the malignity with which Burke came to regard Hastings. It was no doubt the object of the latter to engage the Mahrattas in an offensive and defensive alliance, and with this view, the articles regarding Hyder were inserted. What better course of policy could be devised? That the agreement was not acted upon was not the fault of the British Government, for in truth the treaty was not ratified by the Peshwa until after Hyder's death. The object of Nana Furnavese in this delay is explained by Duff to have been the intimidation of both the English

The Mahrattas also agreed, and to this the imaginations of the English attached a high importance, that, with the exception of the ancient Portuguese establishments, they would permit no other nation, except the English, to open with them any friendly intercourse, or to erect a factory within their dominions.

The terms of this agreement, the gentlemen of the Presidency of Bombay arraigned as inadequate, nay humiliating; and declared, that had the negotiation been left to them and to Goddard, who best knew the state of the Mahratta government, and with what facility it might have been induced to lower its tone, a far more favourable treaty might have certainly been obtained.

CHAPTER VIII.

Burdens sustained by the Nabob of Oude.—His Complaints.—How received by the English.—Mr. Bristow removed from Oude.—Agreement between Mr. Hastings and the Nabob.—The Begums despoiled.—Whether the Begums incited Insurrection.—Alleged oppressions of Colonel Hannay.—The head Eunuchs of the Begums tortured.—A present of ten Lacs given to Mr. Hastings by the Nabob.—Governor-General accuses Middleton, and replaces Bristow.—Treatment received by Fyzoolla Khan.—Decision by the Court of Directors relative to the Begums.—Set at nought by Mr. Hastings.—Governor-General's new Accusations against Mr. Bristow.—Governor-General's Plan to remove the Residency from Oude.—Governor-General repeats his visits to Oude.—Resigns the Government.—Financial Results of his Administration.—Incidents at Madras.

THE next of the great transactions to which the presence of the Governor-General, in the upper provinces, gave immediate existence, was the memorable arrangement which

and Hyder, by holding out the possibility of a union with either against the other, by which he hoped to recover from the latter the territories south of the Nerbudda, and from the former, Salsette. If any blame could be imputed to Hastings, it was not for delaying or impeding the treaty, but sanctioning the sacrifices necessary to obtain it. Hist. of Mahrattas, ii. 463.—W.

BOOK V. CHAP. VIII. 1781.

he formed with the Nabob of Oude. In his payments to the Company, that Nabob had fallen deeply into arrear; and the extreme pecuniary distress endured by the Company,[1] rendered it necessary to devise the most effectual means for obtaining what he owed. His country, however, had, by misgovernment, fallen into the greatest disorder. The Zemindars were almost everywhere in a state of disobedience; the country was impoverished; and the disposition of the people, either deserting it or pining with want, threatened the evils, or promised the blessings, of a general revolt.[2] Before the connexion between the English and Oude, its revenue had exceeded three millions sterling, and was levied without being accused of deteriorating the country. In the year 1779, it did not exceed one-half of that sum, and in the subsequent years fell far below it, while the rate of taxation was increased, and the country exhibited every mark of oppressive exaction.

By the treaty of Fyzabad, formed with the late Nabob, at the conclusion of the Rohilla war, it was agreed, that a regular brigade of the Company's troops should, at the expense of the Nabob, be kept within the dominions of Oude. Even this burden was optional, not compulsory; and the Court of Directors gave their sanction to the measure, "provided it was done with the free consent of the Subah, and by no means without it."[3]

To the first was added, in the year 1777, a second, called the *temporary* brigade; because the express condition of it was, that the expense should be charged on the Nabob for so long a time only as he should require the corps for his service." The Court of Directors were still more anxious in this case than in the former, to determine, that the burden should not be fastened on the Nabob contrary to his will. "If you intend" (say they, addressing the Governor-General and Council) "to exert your influence, first, to induce the Vizir to acquiesce in your proposal,

[1] Even the pay of the troops was, everywhere, four and five months in arrear.

[2] The Minute in which the Governor-General introduced the subject of his journey to the upper provinces, begins in these words; "The province of Oude having fallen into a state of great disorder and confusion, its resources being in an extraordinary degree diminished, and the Nabob Asoph ul Dowla," &c. Tenth Report of the Select Committee in 1781, App. No. 2.

[3] Letter of Directors to the Governor-General and Council, dated 15th December, 1775.

and afterwards to compel him to keep the troops in his pay during your pleasure, your intents are unjust, and a correspondent conduct would reflect great dishonour on the Company."

Even the temporary brigade did not put a limit to the expense for English soldiers whom the Nabob was drawn to maintain. Several detached corps, in the Company's service, were also placed in his pay; and a great part of his own native troops were put under the command of British officers.

In the year 1779, the expense of the *temporary* brigade, and that of the country troops under British officers, increased, the one to the amount of more than eighty, the other of more than forty thousand pounds sterling, above the estimate. These particulars, however, constituted only the military part of his English expense. The civil expense resulted from an establishment under the Resident, which, without any authority from the Court of Directors, or any record in the books of the Council, had gradually and secretly swelled to a great amount; and was increased, by another establishment for another agent of the Company, and by pensions, allowances, and large occasional gifts, to various persons in the Company's service.

In that year, viz. 1779, the Nabob complained that the pressure was more than he was able to endure. "During three years past," said he, "the expense occasioned by the troops in brigade, and others commanded by European officers, has much distressed the support of my household; insomuch, that the allowances made to the seraglio and children of the deceased Nabob, have been reduced to one-fourth of what it had been, upon which they have subsisted, in a very distressed manner, for two years past. The attendants, writers, and servants, &c. of my court, have received no pay for two years past; and there is at present no part of the country that can be allotted to the payment of my father's private creditors, whose applications are daily pressing upon me. All these difficulties I have for these three years past struggled through, and found this consolation therein, that it was complying with the pleasure of the Honourable Company, and in the hope that the Supreme Council would make inquiry, from im-

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partial persons, into my distressed situation; but I am now forced to a representation. From the great increase of expense, the revenues were necessarily farmed out at a high rate, and deficiences followed yearly. The country and cultivation is abandoned. And this year, in particular, from the excessive droughts, deductions of many lacs[1] have been allowed the farmers, who are still unsatisfied.—I have received but just sufficient to support my absolute necessities, the revenues being deficient to the amount of fifteen lacs;[2] and for this reason, many of the old chieftains, with their troops, and the useful attendants of the court, were forced to leave it; and there is now only a few foot and horse for the collection of my revenues; and should the Zemindars be refractory, there is not left a sufficient number to reduce them to obedience." In consequence of these distressing circumstances, the Nabob prayed, that the assignments for the new brigade, and the other detached bodies of the Company's troops, might not be required; declaring that these troops were "not only quite useless to his government, but, moreover, the cause of much loss, both in the revenues and customs; and that the detached bodies of troops, under their European officers, brought nothing but confusion into the affairs of his government, and were entirely their own masters."[3]

This representation, which events proved to be hardly an exaggeration, and the prayer by which it was followed, the Governor-General received, with tokens of the highest indignation and resentment. "These demands," he said, "the tone in which they are asserted, and the season in which they are made, are all equally alarming." In the letter which was despatched in his words to the Resident, the grounds on which the Nabob petitioned for relief are declared to be "totally inadmissible.—He stands engaged," it is added, "to our government, to maintain the English armies which, at his own request, have been formed for the protection of his dominions; and it is our part, not his, to judge and determine in what manner, and at what time, these shall be reduced or withdrawn." In his minute,

[1] Stated by the resident, in his letter, dated 13th December, 1779, to amount to twenty-five lacs, 250,000*l.*

[2] 150,000*l.*

[3] Tenth Report, ut supra, Appendix, No. 7.

in consultation upon the subject, he says, that by the treaty made with Asoph ul Dowla, upon the death of his father, "he became, eventually, and necessarily, a vassal of the Company." He affirmed that, "the disorders of his state, and the dissipation of his revenues, were the effects of his own conduct, which had failed, not so much from the casual effects of incapacity, as from the detestable choice which he has made of the ministers of his power, and the participators of his confidence."[1] And to the Nabob himself he declared, "Your engagements with the Company are of such a nature as to oblige me to require and insist on your granting *tuncaws* for the full amount of their demands upon you for the current year, and on your reserving funds sufficient to answer them, even should the deficiency of your revenues compel you to leave your own troops unprovided for, or to disband a part of them to enable you to effect it."[2]

The difficulties under which the Governor-General was placed, were severe and distressing. It is true, that the protection of the Nabob's dominions rested solely upon the British troops, and that without loss of time they would have been overrun by the Mahrattas, had those troops been withdrawn; it is true, that the debt due to the Company would, in that case, have been lost; that a dangerous people would have been placed upon the Company's frontier; that the Company's finances, always in distress, and then suffering intensely by war, could not maintain the same number of troops, if their pay was stopped by the Vizir. And the law of self-preservation supersedes that of justice. On the other hand, from the documents adduced, it is evident, that the English had no *right* to compel the Nabob, if not agreeable to him, to maintain any part of those their troops; and the Governor-General was not entitled, as he did, to plead at once, both

[1] The words which follow sufficiently indicate the species of companions which he meant: "I forbear to expatiate further on his character; it is sufficient that I am understood by the Members of the Board, who must know the truth of my allusions." Lord Thurlow, the friend of Hastings, and his fierce defender on his trial, speaks out plainly, and calls them without reserve, the instruments of an unnatural passion. See "Debate in the House of Lords, on the Evidence delivered at the Trial of Warren Hastings," &c.; a quarto volume got up by Mr. Hastings, and distributed to his friends, but never published.

[2] Tenth Report, ut supra, Appendix, No. 7.

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the law of self-preservation, and the law of right. The truth also is, that his law of self-preservation, when examined, and brought into conformity with the facts, implies a strong convenience, and nothing more. It was very convenient for the English at that time, to have a large body of troops maintained by a different treasury from their own. But it will hardly be maintained, at any rate by the friends of Mr. Hastings, that, in his hands, the British empire in India must have been destroyed, had it been compelled to rely upon its own resources.[1] It was for a great convenience, then, and for nothing else, that the English, without any claim of right, compelled the Nabob Vizir to maintain their troops; that is, treated him as the vassal which Mr. Hastings described him, and substantially seized and exercised the rights of sovereign and master over both him and his country.

Another point well deserves to be considered: whether the original brigade of the Company's troops was not a force sufficient to protect the Nabob's country against all the dangers with which it was threatened. If the English who included in their own line of defence the boundaries of Oude, did not provide their due proportion, but impose the whole upon the Nabob, they defended themselves at his expense; they delivered themselves from a burden which was their own, and, by compelling the Nabob to bear it, violated the laws of justice.

It is also a question, whether the troops quartered upon him, in addition to that brigade, as they were kept in idleness in his dominions, were not, with all their expense, of little use either to him or the Company. As they were not employed against the enemies of the Company, they could be of little use in repelling them; and the complaint of the Vizir that they and their officers acted as the masters in his country, and as a source both of expense and of disorder, is confirmed by Mr. Francis, who, in Council, pronounced it "notorious, that the English army had devoured his revenues and his country, under colour of defending it."[2]

[1] It would be presumptuous to affirm that it must have been destroyed, but it was enough for the government to apprehend the possibility of such an event, to justify their employing all available resources for its prevention. It was for something more than convenience; it was for security.—W.

[2] Extract of Bengal Consultations, 15th December, 1779; Tenth Report, ut supra, Appendix, No. 7.

The Governor-General, when pressed for argument, made the following avowal; that ambiguities had been left in the treaty: and that it was the part of the strongest to affix to these ambiguities that meaning which he pleased.[1] That this is a very common political procedure, every one knows. The allegation, however, it its essence, is, it is evident, only a varnish placed upon injustice by fraud. In the present case, besides, it happened, by a singular chance, that ambiguity had not existence, and the allegation of it was false. "So long only as the Nabob pleased," was the express condition of the compact; and the moment at which the Nabob desired relief, the most exact definition was applied.

The Governor-General surmised a circumstance, which always seems to have animated him to peculiar severity: that the idea of the instability of the existing government was among the causes which emboldened the Nabob to complain. "I, for my own part," said he, "do not attribute[2] the demand of the Nabob to any conviction impressed on his mind by the necessity of his affairs; but to the knowledge which his advisers have acquired of the weakness and divisions of our own government. This is a powerful motive with me, however inclined I might be, upon any other occasion, to yield to some part of his demands, to give them an absolute and unconditional refusal in the present; and even to bring to punishment, if my influence can produce that effect, those incendiaries who have endeavoured to make themselves the instruments of division between us."[3]

Under the enormous demands of the English, and the Nabob's inability to meet them, the debt with which he stood charged in 1780 amounted to the sum of 1,400,000*l*.

[1] His words are these: "As no period was stipulated for the continuance of the temporary brigade, or of the troops which are to supply their place in his service, nor any mode prescribed for withdrawing them; the time and mode of withdrawing them must be guided by such rules as necessity, and the common interests of both parties, shall dictate. These, either he must prescribe, or ourselves. If we cannot agree upon them, in such a division, the strongest must decide."

[2] It would be very curious, if the Governor-General at the commencement of the year 1780, was totally ignorant of the ruin of the Nabob's finances; and in eighteen months afterwards, viz. at the time of his journey to the upper provinces, was so convinced of that ruin, as to make it the principal ground of the extraordinary procedure which he adopted, when he, allowing the inability to be real, removed the brigade and other objects of complaint.

[3] Extract of Bengal Consultations, 15th December, 1779; Tenth Report, ut supra, Appendix, No. 7.

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The Supreme Council continued pressing their demands. The Nabob, protesting that he had given up everything, that "in the country no further resources remained, and that he was without a subsistence," continued sinking more deeply in arrear: till the time when the resolution of Mr. Hastings was adopted, to proceed to make with him a new arrangement upon the spot.

As a step preliminary to the affairs which the Governor-General meant to transact with the Nabob, he withdrew the resident, Mr. Bristow. This gentleman had been appointed by the party of General Clavering, when they removed Middleton, the private agent of Mr. Hastings: the Governor-General had removed him soon after the time when he recovered his superiority in the Council: the Court of Directors had ordered him to be replaced, as unjustly and improperly removed. Mr. Hastings, in disobedience of these orders, had refused to replace him, till it became a condition of the compromise into which he entered with Francis: and he now removed him again with a fresh violation of the authority of the Court of Directors, in conformity with whose orders he occupied the place. Mr. Middleton was again appointed, on the reason, notwithstanding the condemnation of the Court of Directors, again avowed, that a person in the Governor-General's own confidence was necessary in that situation.

As the Governor-General intended to make a very short stay at Benares, and then proceed to Lucknow, the Nabob had already left his capital, in order to pay him the usual compliment of a meeting, when he received intelligence of the insurrection. Mr. Hastings, who wished not for the interview in a state of humiliation, or under the appearance of receiving protection from his ally, endeavoured by a letter to make him return to his capital. But the Nabob was eager to show the interest which he took in the fate of the Governor-General, or eager to know the situation in which he was placed; and hastened with but a few of his attendants to Chunar. The English ruler was at pains to afford him a cordial reception. And with little debate or hesitation they made a memorable arrangement. In consequence of "the repeated and urgent representations of the Nabob, that he is unable to support the expenses of the temporary brigade of cavalry, and English officers with

their battalions, as well as other gentlemen who are now paid by him," (such are the terms of the preamble to the covenant) it was agreed, on the part of the Governor-General, that from the expense of the temporary brigade, and of all other English troops, except the single brigade left with Suja-ul-dowla, and a regiment of sepoys for the resident's guard; and from the expense of all payments to English gentlemen, excepting those of the resident's office; the Nabob should be relieved.[1] According to another article, permission was granted him to resume such of the jaghires within his territories, as he himself might choose, with only this reservation, that a pension equal to the net rent should be paid to the holders of such of them as had the Company for their guarantee. An article was also inserted, according to which the Nabob was to be allowed, when the suitable time should arrive, to strip Fyzoolla Khan of his territory, allowing him only a pension in its stead.

Such was all that was seen on the face of this agreement; where no advantage to the English appeared. The circumstances, however, which constituted the real nature of the transaction were only behind the curtain.

There were two Princesses, known by the name of the Begums; the one, the mother of Suja-ul-dowla, the late Nabob; the other, the widow of the late Nabob, and mother of the present. These Princesses the preceding sovereign had always treated with the highest consideration and respect; and allowed them a magnificent and expensive establishment. At the death of Suja-ul-dowla, those Prin-

[1] See page 301, where it appears that Hastings, little more than a year before, treated as *incendiaries*, and threatened with punishment, those advisers, by whose suggestion he deemed it proper to assume that the Nabob implored the relief which was now granted, and so much as stated those sufferings of the country which the Governor-General now held studiously up to view. To threaten to punish the representation of grievances, as Burke justly on this passage remarks, is to endeavour to obstruct one of the most sacred duties of a dependent prince, and of his advisers; a duty in the highest degree useful both to the people who suffer, and to the governing power. It affords a curious moral spectacle to compare the minutes and letters of the Governor-General, when maintaining, at the beginning of the year 1780, the propriety of compelling the Nabob to sustain the whole of the burden imposed upon him; and his minutes, and letters, when maintaining the propriety of relieving him from these burdens in 1781. The arguments and facts adduced on the one occasion, as well as the conclusion, are in flat contradiction to those exhibited on the other. See the Documents in the Second and Tenth Reports, ut supra; printed also for the House of Commons on the 16th of Burke's Charges: and in the Minutes of Evidence on the Trial.

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cesses, according to the custom of India, were left in possession of certain jaghires; that is, the government portion of the produce of a part of the land, over which, for the greater certainty of payment, the holder of the jaghire was allowed the powers of management and collection. This was the fund, from which the Begums provided for their state and subsistence; and for the state and subsistence of the numerous families of the preceding Nabobs, placed under their superintendence. Suja-ul-dowla, at his death, had also left to the Begums the greater part of the treasure which happened to be in his hands; and imagination swelled the sum to a prodigious extent. Mr. Hastings had been disappointed in the mine which he expected to drain at Benares. His power and reputation depended upon the immediate acquisition of money. In the riches of the Begums appeared to lie an admirable resource. It was agreed between Mr. Hastings and the Nabob, that his Highness should be relieved from the expense, which he was unable to bear, of the English troops and gentlemen; and he, on his part, engaged to strip the Begums of both their treasure and their jaghires, delivering to the Governor-General the proceeds.[1]

This transaction, however objectionable it may at first sight appear, Mr. Hastings represented as attended with circumstances which rendered it not only just but necessary. The weight of these circumstances ought to be carefully and impartially considered.[2]

In the year 1775, not long after the death of Suja-ul-

[1] To enable the Nabob "to discharge his debt to the Company in the shortest time possible," that is, to get money from him; "and to prevent his alliance from being a clog instead of an aid;" that is, costing money, instead of yielding it, is declared by the Governor-General to have been "the chief object in his negotiations with the Nabob." Letter to Mr. Middleton, 23rd September, 1781.

[2] Although the text does not repeat the enormous falsehoods which the oratory of Sheridan and Burke invented, and has been by some imagined to excuse, yet the general tone of the narrative is influenced by the misrepresentations of those masters in the art of rhetorical deception. The jaghires and treasures of the Begums were of considerable value, and what is of more consequence, were illegally held. The easy temper of the Nabob allowed the period of his accession to pass without interfering with the possessions of the Begums, but their occupancy of the jaghire was always dependant upon his pleasure; and the wealth, which had been his father's, was, by the Mohammedan law, indubitably his own: a mother being entitled to one-eighth only of her husband's property, and a grandmother having no claim to inheritance where a mother is living: therefore, as sovereign or son, the Nabob had full right over the major part of the great wealth and power which the Begums had appropriated.—W.

Dowla, his widow, the mother of the reigning Nabob, complained, by letter, to the English government, of the treatment which she received from her son. She stated that various sums, to the extent of twenty-six lacs of rupees, had been extorted from her, under the plea of his being in want of money to discharge his obligations to the English chiefs; and that a recent demand had been urged for no less than thirty lacs, as absolutely necessary to relieve him, under his engagements to the Company; and to save his affairs from a ruinous embarrassment. Upon the faith of the English government, to which alone she would trust, she agreed to make this sacrifice; and it was solemnly covenanted, on the part of her son, and guaranteed on the part of the English government,[1] that no further invasion should ever be made upon her, in the full enjoyment of her jaghires and effects, whether she resided within the dominions of Asoph ul Dowla, or chose to reside in any other place. This agreement was far from producing peace between the Nabob and the Begums. Perpetual complaints of injurious treatment were made by the Princesses, and the business of mediation was found by the English resident a difficult and delicate task.

In the beginning of the year 1778, those dissensions arose to a great height, and the aged Princess, "whose residence the treatment of her grandson" (to use the words of Mr. Middleton, the resident) "seems to have rendered irksome and disgusting to her," resolved to abandon his dominions, and repair on a pilgrimage to Mecca. To the execution of this design, the Nabob was exceedingly averse; because it would withdraw from the sphere of his power the great treasure which he imagined she possessed, and which at her death, if not before, he could render his own. Both the Nabob and his grandmother applied to the resident; the one for the purpose of procuring his influence to prevail upon the Begum to remain; the other for the purpose of procuring it to

[1] This covenant was the grand error of the whole proceeding; for the English had no possible right to interfere in a family dispute. It was the unauthorised act of the Resident at Lucknow, always strongly condemned by Hastings, and acquiesced in by the Council, on the plea of its having been done, and from the reluctance of the majority to withdraw their support from the Resident. Min. of Evid. 440.—W.

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induce the Nabob to allow her to depart. The Begum complained that she was subject to daily extortions and insults; that the Nabob withheld the allowance which had been established by the late Vizir for the maintenance of the family of her deceased husband; that he had resumed the jaghires and emoluments of her servants and dependants; that he had made no provision for the maintenance of the women and children (a very numerous family) of the late Vizir, his own father; that the education and condition of the children were wholly neglected; and that the favourites of the Nabob were allowed, and even encouraged, to degrade his family by their oppressions and insults. The resident reported to the Governor-General and Council, that "the deportment of the Nabob toward her, his family, and relations in general, was, he could not but admit, very exceptionable; that her claims were very moderate and just, and such as it would be natural to suppose the Nabob could not in decency refuse." He even suggested, if the Nabob should refuse to comply with these reasonable demands, "that the influence of the English government should be exerted, to secure to the Begum whatever might appear to be her rights;" in which case he doubted not that her design of departing with her treasure would be willingly abandoned.

While the resident was endeavouring, but without success, to prevail upon the Nabob to afford to his grandmother a reasonable satisfaction, he received from the second of the Princesses a representation of the violations which had been committed by her son of the conditions of the recent treaty; a treaty which she called upon the English government, in quality of its guarantee, to protect. The resident in vain endeavoured to improve the behaviour of the Nabob; and in reporting upon his disappointment, observes, "I have on all occasions, as much as possible, avoided troubling the Honourable Board with any matters which reflect upon the conduct or government of the Nabob, wishing rather to check and obviate abuses, by friendly admonitions and remonstrances to his Excellency himself, than to correct them by an appeal to your authority. But such is his Excellency's disposition, and so entirely has he lost the confidence and affections of his subjects, that, unless some restraint is imposed upon him,

which would effectually secure those who live under the protection of his government, from violence and oppression, I am but too well convinced, that no man of reputation or property will long continue in these provinces."[1]

On the 23rd of March, the Council-General, in which Mr. Hastings had then the ascendant,[2] took under their consideration the complaints of the Begums. With regard to the eldest of the Princesses, and those of the relations and subjects of the Nabob, in favor of whom the guarantee of the Company was not interposed, they held themselves incapable, in any other way than that of remonstrance, and by tokens of displeasure, to oppose the oppressions of the Nabob. But as they had become parties to a treaty for the protection of the second of the Begums, the mother of the Nabob, they determined to make use of their authority on her behalf. On the rapacity which he had practised with respect to the elder of the Begums, and some of his other relations, their instructions to the resident were in the following words, "We desire you will repeat your remonstrances to the Vizir on these points, in the name of this government; representing to him the consequences of such an arbitrary proceeding; the reproach to which his honour and reputation, as well as ours, from being connected with him, will be exposed, by such acts of cruelty and injustice; and the right which we derive, from the nature of our alliance with him, to expect that he will pay a deference to our remonstrances." They add, "with respect to the Bao Begum (the mother of the Nabob), her grievances came before us on a very different footing. She is entitled to our protection, by an act, not sought by us, but solicited by the Nabob himself. We therefore empower and direct you, to afford your support and protection to her, in the due maintenance of all the rights she possesses, in virtue of the treaty executed between her and her son, under the guarantee of the Company."[3]

Such was the light in which the relative conduct of the

[1] Mr. Middleton's Letter to Gov.-Gen. and Council, dated Fyzabad, 3rd Feb. 1778. Report, ut supra.

[2] The members were, Mr. Hastings, Mr. Barwell, Mr. Francis, Mr. Wheler.

[3] Report, ut supra. The documents to which reference is here made were all reprinted, both in the papers called for by the House of Commons, and in the Minutes of Evidence, taken at the Trial in Westminster Hall.

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Nabob and the Begums appeared to the Governor-General and Council, in 1778; and on the footing which was then established, matters between them remained, till the meeting between Mr. Hastings and Asoph ul Dowla at Chunar, in 1781, when the Nabob was, by treaty, allowed to seize the property of the Princesses, and of others his relations; and, on the condition of bestowing that property upon the English, actually rewarded for the seizure, by obtaining relief from a permanent and oppressive expense. The reasons which Mr. Hastings adduced for this proceeding are, that the Begums had endeavoured to excite insurrection in Oude in favour of Cheyte Sing, and that they employed their power and influence to embarass and disturb the Nabob's administration.

If the testimony of an accuser shall pass for proof, when that accuser derives great advantage from the supposition of guilt, and great loss from the supposition of innocence, no individual is under protection.[1] It is further to be remarked, that the insurrection at Benares happened on the 16th of August; and the treaty by which the Nabob was authorized to resume the jaghires was signed at Chunar, on the 19th of September. The Begums, who had first to hear of the insurrection at Benares, and then to spread disaffection through a great kingdom, had, therefore, little time for the contraction of guilt. Besides, when the government of the Nabob, as the English themselves so perfectly knew, had fallen into contempt and detestation with all his subjects, it was very natural to suppose, that the servants and dependants of the Begums, who were among the severest of the sufferers, would not be the least forward in exhibiting their sentiments. And as the seclusion of the Begums rendered it impossible for them to superintend the conduct of their servants abroad, they were less than other people responsible for their conduct.[2]

[1] This is arguing as if Hastings derived a personal advantage from the guilt of the Begums—whatever advantage resulted from the recovery of the wealth illegally detained by the Begums was entirely public. There could be no doubt that the position of the Begums, their resources, their armed followers, their pretensions, and their temper, were injurious in the highest degree to the government of the Vizir.—W.

[2] If the Begums were incapable of responsibility, it followed that they were unfit to have power. They had no business with armed adherents if they could not prevent those adherents from perpetrating what they pleased. The fact is not true. The Begums had the means of controlling their servants;

But the observation of greatest importance yet remains to be adduced. What was the proof, upon the strength of which the Begums were selected for a singular and aggravated punishment? Answer: no direct proof whatsoever. Hardly an attempt is made to prove any thing, except a *rumour*. Mr. Hastings' friends are produced in great numbers to say that they heard a *rumour*. Upon allegation of a *rumour*, that the Begums abetted Cheyte Sing, judgment was pronounced, and punishment followed.

Before a just judgment can be pronounced, and punishment can be justifiably inflicted, it is necessary that trial should take place, and that the party accused should be heard in his defence. Was this justice afforded the Begums? Not a tittle of it. So far from it; that Mr. Hastings, while yet in the heat of the insurrection at Chunar, when the Begums had scarcely had time to rebel, much less had he had time to make any enquiry into the imputation of guilt; at a moment when all was confusion, alarm and hurry; when everything was ready to be reported, and everything to be believed; pronounced a final judgment, to supersede the guarantee of the English government, to strip the Princesses of Oude of their estates, and give them up helpless into the hands of the Nabob.

Of the evidence adduced upon this important point, it is highly requisite to give a short account. If anything be indispensable to righteous judgment, it is, that evidence should first be collected, and judgment follow after. Mr. Hastings pronounced judgment, and sent his instrument, the Nabob, to inflict punishment in the first place. Some time after all this was done, he then proceeded to collect evidence. But evidence of what sort? He brought forward persons who, he knew (or might know) beforehand, would give the sort of evidence he wished; and a month after judgment had been pronounced, got them to make affidavit, before Sir Elijah Impey, of the facts, or supposed facts, of which it was useful for him to establish the belief. It is altogether unnecessary to allude to the character or credibility of the individuals

but had it been otherwise, as asserted in the text, it would at once justify whatever measures were necessary to wrest from them resources and powers they could not safely be trusted with.—W.

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who were taken into his service. It is perfectly sufficient to observe, that this is a mode of getting up a proof, by means of which there never can be any difficulty of getting a proof of anything. Find a number of persons, even if not mendacious, with minds sufficiently partial to you, or sufficiently influenced by circumstances, to believe as you would have them (often a very easy matter, whatsoever may be the state of the facts), and get them to set down whatever they and you think proper, exposed to no cross-examination, exposed to no counter-evidence; and think, whether it would not be an extraordinary case, in which, upon these terms, any man, more especially a powerful ruler, could remain without a defence.

The fact is, that recourse to such a mode of defence betrays a deep consciousness, that the conduct in favour of which it is set up, stands much in need of a defence, and seems pretty strongly to imply that no better defence can be found for it.

The behaviour of the Supreme Judge, in lending himself to this transaction, exposed him to the severest strictures from the Managers for the Commons' House of Parliament on the trial of Mr. Hastings. He acknowledged, upon his examination, that he went from Benares, where his business was concerted between him and Mr. Hastings, to Lucknow, the capital of Oude, for the express purpose of taking these affidavits, though he acknowledged that "undoubtedly he did not consider his jurisdiction as extending to the province of Oude;" and though, in taking an affidavit, there is so little occasion for any remarkable qualifications in the Judge, that all he has to do is to hear a person swear that something in a paper is true, and to testify that he has heard him do so. "What the affidavits contained," said the Judge when examined upon the trial, "I did not know; nor do I at present, for I have never read them." He also declared that he did not know, whether the persons who swore to them had ever read them. He also said, "I believe Mr. Middleton, in consequence of a letter Mr. Hastings wrote to him, had communicated the subject-matter of what they were to depose to." At the time of taking the affidavits of the natives, not so much as a sworn

interpreter was present. The judge declared he never asked of one of the deponents, whether they knew the contents of their affidavits: and, "had no means of knowing whether the deponents in the Persian or the Hindu language understood anything of the depositions which they gave, except that they brought their affidavits ready drawn." He also admitted that he had no means of knowing whether, of the affidavits which were taken before him, the whole were published by Mr. Hastings, or whether all that had been unfavourable to him had not been suppressed. In fact, the examination of Sir Elijah Impey, upon the subject of affidavits, discloses a curious scene, in which it appears that one object alone was in view, namely that of getting support to any allegations which Mr. Hastings had set up.[1] A set of affidavits, thus circumstanced, could be no proof of the guilt of an absent party.[2]

These affidavits affirm not one criminal fact, on the part of the Begums. All that they affirm with regard to these Princesses is *rumour* merely. The witnesses had *heard* that the Begums instigated that disaffection, which manifested itself in almost every part of the Nabob's dominions. In one sense, this is evidence of the fairness and honourableness of Mr. Hastings; for undoubtedly it goes a certain way to prove that no undue means were used to put matter into these affidavits.

Some of them speak directly to certain tumultuary proceedings in Goruckpore, one of the districts of Oude. But the insurrection, if such it might be called, was not against the *British* authority, for there was none there to oppose. The *Nabob's* sepoys were refractory for want of pay. An Aumil, or renter of the Begums, showed a disinclination to permit a party of the *Nabob's* sepoys

[1] See Minutes of Evidence at the trial, p. 622 to 651, and 838 to 848.—M.

[2] As usual this is uncandidly stated, and no regard is had to Sir Elijah Impey's own account of the transaction. He states that he suggested the arrangement to Hastings, that people in England might be satisfied that Hastings in his narrative had affirmed no more than the truth. He thought the public would derive additional confidence from declarations on oath taken before a judicial authority, and offered his services accordingly. The narrative of Hastings carries with it proof of its own credibility, and the suggestion of the Chief Justice was a work of supererogation. His interposition was a mistaken act of friendship, but it deserved not the strictures made upon it by the managers of the Commons, strictures of which the acerbity was deepened by the clear and resolute manner in which Sir Elijah's evidence was given.—W.

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to pass through his district, which he knew they would plunder, and hence impose upon him a severe pecuniary loss. And the country people in general showed a hostile disposition to these same sepoys of the *Nabob*. What has this to do, in the smallest degree, with the *British* authority? And if the sepoys had been British, which they were not, what proof is given, that the Begums were the cause of the hatred they experienced, or knew of the commotions to which that hatred gave birth?[1]

Rumour affirmed that the Begums promoted the disaffection. If rumour, on such an occasion, were a proper ground of belief, rumour affirmed that the Nabob himself, together with his brother Saadut Ali, not only abetted the disaffection, but had entered into a deliberate plan for the extirpation of the English from the country. Why is rumour to be evidence against one, not evidence against another, just as it suits the pleasure and convenience of Mr. Hastings?[2]

One of the deponents, who spoke most distinctly to what he reckoned symptoms of hostility on the part of the Begums, was a Major Macdonald, an English officer in the service of the Nabob. He states that his march, at the head of a party of the Nabob's sepoys, was opposed by Zalim Sing, a Zemindar, who had long been treated by the Nabob as a rebel. This hostile chief showed, even to Macdonald's people, a paper purporting to be a sunnud from the Nabob, restoring him to his Zemindary, and vesting him with the government of certain districts; and he informed them he had the Nabob's instructions to drive says the affidavit, "the Fringies out of his districts, that he only waited for the fortunate hour, boats being already provided from Fyzabad (which the deponent knew absolutely to be the case) to cross the Gogra, and carry the

[1] Contumely to the Nabob's officers was no new thing with the Begums, nor ever treated as rebellion till it suited the Governor-General. In January, 1776, when the Begum was complaining to the English government, and when it was affording her protection, the Resident in Oude writes to the Governor-General and Council: "In making this complaint, the Begum forgets the improper conduct of her own servants, who have hitherto preserved a total independence of the Nabob's authority; beat the officers of his government; and refused obedience to his Perwannahs." Minutes, ut supra, p. 2048.

[2] Whether the rumours hostile to the fidelity of the Nabob were founded at all upon fact is doubtful; but certainly they were shown to be of little regard when he put himself in the power of Hastings at Chunar.—W.

Nabob's orders into execution. Further, that his Excellency had altered his sentiments regarding the part he was to take in the present contest; that his Excellency set out with the intent of adhering to his treaty with the Company, but that Mirza Saadut Ali wrote him he was to blame if he gave any assistance; that now was the time to shake off the English yoke; that it might not be prudent to declare himself at once; that he had only to stand neuter; and, under pretence of defending themselves, direct his subjects to take arms, and endeavour to prevent the junction of the English forces, when the matter would work of itself. The deponent said, he believed the reports, as before related, at that time, and still is of opinion, the threats contained were intended to be carried into execution had the league been successful."[1]

Of the disturbances, moreover, in Goruckpore, and the hostile disposition manifested by the people to the sepoys of the Nabob, we are presented with another and a very different account. They are said to have been the effect of oppression; of oppression, cruel, and extraordinary, even as compared with the common degree of oppression under the government of the Nabob. It was given in evidence, that the country, from a very flourishing state in which it existed under the preceding Nabob, had been reduced to misery and desolation; that taxes were levied, not according to any fixed rule, but according to the pleasure of the collector: that imprisonments and scourgings for enforcing payment, were common in every part of the country; that emigrations of the people were frequent; and that many of them were so distressed as to be under the necessity of selling their children.[2]

The country thus oppressed, was under the management of Colonel Hannay, an officer of the Company, who had obtained permission to quit for a time the Company's service, and enter into that of the Nabob. He was allowed to rent the provinces of Goruckpore and Baraitch; and, commanding also the military force in the district, engrossed the whole of the local government. Mr. Holt, who was appointed assistant to the resident at the Vizir's court about the beginning of the year 1780, was asked, "Did you hear that Colonel Hannay was himself in particular danger

[1] Minutes, ut supra, p. 259, 261. [2] Ibid. p. 381–390.

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from the insurrections in 1781!—I did.—What do you suppose those insurrections arose from at first—did you ever hear of any machinations or contrivances of particular persons, or did you ever hear what the cause was they objected to?—I have heard it was owing to the misconduct and misgovernment of Colonel Hannay?"[1]

Captain Edwards, another of the Company's officers, who had obtained permission to accept of service with the Vizir, and who was aide-de-camp to that Prince at the time of Mr. Hastings' quarrel with Cheyte Sing, was asked, "In what situation was Colonel Hannay," meaning in the service of the Vizir?—"I understand that he rented a great part of the Nabob's country, called Baraitch and Goruckpore.—Do you know what was the general fame of the country with respect to Colonel Hannay's administration in those provinces?—That the measures of his government appeared to the natives there very unjustifiable and oppressive.—Did you ever see, or know, any fact or circumstance from which you could infer in the same manner?—When I accompanied his Excellency the Nabob into that country (I believe it was in the latter end of the year 1779, or early in the year 1780), the country seemed to be little cultivated, and very few inhabitants made their appearance; and the few that were in the country seemed much distressed; and I understood that the country had been better peopled, but that they had all left the country in consequence of Colonel Hannay's administration.—Was it at Lucknow that you heard the reports concerning Colonel Hannay, and his oppressions? It was both at Lucknow and at many other places: it was a general report.[2]

[1] Minutes, ut supra, p. 391. See to the same purpose the evidence of Colonel Achmuty, p. 783.—M. Some other passages should have been quoted from the evidence of this witness if it was worth while to quote any. With regard to this very subject, he was asked, "What effect the administration of Colonel Hannay had in exasperating the natives?—I saw no marks of exasperation whilst I was there.—At the time you were there you saw no marks of exasperation?—What I mean by exasperation is—*there was no insurrection.*" In clemency to Mr. Holt, it should be added, that when he was in Goruckpore, and heard one thing and saw another, he was between sixteen and seventeen years of age. Min. Evid. 402. It is something beneath the dignity of history to quote such testimony as this, in depreciation of a great public character.—W.

[2] Minutes, ut supra, p. 778, 782. Of the insurrections one principal part at least was occasioned by indignation at the confinement of a great number of persons in the Fort of Goruckpore, followed by a design to effect their rescue. See Minutes, ut supra, p. 1963, where a letter of Colonel Hannay's is acknowledged, to the officers on the spot, stating that the release of those prisoners would quiet the country. See the Cross-examination of Captain Williams, throughout, Ibid. p. 1935—1966.

It is also a circumstance of great importance, that when Colonel Hannay entered the service of the Nabob in 1778, he was a man in debt, or what is called by the witness "involved circumstances." Before the end of 1781, that is in a period of about three years, he was understood to have realized a fortune of 300,000*l*."[1]

It is now, however, in justice to Colonel Hannay, to be observed, with regard both to the oppressions of which he is accused, and the vast amount of his fortune, that most of the evidence adduced is evidence rather to the *rumour* of these facts, than to the facts themselves. But if this be a plea, as it undoubtedly is, in behalf of Colonel Hannay, it is a plea,[2] it must be remembered, no less availing in favour of the Begums. It appears, indeed, with strong evidence from the cross-examination of Mr. Hastings' own witnesses upon the trial, that a considerable number of the Rajas or ancient chiefs of the country,[3] who till that time had remained in possession of their respected districts, paying an annual sum, as revenue, to the Vizir, were driven out during the administration of Colonel Hannay; and that they retained the country in a state of perpetual disturbance, by endless efforts for their restoration.[4] This accounts for the turbulent state of the country. Whether it was injustice, by which the Rajas were expelled; or whether it was impossible to make them obedient subjects, sufficient evidence is not afforded to determine.

It is at any rate certain, that Colonel Hannay became in the highest degree odious to the Vizir; he dismissed him his service before the end of the year 1781, and having heard that he was using his influence to be sent back, he wrote to the Governor-General, about the beginning of September following, in these extraordinary terms:

"My country and house belong to you; there is no difference. I hope that you desire in your heart the good

[1] Minutes, ut supra, p. 390, 391.

[2] Notwithstanding this admission, it is clear that the 'rumours' to Colonel Hannay's disadvantage are treated with a leniency, and adopted with a readiness, not shown to those that were unfavourable to the Begums.—W.

[3] Here again the word Raja is misunderstood. In the district of Goruckpore, every Zemindar, however petty, takes the name of Raja. These 'ancient chiefs,' therefore, are the creation of the text, and they were nothing but refractory farmers of the revenue, who would not pay their rents. Goruckpore has always been a troublesome district.—W.

[4] Ibid. p. 1909—2008.

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of my concerns. Colonel Hannay is inclined to request your permission to be employed in the affairs of this quarter. If, by any means, any matter of this country dependent on me, should be intrusted to the Colonel, I swear by the Holy Prophet, that I will not remain here, but will go from hence to you. From your kindness let no concern, dependent upon me, be intrusted to the Colonel; and oblige me by a speedy answer, which may set my mind at ease."[1]

It is also a most suspicious circumstance, that the accusations of the Begums seem originally to have come from Colonel Hannay, and to have depended almost entirely upon the reports of him and his officers; who were deeply interested in finding, for the disturbances of the country, which they ruled, a cause different from their own malversations.

When the Nabob departed from Chunar, at which time, according to the statements of Mr. Hastings, the Begums were in a state of rebellion, he chose to pass through Fyzabad, the place of their residence, accompanied merely by his usual attendants, and about five or six hundred horse: and, according to the opinion of Captain Edwards, probably entered the city with only a few attendants, as in general his rate of travelling far exceeded the utmost speed of a body of horse.

As every mark of suspicion that rebellion was excited or intended by the Begums was thus removed from the behaviour of the Nabob; so not a single expression ever appears to have been obtained from him, which implied that they had been guilty of any such offence; and yet if he had conceived any apprehension from them, it was to the English he must have flown for protection, and to them he would naturally have communicated his fears. His aide-de-camp, Captain Edwards, who had accompanied him to Chunar, and proceeded with the rest of the troops to Lucknow, when the Nabob left the direct road to his capital to pass through Fyzabad, was asked, "Did you hear upon the return of the Nabob, and Hyder Beg, to Lucknow, any charge, or any thing that led you to believe, that discoveries of rebellion or treason had been made by the Nabob while at Fyzabad?—No, I did not.—When did you

[1] Minutes, ut supra, p. 660.

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first hear of any accusation, or charge, of any rebellion or disaffection, against the Begums?—Some time after I arrived at Lucknow; about a fortnight after, I heard the gentlemen in the Resident's family mention the different accounts, that Colonel Hannay and his officers had sent.—Was the intelligence you received upon that subject confined to communications, made by Colonel Hannay and his officers, to the Resident's office, or did you hear of any other besides? I heard that such reports prevailed at Lucknow, among the natives, which were not generally believed; and there were a few who mentioned they had heard the reports.—The question put to you is, whether you heard of any other instances than those mentioned by Colonel Hannay and his officers?—I heard my own servants say, as they went through the market-place, they had heard from the Resident's servants, that they had heard such reports did prevail.—Meaning the reports from Colonel Hannay?—Yes, meaning those reports.—Did the natives in general give any credit to these reports?—No, I do not think they did.—Did you not hear more of this sort of report after the treasure was seized in January, 1782?—I did; I heard the treasures were seized in consequence of the report, and the charge and accusation, made by Colonel Hannay and some of his officers, that the Begums had been in a state of rebellion."[1]

As Colonel Hannay and his officers, white and black, were almost the only persons whose affidavits, originally taken at Lucknow, imputed any acts of disaffection to the Begums; so they were his officers, including the Paymaster of his troops, who alone, or nearly so, were called to prove the allegation in England.[2] One or two other persons, the aid of whose testimony was required, could speak to nothing but *reports*, at Allahabad, or at Calcutta. And it appears, with great force of evidence, from the examination of the witnesses adduced in favour of Mr. Hastings, that the accusation rested upon the allegations of Hannay, and his officers: who, themselves, could affirm nothing but rumour, or facts of which it is more probable that they themselves were the cause than the Begums; and that the story,

[1] Minutes, ut supra, p. 777.

[2] Colonel Hannay might have been an indifferent administrator of a province, though that is not proven, but that is no reason why he and his officers should be suspected of untruth.—W.

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being taken up by Mr. Hastings, and propagated by him and his friends, with all the authority of government, was spread abroad among the English throughout the country, and by them, in the usual manner, upon no better authority, passively, but not the less fervently and confidently, believed.[1]

The departure of the Nabob from Chunar, for the purpose of seizing the property of his mother and his grandmother, was urged by Mr. Hastings: upon the arrival, however, of that Prince in his own dominions, he manifested a great reluctance to enter upon the ungracious work. The Governor-General waited, as he himself informs us, "with much impatience." He urged the Nabob by the strongest remonstrances. He enjoined the Resident, in the most earnest and most peremptory terms, to leave no effort unattempted for the accomplishment of this important event. The reluctance, however, of the Nabob continued unsubdued; and Mr. Middleton, the Resident, was instructed to supersede the authority of the Nabob, and perform the necessary measures by the operation of English power. He proceeded at last to the execution of the Governor-General's commands; but the Nabob, shocked at the degradation which he would sustain in the eyes of his people, if acts under his government of so much importance should appear to emanate from any power but his own, undertook the melancholy task.[2] The words of the Resident to the Governor-General are instructive: "I had the honour to address you on the 7th instant, informing you of the conversation which had passed between the Nabob and me on the subject of resuming the jaghires; and the step I had taken in consequence." The step was

[1] See Minutes of Evidence for the Prosecution, p. 361—951 Ditto, for the Defence, p. 1823—2008.—M.

There can be no doubt that the allegation was in the main true,—that the Begums were disaffected to the British Government,—that they connived at, if they did not authorize, levies of armed men for the service of Cheit Sing,—that their followers were prepared to rise in his behalf. There was no actual rebellion, but there was a manifestation of hostile feeling which justified retribution.—W.

[2] According to Mr. Hastings, the Nabob had no objection to plunder the Begums. But he had given jaghires to certain persons, whom Mr. Hastings calls his "Orderlies, and others of that stamp;"..... "the companions of his looser hours." These he wished not to resume; and, therefore, endeavoured to depart from his engagement of resumption altogether. But the cause appears not sufficient to account for the effect. If he had resumed the jaghires of his orderlies, which were of trifling amount, what would have hindered him from giving them something of equal or greater amount?

the issuing of perwannahs or warrants to the Aumils or agents on the jaghires, to desist from acting in behalf of the Begums. "His Excellency appeared to be very much hurt and incensed at the measure; and loudly complains of the treachery of his ministers, first, in giving you any hopes that such a measure would be adopted; and, secondly, in promising me their whole support in carrying it through. But as I apprehended" (he means, expected) "rather than suffer it to appear that the point had been carried in opposition to his will, he at length yielded a nominal acquiescence, and has this day issued his own perwannahs to that effect; declaring, however, at the same time, both to me and his ministers, that it is an act of compulsion."[1]

The resumption of the jaghires was not the only measure which had been conceived and resolved against the Begums. Their treasures were to be seized.[2] The Nabob

[1] Letter to Mr. Hastings, dated 9th of December, 1781. Notwithstanding these, and the numerous other proofs, that Hastings was well aware of the reluctance of the Nabob, to proceed to the acts by which his parents were plundered, Hastings, when it suited his purpose to put on the show of a wonderful tenderness for the Nabob, wrote to his private agent, Major Palmer, viz., on the 6th of May, 1783, "that it had been a matter of equal surprise and concern to him to learn from the letters of the resident, that the Nabob Vizir was with difficulty, and almost unconquerable reluctance, induced to give his consent to the attachment of the treasure deposited by his father under the charge of the Begum his mother, and to the resumption of her jaghire, and the other jaghires of the individuals of his family;" as if he had never heard of these facts before! Such specimens of Mr. Hastings, as this, meet us often in the records of his government.

[2] As some confusion took place, though much less than what was expected, and the servants and agents of the princesses withheld not some demonstrations of opposition, when the jaghires were taken away; this was called resistance: and Mr. Hastings was willing it should appear that this was heinous guilt, and that only in punishment of this guilt the resolution of seizing their money was adopted. See Letter of Governor-General and Council to the Court of Directors, 11th of February, 1782; Tenth Report, ut supra, Appendix, No. 5). He himself, however, has furnished sufficient proof, that the resolution was adopted before the resumption of the jaghires was begun. "It may be necessary," he says, in his letter dated at Suragegurrah, on the Ganges, 23rd of January, 1782, "in this place to inform you, that in addition to the resolution of resuming the Begums' jaghires, the Nabob had declared his resolution of reclaiming all the treasures of his family which were in their possession, and to which by the Mohammedan laws he was entitled. This resolution I have strenuously encouraged and supported.... I have required and received the Nabob's promise, that whatever acquisitions shall be obtained from the issue of these proceedings, it shall be primarily applied to the discharge of the balance actually due from him to the Company." Tenth Report, ut supra, Appendix, No. 6; and Minutes of Evidence, ut supra, p. 2078). Before the acquiescence of the Nabob could be procured to the execution of the plan for resuming the jaghires, viz., on the 6th of December, 1781, the Resident writes to Mr. Hastings as follows: "Your pleasure respecting the Begums, I have learnt from Sir Elijah; and the measure heretofore proposed will soon follow the resumption of the jaghires. From both, or indeed from the former alone, I have no doubt of the complete liquidation of the Com-

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and the Resident, with a body of English troops, proceeded towards the abode of the princesses at Fyzabad, where they arrived on the 8th of January. The first days were spent in demands and negotiations. On the 12th the troops were ordered to storm the town and the castle, but little or no opposition was made; for no blood was shed on either side; and the troops took possession of all the outer enclosure of the palace of one of the princesses, and blocked up the other.

Still, however, the female apartments were unviolated, and the treasure was not obtained. The difficulty was to lay hands on it without the disgrace of profaning and polluting the sacred precinct. The principal agents of the princesses were two aged personages of great rank and distinction, who had been in high trust and favour with the late Nabob; the eunuchs, Jewar Ali Khan, and Behar Ali Khan. It was resolved to put those personages in confinement, and apply to them other severities, in order that the Begums might, by their compassion, be moved to give up the treasure; or that the eunuchs themselves should be compelled, by their sufferings, to give up what was in their own custody, and use their influence with the princesses to resign what they possessed. By the torture of one party, money was to be extorted from another. The cruel lessons of Eastern despotism were well acquired by Englishmen.[1]

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pany's balance." These expressions apply so necessarily to the seizure of the treasures, that they can be applied to nothing else. In another letter to the Governor-General, on the following day, the Resident alludes to the same measure in the following terms: "His Excellency talks of going to Fyzabad, for the purpose heretofore mentioned, in three or four days; I wish he may be serious in his intention; and you may rest assured I shall spare no pains to keep him to it." The representation which was made, both in this letter to the Directors, and in the defence which Mr. Hastings first presented to the House of Commons, that the opposition of the Begums to the seizure of their jaghires, was the cause on account of which the treasure was forcibly taken away from them, Mr. Hastings in a second defence retracted, affirming that the assertion was a blunder. See this defence, Minutes of Evidence at the Trial, p. 366. It was attempted to account for the blunder, by stating that the first evidence was not written, and hardly examined by Mr. Hastings. According to this account, his blood was very cool upon the subject of his accusation, notwithstanding the loud complaints he so frequently preferred of the mental torture which it inflicted upon him.—M.

What this last remark imports is not very clear. The fact was, that a very few days were allowed to reply to charges of most voluminous extent. It was wholly impossible for one person, unaided, to compose a reply to each head of accusation. Hastings wrote some of the answers, his friends wrote others, of which he approved upon a cursory perusal; it is more wonderful that so few mistakes, than that any, should have been made.—W.

[1] This is quite unauthorized. No person was "tortured;" and whatever punishments were inflicted were not the acts of Englishmen. Except as

The expedient was attended with success. The Begums, or rather the elder of the two, in whose possession, as head of the female department, the treasure was placed, was wrought upon by these proceedings to make a surrender; and money was paid to the English resident to the amount of the bond given to the Company by the Nabob for his balance of the year 1779-80.

The eunuchs were not yet released. Another balance remained, for the year 1780-81. Money for the discharge of this remaining debt was also demanded of the Princess. "She declared with apparent truth," says the Resident, "that she had delivered up the whole of the property in her hands, excepting goods; which, from the experience," he adds, "of the small produce of the sale of a former payment made by her in that mode, I refused, as likely to amount, in my opinion, to little or nothing." Money, however, was absolutely required; and new severities were employed. To the officer guarding the eunuchs, the following letter was addressed by the Resident, dated the 20th of January, 1782." "Sir, when this note is delivered to you, I have to desire, that you order the two prisoners to be put in irons, keeping them from all food, &c., agreeable to my instructions of yesterday. (Signed) Nath. Middleton."

The sufferings to which they were thus exposed, drew from the eunuchs the offer of an engagement for the payment of the demanded sum, which they undertook to complete, within the period of one month, from their own credit and effects. The engagement was taken, but the confinement of the eunuchs was not relaxed; the mother and grandmother of the Nabob remained under a guard; and the Resident was commanded, by Mr. Hastings, to make with them no settlement whatsoever. In the mean time, the payment upon the bond extorted from the eunuchs was begun; the Begums delivered what they declared was the last remaining portion of their effects, including down to their table utensils; and the Resident himself reported, "that no proof had yet been obtained of

guards in the service of the Vizir, they had nothing whatever to do with the proceedings; and the severities adopted were the acts of the Nabob and his ministers. The orders for their enforcement were addressed to the officers on duty, through the Resident, but they originated with the Nabob.—W.

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their having more." Before the 23rd of February, 1782, upwards of 500,000*l.* had been received by the Resident for the use of the Company; and there remained on the extorted bond a balance, according to the eunuchs, of 25,000*l.*; and of no more than 50,000*l.* according to the Resident. The prisoners entreated for their release, declaring their inability to procure any further sums of money while they remained in confinement; but expressing a confident hope of being able to raise the balance required, if they were allowed to go abroad among their friends, and solicit their assistance. So far from any relaxation of their sufferings, higher measures of severity were enjoined. On the 18th of May, after they had lain two months in irons, the officer who commanded the guard under which they were confined, wrote to the Resident in the following words: "The prisoners, Behar Ali Khan, and Jewar Ali Khan, who seem to be very sickly, have requested their irons might be taken off for a few days, that they might take medicine, and walk about the garden of the place where they are confined. Now, as I am sure that they will be equally secure without their irons as with them, I think it my duty to inform you of this request. I desire to know your pleasure concerning it." The nature of the orders under which the Resident acted, rendered it necessary for him to refuse the smallest mitigation of their torture. Nay, within a few days, that is, on the 1st of June, other terrors were held up to them. They were threatened to be removed to Lucknow, where, unless they performed without delay, what they averred themselves unable to perform, they would not only be subjected to still severer coercion, but called upon to atone for other crimes. As these crimes were not specified, the threat was well calculated to act upon their fears. It involved the prospect of unbounded punishment; any infliction, in short, for which persons with arbitrary power in their hands could find or feign a pretence. Several expedients were offered, both by the prisoners and the Begums, who were alarmed at the prospect of losing, by removal, their confidential servants. These expedients were not treated as objectionable, on any other score except that of time. They were rejected. The prisoners were removed to Lucknow, and cruelties inflicted upon them, of which the

nature is not disclosed, but of which the following letter, addressed by the assistant-resident to the commanding officer of the English guard, is a disgraceful proof. "Sir, the Nabob having determined to inflict corporal punishment upon the prisoners under your guard, this is to desire that his officers, when they shall come, may have free access to the prisoners, and be permitted to do with them as they shall see proper."

All the measures, however, of severity which could be devised, proved unavailing, though the women of the Zenana were at various times deprived of food till they were on the point of perishing for want. The rigours went on increasing till the month of December, when the Resident, convinced, both by his own experience, and the representation of the officer commanding the guard by which the princesses were coerced, that every thing which force could accomplish was already performed, and that if any hope remained of further payments, it was by lenient methods alone they could be obtained, removed, of his own authority, the guard from the palaces of the Begums, and set at liberty their ministers. As endeavours had been used to make the severities appear the act of the Nabob, so the Resident strove to make the favour appear the bounty of the man by whom the English sceptre was swayed; declaring to the Begums, that it was the Governor-General from whom the relief had been derived, and that he "was the spring from whence they were restored to their dignity and consequence." The letter in which the commanding officer reported the execution of the order of release, exhibits what no other words can express. "I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2nd instant; and, in consequence, immediately enlarged the prisoners, Behar Ali Khan, and Jewar Ali Khan, from their confinement, a circumstance that gave the Begums, and the city of Fyzabad in general, the greatest satisfaction. In tears of joy, Behar and Jewar Ali Khan expressed their sincere acknowledgments to the Governor-General, his Excellency the Nabob Vizir, and to you, Sir, for restoring them to that invaluable blessing, liberty; for which they would ever return the most grateful remembrance: and at their request, I transmit you the enclosed letters. I wish you had been present at the

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enlargement of the prisoners. The quivering lips, with the tears of joy stealing down the poor men's cheeks, was a scene truly affecting. If the prayers of these poor men will avail, you will at the last trump be translated to the happiest regions in heaven." [1]

Of the transactions of Mr. Hastings with the Nabob at Chunar, another feature still remains. A present was offered; a present of a sum of no less than ten lacs, or 100,000*l.* sterling; and, notwithstanding the Company's laws against presents—notwithstanding the acknowledged distress of the Nabob, and his inability to pay the debt he owed to the Company, it was accepted. The Nabob was totally unprovided with the money: the gift could be tendered only in bills, which were drawn upon one of the great bankers of the country. As the intention of concealing the transaction should not be imputed to Mr. Hastings, unless as far as evidence appears,[2] so in this case the disclosure cannot be imputed to him as virtue,

[1] Letter to the Resident, dated Fyzabad, 5th of December, 1782. See Tenth Report, ut supra, and Minutes of Evidence, ut supra, p. 348, 725. Appendix to 2nd Art. of Charge, p. 78, 97, 43, 172.—M.

The Eunuchs were, no doubt, very happy to be released from confinement, but during the greater part of the time it was little more than nominal. They resided in a spacious and commodious house, belonging to one of themselves. They had all their servants about them, no restriction was placed on their food, and they were allowed to receive visitors. For about three months they had irons on their legs, but even then they could walk in the garden, and their fetters were removed when they returned from Lucknow, in August. The two Begums, the grandmother and mother of the Nabob, were subjected to no hardships, nor indignities, except a guard at the gate of the palace. So little did they suffer, that their faithful adherents, the two Eunuchs, were desirous they should be made to apprehend something worse—their forcible removal from Fyzabad. The officer in command writes to the Resident, "The Cajahs (the two Eunuchs) one day told me that if I would pitch the Begum's camp equipage, and desire her to prepare for an immediate journey, she would probably pay the balance due." With regard to the distress for provisions, suffered by the inmates of the Khurad Mahal, the inferior women of Shuja-ad-Dowlah's Zenana, it appears to have been, in some respects, accidental, and was one in which the English were not implicated; their maintenance was by assignments upon the revenues of a particular district, which revenues were ill-collected, and the native officer, whose business it was to provide the establishment with supplies, was deficient in the means. Whether there was any design in this, or what object was to be effected by it, is not very obvious; but it was not a case in which the English authorities could with propriety interfere. Major Gilpin, the commandant of the guard, however, advanced 10,000 rupees for the expenses of the Mahal. Evidence of Captain Jaques and Major Gilpin.—Minutes of Evidence, 849-910. Nothing could be more grossly unjust than to impute the sufferings which were thus occasioned, and which were most preposterously and falsely exaggerated, to the purposes or orders of Hastings.

[2] The removal just before of the Company's agent, Mr. Bristow, and the appointment of a private agent of his own, ought constantly to be treated as a ground of suspicion; because it is exactly what a man with rapacious intentions would have performed.

since no prudent man would have risked the chance of discovery which the publicity of a banker's transactions implied. Mr. Hastings informed the Directors of what he had received, in his letter dated the 20th of January, 1782; and, in very plain terms requested their permission, as a reward for his services, to make the money his own.[1]

In the beginning of 1782, when little or no progress had been made in realizing the sums of money which the Governor-General expected from his arrangements with the Nabob, he began to express, in a strain of unusual severity, his disapprobation of the Resident, Mr. Middleton: either really dissatisfied with him, under the failure of his efforts; or, by a concerted plan, anticipating the commands of the Directors for the restoration of Bristow, by removing the confidential agent, now when the confidential transactions were closed, that the restoration of Bristow might carry the appearance of his own act, and receive its completion before the commands of the Directors should arrive.[2] Manifesting extreme anxiety for the money, on account of which he had ventured on disreputable ground, "the agreement," he said, "which I concluded with the Vizir, has yet served only to gratify revenge, or some concealed interest, and to make me odious to my own countrymen."[3] The Resident had at first suggested

[1] Letter of the Governor-General, Eleventh Report, ut supra, Appendix C, No. 1. Why he should have wished for his reward out of this, rather than any other portion of the Company's money, at first strikes the mind as obscure. But a very appropriate reason may be supposed. Drawn from any of the known sources of the Company's revenue, the money must have appeared in their accounts, and could not be given to the Governor-General without the consent of the Company at large. The assent of the Directors obtained, the gift of the Nabob might have never appeared in any account, no consent of the Company at large have been sought, and the donation appropriated by the Governor-General without the knowledge of the public.

[2] The complaints against Middleton are exposed to the suspicion of insincerity; 1, by their unreasonableness; 2, by the conformity of the artifice to the character of Mr. Hastings; 3, by its great utility for the interest of his reputation, as well as of his pride and consequence; 4, by the continued and very extraordinary subservience of Middleton, afterwards, to the views of Hastings, notwithstanding the serious injury which he now sustained at his hands.

[3] Letter to Middleton, dated Benares, 1st of January, 1782. Extracts from Papers (in No. 1, vol. i.) presented to the House of Commons, 13th of March, 1786, p. 52. The Governor-General, showing a keen sensibility to the imputations on his character to which the transactions in Oude exposed him, ("I must desire," said he, "that your letters, upon all official and public subjects, may be official; I cannot receive any as private, and my reputation and character have been too far committed to admit of an intercourse which I cannot use as authority") seemed to think that the success of the measure, the money in hand, would sanctify the means. The rule, he well knew, too generally holds.

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his doubts, whether the force which he could employ in the resumption of the Jaghires, would be sufficient to overcome the opposition which he anticipated. "I judged it improper," says the Governor-General, "to expose a service of such importance, either to the hazard of a defeat, or the chance of a delay; and therefore immediately issued orders for the march of Colonel Sir John Cumming, with his entire detachment, for the performance of it."[1] The Resident hastened to communicate his opinion, that the Nabob would be alarmed and disgusted at the march of this force into his dominions; that the payment of the detachment would be a breach of the immediate treaty, equivalent to an order for imposing upon him anew the expense of the temporary brigade; that a part of the Nabob's troops were equal to the service; and that a fortnight would suffice for its accomplishment. Under these representations, the Governor-General ventured not to continue the march of the detachment; but he declared to the Resident, that the contradictions in his statements covered them with doubts; and, if the Resident could not assure him of his perfect competence to the service, that he would himself suspend his journey to the Presidency, and repair to Lucknow for the accomplishment of the business in person. The Resident declared his competence; and the Governor-General departed from Benares, on his way to Calcutta, on the 7th of January. He departed, however, "after much hesitation, and, I will confess," says he, "with some reluctance. I dread the imbecility and irresolution which too much prevail in the Nabob's councils, and must influence, in some degree, both the conduct of the Resident and the Minister; and I consider the impending measure of too much consequence to be exposed to the risk of a disappointment." The Resident had stated, that the Governor-General had not by him been understood as intending the reformation, this year, of the Nabob's military establishment, or as expecting a present supply to the Company's treasury. "These," says the Governor-General, in his letter of 3rd January, "are fresh instances of what I have had too frequent cause to complain of, your total inattention to my instruc-

[1] Letter from the Governor-General to the Council, dated 23rd of January 1782; Tenth Report, Appendix, No. 6.

tions." He then repeats to the Resident the passage in his instructions, in which he told him, that "to enable the Nabob to discharge his debt to the Company in the shortest time possible, was the chief object of his negotiation:" that the Jaghires should be appropriated to that purpose: and that the reform of the troops should take place immediately after the settlement of the sum to be allowed for the personal and domestic expenses of the Nabob.[1] But these expressions are vague, and necessarily express no more than a very eager desire for despatch; and the Resident, for aught that appears in the words, might be well justified in the conclusion which the Governor-General thought proper to condemn.

Mr. Middleton continued the exertions, and practised all the severities, which have already been described, for extorting the money which the Governor-General demanded. Yet he was formally accused by the Governor-General on the 23rd of September, and pronounced guilty of remissness in his duty; when Mr. Bristow was appointed to fill the office from which, before the recent transactions, he had just been removed. In the meantime, that is, on the 6th of May preceding, Major Palmer had been sent to Oude, as the private agent of Mr. Hastings; and various new demands were urged upon the dependent Prince. The current annual claims varied from seventy to one hundred and thirty lacs per annum, previous to the time of Middleton's appointment in 1781. The receipts of the Resident, in discharge of those claims, varied from sixty to eighty lacs per annum, whence the balance of debt perpetually increased. At the time of concluding the treaty between the Nabob and Hastings at Chunar, that balance appeared to stand at forty-four lacs. The Resident, instead of eighty lacs, which before was the maximum of the annual payments, realised one crore and forty-six lacs. By demands, however, urged by Major Palmer to the amount of eighty-two lacs, and claims of unknown balances, which appeared on adjusting the books of the Presidency, the sums, of which payment in that year was required of the Nabob, exceeded considerably two crores and a-half; that is, were at least equal to twice the annual revenue of the

[1] Extracts from Papers, ut supra, p. 53; Tenth Report, ut supra, Appendix, No. 6.

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whole country.[1] In vindicating himself from the charge of remissness, in seizing the treasures of the Begums, Mr. Middleton shows, that not only had he been successful in regard to the ultimate acquisition, but that no unnecessary time had intervened, and that no instrument of coercion, except the disgraceful one of violating the apartments and the persons of the Princesses, had been left unemployed. "The Nabob," he says, "was son to the Begum we were to proceed against: a son against a mother must at least save appearances: circumstances sufficiently marked the English as the principal movers in the business: the favourable occasion was not missed to persuade the Nabob that we instigated him to dishonour his family for our benefit: I had no assistance to expect from the Nabob's ministers, who could not openly move in the business: in the East, it is well known, that no man, either by himself or his troops, can enter the walls of a Zenana — scarcely in the case of acting against an open enemy — much less an ally — a son against his own mother. The outward walls, and the Begum's agents, were all that were liable to immediate attack: they were dealt with — and successfully, as the event proved."[2]

The reply which is made by the Governor-General to this defence is remarkable. As usual with the Governor-General, it is mysterious and equivocal. But if anything can be gathered from it, they are the two following things: that he did intend that Mr. Middleton should have violated the Zenana; and that not having acted in that manner, Mr. Middleton, his own chosen and confidential agent, might, both by himself and by others, be suspected of having betrayed his duty for bribes. "I was pointed," says the Governor-General, "in my orders to Mr. Middleton, that he should not allow any negotiation or forbearance, when he had once employed the Company's influence or power in asserting the Nabob's claims on the Begums. My principal, if not sole inducement, for this order, which, with the instructions following it, was as

[1] "The Nabob's net revenue," (says Mr. Middleton, Defence to the Governor-General and Council; Extracts from Papers in No. 1, vol. ii., presented to the House of Commons, 13th March, 1786, p. 2.) "to my knowledge, never exceeded a crore and a half, but generally fell very short of that sum." The Governor-General disavowed the demands which were made by his private agent, Palmer, and other remissions took place.—Ibid.

[2] Ibid. p. 3.

absolute as it could be expressed, was — to prevent the imputation which is too frequently, with whatever colour of reason, cast on transactions of this nature, begun with demands of sums of money to an enormous amount, supported with a great military parade and denunciations of vengeance for a refusal, and all relenting into the acceptance of personal submission and promise of amendment: in plainer words, I did not choose to be made the instrument of private rapacity, if any such design existed; nor to expose myself to the obloquy of it, if such a design did not exist."[1] The Governor-General, however, no where said to Mr. Middleton, You shall enter the Zenana itself, if respect for it prove any obstruction to your designs. And it would have been equally easy for him to have condemned the Resident had he understood his orders in that invidious sense, as it was, according to the sense in which he did understand them. If the Resident had been guilty of the violation, and a storm of odium had arisen, the political conduct of the Governor-General lays sufficient ground for the presumption, that he would not have scrupled to form for himself a screen out of his own ambiguity.[2]

Upon the intelligence received of the recall of Mr. Bristow, and the appointment of Mr. Middleton to the office of Resident with the Vizir, previous to the memorable journey to Benares, the Court of Directors wrote to the Governor-General and Council in the following terms: — "Equally extraordinary, and unwarrantable, have been your proceedings respecting Mr. John Bristow. He was appointed Resident at Oude in December, 1774. In December, 1776, he was recalled, without the shadow of a charge being exhibited against him. By our letter of the 4th of July, 1777, we signified our disapprobation of the proceedings against Mr. Bristow, and directed that he should be restored to his station; which direction we confirmed by our subsequent letter of the 23rd of December, 1778. Mr. Bristow arrived in India in February, 1780, and in October of the same year it was resolved by

[1] Governor-general's Minute on Mr. Middleton's Defence, 21st October, 1783. Ibid. p. 14.

[2] Hastings intended that his orders should be obeyed. It was for his agents to adopt the least objectionable mode of executing them. This is all that can be fairly inferred from his instructions.—W.

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your Board, that Mr. Bristow should return to Oude; but that his appointment should be limited solely to the conduct of political negotiations, Mr. Middleton being at the same time nominated to settle pecuniary matters with the Vizir. On the 21st of May, 1781, upon receiving a letter from the Vizir, expressing his desire that Mr. Bristow should be removed from his court, he was again recalled. But, without entering into the consideration of this matter, and in order to vindicate and uphold our own authority, we do hereby positively direct that Mr. Bristow do forthwith proceed to Oude, in the station of our Resident there. You are likewise to observe, that we shall not suffer any other person to proceed to Oude, for the management of finance, one person being, in our opinion, sufficient to transact our business there as principal in both these departments."[1]

Along with the reprobation of the recall, and command for the restoration of Mr. Bristow, a similar reprobation and command arrived from the Court of Directors respecting Mr. Fowke, as Resident at Benares. The Governor-General, claiming a latitude in disobeying the orders of the Company, when those orders were "destructive to their own affairs;" and alleging that the diminution of authority of the Governor-General, in displaying to the eyes of India the defeat of his intentions, even with respect to his own agents, was so destructive; insinuating also, besides these general, some particular objections, of which he spoke in the following mysterious terms: "My present objection to his appointment I dare not put upon record, the Members of the Board individually know it;" opposed obedience to the Company's injunctions. The other Members, however, of the Board, consisting of Mr. Stables, Mr. Macpherson, Mr. Wheler, and Sir Eyre Coote, were of a different opinion; they declared that, where the commands of the Directors were precise and peremptory, they conceived themselves to have no latitude of choice; and Mr. Fowke received his appointment. The arrangement which the Governor-General had made for the management of the affairs of Benares had, as usual, disappointed his pecuniary expectations; and his dread of blame on the

[1] Company's General Letter to Bengal, 28th August, 1782; Tenth Report, ut supra, Appendix, No. 8.

score of the transactions, to which his journey had given birth, seems upon this head to have rendered his irascibility peculiarly keen. The storm of his indignation fell upon the person into whose hands the collection of the revenues had fallen, the father of the newly-made Raja. "I feel myself," said Hastings, "and may be allowed on such an occasion to acknowledge it, personally hurt at the ingratitude of this man, and at the discredit which his ill-conduct has thrown upon my appointment of him. He has deceived me: he has offended against the government which I then represented." The "personal hurts" of the Governor-General seem but too frequently to have prompted the measures of his administration. If he was "personally hurt," he was ill-qualified to assume the function of a judge. The Naib had failed in raising all the money which had been imposed as tribute upon the province. Had the tribute not been, as it was, too large, dismission from his office might appear to be a sufficient visitation for his offence. He was also deprived of lands, thrown into prison, and threatened with death, by the sole authority of Mr. Hastings, who did not so much as communicate the measures to his Council till after they were passed; while the Naib in vain represented, that the tribute exceeded the means of the country; that the ordinary receipts had been diminished by a drought; and that, from a severe illness, he had, during two months, been incapable of attending to the painful and laborious duties of his office.[1]

Among the articles in the treaty, formed by the Governor-General with the Vizir at Chunar, one related to the Nabob Fyzoolla Khan. This was the chief who survived the ruin of the Rohilla nation in 1774, and who, having occupied a strong post on the hills, concluded a treaty, under the sanction and guarantee of the English government, by which he received in jaghire the country of Rampore and some other districts of Rohilcund, estimated at a revenue of fifteen lacs of rupees. "From the month of October, 1774, to the latter end of February, 1778," says the Governor-General, "we had no reference made to us relative to Fyzoolla Khan; but on the 25th of of February, 1778, we received a letter from Mr. Middleton, in which he informed us, that reports had prevailed

[1] See the Minutes of Evidence upon the Benares Charge.

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at Lucknow, that Fyzoolla Khan retained in his service a greater body of troops than were specified in the treaty of 1774, and that he had given protection and encouragement to Zabita Khan's defeated army. Mr. Middleton, in the same letter, told us that he did not pay much attention to these reports; but added — that the Nabob's oppressive and unjust conduct, in various instances, might induce Fyzoolla Khan to form connexions, and to engage in schemes, incompatible with his duty and allegiance to the Vizir."

The treaty which had been formed between Fyzoolla Khan and the Vizir, in 1774, commonly known by the name of the treaty of Lal Dang, had been signed by the English Commander-in-Chief, in the name of his nation, as both a party to the transaction, and guarantee of the engagement. Distrusting the faith of the Nabob, and alarmed by the preceding imputations, which he justly regarded as proofs that the wish was formed to dispossess him of his country, Fyzoolla Khan endeavoured to assure himself more completely of the protection of the English; and, as if the signature of the commanding officer was not sufficiently binding, made earnest application to have the treaty ratified by the Governor-General and Council. 'Upon this subject," says Mr. Hastings, "I had frequent applications from him. But the guarantee appeared to me unnecessary, except as it would afford great satisfaction to Fyzoolla Khan; for our government must have interfered, if the Nabob Vizir had attempted to encroach upon the rights which Fyzoolla Khan enjoyed under his treaty with the Vizir. Mr. Middleton deputed Mr. D. Barwell to Rampore, the residence of Fyzoolla Khan. Mr. Barwell transmitted to Mr. Middleton a very particular account of Fyzoolla Khan's conduct, which appeared to have been in no instance contrary to his engagements; and in the month of April, his treaty with the Nabob Vizir was guaranteed by the Company, agreeably to his earnest and reiterated requests. By whose suggestions doubts were instilled into the mind of Fyzoolla Khan, as to the validity of the treaty which Colonel Champion had witnessed, I know not." On the occasion of the guarantee a present of elephants, horses, and other articles, with a lac of rupees, or 10,000*l*. sterling was made to the Nabob,

and one of a similar sum, or another lac, to the Company.

This transaction was soon followed by another. In the same year intelligence was received of a war between England and France. Fyzoolla Khan, "being indirectly sounded," displayed the greatest readiness to assist. He was under no obligation to afford a single man; but, at the suggestion of the Resident at Oude, made an offer of all his cavalry, 2000 strong, and actually furnished 500. The Governor-General, on the 8th of January, 1779, wrote to him, "that in his own name, as well as that of the Board, he returned him the warmest thanks for this instance of his faithful attachment to the Company and the English nation."

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In the treaty of Lal Dang, were the three following articles: "That Fyzoolla Khan should retain in his service 5000 troops, and not a single man more: that with whomsoever the Vizir should make war, Fyzoolla Khan should send two or three thousand of his troops, according to his ability, to join him: and that if the Vizir should march in person, Fyzoolla Khan should attend him with his forces."

In November, 1780, the Governor-General and Council recommended to the Vizir to demand, that is, the Governor-General and Council did themselves demand, of Fyzoolla Khan, to furnish a body of 5000 horse, "as the quota stipulated by treaty for the service of the Vizir." The treaty, however, did not stipulate for 5000, but only for 2000, or 3000, according to his ability; and not for *horse*, but *troops*, of which not the whole, but the usual proportion in horse, equity of construction, could by any means, require: and the troops were not for the service of the Vizir, but of the Company.[1] With the strongest expressions of duty and allegiance, Fyzoolla Khan represented, that his whole force was by treaty limited to 5000 men; of which 2000 were horse, and 3000 foot; that 3000 foot were required for the business of his government and col-

[1] This was too evident to be denied by any body; but it was expressly stated to Fyzoolla Khan, by the Vizir, on the letter in which he communicated the demand, that the demand was made by the direction of Mr. Hastings, and "not for his (the Vizir's), but the Company's service." (See the Twenty-Second Charge, moved by Mr. Burke,) Mr. Hastings himself says (see his answer to that charge), "Fyzoolla Khan was under no engagement to furnish us with a single man, *nor did I ever demand a man from him.*" True, in sound, as usual with Mr. Hastings; false in substance.

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lections; but the whole was at the command of the Vizir and the Company. When this answer was received, the Governor-General, who, together with Mr. Wheler, constituted the whole Board, and by his casting vote united in his own person all the powers of government, declared upon record, that "The Nabob Fyzoolla Khan had evaded the performance of his part of the treaty between the late Nabob Suja-ul-Dowla and him, to which the Honourable Company were guarantees, and upon which he was lately summoned to furnish the stipulated number of troops, which he is obliged to furnish on the condition by which he holds the jaghire granted to him."

In defence of this procedure, Mr. Hastings states, that the Company was environed with difficulties: the burden of the Mahratta war; the alarming progress of Hyder Ali in the Carnatic; the march of the Berar army into Cuttack: and the prospect of an armament from France: That Sir Eyre Coote, before departing for Madras, recommended application to Cheyte Sing for a body of horse to cover the province of Bahar; a battalion of sepoys; 1000 of the Vizir's infantry; and as many of Fyzoolla Khan's troops as could be procured, for the defence of Rohilcund. That the British officer who commanded in that district complained by letter of having with him only 500 of that chieftain's horse, though, "in his agreement with government, he was obliged to keep up 500 troops for assisting in the defence of Rohilcund:" That in the hurry of business, he, and the other Members of the Board, were deceived by this letter in the belief that 5000 was the quota defined; and that horse, though not expressed in the treaty, was undoubtedly understood.[1]

A deception of such a kind, in matters of such importance, is not the most honourable sort of apology, even where it holds.[2] The demand, however, of the Board went far beyond the erroneous words of the letter. The letter spoke of only *troops*, not *horse*; and it spoke of 5000, as only *to be kept up*; not sent out of the country, for de-

[1] Hastings' Defence on the Charge respecting Fyzoolla Khan.

[2] The Vizir knew the terms of the treaty better; and his letter was before Hastings, in which he admitted that the demand was a breach of that treaty. "Should Fyzoolla Khan mention any thing of the tenor of the treaty, the *first* breach of it has been committed by him. I will reproach him with having kept *too many troops*, and will oblige him to send the 5,000 horse."

duction was necessary of those required for indispensable service at home: And the declaration of one of the parties as to what was *understood* in a treaty, but not expressed, when there is no reason why it should not have been expressed, is an unavailing pretence, which, if admitted, would for ever place the weaker of two contracting parties at the mercy of the stronger. As to the dangers of the British government, urged by the Governor-General on this, as they are on so many other occasions, there is only one principle which can render them applicable in his defence; viz. that they furnished sufficient grounds for taking from every prince or lord of the country, whatever any of them had not ability to prevent him from taking.

In proceeding to measures of compulsion, Hastings somewhat lowered his demand. On the 15th of February, 1781, he decreed in council, "that a deputation to Fyzoolla Khan should be immediately recommended to be sent by the Nabob Vizir, accompanied by an agent from Mr. Middleton in behalf of the English government, as guarantees, and that in presence of proper witnesses they should demand immediate delivery of 3000 cavalry; and if he should evade or refuse compliance, that the deputies should deliver a formal protest against him for breach of treaty, and return, making their report to the Vizir, which Mr. Middleton was to transmit to the Board." The deputation was sent. Fyzoolla Khan, alleging both his inability and the express words of the treaty, offered "in addition to the 1000 cavalry already granted, to give 1000 more, when and wheresoever required, and 1000 foot;" together with one year's pay in advance, and funds for the regular payment of them in future. The offer was rejected; and the protest made. Hastings suspended all proceedings upon this protest at the Board; met with the Nabob at Chunar; and signed the following article relative to Fyzoolla Khan:—"That as Fyzoolla Khan has, by his breach of treaty, forfeited the protection of the English government, and causes, by his continuance in his present independent state, great alarm and detriment to the Nabob Vizir, he be permitted, when time shall suit, to resume his lands and pay him in money, through the Resident, the amount stipulated by treaty, after deducting the amount and charges of the troops he stands engaged

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to furnish by treaty; which amount shall be passed to the account of the Company during the continuance of the present war."

What comes next to be stated is a characteristic circumstance. In transmitting the treaty of Chunar to his colleagues at the Board, Mr. Hastings accompanied each article with his own explanations and remarks. Those upon the article relating to Fyzoolla Khan, were as follows: "The conduct of Fyzoolla Khan in refusing the aid demanded, though not an absolute breach of treaty, was evasive and uncandid. The demand was made for 5000 cavalry; the engagement in the treaty is literally for 5000 horse and foot; Fyzoolla Khan could not be ignorant that we had no occasion for any succours of infantry from him, and that cavalry would be of the most essential service; so scrupulous an attention to literal expression, when a more liberal interpretation would have been highly useful and acceptable to us, strongly marks his unfriendly disposition; though it may not impeach his fidelity; and leaves him little claim to any exertions from us, for the continuance of his jaghires. But I am of opinion that neither the Vizir's, nor the Company's interests would be promoted by depriving Fyzoolla Khan of his independency: and I have, therefore, reserved the execution of this agreement to an indefinite term; and our government may always interpose to prevent any ill effects from it."

This imperiously calls for some observations. Mr. Hastings inserts, in an article of a solemn, public treaty, and sets his hand to the article, that a dependent of the Company has been guilty of a breach of treaty; when at the same moment, he writes to his colleagues, that he has *not* been guilty of a breach of treaty, and that his fidelity is unimpeached. He gives to the Vizir, by equally solemn treaty, what the Vizir anxiously solicited, as an object of great desire, permission to dispossess Fyzoolla Khan; yet he writes to his colleagues, that this was a fraudulent artifice, and that he never meant the permission to have any effect. The cause of Mr. Hastings, during a calm investigation, suffers exceedingly by his practice and skill in the arts of deceit; because the fair colours, which he himself can throw upon his conduct, become thoroughly

untrustworthy, and, unless where they are supported by other evidence, cease to persuade.

When, too, Mr. Hastings informs his colleagues, that by the treaty in virtue of which Fyzoolla Khan possessed his jaghire, he was bound to afford 5000 troops, the information was glaringly incorrect; for the oppressed dependant had expressly appealed to the treaty, and offered obedience to the full extent of its bonds. Nay, by the treaty, he was rigidly bound not to retain in his service any more than 5000 troops both horse and foot; and had he sent 5000 horse to the service of the English, in addition to which he must have raised horse and foot for the business of his country, he might have been punished for breach of treaty, and on this pretext, deprived of his independence.

For several months after the return of the Vizir to his own capital, the Governor-General was importuned, by applications both from him and from the Resident, to permit the expulsion of Fyzoolla Khan. Towards the end of the year, 1782, a negotiation was opened for a pecuniary commutation of the military aid. Major Palmer was deputed to Rampore; and spent a month, as he himself significantly expresses it, "in order to effect by persuasion, what he could have obtained in an hour by threats and compulsions;" that is, a sum of fifteen lacs of rupees, on the condition of being exempted from all future claims of military service.

Endeavour was used to obtain from Fyzoolla Khan another sum of fifteen lacs; for which his jaghire, which was only a tenure for life, was to be converted into a perpetual hereditary possession. As this change in his tenure was supposed to be of the highest importance to Fyzoolla Khan, he very much surprised the English agent by declaring his inability to advance the money required, and declining the bargain. From the improving cultivation of the country, and apparent riches of the people, the effects of the good government which that lord had maintained, the English, as usual, believed, in company with the Viziir, that his riches were immense.[1]

[1] The result proved the unsoundness of his excuse, for he did pay the fifteen lacks and without any inconvenience. Of the rapid improvement of his resources, we have undeniable testimony in the life of Hafiz Rhemat Khan

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Major Palmer bore his testimony, on this occasion, to the falsehood, too, of the imputations upon which the oppression of Fyzoolla Khan had been founded: That he had given encouragement to the desertion of the ryots of the Vizir; and that he had a greater number of troops than 5000. The numbers of the Rohilla people in this Country exceeded that amount; but Rohillas, in other than military employments, were not by the treaty forbidden. At any rate, the Major adds, "it does not appear that their number is formidable, or that Fyzoolla Khan could by any means subsist such numbers as could cause any serious alarm to the Vizir; neither is there any appearance of their entertaining any views beyond the quiet possession of the advantages which they at present enjoy."

It was an object with the Governor-General and Council, to convince the Court of Directors that the bargain they had made with Fyzoolla Khan was a good one, and the money obtained an ample compensation for the alienated right. They now, therefore, distinctly understood and affirmed, that Fyzoolla Khan was bound not to exceed the number of 5000 troops, in horse and foot, and to send to the service of the Vizir only two or three thousand *men;* which, to the Vizir, they said, was "a precarious and unserviceable right;" that "the rumours which had been spread of the hostile designs of Fyzoolla Khan, against the Vizir, were totally groundless; and if he had been inclined, that he had not the means to make himself formidable."[1] These expressions are to be contrasted with those

It is there stated by Mustajat Khan, "When Fyzoolla Khan took possession of the territory granted to him by the treaty of Lolldong, he adopted every means in his power for increasing the cultivation, and, in a few years, so improved the country, that the produce was treble, or perhaps quadruple, the former amount. Being prudent in his expenditure, his coffers were well filled, and he was enabled to entertain a large proportion of the Afghans of Bareilly, Phillibheet, Ownla, etc., all of whom eagerly flocked to his standard," p. 130. That in all this Fyzoolla Khan acted wisely is not denied, but the tendency of his measures was as undeniably a violation of the spirit of the treaty, into which he had entered; and their success is a proof that his plea of inability to furnish either men or money was dishonest.—W.

[1] Secret Letter from Bengal, dated 5th of April, 1783; Extracts from Papers (in No. 2, vol. 1), presented to the House of Commons, ut supra, p. 44. In the Secret Letter from Bengal, dated 10th of March, 1783, the Governor-General and Council also say, "This," (the fifteen lacs) "is a valuable compensation for expunging an article of a treaty, which was of such a tenor, and so loosely worded, that the Vizir could never have derived any real advantage from it. The money will of course be received by the Company, in part liquidation of the Vizir's debt."

made use of, on the 1st of April, 1781, by the Assistant Resident Johnson; who was sent for the purpose of making the protest, in case of the refusal of 3000 horse. On the hunt for appearances of guilt, he found them at every step; and the very day after his arrival, reported, that "the Rohilla soldiers, in the district of Rampore alone, were not less than twenty thousand." With great caution should men in power receive from their agents reports by which their known wishes are flattered; because the proportion of observers is lamentably small, who, in such cases, will not deceive themselves, and without any formed intention of mendacity, yet from the very lust of pleasing the men on whose favour or disfavour their prosperity or adversity depends, give them reports which will deceive them. It is necessary, in justice to Mr. Hastings, to add, that with respect to the permission, granted by the treaty of Chunar, to resume the jaghire of Fyzoolla Khan, he afterwards allowed that his conduct was the proper object of blame.[1]

It appears that the Vizir relented at a period rather early in the persecution of the Begums. Before the recall of Mr. Middleton, he wrote to the Governor-General several letters, on the particular subject of the resumption of the estates, and the confiscation of the treasures of the Princesses, and appears to have severely complained of the opprobrious part which he was compelled to perform. It was one of the rules of the Governor-General, to suppress as much as possible of any correspondence, of which the appearance would give him pain. These letters, accor-

[1] For the passage relating to Fyzoolla, see Parliamentary Papers, ut supra; the Twenty-second Article of Charge presented by Mr. Burke; the Answer of Mr. Hastings; and the Tenth Report of the Select Committee.—M.

Hastings admits that in the anxiety and alarm, which he naturally suffered during the crisis of Cheit Sing's insurrection, he assented without due consideration, to the Vizir's views of dispossessing Fyzoolla Khan; even then, however, he provided against their being precipitately realized, and what was the consequence? They were never realized. It was therefore monstrous injustice to impeach him for concurrence in a measure that never took place, in consequence of his own precautions against its unreasonable accomplishment. That the expulsion of the Nabob of Rampore might in time become imperative was very probable, for there was no doubt, whatever may be pretended in the text, that the Nabob's troops and resources considerably exceeded those limits to which the treaty purposed to restrict him, and there was as little doubt of his hostility to the Vizir. The contingency was, however, obviated by a pecuniary levy, in consideration of which he was released from all obligations to furnish troops for the service of the Vizir. So little real injury was done to Fyzoollah Khan, by this arrangement, that he enjoyed a prosperous administration until his death, in the year 1794, during which his country became exceedingly flourishing and prosperous, and he left a large accumulated treasure to unworthy descendants.—W.

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dingly, were not entered in the Company's records. But what he wrote to the Resident on the subject of them remains, and shows, that in his breast they excited the highest resentment. He chose to consider them as not the letters of the Vizir; whom he represents as too void of character, to write anything of himself. He called them the letters of the minister, "who," says he, "by an abuse of his influence over the Nabob, he being, as he ever must be, in the hands of some person, a mere cipher in his hands, dared to make him assume a very unbecoming tone of refusal, reproach, and resentment, in opposition to measures recommended by me, and even to acts done by my authority."

He persisted in ascribing guilt to the Begums, and said, "the severities which have been exercised towards them, were most justly merited, by the advantage which they took of the troublos in which I was personally involved last year, to create a rebellion in the Nabob's government;[1] and to complete the ruin which they thought was impending on ours." "If it is the Nabob's desire to forget and forgive their past offences, I have no objection to his allowing them, in pension, the *nominal* amount of their jaghires; but if he shall ever offer to restore their jaghires to them, or to give them any property in land, after the warning which they have given him, by the dangerous abuse which they formerly made of his indulgence; you must remonstrate, in the strongest terms, against it; you must not permit such an event to take place; until this government shall have received information of it, and shall have had time to interpose its influence for the prevention of it." On this, and on various other occasions, where the Governor-General spoke of pensions with so much ease, he well knew, that in the circumstances and with the disposition of the government of the Vizir, a pension, unless to

[1] When it suited the Governor-General he could assign the disturbance in Oude to very different causes. In a Minute [Bengal Secret Consultations, 10th December, 1783; Extracts from Papers (in No 2, vol iv.) presented to the House of Commons, upon the 13th day of March, 1786, p. 7], he says, "The Zemindars in the provinces of Oude, and in the other dominions of the Nabob. Asoph ul Dowlah, have ever been either in a state of actual rebellion, or bordering upon it; even in the time of the Nabob Sujah ul Dowlah, they could only be restrained by a military force superior to that which they could oppose to it." The instigations, surely of the Begums, was not then wanted to account for the little ferment which took place in Oude, upon the occasion of the explosion in Benares.

Englishmen whom he feared, little or nothing differed from a name. Nay more; if the payment had been sure, the nominal revenue was but a portion of the actual proceeds; and the Begums, of course, were to be robbed of all the rest. It was, in fact, from this robbery, namely, the revenue which the Nabob could extract from the estates of the Begums, beyond the pensions he would bind himself to pay them, that the money was to come, by which the distress of Mr. Hastings was to be relieved.[1]

The period at last arrived for the review by the Court of Directors, of the proceedings of their government in India, relative to the Begums. In their letters of the 14th of February, 1783, "It nowhere," say the Directors, "appears, from the papers at present in our possession, that the Begums excited any commotions previous to the imprisonment of Cheyte Sing, and only armed themselves in consequence of that transaction; and it is probable that such a conduct proceeded from motives of self-defence under an apprehension that they themselves might likewise be laid under unwarrantable contributions." The Court of Directors, in consequence, gave their commands, that if, upon inquiry, it should appear that the Princesses had not been guilty of the practices of which Mr. Hastings accused them, their estates should be restored; and an asylum offered them within the Company's territory. In obedience to this injunction, it was moved by Mr. Stables, a member of the Supreme Council, that the inquiry should be instituted.

The conduct pursued by the Governor-General is the next object of regard. He set himself in opposition to the inquiry; and, having a majority of the Council on his side, he prevented it. The reasons by which he supported his opposition were as follows. He asserted, "that the reasons of the Court of Directors, if transmitted with the orders for the inquiry, will prove, in effect, an order for collecting evidence to the justification and acquittal of the Begums, and not for the investigation of the truth of the charges which have been preferred against them." Here

[1] Jagirs and estates are here confounded, although two very different things; the Begums had no estates, and every principle of good government demanded the resumption of grants held upon the condition of military service, which only furnished a pretext for levying armed followers, and a means of defying the authority of the state.—W.

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the insinuation is, that whenever, in India, the views of government are known, all evidence tendered will be sure to coincide with those views. The Governor-General ought to have reflected, that, if this be true, all the evidence which he produced against the Begums, Cheyte Sing, or any of the other parties, whom he pretended to punish under the colour of guilt. if in other respects less devoid of the essentials of proof than it really was, ought to be counted for nothing. Besides, it was neither necessary nor did the author of the proposal require, that "the reasons" of the Court of Directors should be transmitted with the order for inquiry. Mr. Hastings, in a further Minute asserted, that the inquiry would be fraught with "evils greater than any which exist in the consequences which have already taken place, and which time has almost obliterated." "If," said he, "I am rightly informed, the Nabob Vizir and the Begums are on terms of mutual good will, it would ill become this government to interpose its influence, by any act which might tend to revive their animosities, and a very slight occasion would be sufficient to effect it. They will instantly take fire on such a declaration, proclaim the judgment of the Court in their favour, demand a reparation of the acts, which they will construe wrong, with such a sentence warranting that construction, and either accept the invitation (to reside under the protection of the Company), to the proclaimed scandal of the Nabob Vizir, which will not add to the credit of our government, or remain in his dominions, but not under his authority, to add to his vexations and the disorders of the country, by continual intrigues and seditions. Enough already exists to affect his peace, and the quiet of his people. If we cannot heal, let us not inflame the wounds which have been inflicted." He added, "If the Begums think themselves aggrieved to such a degree as to justify them in an appeal to a foreign jurisdiction; to appeal to it against a man standing in the relation of son and grandson to them; to appeal to the justice of those who have been the abettors and instruments of their imputed wrongs; let us at least permit them to be the judges of their own feelings, and prefer their complaints, before we offer to redress them. They will not need to be prompted. I hope I shall not depart from the simplicity

of official language, in saying, the Majesty of Justice ought to be approached with solicitation, not descend to provoke or invite it, much less to debase itself by the suggestion of wrongs, and the promise of redress, with the denunciation of punishments, before trial, and even before accusation." If nothing remains to stain the reputation of Mr. Hastings, but the principles avowed in this singular pleading, his character, among the friends of justice, would be sufficiently determined.

Although the commands of the Court of Directors, respecting reparation to the Begums, were strengthened by a formal application from the Vizir, "requesting" (such are the words of Mr. Hastings, introducing the subject to the Board) "that he might be permitted to restore, to his grandmother and other relations, the jaghires which were taken from them the beginning of last year," the authority of the Governor-General was sufficient to prevent, at the present time, the adoption of any measure in their favour.[1]

Notwithstanding the severities practised upon the family of the Vizir, and the usurpation of his authority by Mr. Middleton, who even issued warrants upon his own authority for the resumption of the jaghires, Mr. Middleton was dismissed for want of rigour in pressing the demands of the English government; and Mr. Bristow was appointed, under the implied as well as declared expectation, that he would supply what had been remiss in the conduct of his predecessor. Nor was this all. He was furnished with a set of instructions, from the hand of the Governor-General, bearing date the 23rd of October, 1782. In these instructions, in which he was particularly referred to the injunctions which Mr. Middleton had previously received, four objects were principally pointed out to his attention: 1st, "To limit, and separate the personal disbursements of the Vizir from the public accounts; 2ndly, To reform the military establishment, reducing the troops to one uniform corps, and to the form, if possible, most useful to the Company, that of cavalry; controlling even the appointment of officers, nay, "peremptorily opposing it," as often as the Vizir should persist in a choice which to the Resi-

[1] See the Fourth Article of Charge, and Mr. Hastings' Answer, with the Papers printed by the House of Commons, in 1786.

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dent should appear objectionable; 3rdly, To control, or rather to exercise, the power of appointing Aumils and collectors in the revenue department, it being reserved to the Nabob's ministers to appoint them, with the concurrence of the Resident; 4thly, To endeavour to reform the disgraceful state of the administration of justice.

The grand object of the English government was, to obtain from the Nabob the payment of the sums for which they had induced him to become bound. But such were the disorders of his administration, and such the effects of those disorders upon the population and produce of the country, that without great reforms this payment seemed impracticable, and without the virtual assumption of the powers of government into better hands than those of the Vizir and his agents, all reform was an object of despair. The government, accordingly, had been converted into a government of Englishmen, in fact; conducted by the instrumentality of the Vizir and his agents, and under the forms of their authority. Of this, the points of instruction to Mr. Middleton, described above, are more than adequate proof.

In the administration of the Nabob, the principal organ went by the name of the Minister. The person raised to this office by the influence of the Governor-General was Hyder Beg Khan. The character and situation of this person, as described by Mr. Hastings himself, require to be noticed. In his instructions to Mr. Bristow, in October, 1782, he says: "Immediately on your arrival, sound the disposition of Hyder Beg Khan. His conduct has, for some time past, been highly reproachable. Till within these three months he possessed, without control, both the unparticipated and entire administration, with all the powers annexed to that government; the Nabob being, as he ever must be in the hands of some person, a mere cipher in his." To so great a degree did Mr. Hastings represent the Vizir as being the mere tool of the minister, that he treated the very letters of the Vizir as literally the letters of the minister; and spoke of him and of them in the following terms: "He has dared to use both the Nabob's name and even his seal affixed to letters, either dictated to the Nabob, or written from him without his knowledge." He then proceeded to state the necessity,

that this man, in whose hands the Vizir was a tool, should be merely a tool in the hands of the English Resident; in other words, that the English Resident should wield substantially the powers of government. "I cannot omit," said he, "to repeat the sentiments which I expressed in the verbal instructions which I gave you at your departure, that there can be no medium in the relation between the Resident and the minister, but either the Resident must be the slave and vassal of the minister, or the minister at the absolute devotion of the Resident." He then describes him as the mere creature of the English government. "He exists," said the Governor-General, "by his dependence on the influence of our government; and if he will submit to hold his office on such conditions as I require, I would prefer him to any other. At the same time, it will be necessary to declare to him, in the plainest terms, the footing and conditions on which he shall be permitted to retain his place, with the alternative of dismission, and a scrutiny into his past conduct, if he refuses. These conditions are described as follows: "In the first place, I will not receive from the Nabob, as his, letters dictated by the spirit of opposition—but shall consider every such attempt as his minister's and as an insult on our government. In the second place, I shall expect that nothing is done, in his official character, but with your knowledge and participation; at the same time the first share of the responsibility will rest with you: the other conditions will follow distinctly in their places, because I consider you as responsible for them." The responsibility implies the power; therefore the power was to exist in the Resident; and any opposition, so much as by letter, that is, by complaint, was to be considered as an insult on the English government.

To the Minister, Hyder Beg, Mr. Hastings himself wrote in the following terms. "In answer to my letter Raja Gobind Ram received a perwanna from the Nawab, containing complaints and reproaches at my interference in his affairs, and his unwillingness to receive any agent from me. These sentiments, and these expressions, are neither consonant to the benevolence of the Nawab's temper, nor to the friendship which, I know, he possesses for me;—but were dictated for other purposes, known to yourself only. They

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are your sentiments, and your expressions; and not the Nawab's. But my astonishment at the other parts of the perwanna is not to be expressed; for it declares all I had said respecting the disordered state of the Nawab's government to be entirely false. Either these affirmations were dictated by the Nawab; or written without his knowledge. If they were dictated by the Nawab, they were such as would not admit of a reply from me, in an immediate address to himself; because I must have told him that he was deceived, and kept in utter ignorance of his own affairs, at the same time that the whole world, except himself, saw the condition they were in, and the destruction that was hanging over him. If the letter was written in the Nawab's name, but without his knowledge, what must have been your opinion of me, that could induce you to attempt so gross a deception upon my understanding? In either case, your conduct is without excuse. Its object I plainly see. By the authority of the Nawab Vizir you mean your own. When you make the Nawab to complain of the usurpation upon that authority, and to assert his right to the uncontrolled exercise of it, the plain interpretation of this is, that you yourself lay claim to the usurpation of his authority, and to the uncontrolled exercise of it. And how has it been exercised? I shall not repeat particulars, having already written to you fully upon them—and the subject is unpleasant. But I must tell you that such is their notoriety, that the report of them is echoed to me from all parts of Hindostan and the Deccan; and the most alarming apprehensions are expressed by my agents, employed in the remote affairs of this government, lest they should attract the hostilities of other powers." [1]—Such, at the end of October, 1782, was the opinion declared by Mr. Hastings of the condition in which the government of Oude was kept in the hands of the Nabob and his Minister.

In pointing out to Mr. Bristow the establishment of new offices, for the business of the revenues, for reform in the administration of justice, for the appointment of new administrators, and the coercion of rebellious Zemindars; as part of the objects, on the accomplishment of which, for

[1] Governor-General to Hyder Beg Khan, dated 20th October, 1782. Minutes, ut supra, p. 797.

the reform in the disorders in the Nabob's government, the desires of the Governor-General were fixed; absolute performance was exacted at the hands of the Resident, without any other limitation to the exercise of his power, than what the rules of prudence, and "every ostensible and external mark of respect to the Nabob," might recommend.

When the Resident had as yet been but a few months in office, a letter was written by the Vizir, dated the 28th of March, 1783, arrived, complaining, in the most bitter terms, of the assumption of his authority by the Resident. Instead of treating it, according to the terms of his paper of instructions, as the letter, "not of the Vizir, but of the Minister, and as an insult on the English government," the Governor-General received it with profound respect; and, on the 21st of April, presented it, with the documents by which it was attended, to the Council, as a matter deserving their most serious regard. From the delicacy of the relation, in which, on account of former oppositions, he stood to Mr. Bristow, he professed a desire to be guided in his sentiments, on this occasion, by the sentiments of the Board. On the 19th of May, consultation upon the subject took place, when the reserve of the Governor-General disappeared. He declared, that "the facts, as stated in the Nabob's complaints, were usurpations of the authority, and even of the sovereignty, of the Nabob Vizir." But, what was more singular, he declared that his instructions to Mr. Bristow did not authorize any usurpation of that authority or sovereignty. And he proposed, even before Mr. Bristow should be heard in his defence, that certain proceedings of his, the objects of the Vizir's complaint, should be immediately revoked. The Council, however, rejected this proposition; and only so far concurred with the Governor-General, as to send Mr. Bristow a copy of the papers, and require his defence. The tone of the Governor-General, upon this, rose very high. "The Governor-General," such were the terms of his minute, "desires it to be recorded, that he protests against the resolution of the Board, and will assign his reasons at large hereafter." What follows is still more remarkable. As if he had penned the instructions by his sole authority, and as if upon that authority alone their

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validity rested, he declared them no longer of any force. The minute goes on: "He (the Governor-General) also desires, that as the instructions given by him to Mr Bristow have no longer any force, and as he solemnly disavows their authority, under any construction, for Mr. Bristow to exercise any control over the Nabob Vizir, or participation in the sovereignty of the Vizir's dominions, the Board will be pleased to cause such new instructions to be drawn out, and transmitted to Mr. Bristow, as they shall think proper." If the whole extent is admitted, of the exaggerating language of Mr. Hastings and the Nabob, which nevertheless very far exceeded the facts, the whole of his paper of instructions not only authorized, but commanded, a complete control over the Nabob Vizir, and not a participation only in the sovereignty, but the substantial exercise of the whole.[1]

On the 24th of July, Mr. Hastings complained to the Board, that Mr. Bristow had been guilty of disrespect to the Board, in not transmitting his defence; and on this occasion could not forbear alluding to an offence, which he appears never to have surmised without a purpose of punishment: "Perhaps," said he, "Mr. Bristow may wish to avail himself of the principle, which forbids that any man should be condemned unheard, to withhold his defence until he shall have exceeded the period which has been so repeatedly portended, for the close of the present government." On the 28th of the same month, he moved, "That Mr. Bristow, for disrespect to the Board, and disobedience of the written orders to him by the Board, on the 29th of May, be removed and recalled from his station and office at Lucknow." Yet Mr. Hastings had before him a letter of Mr. Bristow, dated on the 23rd of June, in the following words: "Since I had last the honour to address you, I have been confined to my room by indisposition. I am now somewhat recovered, and shall not fail to expedite my reply to your commands of the 22th ult.,

[1] It is memorable, that there is actually in his Paper of Instructions the following passage: "From the nature of our connexion with the government of Oude, from the Nabob's incapacity, and the necessity which will for ever exist (while we have the claim of a subsidy upon the resources of his country), of exercising an influence, and frequently substituting it entirely in the place ... of an avowed and constitutional authority in the administration of his government," &c.

which I have on this account been compelled to postpone." The Board refused to acquiesce in the precipitate condemnation recommended to them by their President; and soon after, the letter of Mr. Bristow, dated on the 30th day of July, arrived. The Resident either absolutely denied the facts which were asserted in the complaints of the Vizir, or represented the actions with which he was charged, as actions to the performance of which he was, by the tenor of his instructions, compelled, actions absolutely necessary to accomplish the ends which the English government had in view, actions attended with beneficial effects, and performed with all the delicacy possible towards the Vizir. The complaints he represented as flowing solely from the Minister, to whose interests all reform was averse, who had opposed it in every instance, with all the power of eastern subtlety, with all the power of a despotic influence tyrannically exercised over the helpless Vizir, and with all the effect which could be given to this power by a hold upon the ear of the Governor-General. On hearing this defence, the Council-General, with the exception of Mr. Hastings, the accuser, unanimously declared, that no misconduct on the part of Mr. Bristow had been proved; and, by their decision, pronounced a heavy condemnation of their chief. Nothing seems better supported, than the opinion which the minute of Mr. Macpherson expressed, "That Mr. Bristow has fully refuted the accusations advanced against him; and that, if they had in some degree been established, they would lie more against the Board than against Mr. Bristow, who continually advised them of his endeavours to carry their instructions into effect."

The Governor-General meditated an important change in the relations between the Nabob of Oude and the English government. He moved, that in conformity with the proposal of the Vizir, and of his Minister, the English residency should be withdrawn, and the joint security of the Nabob and the Minister taken for the discharge of the obligations which the Company held upon the government of Oude. In the instructions, to which reference has so frequently been made, of Hastings to Bristow, "The Nabob," it was said, "has repeatedly and bitterly complained of the indignity which he suffers in his authority, by the

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usurpation of the Company's residents; and has repeatedly demanded, that whenever the Company's balance shall be completely discharged, he may be free from this vexation, that he may be permitted to pay the subsidy in ready money; and that the assignments which have been granted to satisfy that demand may be restored him." The quarter from which this proposition proceeded, Mr. Hastings at the same time declared, was no secret to him. It proceeded, he said, from Hyder Beg Khan. He added, "It may not, however, be amiss to talk with the Minister on this subject; to let him know that it is well understood to be a demand for substituting his authority in the place of the Company's, and to invest him with the sovereignty of the Vizir's dominions." These words are pregnant with meaning. In the first place they declare, that the authority exercised by the Company, embraced the sovereignty of the Vizir's dominions, though, for the sake of criminating Mr. Bristow, he could erect every interference in that sovereignty into an act of guilt; and secondly, they declare, that to withdraw the English residency from Oude, was to deliver over the Vizir and his sovereignty into the hands of Hyder Beg, whose character he painted in the blackest colours. Yet, at the very moment when he was proposing to offer up this sacrifice of the Vizir and his sovereignty to the cupidity and tyranny of Hyder Beg Khan, he was not restrained from the glaring hypocrisy of expressing a deep concern for the indignity which he pretended the Vizir had sustained, by the part which the English Resident had acted, in endeavouring to reform his government, and check the malversations of the Minister by whom he was oppressed.

At the very time, however, of penning his instructions, Mr. Hastings stated that he had an inclination to the present measure. "I confess," says he, "that I did myself give encouragement to this proposition; knowing at the same time the quarter from which it came, I mean from Hyder Beg Khan; but willing to exonerate this government from the trouble and responsibility, and the Company from the disgrace, of whatever might attend the administration of the Nabob's government. I thought, too that it presented a sure prospect of the regular pay-

ment of the current demands, by the penalty which would attend the failure, in the resumption of the former system of assignments, and in the personal claims which it would lay on the Minister. But his misconduct has since manifested itself in so many particular instances—besides the universal disorder of the country; and this is so alarming in its effects to our government, that I shall hesitate, until I have the surest and most satisfactory grounds, to recommend an acquiescence in such a measure." What change there was in the grounds, except for the worse, in the few months between the time when this was written, and the date of his motion, does not appear. Another point is also remarkable. In the conversation which the Governor-General recommended to the Resident to hold with the Minister on this subject, he desired him to ask, provided the sovereignty of the Vizir's dominions, according to the terms of his proposition, were transferred to him, "Whether, in the event of his involving our government in a new scheme of hostilities, by those which his mal-administration may produce, whether internally or by invasion in that country, he shall think himself in justice exempt from the personal vengeance which we may be disposed to exact from him."

In the first letter of complaint, which was received from the Vizir against Mr. Bristow, the proposition for the removal of the residency, and the appointment of Hyder Beg Khan to the entire management of the country, was renewed; and Mr. Stables, in his Minute in Council on the 19th of May, 1783, declares, that this was the "great object which the minister, and" (the cipher in his hands) "his master, had in view, in preferring their complaints against the Resident." Mr. Stables added, "In justice and candour to the Nawab Vizir and his minister, I think the Board ought explicitly to declare that they cannot, on any account, comply with the Vizir's request, to grant him discretional powers over his country, while such heavy debts remain due to the Company." In the debate, too, in Council, of the 31st of July, after the proposition was formally moved by the Governor-General, it met with the opposition of all the other members of the Board. The tone of the Governor-General, however, after the opposition has lasted for a little time, grew so high, as to intimi-

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date his colleagues; threatening them with the inconveniences of a divided administration, and the loss of his authority in the difficulties which attended the government of Oude. They were, therefore, induced to offer, on the 31st of December, to acquiesce in his proposal, provided he would take the whole responsibility of the measure upon himself. This, however, was a load which the Governor-General declined. It was afterwards explained, that responsibility with his fortune, or a pecuniary responsibility, was not understood. Responsibility, thus limited, which in fact was no responsibility at all, leaving nothing to be affected but his reputation, which it was impossible to exempt, he had no objection to undergo. On the 31st of December, it was determined, that the residency should be withdrawn; on receiving the security of creditable bankers for the balance which the Nabob owed to the Company, and for the accruing demands of the current year.

Many grounds of suspicion are laid in this transaction. From one remarkable fact, they derive the greatest corroboration. There is great reason to believe, that the letters which were written in the name of the Nabob, complaining of Bristow, were in fact suborned by the Governor-General, written in consequence of instructions, that is, commands secretly conveyed.

When Mr. Bristow was removed, just before the first journey of the Governor-General towards Oude, the removal was in like manner preceded by violent complaints from the Nabob. These complaints were suborned. Mr. Hastings himself, when proposing the return of Mr. Bristow in 1782, informs the Nabob's Vakeel, that "His Highness," meaning the Nabob, "had been well pleased with Mr. Bristow, and that he knew what the Nabob had written formerly was at the instigation of Mr. Middleton."[1] The instigation of Mr. Middleton was the instigation of Mr. Hastings.

Besides, it is in evidence, that this was not a singular case. It was the ordinary mode of procedure, established between Mr. Hastings and the Nabob. There was, it ap-

[1] Extract of an Arzee, written (27th August, 1782) from Raja Gobind Ram to the Vizir, by the Governor-General's directions. Minutes of Evidence, ut supra, p. 795.

pears, a regular concert, that the Nabob should never write a public letter respecting the residents or their proceedings, till he had first learned privately what Mr. Hastings wished that he should express, and that he then wrote accordingly. This appeared most fully, after the departure of Mr. Hastings, when the Nabob proposed to carry on the same practice with his successor. In a letter received on the 21st of April, 1785, "I desire," says the Vizir, "nothing but your satisfaction: and hope that such orders as relate to the friendship between the Company and me, and as may be your pleasure, may be written in your *private* letters to me through Major Palmer, in your letters to the Major, that he may, in obedience to your orders, properly explain them to me, and whatever may be settled he may first, in secret, inform you of it, and afterwards I may write to you, having learnt your pleasure —in this way, the secrets will be known to your mind alone, and the advice upon all the concerns will be given in a proper manner." The same thing is still more clearly expressed by the minister Hyder Beg Khan, on the same occasion. "I hope that such orders and commands as relate to the friendship between his Highness's and the Company's governments, and to your will, may be sent through Major Palmer in your own *private* letters, or in your letters to the Major, who is appointed from you at the presence of his Highness, that, in obedience to your orders, he may properly explain your commands, and whatever affair may be settled, he may first secretly inform you of it, and afterwards his Highness may, conformably thereto, write an answer, and I also may represent it. By this system, your pleasure will always be fully made known to his Highness, and his Highness and I will execute whatever may be your orders, without deviating a hair's breadth." When it was the intention of Mr. Hastings that Mr. Bristow, who had been withdrawn upon complaints, which, without any dislike to Mr. Bristow, the Nabob, through Middleton, had been instructed to prefer, that obedient sovereign was instructed to make an application of a very different description. "The Governor," said the Nabob's Vakeel in the Arzee already quoted, "directed me to forward to the presence, that it was his wish, that your Highness would write a letter to him; and,

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as from yourself, request of him that Mr. Bristow may be appointed to Lucknow." In his answer to the Vakeel the Nabob curiously says, "As to the wishes of Mr. Hastings, that I should write for him to send Mr. John Bristow, it would have been proper and necessary, for you, privately to have understood what were Mr. Hastings' real intentions; whether the choice of sending Mr. John Bristow was his own desire; or, whether it was in compliance with Mr. Macpherson's—that I might then have written conformably thereto.—Writings are now sent to you for both cases. Having privately understood the wishes of Mr. Hastings, deliver whichever of the writings he shall order you." [1] After all this, and after the threats of Mr. Hastings against all letters from the Nabob which he might dislike, the meaning of the letters complaining of Bristow cannot be misunderstood. It was a shrewd surmise of the Nabob, respecting Macpherson: who had become recently a Member of the Supreme Council, and whose support Mr. Hastings might require. The accusations, which the Governor-General afterwards aimed at Mr. Macpherson for supporting Bristow, fall in, at least, with the conjecture.

The cause which prompted so violent a desire for his recall is involved in comparative mystery. We can trace a kind of analogy. As the preceding removal of Mr. Bristow was immediately followed by the first visit of the Governor-General to the Nabob; so the present removal was immediately followed by another. This, undoubtedly, proves nothing against Mr. Hastings: but if there be any other grounds for suspicion, this tends to confirm them. If these visits were intended for any unjustifiable transactions between the Governor and Nabob, the removal of a witness, whose compliance could not be depended upon, was just the proceeding which, in such circumstances, every man would adopt.[2]

Before the removal of the residency was finally settled, the Governor-General had represented, that a great demand existed for his presence in Oude, to aid in settling

[1] Minutes of Evidence, ut supra, p. 798, 799, 796.

[2] This detail of the conflicting opinions of the Council, and of the machinery by which Hastings maintained a necessary control over the Vjzir, his minister, and the British Resident, is scarcely matter for history, especially when the object of the whole proves to be the indication of a very vague inference, unfavourable to the private integrity of Hastings.—W.

the disorders of the country, and in making such arrangements as would enable the Vizir to fulfil his engagements. His journey was opposed by the other Members of the Board. Upon it, however, for some reason or other, the Governor-General had set his heart. A letter was procured from Major Palmer, representing the state of the country as alarming, and urgently requiring the immediate presence of Mr. Hastings; with other letters from the Vizir, and his minister, earnestly requesting to see the Governor-General at Lucknow. The consent of a majority of the Council was at last obtained; and Mr. Hastings was authorized to proceed to Lucknow, invested with all the powers of the Board, to regulate and determine the affairs both internal and external of the state, and for that purpose to command even the military resources of the English government without control. The proposition of the Governor-General was introduced on the 20th of January, 1784; the consultation was closed, and the authority of the Board conferred on the 16th of February; and on the following day, the 17th, the journey of the Governor-General began.

In proceeding to Lucknow, he passed through the province of Benares, which, in the time of Cheyte Sing and his father manifested so great a degree of prosperity; and, there, witnessed the effects of his late proceedings. The first deputy whom he had appointed for the Raja was dismissed for the offence of not making up his payments to the exacted amount. The second, as might well be expected, acted upon the "avowed principle that the sum fixed for the revenue must be collected." The consequence was, that the population was plunged into misery; and desolation pervaded the country. "From the confines of Buxar," says Mr. Hastings, "to Benares, I was followed and fatigued by the clamours of the discontented inhabitants. The distresses which were produced by the long-continued drought unavoidably tended to heighten the general discontent. Yet, I have reason to fear, that the cause existed principally, in a defective, if not a corrupt and oppressive administration." "I am sorry to add, that from Buxar to the opposite boundary, I have seen nothing but traces of complete devastation in every village." "I cannot help remarking, that except

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the city of Benares, the province is in effect without a government. The administration of the province is misconducted, and the people oppressed; trade discouraged, and the revenue in danger of a rapid decline from the violent appropriation of its means."[1] It is remarkable, how few of the political arrangements of Mr. Hastings produced the effects which he expected from them; and how much his administration consisted in a perpetual change of ill-concerted measures. The arrangements for the government of Benares were his own; and for the effect of them he was responsible; but he enjoyed a happy faculty of laying the blame at any door rather than his own. He ascribed the existing evils to the deputy solely; and with the approbation of the Council removed him. The predecessor of that deputy, who transgressed in nothing but the extent of his exactions, met with a severer fate. To procure some redress of his grievances, he had even repaired in person to Calcutta, where, so far from receiving any attention, he received two peremptory orders from the Supreme Council to quit the city and return. Nor was this all. Upon the arrival of Mr. Hastings at Benares, he ordered him into prison again; after which his vexations and hardships soon put a period to his life. His poverty was real and he died insolvent.

The Governor-General arrived at Lucknow on the 27th of March. He had some success in obtaining money from the minister into whose hands the government was transferred. In order still more to disburden the revenues of the Vizir, he agreed to withdraw the English detachment commanded by Colonel Sir John Cumming, which still was stationed on the frontiers of Oude at the Nabob's expense; and agreed for this reason, "That the Company would gain nothing by its continuance, since the Nabob had not the means of defraying the expense; and whether it remains," he added, "on account of the Company, or be continued to swell the Nabob's with an accumulating debt which he cannot pay, its effects on the Company's funds will prove the same, while it holds out a deception to the public." Mr. Hastings had eluded inquiry into the truth of

[1] Letter from the Governor-General to the Council Board, dated Lucknow, 2nd of April, 1784.

the allegations on which the confiscation of the estates and treasures of the Begums, and others, had been ordered; and the commands of the Court of Directors had till this time remained without effect. The time, however, was now come, when at least a partial obedience was deemed expedient; and Mr. Hastings reported to the Board, that the jaghires of the Begums, and of the Nabob Salar Jung, the uncle of the Vizir, had been "restored, conformably to the Company's order, and more so to the inclinations the Nabob Vizir, who went to Fyzabad for the express purpose of making a respectful tender of them in person to the Begums." The restoration, however, tardy as it was, fell greatly short of completeness; for Mr. Hastings reported that the personages in question, had made a *voluntary* concession of a *large* portion of their respective shares." The Governor-General was now so far from expressing any apprehensions of disorder from the possession of jaghires by the Princesses and other principal persons of the Nabob's family, that he declared his expectation of their influence in supporting the arrangements which had taken place with the Vizir.[1]

The Governor-General departed from Lucknow on the 27th of August. He arrived at the Presidency on the 4th of November, resumed his seat at the Council Board on the 11th, and on the 22nd reminded the Directors of his request, addressed to them on the 20th of March, in the year 1783, to nominate his successor. He now began to prepare for his departure. On the 8th of February, 1785, he resigned his office, and embarked for England.[2]

In India, the true test of the government, as affecting the interest of the English nation, is found in its financial results. In 1772, when the administration of Mr. Hastings began, the net revenues of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, which, being the principal branch of receipt, will suffice for that general conception which is all I can attempt

[1] Letters from the Governor-General to the Council Board, dated Benares, 20th September, 1784.

[2] For the preceding train of measures, the reader is referred to the Papers, relating to the province of Oude, presented to the House of Commons in the year 1786; to the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixteenth, and Twenty-second Articles of Charge, presented by Burke, with the Answers of Mr. Hastings, and the Appendix of Documents printed along with them; also to the Minutes of Evidence on the Trial, in which the documents were printed again.

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to convey, were 2,373,650*l.*; the civil and military charges of the government of Bengal were 1,705,279*l.*; difference 668,371*l.*: the whole of the bond and other debts in India were 1,850,166*l.*; and the debt in England, including capital stock, and the sums due to the annuitants, were 12,850,166*l.* In 1785, the revenues of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, including the new revenue of Benares, and the subsidies from Oude, amounted to 5,315,197*l.*; the charges, deducting Clive's jaghire, 30,000*l.* per annum, which ceased in 1784, one-half of the allowance to the Nabob of Bengal, and the tribute to the Mogul, amounted to 4,312,519*l.*; the difference, 1,002,678*l.*, is an improvement upon the year 1772, of 334,307*l.*; but, on the other hand, the debt in 1786, when the whole of the arrears of Mr. Hastings' administration were brought to account, was raised to 15,443,349*l.* in England; and in India, including China to 10,464,955*l.*; a sum of 25,908,334*l.*; to which should be joined 1,240,000*l.*, the sum which was yielded by the subscription at 155 per cent. of 800,000*l.* added this year to the capital stock. The administration of Mr. Hastings, therefore, added about twelve and a-half millions to the debt of the East India Company; and the interest at five per cent. of this additional debt, is more than the amount of the additional revenue.[1]

Nor is this the only unhappy result in the financial administration of Mr. Hastings. The net territorial revenues of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, instead of increasing had actually declined. In the year ending the 1st of May, 1772, they amounted to the sum of 2,126,766*l.*, and in the year ending on the same day in 1785, to that of 2,072,963*l.*[2] In Lord Cornwallis's celebrated revenue letter, dated the 16th November, 1786, it is allowed, that the state of the accounts exhibits a debt in India of 8,91,25,518 rupees, and assets valued at 5,81,24,567, with

[1] For these statements see the accounts exhibited in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Reports of the Committee of Secrecy, in 1781; and the accounts presented to Parliament for the several years. See also Bruce's Plans for British India, p. 323.—M.

It should not be forgotten, however, that during his administration he had to provide, from the revenues under his management, for the whole charge of the Bombay and Madras Presidencies, during most ruinous wars, for armaments sent to their succour, for operations and negotiations intended for their relief, and for the defence of Bengal. The addition to the debt was as moderate as could have been looked for under such extraordinary pressure.—W.

[2] An account presented to the House of Commons, March 30th, 1786. See

a balance against the Company of 3,10,00,950. But Lord Cornwallis observes, that the amount of assets is so much made up for the sake of show, that is, a delusion, that it presents a result widely different from the truth; and that the balance between the debts, and such assets as are applicable to their extinction, would not, in his opinion, fall short of 7,50,00,000 rupess. "Of this debt something more than a crore of rupees was subscribed for transference to England, leaving a debt of about 6½ crores, "nearly the whole of which," he says, "is running at an average rate of interest of 8¾ per cent. per annum." "For the discharge of this," his Lordship adds, "your Bengal

also the following statement of the Bengal Revenues; taken from the printe Minutes of Evidence on Mr. Hastings' Trial, p. 1276.

Years.	Current net Collections.	Balances collected.	Total.	Bengal charges Collection.
1776—7	187,15,865	13,94,769	201,10,634	49,05,739
1777—7	170,49,710	20,78,451	191,28,161	53,80,818
1778—8	173,95,871	19,19,747	193,15,618	56,45,947
1779-80	180,21,226	15,66,322	195,87,548	56,80,637
Rupees.	711,82,672	69,59,289	781,41,961	216,13,141
1781—2	189,55,004	6,23,989	195,78,993	66,55,869
1782—3	188,24,855	6,50,462	194,75,317	59,63,661
1783—4	181,93,492	4,49,916	186,43,408	71,29,094
1784—5	176,68,646	8,91,701	185,60,348	73,73,738
Rupees.	736,41,997	26,16,069	762,58,066	271,22,362
	Less in last four years		18,83,895	
	Increase in last four years.....			55,09,221
1777—80	Total		580,31,327	
1781— 4	.....		576,97,718	
	Less in last three years ..		3,33,909	
1774—5	195,69,610	17,40,399	213,10,009	
1775—6	195,25,825	12,18,176	207,44,001	
1776—7	187,15,865	13,94,769	201,10,634	
	578,11,300	43,53,344	621,64,644	
Total in 1781—4			576,97,718	
Less in last three years			44,66,927	

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government alone can hereafter furnish a fund; which (under the limitations in the estimate) is stated at a gross sum of about 46,00,000 current rupees per annum. And the ordinary expenses of your different settlements, allowing for the provision of an European investment, at present exceed their resources."[1] That is to say; the revenue of the Indian government at the close of the administration of Mr. Hastings, was not equal to its ordinary expense.

The incidents which had occurred under the Presidency of Madras, from the period of terminating the war with

Another View of the Collections under the Bengal Government.

Years.	Current Collections.	Collected account Balances.	Gross Collection.	Charges Collection.	Annual Receipts into the Treasury.
1772—3	2,37,29,763	18,18,226	2,56,17,989	41,56,970	2,14,61,019
1773—4	2,35,77,528	18,05,528	2,53,83,057	43,02,596	2,10,80,460
1774—5	2,37,20,882	17,40,399	2,54,61,282	41,51,272	2,13,10,009
1775—6	2,40,33,296	12,18,176	2,55,51,472	45,07,471	2,10,44,001
1776—7	2,36,21,604	13,94,769	2,56,16,373	49,05,739	2,01,10,434
1777—8	2,24,30,527	20,79,450	2,45,08,978	53,80,818	1,91,28,160
1778—9	2,30,41,818	19,19,747	2,49,61,565	56,45,946	1,93,15,618
1779-80	2,37,01,863	15,66,321	2,47,68,185	56,80,937	1,90,83,547
1780-81	2,26,82,691	14,24,542	2,41,07,233	60,98 510	1,80,08,723
1781—2	2,56,10,873	6,23,989	2,62,34,863	66,55,869	1,95,78,993
1782—3	2,47,88,515	6,50,461	2,54,38,977	59,63,660	1,94,75,316
1783-4	2,53,22,585	4,49,915	2,57,72,201	71,29,093	1,86,43,107

Mr. Stuart's Minute on the Revenues of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, Minutes of printed Evidence of Hastings' Trial, Appendix, Art. vi. No. 157 p. 904.—M.

This statement, it may be remarked, explains the preceding, and puts in a clearer light, the real nature of the financial operations of Hastings' administration. The absolute collections of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, had not declined, on the contrary, they had *increased*. The total collections of 1772 were rupees 2.56.17.000; those of 1783, 2.57.72.000, giving a surplus on the latter of rupees 1.55.000. The former period too, it should be remembered, was the first year of the new settlement, under which farmers of the revenue bade against each other, and raised the amount to a height which proved ruinous. The charges of collection had at the same time increased, and these being deducted from the collectors, left a decrease upon the "net" collections. As observed by Mr. Macpherson, the successor of Hastings, those charges "might more properly be called the increasing expenses of our government, than the increased expenses of the collection of the Revenue," including, in fact, the charges of the Dewani and Foujdari Adaulut, or Civil and Criminal Courts, besides many other expenses only remotely collected with the business of collection. Min. Evid. 714, 722—904. The strong tendency of such charges to increase, and the difficulty of effectively controlling them in seasons when the energies of the government are absorbed by great political interests, are so universally a part of the history of all administrations, in all countries, that they reflect no particular discredit on the government of Hastings.—W.

[1] Extract from Revenue Letter, printed by order of the House of Commons, 1787.

Tippoo, till the time when Mr. Hastings surrendered his office, remain to be adduced.

The situation of the Nabob of Arcot, as it had long been, so it continued to be, a source of uneasiness and of difficulty to the English rulers in the southern Presidency. The wretched government which that Nabob maintained, and which his want of talents, his want of virtue, and the disadvantages of his situation, disqualified him for improving, not only sunk the people into the deepest wretchedness, but cut off the resources required for the defence of the country. The impossibility, which the Presidents had experienced, of obtaining, through his hands, the means which were necessary to provide for the security of the province; or their connivance, from unworthy motives, at his unwillingness to provide them, had laid open the country to all the disasters, to which the weak and unprotected state in which it was found by Hyder Ali exposed it. When the war began, the strongest necessity existed for rendering the resources of the country available to its defence. Supplies, in the highest degree defective, had been obtained from the Nabob; nor was there any rational prospect of improvement. For the payment of particular debts, both to the Company and to individuals, it had been usual with him, according to the custom of Indian princes, to grant assignments on the revenues of particular districts; and no inconsiderable portion of the whole was under this disposition. As the exigency was peculiarly violent, nothing less being immediately at stake than the existence, in the Carnatic, of both the Nabob and the English, Lord Macartney regarded an extension of the same expedient, namely, an assignment of all his revenues, as the only feasible plan for meeting the present difficulties; and compliance with it, as no unreasonable condition imposed on the Nabob, seeing the proceeds were to be employed for his own defence, and that it was impossible he could, if defended at all, be so well defended by any other means. Not without great difficulty the consent of the Nabob was obtained. It was an arrangement far from agreeable to that vanity and ambition, which formed a strong ingredient in his character. And there was no want of persons in his confidence who inflamed his dis-

BOOK V. CHAP. VIII. content, and who excited him to employ every stratagem to obtain the surrender of the power he had given away.

1782. It has already been observed, that the seat or durbar of the Nabob, who had taken up his residence at Madras, was one of the most corrupt and active scenes of intrigue that had ever been exhibited in India. The Nabob, who was totally incompetent to his own defence, was necessarily in a state of abject dependence upon the Company; but, receiving directly the revenues of the country, he endeavoured, as far as possible, by the application of money, to secure the gratification of his will. His policy was, to purchase friends among the English rulers; and to excite opposition to those whose acquiescence he failed in acquiring. The effects were mischievous, in a variety of ways. The servants of the Company were too frequently taught to look to the violation, rather than the performance of the duties, as their most certain source of reward; and the business of the Presidency was in general disturbed by a violent spirit of division and counteraction.

The mind of the Nabob was of that class of minds which must, by a kind of necessity, be always governed by somebody; and in the imbecility of age, and of a constitution worn with indulgence, he now leaned more absolutely on the accustomed support than at an earlier period of his life. The persons who at this period had acquired the entire ascendancy over him were Ameer ul Omrah, his second son, and Paul Benfield. The former is described as excelling in all the arts of Eastern, the latter in all the arts of Western, villany. The passion of the former was power, the passion of the latter, money; and this much, at least, appears, that both pursued their ends with much ardour, with great talents for intrigue, with great audacity, and not much of moral restraint. The immediate object of the former was to get his elder brother disinherited, and to obtain the succession for himself. For this purpose the old Nabob, whose passions and those of his favourite were one, had employed all his arts to obtain from the Company an acknowledgment, that he had the right of naming his successor, without regard to the established order of inheritance. With a view, by obtaining favour with the English, to pave the way to this and other desirable objects, the Ameer ul Omrah had acted the part of

a zealous instrument in obtaining the consent of his father to the assignment of the revenues. When he found that Lord Macartney was as little subservient to his purposes, after this event as before, his disappointment and his enmity were equally strong. His endeavour was to render the assignment useless; to annul, if possible, the transaction. As he had his father's mind compliant in all things, so he had it eager in the pursuit of an end, the hope of which served as a balm to the wound his pride had received, in ever relinquishing the management of the revenues. In Benfield he met with an able coadjutor. Benfield had been removed by Lord Macartney from some of the offices which he held as a servant of the Company. The liberalities and the views of the Nabob and his son pointed out a path to fortune as well as revenge.

The first expedient was, by practising on the renters, and other persons in charge of the revenues, to render unproductive the collections. Disordered and desolate as the country was, without a government, and ravaged by a destructive foe, the realising of any revenue was in itself a difficult task. Lord Macartney had appointed a committee, consisting of some of the most trustworthy of the Company's servants at the Presidency, for conducting the business relative to the assigned revenues. They speedily discovered that secret orders and suggestions, which counteracted all their proceedings, had been sent into the districts. The people had been taught to distrust the validity of the engagements formed with the English government; and hence to practise all the arts of delay and evasion. The greatest oppression was evidently exercised upon the unhappy cultivators: yet little could be obtained from the renters and collectors for the Company's treasury; while large sums, it is affirmed, were privately sent to the Ameer ul Omrah.[1]

The known enmity of Sir Eyre Coote to Lord Macartney suggested the first stratagem for overturning the engagement with the President. A bait was offered, the attractions of which, it was supposed, the avidity of the General for power would not be able to resist. The Nabob offered to vest in his hands full authority over all the officers of his government and revenues. But the General too well

[1] Barrow's Life of Macartney, i. 241.

BOOK V. CHAP. VIII.

knew what a frightful chaos his government was, to have any desire for the responsibility of so dangerous a trust.

1783.

As soon as it was found that the ear of the Governor-General was open to representations against the Governor of Madras, it was a channel in which the Nabob and his instruments industriously plied. Lord Macartney was accused of not having abilities to render the assignment of the revenues productive; of enhancing the disorders of the country; and, above all, of practising the utmost cruelty and oppression towards the Nabob and his family. Letters of this import were not only sent at various times, in the Nabob's name, to Bengal; but one was written and transmitted to the British King.

Sufficient encouragement having been received from the Governor-General, the Nabob ventured at last to solicit the restoration of his revenues, by the surrender of the assignment; and his former agents, Assam Khan, and Mr. Richard Sullivan, were sent on a second mission to Bengal, in January, 1783.

Their criminative representations against Macartney were received; and not only entered on the records, but immediately sent to England; without communication to the party accused; and of course without an opportunity afforded him of obviating their effects, however undeserved, by a single word of defence. A most singular examination of the Nabob's agents or advocates took place before the Supreme Council, on the subjects on which the Nabob prayed their interference. The agents were directed to state whatever they knew, and did state whatever they chose; matters of hearsay, as much as of perception; without a word of cross-examination, from an opposite party, to limit and correct the partial representation of interested reporters. After completing their statements, and not before, they were asked, if they would swear to the truth of what they had stated. The compulsion was almost irresistible. To have said, they would not swear, was to confess they had not spoken the truth. Assam Khan, however, excused himself, on the plea that it was not honourable for a Mussulman to confirm what he said by an oath. Mr. Sullivan had no such apology, and therefore he took his oath, but with a tolerable latitude; that, "to the best of his belief and remembrance, he had

spoken the truth, and nothing but the truth;" an oath which, if we have charity enough to believe it to be in no degree strained, affected not any part of the truth, however material, which it might have suited and pleased him to suppress.

On the strength of this information, partial and interested as it was, a resolution was passed, on the 8th of January, 1783, to surrender the assignment into the hands of the Nabob; though not only had this assignment been formerly approved and highly praised by the Governor-General and Council, as an act of equal utility and justice, but the delicacy of the Madras government, which endeavoured to accomplish the end by gentle means, had been treated as too scrupulous, and the utility of a greater severity particularly and strongly displayed.[1]

The interruption and disturbance which the Nabob was able to give to the government of Madras, he was emboldened to carry to the greatest height, by the encouragement he received from so high a quarter. A viler display of hypocrisy is not upon record, than the language in which the author of the calamities of the whole Rohilla nation, of those of Cheyte Sing, and of the Begums of Oude, affected to bewail the cruelties which, he said, were practised upon the Nabobs of the Carnatic and Oude, by Lord Macartney, and Mr. Bristow. "The condition," Mr. Hastings said,[2] "of both Princes is equally destitute and

[1] The reader should have before him the very words. In the letter from the Governor-General and Council to the President and Select Committee of Fort St. George, dated 5th April, 1782, they "regret," they say, "that the government of Madras should have suffered any consideration, even of delicacy towards the Nabob, or attention for those feelings which it might be natural for him to retain, to restrain them from availing themselves as effectually for the assignment as the desperate necessity which exacted such a concession, inevitably demanded." They add a great compliment, and say, "Happy would it be for the national interest and reputation, if the same disinterested and forbearing spirit should invariably dictate the conduct of their affairs." They rise to the use of unlimited terms, instructing the Governor to assume every power necessary to render the assignment effective—"in a word, the whole sovereignty" (such is their expression) "if it shall be necessary to the exercise of such a charge, not admitting the interposition of any authority whatever, which may possibly impede it. If you continue the Nabob's agents; or suffer them to remain, under whatever denomination, in the actual or virtual control of the revenue, they are your servants, and you alone will be deemed responsible for all their acts. And your intercourse with the Nabob may and ought to be restricted to simple acts and expressions of kindness."

[2] In his Minute on the 2nd of November, 1783, printed among the papers presented to the House of Commons on the 13th of March, 1786. For the opinion which Mr. Hastings entertained of the mischievous character of the Nabob, and of the intrigues of which he was at once the cause and the dupe,

BOOK V. CHAP. VIII. 1783.

equally oppressed; and the humiliation of their remonstrances shows them to be equally hopeless of any redress but in the mercy of their oppressors."[1] Orders were despatched to Madras for the restoration of his revenues to the Nabob; of which the sixth part, which he had reserved he himself, as requisite for the maintenance of his family and dignity, had been exactly paid; and in reality yielded to him more money for his private purposes, than he had ever before enjoyed. It curiously happened that before the orders of Supreme Council arrived at Madras, despatches were received from the Court of Directors, which conveyed their approbation of the assignment, and commanded the assistance of the Bengal government to render it effectual; despatches which, at the same time, contained the condemnation of the transaction by which Mr. Sullivan was appointed an agent of the Supreme Council at the residence of the Nabob, and a declaration that the only organ of communication with Mahommed Ali was the Governor and Council of Madras. Upon this communication from the Court of Directors, the Governor and Council applied to the Supreme Council for the assistance which they were commanded to yield. After a hesitation of a few months, the Supreme Council resolved to disobey: and informing the Governor and Council of Madras, that they assumed the right of judging for themselves, they repeated their orders of the 13th of January, and commanded the surrender of the assignment.

"The consequences of obedience appeared to Lord Macartney of the most alarming description. The pay of the Madras army was at that moment seven months in arrear: from the resources of the Carnatic alone was any supply to be obtained: not a single pagoda, since the death of Sir Eyre Coote, had been sent from Bengal: if the assignment was given up, the slender produce of the Circars, which Mr. Hastings would have sacrificed, would alone have remained; and neither the native, nor European

entertained as long as since the period when he was second in Council at Madras; see the records of that Presidency in Rous's Appendix, p. 682*, 688*, 704, 717, 718, 729.

[1] Nothing is here stated but the truth; and the cases of both princes were not analogous to those with which they are contrasted. At the same time there is no doubt that Hastings would have felt little sympathy for either, if he thought their situation incompatible with public benefit or necessity. —W.

troeps, could be expected to bear any addition to the privations which they now endured. With a prospect of the actual dissolution of the government, if the revenues, on which every thing depended, were at so extraordinary a moment given up; and fully impressed with the conviction that to surrender them to the Nabob was to render them unavailing to the defence of the country, defence which then fell upon the Company without any resources, and oppressed them with a burden which they were unable to bear, he resolved to maintain the assignment, which, at the close of the second year, had yielded one million sterling from those very countries, which for eighteen months after the invasion of Hyder Ali had not contributed a pagoda toward the expenses of the war.

With this disobedience, Mr. Hastings, whose administration was now so formidably assailed in England, and who was deeply concerned in the success with which he might perform the business of winding it up, found, either not leisure, or not inclination, to enter into contest.[1]

After the unreserved exhibition, which I have accounted it my duty to make, of the evidence which came before me of the errors and vices of Mr. Hastings's administration, it is necessary, for the satisfaction of my own mind, and to save me from the fear of having given a more unfavourable conception than I intended of his character and conduct, to impress upon the reader the obligation of considering two things. The first is, that Mr. Hastings was placed in difficulties, and acted upon by temptations, such as few public men have been called upon to overcome: and of this the preceding history affords abundant evidence. The second is, that no man, probably, who ever had a great share in the government of the world, had his public conduct so completely explored and laid open to view. The mode of transacting the business of the Company, almost wholly by writing; first, by written consultations in the Council; secondly, by written commands on the part of the Directors, and written statements

[1] Papers presented to the House of Commons, pursuant to their orders of the 9th of February, 1803, regarding the affairs of the Carnatic, vol. ii.; Barrow's Life of Lord Macartney, i. 238—280.

BOOK V. CHAP. VIII. 1785.

of every thing done on the part of their servants in India; afforded a body of evidence, such as under no other government ever did or could exist. This evidence was brought forward, with a completeness never before exemplified, first by the contentions of a powerful party in the Council in India; next by the inquiries of two searching committees of the House of Commons; in the third place by the production of almost every paper which could be supposed to throw light upon his conduct, during the discussions upon the proceedings relative to his impeachment in the House of Commons; lastly, by the production of papers upon his trial. And all this was elucidated and commented upon by the keenest spirits of the age; and for a long time without any interposition of power to screen his offences from detection. It is my firm conviction, that if we had the same advantage with respect to other men, who have been as much engaged in the conduct of public affairs, and could view their conduct as completely naked, and stripped of all its disguises, few of them would be found, whose character would present a higher claim to indulgence than his. In point of ability, he is beyond all question the most eminent of the chief rulers whom the Company have ever employed; nor is there any one of them, who would not have succumbed under the difficulties which, if he did not overcome, he at any rate sustained. He had no genius, any more than Clive, for schemes of policy including large views of the past, and large anticipations of the future; but he was hardly ever excelled in the skill of applying temporary expedients to temporary difficulties; in putting off the evil day; and in giving a fair complexion to the present one. He had not the forward and imposing audacity of Clive; but he had a calm firmness, which usually, by its constancy, wore out all resistance. He was the first, or among the first, of the servants of the Company, who attempted to acquire any language of the natives, and who set on foot those liberal inquiries into the literature and institutions of the Hindus, which have led to the satisfactory knowledge of the present day. He had the great art of a ruler, which consists in attaching to the Governor those who are governed; his administration

assuredly was popular, both with his countrymen and the natives in Bengal.[1]

CHAPTER IX.

Legislative Proceedings from 1773 *to* 1780.—*Renewal of the Charter.—Select and Secret Committees of the House of Commons.—Proceedings against Indian Delinquency.—Mr. Dundas's East India Bill.—Mr. Fox's East India Bills —Mr. Pitt's East India Bill.*

IT is now time to inquire into the proceedings to which the affairs of India had given birth in England since the last great legislative interference. From the year 1767 till the year 1773, the East India Company was bound to pay to the public, yearly, the sum of 400,000*l.*, "in respect of the territorial acquisitions and revenues lately obtained in the East Indies." But in the year 1773, the financial embarrassments of the Company became so great, that

[1] The same course is here adopted that was pursued in regard to Clive, and an inculpatory review of almost all the leading measures of the administration of Hastings is nullified by a tardy admission of its general merits. But if all his most important acts are open to the charges of cruelty, injustice, vindictiveness, corruption, vileness, self-seeking, dishonesty, and hypocrisy; if he trampled upon the just rights of all the native princes with whom he had to deal; if he instigated and fostered wars of unjust aggression; if he interfered unauthorizedly and impoliticly with the powers of the other Presidencies; if he patronised base and corrupt men, and dismissed and persecuted honest men; if he employed the authority of justice to sanctify falsehood, and even to minister to his vengeance; it is not possible to conceive in what his redeeming virtues consisted. It cannot be believed, that with all this mass of criminality against him, he should have enjoyed the attachment of those whom he governed, and that his administration should have been popular, not only with his countrymen, but with the natives of Bengal. The more ready solution of the problem is, the falsehood of the accusation. That every act of a government, so full of momentous and perilous matter as his, should be free from rational exception, perhaps from just censure, would be a phenomenon to which the history of man could afford no parallel. Like other men, he was occasionally ignorant or imperfectly informed; he doubted, he wavered, he changed his opinion, he was biassed by his feelings; he judged erroneously, he acted wrongly. He was not, however, judged like other men, by his acts, but every mistake or misconception, every hasty impression, every fluctuating purpose, every injudicious resolution, was hunted out, made public, and arrayed in evidence against him. The Author may well say, that few statesmen could endure such a searching exposure. The ultimate decision of the world will, however, be pronounced not upon a pitiful dissection of his private, but the great body of his public acts, and this decision has already elevated him above grovelling detraction. We look now with wonder, not unmixed with contempt, upon the almost insane virulence with which he was assailed, and think of him in no other character than that of the ablest of the able men who have given to Great Britain her Indian empire.—W.

BOOK V. CHAP. IX. 1781.

they were obliged to solicit, and they received, a loan from the public of 1,400,000*l.* At that time it was represented, "That in the then circumstances of the East India Company, it would not be in their power to provide for the repayment of such loan, and for the establishing their affairs upon a more secure foundation for the time to come, unless the public should agree to forego for the present, all participation in the profits arising from the territorial acquisitions and revenues lately obtained in the East Indies."[1] It was accordingly, at that time enacted, that it should not be lawful to make a dividend of more than six per cent. per annum on the Company's capital stock, till that loan was repaid; and that the whole of their surplus profits should be applied to its liquidation: that after the loan of 1,400,000*l.* should be repaid, it should not be lawful to make a dividend of more than seven per cent. per annum upon the capital stock, until, by the application of the whole of their surplus profits, their bond debt should be reduced to the sum of 1,500,000*l.* In the year 1769, the loan being repaid, and the debt reduced, according to the terms of the preceding ordinance, an act was passed, to be in force for one year, permitting a dividend of eight per cent. for that year, and reserving the surplus profits for the future disposal of the legislature. In the year 1780, another act was passed for one year also, containing precisely the same enactments as that of the preceding year.

As the exclusive privileges were to expire upon three years' notice after the 25th of March, 1780, it was now high time to treat about a renewal of the charter; and accordingly, during the latter part of that year, and the beginning of 1781, much negotiation took place between the treasury and the East India House. In parliament, the business was of very difficult handling. The contests between the Supreme Council and Supreme Court, which were represented as actually opposing one another with an armed force, had given occasion to petitions from the British subjects in India, from the Governor-General and Council, and from the East India Company; and had made a deep impression upon the public mind. The complaints and representations of Mr. Francis, taken up

[1] Such are the words of the preamble of the Act, 21 Geo. III. c. 65.

warmly by a powerful party in the legislative assembly, had filled the nation with ideas of injustice and other crimes on the part of Mr. Hastings. Intelligence had been received of the irruption of Hyder Ali into the Carnatic, with the strongest representations of the misconduct of those agents under whom so much calamity had arrived. And strong fears were excited, that the ruin of the English interests, in that part of the world, was at hand.

The points were two, upon which the views of the minister and the Company found it difficult to concur; the right to the territory; and the remuneration due to the public for the advantages which the East India Company were allowed to enjoy. According to the minister, the right of the crown to all territory acquired by subjects, was a matter of established law. The Company were at this time sufficiently bold to assert, that the Indian territory which they had acquired belonged of right to themselves. On the other point, the only question was, what proportion of the proceeds from the Indian territory the East India Company should be made to give up to the nation.

Lord North was now tottering on the ministerial throne; the East India Company were, therefore, encouraged to greater boldness, in standing out for favourable terms; and they declined to bring forward a petition for a renewal of the charter, on those terms to which the minister desired to reduced them. On the 9th of April, 1781, he represented, that "though he did not then intend to state any specific proposition relative to the future management of the Company's affairs, still he held it to be his duty to state to the House some points, that would be very proper for them to consider, before they should proceed to vote. First, the propriety of making the Company account with the public for three-fourths of all the net profits above eight per cent. for dividend; Secondly, of granting a renewal of the charter for an exclusive trade for a short rather than a long term; Thirdly, of giving a greater degree of power than had been hitherto enjoyed, to the Governor of Bengal, that, in future, among the members of the Council, he might be something more than a *primus inter pares*, equal with the name of chief; Fourthly, of establishing a tribunal in England, for juris-

BOOK V. CHAP. IX. 1781.

diction in affairs relating to India, and punishing those servants of the Company who should be convicted of having abused their power; Fifthly, the propriety, as all the despatches received from India by the Directors were by agreement shown to his Majesty's Secretary of State, of making all despatches to India be shown to him before they were sent, lest the Directors might, at some time or other, precipitate this kingdom into a war, without necessity, with the princes of that country; Sixthly," he said, "it would be the business of the House to determine, upon what terms, and whether with or without the territorial revenues, the charter should be renewed; Seventhly, whether, if government should retain the territories, it might not compel the Company to bring home the revenue for government; and, Eighthly, whether any, and what regulations ought to be made, with respect to the Supreme Court of Judicature."[1]

Of these propositions, the third, the fourth, and the fifth, are remarkable, as the archetype, from which were afterwards copied three of the principal provisions in Mr. Pitt's celebrated East India Bill.[2]

At last a compromise was effected between the minister and the Directors. A petition for renewal of the charter was presented from the Directors, on the 26th of June, 1781. An act was passed, of which the following were the principal provisions: That, whereas the Company, since

[1] See Parliamentary History, xxii. 111.

[2] The purport of these three propositions he expressed more explicitly on the 25th of May. "He had an idea which he had once thrown out, of giving the Governor-General greater powers than were at present vested in him; authorizing him in some cases to act independently of his Council, only stating to them, after he had so acted, the reasons upon which he justified his conduct, and sending home those reasons; together with such as the Council should at the time have delivered, in case they differed in opinion from the Governor-General..... Another matter he designed to introduce was this: At present the Company were obliged to send copies of all their despatches from India, but not of any of the orders and instructions which they sent out: he meant, therefore, to insert in the bill a clause, obliging them to show to the Lords of the Treasury, or the Secretaries of State, all their instructions to their servants that related to their political and military conduct; and to add further, that if his Majesty thought proper to signify, through his Secretaries of State, to the Directors, any order relative to the particular conduct of the Company's servants, in regard to the prosecution and management of war in India, or to the political direction of affairs, or to any treaties with the powers in India, that the Directors should be obliged to obey such order, and to send it out to India immediately..... He thought it would be a desirable thing to establish a Court of Judicature in this kingdom, to hear and determine, in a summary way, all charges of peculation and oppression in India." Ib. p. 326.

1781.

the 24th of June, 1778, when they had paid their loan to the public, and reduced their bond debt to the pre-appointed limits, had been in possession of all the profits arising from the Indian territory, exempt from participation with the public, they pay 400,000*l.* to the public, in discharge of all claims upon that account previous to the 1st of March, 1781: that all the former privileges granted to the Company be continued to them, till three years' notice after the 1st of March, 1791: that the Company pay out of their clear profits, a dividend of eight per cent. per annum on the capital stock, and of the surplus three-fourths to the public, reserving the remainder to their own use: and that the claims with respect to the territory, on the part both of the Crown and of the Company, remain unaffected by the present act. Of the propositions thrown out by the minister, for the introduction of reforms into the government of India, only one was carried into effect; namely, that regarding the powers of ministers over the political transactions of the Company. It was ordained that they should communicate to ministers all despatches which they sent to India, with respect to their revenues, and their civil and military affairs; and that in all matters relative to war and peace, and transactions with other powers, they should be governed by the directions which ministers might prescribe.[1]

On the 12th of February, 1781, petitions from the Governor-General and Council, and from a number of British subjects residing in Bengal, and from the United Company of merchants trading to the East Indies, against the pretensions and proceedings of the Supreme Court of Judicature, were read in the House of Commons; and after a debate it was agreed, that a Select Committee should be chosen to whom they were referred. This was that celebrated committee who were afterwards instructed to take into consideration the administration of justice, in the provinces of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa; and in what manner that country might be governed with the greatest advantage to the people, both of Great Britain and of India; in which Committee the most conspicuous, as well as the most laborious member, was Edmund Burke.

The Select Committee was moved for by General Smith,

[1] 21 Geo. III. cap. 65.

BOOK V. CHAP. IX. 1781.

who belonged to what is called the opposition party in the House; and it was chiefly composed of members who had acted not in concert with the minister. That a want of equal zeal for the elucidation of Indian delinquency might not be imputed to his party, the minister, on the 30th of April, immediately after the arrival of the news of the irruption of Hyder Ali into the Carnatic, moved for the formation of a Secret Committee, who should inquire into the causes of the war, then subsisting in the Carnatic, and into the state of the British possessions on the coast. This Committee was composed almost entirely of persons connected with the minister; and Mr. Henry Dundas, then Lord Advocate of Scotland, was its presiding and most active member.

The first of these Committees presented the House with twelve Reports, the other with six; and the public is deeply indebted to them for the publication of the most important documents of the Indian government, during the period to which their inquiries applied. Any considerable desire for the welfare of India, guided by any considerable degree of intelligence, would have drawn a great lesson from that example. An adequate plan for a regular, and successive, and still more perfect publication of the most material documents of the Indian administration, would be one of the most efficient of all expedients for improving the government of that distant dependency.[1]

On the 23rd of May, a report from the Select Committee on the petitions against the Supreme Court was read; and leave to bring in a bill for the better administration of justice in Bengal, for the relief of certain persons imprisoned at Calcutta under a judgment of the Court, and for imdemnifying the Governor-General and Council for resisting its process. The subject was debated on the

[1] The Reports of the two Committees, described in the text, undoubtedly contain a vast mass of authentic and important matter, so as to have extracted from the Records of the Company all that is of consequence for the elucidation of events during the periods to which they refer. Some of the contents are trivial and irrelevant, but the whole compilation is of exceeding value. Many important official documents, illustrative of the history of British India, have been published from time to time, since the date of those celebrated Reports, and, consistently with the spirit of the present day, official muniments regarding India likely to be multiplied. Their utility, however, is even already impaired by their abundance, and the labour of consulting them is unfavourable to their being advantageously consulted. A systematized and judicious selection is wanted, to render them conveniently subservient to public information.—W.

19th of June, Mr. Dunning being the most remarkable of the opponents of the bill. It was passed without delay; and it exempted from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court the Governor-General and Council, all matters of revenue, and all Zemindars, and other native farmers and collectors of the revenue.[1]

Lord North resigned the office of Minister in the month of March, 1782; and was succeeded by the Marquis of Rockingham and party, the hostility of whom to the present managers in India was sufficiently known.

On the 9th of April, 1782, Mr. Dundas moved that the reports which he had presented as Chairman of the Secret Committee should be referred to a Committee of the whole House; and, in a speech of nearly three hours in length, unfolded the causes and extent of the national calamities in the East. He expatiated on the misconduct of the Indian Presidencies, and the Court of Directors; of the former, because they plunged the nation into wars for the sake of conquest, contemned and violated the engagement of treaties, and plundered and oppressed the people of India; of the latter, because they blamed misconduct only when it was unattended with profit, but exercised a very constant forbearance towards the greatest delinquency, as often as it was productive of a temporary gain. The speech was followed up by a number of propositions, which he moved in the shape of resolutions. Beside the reproaches which these resolutions cast upon the general strain of the Company's administration in India, they pronounced a condemnation, so strong upon the measures of the Presidency of Madras, that nothing less than criminal proceedings against the authors of them could accord with so vehement a declaration of their guilt. The resolutions

[1] The object of the act is not so much to exempt from the jurisdiction of the Court natives of India inhabitants of the provinces, as to forbid the pretexts under which they had been attempted to be brought within that jurisdiction. It is therefore enacted, that no person shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, for, or by reason of his being a land-owner, land-holder or farmer of land, or deriving his support in any way from connexion with landed property, or exercising any ordinary or local authority commonly annexed to the possession or farm of lands. It also declared that no native, for or by reason of his being employed by the Company, or British subjects, either in public or private matters, should become subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in any questions of inheritance or contract, except under special agreement. The exemptions of the Governor and Council, and the prohibition of the Court's interference on matters of revenue, are as stated in the text. See a useful compilation, entitled the Law relating to India and the East India Company, 1840, p. 41.—W.

BOOK V. CHAP. IX. 1782.

were solemnly voted; articles of charge against Sir Thomas Rumbold and other Members of the Madras Council were adopted; and a bill of pains and penalties, for breaches of public trust, and high crimes and misdemeanors, committed by Sir Thomas Rumbold, was introduced by Mr. Dundas. The bill was read a first time. Before the second reading, Sir Thomas Rumbold was heard in his defence. The session drew to a close, before a great progress was made. In the beginning of 1783, the state of the ministry was unsettled. And, as if, when ministry is unsettled, parliament were inadequate to its functions, the bill was neglected till the middle of the session. After the middle of the session, the members soon began to be remiss in their attendance.[1] And on the 19th of December, immediately after the dismissal of Mr. Fox's coalition ministry, a motion was made and carried for adjourning the further consideration of the bill till the 24th of June next, by which the prosecution was finally dropped. Sir Thomas consented to accept of impunity without acquittal; his judges refused to proceed in his trial, after they had solemnly affirmed the existence of guilt: and a black stain was attached to the character of them both.

Beside his prosecution of Sir Thomas Rumbold, Mr. Dundas proceeded to urge the legislature to specific propositions against Mr. Hastings and Mr. Hornby, the presiding members of the other Presidencies. Against Mr. Hastings, in particular, he preferred a grievous accusation, grounded on the recent intelligence of the ruin brought upon the Raja Cheyte Sing. On the 30th of May, 1782,

[1] On the 2nd of May, 1783, "The Lord Advocate complained of the very thin attendance that he had hitherto found, whenever the bill of pains and penalties against Sir Thomas Rumbold became the subject of discussion. He wished to know whether it was seriously intended to pursue the business to the end or not? If it was the intention of the House to drop it, he wished to be made acquainted with that circumstance, and then he would not move for another hearing on the subject; for it was a mockery to go into the evidence on the bill, when there could not be kept together a sufficient number of members to make a house.—Mr. *Fox* declared, that, to drop the bill would be productive of the most fatal consequences; for it would convince the world, that the most atrocious misconduct in India would meet with impunity in parliament. And, therefore, he requested gentlemen would, for the credit, honour, and interest of the country, attend to the evidence for and against the bill. If the bill should be lost for want of attendance, it would not clear the character of Sir T. Rumbold. On the other hand, it would hold out his idea to the people of India, that it was in vain for them to expect redress of their grievances in England—Mr. W. *Pitt* thought, that some mode might be devised to enforce attendance, as in the case of ballots for election committees." Parliamentary History, xxiii. 805.

he moved, and the House adopted, the following resolution: "That Warren Hastings, Esq. Governor-General of Bengal, and William Hornby, Esq. President of the Council of Bombay, having in sundry instances acted in a manner repugnant to the honour and policy of this nation, and thereby brought great calamities on India, and enormous expenses on the East India Company, it is the duty of the Directors of the said Company to pursue all legal and effectual means for the removal of the said Governor-General and President from their respective offices, and to recall them to Great Britain." The Marquis of Rockingham was still minister; and his party appeared to have firmly determined upon the recall of Mr. Hastings. The vote of the House of Commons was therefore followed by a similar proceeding on the part of the Directors. But the death of the Marquis, which happened at this critical period, gave courage and strength to the friends of that Governor, and in a Court of Proprietors of East India Stock on the 31st of October, 1782, the order of recall which had been made by the Court of Directors was rescinded by a large majority.

On the 24th of April, 1782, the Chairman of the Select Committee presented a series of resolutions, which referred to little more than two points. Mr. Sullivan, who was Chairman of the East India Company, had mis-stated a conference held between him and certain Members of the House of Commons; and the consequence had been, that the relief intended to certain persons confined in the common gaol at Calcutta, had been considerably delayed. Mr. Sullivan had also postponed the transmission of the act of parliament for the remedy of the evils arising from the proceedings of the Supreme Court of Judicature. Mr. Sullivan had, moreover, bound a clerk at the India House, peculiarly qualified to give information, by an oath of secrecy, from communicating evidence to the Select Committee. A series of resolutions were, therefore, moved and carried for the censure of Mr. Sullivan. This is the first of the points to which the resolutions moved on the part of the Select Committee referred. On the second, viz. the conjunct transaction of Mr. Hastings and Sir Elijah Impey, in making the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court head of the Sudder Dewannee Adaulut, it was

BOOK V. CHAP. IX. 1783.

resolved, that the dependence of the Chief Justice, created by holding emoluments at the pleasure of the executive government, was inconsistent with the faithful administration of justice. That the Governor-General and Chief Justice were highly culpable in that transaction: and that the appointment should be immediately vacated and annulled. To these resolutions were added other two: the first, "That the powers given to the Governor-General and Council by the East India Act of 1773, ought to be more distinctly ascertained." The second, "That it will be proper to reduce into one act the several acts of parliament made to regulate the East India Company, and further to explain and amend the same, and also to make new regulations and provisions to the same end." The whole of these resolutions were carried; and upon those which related to the dependence, in other words the corruption, of the Chief Justice, was founded a resolution, voted on the 3rd of May, for an address to the King, that he would recall Sir Elijah Impey, to answer for his conduct in that transaction.

The vote of the Court of Proprietors, in opposition to the recall of Mr. Hastings, was severely reprobated by Mr. Dundas, at the beginning of the next session of parliament, when he moved, that all the proceedings in relation to it should be laid before the House; and pronounced it an act both dangerous in principle, and insulting to the authority of parliament.

On the 5th of March, 1783, a petition from the United Company of Merchants trading to the East Indies was presented to the House of Commons, and referred to a Committee. It set forth, that having paid 300,000*l.* of the sum exacted of them for the benefit of the public, by the late act, they were unable to pay the 100,000*l.* which remained; that the advances which had already been received by the public "were made under mistaken ideas of the petitioners' pecuniary abilities;" that the aid necessary to carry on their affairs only to the 1st of March, 1784, would, upon the most moderate calculation, be 900,000*l.*, even if excused the payment of the sum of 100,000*l.*, due upon the late agreement; and they prayed, that if re-imbursement be not made to them, they be allowed to increase their bond debt, without diminishing their dividend,

which would affect their credit; that they be not required to share anything with the public, till the increase thus made of their bond debts be again wholly reduced; that the term of their exclusive privileges, a short term being injurious to their credit, should be enlarged; and that the petitioners be relieved from that share of the expense attending the service of the King's troops and navy which according to the late act they were bound to afford. Two acts were passed for their relief; the first allowing more time for the payment of the taxes for which they were in arrear, and enabling them to borrow money on their bond, to the amount of 500,000*l.*; the second act (the relief granted by the first being found insufficient), accommodated them with a loan from the public to the amount of 300,000*l.*; both acts permitting them to continue a dividend of eight per cent.; though, after paying necessary expenses, their receipt fell short of that dividend by a sum of 255,813*l.*[1] They borrowed money, therefore, to be divided among themselves, to that amount; a singular way for a trader to keep out of debt.

Upon the death of the Marquis of Rockingham, the Earl of Shelburne, afterwards Marquis of Lansdowne, became minister, and continued in office from the 13th of July, 1782, till the 5th of April, 1783. At that time, the coalition of Lord North and Mr. Fox gave existence to the ministry which that circumstance has served to designate, and to characterize.

The former exertions of Mr. Dundas, in the investigation and adjustment of the nation's Indian affairs, were followed up by a bill, which he introduced to the House on the 14th of April, 1783. Its principal provisions were these: That the King should have the power of recall over the principal servants of the Company: that the Governor-General and Council of Bengal should have a controlling power over the other presidencies; and that the Governor-General should have a power of acting, on his own responsibility, in opposition to the opinion of his Council: that the Governors of the other presidencies should not have a power of originating any measure contrary to their Councils, but a power of suspending their

[1] See the acts of 23 Geo. III. cap. 36 and 89; and Cobbett's Parl. Hist. xxiii. 571.

BOOK V. CHAP. IX. 1783.

action by a negative till the opinion of the Controlling Presidency should be known: that the displaced Zemindars should be replaced: that the Raja of Tanjore should be secured in all his present possessions. In his speech he repeated his former arguments for the recall of Mr. Hastings; and then launched out into the numerous and extraordinary circumstances, which pointed out Lord Cornwallis as the fittest person in the world for the government of India. "Here there was no broken fortune to be mended! Here was no avarice to be gratified! Here was no beggarly, mushroom kindred to be provided for! No crew of hungry followers, gaping to be gorged!"[1] Leave was given to bring in the bill. But Mr. Dundas, who was now in opposition, and of course received no encouragement from the ministry, did not persevere.

On the 11th of November, in the year 1783, a new parliament met. In the speech from the throne they were informed, that definitive treaties of peace had been signed, or preliminaries ratified, with the courts of France and Spain, with the United States of America, and the States General of the United Provinces. They were also informed, that among the important objects, the urgency of which had required their presence after so short a recess, the affairs and government of India solicited the utmost exertions of their abilities, and that the fruit was now expected of those important inquiries, which had been so long and diligently pursued.

By the treaty of peace with France, Pondicherry, and Carrical, to both of which some territory was annexed, the whole of the possessions which France enjoyed in Bengal and Orissa at the commencement of the war, together with Mahé, and the power of restoring their factory at Surat, were conceded to the French. In the treaty with the Dutch, Trincomalee was restored; but Negapatam was retained.

The opponents of the ministry, in both houses of parliament, proclaimed aloud the necessity, occasioned by the state of affairs in India, for instant and effectual reform. They enumerated the abuses which appeared to prevail; and they called upon, they stimulated, and importuned

[1] See the acts of 23 Geo. III. cap. 36 and 39; and Cobbett's Parl. Hist. xxiii. 759.

the minister to bring forward a scheme of improvement, and without delay to gratify the impatient expectation of the people. In these vehement calls, the voice of Mr. William Pitt was distinguished for its loudness and importunity. At that time it suited him to desire not only reform, but complete reform: reform, co-extensive with the evil possible to be removed, and the good capable of being attained. He challenged and summoned the minister to bring forward a plan, "not of temporary palliation or timorous expedients; but vigorous and effectual; suited to the magnitude, the importance, and the alarming exigency of the case." Mr. Fox afforded his adversaries but little time to complain of delay.

His plan was divided into two parts, and introduced in two separate bills; one having a reference to the governing power at home; the other to the administration in India.

I. For constituting an organ of government at home, the two existing Courts of Directors and Proprietors of the East India Company were to be abolished, as totally inadequate to the ends of their institution; and, in their room, seven Commissioners were to be named in the act, that is, chosen by the legislature. These commissioners, acting as trustees for the Company, were to be invested with full powers for ordering and administering the territories, revenues, and commerce of India; and to have the sole power of placing and displacing all persons in the service of the Company, whether in England or abroad.

The following were the most material of the subordinate regulations.

For managing the details of the commerce, but subject to the authority and commands of the Superior Board, nine assistant Directors were to be named by the legislature, being Proprietors, each of not less than 2,000*l.* of East India capital stock.

In the superior body, vacancies were to be supplied by the King; in the inferior, they were to be supplied by the Proprietors, voting by open poll. Removals in the superior body were to be performed by the King, upon the address of either house of Parliament; in the inferior, by the same authority, and also by concurrence

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of any five of the Chief Directors, recording their reasons.

For the more speedy and effectual repression of offences committed in India, the Directors were, within twenty-one days after the receipt of any accusation or charge, to enter upon the examination of it, and either punish the offender, or record their reasons for not punishing.

Before any person who had served in India, and against whom any charge appeared, should be allowed to return, the Directors were to make a particular inquiry into the circumstances of the charge, and to record their reasons for permitting the return.

Upon knowledge of any dispute subsisting between the heads of the different settlements, or between the heads and their councils, the Directors were to institute immediate inquiry, and come to a decision in three months, or to record their reasons why they did not.

If the constituted authorities at any of the settlements should require the direction or opinion of the Directors, they were to give it in three months, or to record their reasons for not giving it.

If any injury to any native prince should be complained of, or appear, the Directors were to inquire, and to make compensation wherever it was due.

For publicity, one expedient was thought to suffice,—that the Directors should, once in six months, lay before the Proprietors the state of the commerce; and before the commencement of each parliamentary session, should present to the ministers certain political and commercial statements, which the ministers should exhibit to parliament.

It was provided that no Director or Assistant Director, should, while in office, hold any place of profit under the Company, or any place during pleasure under the King; but neither was to be disqualified for retaining a seat in parliament. And the act was to continue in force during four years.

II. Under the second part of the plan, that which had for its object the reform of the immediate administration in India, no improvement whatsoever, in the order and distribution of the powers of government, was attempted, and hardly any thing higher was proposed, than to point out what were deemed the principal errors or delinquencies

into which the Indian government had strayed, and to forbid them in future.

Strict obedience was enjoined to the commands of the Directors, because Mr. Hastings, whenever a strong motive occurred, disobeyed them.

The councils were forbidden to delegate their powers; because, in two memorable instances, those of his journeys to the Upper Provinces, the Supreme Council had delegated theirs to Mr. Hastings.

The regular communication to the councils of all correspondence, was rendered imperative, upon the Governor-General and other Presidents; because Mr. Hastings, when he had certain objects to serve, had withheld parts of the correspondence.

Because the other servants of the Company had usually united with the governors, in those proceedings of theirs which were most highly condemned, the servants were to be rendered less dependent upon the governors, by lodging a greater share of the patronage in the hands of the commissioners.

No banyan, or native steward, of any of the principal servants, was to be allowed to rent the revenues; because the banyan of Mr. Hastings had rented them to a great amount. Such renting to the banyan was declared to be the same thing as renting to the master.

No presents were to be taken, even for the use of the Company; because Mr. Hastings had taken presents, and screened himself by giving them up, at last, to the Company.

The abolition was to be ordained of all monopolies; because the Company's servants in Bengal had been the cause of evil, by monopolizing salt, beetel-nut, and tobacco.

Passing then from the imputed errors in Bengal to those at Madras, the bill proposed to enact:

That no protected or dependent prince should reside in the Company's territory, or rent their lands; because the Nabob of Arcot had disturbed the Presidency with intrigues, by residing at Madras, and had rented, as was alleged, corruptly, the Madras Jaghire.

That no civil or military servant of the Company should lend money to such prince, rent his lands, or

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have with him any pecuniary transaction; because, the lending of money to the Nabob of Arcot, renting his lands, and other money transactions between him and the Company's servants, had given rise to many inconveniences.

As the inaccurate definition of the limits prescribed to the control of the Governor-General and Council over the other Presidencies, had been fertile in disputes, an attempt, but not very skilful, was made to remove that deficiency, by enacting that it should extend to all transactions which had a tendency to provoke other states to war.

The old prohibition of the extension of territory was enforced, by forbidding hostile entrance upon any foreign territory, except after intelligence of such hostile preparations, as were considered serious by a majority of the Council; forbidding alliance with any power for dividing between them any acquirable territory; and loans of troops to the native princes; excepting, in all these cases, by allowance of the Directors.

The project of declaring the Zemindars, and other managers of the land revenue, hereditary proprietors of the land, and the tax fixed and invariable — originally started by Mr. Francis, and in part proposed for enactment in the late bill of Mr. Dundas — was adopted.

Instead of the regulation, introduced into the bill of Mr. Dundas, that the Governor-General should have a power of acting on his own responsibility, independently of the will of his Council, power was only to be given to him, and to the Presidents at the other settlements, of adjourning or postponing, for a limited time, the consideration of any question in their respective councils.

A mode was prescribed for adjusting the disputes of the Nabob of Arcot with his creditors, and with the Raja of Tanjore.

All offences against the act were rendered amenable to the courts of law in England and India. And all persons in the service of the Company, in India, or in that of any Indian prince, were declared unfit, during the time of that service, and some succeeding time, to hold the situation of a member of the lower house of parliament.

No proceeding of the English government, in modern

times, has excited a greater ferment in the nation, than these two bills of Mr. Fox. An alarm diffused itself, for which the ground was extremely scanty, and for which, notwithstanding the industry and the art with which the advantage was improved by the opposite party, it is difficult, considering the usual apathy of the public on much more important occasions, entirely to account. The character of Mr. Fox, who was at that time extremely unpopular, and from the irregularity of his private habits, as well as the apparent sacrifice of all principle in his coalition with Lord North, was, by a great part of the nation, regarded as a profligate gamester, both in public and in private life, contributed largely to the existence of the storm, and to the apprehensions of danger from the additional power which he appeared to be taking into his hands.[1] In the House of Commons, indeed, the party of the minister eminently prevailed; and though every objection which the imagination of the orators could frame, was urged against the measure, with the utmost possible pertinacity, vehemence, and zeal, the bill passed by a majority of more than two to one.

In the meantime opportunity had been found for alarming the mind of the King. The notion circulated was, that, by vesting the whole patronage of India in the hands of Mr. Fox, by vesting it in a board of commissioners, under his appointment, it would be impossible for the King ever to employ, as minister, any other man; and the power of Mr. Fox would be rendered absolute over both the King and the people. Instead of having recourse to the expedients, which the law had placed in his hands, of dismissing his ministers, or even dissolving the parliament; a clandestine course was adopted, which violated the forms of the constitution. Though it had often been declared that the constitution depended on the total exemption of the deliberations in parliament from the im-

[1] To prevent misconception, it is necessary to preclude the inference that I concur in the opinion, which I give in the text, as one among the causes of a particular effect. In the private character of Mr. Fox, there was enough, surely, of the finest qualities, to cast his infirmities into the shade. And though, absolutely speaking, I have no great admiration to bestow upon him, either as a speculative or practical statesman; yet, when I compare him with the other men who had figured in public life in his country, I can find none whom I think his superior, none, perhaps, his equal.

pulse of the royal will, the King employed Lord Temple to inform as many as he thought fit of the peers of parliament, that those who should vote for the Indian Bill, he would take for his enemies. On the day of the second reading of the bill, the minister was left in a minority of seventy-nine to eighty-seven.

The outcry which was raised against this measure holds a considerable rank among the remarkable incidents in the history of England. It was a declaration, a vehement declaration, on the part of the King, and of the greatest portion of all the leading orders in the state, as well as of the body of the people, that the Commons House of Parliament, as now constituted, is altogether inadequate to the ends which it is meant to fulfil. Unless that acknowledgment was fully made, the outcry was groundless and preposterous.

The essence of the change which Mr. Fox proposed to introduce consisted in this, and in nothing but this: that the Board of Directors should be chosen, not by the owners of Company's stock, but by the House of Commons.

Surely, if the House of Commons were a fit instrument of Government, a better choice might be expected from the House of Commons, than from the crowd of East India Proprietors. The foundation on which the justice of the clamour had to rest, if any justice it contained, was this: that the House of Commons would act under a fatal subservience to the profligate views of the minister. But to suppose that the House of Commons would do this in one instance only, not in others, the motive being the same: that they would make a sacrifice of their duty to their country, in one of the most ruinous to it of almost all instances, while in other instances they were sure to perform it well, would be to adopt the language of children, or of that unhappy part of our species whose reason is not fit to be their guide. If the House of Commons is so circumstanced, as to act under motives sufficient to ensure a corrupt compliance with ministerial views, then, undoubtedly, the House of Commons is a bad organ for the election of Indian rulers. If it is not under such motives to betray the interests of the country to the views of ministers, then it is undoubtedly the best instrument of choice which the

country can afford: nor is there anything which can render it, compared with any other electing body, which could be formed in the country, unfit for this function, which does not, by necessity, imply an equal unfitness for all its peculiar functions: if it is unworthy to be trusted with the election of East India Directors, it is still less worthy to be trusted with the purse-strings of the nation: if there would be danger to the British people in the one case, the danger is far greater in the other.

A heart-felt conviction, that the House of Commons, as now constituted, is totally unworthy of trust, announced in the strongest of all possible terms, by the King, by the principal part of the aristocracy, of the whole, in short, of that part of the nation whose interests and ideas are in the strongest manner linked to monarchical and aristocratical privileges and distinctions, is of infinite importance; because it may be so employed as to make them ashamed of that opposition to reform, which, by so many selfish and mean considerations, they are in general engaged to maintain.

There is but one allegation, which appears capable of being employed to elude the force of this deduction: that the House of Commons would not act under a profligate subservience to the views of a minister, if subject only to the influence which was then at the command of the minister; but would be sure to do so, if subject to all that influence which would be created by adding the patronage of India.

This allegation, then, rests upon the assumption, that the profligate subservience of the House of Commons depends wholly upon the degree, more or less, of the matter of influence to which it is exposed: if the quantity to which it is exposed is sufficiently small, it will have no profligate subserviency: if the quantity to which it is exposed is sufficiently great, its profligate subserviency will be unbounded. Admit this: and is anything necessary, besides, to prove the defective constitution of that assembly? In taking securities against men, in their individual capacity, do we rest satisfied, if only small temptations to misconduct exist? Does not experience prove, that even small temptations are sufficient, where there is nothing to oppose them?

In the allegation is implied, that the House of Commons would, as not yet feeling the influence of Indian patronage, have, in choosing men for the Board of Direction, at that first time, chosen the best men possible; but these men, being the best men possible, would have employed the Indian patronage placed in their hands, to corrupt the House of Commons into a profligate subservience to the views of the minister. For what cause?

The analysis of the plea might, it is evident, be carried to a great extent, but it is by no means necessary; and for the best of reasons; because the parties who joined in predicting the future profligacy of the House, universally gave it up. The House of Commons, they said, is now is at this instant, that corrupt instrument, which the patronage of India applied to it in the way of influence would make it. The House of Commons, they maintained, was then at the beck of the minister; was, even then, in a state of complete subservience, even for the worst of all purposes, to the minister's views. Mr. Pitt said, "Was it not the principle, and declared avowal of this bill, that the whole system of Indian government should be placed in seven persons, and those under the immediate appointment of no other than the minister himself? He appealed to the sense and candour of the House, whether, in saying this, he was the least out of order? Could it be otherwise understood, or interpreted? That these seven men were not to be appointed solely by the minister."[1] On another occasion, he said, that he objected to Mr. Fox's bill, "because it created a new and enormous influence, by vesting in *certain nominees of the minister* all the patronage of the East."[2] Mr. W. Grenville (afterwards Lord Grenville) said, "The bill was full of blanks, and these blanks were to be filled by that House: it was talking a parliamentary language to say, the minister was to fill the blanks: and that the seven commissioners were the seven nominees of the minister: seven commissioners chosen, by parliament ostensibly, but in reality by the servants of the Crown, were to involve in the vortex of their authority, the whole treasures of India: these, poured forth like an

[1] Debate on Mr. Fox's motion for leave to bring in his East India Bills; Cobbett's Parl. Hist. xxiii. 1210.

[2] Debate on the state of the nation; Cobbett's Parl. Hist. xxiv. 271.

irresistible flood upon this country, would sweep away our liberties, and all that we could call our own."[1] But if parliament would choose these seven commissioners at the beck of the minister; what is there they would not do at the beck of the minister! The conclusion is direct, obvious, and irresistible. Upon the solemn averments of these statesmen, the question is for ever set at rest.[2]

At the same time, it must be admitted, that the bills of Mr. Fox, many and celebrated as the men were who united their wisdoms to compose them, manifest a feeble effort in legislation. They afford a memorable lesson; because they demonstrate, that the authors of them, however celebrated for their skill in speaking, were not remarkable for the powers of thought. For the right exercise of the powers of government in India, not one new security was provided; and it would not be very easy to prove, that any strength was added to the old.

I. There was nothing in Mr. Fox's number *Seven*, more than in the Company's number *Twenty-four*, to ensure good government: and by this change of one electing assembly for another, the nation decided, and under the present constitution of the House of Commons decided well, that bad would only be improved into worse.

If such was the nature of the fundamental expedient, it cannot be imagined that the subsidiary ones would impart

[1] Debate on Mr. Fox's motion, ut supra, Cobbett's Parl. Hist. xxiii. 1229.

[2] The character here given of the House of Commons is an exaggerated picture of defects inseparable from its constitution at any period, inseparable from the constitution of all popular assemblies, and proofs not of profligacy; the term is absurd; but of the bounded extent of human wisdom and virtue. No assembly, comprising a number of persons of various tempers, prejudices, education, intelligence and interests, will ever be capable of considering any question whatever upon its own merits alone, and, according to their unbiassed judgment; they will and must act under various influences, the combination of which constitutes the grand element of all parliamentary opinion —party. The ministerial party, be the House of Commons sublimated to the utmost tenuity of purification by the alembic of reform, must always comprise in it elements of strength which may be more than a match for the utmost efforts of the opposition, and it must, therefore, ever be an object of prudent precaution to guard against their augmentation, either in number or efficiency. It was no universal conviction, therefore, that the House of Commons of 1783 was in a special degree unworthy of trust, which rendered the proposed ministerial accession of patronage so widely unpopular, but a reasonable jealousy of that additional influence which not only at that particular period, but in all time to come, in reformed or unreformed parliaments alike, must have accrued to the party of the minister from his monopoly of the East India patronage. It is taking a very circumscribed view of the measure to consider it only in relation to any particular state of the national representation: the objections to it are abstractedly valid at all seasons, and are founded on the constitution of parliament, and the nature of man.—W.

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a high degree of merit to the whole. If not absolutely nugatory, they were all feeble in the highest degree. What useful power of publicity, for example, was involved in transferring annually to the hands of the ministers a certain portion of Indian papers? A proper policy being established between the minister and his seven directors, they could present to parliament everything which favoured their own purposes, keep back everything which opposed them; and thence more effectually impose upon the nation. It seems, from many parts of the bill, to have been the opinion of its authors, that if they only gave their commands to the rulers of India to behave well, they would be sure to do so. As if there were no channel of corruption but one, it was held sufficient, if the directors, while in office, were prohibited from holding places of profit under themselves, and places of profit during pleasure under the King.

The seven directors, in the case of some of their most important decisions, were bound to record their reasons; a most admirable security where the *public* are to see those reasons. Where they are to be seen only by the parties themselves, and by those who have like sinister interests with themselves, as in this case by the minister, they are obviously no security at all.

Good conduct in any situation depends upon the motives to good conduct, which operate in that situation; and upon the chance for intelligence and probity in the individuals by whom it is held. That, in regard to motives, as well as intelligence and probity, the public had less security for good conduct, in the case of the ministerial commissioners, than in the case of Directors chosen by the Company, will be fully made to appear, when we come to examine the nature of the ministerial board erected by Mr. Pitt; a board which, in all those particulars, is very nearly on a level with that of Mr. Fox.

II. With regard to that part of the scheme which was intended to improve the state of administration in India, no change in the order and distribution of the powers of government was attempted. The plan of the machinery, therefore, that is, the whole of its old tendency to evil, described by Mr. Fox as enormous, was to remain the same. All, it is evident, that, upon this foundation, could

be aimed at, was to palliate; and, in the choice of his palliatives, Mr. Fox was not very successful.

Merely to forbid evil, in a few of the shapes in which it had previously shown itself, was a slender provision for improvement, when the causes of evil remained the same as before; both because there were innumerable other shapes which it might assume, and because forbidding, when there is no chance, or little chance, of harm from disobedience, is futile, as a barrier against strong temptations.

To lessen the power of the Chief Ruler in selecting the immediate instruments of his government, was so far to ensure a weak and distracted administration. The sure effect of it was, to lessen the power of a virtuous ruler in obtaining assistance to good. And as the co-operation of the inferior servants, in the imputed plunder, embezzlement, and oppression, was secured, not by the power of the Governor-General to promote them, but by the common interest which they had in the profits of misrule; his not having the power to promote them was no security against a co-operation secured by other means.

In respect to sanctions, on which the efficiency of every enactment depends, Mr. Fox's bill provided two things: chance of removal, and prosecution at law; nothing else. In respect to chance of removal; as the effect of the bill was to render the minister absolute with regard to India, those delinquencies alone, which thwarted the views of the minister, created any danger; those which fell in with his views were secure of protection. From prosecution at law, under tribunals and laws such as the English, a man who wields, or has wielded the powers of government, has it is obvious from long experience, very little to fear.

It really is, therefore, hardly possible for anything in the shape of a law, for regulating the whole government of a great country, to be more nugatory than the bill of Mr. Fox.

On the great expedient for ensuring the rights of the native subjects, borrowed from Mr. Francis, the scheme of declaring the land unchangeable, and the renters hereditary; we have already made some and shall hereafter have occasion to make other remarks, to show that it is

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founded upon false ideas, and productive of evil rather than good.

The prohibition of monopolies and presents, and some other minor regulations, were beneficial, as far as they went.

If this project of a constitution for India proves not the existence of a vast portion of intellect among those by whom it was framed, the objections of those who had only to criticise, not to invent, appear to prove the existence of a still smaller portion among its opponents. Not one of their objections was drawn from the real want of merits in the plan; from its total inefficiency, as a means, to secure the ends, at which it pretended to aim. They were all drawn from collateral circumstances; and, what is more, almost all were unfounded.

The danger to the constitution, in giving the appointment of Directors to the House of Commons, was the subject of the principal cry. But it has been shown that this could have no injurious effect, unless the House of Commons were already perverted from its supposed ends, and the goodness of the constitution destroyed.

Much rhetoric was employed to enforce the obligation created by the "chartered rights of men." But it was justly observed, That the term, "chartered rights of men," was a phrase full of affectation and ambiguity; That there were two species of charters: one, where some of the general rights of mankind were cleared or confirmed by the solemnity of a public deed; the other, where these general rights were limited for the benefit of particular persons: That charters of the last description were strictly and essentially trusts, and ought to expire whenever they substantially vary from the good of the community, for the benefit of which they are supposed to exist.

The loss of the India bill, in the House of Lords, was the signal for the dissolution of the ministry. At the head of the new arrangement was placed Mr. Pitt. On the 14th of January, 1784, he moved for leave to bring in a bill on the affairs of India. A majority of the House of Commons still supported his opponent, and his bill was rejected. Mr. Fox gave notice to the House of his inten-

tion to bring in a second bill. On the 10th of March, however, parliament was dissolved; and in the new House of Commons the minister obtained a decided majority The re-introduction of his India bill could now wait his convenience.

The new ministry had been aided in the triumph obtained over their opponents, by all the powers of the East India House, who had petitioned against the bills of Mr. Fox, had employed every art to excite the public disapprobation, and had exerted themselves at the general election to swell the ministerial majority. The minister owed a grateful return. The Company's sale of teas was a principal source of their income. It had of late been greatly reduced by the powers of smuggling. As high price afforded the encouragement of smuggling, a sufficient reduction would destroy it. Any part of the monopoly profit would not have been a pleasant sacrifice to the Company. The public duties, they thought, were the proper source of reduction: and it pleased the minister to agree with them. On the 21st of June, he moved a series of resolutions, as the foundation for an act, which soon after passed, and is known by the name of the Commutation Act. The duties on tea, about 50 per cent., were reduced to 12½ per cent. It was estimated that a diminution would thence arise of 600,000*l.* in the public revenue. Under the style and title of a commutation, an additional window-tax, calculated at an equal produce, was imposed.

To relieve their pecuniary distress, the Company, as we have seen, had applied to parliament for leave to borrow 500,000*l.*, and for a further aid, afterwards of 300,000*l.* in Exchequer bills. They had also prayed for a remission of the duties which they owed to the public, to the amount of nearly a million. They were bound not to accept, without consent of the Lords of the Treasury, bills drawn on them from India, beyond the annual amount of 300,000*l.* Bills, however, had arrived from Bengal, to the amount of nearly one million and a half beyond that amount. For these distresses some provision had been made before the dissolution of the preceding parliament. The minister now introduced a bill, to afford a further relief in regard to the payment of duties, and to enable them to accept

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1784. In other pecuniary adventures, the receipts upon the capital embarked are in proportion to the gains. If profit has been made, profit is divided. If no profit, no division. Instead of profit, the East India Company had incurred expense, to the amount of an enormous debt. It was proposed that they should still have a dividend, though they were to borrow the money which they were to divide, or to obtain it, extracted, in the name of taxes, out of the pockets of their countrymen. A bill was passed which authorized a dividend of eight per cent. In defence of the measure, it was urged, that unless the dividend was upheld, price of India stock would fall. But why should the price of India stock, more than the price of anything else, be upheld, by taxing the people? It was also urged, that not the fault of the Company, but the pressure arising from the warlike state of the nation, produced their pecuniary distress. If that was a reason, why was not a similar relief awarded to every man that suffered from that cause? The arguments are without foundation; but from that time to this they have supported an annual taxation of the English people, for the convenience of the parties on whom the government of India depends.

At last, Mr. Pitt's bill, for the better government of the affairs of the East India Company, was again introduced; and being now supported by a competent majority, was passed into an act, on the 13th of August, 1784. With some modification, it was the same with the bill which the former House of Commons had rejected.

The Courts of Directors and Proprietors remained, in form, the same as before. The grand innovation consisted, in the erection of what was called a Board of Control. This, together with, 1. The creation of a Secret Committee of Directors; 2. A great diminution in the powers of the Court of Proprietors; 3. A provision for a disclosure of the amount of the fortunes brought home by individuals who had been placed in offices of trust in India; 4. The institution of a new tribunal for the trial and punishment of the offences liable to be committed in India; constituted the distinctive features of this legis-

lative exertion; and are the chief particulars, the nature of which it is incumbent upon the historian to disclose. The other provisions were either of subordinate efficacy, or corresponded with provisions in the bills of other reformers, which have already been reviewed.

I. The Board of Control was composed of six Members of the Privy Council, chosen by the King, of whom the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and one of the principal secretaries of state were to be two; in the absence of whom, the senior of the remaining four was to preside. In point of fact, the whole business has rested with that senior; the other commissioners being seldom called to deliberate, or even for form's sake to assemble. The senior is known by the name of the President of the Board of Control, and is essentially a new Secretary of State; a secretary for the Indian department. Of this pretended Board and real Secretary, the sphere of action extended to the whole of the civil and military government, exercised by the Company; but not to their commercial transactions. Its duties, very ill defined, or rather not defined at all, were adumbrated, in the following vague and uncertain terms: "From time to time, to check, superintend and control, all acts, operations, and concerns, which in any wise relate to the civil or military government, or revenues, of the territories and possessions of the said United Company in the East Indies." All correspondence, relative to the government, was to be communicated to the Board; including all letters from India, as soon as received, and all letters, orders, or instructions intended for India, before they were sent. The Board was also to be furnished with copies of all proceedings of the Courts of Directors and Proprietors; and to have access to the Company's papers and records. By one clause, it was rendered imperative on the Court of Directors to yield obedience to every command of the Board, and to send out all orders and instructions to India, altered and amended at the pleasure of the Board. On the second introduction of the bill, when a sure majority made the minister bold, a power was added by which, in cases of secrecy, and cases of urgency; cases of which the Board itself was to be the judge; the Board of Control might frame and transmit orders to India without the inspection of the Directors.

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It was only in the case of a doubt whether the orders of the Board of Control related or did not relate to things within the sphere of the civil and military government, that the Directors were allowed an appeal. Such a doubt they were to refer to the King in Council. An appeal from the King's Council, to the King in Council, was an appeal from men to themselves.

Of two bodies, when one has the right of unlimited command, and the other is constrained to unlimited obedience, the latter has no power whatsoever, but just as much, or as little, as the former is pleased to allow. This is the relative position of the Board of Control, and the East India Company. The powers of the Board of Control convert the Company's Courts into Agents of its will. The real, the sole governing power of India is the Board of Control, and it only makes use of the Court of Directors as an instrument, or as a subordinate office, for the management of details, and the preparation of business for the cognizance of the superior power.

The real nature of the machine cannot be disputed, though hitherto its movements have been generally smooth, and the power is considerable which appears to remain in the hands of the Directors. The reasons are clear. Whenever there is not a strong motive to interfere with business of detail, there is always a strong motive to let it alone. There never yet has been any great motive to the Board of control to interfere; and of consequence it has given itself little trouble about the business of detail, which has proceeded with little harm, and as little benefit, from the existence of that Board. So long as the Court of Directors remain perfectly subservient, the superior has nothing further to desire. Of the power which the Directors retain, much is inseparable from the management of detail.

The grand question relates to the effects upon the government of India, arising from an authority like the Board of Control, acting through such a subordinate and ministerial instrument as the Court of Directors.

It is evident, that, so far as the Directors are left to themselves, and the Board of Control abstain from the trouble of Management, the government of India is left to the imperfections, whatever they were, of the previous

condemned system, as if no Board of Control were in existence. In that part of the business, in which the Board takes a real share, it is still to be inquired, what chance exists, that better conduct will proceed from the Board of Control, than would have proceeded from the Court of Directors?

Good conduct in public men arises from three causes; from knowledge or talent: from the presence of motives to do good; and the absence of motives to do evil.

I. Few men will contend that the lord, or other person, whose power, or powerful kinsman, may recommend him for President of the Board of Control, is more likely to possess knowledge or talent, than the Court of Directors. That which the practical state of the British constitution renders the presiding principle in directing the choice of men for offices wherein much either of power or money is to be enjoyed, affords a much greater chance for ignorance than knowledge. Of all the men who receive education, the men who have the most of parliamentary interest are the least likely to have any unusual portion of talent; and as for appropriate knowledge, or an acquaintance in particular with Indian affairs, it cannot be expected that the Board of Control should, except by a temporary and rare contingency, be fit to be compared with the Court of Directors; besides, it would have been easy, by laying open the direction to men of all descriptions, and by other simple expedients, to increase exceedingly the chance for talent in the Court of Directors.

II. If the Board of Control, then is more likely than the Court of Directors to govern India well, the advantage must arise from its situation in regard to motives: motives of two sorts; motives to application; and motives to probity. Both the Board of Control, and the Court of Directors, are destitute of these motives to a high degree; and it is a matter of some nicety to make it appear on which side the deficiency is most extraordinary.

Motives to application, on the part of the Board of Control, can be discovered none. And application, accord-

ingly, such as deserves the name, a careful pursuit of knowledge, with incessant meditation of the ends and the means, the Board has not even thought of bestowing. If Mr. Dundas be quoted as an objection, it is only necessary to explain the circumstances of the case. The mind of Mr. Dundas was active and meddling, and he was careful to exhibit the appearance of a great share in the government of India; but what was it, as President of the Board of Control, that he ever did? He presented, as any body might have presented, the Company's annual budget, and he engrossed an extraordinary share of their patronage. But I know not any advice which he ever gave, for the government of India, that was not either very obvious, or wrong.

The Institution of the Board of Control, as it gave no motives to application in the members of that Board, so it lessened prodigiously the motives to application in the Court of Directors. Before the existence of the Board of Control, the undivided reputation of good measures, the undivided ignominy of bad, redounded to the Court of Directors. The great sanction of public opinion acted upon them with undivided energy. Men are most highly stimulated to undergo the pains of labour, when they are most sure of reaping the fruits of labour; most surely discouraged from labour, when they are least sure of reaping its advantages; but, in taking pains to understand the grounds of action, and laboriously to frame measures adapted to them, the Court of Directors, before their subjugation to the Board of Control, were sure of reaping the fruits of their labours in the execution of their schemes. What motive, on the other hand, to the laborious consideration of measures of government, remained, when all the fruits of knowledge and of wisdom might be rejected by the mere caprice of the President of the Board of Control?

Such is the sort of improvement, a retrograde improvement, in respect to knowledge or talent, and in respect to application, which the expedient of a Board of Control introduced into the government of India.

It only remains that we examine it in relation to pro-

bity; and inquire, whether the men who compose it are subject to the action of stronger, or weaker motives, to the exercise of official probity, than the Court of Directors.

There are two sorts of motives, on which, in regard to probity, the conduct of every man depends: by the one he is attracted to virtue; by the other repelled from it.

In regard to attracting motives, very little is provided to operate either upon the Board of Control, or the Court of Directors. The sanction of public opinion, the credit of good, and the discredit of bad conduct, is one source: and it does not appear that there is any other. In the first place, it ought to be remembered, as a law of human nature, that the influence of this sanction is weakened, or more truly annihilated, to any important purpose, by division. Whatever might have been its force, upon either the Board of Control, or the Court of Directors, acting alone, it is infinitely diminished when they act both together; and, by sharing, go far to destroy responsibility.

For the salutary influence of public opinion, both the Board of Control, and the Court of Directors, are unfavourably situated; but it will probably, without much dispute, be allowed, that the Court of Directors is the least unfavourably situated. So long as they acted by themselves, the Court of Directors were exposed, without shelter, to the public eye. The President of the Board of Control is the mere creature of the minister, existing by his will, confounded with the other instruments of his administration, sheltered by his power, and but little regarded as the proper object either of independent praise, or of independent blame.

With regard to motives repelling from probity, in other words, the temptations of improbity, to which the Board of Control and the Court of Directors are respectively exposed, the following propositions are susceptible of proof:—That almost all the motives of the deleterious sort, to which the Court of Directors stand exposed, are either the same, or correspond, with those to which the Board of Control is exposed. That those to which the

Court of Directors are exposed, and the Board of Control is not exposed, are of inconsiderable strength: that those to which the Board of Control is exposed, and the Court of Directors are not exposed, are of great and uncommon strength: and that by the conjunct action of the two bodies, the deleterious motives of the one do not destroy those of the other, but combine with them, and increase the power of the whole.

It is to be observed, that neither the Board of Control, nor the Court of Directors have any *direct* interest in the misgovernment of India. Their ambition is not gratified by the unnecessary wars, nor their pockets filled by the oppressions and prodigalities of the India rulers. In as far as the Directors are proprietors of Indian stock, and in as far as good government has a tendency to increase the surplus produce of India, and hence the dividend upon stock, the Court of Directors have an interest in the good government of India. The Board of Control, as such, has necessarily no such interest; in this respect; therefore, it is inferior to the Court of Directors.

If exempt from motives of the *direct* kind, to them is-government of India, it remains to inquire what are the motives of the *indirect* kind, to the action of which the Board of Control, and the Court of Directors, are severally and respectively exposed.

In the first place, we recognise the love of ease; an incessant force, and for that reason of the most potent agency in human affairs. Bating the cases in which the result depends not upon the general qualities of the species, but the accidental ones of the individual, this is a motive which it is not easy to find other motives sufficient to oppose; which, in general, therefore, prevails and over-rules. This is a motive, to the counteraction of which, there is scarcely anything provided, in the case either of the Board of Control, or of the Court of Directors. To a great extent, therefore, it is sure to govern them. Provided things go on in the beaten track, without any unusual stoppage or disturbance, things will very much be left to themselves.

Little, however, as is the application to business, which

can rationally be expected from the Court of Directors, still less can be looked for on the part of the Board of Control, where either hereditary idleness and inefficiency will preside; or the mind of the President will be engrossed by those pursuits and struggles on which the power of the ministry, or the consequence of the individual, more immediately depends. The consequence is certain; whenever aversion to the pain and constraint of labour governs the superintendent, the interest of the subordinates, in every branch, is naturally pursued at the expense of the service, or of the ends which it is the intention of the service to fulfil.

Beside the love of ease, which everywhere is one of the chief causes of misgovernment, the motives to the abuse of patronage, and to a connivance at delinquency in India, seem almost the only deleterious motives, to the operation of which either the Board of Control, or the Court of Directors, are exposed.

In regard to patronage, the conduct of the Court of Directors will be found to exhibit a degree of excellence which other governments have rarely attained. In sending out the youths who are destined for the different departments of the service, the Directors have been guided, no doubt, by motives of affection and convenience; but all youths go out to the lowest stations in their respective departments, and can ascend only by degrees. The rule of promotion by seniority has sometimes been too rigidly observed; seldom, comparatively, violated by favouritism. The Directors, who send out their relatives and connexions, have very often retired from the direction, before the youths whom they have patronized are of sufficient age or standing in the service, to occupy the stations in which the power of producing the greater evils is enjoyed.

But, as the constitution of the Court of Directors has prevented any considerable abuse of patronage; so the situation of the British minister, depending as he does upon parliamentary interest, creates, it may, without much fear of contradiction, be affirmed, a stronger motive to the abuse of patronage, than, under any other form of government, was ever found to exist. In this respect, good government is far less exposed to violation from an insti-

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tution such as that of the Court of Directors, than an institution such as that of the Board of Control.[1]

To connivance at delinquency in India, the Directors may be supposed to be led by three sorts of motives:

1. Inasmuch as they may have been delinquents themselves.

2. Inasmuch as they may send out sons and other relatives, who may profit by delinquency.

3. Inasmuch as delinquents may be proprietors of India stock, and hence exert an influence on the minds of Directors.

1. The motive to connive at any delinquency, in which a man is to have no profit, because he himself has formerly been delinquent in a similar way, must be regarded as a feeble, if any motive at all. Experience proves it. Clive was not less violent against the undue emoluments of the Company's servants, because he had drawn them so copiously himself. If the Court of Directors be inferior in this respect to the Board of Control, it must be allowed to be an inferiority easily compensated by other advantages. Besides, if a man must be supposed to sympathize with delinquency, because he has been a delinquent himself, the disposition is pretty nearly the same which leads to delinquency in India and in England; and hence a danger fully as great, of finding this kind of sympathy at the Board of Control, as in the Court of Directors.

2. The Directors may send out sons and nephews. So may the Secretary of State for the India department, the President of the Board of Control.

3. East India delinquents may operate on the minds of Directors through influence in the Court of Proprietors. East India delinquents may also operate on the minds of ministers through parliamentary influence. And the latter operation, it is believed, will certainly appear to be, out

[1] "With respect to the abuse of patronage," said Mr. Windham, in his famous speach (May 26th, 1809) on Mr. Curwen's Reform Bill, "one of those by which the interests of countries will in reality most suffer, I perfectly agree, that it is likewise one, of which the government, properly so called, that is to say, persons in the highest offices, are as likely to be guilty and from their opportunities more likely to be guilty than any others. Nothing can exceed the greediness, the selfishness, the insatiable voracity, the profligate disregard of all claims from merit or services, that we often see in persons in high official stations." Parliamentary Debates, xiv. 758; for publication in which the speech was written and prepared by the author.

of all comparison, the stronger, and more dangerous operation of the two.

In point of fact, the influence exerted upon the Directors through the Court of Proprietors has never been great. The Court of Directors have habitually governed the Court of Proprietors; not the Court of Proprietors the Court of Directors. The Company's servants returned from India have not been remarkable for holding many votes in the General Court.

The powerful operation of ministerial support extends to every man in India, whose friends have a parliamentary interest in England. The men who have the greatest power of doing mischief in India, are the men in the highest stations of the government. These are sure to be generally appointed from views of ministerial interest. And the whole force of the motives, whatever they are, which operate to their appointment, must operate likewise to connivance at their faults.

In every one of the circumstances, therefore, upon which good government depends, the Board of Control, when examined, is found to be still more defective, as an instrument of government, than the Court of Directors, the incompetency of which to the right government of India, had been so loudly and so universally proclaimed.

What will be said in its favour is this: That the Board of Control and the Court of Directors check each other. To this end we must of necessity suppose, that where the Court of Directors may have an interest in misgovernment, the Board of Control will have no such interest, and in that case will not allow the Court of Directors to pursue their interest; that, in like manner, where the Board of Control may have an interest in misgovernment, the Court of Directors will have no such interest, and in that case will not allow the Board of Control to pursue their interest.

According to this supposed mode of operation, the interests of all the governing parties are defeated. The theory unhappily forgets that there is another mode of operation; in which their interests may be secured. That is the mode, accordingly, which stands the best chance of being preferred. It is a very obvious mode; the one party having leave to provide for itself, on condition that

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it extend to the other a similar indulgence. The motives to misgovernment, under this plan, are increased by aggregation, not diminished by counteraction. Such are the greater part of the pretended checks upon misgovernment which have ever been established in the world; and to this general law the Board of Control and Court of Directors do not, certainly, form an exception.

There is still another circumstance; and one to which the greatest importance will doubtless be attached. So long as the government of India was independent of the minister, he had no interest in hiding its defects; he might often acquire popularity by disclosing them. The government of India, in these circumstances, was subject to a pretty vigilant inspection from Parliament. Inquiries of the most searching description had twice been instituted, and carried into its innermost recesses. The persons charged with the duties of government in India, acted under a full sense of the attention with which they were watched, and of the exposure to which their conduct was liable. A beneficial jealousy was preserved alive, both in parliament, and in the nation. At that time both erred, perhaps, by too much, rather than too little, of a disposition to presume among their countrymen in India the existence of guilt: a disposition far more salutary, notwithstanding, than a blind confidence, which, by presuming that every thing is right, operates powerfully to make every thing wrong. A great revolution ensued, when the government of India was made dependent upon the minister, and became in fact an incorporated part of his administration. Then it was the interest of the minister to prevent inspection; to lull suspicion asleep; to ward off inquiry; to inspire a blind confidence; to praise incessantly the management of affairs in India; and, by the irresistible force of his influence, make other men praise it. The effects are instructive. From the time of the acquisition of the territorial revenues of Bengal, parliament and the nation had resounded with complaints of the Indian administration. The loudness of these complaints had continually increased, till it became the interest of the minister to praise. From that very moment complaint was extinguished; and the voice of praise was raised in its stead. From that time to this, no efficient

inquiry into the conduct of the government has ever taken place. Yet, in the frame of the government, no one new security can be pointed out, on which a rational man would depend for any improvement; and the incumbrances of the East India Company have continued to increase.[1]

II. It was ordained by this act, that the Court of Directors should choose a Committee of Secrecy, not to exceed the number of three. As often as the Board of Control should frame orders which required secrecy, they were to transmit these orders, without communicating them to the Court of Directors; and receive answers to them under the same concealment. This was a regulation which enabled the Board of Control and the Committee of Secrecy, to annihilate, as often as they pleased, the power of the Court of Directors. With respect to the government of India, the Court of Directors might be regarded as, in fact, reduced to three. Of this subsidiary regulation, the effect was to render more complete the powers of the Board of Control.

III. It was ordained, that no act or proceeding of the Court of Directors, which had received the approbation of the Board of Control, should be annulled, or in any way affected, by the Court of Proprietors. This was a provision, by means of which, as often as it pleased the

[1] The assertion that complaint was extinguished by the new bill, is somewhat incompatible with the fact, that it was immediately followed by the impeachment of Hastings. It is also possible, that that very impeachment exercised more influence than the bill. So impotent a conclusion, after such pompous note of preparation was well calculated to disgust the public, and teach them the salutary lesson of listening in future to complaints with caution and distrust. It would, however, have been more generous to have believed that complaint ceased because grievances ceased; not because the minister had an interest in silencing the aggrieved. And whether he had or not an interest in so doing, the position in which he was now placed was very unfavourable for such a purpose. The author has omitted to notice the origin of a new principle in all questions affecting India, which is, an English House of Commons is more likely to operate as a stimulus to attention than any disinterested tenderness for the condition of the people of India. The administration is now responsible for the foreign and domestic policy of India. This is quite enough to provoke jealousy, to animate inquiry, to keep open the eyes of opposition in a persevering vigil, which the absence of all party-feeling would be too soporific a state to maintain. So far, therefore, was the institution of the Board of Control from administering a narcotic to the representatives of the people in Indian questions, it had a tendency to supply them with new inducements to vivacity. That it failed so to do, that no more instances of public ingratitude welcomed the return of the Governor-Generals, who succeeded Warren Hastings, is to be attributed in candour and in truth to the extinction of all pretext for a similar abuse of the power of the Parliament, as well as to an improvement in the spirit of the House, and to a more extensive knowledge of the nature of our Indian Empire, and the difficulties of its administration, amongst the educated portion of the people;—W.

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Board of Control, and the Court of Directors, they could annihilate all direct power of the Court of Proprietors. By these several regulations, for more and more lessening the number of persons in whom any efficient part of the power of the East India Company remained, the facility of using it as a tool of the minister, was more and more increased.

IV. The next important provision in the bill of Mr. Pitt, was that by which it was rendered obligatory upon the servants of the Company, to give an inventory of the property which they brought from India. If the undue pursuit of wealth was there the grand cause of delinquency, this undoubtedly was a regulation of no ordinary value. When the amount of a man's acquisitions in India was known, comparison would take place between his acquisitions and his lawful means of acquiring; and the great sanction of popular opinion would operate upon him with real effect. The difficulty of convicting the delinquent would thus be exceedingly diminished; and this prospect of punishment would contribute powerfully to save him from crime.

To the credit of the authors of the bill be it spoken, means of far greater than the usual efficacy were employed to force out the real state of the facts, and to defeat the efforts of concealment or deception. The parties were rendered subject to personal examination upon oath; and, for false statement, to the forfeiture of all their goods, to imprisonment, and incapacitation. Information tending to the detection of falsehood was called for by the greatest rewards.[1]

So important an instrument of good government as this, ought not, assuredly, to be confined to India. Wherever the pursuit of wealth is liable to operate to the produc-

[1] These clauses were repealed, only two years afterwards, in the amended Bill, by Act 26, Geo. III. cap. lvi., and, notwithstanding the commendation bestowed upon them in the text, most justly; for as even Burke, although he opposed some of the amendments, observed of the original law, which rendered every individual who had been in India accountable for his fortune, it was incongruous with the national character, a violation of national rights, unbecoming to the legislature, and disgraceful to the country; it afforded every subterfuge which villany could desire, and exposed honesty alone to ridicule and contempt." The orator treated the following scheme, for the establishment of a Special Tribunal for Indian Deliquencies, with equal severity. All that had been said in its condemnation "fell short of its turpitude; it had no authority, example, similitude, or precedent, except perhaps the Star-Chamber of detestable memory." Parliamentary History, xxv. p. 1276.—W.

tion, in any degree, of bad government, there undoubtedly it ought to exist.

V. A new tribunal was constituted, "for the prosecuting and bringing to speedy and condign punishment British subjects guilty of extortion, and other misdemeanours, while holding offices in the service of the King or Company in India." The Judicature was composed of one judge from each of the common law courts in Westminster Hall, chosen by his Court; four peers, and six members of the House of Commons, chosen, after an operose method, by their respective houses of parliament.

Of the procedure, according to which justice was, in this channel, to be administered, the only part which it is here material to notice, is that which regards its powerful instrument, Evidence.

For more effectually opening the sources of evidence, it was ordained, that witnesses should be compelled, by punishment as for a misdemeanor, to attend, and, by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of the Court, to give evidence. The Commissioners or judges might send for papers, persons, and records, and commit to prison for all prevarication.

The punishment of offences committed in India, by trial in England, conducted under the rules of evidence mischievously established in the English courts, was impracticable, and the attempt absurd. This important truth seems, in part at least, to have been now very clearly perceived by the legislature; and an attempt was made, very feeble indeed, and far from commensurate with the evil, to remedy a defect of the law; a disgusting defect, which ensured, or little less than ensured, impunity to one of the highest orders of crimes.

"Whereas the provisions made by former laws" (such are the words of the statute,) "for the hearing and determining in England offences committed in India, have been found ineffectual, by reason of the difficulty of proving in this kingdom matters done there," it was enacted, that witnesses should be examined in India, by the competent judges; that their testimony should be taken down in writing, and that, when transmitted to England, it should be received as competent evidence by the tribunal now to be established. It was further enacted, "in order"

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(says the statute) "to promote the ends of justice, in ascertaining facts committed at so great a distance from this country, by such evidence as the nature of the case will render practicable," that all writings which might have passed between the Company and their servants in India, might, as far as they related to the facts in question, be read, and their evidence, as far as to the Court might appear to weigh upon the question, should be received. And also, upon the prayer of either of the parties, power was given of obtaining the examination, upon interrogatories, before a commissioner duly appointed, of absent witnesses, the depositions of whom, in this manner procured, should be admitted as evidence.

Of this important provision in the East India bill of Mr. Pitt, the nature will appear, if we consider, first the necessity for it, and next its adaptation to the ends which it had in view.

1. The necessity for it implies, that there was no tribunal, as yet existing in this kingdom, which was adequate for the purpose of punishing and repressing crimes committed in India; because, if there was any such tribunal, no other, for a purpose which might have been answered without it, ought to have been called into existence. By enacting, therefore, a law for the creation of this new tribunal, the legislature of the country, with all the solemnity and weight of legislation, declared, that, for the punishment of crimes of the description here in question, the other tribunals of the kingdom, the courts of law, the courts of equity, and even the high court, as it is called, of parliament, are unfit. In what respect, unfit? Not merely for their absurd exclusion of such evidence as it was ordained that the new tribunal should receive. Because, had this been the only objection, it might have been easily removed, by simply prescribing what sort of evidence they ought to receive. They were, therefore, according to the declaration of the legislature, unfit on other grounds, and these so fundamental, that no superficial change could remove the unfitness.

This declaration is of very great extent. For if the tribunals, previously existing, were all, even with such rules for the admission of evidence, as the legislature might have compelled them to observe, unfit to try and to punish,

the crimes of high functionaries in India, they were equally unfit to try and to punish the crimes of high functionaries in England. The crimes of high functionaries are not one sort of thing in England, another sort of thing in India. They are the same sort of thing in both countries. And the only difference is, that the means of proof are to be brought in one case from a greater distance.

That the courts of law and equity are not tribunals by which the crimes of high functionaries can be repressed, was already the doctrine of the constitution; since it appointed the method of impeachment before the high court of parliament. The present declaration of the legislature bore, then, particularly, only upon the method of impeachment. That the declaration was just, in regard to the method of impeachment, if any doubt till then could possibly have remained, was made appear, according to the confession of all parties, even in parliament, a few years afterwards, by the trial of Mr. Hastings.

We may then proceed upon it as a fact, fully established by experience, and solemnly recognised by the legislature, that, as far as law is concerned, there is impunity, almost or altogether perfect, to the crimes of high functionaries in England.

2. If we consider the adaptation of this tribunal of Mr. Pitt to the ends which it had in view, we shall first perceive that it was so constituted as to be an instrument in the hands of the minister, and sure to do whatever could be done with any tolerable degree of safety, to secure his objects, whatever they might be.

It consisted of two parts; three judges sent from the three courts of common law; and ten members from the houses of parliament. The subservience of the judges of the common-law courts to the minister, or to the master of the minister, is the doctrine of one of the most remarkable parts of the British constitution; the trial by jury. If it were not for the wrong bias to which the judges of England are liable, and all biases are trifling compared with the bias towards the Court, the institution of a jury would not only be useless, but hurtful. And if this be the doctrine of the constitution, there is assuredly none of its doctrines, which an experience more full and

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complete, an experience more nearly unvarying, can be adduced to confirm.

Such is the state of the case, in as far as regards that part of the proposed tribunal, consisting of the ordinary judges. With regard to that part which consisted of members chosen by the two houses of parliament, the case is cleared by the doctrine of the authors of the bill themselves. Mr. Pitt and his friends maintained, and nobody affected to deny, that the members to be chosen by parliament for Mr. Fox's Directors, would be "nominees" of the minister. There was nothing which could give the minister a power of nomination in that, which he would not possess in the present case. The second class of the members of the tribunal would, therefore, be "nominees" of the minister.[1]

The subservience of the whole would for that reason be complete. So far only as it was the interest of the minister that justice should be well administered, so far only would there be the *intention* to administer it well. How far, even when it *had* the intention, it would have the *other* qualities requisite for the detection and punishment of the official offences of official men, would demand a long inquiry sufficiently to unfold. I must leave it to the reader's investigation. Enough has probably been said to give a correct, if not a complete, conception of this new expedient for the better government of India.

Such were the five principal provisions in the celebrated India bill of Mr. Pitt. Of other particulars, not many require to be mentioned; and for such as do, a few words will suffice.

[1] For some curious information on this subject, see a debate which took place in the House of Commons, on the 16th of February, 1785, on the positive fact, that a ministerial list of members to be balloted for on the very first choice for this new tribunal, was handed to members, by the door-keeper, at the door of the House. Cobbett's Parl. Hist. xxv. 1054—1060. After some experience, viz. on the 19th of March, 1787, Mr. Burke said, "that the new judicature was infinitely the worst sort of jury that could be instituted, because it had one of the greatest objections belonging to it that could belong to any panel. The members of it were nominated by the minister, and it was known soon after the commencement of every session who they were." Cobbett's Parl. Hist. xxvi. 748. Mr. Pitt said, "if the Right Hon. Gent. meant generally to insinuate, that, in every act of the House, the influence of the minister was prevalent, he should not attempt to enter into the question, nor did he think such an insinuation decent or respectful to parliament." This, if not an admission, was not far from it. The only other circumstance with which he attempted to contradict the assertion was this, that each gentleman gave in a list. True; but what list? The minister's list, or another.

As the increase of the patronage and influence of the minister was the foundation of the furious outcry, which had been raised against the plan of Mr. Fox, there was a great affectation of avoiding all increase of ministerial patronage, by the bill of Mr. Pitt. In particular, no salaries were annexed to the offices of President, or Members of the Board of Control; and it was stated, that these offices might always be filled, without increase of expense to the nation, or of influence to the Crown, by functionaries who enjoyed other places of profit. We shall afterwards see, that this was a mask; which it was not long thought necessary that the project should wear.

The patronage of India was left to the Directors, subject to the following inroads: that the nomination of the Commander-in-Chief, who should always be second in Council, should belong exclusively to the King; that the Governor-General, Presidents, and Members of all the Councils, should be chosen, subject to the approbation of the King; and that the King should have the power of recalling them.

When it is said that the patronage of the Company was left with the Directors, it can only, by any body, be meant, that it was *ostensibly* left. For it never can for one moment be doubted that whatsoever patronage is in the hands of the subordinate and obeying body, in *reality* belongs to the superordinate and commanding. To ministerial purposes in general the patronage of the East India House is the patronage of the minister: in all the departments subordinate to the minister a large portion of the patronage necessarily follows the superintendence of the details. And it is probable that, in the East India House, a less proportion of the patronage remains, not placed immediately at the command of the minister, than in the most immediate departments of his administration, those, for example, of the Admiralty, and the Commander-in-Chief.[1]

[1] Mr. Burke said, "The new bill (Mr. Pitt's) vested in the crown an influence paramount to any that had been created by the first bill (Mr. Fox's). It put the whole East India Company into the hands of the crown: and the influence arising from the patronage would be the more dangerous, as those who were to have the distribution of the whole, in reality, though perhaps not in name, would be removeable at the will and pleasure of the Crown." Cobbett's Parl. Hist. xxiv. 354. Mr. Fox said, "By whom is this Board of Superintendence to be appointed? Is it not by his Majesty? Is it not to be under his control? In how dreadful a point of view, then, must the very supposition of an agreement between this Board and the Court of Directors

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Such were the contrivances for improving that part of the machinery for the Indian government, which had its seat in England. For immediate operation upon the faults of that part of it which had its seat, by unavoidable necessity, in India, the provisions of Mr. Pitt coincided to a great degree with the palliatives of Mr. Fox. A control was given to the Governor-General and Council of Bengal over the other Presidencies. Aggressive wars, presents, and disregard of orders, were forbidden. The Zemindars who had been displaced, were to be restored, and their situation as much as possible rendered permanent; though nothing was said about their hereditary rights, or a tax incapable of augmentation. The debts of the Nabob of Arcot, and his disputes with the Raja of Tanjore, were to be taken into consideration, and a plan of adjustment was to be devised, by the Directors.

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strike every one who attends to it! Must not the existence of such a union extend the influence of the prerogative, by adding to it the patronage of the Company? Is it not giving power to the Sovereign for the ends of influence, and for the extension of that system of corruption which had been so justly reprobated?" Ibid. 305. Mr. Fox again said, "The last parliament, to their immortal honour, voted the influence of the Crown inconsistent with public liberty. The Right Hon. Gent., in consequence of that vote, finds it probably unequal to the great objects of his administration. He is, therefore, willing to take the present opportunity of making his court—where he knows such a doctrine as the above will never be acceptable—and the plain language of the whole matter now is—that the patronage of India must be appended to the executive power of this country, which otherwise will not be able to carry on schemes hostile to the constitution in opposition to the House of Commons." Ibid. 335.—To these authorities may be added that of the Court of Directors. In the "Reply to the Arguments against the Company's Claim," &c., dated, East India House, 19th January, 1805, it is affirmed, "The control and direction of Indian affairs is not with the Company; unless, indeed, it be argued, that *the small share of patronage left to them* constitutes power and influence: All the great wheels of the machine are moved by government at home, who direct and control the Company in all their principal operations in India." See State Papers in Asiat. Ann. Reg. for 1805, p. 201.

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